1. No.

The traffic stop and subsequent arrest did not violate the Suspects constitutional right under
the Fourth Amendment.
At issue is whether the Officers conduct of stopping the Suspects vehicle at the traffic
stop and his subsequent arrest violates the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure provided in the Fourth Amendment. In order for a search and seizure to be valid
under the Fourth Amendment, such search and seizure must be reasonable and the
police officer must obtain a warrant based on probable cause for making the search and
seizure. As per the Supreme Courts exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of
this constitutional provision is inadmissible in court. However, in the present case the
stopping of the Suspects car and his subsequent arrest are not in violation of the
constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The facts mention the application of
a state motor vehicle code to the Suspects activity. The state motor vehicle grants police
officers discretion to make an arrest for any traffic infraction including the violation of
state seat belt law. The Suspects failure to comply with the state seat belt law grants the
police officer a statutory basis for stopping and arresting him. It is irrelevant whether
such an arrest is based on a mere violation of the seat belt law has been made before or
not. Further the state motor vehicle code grants the police officer the authority to make
arrest of persons who fail to comply with the code. Hence, the police officers motive of
uncovering evidence relating to drug dealing by the Suspect does not make the arrest
invalid. Therefore, the Suspects constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment have
not been violated as the stop and arrest were both permissible under the state motor
vehicle code.

2. No, the Officers seizure of evidence from the Suspects car did not violate the Suspects
constitutional right.
At issue is whether the seizure of cocaine from the Suspects car violates the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure mentioned in the
Fourth Amendment. In order for search and seizure to be valid under the Fourth
Amendment, the police officer must obtain a warrant based on probable cause that the
evidence is reasonably likely to be found in the place for which such warrant has been
obtained. However, there exists exceptions to the warrant requirement. The exception of
plain view doctrine is applicable to the present facts. Plain view doctrine stipulates the
following requirements: (i) lawful access to the place from which the item can be plainly
seen; (ii) lawful access to the item itself and (iii) criminality of the item is immediately
apparent. Here, all three requirements are met in the following manner: (i) police officer
has lawful access to the Suspects car as he has violated the state motor vehicle code
and the police officer can, through plain view, recognize the clear plastic bag containing
the white powder on the front seat of the Suspects car; (ii) the item in question is the
clear plastic bag containing cocaine which is within the lawful access of the police officer
and (iii) criminality of cocaine as a drug is immediately apparent. Therefore, the
application of the plain view doctrine as an exception to the Fourth Amendment qualifies
the seizure of cocaine from the Suspects car as valid.
 Furthermore, on questioning the Suspect Are those drugs yours?, he replied saying:
No, the cocaine isnt mine. His identification of the drug acts as a probable cause for
the seizure. In the fact pattern, the Suspect is seated in an automobile and the Supreme
Court has in numerous cases held that if a police officer has probable cause to believe
that an automobile contains a seizable item, he may search the automobile without a
warrant. Thus, the application of the automobile exception to the facts render the seizure
of cocaine valid.

3. Yes, the Officers questioning of the Suspect violated the Suspects Miranda rights under the
Fifth Amendment.
At issue is whether the handcuffing and questioning of the Suspect by the police officer
violated Miranda rights of the Suspect. The handcuffing and questioning of the Suspect
will be characterised as custodial interrogation. Miranda Rights provide protection during
custodial interrogation when any statement or conduct the police knew or should have
known is likely to elicit an incriminating response. A suspect is considered to be in
custody when the atmosphere can be objectively characterised by police domination and
coercion. The questions likely to elicit an incriminating response from the Suspect qualify
for protection under the Fifth Amendment. Here, after the police officer had handcuffed
the Suspect and informed him of his arrest, the officer proceeded to question him. The
handcuffing triggered an element of police domination and coercion. The question about
the ownership of drugs was a pin-pointed question likely to elicit self-incriminating
response from the Suspect. Therefore, it can be said that the Officers questioning of the
Suspect violated his Miranda rights.

4. No, the Suspects confession to the Detective should not be suppressed.

At issue is whether the Suspects confession to the Detective be admissible or should it
be suppressed. Given the fact that the police officer has previously violated the
Suspects constitutional rights - his Miranda rights, the evidence obtained in violation of
this right is generally considered to be excluded from admission as evidence at trial.
However, there exist exceptions for such evidence. The fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is one such exception which is applicable in the present case. The doctrine
states that evidence obtained prior to the unconstitutional conduct is inadmissible to the
prosecutors case-in-chief. However, the Supreme Court has held that if police obtain an
unwarned confession from a suspect, warn the suspect and then re-question the
suspect, in such a case if there is break in the case of unwarned questioning and
warned questioning then incriminating statements obtained from the warned questioning
can be admissible. Here the facts show a break in the causal link between the police
officers questioning and the detectives question. While the former had violated the
Suspects Miranda rights, the later had explicitly warned the Suspect and the Suspect
had stated that he understood his Miranda rights before answering the Detectives
questions. Therefore, it can be said that such confession was not unconstitutional and
should be admissible as evidence at trial.
Furthermore, during his interaction with the Detective the Suspect started speaking
vaguely. He stated that I am not sure about this. Maybe I need a lawyer. Here is
equivocal behavior cannot be understood as a clear and explicit demand for his right to
counsel as granted by his Miranda rights. Thus, it is insufficient to suppress his
confessions made to the Detective.