1.

TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and
physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided
to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found
it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she
again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter
Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his
consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does
not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently
because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case
against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages
of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after
obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys
fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

2. TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao

CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the
ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled
to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.

3. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where
she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected
as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation
of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should
be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil
Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a
new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
4. Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The
residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution
for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.
The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition dismissed.

5. Silverio vs Republic
G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his
first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his
petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed
the trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or
sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth
certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this
petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will
be major changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.

6. Alcantara vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in
a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that Restituto
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the
trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City
Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona,
Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place. The certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states
that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license
number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification
enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist
on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents
of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity
of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila
City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot
benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle (Alcantara vs Alcantara,
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007).

7. Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian
structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted
possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case,
respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

8. Navarro vs. Domagtoy

AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the
grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in
Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise
solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years
and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute
a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-
compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

9. Cario vs Cario
Facts:

Article 40

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her. In 1992,
SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior to his second
marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days
after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao
was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993,
Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the
marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void
due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also
claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.
Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage
is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a
cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides
that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed
by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that
the other may not have contributed at all.

10. GR NO. 183896, JANUARY 30, 2013 ABBAS VS ABBAS DIGEST

DECEMBER 16, 2014 CASE EATERS LEAVE A COMMENT
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Abbas vs Abbas

Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4 of the Family Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on
December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-
law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not
know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family
Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of
the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which
are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception to those covered by the
preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

11. Sally Go-Bangayan vs Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.

February 11, 2014 No comments

Civil Law Family Code Marriage Bigamy Non-existent marriage

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was
outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sallys father was
against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage
contract in March 1982.

In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-
existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly
issued to Benjamin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.

12. Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada
is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

13. TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner
then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila
on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

14. Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned
from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry under Philippine law.

15. Fujiki vs Marinay

2013

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,
to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that" only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

16. Bayot vs CA G.R. No. 155635

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was
docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also
issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4,
1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay
a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's
incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss,
since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to
be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of
jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a
holder of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown
in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican
Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America,
a country which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-
couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

17. Zamoranos case (Please see previously assigned case list)

18 Llave V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remainedsubsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellitais void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13
of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.

HELD:

The petition is DENIED.