Luna 2007

Frente AmpZio and the Crafting
of a SociaZ Democratic AZtemative

in Uruguay
Juan Pablo Luna
ABSTRACT
This study of Uruguays Frente Amplio explores four central ques-
tions for the analysis of the new Latin American left. How did a
leftist alternative emerge and grow inside an institutionalized party
system?How do the socioeconomic and political factors that enabled
the rise of the left in Uruguay differ from those observed in other
Latin American cases? How did Frente Amplio adapt itself to profit
from the opportunities that arose during the 1990s? What are the
implications of the previous factors for governmental action by the
FA? In answering these questions, this study integrates an analysis of
the sociological and political-institutional opportunity structures con-
solidated during the 1990s with one of strategic partisan adaptation
processes. This perspective is useful for explaining how, by 2004,
Frente Amplio had built a dual support base from its historical con-
stituency and a socially heterogeneous group alienated from tradi-
tional parties due to economic and political discontent.
I n October 2004 the Uruguayan left, led by the party Frente Amplio
(FA), came to power, breaking 175 years of electoral dominance by
the traditional Colorado (PC) and Blanco (PB) parties. The presidential
triumph of this party was coupled, for the first time since 1966, with its
attainment of an absolute congressional majority (50.7 percent), mark-
ing a political watershed in the countrys history (Altman and Castiglioni
2006; Buquet 2005; Lanzaro 2004).
In analyzing FAs achievement, this study explores four central
questions to offer a comparative analysis of political representation and
the rise of the left in contemporary Latin America. How did a leftist
alternative emerge and grow in the context of an institutionalized party
system? How d o the socioeconomic and political factors that enabled
the rise of the left in Uruguay differ from those observed in other Latin
American cases? How did FA adapt to profit from the opportunities that
arose? What are the eventual implications of these factors for the FAs
governmental action and political representation?
Frente Amplios successful electoral bid was the result of the partys
complex transition from a predominantly urban, center-left mass party
to an increasingly catch-all, professional electoral organization. Operat-
ing in an opportunity structure driven by the demise of Uruguays state-
1
2 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS A N D SOCIETY 49: 4
centric sociopolitical matrix (Cavarozzi et al. 2003) and the decreasing

capacity of both traditional parties to satisfy and retain their historical
constituents, FA successfully pursued programmatic moderation while
maintaining a consistent opposition to attempts at neoliberal reform.
The party also managed to pursue leadership renewal, organizational
flexibility, and programmatic and electoral alliances with traditional
party splinter groups and the centrist Nuevo Espacio (NE) Party while
managing internal conflicts in a way that expanded its electorate. From
1990 on, the FA municipal government in Montevideo (home to approx-
imately half of the electorate) also played a decisive role in building the
2004 electoral coalition by promoting moderation, proving the partys
capacity to rule effectively, contributing to the penetration of traditional
party strongholds in Montevideos periphery, and catalyzing the charis-
matic leadership of TabarC VAzquez. Throughout this complex process
of adaptation, the party was able to expand its constituency significantly
without alienating its historical electoral base.
As a result of its rise to power, FA currently has a double support
base in Uruguayan society, composed of the old constituencies for
import substitution industrialization (ISI), joined by citizens who have
become disenchanted with the traditional party elite because of eco-
nomic hardship, especially those in the informal labor market and those
living in rural areas. Because the Uruguayan party system is relatively
institutionalized, and the country underwent only a moderate neoliberal
transformation during the 1990s, the conflicting and very pressing
demands of each constituency could eventually trigger a salient distrib-
utive conflict between different segments of FAs electoral base. If cat-
alyzed by factional disputes within the party, such a distributive conflict
could eventually hinder the performance of the FA government.
This study first presents a framework for analyzing the recent rise of
the left in Latin America and provides evidence of FAs historical devel-
opment, illustrating the recent diversification and expansion of its con-
stituency. It then explains this outcome by analyzing the sociological
opportunity structure that was generated by the unique transformation of
Uruguays statist IS1 model during the 1990s.This breakdown of the state-
led development model differed not only from that observed in Europe
but also from breakdowns that occurred in other Latin American cases.
A particular institutional and political opportunity structure
emerged in Uruguay during the 1990s. This opportunity structure
favored the FA, and helps to explain the partys 2004 electoral victory.
The political-institutional dimension contains two salient factors: the
slow erosion of support for traditional parties and the lack of a chal-
lenge from the left of the FA. Subsequently, this study focuses on polit-
ical agency; specifically, how FA profited from those enabling condi-
tions by pursuing a complex pattern of partisan adaptation. The final
LUNA: FRENTE AMPLIO 3
section explores some of the challenges the FA government faces and

draws some comparative implications.
THE RISE OF THE TIN AMERICAN LEFT:

