LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

The Legislative Department WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE

POWER OF THE CONGRESS?
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of ANSWER:
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
A. Substantive: Limitations on the content of laws.
provision on initiative and referendum. B. Procedural: Limitations on the manner of passing
laws
To What Body is Legislative Power vested? C. Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
D. Congress, as a general rule, cannot delegate its
ANSWER:
legislative power.
GR: CONGRESS
Note:
XPN: POWERS RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE
The Congress of the Philippines is a bicameral body
PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
composed of Senate and House of Representatives, the
first being the considered as the upper house and the
second the lower house.
WHAT ARE THE CLASSES OF LEGISLATIVE POWER?
1. The Senate
ANSWER: ODeCO
Composition (Section 2)
A. Original: Possessed by the people in their sovereign
capacity i.e. initiative and referendum SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
B. Derivative - delegated by the sovereign people to
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original Philippines, as may be provided by law.
power of the people
C. Constituent: The Power to amend or revise
24 senators elected at large by qualified voters
Constitution
D. Ordinary: The Power to pass ordinary laws.

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Qualifications (Section 3)
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
1. Natural Born Citizen
2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered votes
5. Resident of the Phil. For not less than 2 years
immediately preceding the day of election
Can Congress or COMELEC impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?
ANSWER: No. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution (Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947,
Feb. 19, 2009; Social Justice Society v. DDB and
PDEA, G.R Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658, Nov. 3, 2008).
o Pimentel v. Comelec G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.
157870 (and other consolidated petitions), November 3,
2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality
of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of
secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees
of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged
before the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing
shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or
by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
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(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo
a random drug testing x x x;
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution?

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. 2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
Officers and employees of public and private offices, unconstitutional?
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing III. THE RULING
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with [The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law; It alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
xxx xxx xxx 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a enjoined all the concerned agencies from
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
shall undergo a mandatory drug test; 1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or qualification for candidates for senator; NO,
elected both in the national or local government shall Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing
undergo a mandatory drug test. qualifications for candidates for senator in addition
to those laid down by the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
II. THE ISSUES additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates,
a candidate for senator needs only to meet the

