PART IV ADMISSION TO PRACTICE who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be

20 CASE DIGESTS deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO (former Bar the general average in subsequent bar
confidant) examinations.

FACTS:
Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo
for disbarment.
1. Admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang
back to the respective examiners for re-
evalution or re-checking.
2. The five examiners admitted having re-
evaluated or re-checked the notebook to
him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he
has the authority to do the same and that
the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and was on the borderline
of passing.
3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971
bar exam because of Lanuevos move but
the exam results bears that he failed in 5
subjects namely in (Political, Civil,
Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having
charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
RULING:
The court disbarred Lanuevo has no authority to
request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of
examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to
the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He
does not a have any business evaluating the answers
of the examinees.
Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964,
candidates for admission to the bar must be of good
moral character. Galang has a pending criminal
cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when
he declared under oath that he had no pending
criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the
fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was
declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion
that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the
fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of the court on the petitions
of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts
primary prerogative to determine who may
be admitted to practice of law and,
therefore, in excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress
under this power are only minimum norms,
not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and
amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the
Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement
or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known It will be noted that the Constitution has not
as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar responsibilities concerning the admission to the
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside
1946-195170% in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has
1952 .71% not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would
1953..72% have nothing over which to exercise the power
1954..73% granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
1955..74% supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but
the authority and responsibility over the admission,
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
grade lower than 50%. attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested
in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that

PALE 1
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal
in the exercise of its primary power on the matter.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate
directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its judgment the need for
a better service of the legal profession requires it.
But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law is realized.
They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the
establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the
bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain
72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum
general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of
the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none,
PALE
and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
People v. Simplicio Villanueva
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
PAREDES, J.:
FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston
Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition
of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused invoking Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no
judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients."
ISSUE: WON City Attorney Fule was engaging in
private law practice.
HELD:
NO. The Court believes that the isolated appearance
of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of thesame kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self
outtothe public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that
in the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney
Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not
appear that he was being paid for his services or that
his appearance was in a professional capacity.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.
2

CONCEPCION DIA-AONUEVO v. MUN. JUDGE
BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAY
A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975
MUOZ PALMA, J.
FACTS:
Respondent, incumbent Municipal Judge of Tabaco,
Albay, faces this administrative complaint for
conduct unbecoming a judge on two counts: (1)
engaging in the practice of law, and (2) failure to
return promptly to complainant, Concepcion Dia-
Aonuevo, the money deposited with him.
Complainant, Dia-Aonuevo, claims to be a co-owner
of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of
riceland. This property was the object of a deed of
sale executed by the other co-owners owning only
one-third undivided portion of the property and
acknowledged before the respondent, Municipal
Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, as ex-officio notary public.
Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or
repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo
Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to
intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow
them to redeem the property and for that purpose
she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be
used to pay the vendee. Respondent agreed and
received the amount of P3,500.00 for which he
issued a receipt. Respondent sent a letter to Alfredo
Ong but the latter did not answer. A complaint was
filed for the annulment of sale of real property and
redemption with damages. This complaint was
prepared by "Eligio R. Berango & B.B. Bercacio &
Ass." as counsel for the plaintiffs, with Eligio R.
Berango signing the complaint.
During the pendency of the civil case, complainant,
in need of money, asked respondent judge to allow
her to withdraw P1,500.00 from the P3,500.00 she
had deposited with him but no action was taken by
respondent. The verbal request was followed by
several letters advising Judge Bercacio that
complainant was withdrawing the amount of
P3,500.00. Eliciting no response, filed the present
complaint.
ISSUE: WON respondent engaged in the practice of
law.
HELD:
Respondents actuations fall within the definition of
practice of law. The active interest he took in the
case of Mrs. Aonuevo manifested as follows: (a) He
gave Mrs. Aonuevo legal advice on the remedy
available to her and her co-owners with regards to
the property sold to Alfredo Ong; (b) He accepted
from Mrs. Aonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for
purposes of redeeming the property from the
vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses; (c) He
wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs.
Aonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the
land in question; (d) When his attempts at an out-of
courtsettlement failed, he caused the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4591, for which hewas
issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees;
PALE
(e) He was present together with Atty.Berango at the
pre-trial.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court or participation in court proceedings
but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers
in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal advice to
clients or persons needing the same, etc.
Hence, respondent violated the Circular issued by the
Secretary of Justice in relation to Section 77 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides
that no Municipal Judge shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advice to clients.
Respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as
charged, and hereby suspend him from office for a
period of six (6) months effective immediately upon
finality of this decision, with the warning that
commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will
warrant a more severe penalty from the Court.
RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner Cayetano opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
It was established that after graduating from College
of Law (UP) and having hurdled the bar (1960),
respondent has worked in the following:
1. Law office of his father;
2. World Bank group as Operations Officer
for about 2 years, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank (1963-1970);
3. Meralco group as Chief Executive
Officer of an investment bank loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank (Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970);
4. Services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer (since 1986);
5. NAMFREL As Secretary-General (1986)
and later National Chairman (1987);
6. He also claimed to have worked with
the underprivileged sectors, and was
also a member of the Davide
Commission as well as the
Constitutional Commission.
3
ISSUE:
WON respondent possess the requirement of 10
years practice of law.
HELD:
Yes. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office.
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. The practice of law is defined
as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law.
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative
agency.
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment.
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate
counsel, three factors are apropos:
PALE
1. First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems
2. Second Decision Analysis. This enables
users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty.
3. Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations.
The organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
1. Preventive Lawyering.
2. Managerial Jurisprudence.
3. Organization and Functioning of the
Corporate Counsel's Office.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
Petition dismissed.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
CASTRO, C.J.
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines.
4
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice. The said Resolution was pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of
the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of
the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
The authority of the Court to issue the order applied
for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.
Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in
the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
ISSUE:
WON mandatory membership in the IBP is violative of
a lawyers constitutional right.
HELD:
PALE
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.
The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities. All legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State the administration of justice as an
officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected
with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to
the exercise of the police power."
The provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic
Facts:
1. The Legal Clinic posted an advertisement which
states that for secret marriage, one pays Php 560.00
for a valid marriage. Likewise, information on divorce,
absence, annulment and visa are accepted. The
contact details and address of the company are
likewise provided for.
5

2. According to petitioner, the advertisements are
unethical, demeaning of the law profession and
destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the Bar and that as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements.
3. According to respondent, the Legal Clinic does not
engage in the practice of law, rather engages in legal
support services through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines.
4. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Philippine
Bar Association, Philippine Lawyers Association, UP
Women Lawyers Circle, Women Lawyers Association
of the Philippines and Federacion International de
Abogadas were required to submit their respective
position papers to the controversy.
5. IBP wised that the high court perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice. PBA claimed
that only natural persons may engage in the practice
of law. PLA claimed that respondent is engaged in the
practice of law contrary to what respondent posits.
UPWLC claimed that the public should be protected
from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such service.
WLAP claimed that the Legal Clinic engaged in
advertising its services to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which are illegal and against the
Code of Professional Responsibility. FIA said that
advertisements are ethically objectionable because
for one, no Philippine marriage can be secret and
two, failed to state limitation that only paralegal
services or legal services are available.
Ruling:
1. To practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
2. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and
proper.
3. The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch
of law practiced. Another exception to advertising is
the publication in reputable law lists in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data.
4. The Legal Clinic is restrained and enjoined from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of
similar advertisements being brought into attention.
People v Tuanda
Fe P. Tuanda asks the court to lift her
suspension from the practice of law
PALE
Dec. 17, 1983: Tuanda received several
pieces of jewelry (valued at 36k) for sale on
a commission bases from Hermina
Marquez, with the condition that Tuanda
turn over the sales proceeds and return
unsold items to Marquez on or before Feb.
14,
1984 .
In Feb 1984, Tuanda issued 3 checks worth
15,450 to Marquez (which were dishonored
by the bank for insufficiency of funds)
instead of returning the jewelry still worth
approximately 26,250
Tuanda made no other arrangements to
repay Marquez
She was sued by Marquez for estafa and 3
counts of violation of BP 22 in the RTC
Acquitted of estafa, but guilty on all counts
of violation of BP 22
CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision, but
also suspended Tuanda from the practice of
law
Tuanda filed an appeal and motion to lift
order of suspension
ISSUE: W/N Tuanda was rightfully suspended
RULING: YES
The offense she was guilty of involved moral
turpitude. Violation of BP 22 is a serious
criminal offense which affects public interest
and order because it is harmful to put
useless papers in circulation
Under S27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
ROC, she can be suspended for having been
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude
Also, the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to
the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense.
Motion to lift order of suspension is DENIED
People v. Simplicio Villanueva
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
PAREDES, J.:
6
FACTS:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston
Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition
of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused invoking Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no
judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients."