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
After the political dominance of center-right parties during much of the
1990s, a new wave of political alternation toward the center-left was
consolidated in Latin America by the mid-2000s. This shift was catalyzed
in different countries by popular discontent with the economic crisis
that hit the region between 1998 and 2002. Riding this wave, a series of
charismatic leftist leaders have emerged, opposing incumbents and
rallying broad electoral constituencies to support their parties and elec-
toral movements.
Significant differences exist nevertheless, both between this new
leadership and European social-democratic experiences and among the
diverse leftist political forces currently in power in Latin America. Such
differences are manifested in distinct routes to power and programmatic
stances, and they imply specific distributive trade-offs and political gov-
ernance challenges for those in office.
The winning leftist coalitions and the partisan strategic adaptation
processes involved in crafting successful electoral performances differ
radically from those observed in both industrial and postindustrial
Europe, both in the way popular sectors have been politically incorpo-
rated and in the sociostructural context in which the parties operate
(Filgueira 1999; Roberts forthcoming). Instead of growing with the
expansion of the working class during the golden age of postwar capi-
talism, the new Latin American left became successful in a context of
increasingly weak working-class organizations and a more fragmented
civil society (Roberts 1996). European social-democratic parties, further-
more, have recently realigned in an effort to attract new constituents to
compensate for the decay of organized labor and lower classes ten-
dency to align with more rightist-authoritarian appeals (or simply de-
align). Nevertheless, they still draw electoral support from a more
homogenous social constituency (Kitschelt 1994).
The electoral success of leftist parties in contemporary Latin Amer-
ica, meanwhile, is built partly on a broad electoral movement that
opposes neoliberal reforms and represents the losers in this economic
model. Yet the common denominators of popular discontent with
reforms and a powerful charismatic leadership that can rally support on
that basis d o not negate the significant differences that exist among left-
ist coalitions across Latin America. Those differences derive from a path-
dependent trajectory contingent on divergent IS1 constellations of the
past, dissimilar structural reform patterns, and distinct party systems. In
4 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 49: 4
each case, the interaction of these three factors yielded particular con-
straints and opportunity structures for partisan strategic adaptation.
This study contends, therefore, that to fully understand and explain
this divergence, each case should be regarded in light of a path-depend-
ent historical trajectory that considers the sociostructural context in
which each leftist party emerged (sociological opportunity structure),
the political-institutional situation that each party faced while competing
for office (political opportunity structure), and the nature of the process
of partisan adaptation (or creation) that made it possible to profit from
those opportunities and maximize electoral returns. Further, it is argued
that while the first factor is contingent on the nature of each countrys
IS1 model and its reform over the past 20 years, the second factor relates
to the path-dependent trajectory of the party system in which the left
emerged and competed. And whereas these two factors explain why
certain constituencies became available for leftist mobilization, the
processes of partisan adaptation (or creation) explain how a leftist polit-
ical force could maximize the potential electoral return created by the
sociological and political-institutional opportunity structures. When the
rise of the left is analyzed from this threefold perspective, a better map
of divergence and convergence within the new Latin American left
emerges. Indeed, future analyses could draw on this framework to illu-
minate the specific distributive and policymaking dilemmas that leftist
governments currently confront.
This study applies this general analytical framework to the
Uruguayan case. The analysis suggests that both the social composition
of FAs electoral coalition and the processes of partisan adaptation and
electoral strategizing involved in its construction do not fit well with
scholarly accounts of parallel processes in other cases. There are several
reasons for this observation.
First, from a historical perspective, the case presents the unusual
combination of an elite party system that witnessed extensive IS1 in the
past (Roberts forthcoming). Second, FA can be portrayed as a social-
democratic mass party that emerged and attained office by opposing
attempts at neoliberal reform in the context of a relatively highly insti-
tutionalized party system that did not undergo significant deinstitution-
alization during the 1990s. Third, from a programmatic standpoint, FA
successfully overcame the electoral trade-offs that social-democratic par-
ties elsewhere had confronted by moving to the center of the ideologi-
cal spectrum without alienating its historical leftist constituency (Prze-
worski and Sprague 1986). In terms of the social base, however,
whereas typical social-democratic parties faced the challenge of reach-
ing the middle class while holding on to their working-class con-
stituency, FAs original support base came from the organized working
class and progressive sectors of the middle class and the intelligentsia.
Therefore, the partys electoral challenge has been to win over the unor-
ganized poor, historically co-opted by traditional parties, while retaining
strong links to its historical constituency.
In Europe, and more recently in other Latin American cases (i.e.,the
Chilean Socialist Party), the transition from a leftist party with strong ties
to the progressive middle classes and labor unions-especially those cre-
ated under the import substitution model-to a catch-all electoral organ-
ization is a well-worn path in the evolution of successful, vote-maximiz-
ing social-democratic parties seeking to solve the classical trade-off
theorized by Przeworski and Sprague: moving to the center of the ideo-
logical spectrum without alienating the partys historical leftist con-
stituency.2 Because of the distinct sociological and political opportunity
structure FA faces, however, the partys adaptation and its consequences
deviate from both the European path and those of other labor-mobiliz-
ing parties and postneoliberdl electoral movements in Latin America.
For these reasons, the analysis of this case fills an important gap in
the literature and provides a much-needed counterpoint to extant analy-
ses of the trajectory of other members of the new Latin American left.
THEEVOLUTION BASE
OF FAS SOCIAL
AND THE CRAFTING OF THE
2004 ELECTORAL COALITION
Frente Amplio was born in 1971 out of a popular front of Communists,
Socialists, Christian Democrats, leftist independents, and splinters from
both of Uruguays traditional parties. That front would compete with
two catch-all parties that had dominated Uruguayan politics since the
nineteenth ~ e n t u r yToday,
.~ FA comprises 16 fractions.* As one of the
regions oldest and most institutionalized leftist parties, it is the most
resilient example of a leftist popular front in Latin America. Recently, FA
has also crafted broader electoral alliances with splinters from the tradi-
tional parties, creating the Encuentro Progresista (EP) in 1994 and the
Nueva Mayoria (NM) in 2004. The latter provided a way back into the
party for part of the fraction called Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo
(PGP), a moderate center-left group that left FA in 1989 to create the NE,
after having obtained the largest plurality within FA in 1984.
FA emerged in the context of an institutionalized, pluralist party
system and the presence of an already autonomous labor movement.
Nevertheless, the influence of the Communist Party (CP) within FA led
to the development of a Marxist-Leninist strategy in relation to labor,
while the Socialist Party (SP) retained its historical influence in the stu-
dent movement and the intellectual strata. For these reasons, FA had
evolved by 1990 into a labor-oriented mass party with a relatively weak
capacity for encapsulating non-working-class subordinated sectors that
Table 1. Electoral Results, 1942-1999 (percent)

Colorado Blanco Frente Nuevo
Party Party Catholics Marxists Amplio Espacio Others Total
1942 57.2 34.5 4.3 4.1 0 100
1946 46.3 40.4 5.2 7.2 0.8 100
1950 52.3 38.3 4.4 4.4 0.6 100
1954 50.5 38.9 5.0 5.5 0 100
1958 37.7 49.7 3.7 6.2 2.7 100
1962 44.5 46.5 3.0 5.8 0.1 100
1966 49.3 40.3 3.0 6.6 0.7 100
1971 41.0 40.2 18.3 0.6 100
1984 30.3 35.0 2.4 21.3 0.0 100
1989 30.3 38.9 21.2 9.0 0.6 100
1994 32.3 31.2 30.6 5.2 0.7 100
1999 32.7 22.2 0.2 40.3 4.6 100
2004 10.4 34.3 50.7 2.5 100
Source: Buquet 2005.
had already been co-opted by the clientelistic machines of both tradi-

tional parties (Panizza 1990).5
The historical brotherhood of FA and labor is manifest in the
partys adoption of the union confederations manifesto as the keystone
of its traditional programmatic platform (1971-94), the continuous inter-
action between union and party leaders, and the reliance on labor as
the partys transmission belt. Since the CPs crisis following the fall of
the Soviet Union, however, different fractions of FA have competed to
control a labor base that has gradually gained autonomy and become
more radicalized as the party has begun to moderate. Today, several
fractions are represented, and compete within both the labor and stu-
dent movements. Although the historical brotherhood remains, the
harsh confrontation in 2002-3 between the FA-led municipal govern-
ment of Montevideo and the municipal employees union suggests that
labor might become a significant challenge for the FA government in the
future (Doglio et al. 2004).
The above events notwithstanding, FA grew stronger precisely
when the economic model into which labor was politically incorporated
stagnated. Especially after 1989, FA gradually became the most-voted-for
party in the country (see table 1). When the partys performance is ana-
lyzed across socially heterogeneous constituency groups, however, it
becomes clear that voter support grew by different degrees and at dif-
ferent times across distinct social strata.6
Table 2 (page 8 ) describes FAS historical performance in 18 Mon-
tevideo neighborhoods (one for each of the citys municipal zones). It
further classifies the neighborhoods into terciles that reflect different

levels of social development. The same analytical strategy is then
applied to information on electoral behavior in the 18 electoral districts
of the countrys interior. This methodological strategy provides the best
available estimation of the evolution of electoral behavior by geograph-
ical units for which concurrent sociodemographic information is avail-
able. Table 2 also presents the rate of FAs electoral growth, obtained by
taking each previous election as base 100 and comparing the share of
the vote obtained by the party in 2004.
As table 2 shows, during the 1984-2004 period, FA grew signifi-
cantly stronger in all three social strata. Nevertheless, in Montevideo,
FAs electoral growth was especially concentrated in the lower social
strata, where its emergent constituency was consolidated in the election
of 1999 rather than in 1984 and 1989. An important point is that the
greatest surge in support from this social segment occurred not in 2004,
when support from the other two segments rose, but in 1994, after FAs
arrival in municipal government in 1989. It is quite notable that in 1994,
the party was able to capture traditional clientelistic strongholds of the
Colorado and Blanco parties in Montevideos periphery, as Mieres
describes (1994). For instance, in zone 17 (Cerro, Casab6, Pajas Blancas,
and Santa Catalina), where poverty affected 47.1 percent of households
(and where 75.8 percent of residents voted for FA in 2004), a 15 percent
electoral share increase in favor of FA was observed between 1989 (42.3
percent) and 1994 (57.7 percent). This is further illustrated by a corre-
lation analysis of vote shares over time in each zone, which demon-
strates significant inconsistencies (lower correlations) between the vote
shares of 2004 and those of 1984 (.36) and 1989 (.79**).1 Since 1994,
except for inertial electoral growth (i.e., national average interelection
growth) witnessed in each zone, relative electoral returns display great
stability, with highly significant and strong correlations obtained
(1994=.97**,1999=.96**).Therefore, the most significant realignment of
lower sectors with FA happened between 1984 and 1994.
Although it began with a higher electoral support base in 1984, FAs
performance in the middle strata presents a growth trend similar to that
observed in the lower strata, thereby illustrating the partys capacity to
maintain and expand its hold on social sectors closer to its historical
constituency. Meanwhile, in 2004, in the aftermath of the economic col-
lapse of 2002, FA grew almost evenly across all three social strata,
making significant inroads into upper social sectors that may have been
alienated by economic malaise. For instance, in zone 5 (Pocitos, Punta
Gorda, Buceo), where only 3.4 percent of households were poor in
2004 and where FA had increased its electoral share by only 6.7 percent
in all previous elections (33 percent in 1984, 39.7 percent in 1999), sup-
port for the party grew by almost 10 percent in 2004 (49.4 percent).
Table 2 . Frente Amplios Electoral Share and Growth Rates per Year
by Social Strata, Montevideo and the Interior
FAS Share (%> Growth Rates (%>

