LEGAL SEPARATION

GARCIA VS. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.*

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,

respondent.

Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad.At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.Respondent, on the other hand, argues that
the Australian divorce decree is a public documenta written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent is getting ahead
of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public or Official Records; Requisites.Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A partys failure to object properly renders a foreign divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the court of another State.Fortunately for respondents cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipino is no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquires another States citizenship.Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13
and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him
to Philippine personal laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a defense
raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely upon him.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory ordera
conditional or provisional judgment of divorceis in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means
the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decreea conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the
divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in
a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court
may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does not raise a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to the civil status of the person presenting it where no proof has been presented
on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under the foreign law.We also reject the claim of
respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil
status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a foreign nationala duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify.
To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirements for procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which will not
affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate.In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family
Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license
issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p.
146.).

Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity
to remarryhe must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign States personal law governing
his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners
contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with
the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and void on
the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was really
capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decreethe most judicious course is to remand the case
to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcees legal capacity to remarry.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground
of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
 ONG ENG KIAM VS. ONG

G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006.*

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

Family Code; Marriages; The Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its
infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be
clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.The
Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State,
thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds
enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven, can
the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.

Courts; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when
confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.This Court is not a
trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal.

Same; Same; It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of
fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by
the lower courts.It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts. The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when
in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are con-
trary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion. As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies.

Same; Evidence; The Supreme Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of
observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.The
Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of
witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that the assessment
of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.

Evidence; Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness testimony as biased
and unworthy of credence and a witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect
the veracity of his or her testimony.Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a
witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a witness relationship to one of the parties
does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.

Family Code; Marriages; Abandonment; As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.Also without merit
is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should
not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall
be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that
Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by
the said provision.

Same; Same; With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage
and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.We
reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. The Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage
and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation.
 GINEZ VS. BUGAYONG

[No. L-10033. December 28, 1956]

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff and appellant, vs. LEONILA GINEZ, defendant and appellee.

1.HUSBAND AND WlFE; INFIDELITIES AMOUNTING TO ADULTERY; CONDONATION

DEPRIVES OFFENDED SPOUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.Granting that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with-him and together they slept as husband and wife,
deprives him, as the alleged offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending
wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF COHABITATION TO CONSTITUTE CONDONATION.The only

general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission
of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will
amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L.J.
Prob. 73).
 OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO

[No. L-13553. February 23, 1960]

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

1.LEGAL SEPARATION; CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE OF

ADULTERY INDEPENDENTLY OF CONFESSION.Where there is evidence of the adultery
independently of the defendant's statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation
should be granted, since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant's confession.

2.ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION MADE OUTSIDE OF COURT.Article 101 of the

new Civil Code does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court.

3.ID.; ID.; COLLUSION MAY NOT BE INFERRED FROM CONFESSION.Collusion may not be
inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery, desires the divorce
and makes no defense.

4.ID.; CONDONATION; FAILURE OF HUSBAND TO SEARCH FOR ERRING WIFE.In the case at
bar, the wife left her husband after the latter discovered her dates with other men. Held: The failure of the
husband actively to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to
the adultery. It was not his duty to search for her.
 MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES

[No. L-11766. October 25, 1960]

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant and appellee.

1.HUSBAND AND WIFE; LEGAL SEPARATION; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS; TIME WITHIN

WHICH TO BRING ACTION.While defendant's act of cohabiting with a woman other than his wife
constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation, nevertheless, the complaint should be dismissed,
because it was not filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant
of the cause and within five years f rom and after the date when such cause occurred (Art. 102, new Civil
Code).

2.ID.; ID.; CONDONATION OR CONSENT OF INNOCENT SPOUSE; HOW MADE.The law

specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided the latter
has not condoned or consented to the adultery or concubinage committed by the other spouse (Art. 100,
new Civil Code; and plaintiff (innocent spouse) having condoned and/or consented in writing to the
concubinage committed by the defendant husband, she is now underserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).
 LOPEZ VS. CA

