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The current edition of the module guide was published in 2016.

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The Supreme Court has agreed with the Court of Appeal ruling in Golds
(2014) EWCA Crim 748 that, for the purpose of diminished
responsibility substantially impaired means something whilst short of
total impairment is nevertheless significant and appreciable rather
than a more than trivial impairment. Golds appeal was dismissed.
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0053-
judgment.pdf

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In R v Jogee, Ruddock v The Queen [2016] 2 WLR 681 the Supreme
Court ruled that in cases of joint enterprise in murder the previous
basis for liability established in Chan Wing Siu (1985) and approved in
Powell (1999) was a wrong turning. It was insufficient that the
secondary party contemplated that the principal might commit murder.
Rather, it had to be shown, as in accessoryship generally, that the
secondary party intended to assist or encourage that murder.
Contemplation is not the fault element in accessoryship. Intention is.
However, if the secondary party can be shown to have contemplated
the commission of murder and carried on regardless, this could of
course be used by the prosecution as evidence that it was indeed
intended or intended if the occasion arose. Jogee was retried at
Leicester Crown Court. His conviction was quashed and replaced by a
conviction for manslaughter. The jury found that there was insufficient
evidence that the defendant intended to encourage the principal to kill
or cause serious injury. There was, however, sufficient evidence that he
intended to encourage a lesser harm. In such circumstances a
conviction for manslaughter is proper.
Since the Supreme Court decision, a number of appeals have been
lodged by prisoners convicted of murder on the basis of the Chan Wing
Siu/Powell joint enterprise principle. Significantly, these have been
unsuccessful. The latest, R v Johnson and others (2016), explain the
reason for this. An appeal based on a post-conviction change in the law

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will only be successful if that conviction was unsafe (s.2 Criminal

Appeal Act 1968). It would not be unsafe if for example on the proven
facts, the jury would be unlikely to have reached a different verdict had
the original trial judge directed it in accordance with the changed law.
Given, as explained above, that Jogee replaces a rule of law
(contemplation is culpability) with a rule of evidence (contemplation is
evidence of intention/culpability) it is not surprising the Court of
Appeal were not inclined to quash the convictions. The average jury
person will not take much convincing that a person who robs a bank
with a person who he knows is carrying a lethal weapon and may use it
actually intended it to be used if the occasion arose. This does not
mean of course that the law has not changed. It means rather that it
will be less easy for the prosecution to gain a conviction on the basis of
foresight.
It should be noted that Jogee has not gone down well in other common
law jurisdictions. In Miller v The Queen; Smith v The Queen; Presley v
DPP for the State of South Australia, 334 ALR 1 Jogee was not followed
by the High Court of Australia, approving the law as articulated in
Chan Wing Siu and Powell. A similar rejection of Jogee was made by the
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, approving the reasoning in Miller
(HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87).