52
Social Strata 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 1984=100 1989=100 1994=100 1999=100
>
Montevideo wz
Upper 33.3 32.2 40.3 46.6 57.1 171.8 177.6 141.7 122.8
Middle 35.8 36.5 47.1 54.7 65.9 183.6 180.2 140.3 120.5
92:
Low 31.9 34.3 47.2 56.7 67.7 213.7 198.3 143.9 119.4
Total 33.7 34.3 44.9 52.7 63.5 189.7 185.4 141.9 120.9
8c
=!
Q
Interior >
Upper 8.9 9.3 17.3 32.9 40.5 491.9 454.5 237.5 122.9 8
Middle 9.3 9.3 17.8 34.7 42.0 488.1 496.1 248.0 121.1 8
Low 8.2 6.6 16.2 33.0 38.7 512.0 614.0 257.9 118.9
Total 8.8 8.4 17.1 33.5 40.4 497.4 521.5 247.8 121.0
Source: Calculations based on Moreira 2005, 3741.
h
9
h
Figures from the countrys interior complement this portrait. In spite

of presenting relatively lower levels of electoral support for the party
(lower still than those obtained in Montevideo in 1994), the data illus-
trate FAs progressive consolidation as a national party. In this regard,
taking 1984 as a baseline, electoral growth rates are significantly higher
in the interior than in Montevideo. In this case, coinciding with the first
presidential and congressional elections that were held independently
of municipal contests (and therefore with less influence from traditional
local caudillos), at an average of 16.4 percent, 1999 represents the single
most significant instance of FAs electoral growth. FAs performance in
2004 is relatively homogeneous across different social strata, with
middle sectors presenting only slightly higher levels of support for the
party than both upper and lower strata. Although no significant differ-
ences of means were obtained, the evolution of the partys social base
appears the opposite of that observed in Montevideo. Although FA grew
more markedly in the lower strata compared to 1984, 1989, and 1994,
moreover, the absolute vote share the party obtained in this segment is
the smallest, a significant divergence from Montevideo, where FA con-
trols the municipal government.
FAs constituency has therefore come together at different paces and
through different sociopolitical processes, which affected certain social
segments in Montevideo and the interior at different times. The contrast
between these two regions also underscores how control of the local
government interacted with national factors to affect the partys con-
stituency composition in each district.
Although FA has been treated thus far as a single actor, it should also
be noted that individual party fractions perform differently within the
overall leftist constituency. Table 3 presents the fractional distribution of
FAs electoral vote in Montevideo in 1999, the latest election for which
data are available. For simplicitys sake, the table presents results for four
major fractions of the party: the Communist Party (CP), the Socialist Party
(SP), the Movimiento de Participacibn Popular (MPP), and the Asamblea
Uruguay (AU). In the election of 2004, these fractions obtained nearly
70 percent of the overall vote captured by FA. Moreover, the MPP (29.2
percent), AU (17.7 percent), and SP (14.4 percent) were the three most-
voted-for fractions of FA at the congressional level. While the SP and the
CP represent traditional Marxist fractions, the MPP and AU are relatively
new elements. The former originated from the Tupamaro urban guerrilla
movement of the late 1960s, which, after democratization, witnessed a
progressive shift from a verticalist military organization to a democratic
party apparatus. The AU, in contrast, originated from a grouping of inde-
pendent frentistas and prorenovation splinters of the CP.
As table 3 shows, the CP and the SP performed. especially well
among low and middle sectors. Additionally, in 1999, the SP had already
Table 3. Internal Distribution of Votes in Montevideo by Social Strata,

1999 (percent)
Social Structure Index CP SP AU MPP
Low 7.8 29.5 16.9 17.2
Middle 6.4 27.6 19.5 17.2
High 4.9 22.9 22.4 17.0
Total 6.4 26.7 19.6 17.1
Note: Figures represent the mean proportion of votes obtained by the fractions in
the zones representing each social stratum.
captured an important share of the lower sectors. This can be explained,

at least partly, by the association of the increasingly popular Tabari.
Vizquez (Montevideos first FA mayor, and a presidential candidate
since 1994) with this fraction of FA. Meanwhile, the MPP, which had a
cross-class constituency in 1999, performed relatively the same among
each population segment. The AUs vote distribution is a virtual mirror
image of that obtained for both Marxist fractions, with its centrist pro-
file drawing support in high and middle strata.
FAs fractions therefore tend to show divergent degrees of con-
stituency specialization,which contributes to the catch-all configuration
of the party. The ability of this internally heterogeneous coalition to
remain unified is a crucial factor in explaining FAs electoral success.
The electoral bandwagon of FA came together in 2004 to produce
the first-ever presidential victory by a nontraditional party in Uruguay.
To this end, it benefited from the sociological and political-institutional
opportunity structures that emerged during the 1990s and from a com-
plex adaptation strategy that allowed it to profit from such opportuni-
ties without alienating its traditional base.
THESOCIOLOGICAL
OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE
From a strictly sociological point of view, the strong correlation between
age and party identification that was already apparent in the 1971 elec-
tions (with younger voters consistently favoring FA and older ones align-
ing with traditional parties) gave rise to a demographic explanation for
FAs growth.12This sociological explanation became the most commonly
accepted one in Uruguayan political science (Buquet and De Armas
2004; see also Aguiar 2000; Canzani 2000; Gonzilez and Queirolo 2000).
According to this approach, over time, those who strongly identify
with traditional parties would naturally exit the electorate, automatically
decreasing their numbers among a renewed citizenry that would
become progressively dominated by FA identifiers. Although the empir-