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with
like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and,
if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution,
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be
of little value if one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f)
thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary
and tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton and Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v.
Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following
principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and
are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably
be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have
the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
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As to paragraph (d), covering officers and
employees of public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employeesand students for that matter
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and
informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness
is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the
office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis
of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency
in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one,
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected
to random drug test as contained in the companys work
rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken
under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible
the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ
two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible
the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH)
to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on
the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service
law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged
before the prosecutors office with a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
6 years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Term (Section 4)
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Term: 6 Years
Term Limit: 2 Consecutive Terms
Is the Congress Continuing Body?
o League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec
G.R. No. 176951, November 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),
represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor
Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his
personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF
CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO
DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE
OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for
prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En
Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down
the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections
10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the
Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a
Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul
the Decision of December 21, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution
Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X,
Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws
First issue:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression
of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it
did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of
amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the
LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of
economic viability for the creation of local government
unitsincome, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of
putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines
for economic growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses
found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted
the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No.
9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments
to the LGC itself.
Second Issue:
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become the States partners
in accelerating economic growth and development in the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood
up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
o Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338, December 2008
Garcillano v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Committee on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information
and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms
G.R. Nos. 170338, 179275, December 23, 2008
Nachura, J., En Banc
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of two petitions.
In 2005, respondent House Committees (see case title)
conducted a congressional investigation with regard to the
wiretapped conversations that surfaced between petitioner,
former COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano and former
President Arroyo.
In 2007, the Senate conducted its own legislative inquiry
where it summoned another petitioner to this case, Major
Sagge, member of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
(ISAFP) without the following:
(1) PUBLICATION of the Senate Rules of Procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation
(2) The intended legislation referred to in the preceding
number (in aid of legislation)
SECTION 21, Art. VI (1987 Constitution) provides that:
[T]he Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
Respondents claimed that their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication was justified by the
fact that the rules have never been amended since 1995.
Further, aside from the availability of free booklets
containing the 1995 rules, the Senates internet web page
also provided the 1995 rules that serves as the functional
equivalent of a written document with reference to the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
ISSUE: WON Sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution was
violated
HELD:
Petition to issue writ of prohibition GRANTED prohibiting the
Senate and any of its committees from conducting any
inquiry in aid of legislation in connection with the Hello
Garci tapes.
The constitutional provision is CLEAR and UNAMBIGUOUS.
The definition of publication is stated in Art. 2 of the Civil
Code. The Electronic Commerce Act (R.A. 8792) merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence of electronic data
messages or electronic documents insofar as they
constitute the original copies. The internet is not the
medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.
While the Senate as an institution is not completely
dissolved with each national election (hence, a continuing
body in the institutional sense), the Senate of each
Congress (e.g. 13th Congress, 14th Congress), however,
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
previous Congress. The Senate is NOT a continuing body in
connection to the conduct of its day-to-day business
because the members of the incumbent Congress are not
responsible for the acts and deliberations of the previous
Congress which they took no part in.
Hence, until the Senate shall have published its own rules
of procedure informing the public on whether or not they
would retain or modify the rules followed by the previous
Congresses, the conduct of legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation contemplated in the constitution cannot not be
legally conducted.
o Arnault v. Nazareno
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the
acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to be examined by the special committee
created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate
investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well
as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who
refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in
aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose
penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid
of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members imposing
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to
violate the witness right to due process of law.
2. The House Of Representatives
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
Composition (Section 5 (1))
o District Representatives (Section 5 (1))
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metro Manila area.
Rules on Legislative Districting (Section
5 (3))
HOW ARE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED?
ANSWER:
Legislative districts are apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area. They are
apportioned in accordance with the number of their
respect inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Section 5, Article VI, 1987Constitution)
Each city with a population of at least 250,000 shall
have at least one representative. Each province shall
have at least one representative.
Note: The question of the validity of an
apportionment law is a justiciable question. (Macias
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE
APPORTIONMENT?
ANSWER:
1. Elected from legislative districts which are
apportioned in accordance with the number of
inhabitants of each area and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio:
a. Uniform Every representative of Congress
shall represent a territorial unit with more
or less 250,000 population. All the other
representatives shall have the same or
nearly the same political constituency so
much so that their votes will constitute the
popular majority.
b. Progressive It must respond to the
change in times. The number of House
representatives must not be so big as to be
unwieldy. (Let us say, there is a growth in
population. The ratio may then be
increased. From 250,000 constituents/1
representative it may be reapportioned to
300,000 constituents/1 representative).
2. Each legislative district shall comprise
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (This
condition is not absolute)
3. Each city with a population of at least 250,000
or each province shall at least have one
representative.
4. Legislative districts shall be reapportioned by
Congress within 3 years after the return of each
census (Senator Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
189793, April 7, 2010.
Note: GR: There must be proportional
representation according to the number of their
constituents/inhabitants
XPN: In one cityone representative/one province
one representative rule.
Note: Where a town is converted to a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than
250, 000, the creation of a separate congressional
district is in keeping with the one cityone
representative/one provinceone representative rule.
A city which has exceeded the number of 250,
000 inhabitants is entitled to one representative.
WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR SUCH RULE?
ANSWER:
The underlying principle behind the rule for
apportionment is the concept of equality of
representation which is a basic principle of
republicanism. One mans vote should carry as
much weight as the vote of every other man.
Note: Section 5 provides that the House shall be
composed of not more than 250 members unless
otherwise provided by law. Thus, Congress itself may by
12
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
law increase the composition of the HR. (Tobias v.
Abalos, G.R. No. L114783, December 8, 1994)
As such, when one of the municipalities of a
congressional district is converted to a city large
enough to entitle it to one legislative district, the
incidental effect is the splitting of district into two.
The incidental arising of a new district in this manner
need not be preceded by a census. (Tobias v.
Abalos, G.R. No. L114783, December 8, 1994)
Reapportionment can be made thru a special
law. (Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
118577, March 7, 1995)
Mariano Jr. v. Comelec, 242
SCRA 211, 1995
G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents
of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52
of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John
H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes
and bounds with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
extend his term to more than two executive terms as
allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot
be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by
the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on
the northwest, by the City of Manila.
13
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under
dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of
metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854,
the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.
Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department
of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City
of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as
the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners
is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides
that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two
14
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law.
Aquino III v. Comelec G.R. No.
189793, April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative
district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
15
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
There is a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a
province is entitled to at least a representative, there is
nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order
to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the
constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
Re-appointment of Legislative Disctricts
(Section 5 (4))
What is Gerrymandering? Is it allowed?
ANSWER
Gerrymandering is the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of
favoring a candidate or a party. It is not allowed because
the Constitution provides that each district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory (Bernas, Reviewer in Philippine
Constitution, p. 186)
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA
106 1994
G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994
PONENTE: BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. A plebiscite was held for the people of
Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said
conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said
conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7,
911 voted no.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was
unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the
claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.
Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal
construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been
16
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
(Lidasan v. Comelec). ORDERED.