G.R. No. 148510. July 21, 2004.*

ALBERTO LOPEZ a.k.a. CESAR A. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BENJAMIN ANTONIO, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 170, Malabon, Metro Manila and CHERRY
PIE LOPEZ, respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Where a party assails final resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, he should file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, instead of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.Since petitioner assails final resolutions of the Court of Appeals, he should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. On this score alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Same; Same; Where a partys motion for reconsideration of the questioned resolution of the appellate
court did not contain an affidavit or proof of service as required by Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, nor did it state the material dates in order to determine its timeliness, it is considered a
mere scrap of paper, and did not toll the running of the period to file the motion.As petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the questioned March 19, 2001 Resolution of the appellate court did not contain an
affidavit or proof of service as required by Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor did it
state the material dates in order to determine its timeliness, it is considered a mere scrap of paper, and did
not thus toll the running of the period to file the motion. In fact, petitioner did not even state when he
received the said resolution, hence, it can not even be determined when the reglementary period expired.

Same; Support; A judgment granting support never becomes finala party can always file a motion to
modify the amount of support.En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not
without remedy. For as what he seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he
can file a motion with the trial court for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes
final.
 LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

No. L-18008. October 30, 1962.

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Change of Name; Legal separation alone not ground for wifes change of name; Mandatory language of
Article 372, New Civil Code.A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum, and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must
continue using the name and surname employed by her before the separation.

Same; Applicability of Rule 103, Rules of Court; Doubtful.It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article
372 of the New Civil Code with regard to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify a change
of name, because to hold otherwise, would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provisions of said Article 372.
 ARROYO VS. CAMPOS RUEDA

[No. 17014.August 11, 1921]

Mariano B. Arroyo, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo, defendant and appellee.

1.Husband and Wife; Separate Maintenance of Wife.Where the wife is forced to leave the marital home
by ill-treatment from her husband, he can be compelled to provide for her separate maintenance, without
regard to whether a cause for divorce exists or not.

2.Id.; Id.; Necessity for Separation.Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the anomalous de facto separation of the
spouses. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in
favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and
separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

3.Id.; Action by Husband for Restitution of Conjugal Rights; Wife Admonished to Return.In an action
by the husband against a wife to obtain a restitution of conjugal rights, the court entered a judicial
declaration to the effect that the wife had absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause,
and she was admonished that it was her duty to return. The court, however, refrained from making an
order absolute requiring her to return.
 HEIRS OF JUGALBOT VS. CA

G.R. No. 170346. March 12, 2007.*

HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT, Represented by LEONILA B. JUGALBOT, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA, Represented by LOLITA R. GOROSPE,
Administratrix, respondents.

Agrarian Reform; Tenancy; Requisites; A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; Tenancy is not a
purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the landit is also a legal
relationship.As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 236 (1991), and subsequently
in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 714 (1999), the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation
that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not automatically make the case an agrarian
dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants.
The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the
purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing
of harvests between the parties. Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 666 (2003), further affirms the
doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically
give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the
claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant
tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between
petitioner and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).
The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Same; Due Process; The landowner is denied due process where the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) took the property without sending notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper
party.The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27
due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them. Firstly,
the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals
was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send
notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were
erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the
proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records,
pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnership; The presumption under civil law that all property of the
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage.Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 641 (1997), held that
the presumption under civil law that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of the conjugal partnership. In Spouses Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any proof
that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact
that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo
as evidenced by the registration in the name of Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza, does not
suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

Same; Tenancy; Due Process; The issuance of a certification that a property is tenanted and primarily
devoted to rice and corn in the absence of an ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and
report deprives the land owner of her right to property through denial of due process.The defective
notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig
on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily
devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding
investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of
the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report
likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due process.

Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private
property, the law must be strictly construedany act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that
results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property,
the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which
relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant
case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular
inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results
from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Independent evidence, aside from the self-serving statements of alleged
tenants, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner, and
establish a tenancy relationship.There is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that
Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there was
sharing of harvests, except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas
Jugalbot or any of his farm household cultivated the land in question. No proof was presented except for
their self-serving statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent evidence, aside from
their self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the
landowner, and establish a tenancy relationship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be establishedthere must be concrete evidence on record
adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 431
(1988), we ruled that the respondents self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations could not
establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be
concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.

Same; Same; The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de
jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to
establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 168 SCRA 247 (1998),
we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de facto
tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure guaranteed by our
tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.

Same; Same; Subdivisions; An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to
be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.In
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 398 (1989), we held that an agricultural leasehold cannot be
established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion
into a residential subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its
conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the
land into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.