ical evidence supports to some degree the presence of such a signifi-
cant structural trend-which, according to Buquet and De Armas,
explains roughly 52 percent of FAs electoral growth between 1984 and
1999-the data also suggest a need for additional explanations (Buquet
and De Armas 2004, 126). Moreover, the evidence already presented on
the evolution of FAs social base makes it clear that the partys electoral
growth was not smoothly distributed over time and among socioeco-
nomic segments of society, as a purely sociological explanation would
predict. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of the complex
causal process that produced the electoral result of 2004 is needed.
As stressed by Roberts (20021, the Uruguayan case presents an
unusual combination of an elite party system that witnessed relatively
high levels of IS1 (which peaked in the 1950s and 1960~1,particularly in
regard to the expansion of its welfare state and the extent of economic
protectionism. This combination is crucial to understanding the emer-
gence of a labor-mobilizing party in the 1990s, which transformed the
traditional party system differently from the transformations witnessed
in other institutionalized elite two-party systems (i.e., Venezuela,
Colombia, and Costa Rica).
As the crisis of the development model took hold and reform
advanced in Uruguay, a system that was dominated by nonprogram-
matic linkages became increasingly programmatically oriented. In this
setting, FA expanded its electoral support by defending the organiza-
tions of IS1 beneficiaries. At the same time, FA began to provide an alter-
native leadership to those who felt alienated by economic malaise, as
well as those who were increasingly marginalized by the clientelistic
machines of both traditional parties. Increasing fiscal deficits explain
why those political machines became less efficient in ensuring electoral
support. In sum, FAs growth helped to contain popular discontent
while it also enhanced the level of interest aggregation in society and
the significance of programmatic linkages for party competition.
Moreover, the presence of strong traditional partisan subcultures
and the gradual nature of the reforms (and economic decay) protected
the country against electoral dealignment; it also provided the basis for
a programmatic realignment in the 1990s, through which FA became the
reinterpreter of Butllismo, as traditional parties promoted state reforms
and economic liberalization. Butllismo owes its name to Jose Batlle y
Ordbiiez, a Colorado Party leader who presided over the country during
the first two decades of the twentieth century and sought to create a
model country by pursuing a social-democratic model based on the
creation of a strong state. During the first half of the century, the imple-
mentation of that model coincided with impressive levels of social wel-
fare (Panizza 1990). As the effects of the gradual but unrelenting eco-
nomic crisis that began shortly after WWII became more visible, Bat-
llismo became the predominant ideology in the country, and thus was
the symbol of Uruguays happy past.
Accordingly, in 2004, the Uruguayan electorate was still the most
statist in Latin America, its citizens rating the states responsibility for
peoples welfare at 6.02 (against a regional average of 5.2) on a ten-
point scale. Likewise, Uruguayans were the least convinced of the
market economys ability to promote development, with 50 percent
expressing confidence in the market, compared to the Latin American
average of 63.1 percent. Moreover, while 60 percent of Latin Americans
in general agreed that private enterprise was needed for economic
development, only 49 percent of Uruguayans thought so (Latino-
barbmetro 2004).
The programmatic partisan realignment observed in Uruguay during
the 1990s is linked to long-term developments. As economic growth
slowed in the mid-l950s, education, urbanization, and the labor supply
continued to grow. The excess labor supply became a major social prob-
lem as families struggled to maintain their previous consumption levels.
While the tension between high expectations and the growth of open
unemployment fostered discontent, both traditional parties intensified
their reliance on patronage to fight structural unemployment and avoid
social conflict (Aguiar 1984). In the medium run, however, the economic
crisis triggered partly by this political adjustment mechanism catalyzed
social discontent and political polarization during the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1973 military coup was a terrible corollary of this downward
spiral in the wake of ISIs exhaustion. Its political repressiveness
notwithstanding, however, the Uruguayan military regime (1973-85)
was characterized as an authoritarian parenthesis that did not succeed
in transforming the countrys political structures. Despite the military
repression of the dictatorship, moreover, civil society organizations and
interest groups remained relatively strong. These organizations would
eventually build strong ties with FA when they joined together to
oppose neoliberal reforms after the countrys redemocratization.
Additionally, apart from some macroeconomic reforms and trade
liberalization, the Uruguayan military did not embark on massive struc-
tural and institutional reforms (Castiglioni 2005). Therefore, after the
return to democracy, a significant proportion of the population was still
entitled to IS1 benefits. Table 4 provides comparative evidence for this
claim by displaying the levels of public social expenditure in five coun-
tries governed by leftist governments circa 2000-2001. As the table
shows, Uruguay still has the highest level of state-provided social assis-
tance in the region, a point that has important implications for politics.
For instance, in the 1999 election, pension beneficiaries (30 percent)
and public employees (9 percent) represented almost 40 percent of the
Table 4. Social Expenditures in Five Latin American Countries

Per Capita Social Social Social Expenditures/
Expenditures Expenditures/ Public Sector
(1997 constant US$) GDP (%I Expenditures (%)
Chile 936 16.0 69.7
Brazil 936 18.8 61.6
Bolivia 183 17.9 60.4
Venezuela 402 11.3 37.9
Uruguay 1,494 23.5 75.0
Source: Authors construction, based on data reported in CEPAL 2004, 777.
electorate; and in addition to their quantitative weight, both interest

groups were well 0 r g a n i ~ e d . l ~
In a representative democracy that escaped the patterns of hyper-
presidentialism and delegation that prevailed in the region in the 1990s,
the organizations of IS1 beneficiaries allied with FA to oppose attempts
at neoliberal reform. In confronting reformist attempts led by subse-
quent government coalitions of the Blanco and Colorado fractions, this
IS1 coalition relied on congressional representation and direct democ-
racy mechanisms to block reforms (Filgueira and Papadopulos 1996;
Castiglioni 2005). Indeed, the use of direct democracy mechanisms
against reform proposals became a crucial part of FASopposition strat-
egy (Altman 2002). The presence of a veto coalition identified with FA
and opposed to reformist attempts synergized the ideological hegemony
of the statist Butllisrno (even within fractions of the Colorado Party led
by ex-president Julio Sanguinetti) and became the crux of party com-
petition in the 1990s.
In this context, as the party system became more and more com-
petitive, with the parallel decline of traditional parties and growth of FA,
the Blancos and Colorados were limited in the reforms they could intro-
duce. Indeed, reform attempts were usually made in policy areas char-
acterized by dispersed, low-profile interests (i.e., trade openness and
financial liberalization). When broader social policy reforms were imple-
mented during Sanguinettis second presidential term (1990-95), they
were designed to avoid hurting the interests of powerful groups, such
as pensioners (Castiglioni 2005). Consequently, whereas the Index of
Economic Freedom rates Uruguay as the second most liberalized econ-
omy in Latin America (after Chile), the country ranks comparatively
lower than Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica on Evans
and Rauchs 1999 Weberianness scale because of its lack of significant
state reform during the posttransition period (Panizza 2004). Over the
last decade, social expenditures (particularly pensions) have also
increased as a percentage of GDP, making Uruguay the Latin American

country that spends the most o n social programs.
In short, posttransitional governments implemented an inconsistent
policy mix that combined some elements of the Washington Consensus
(trade and financial liberalization) with components of the state-centric
model. Although in the short run this policy configuration reduced the
social costs of reform, its incoherence contributed to the socioeconomic
collapse of 2002, which mirrored that of neighboring Argentina in terms
of its economic scope and social effects. During the 1990s, the rising
fiscal deficit was financed partly by growing public utility and oil tariffs
and an expanding tax burden. Until 1998, when the Asian crisis hit, an
overvalued currency (that was, however, aligned with those of the
countrys major trading partners, Brazil and Argentina) helped to lighten
the fiscal load by appreciating real wages. The availability of cheap
imports also helped to raise living standards. These imports were
financed through capital investments in the financial system, which
helped to hide the emerging trade deficit.
The steady deindustrialization of the economy, a sustained economic
crisis in the agricultural sector, and the exponential increase of unem-
ployment, which grew from 8.5 percent in 1990 to 18.3 percent in 2003
(INE 20051, were the socioeconomic partners of the inconsistent equilib-
rium of the 1990s. Though significant reductions in poverty and inequal-
ity were achieved in the 1990-94 period, the increased social expendi-
ture was not sufficient to offset the social effects of trade liberalization
and currency overvaluation. Indeed, even during periods of sustained
economic growth (1994-971, both of those indicators worsened.l 4
The distribution of political power within and among specific social
groups was also reshaped during this period. Higher unemployment in
the private sector and the reincorporation of industrial workers into the
service and informal economies caused union membership to decline
sharply, particularly in the private sector. With a 50 percent overall
decline in union membership, public workers unions grew from 49 per-
cent of all union affiliates in 1987 to 59 percent in 2001 (Supervielle and
QuifiBnez 2003).
In this context, social sectors with greater organizational capacity
and the political leverage to veto reforms were better able to protect
their interests; but more vulnerable sectors of the population that had
never entered the substitutive state-centered model or that had been
expelled from it during the crisis became less and less able to deal with
the costs of adjustment. This disparity was evident in the uneven evo-
lution of real wages and unemployment rates in the private and public
sectors. A further illustration of this unequal capacity to ride out the
storm is in the real value of pensions compared to family allowances
targeted to poor families with children. Though poverty rates for
Uruguayan children are extremely high (42 percent of infants to 5-year-