ISSUE: WON City Attorney Fule was engaging in
private law practice.
HELD:
NO. The Court believes that the isolated appearance
of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of thesame kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self
outtothe public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that
in the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney
Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not
appear that he was being paid for his services or that
his appearance was in a professional capacity.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA,
and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate
criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San
PALE
Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of
respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less
serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well
as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the
motion for reconsideration holding, among others,
that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of
party-litigants should be allowed only in places where
there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well
founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the
bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend
litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants,
then the requirement of membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional
requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer
to appear in court, would be put to naught. "
RULING:
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in
person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for
the purpose
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party
to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the
litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance,
now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an
attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the
respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is
empowered to determine who shall be the private
prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he
objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana
and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court
It is accordingly our view that error was committed in
the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V.
Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to
aid the latter in conducting his defense.
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one
to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the
first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case
personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's
participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
trial of the case.
On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor,
with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, We
may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense
counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before
the municipal trial court, with more reason should he
be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the
supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal
Court of Paraaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil
action nor reserve his right to institute it separately
and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly
7
 instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal
interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of
his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a
lawyer.
ORDER THAT DISALLOWED THE APPEARANCES IS SET
ASIDE.
SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the
disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon
was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,
and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who
was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for
over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not
in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence
against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled
by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na
nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng
attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag
rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not
satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano
ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide
considered a crime involving moral
turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant
disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having
pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his
treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by
his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly
indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust
refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify
disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and
in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the
land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for
4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for
his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
CORDON V. BALICANTA
PALE
FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter,
inherited some properties from her husband
with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently,
Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a
corporation to develop the real properties
inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the
properties were registered in the corp.s name.
Atty Balicanta was the one who single-
handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being its
Chairman, President, General Manager, and
treasurer. By being such officers, he made a
number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting
trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to
sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of
some of the properties to other people. And by
using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta
also made the following acts: 1) obtained a
loan from Land Bank using the properties as
collateral; 2) Sold the Corps right to redeem
the properties to another person; 3)
demolished the ancestral home of the Cordons
and sold the lot to another person. In all of
these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the
proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands
for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties
and to account the proceeds of the loan. When
such demands were unheeded, The Cordons
terminated Balicantas services and filed a
complaint for disbarment against the latter in
the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report,
recommended for Balicantas disbarment as
well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that
Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such
conduct.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.
HELD: YES! Disbarred.
RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out
against his client followed a well thought of
plan to misappropriate the corporate properties
and funds entrusted to him. He started his
devious scheme by making himself the
President, Chairman of the Board, Director and
Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew
he was prohibited from assuming the position
of President and Treasurer at the same time. He
also entered into dishonest transactions under
1 By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, this
resolution is automatically elevated
to the SC for final action.
8
the cloak of sham resolutions. His
misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to
use the corporation as a means to convert for
his own personal benefit properties left to him
in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property,
reputation, his life, his all.
IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last
election, he admits that he made use of a card
written in Spanish containing the fact that he
was a candidate for third member of the
Province of Isabela & offering services as
notary public (such as free consultation,
execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits
that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant
of a barrio if his home municipality saying that
he will continue his practice of law and for the
lieutenant to make known to the people of his
desire to serve as lawyer & notary public
(including his services to handle land
registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted
advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his
services and is contrary to the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations is unprofessional. His acts
warrant disbarment, but because of the
mitigating circumstance of his youth and
inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to
do so would be unprofessional. It is also
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases
result in the lowering of the confidence of the
community and integrity of the members of the
bar (as it results in needless litigations and in
incenting to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
PALE
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO
SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer was published which reads:
Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact
number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme
Court, called up the number but it was Mrs.
Simbillo who answered. She claims that her
husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within 4-6mos provided the case
will not involve separation of property and
custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed
which was referred to the IBP for investigation
and recommendation. The IBP resolved to
suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that
although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not
appear in the advertisement, he admitted the
acts imputed against him but argued that he
should not be charged. He said that it was time
to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the
public isnt served in any way by the
prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Simbillo violated
Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD
Yes!