Same; Social Justice; Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice
are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivilegedthey apply with equal force to those who,
notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the
courts.On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the
preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged.
They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are
equally deserving of protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of
the rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against
them. As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not be carried out
to such an extent as to deny justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side.
For in the eyes of the Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the
bedrock principle by which our Republic abides.
 HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK VS. DAILO

G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005.*

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Code; Property; The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife; Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court declared that the absence
of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of
the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed next, there is
no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.

Same; Same; Same; Conjugal Partnership; Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules
on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or
both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the
rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the
chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the
Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such; Other than petitioners
bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family; Conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable for the payment of the principal obligation.The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners
sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof,
does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of
the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to
the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.
 SECURITY BANK VS. MAR TIERRA CORP.

G.R. No. 143382. November 29, 2006.*

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MAR TIERRA CORPORATION,
WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA, respondents.

Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnerships; Guaranty; Where the husband contracts an obligation on
behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, but if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 286 SCRA 272 (1998), we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a
legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other
hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety
or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement,
it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party.

Same; Same; Same; To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband
alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit.In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement)
under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent
corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. To
hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the
objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying
concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
 MERCADO-FEHR VS, FEHR

G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003.*

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law; Definition of Grave Abuse of Discretion.A petition for
certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper
remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error
committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and
not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid
application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the
Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for
instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of
justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious
effects of the judgment complained of.

Same; Same; Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are
technical rules may be relaxed.The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has long been settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the subject of review. There were,
however, incidental matters that had to be addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of
the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to the
division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant to the courts
directive in its main decision to dissolve the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally
disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, and
as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However,
considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result
in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their common property, and
thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom the court had entrusted
to her care. We have held that where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court
which are technical rules may be relaxed.

Civil Law; Family Code; Elements for Article 147 to Operate.For Article 147 to operate, the man and
the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in the case at bar.
 ATIENZA VS. DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698. November 29, 2006.*

LUPO ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, respondent.

Husband and Wife; Family Code; Co-ownership; As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions.It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry
each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required. As it is,
the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

Same; Same; Same; Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way
before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.Here, although the
adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill
up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there
was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.

Evidence; Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence.As we see it, petitioners claim of co-
ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged
contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and
voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
 ACRE VS, YUTTIKKI

G.R. No. 153029. September 27, 2007.*

BEATRIZ, ALLAN, MARY ANN, JOCELYN, WELMA, ROWEL and SOFRONIO WENDEL II, all
surnamed ACRE, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE YUTTIKKI, respondent.

Family Code; Marriages; Husband and Wife; Co-Ownership; The property regime of parties to a
bigamous marriage is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which provides that all properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
governed by the rules on coownershipif there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses,
there can be no co-ownership.Undeniably, the marriage between respondent and Sofronio is bigamous
considering that their union was celebrated while he was still married to Beatriz. As such, their property
regime is covered by Article 148 of the Family Code providing that all properties acquired by the parties
out of their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. Hence, if there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no
coownership. Petitioners failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an actual
contribution in acquiring the contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here.
 CARINO VS. CARINO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.*

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Property; For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject death benefits of the deceased.It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.Under the Civil Code, which was the
law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.Under Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships
in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man,x x x In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
THE FAMILY

CONCEPTION VS. CA

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005.*

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.

Family Code; Marriages; Filiation; The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article
167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Same; Same; Same; The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the
rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy
does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.

Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)
(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could
have enable the husband to father the child.The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was
no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

Same; Same; Same; The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of
physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted
only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the
separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take
place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together
during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.

Same; Same; Same; Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary.Sexual union between spouses is
assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as
the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

Same; Same; Same; An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.The import of Ma. Theresas statement
is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This
declarationan avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimateis the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.

Same; Same; Same; For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had
no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward
the legitimacy of the children.For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to
lean toward the legitimacy of children.

Same; Same; Same; Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that
the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.

SSame; Same; Same; For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she
had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to
lean toward the legitimacy of the children.For reasons of public decency and morality, a married
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the
intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

Same; Same; Same; Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that
the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.

Same; Same; Same; A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child.As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames. A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the
eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

Same; Same; Same; In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visi-tation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children.In case of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation
rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural
right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

Same; Same; Same; The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to
those of tender years.The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to
those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents,
to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case,
the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
 JOSEF VS. SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060.November 27, 2008.*

ALBINO JOSEF, petitioner, vs. OTELIO SANTOS, respondent.