olds live in poverty, compared to 8 percent of Uruguayans 65 and
older), from 1991 to 1999, the real value of family allowances decreased
by 47 percent, while pensions real value grew by 60 percent over the
same period (Filgueira and Kaztman 2001).
Against this sociostructural backdrop, despite their seemingly con-
tradictory interests, both the original (ISI) and emerging constituencies
of FA consolidated and even grew during the 1990s. The prevailing
political-institutional context helped to allow FA to strengthen its grip on
both groups.
THEPOLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURE
Several political factors set the stage for FAs electoral advance. The lack
of viable political alternatives to the left of FA was a crucial precondi-
tion that facilitated the partys transition to the ideological center.
Among institutional and strategic factors, FAs virtual hegemony on the
left was also facilitated by the development of a strong frenteumplistu
subculture in the country. Whereas the Blanco and Colorado identities
are rooted in the civil wars of the nineteenth century, the FAs epic is
based on popular opposition to the military regime, which focused its
repression on the partys activists. FAs appropriation and reinterpreta-
tion of Butllismo and its control of key vehicles of political socialization
also helped to solidify a strong partisan subculture that became instru-
mental in maintaining party unity despite its increasing internal hetero-
geneity. The relative strength of this identity is reflected in the high
transmission of frenteumplismo partisan identity from one generation to
the next; this kind of transmission process occurs much less frequently
among members of traditional parties (see Moreira 2000).
Indeed, discontent with traditional parties has benefited FA enor-
mously. Political dissatisfaction has built up gradually since the mid-l950s,
when Uruguayans began to seek change by switching first between tra-
ditional party fractions and then between parties themselves, leading to
significant alternation within the traditional bloc (Gonzdez 1995). How-
ever, the 2002 economic collapse exacerbated the growing crisis, pro-
ducing both direct and indirect impacts on electoral behavior. While dis-
contented voters became alienated from governing parties as a result of
economic decay, the fiscal crisis hindered the ability of both parties to
feed their political machines. As a result, not only voters but also tradi-
tional party activists, and even some fraction leaders, grew alienated from
the Blancos and Colorados. Therefore, the failure of traditional party lead-
ers to fulfill clientelistic pacts with their constituents and brokers paved
the way for the FA to make inroads with these groups. Comments from
two local leaders, one Colorado and one Blanco, illustrate this point.
[Elvery weekend, I went out to talk to the people. Today, I dont do

it anymore. . . . We cannot go out and promise what we dont have.
(Aliano 2003)
The political power in Montevideo is forgetting us. . . . they did not

provide us with political offices. , . . [We]have people working all
year round, and they are the ones keeping the presence of the party
alive. Then when elections come, they benefit from that. But when
we go there, they shut the door in your face. And if the party has
no reciprocity with us, we cannot provide for the people. Then how
can I go and ask them for their vote? (Creceri 2003)
Traditional clientelism has also weakened because of patrons dis-

satisfaction with its payoffs.
For us, clientelism has been a total disaster. Every public employee
seems to have been appointed by FA. . . . We put them there and
six months after they turn leftist. . . . Like every communist, they
are traitors. (Cortis 2003)
Meanwhile, FASgreater capacity to mobilize activists ideologically also

gives the party a competitive advantage. In the words of one Colorado
member of Congress,
The sectors that we used to relate to in this way [a clientelistic

vote] are now voting for the FA. Today we have lost our base organ-
izations; we only have a traditional but intermittent organization
that is quickly mobilized during elections. . . . FA has a great activist
base that is much cheaper to maintain. (Pais 2002)
For its part, the constitutional reform of 1996 produced other nega-
tive externalities for traditional parties. l 5 First, the mandatory presiden-
tial primaries and the elimination of the double simultaneous vote for
the upper house made it more difficult to maintain the traditional elec-
toral cooperatives that had allowed Blancos and Colorados to expand
their electoral menu by enhancing internal competition among alterna-
tive leaderships. Second, the separation of local elections from national
ones hindered the articulation of efficient electoral pacts between local
caudillos and national candidates. This was especially evident when
mayors were asked to support a national party candidacy that did not
coincide with their fraction, or when they perceived that actively cam-
paigning in support of an unpopular option might hinder their own
electoral chances in the upcoming local election. In both cases they
reserved their political machine for local elections (Ramos 2003). At
the national level, especially in 1999, this translated into a significant
gap between national and local electoral results, with FA winning favor
in the former.
Both traditional parties thus have suffered a process of progressive

oligarchization, which has hindered the renewal of party leadership and
weakened their capacity to maintain an active partisan apparatus and
extensive and internally diverse caudillo networks. FAs near-victory in
the 1994 election, moreover, increased the perceived costs of losing
office for both traditional parties. Up to 1994, the traditional party in
opposition sought to benefit from the votes lost by the incumbent, usu-
ally free-riding by withholding support for electorally harmful reforms
(Filgueira and Filgueira 1997). But in 1995, a stronger coalition between
the two traditional parties arose. In this scenario, along with other sig-
nificant reforms (social security and education), the two traditional par-
ties joined forces to change the electoral system for presidential contests
into a runoff, in order to avoid FAs immediate electoral victory. How-
ever, this also consolidated a bipolar competitive logic in the system that
was structured around a traditional party family (then in government)
and a leftist family (in the opposition) composed of the FA and the NE.
Thereafter, both ideological families consistently appeared at crit-
ical moments, especially during the electoral processes of 1999-2000
and 2004-5.16 This emerging logic of competition further decreased tra-
ditional parties capacity to differentiate their programmatic platforms
from one another and created a situation in which both parties were
held accountable for the status quo regardless of whether they held the
presidency.
Competing in this political-institutional context, FA was able to make
significant electoral inroads during the 1990s. The final outcome, how-
ever, cannot be explained without accounting for the partys capacity to
adapt and profit from the favorable opportunity structure it confronted.
ADAPTATIONPATTERN
FAs PARTISAN
Beginning in the early 1990s, FA experienced a complex process of ide-
ological and programmatic renovation, gradually replacing its original
anti-imperialistand anti-oligarchicplatforms with a progressive pro-
grammatic stance centered on opposition to neoliberal reforms and a

reinterpretation and appropriation of Batllismo. During this period, FA
achieved two seemingly contradictory objectives, which came as exter-
nalities of leadership disputes (Yaffi. 2005). First, it consolidated its
image as the opposition against the traditional party family. Second, it
moderated its program and expanded its electoral menu through frac-
tionalization, becoming increasingly catch-all. In addition, in spite of its
increasing electoral orientation, the party managed to maintain a com-
paratively larger and more vibrant activist apparatus in the streets than
those of the Blancos and Colorados. FA accomplished this by mobiliz-
ing activists between elections in attempts to block promarket legisla-
tion enacted or proposed by the governing coalition using direct

democracy mechanisms.
FAs renewal coincided with the collapse of global Communism in
1989 and the partys election to the municipal government of Montev-
ideo in 1990. In the face of significant internal opposition, led by FAs
historical leader (Liber Seregni) and other conspicuous party figures
(especially Danilo Astori), Tabari. Vizquez was elected mayor. Before
this, Vizquez had been a relatively unknown Socialist activist. His vision
for programmatic renovation included pursuing political alliances with
centrist groups outside the party.
Thus, between the national congressional elections of 1991 and
1994, FAs internal politics were characterized by harsh confrontation
between moderates (led by Vazquez with the support of Socialists,
Christian Democrats, the PGP, the Vertiente Artiguista, the prorenovation
fraction of the CP, and Blanco leaders from the Polo Progresista fraction)
and radicals (of which Astori became the most vocal representative).
Vizquezs objective of crafting a macrc-center-left coalition for the 1994
election crystallized that year with the proposal to create the EP. Ulti-
mately, the CP supported the initiative in the 1994 Congress, breaking
the deadlock that had existed since 1991. This enabled FA moderates to
seek alliances beyond the party and to craft an alternative programmatic
manifesto (that of the EP), eliminating the most radical proposals that
they previously had failed to remove from FAs traditional program.
Following the 1994 electoral defeat, Vizquez had to face additional
leadership challenges to consolidate his own position and to push the
moderation process forward. The confrontation with Seregni and Astori
over the constitutional reform of 1996 was crucial in this respect. While
Vazquez opposed the reform, Seregni (still the president of FA) had
personally negotiated the deal with Blanco and Colorado leaders, and
therefore supported the measure. Seregni, joined by Astori, claimed
that beyond short-term hindrances to FAs electoral chances in 1999,
the partial elimination of the double simultaneous vote and the intro-
duction of one-time presidential candidacies were in line with FAs his-
torical positions.
Seregnis resignation as FA president during the partys 25th anniver-
sary celebration in February 1996, and Vizquezs subsequent ascent to
that post, further consolidated the latters power in the party. Although
the reform was popularly ratified in a plebiscite, Vizquezs stance against
it was supported by 49 percent of the electorate (almost 20 percent
above FAs vote share in the 1994 election). In addition, in the context
of the constitutional reform debate, Vizquezs refusal to adhere to a n
arrangement with the traditional parties consolidated his image as a
harsh opposition leader. Internally, this granted Vizquez the support of
radical groups that, since 1990, had been aligned with Seregni and Astori.
It also produced a crucial shift in the internal and external positioning of

