Section 3
4200 clearly and
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
(1) Ramirez v Court of Appeals
-Defines Communication
-Respondent has exhibited actual
expectation of privacy (Subjective)
-The expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable
(Objective)
-Other Imports from jurisprudence RA 4200
Facts:
A case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious
mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners
dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
Private respondent filed a criminal case for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by
one of the parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A.
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored
by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private
communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to
impart. It is a process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures) These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications
of meanings or thoughts which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange,
between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latters office.
(2) Zulueta v CA
-Standard or reasonableness: (1) Justified at
inception if there are reasonable grounds
that it will turn up evidence (2) Scope of
Intrusion is reasonable if measures used in
the serch are reasonably related to searchs
objectives and is not highly intrusive
-Right may be invoked against wife who
went to the clinic of her own husband and
took documents of private correspondence
between husband and paramour.
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision which
ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. The petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents
and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision
is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But
one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
(3) Navarro v CA
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique
Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police station to
report alleged indecent show in one of the night
establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then
having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fist
fight. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a
fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim
who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena,
the other media man , testified. Presented in
evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer
Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken
without the knowledge of the two.
Issue:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in
evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping.
Held:
The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in
view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the
voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals,
248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
(4) Ople v Torres
-Test of reasonable expectation of Privacy:
(1)
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Petitioner alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.
Issue:
W/N the implementation of A.O. no. 308 insidiously
lays the groundwork for a system which will violate
the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.
Held:
In view of right to privacy:
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provide our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as
a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through
the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." A.O. No. 308
should also raise our antennas for a further look will
show that it does not state whether encoding of data
is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission
that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his
PRN.
The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of
the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files. The data
may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this
vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard
against leakage of information. When the access
code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear
of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for
whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system. It is plain and we hold
that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No.
308 may interfere with the individual's liberty
of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks
to prevent.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and
the common good. It merely requires that the
law be narrowly focused and a compelling
interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions.
(5) Vivares v STC
Facts:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas
College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures
of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the
students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled
in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO granted by
the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the
students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and
the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook
accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus,
the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well
as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the
childrens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is
proper.
Held:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme
Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be
availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance;
and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against
STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state
that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that
the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing,
and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking
Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking
site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy
must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that
the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that
their post (status) on Facebook were published
as Public.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to
have some privacy, then he must choose any setting
other than Public. If it is true that the students
concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see
them (as they claim), then how come most of
their classmates were able to view them. This
fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was
their classmates who informed and showed
their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures.
Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the
privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to
privacy. The manner which the school gathered
the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it
appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter,
being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered
them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school (to which
the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
(6) Gamboa v Chan
Facts:
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion
in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to
privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-
Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of
habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the states interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
Ruling:
NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs
made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which
she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.
(7) Katz v United States
Facts:
The petitioner used a public telephone booth to
transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After
extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening
device to the top of the telephone booth and
recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence
against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have
the evidence suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was
denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention
that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was
granted.
Issue:
Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
protects telephone conversations conducted in a
phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction
as evidence against a person?
Held:
Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The
petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone
booth was a constitutionally protected area.
However, the Fourth Amendment protects
persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide
his self from public view when he entered the
telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the
uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to
do so simply because he went to a place where
he could be seen. A person who enters into a
telephone booth may expect the protection of
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as
he assumes that the words he utters into the
telephone will not be broadcast to the world.
Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and
not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Governments activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners
telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable
cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.
(8) Olmstead v United States
Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor
related crimes, including conspiracy. The operation
grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading
conspirator and the general manager of the business
was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the
Petitioner). The main office of the business was in
Seattle and there were three telephones in the office,
each on a different line. There were also telephones
in an office the Petitioner had in his own home, at the
home of his associates and various other places in
Seattle. A lot of communication occurred between
Seattle and Vancouver, British Columbia.
The information which led to the discovery of the
conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely
obtained by intercepting messages on the
telephones of the conspirators by four federal
prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along
the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of
four of the [suspects] and those leading from the
chief office. The insertions were made without
trespass upon any property of the defendants. They
were made in the basement of the large office
building. The taps from house lines were made in the
streets near the houses.
Various conversations were taped and testified to by
government witnesses.
Issue. [W]hether the use of evidence of private
telephone conversations between the defendants
and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping,
amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments[?]
Held. The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching. There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of
the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. By
the invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its
application for the purpose of extending
communications, one can talk with another at a far
distant place. The language of the amendment
cannot be extended and expanded to include
telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from
the defendants house or office. The intervening
wires are not part of his house or office, any more
than are the highways along which they are
stretched.
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of
telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart
from the common law of evidence. But the courts
may not adopt such a policy by attributing an
enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth
Amendment. The reasonable view is that one who
installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those
quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house,
and messages while passing over them, are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here
those who intercepted the projected voices were not
in the house of either party to the conversation.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the
many federal decisions brought to our attention hold
the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as
against a defendant, unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of
his papers or his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for
the purpose of making a seizure. [The court thought],
therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did
not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, [t]he common-law rule is that the
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means by which it was obtained.
A standard which would forbid the reception of
evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical
conduct by government officials, would make society
suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has
been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling
legislation by Congress, those who realize the
difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well
deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should
be confined to cases where rights under the
Constitution would be violated by admitting