Judgments; Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.The above
Order did not resolve nor take into account petitioners allegations in his Opposition, which are material
and relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This is serious error on the
part of the trial court. It should have made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioners claim that
the house and lot in which he and his children resided was their duly constituted family home. Since it did
not, its July 16, 2003 Order is thus null and void. Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be
said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.

Family Law; Family Home; The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs.The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs.
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

Same; Same; The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a
basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the
veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.The family home is the dwelling place of a person and
his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and
likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that
binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the
family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial
courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is
unjustified. The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of
the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or
to someone else.
 ARRIOLA VS. ARRIOLA

G.R. No. 177703. January 28, 2008.*

VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA, respondent.

Civil Procedure; Contempt; Requirements for Initiating an Indirect Contempt Proceeding; Filing of a
verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is
mandatory.Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an
indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should
fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go, 514
SCRA 616 (2007), we held: As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that
has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x.

Civil Law; Family Code; Family Home; One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the
automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence without
need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of
the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.One significant innovation introduced by The
Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family
residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct
Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and
153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family
resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back.

Same; Same; Same; It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the
family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article
159 of The Family Code.It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is
the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under
Article 159 of The Family Code, viz.: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
(Emphasis supplied.) The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following
the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love,
security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any
compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment
to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family
home regardless of its ownership.Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition
of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by
succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot
transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the
law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
 MANACOP VS. CA

G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997.*

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.,
respondents.

Family Code; Family Home; A final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home
under the provisions of the said Code.Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his
residence was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved has
been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law. He asserts that the Family Code and
Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or
extrajudicial constitution as a family home. Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became his family home under the simplified
process embodied in Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision
of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the
procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt
involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the
petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
any of its beneficiaries must be actual, and that which is actual is something real, or actually existing,
as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive.In view
of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other arguments of petitioner other than to
correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family
home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the
house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This
contention lacks merit. The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive.

Same; Same; Same; Beneficiaries, Explained; Maids and overseers are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by Art. 154 of the Family Codeoccu pancy of a family home by an overseer is
insufficient compliance with the law.Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of the
Family Code. Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of the family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers
and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for lead support. This enumeration may include the in-laws
where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy
of a family home by an overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case is insufficient compliance with the
law.
 PATRICIO VS. DARIO III

G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.*

PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.

Civil Law; Family Home; The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family
residence.The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an
unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
by law.

Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries
must be actual.The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the
property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the
law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.

Same; Same; Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code; Requisites to
be a beneficiary of the family home.Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family
for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Same; Same; The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor; Rule shall apply regardless
of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.Moreover, Article 159 of the Family
Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support; Characteristics of legal support.Legal support, also
known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based
on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced;
(4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount.

Same; Property; Co-ownership; Partition; No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time; An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.The law does not encourage co-ownerships
among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Coowners
should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these
situations from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 342 SCRA 753 (2000), no co-owner ought to be
compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at
any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.In Vda. de Daffon
v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 (2002), we held that an action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court
may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.
 HONRADO VS. CA

G.R. No. 166333. November 25, 2005.*

JOSE E. HONRADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, in his
official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 222; THE CLERK
OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City;
MR. NERY G. ROY, in his official capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC of Quezon City; and PREMIUM
AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.

Actions; Certiorari; A writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy and he who comes to court for equity must
do so with clean hands.The ruling of the appellate court is correct. The respondent court, tribunal or
administrative agency acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case.
There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as
to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Moreover, in a
petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only cases
of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy and he who comes to court for equity must do
so with clean hands.

Same; Judgments; Writs of Execution; Properties Exempt from Execution; Claims for exemption from
execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its
sale on execution by the sheriff.While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone: Although the Rules of Court does not
prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the
right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed
not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period
thereafter; In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be
made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or
promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of
sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has
commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority. In the light of the facts above summarized, it is
self-evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly,
reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to
redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution
and defeat the very purpose of executionto put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it
now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of
properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on
execution by the sheriff.
 PATRICIO VS. DARIO

G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.*

PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.

Civil Law; Family Home; The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family
residence.The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an
unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
by law.

Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries
must be actual.The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is something real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the
property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the
law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.