FA leadership and gave Astori a more moderate image for his willingness
to enter into pacts with the traditional family (Yaffi. 2005).
Thereafter, Vazquez received further compensation for his consis-
tent opposition to traditional parties. It included the integration of the
MPP into his internal coalition in 1999 and the results he obtained in the
presidential primary, where he defeated Astori by an uncontestable
margin (82 percent vs. 18 percent). Later that year, Astoris fraction (AU)
suffered further defeat at the polls, obtaining almost 50 percent fewer
votes than the largest internal plurality obtained in the 1994 election (39
percent versus 20 percent).
In spite of their personal confrontation-now centered o n the best
way to organize the opposition (frontal versus pragmatic)-from 1995
on Vizquez and Astori began to concur on the need to moderate the
partys program. FAs moderate stance was also tested during the finan-
cial collapse of 2002. The party proved its commitment to democratic
institutions by supporting the government at a time when it could have
forced its removal by promoting street riots like those seen in Argentina.
Also in 2002, the moderation strategy received another crucial push with
the creation of the Nueva Mayoria (which enabled the return of NE and
the incorporation of other groups splitting from both traditional parties)
(Yaffi. 2005). Although confrontations between Vizquez and Astori con-
tinued during Jorge Batlles presidential term (2000-20051, they centered
progressively on the consolidation of FAs 2004 coalition.1HWhereas
Vkzquezs harsh opposition tactics proved useful in retaining the sup-
port of FAs historical constituency, Astoris pragmatism helped to reas-
sure voters who were alienated from traditional parties but still dis-
trusted FAs potential radicalism.
Thus, during the 1990s, Astori switched his position to become
more moderate. Meanwhile, Vizquez remained an ideologically moder-
ate, pragmatic leader. However, his uncompromising (but accountable)
opposition to the Colorado and Blanco governments won him the sup-
port of radical groups within FA and alienated voters from the traditional
parties. Vazquezs anticipated nomination of Astori as his finance minis-
ter during the 2004 electoral campaign (following Astoris decision not
to contest the FA primary) symbolizes the ultimate convergence of both
leaderships. That convergence enabled the party to maximize FAs elec-
toral appeal across a broad cross-section of voters.
The Municipal Government of Montevideo

The FAs 15-year municipal government experience in Montevideo was
widely vindicated at the polls in 1995 and 1999 and, according to public
opinion polls, enjoyed significantly higher approval levels than parallel
administrations in the interior and at the national level led by Luis

Lacalle, Julio Sanguinetti, and Jorge Batlle during the same period (Can-
zani 2000). This governmental experience was instrumental in fostering
FAs electoral growth in several ways.
First, it contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the
charismatic leadership of Tabari. Vazquez and, from 1995 on, that of
Mariano Arana. Both mayors became highly popular figures, achieving
visibility and popularity that extended beyond Montevideo and was
especially concentrated in the partys emerging constituent segments.
Second, it contributed to moderating the party, proving FAs capac-
ity to rule effectively while at the same time providing its leaders with
much-needed government experience. In this regard, despite con-
fronting well-documented budget discrimination by the national gov-
ernment, this new municipal role was developed in cooperation with
civil society organizations and the private sector and was partly financed
through the implementation of a more progressive tax scheme, a
decrease in tax evasion, and a process of bureaucratic streamlining of
the municipal apparatus (Schelloto 2004). Taking advantage of a
national trend (Laurnaga and Guerrini 19941, FAs municipal administra-
tion went beyond traditional municipal roles to engage more actively in
the promotion of social welfare (especially by providing decentralized
social policy programming), economic development, and cultural poli-
cies (Schelloto 2004; Veneziano 2001).
Third, the administrative deconcentration process-though far less
ambitious than the participatory budgets implemented in Brazil under
the PT-created 18 decentralized municipal offices (Centros Comunales
Zonales, CCZs) and initiated the popular election of zonal councils,
which enabled the party to develop a close to the people administra-
tion. According to a CCZ director, in a marginal neighborhood of Mon-
tevideo, the local center acts like a big ear of the state, where before
there was nothing. And, although often we cannot help [because solu-
tions cannot be found at the municipal level], people leave with the feel-
ing that someone listened to them (Garcia 2002).
Most likely as a result of decentralization and the territorial pene-
tration of the periphery, the FA was able to set u p a powerful political
apparatus that was instrumental in getting close to the people, accom-
panying it in its anguish, and trying to help whenever possible [with
decentralized social programs; i.e., health care and soup kitchens] (Per-
covich 2002). FA thus strengthened its territorial hold by complement-
ing its ongoing mobilization of partisan activists while organizing and
helping former traditional party constituents. As an FA congressional
deputy stated,
M o u always need to participate in meetings in which people are
asking you to solve their particular problems, thats very ingrained.
. . . And when I can, if it is reasonable, I try to help, because many

times you have unnecessarily unfulfilled needs, either due to
bureaucratic problems or peopleslack of knowledge of formal pro-
cedures. . . . Our political party has a neighborhood organization
with which you regularly interrelate, either because they invite you
or because you stop by during the monthly visits. And although
they call you to address a specific problem, you always need to
steal some minutes to talk to them about the common good, about.
. . . how we as a political party are interpreting national events and
seeking improvements. (Rossi 2003)
FAS experience in Montevideo has been crucial both for fostering par-
tisan adaptation and for increasing the partys electoral dominance in the
historical constituencies of both traditional parties. The comparison pre-
sented in table 2 between the social composition of FAs vote in Montev-
ideo and that of the interior (where municipal governments [continued to
be1 infernal vote-generating machines dominated by traditional party
mayors) illustrates the importance of controlling the capitals municipal
government for expanding the electorate in lower segments of society.l9
Reaching FAs Emerging Constituency: AU and MPP
FAs success can also be credited to fractional tactics and their comple-
mentarities, which enabled the FA to reach different electoral cross-sec-
tions. The most recent fractions that were effective in reaching FAs
emerging constituency were the Asamblea Uruguay and the Movimiento
de Participacion Popular; the latter is the more complex and more
recently popular. In different segments of the electorate, both fractions
contributed to the final push toward the election of 2004, in which the
MPP (29.2 percent) and AU (17.7 percent) obtained the two largest plu-
ralities within the FA.
The AUs tactics are structured around the figure of its leader, Danilo
Astori, whose moderate positions have attracted previous supporters of
both traditional parties in the countrys high and middle strata. In effect,
Astori has reduced the costs of entry to FA for previous traditional
party supporters, who have been attracted by the classic third way
platform frequently promoted in the national media.
AU has also developed a network of local leaders who operate
much as local representatives of the traditional parties do, coordinating
problem-solving networks for particularistic needs.
We have learned a lot from the traditional parties, and we are cur-
rently doing things that we used to underrate. We now have a struc-
ture of local leaders, each one of them a caudillo in his place, work-
ing with a team . . . trying to help people to solve their most
immediate needs. (Mahia 2003)
These structures have also allowed AU to gather support from