The practice of law is not a business ---
it is a profession in which the primary duty is
public service and money. Gaining livelihood is
a secondary consideration while duty to public
service and administration of justice should be
primary. Lawyers should subordinate their
primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an
annulment of marriage specialist he erodes
and undermines the sanctity of an institution
still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact
encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not
altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it
must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. Note that the law list where
the lawyers name appears must be a
reputable law list only for that purpose --- a
lawyer may not properly publish in a daily
paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published the contents
of which are likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar.
PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
9

FACTS
General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of
First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK's
liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established
the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill
gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987,
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
'reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against respondents
Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired
by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos. These
respondents were represented by Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General
and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting 'engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza?
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or
the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is 'advising
the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank's liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In
fine, the Court should resolve whether his act
of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included
within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same
PALE
nor is related to but is different from the
subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is
about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of
Mendoza in the liquidation case is not
significant and substantial. We note that the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of
proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a
fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in
the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the
Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very
least, the circumstances under which the
motion to disqualify in the case at bar were
refiled put petitioner's motive as highly
suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court
should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It
is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the
danger that former government employee may
compromise confidential official information in
the process. But this concern does not cast a
shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed,
the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the
Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching
sides for there were no sides.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH
SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY.
DELA CRUZ
Facts:
Disbarment case filed by the Faculty
members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty.
Dela Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:
a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending
cases filed against the respondent:
criminal case for child abuse; admin
10
 case for unethical acts of
misappropriating money for teachers;
and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS
Faculty for illegal deduction of salary.
Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent
contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. He was married
in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after.
7 years after, he contracts another marriage,
but this was annulled for being bigamous.
Malpractice: respondent notarized
documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the
expiration of his notarial commission in 87.
Respondent denied the charges in the
cases pending against him, but admitted his
second marriage and its subsequent
nullification. He also admitted having notarized
documents when his notarial commission had
already expired. However, he offered defenses
such as good faith, lack of malice and noble
intentions in doing the complained acts.
IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz
for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1
year also for notarizing without commission (2
years total)
Held:
SC finds respondent guilty of immoral
conduct, and suspended him from the practice
of law for 2 years, and another 2 years for
notarizing documents.
Respondent was already a member of
the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
marriage. However, after his failed first
marriage, he remained celibate until the 2 nd
marriage, showed his good intentions by
marrying the 2nd wife, and he never absconded
in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty
of disbarment is too harsh.
As to the charge of misconduct for
having notarized documents without the
necessary commission, SC stresses
notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. For doing such constitutes not
only malpractice but also the crime of
falsification of public documents. Respondent
also violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and
this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 and Canon 7.
The other cases against respondent are
pending before the proper forums. At such
stages, the presumption of innocence still
prevails in favor of the respondent.
FACTS
Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen
(Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to
set up a factory for seafood products. Xu
invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered
PALE
that Pan had not established the factory and
asked for his money back. Pan became hostile
and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of
Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa
against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The
complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City
Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a
subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary
investigation. For failure to appear and submit
a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal
complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of
Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest
against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a
motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also
filed with the RTC of Zamboanga a civil
complaint for the collection of a sum of money,
damages, and for the dissolution of the
business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and
Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a disbarment
case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless
suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact
vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty.
Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in
filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded
because of the supposed irregularities in
conducting the investigation. The SC referred
the case to the IBP.
ISSUE
W/N the civil complaint was groundless
W/N is was proper to implead Atty.
Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil
complaint
HELD
Yes, civil complaint was groundless and
it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and
Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.
IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely
to obtain leverage against the estafa case.
There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and
Prosecutor Salanga since they were not parties
in the business venture. Their inclusion in the
complaint was improper and highly
questionable and the suit was filed to harass
both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong
violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP
recommended 2 years suspension
SC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In
addition, the Court mentioned some alternative
remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his
allegations were indeed true. Chiong could
have filed a motion for reinvestigation or
motion for reconsideration of Salangas
decision to file the information for estafa.
Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also
available if it was indeed filed without basis.
Relevant Provisions:
11
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same.
ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY.
CASTRO
Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of
Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private
practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva
Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainants
office to inquire whether the records of Civil
Case No. 784 had already been remanded to
the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of
either party in that case.
Complainant replied that the record
had not yet been transmitted since a certified
true copy of the CA decision should first be
presented. To this respondent retorted, You
mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to
get a copy? Complainant replied that
respondent may show instead the copy sent to
the party he represents. Respondent then
replied that complainant shouldve notified
him. Complainant explained that it is not her
duty to notify the respondent of such duty.
Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and
left the office, banging the door so loud. He
then returned to the office and
shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your
mother, you woman!)