Same; Same; Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code; Requisites to
be a beneficiary of the family home.Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family
for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Same; Same; The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor; Rule shall apply regardless
of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.Moreover, Article 159 of the Family
Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support; Characteristics of legal support.Legal support, also
known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based
on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced;
(4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount.

Same; Property; Co-ownership; Partition; No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time; An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.The law does not encourage co-ownerships
among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Coowners
should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these
situations from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 342 SCRA 753 (2000), no co-owner ought to be
compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at
any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.In Vda. de Daffon
v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 (2002), we held that an action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court
may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.
 SAYSON VS. CA

G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.*

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS

SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON
AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

Civil Law; Adoption; Petitioners' challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but
in a direct proceedings frontally addressing the issue.A no less important argument against the
petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption.

cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing
the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous
or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, this
Court declared: Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus: An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to
show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the
order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain,
since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect
by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court
would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

Same; Family Code; Paternity and filiation; Proof of filiation; Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable
piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art. 265 of the Civil Code and
Art. 172 of the Family Code.On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the
trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the
Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such
evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Remedial Law; Evidence; The evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.Mauricio's
testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming
as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for
the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in
the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v.
Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in
the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Special Civil Actions; Partition; Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party.Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in
the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose.
It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Same; Adoption; Succession; Representation; While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation.There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to
the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right
of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
 LIYAO VS. TANHOTI-LIYAO

G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002.*

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-
LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,
respondents.

Parent and Child; Presumption of Legitimacy; The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only
flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother.Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a
valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow
out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and
the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.

Same; Same; Actions; Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or
in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.The fact that
Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil
Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of
the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
noneeven his heirscan impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress;
The child himself cannot choose his own filiationif the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mothers alleged paramour.It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by
Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot
prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot
allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid
and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.We think not. As
earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the
legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed
away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably,
the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through
Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
 MACADANGDANG VS. CA

No. L-49542. September 12, 1980.*

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents.

Appeals; When conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals are not binding.The findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission
of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.

Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Parent and Child; Necessity of adducing evidence of physical
impossibility of access of husband to the wife during first 120 days of the 300 days prior to the childs
birth in a suit for recognition of illegitimate child.Whether or not respondent and her husband were
separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really
matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the aforenamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony,
respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four
children by her husband lived in her mothers house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband
also lived in her mothers place (p. 73, rec.; pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be
noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her
mothers house in Samal for treatment.

Same; Same; Same; Legitimate filiation, when conclusively presumed.The baby boy subject of this
controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the incident
or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their
separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and
Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date (t.s.n., pp.
21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty [180] days following
the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between
aforenamed spouses. Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.

Same; Baptismal and marriage certificates prove only the administration of the sacraments to the subjects
thereof, not the veracity of the statements made therein with respect to relationship.In Our
jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specifiedbut not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-
22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]). This Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that
concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth
may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.

Same; Same; Same; Quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.The
modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must
be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340-
341).

Same; Same; Same; Same.To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law expressly
refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot
defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of
physical impossibility of access.

Same; Same; Same; Impotence, Meaning of; Distinguished from sterility.Impotence refers to the
inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (Bouviers Law Dictionary 514).
As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical
inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to
procreate, whereas impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In
respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy based on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or recognized
that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or
positive.

Same; Same; Same; Rational behind presumption of legitimacy.It must be stressed that Article 256 of
the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two
solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this
declaration (Powell vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a guaranty in favor of the
children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband
whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wifes adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by
means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which may really be only a confession
of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may declare the child as not her husbands although
the statement be false. But there is another reason which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of
proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of conception, if cannot be determined when
a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being
possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).
Same; Same; Same; Only the husband can contest legitimacy of a child born to his wife.At this
juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
economic interest involved. (Tolentino, citing Bevilaque, Familia, p. 314).

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in
illicit affairs with married men.This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would
indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral
relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the vilest form of
wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
 DE JESUS VS. ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA DIZON

G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.*

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their

mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA
DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and
MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

Parent and Child; Filiation; Illegitimate Children; Actions; The due recognition of illegitimate children in
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required, but where a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead,
a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate; Upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of
the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wifeit is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.Succinctly, in an attempt to
establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having first been instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of some other couple born in lawful wedlock.The rule
that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This
issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot
be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.