lower-class voters, particularly in the countrys interior, where the stark
leftist character of other fractions still alarms some citizens.
The MPP recently emerged as a fashionable fraction and a gateway
to FA for all social strata. The characteristics of the new electoral sup-
porters, however, contrast sharply with those of the MPPs founders and
current hardliner activists, who bear the heritage of the MLN-Tupa-
maros. Indeed, the self-critique of the MPPs leaders revolves around the
difficulty of abandoning practices that are efficient in gathering electoral
support but that contradict a bottom-up approach to representation.
The MPPs main features can be grouped around three central
notions (Castro 2002; Agazzi 2002). First, it is organized around a
bottom-up conception inspired by the MLN tradition, in which popular
participation is the building block of political action. Accordingly, win-
ning elections is not winning power, because power is constructed from
below (Agazzi 2002). Second, the MPP is defined as a movement,
without an organic structure. Different organizational manifestations,
ranging from NGOs and research institutes to rural unionization experi-
ences and from the MLN-Tupamdros to the Blanco and Colorado
columns, converge and interact in this heterogeneous fraction. Third,
in tactical terms, the MPP is extremely pragmatic and open, pursuing a
cross-class electoral strategy, as opposed to a classical Leninist
approach. In the words of Jose Mujica, the MPPs most prominent figure:
If it were necessary to grasp power, I would hug a snake (El Especta-
dor 2004).
Without a doubt, the fundamental reason for the MPPs success is
Mujicas charismatic leadership. Indeed, according to survey data, 70 per-
cent of MPP supporters feel essentially tied to his leadership, and only 9
percent of them would continue to vote for this fraction if Mujica left
(Grupo RADAR 2004). Mujicas leadership is sustained by a continuous
presence in the national media and an extensive network of local radio
stations. This network has been essential in reaching the countryside,
where a significant percentage of the emerging MPP constituency
resides. However, these traits are complemented by the significant pres-
ence of local activists, which is enabled by the MPPs powerful territorial
structure.20In addition, Mujica and other leaders continuously tour the
country, holding mateadus (public gatherings to share a mate drink and
talk about current issues). Attendance at mateadas ranges from 5 to 10
in small villages to 2,000 or more in the public squares of Montevideo.
Programmatically, the MPP has focused on the idea of creating a
productive country articulated around agricultural exports and indus-
trialization. Symbolically, the MPP launched its electoral campaign in a n
empty building that was formerly home to a large industrial facility in a
prototypical working-class neighborhood of Montevideo.
Another key element in explaining MPPs electoral growth is the

pursuit of broad alliances with other sectors of the left and, even more
important, with splinters from both traditional parties. In this context,
Espacio-609 was created to accommodate a Blanco and a Colorado
column.21These columns were not directly integrated into the MPP,
but worked within the movement as autonomous organizations. This
political formation, in line with the historical proposal of creating a
Frente Grunde advocated since the transition to democracy by Tupa-
mar0 historical leaders (RaOl Sendic, Eleuterio Fernindez Huidobro,
Eduardo Bonomi, and Jose Mujica), sought to provide a home for
those who decided to join the movement because they were alienated
by the traditional parties and attracted by Mujicas leadership. The
columns provided a place in which these newcomers traditions and tac-
tics were respected and maintained. As one MPP leader explained,
They [the traditional caudillos who entered the columns] have a dif-
ferent way of doing politics . . , [alnd we cannot ask them to change
all of a sudden. . . . We usually have someone acting as a bridge [a
traditional caudillo] and then we go and try, very slowly, to talk to
the people. We reach the Blancos with a ruralist and Artiguist
discourse. And they also like our rebellious past as Tupamdros,
because that is the root of Blanco identity. Meanwhile, we reach the
Colorados talking about the old Batlle. However, if you tell them
about Marx and Lenin, forget it. But we have the common heritage
of a republican and atheist society in which public education and
civil and social rights are sacred, and thats set in stone. Thats Batl-
lismo. And today FAS platform is Batllista, so they approach us
without major prejudices. Also, we dont know yet how an FA gov-
ernment will be, and that provides a ray of hope against the proven
options. We also have a different style. Others within FA incriminate
people for having voted for the Colorados. . . . You can give people
the opportunity to acknowledge that they were mistaken in the past
without being rude. (Topolansky 2002)
The MPP not only grew by pursuing this strategy but, like FA, it
transformed itself and took on key systemic features that enabled FA to
win the 2004 election. In so doing, both the MPP and the FA could
extend their historical constituency to reach the broad electoral coalition
described above.
AND IMPLICATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
By successfully adapting to the favorable sociological and political-insti-
tutional opportunity structures yielded by the path-dependent trajectory
observed in Uruguay, FA decisively won the October 2004 election, and
Tabare Vizquez assumed presidential office in March 2005. That victory
resulted neither from a sudden collapse of the opposing parties nor

from a process of party system deinstitutionalization.
Instead, as an opposition party, the FA successfully articulated a
strategy that gradually allowed it to gain support among segments of the
population that had historically supported the traditional parties, while
avoiding alienating its traditional leftist constituency. In so doing, FA fol-
lowed a specific path from a Marxist mass party to an electoral-profes-
sional one, pursuing a catch-all strategy while still providing consistent
opposition to neoliberal reforms, and thereby collecting and channeling
social discontent with the other parties in the system. Moreover, the FAs
programmatic realignment around BatZZismo allowed it to increase the
level of programmatic linkages between the party and poor constituents.
This achievement was based on a strategy of opposing incumbents (and
their policy choices) in the media while penetrating clientelistic strong-
holds of traditional parties with its activist base.
In addition, the partys moderation, fractionalization, and leadership
disputes, instead of hindering the partys electoral chances, helped the
party to widen its electoral menu through fractionalization while the
electoral menu of the two traditional parties increasingly narrowed. FAs
efficient administration of the municipal government of Montevideo, the
development of a charismatic leadership, and its engagement in social
policy provision and decentralization were also crucial to expanding its
constituency in the periphery of the city.
In March 2005, the party reached office under favorable circum-
stances. Economic growth had resumed, and the party had been success-
ful in moderating demands during the campaign by continuously stressing
the lack of magical solutions for the countrys problems and the need to
prioritize the requirements of the neediest in Uruguayan society.
However, the party now draws support from a socially diverse con-
stituency, which can be schematically portrayed as composed of two
groups with contrasting interests and diverging degrees of organization.
The partys historical constituency comprises groups that seek to defend
the remnants of the state-centric model. This constituency is represented
largely by unions tied to inward-oriented production (where state
employees are predominant) and pension beneficiaries. During the
1990s, relying on their own organizational capacity and forging a tacit
alliance with FA, these social groups were better able than other social
segments of the population to protect their interests from attempts at
neoliberal reform.
Meanwhile, FA has also gradually consolidated its electoral grip o n
more vulnerable sectors of the population, who never participated in
the substitutive state-centered model or who were expelled from it
during its crisis and have consistently lost the ability to pay the costs of
adjustment. Since 1994 in Montevideo, and more recently in the interior
of the country, FA has absorbed an emergent constituency that com-

prises informal sector workers, the unemployed, a middle class suffer-
ing downward mobility, rural workers, small merchants, agricultural
producers, and even some elite sectors.
Therefore, whereas the partys traditional constituency might
become alienated by reformist attempts, and possesses the organiza-
tional capacity to block them, the emergent constituency lacks such
organizational capacity, and its recent allegiance to FA is especially
motivated by economic and political discontent with the status quo. As
a result, the emerging constituency might become alienated from the
party if tangible improvements are not forthcoming.22
Governing an increasingly fragmented society that is facing the
challenges of adjusting to globalization and financial dependence, FA
may find itself caught between the contradictory demands of its socially
heterogeneous constituencies while seeking to build policy-oriented
coalitions. Moreover, if this distributive conflict translates into fractional
disputes within the party, it might eventually hinder FAs government
performance.
From a comparative perspective, FAs electoral success story illus-
trates the challenges faced by leftist alternatives in contemporary Latin
America. In particular, such parties must consolidate stable policy coali-
tions in a context of extremely fragmented and unequal societies and
against a backdrop of globalization and financial dependence. Unlike
the challenges that confront the European left, these challenges are
related more to the specific composition of left electorates and the par-
ticular political economy of dismantling the state-centered sociopolitical
configuration. These conditions may also be linked to the weakness of
contemporary party systems and the significant failures in political rep-
resentation that have occurred in the region.
In other Latin American cases, the erosion of historical parties
capacity to provide nonprogrammatic side payments to their con-
stituents led either to party system collapse (e.g., in Venezuela), increas-
ing voter alienation (Costa Rica), a mixture of both partial collapse and
alienation (Colombia), or recrafted patterns of nonprogrammatic co-
optation by incumbents (Peru under Fujimori, Argentina under Justicial-
istas governments, and Venezuela under Chiivez). Uruguay, however,
escaped such rapid party system deinstitutionalization. This outcome
may be explained by the existence of a highly institutionalized, uncon-
taminated party with a developed network of friendly interest groups,
good territorial organization, consolidated leadership, programmatic
appeal, and governing experience at the municipal level, all operating
in a context of decaying opportunities for financing nonprogrammatic
linkages and the enduring presence of strong partisan subcultures that
consolidated a new bipolar logic of competition between party families.
During the 1990s, FA therefore contributed t o t h e programmatic struc-