Later, complainant filed
a manifestation that she wont appear in the
hearing of the case in view of the respondents
public apology, and that the latter was forgiven
already.
Held:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10k
with a warning.
Respondent was not the counsel of
record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation
that he will enter his appearance in the case
when its records were already transmitted to
the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the
counsel of record respondent had no right to
impose his will on the clerk of court. He
violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of
encroachment. It matters not that he did so in
good faith.
His act of raising his voice and uttering
vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not
only ill-mannered but also unbecoming
considering that he did these in front of the
PALE
complainants subordinates. For these, he
violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because
respondent apologized to the complainant
and the latter accepted it. This is not to say,
however, that respondent should be absolved
from his actuations. People are accountable for
the consequences of the things they say and
do even if they repent afterwards.
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to
the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing certain advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal
Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about
secret marriage and divorce in Guam and
annulment, and the like. It also says that they
are giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements
are unethical and destructive of the confidence
of the community in the integrity of lawyers.
He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements. On
the other hand, the respondent, while
admitting of the fact of the publication of the
advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but is merely rendering
legal support services through paralegals. It
also contends that such advertisements should
be allowed based on certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in
the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No,
the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristic
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give advice or render any kind of service
that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may
or may not be pending in a court. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises
12
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after
the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a
wide range of activities in and out of court. And
applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic
Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice
of law.
What is palpably clear is that
respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession advertise his talents or
skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The only exceptions are
when he appears in a reputable law list and use
of an ordinary, simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under
these exceptions. To allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already
a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently
been under attack. Hence, it should be
enjoined.
CAYETANO V. MONSOD
FACTS
Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by then President Aquino for the
position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This
nomination was opposed by petitioner
Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least
10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires
that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of
the Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite
Cayetanos opposition, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus,
Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition, basically challenging the
PALE
confirmation by the CA of Monsods
nomination.
ISSUE
Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC
Chairperson?
HELD
YES.
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. Practice of law under
modem conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that
part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its
decision, presented a brief history of Monsods
employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World
Bank Group, where he was assigned as
operations officer in Costa Rica. His job
involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic and project work
of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the
Philippines and worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive of an investment
bank and a business conglomerate. By 1986,
he rendered his services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant and he also
worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was
also the Secretary-General and National
Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His
position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in
13
election law. Also, he sat as a member of the
Davide Commission in 1990.
Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
There are several factors determinative of
whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law."
1. Habituality
2. Compensation
3. Application of law, legal principle,
practice or procedure which calls or
legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice
of law.
4. Attorney-client relationship.
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
FACTS:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney
Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential
letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a
examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-
evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the
Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to
the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-
checking. The five examiners admitted having re-
evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the
Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and was on the
borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to
pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move
but the exam results bears that he failed in 5
subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile,
Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged
of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law
student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe
that it is the Bar Committees regular activity that
when an examinee has failed in one subject alone,
the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject
which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few
properties, including that of a house in BF Homes,
which was never declared in his declaration of assets
and liabilities.
PALE
ISSUE: WON. Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the
examiners such that Galang passed the Bar? YES
HELD: It was plain, simple and unmitigated
deception that characterized respondent Lanuevos
well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the
five examiners concerned to the effect that the
examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the
before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two
(2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or
standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before
or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an
attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged
with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well
settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute
right to be granted every one who demands it, but is
a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise
of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to
take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.
IN RE: ALMACEN
G.R. No.. L-27654, February 18, 1970
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia
Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case
but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He
notified the opposing party of said motion but he
failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of
said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal
as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the
motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed
an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court
which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such
minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed
before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his
lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is
useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are
calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
14
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
He further alleged that due to the minute resolution,
his client was made to pay P120k without knowing
the reasons why and that he became one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He
also stated that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on
Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for
Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen
did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as
he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then
asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He
said he preferred this considering that the Supreme
Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.
Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be
disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court
cannot accept every case or write full opinion for
every petition they reject otherwise the High Court
would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved. It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and
so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the
High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for;
that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions
of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is
the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced.
As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a
motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the
opposing party of the time and place of trial is a
mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by
the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the
reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended
indefinitely.
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S
ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959
FACTS:
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled an
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examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical
training are qualified to take the said examination.