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed

of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from o Party-list Representatives (Section 5 (2))
R.A. No. 7941
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as LIST REPRESENTATIVES
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of

Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Party-
congressional representation is not unconstitutional.
List System Act".
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
promote proportional representation in the election of
section.
representatives to the House of Representatives through a
The argument on the violation of the above provision is party-list system of registered national, regional and
absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted,
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,

17
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -
a. The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives from national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system.
b. A party means either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties.
c. A political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
d. It is a national party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
e. A sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector.
f. A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens
or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interest or concerns.
g. A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-
List System. - Any party, organization, or coalition already
18
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
registered with the Commission need not register anew.
However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with
the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the
election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the
party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. - Any organized group of
persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
provided, that the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve
the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was
submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty
(60) days before election.
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. - The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
19
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition; A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only

7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding for any elective office or person who has lost his bid for an
elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
in which it has registered.
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies,
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. - The
or withdraws in writing, his nomination, becomes
COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitutes
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
applied or who have manifested their desire to participate
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to
resigned.
all precincts for posting in the polling places on election
day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be
Section 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. - No
shown on the certified list.
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a
Section 8. Nominations of Party-List
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
Representatives. - Each registered party, organization or
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-
of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of
five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
than five (5) from which party-list representatives shall be
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election,
chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he

20
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty during
his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of
his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. - Every voter shall be
entitled to two (2) votes. The first is a vote for candidate for
member of the House of Representatives in his legislative
district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization,
or coalition he wants represented in the House of
Representatives: provided, that a vote cast for a party,
sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted
for shall not be counted: provided, finally that the first
election under the party-list system shall be held in May
1998. The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary
information campaign for purposes of educating the
electorate on the matter of the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
percentum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list. For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first
five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system. In
determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed: The parties,
organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections. The parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-
List Representatives. - The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.
21
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are
Chosen. - Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the
respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the
COMELEC according to their ranking in the said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. - Party-list representatives
shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-
list representatives shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation Effect. - Any elected
party-list representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his
seat: provided, that if he changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election,
he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. - In case of vacancy in seats
reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be
automatically filled by the next representative from the list
of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the
same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for
the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party,
organization, or coalition concerned shall submit additional
nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. -
Party-list representatives shall be entitled to the same
salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House
of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. - The COMELEC
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. - The amount necessary for
the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the
regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections
starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations
Act. Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to
utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its
information campaign on the party-list system.
22
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Section 20. Separability Clause. - If any part of this Act
is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Approved: March 3, 1995
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 147598, June 26,
2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS.
COMELEC
[G.R. NO. 147589, JUNE 26, 2001]
Facts:
Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the
Comelec.
Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain major
political parties in the 2001 party-list elections
arguing that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and
not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which
Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not political parties may
participate in the party-list elections
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations
23
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Held:
1. Under the constitution and RA 7941, major political
parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections merely on the ground that they are
political parties.
Provided that they comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected
to the house of representatives.
In other words, while they are not disqualified merely
on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 203766, April 2013 (Parameters
in determining who are qualified to
participate in party list election)
694 SCRA 477 Political Law Constitutional Law
Legislative Department Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified
by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari
against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines
set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations,
24
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-
defined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed,
as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona
fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who
lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno
emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in
25
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.) Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause- year immediately preceding the day of the election.
oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is that 1. Natural Born Citizen
all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike 2. At least 25 years old on the day of the election
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the 3. Able to read and write
legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes 4. A registered votes
in a national election system like the party-list system of 5. Resident of the Phil. For not less than 1 year
elections. immediately preceding the day of election
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a
seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list o Meaning of Residence
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas SCRA 300 (1995)
workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among
others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized. FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,