turing of the Uruguayan party system and the containment of popular
discontent with the system. T h e challenge it faces will be to deliver t o
its heterogeneous electorate in order to avoid t h e deeper partisan dein-
stitutionalization s e e n in other systems in t h e region.
I wish to thank Fernando Filgueira, Evelyne Huber, Jonathan Hartlyn, Jen-

nifer Pribble, David Altman, Robert Funk, and four anonymous reviewers for
their valuable comments on an earlier draft. I am responsible for any remaining
errors. The evidence presented in this paper is the result of fieldwork in
Uruguay funded by a REACH Fellowship awarded in 2001 by UCIS at UNC-CH.
Additional funding was provided by FONDECYT project #1060760. This article
is dedicated to Carlos Filgueira, whose recent and untimely death, in addition
to being a personal loss, left a vast vacuum in Uruguayan social science. As one
among many who benefited from Carloss immense generosity, collegiality, and
personal commitment to improving our society, I strive to live up to the high
standard he set.
1. See Filgueira 1999 for an extremely suggestive discussion of different
sociostructural pathways yielded by different IS1 configurations and their poten-
tial for structuring political competition today.
2. Although the sociological overtones of Paper Stones were criticized both
theoretically and empirically, the notion of electoral trade-offs remains analyti-
cally powerful. Here, the argument follows Kitschelt 1994, incorporating
processes of collective political preference formation and party strategy while
discussing trade-offs.
3. For an excellent account of the Uruguayan party system, see Gonzhlez
1995.
4. For reasons already argued by several authors (see, e.g., Gonzklez 1995,
142, n. 10; Altman 2000, 278-791, the use of the termfraction instead of faction
is more appropriate for describing LJruguayan politics. The effective number of
FA fractions changed from 3.6 in 1971 to 4.2 in 2004, reaching its lowest level
(2.3) in 1989 (Yaffi. 2005).
5. This is a stylized characterization based on the predominant party-voter
linkage strategies in the system. See Altman 2000 for a characterization of pro-
grammatic profiles of parties and fractions.
6. See Moreira 2000 and 2005 for additional evidence and a similar argu-
ment. The data presented in this section partially draw on hers.
7 . Terciles were computed over a one-dimensional factor analysis solution
combining the percentage of population with at least some university educa-
tion in 1999 (ranging between 1.5 percent and 28.1 percent) and the percent-
age of households living below the poverty line in 2004 (ranging between 3.2
percent and 48.3 percent). Both variables are correlated at a .98 level (Spear-
mans coefficient).
8. Because COmpardbk education information was not available at the
regional level, terciles were created only for poverty estimates.
9. Significant differences between lower strata and both middle and upper
ones were obtained when comparing FAs electoral growth rates, taking 1984
and 1989 as a baseline, using one-way ANOVA.
10. Reported coefficients correspond to Spearmans correlations of elec-
toral returns in Montevideos 18 zones. Source: Raw data reported by Moreira
(2005, 37-41).
11. These data were compiled on the basis of Corte Electoral reports con-
taining electoral returns by vote identification series. Those series were georef-
erenced following Mieres 1994. A sociostructural index at the neighborhood
level was created in terciles based on a one-dimensional factor analysis solution
generated from social indicators described in Kaztman 1999, 329-40.
12. Cksar Aguiar proposed the so-called demographic hypothesis in 1984,
which then became widely accepted in Uruguayan political analysis. See Buqiiet
and De Armas 2004 for a review and critical assessment of this explanation.
13. Calculated using the number of pension beneficiaries (Filgueira and
Kaztman 2001) and data from the Corte Electoral on registered voters in 1999.
14. While the percentage of people living under the poverty line was 25.5
in 1991, it reached 32.5 percent in 2002. Meanwhile, the Gini coefficient rose
from 41.05 in 1991 to 43.16 in 2000 (De Le6n 2004).
15. See Gonziilez 1995 for a description of the previous electoral system
and the incentives it provided to political parties.
16. The only time a political alliance cut across partisan ideological fami-
lies was 1992, when the leading fraction of the Colorado Party opposed the gov-
erning Blanco Party, establishing an implicit alliance with the FA to reject a law
seeking to privatize public enterprises.
17. This section draws on the careful historical reconstruction and narrative
offered by Yaffe 2005. See also the works in Lanzaro 2004b.
18. Those confrontations reached their peak in 2003 in discussions of a law
that sought to merge the state-owned oil refinery with a private partner. The law
was opposed by the companys union and by Vizquez, who once again
defeated Astori and traditional party leaders when the law was rejected in the
popular referendum held December 7, 2003.
19. The expression was used by Hubare Aliano, a Colorado caudillo from
the interior (2003).
20. This description is supported by the authors participant observation in
Uruguayan districts during 2002-3.
21. A column is similar to the ugrmpuciones of traditional parties, and can
be seen as a group within a fraction that presents independent lists to the lower
house and in local elections. With the MPP, the congressional list was unified,
but the columns still represent independent political groups within Espacio-609.
22. Perhaps FAs success in capturing seven municipal governments in the
interior of the country could offer a partial way out of the distributive dilemmas
derived from the partys new social base. That outcome could result either from
improving the provision of public goods at the local level or from co-opting
voters on the basis of clientelistic side payments. Moreover, sustained economic
growth can also reduce the salience of this type of distributive trade-off.
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Frente AmpZio and the Crafting

of a SociaZ Democratic AZtemative

centric sociopolitical matrix (Cavarozzi et al. 2003) and the decreasing

section explores some of the challenges the FA government faces and

THE RISE OF THE TIN AMERICAN LEFT:

Table 1. Electoral Results, 1942-1999 (percent)

Source: Buquet 2005.

had already been co-opted by the clientelistic machines of both tradi-

further classifies the neighborhoods into terciles that reflect different

FAS Share (%> Growth Rates (%>

Source: Calculations based on Moreira 2005, 3741.

Figures from the countrys interior complement this portrait. In spite

Table 3. Internal Distribution of Votes in Montevideo by Social Strata,

captured an important share of the lower sectors. This can be explained,

become progressively dominated by FA identifiers. Although the empir-

Table 4. Social Expenditures in Five Latin American Countries

electorate; and in addition to their quantitative weight, both interest

increased as a percentage of GDP, making Uruguay the Latin American

Uruguayan children are extremely high (42 percent of infants to 5-year-

[Elvery weekend, I went out to talk to the people. Today, I dont do

The political power in Montevideo is forgetting us. . . . they did not

Traditional clientelism has also weakened because of patrons dis-

Meanwhile, FASgreater capacity to mobilize activists ideologically also

The sectors that we used to relate to in this way [a clientelistic

Both traditional parties thus have suffered a process of progressive

tion enacted or proposed by the governing coalition using direct

It also produced a crucial shift in the internal and external positioning of

The Municipal Government of Montevideo

administrations in the interior and at the national level led by Luis

. . . And when I can, if it is reasonable, I try to help, because many

Reaching FAs Emerging Constituency: AU and MPP

These structures have also allowed AU to gather support from

Another key element in explaining MPPs electoral growth is the

resulted neither from a sudden collapse of the opposing parties nor

of the country, FA has absorbed an emergent constituency that com-

During the 1990s, FA therefore contributed t o t h e programmatic struc-

I wish to thank Fernando Filgueira, Evelyne Huber, Jonathan Hartlyn, Jen-

El Espectador (Montevideo). 2004. Radio. Entrevista a Jose Mujica, Programa en

Mieres, Pablo. 1994. El voto. Desobediencia y lealtad ciudadana. Montevideo:

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