The petitioner contends that one who has passed the
bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the
prosecution of patent cases does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to
include engineers and other individuals who passed
the examination can practice before the Patent
office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time
he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right
has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent
Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in
the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law
includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other
laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court
but also embraces all other matters connected with
the law and any work involving the determination by
the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and
conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any
party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any
final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
IN RE CUNANAN, RESOLUTION
[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court
then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per
cent by raising it to 75 percent.
15
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners,
the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they
had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional
and valid.
HELD:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author,
to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We
have said that in the judicial system from which ours
has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities may say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.
PEOPLE VS ROMUALDEZ
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
FACTS:
Accused Estela Romualdez was appointed as
corrector for Political Law for the 1926 Bar.As such
corrector, the accused is required to put her
signature or initials on the booklets shechecked and
graded or whenever she will make an alteration. Luis
Mabunay was a barexaminee who failed because he
only got an average of 72.8% and in one subject he
got a gradebelow 60%. After the Supreme Court
denied the recommendation to lower the passing
gradefrom 75% to 70%, Romualdez altered the grade
of Mabunay in Civil Law from 63% to 73%, andin
Remedial Law from 58% to 63% by striking out the
first grades written, without howeveraffixing her
initials under the alterations.
ISSUES: Whether accused committed falsification.
HELD:
Yes. The accused here made several acts of
falsification. She made the alterations in the grades
in such a way as to make it appear that the
correctors had participated therein, because she
blotted out the grades of the correctors and wrote
new and increased grades opposite their initials,
without indicating by her own initials that she made
the alterations. She in that wayattributed to the
correctors statements other than those in fact made
by them.
PALE
REQUIREMENTS
ADVINCULA VS. ATTY. MACABATA
AC NO. 7204 MARCH 07, 2007
FACTS:
The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a
disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabataon the
grounds of Gross Immorality. The complainant sought
for legal advice from the respondent regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which
later failed to settle its accounts with the
complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case
against Queensway Traveland Tours was discussed.
After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the
respondent gave the complainant a ride home. As
the complainant gets off the car, the respondent
allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and
embraced her tightly. Again, after another meeting
on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On
the road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious
reason. The respondent suddenly stopped the car in
the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
This time, the respondent forcefully held her face,
kissed her lips and held her breast. The complainant
managed to escape and decided to hire another
lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages
thru sms where the respondent apologized. The
respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the
lips however countered that there was no
harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead
everything was spontaneous.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent committed acts are
grossly immoral, or which constitute serious moral
depravity that would warrant disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law
DECISION:
The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are
mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, form of
greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the
respondent, though, in turning the head of the
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips
are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered
offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral. The complainant miserably failed to
establish the burden of proof required of her.
However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her
honor. The complaint for disbarment against the
respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded
to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his
clients
ATTORNEYS ROLE DEFINED
PANGAN VS. RAMOS
AC NO. 1052, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979
FACTS:
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa
Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed
because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a
court in Manila. When the records of the said case
was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it
was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the
right to use such name because in his birth
certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos.
D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being
16
his mothers surname. However, in the roll of
attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was
correct.
HELD:
No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who
are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not
authorized to use a name other than the one
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of
law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to
swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D.
Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent
has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to
deception. The Supreme Court hence severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
OCA VS LADAGA
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as
counsel for and inbehalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-
885 for Falsification of Public Documents before
the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court. During
the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on
official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the
case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga.
Respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the
only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her. This is
the first time that respondent ever handled a case for
a member of his family who is like a big sister to him.
He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling
the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge
was aware of his appearance as counsel for his
cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has
been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a
prior permission from the head of the Department.
The presiding judge of the court to which respondent
is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law. For one thing, it has never
been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary
of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at
bar, who is a relative. Based on the foregoing, it is
evident that the isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in
Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the
private practice of the law profession
contemplated by law. Issue: Whether or not Atty.
Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was
engages into private practice? Held: NO Respondent
is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from
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engaging in the private practice of their profession. A
similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. PRINCIPLE: the word private practice
of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services
In Re: Edillon A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court
the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same. Edillon
contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that
he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he
is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the
court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
membership fee to the IBP. HELD: The Integrated Bar
is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be
a member of as distinguished from bar associations
in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one
of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of
his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues. Such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part
of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities
thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues. For
PRINCIPLE: The Supreme Court in order to further the
States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require thet the cost
of the regulatory program the lawyers.
17

Dulalia v. Cruz, A.C. No. 6854, 27 April 2007.
Facts: Susan Dulalia filed an application for a building
permit for a warehouse. The permit was not issued
and she thought that this was due to the respondents
who wrote a letter to Carlos Abacan, the municipal
engineer and concurrent Building Official of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. In the letter, it stated that the
building in question is an unbearable nuisance that
poses as an imminent danger to both respondent and
his family, due to them living in the immediate
vicinity of the construction site Juan Dulalia,
(complainant) claims that Atty. Cruz opposed the
application because of grudge he had against Susan
Dulalia, for objecting to Atty. Cruz marriage with
Susans first cousin, Imelda Soriano while he was still
married to Carolina Agaton.was still valid and
subsisting. Issue: Is Atty. Cruz in violation of the CPR
for 1. Marrying while still in a subsisting marriage? 2.
Using his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan to oppose in Susan Dulalias
application? 3. Engaging in the practice of law while
serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan? Held: Yes only to the first issue, and
the second and third issue were both dismissed. Cruz
appeared to be in good faith, since he was out of the
country when he married Soriano abroad and there
was an assumption on his part his first wife
abandoning him. Prior to his marriage to Soriano, he
was not involved romantically with any woman.
However, the act still stands that he contracted a
second marriage while the first marriage was still in
place and that is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. Furthermore, he is guilty of
Canon 5, for he claims that he was not aware that
the Family Code was already in effect as of August 3,
1988 since he was in the United States since 1986 to
1990, but still such ignorance of the law is not
excusable according to the law. The primary duty of
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles.
Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar.
Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
Pimentel v. Fabros, et. al. A.C. No. 4517, 11
September 2006
Facts: Pimentel files for disbarment against Attys.
Fabros and Paas for unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in relation to the discharge of their
duties as chairman and vice-chairman of the
provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabella in
the 199 elections. Among the complainants
allegations, he alleged that respondents were
required to certify under oath of their canvassing the
votes cast for each candidate for Senator in the
aforementioned elections and to certify that each
entry made was true and, and that the respondents
certified a statement of votes which was actually a
fraudulent statement which had been altered and
contains false and untrue entries. Such alterations
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cannot be attributed to mere computation or
recording error, but was ostensibly the result of a
premeditated scheme knowingly implemented by
herein respondents. Issue: Did the two violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility? Held: Yes, the
court ruled that both are guilty of misconduct, with
the records reflecting, as well as the respondents
admitting of the discrepancy between the questioned
certificate of canvass and the statement of votes. As
public officers, respondents failed to live up to the
high degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill required of them. As lawyers,
they were found to have engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They also
violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no
falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express
provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is
demanded of them as lawyers in the government
service:
pouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes vs Victor
Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, 27 April, 2005 Facts:
Complainants were government employees. Through
respondent, Lourdes renewed a loan application from
Rodela Loans Inc. of 10,000.00. She issued and
delivered five PNB blank checks, which served as
collateral for the approved loan as well as for the
future loans. Lourdes paid respondent 14,874.37
intended to the loan. Respondent filled up the blank
checks entrusted to him by writing on those checks
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and
deposited the same checks which were dishonored
upon payment. Thereafter, he filed a criminal case
against complainants for estafa and for violation of
BP 22. Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for
the disbarment of Atty. Deciembre. Issue: Whether
respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of Rule 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR. Held: Yes.
Respondent lawyer violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03
of the CPR for he seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by
indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at
all and despite full knowledge that the loan supposed
to be secured by the checks had already been paid.
Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and
professional misconduct. He committed an act
indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and
highly unbecoming a member of the bar. Hence, he
was suspended from the practice of law.
ARTIAGA JR. V. VILLANUEVA
Facts:
This case is about the disbarment case filed
by Artiaga against Villanueva for alleged unethical
practices.
The case started with the controversy over 2
parcel of lands with revocable permit applications,
originally the permits belong to a certain
Malabayabas and Suyo, which was later on sold to
the client of Artiaga. However on a later date, when
the client of Villanueva filed for revocable permit
application it was found out that the area being
claimed has already been titled to the client of
Artiaga. Hence the dispute was brought to the
Bureau of Lands for decision.
Initially the Director of Lands rendered a
decision in favour of the client of Artiaga, however it
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was appealed by Villanueva and the decision was
change, after another appeal the final decision was in
favour of the client of Artiaga. The decision being
final and executory an order of execution was issued
however the client of Villanueva remained in
possession of the said parcel of lands.
Thereafter a series of motions and case
where filed by Villanueva as a dilatory tactics to seek
a favourable ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is
considered unethical.
Ruling:
The court ruled that acts of Atty. Villanueva
is in violation of his oath that he wll do no falsehood
nor consent to doing of any in court. According to the
court it was clear that atty. Villanueva caused his
client to commit perjury so that the forceful entry
case will fall under the jurisdiction of the court, this is
shown by the intentional amendment to the original
complaint par 5, wherein under the original
complaint the time line was 1960, while on the
amended complaint the time stated is 1973, the
court state that the reason for such change is so that
the action may still be filed or entertained by the
court, since the action prescribes one year after
accrual of cause of action.
The court further states that it is expected
that a lawyer will defend the clients cause with zeal,
however in doing so it should not disregard its duty
to the court and the truth. Due to his actions the
client was in another case charged with perjury,
which is detrimental to the client.
The court also found that atty. Villanueva is
guilty of lack of condor and respect for the court and
the rights of his adversary, as shown in the case, the
client of Artiaga has already won the case, however
Villanueva filed urgent ex-parte motions and instead
of waiting for the result of such, he perfected his
appeal, thus further delaying the implementation of
the first lawful order of the court. Furthermore when
his appeal was denied, Villanueva turned to other
venues such as CAR for positive results, in doing so
he did not disclose of the prior proceedings that was
held in the court thus securing an ex-parte
proceeding. In this case the court found Villanueva
guilty of forum shopping.
MARY MALECDAN vs. PEKAS and KOLLIN
A.C. No. 5830. January 26, 2004
Facts:
Atty Pekas and Kollin substituted Atty. Bustamante as
a counsels for the Fanged Spouses.
Petitioner Malecdan bought a parcel of land located
in Baguio City from the Fanged spouses. The money
was received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the
account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel
for the latter. The complainant later found out,
however, that the said lot was the subject of a
controversy between the former owners and the
Fanged Spouses.
Then Kollin replaced Bustamante. He filed for a
petition for rescission over the contract of sale,
without returning the amount of money to Malecdan.
While Malecdan was in the US, the Fanged spouses,
Atty Bustamante and the PCIB (bank) signed a
compromised contract, and Malecdan was not made
a signatory to such contract. They caused the
transfer of P30K from the account of Bustamante to a
PALE
separate account for Kollin and Pekas as attorneys
fees.
Now, Malecdan files a case for disbarment against
Kollin and Pekas, because not only was she
prejudiced from such withdrawal of money, but they
also committed acts against the IBP in
contravention/violation to the lawyers oath that they
shall uphold the laws of the land.
Issue:
WON Kollin and Pekas should be suspended? YES
Held:
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a
lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice
of law, the primary purpose of which is to render
public service. The practice of law is a profession and
not a money-making trade. The process of imbibing
ethical standards can begin with the simple act of
openness and candor in dealing with clients, which
would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a
lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition but a serious matter of public
interest.
DECISION: Pekas suspended for 6 months, Kollin for 3
years.
Canons 14-17
Case 1: Burbe vs. Magulta
Facts:
Dominador P. Burbe filed a complaint for the
disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary
action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Complainant
alleged that respondent prepared for him a demand
letter and some other legal papers. Since there was
no settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta then
suggested that the necessary complaint should be
filed which was subsequently drafted by respondent.
The filing fee required the amount of P25,000.00.
Complainant then deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Magulta, upon the instruction
that the former needed the case to be filed
immediately. Despite repeated demands, no case
was filed by Atty. Magulta.
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that no
lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a lawyer-client
relationship.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirmative. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be
paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the
case for which his service had been sought. If a
person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is
established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship
exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the formers fees.
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Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and
that respondent dispensed legal advice to
complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the
lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had
agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at
the soonest possible time, in order to protect the
clients interest.
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member
of Isabela. Before his election, he campaigned that
he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary
public he can do notarial acts such as execution of
deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help
clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation;
that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio
lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that
even though he was elected as a provincial board
member, he can still practice law; that he wants the
lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is
willing to receive works regarding preparations of
sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing
to receive land registration cases for a charge of
three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of
malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing
acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well- merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of
business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It
is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether
allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising
to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyers position, and all other like
self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone
of our high calling, and are intolerable.
PALE
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagordas liability is however mitigated by the fact
that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and that he
was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So
instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from
the practice of law for a month.
Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot , 74 Phil.
579
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in Sunday
Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows
Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes
of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60
Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.
Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that the practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of
merchantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
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