Qualifications (Section 6) established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she

26
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in
Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.
In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in
an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due
to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands
domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does
not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
27
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an
act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Pundaodaya c. Comelec, G.R. No.
179313, September 17, 2009
Pundaodaya versus- Comelec & Noble, G.R.179313,
Sept.17, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Pundaodaya fi led a petition for
disqualifi cation against Noble alleging that the latter
lacks the residencyqualification. Pundaodaya claimed
that Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and
disqualified Noble from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime,
he garnered the highest
number o f v o t e s a n d w a s p r o c l a i m e d t h e w i n n i n g
c a n d i d a t e . P u n d a o d a y a t h e n fi l e d a n U r g e n t M o
t i o n t o A n n u l Proclamation.
The COMELEC EN BANC
reversed the decision of the Second Division and dec
lared Noblequalified to run for the mayoralty position.
Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari
Issue:
Should residence and domicile
be construed as referring to dwelling? Did Noble
eff ectively change his domicile?
Held:
28
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

The Court found that Noble failed to convince that Section 1. Short Title - This act shall be known as the
he successfully eff ected a change of domicile.
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Toestablish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared
not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another
probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
abode.
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the
term residence is to be understood not in its common
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
intends to return and remain (animus manendi). acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following

o R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and oath of allegiance to the Republic:

Reacquisition Act of 2003)
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

29
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
1. Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
4. Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
5. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of
the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any
other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain
valid and effective.
30
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,

rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Approved: August 29, 2003

Section 8. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect (Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the President of the Philippines
Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
o Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649,
Approved, April 16, 2013

CASE 2013-0016: CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS.

(Sgd.) FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate
(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA JR. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
and LINOG G. BALUA (G.R. NO. 195649, 02 JULY 2013,
Speaker of the House of
SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN
Representatives
CITIZENSHIP AS CONDITION IN RUNNING FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE (BRIEF TITLE: MAQUILING VS. COMELEC)

CASE 2013-0016: CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS.

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130
and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and
August 26, 2003, respectively.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
and LINOG G. BALUA (G.R. NO. 195649, 02 JULY 2013,
SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP AS CONDITION IN RUNNING FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE (BRIEF TITLE: MAQUILING VS. COMELEC)

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. DISPOSITIVE:

(Sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate
NAZARENO
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Secretary General, House Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
of Represenatives hereby DENIED with finality.

31
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST/DOCTRINE/SUBJECT:
ROMMEL ARNADO WAS BORN A FILIPINO CITIZEN. THEN HE
BECAME A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN. BEFORE BE
RAN FOR MAYOR OF KAUSWAGAN LANAO DEL NORTE HE
EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP.BUT HE STILL USED HIS U.S. PASSPORT. CAN
HE STILL BE CONSIDERED AS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR
MAYOR.
YES.
IT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE THAT THOSE WHO SEEK TO
RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE MUST BE SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY A FILIPINO CITIZEN. TO ALLOW A FORMER
FILIPINO WHO REACQUIRES PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP TO
CONTINUE USING A FOREIGN PASSPORT WHICH
INDICATES THE RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN STATE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AS ITS NATIONAL EVEN AFTER THE FILIPINO
HAS RENOUNCED HIS FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP, IS TO ALLOW
A COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THIS POLICY.
ARNADO ARGUES THAT SECTION 349 OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION ACT OF THE UNITED STATES
PROVIDES THAT HIS EXECUTION OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF
RENUNCIATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP HAS THE
EFFECT OF EXPATRIATION AND THUS WAS DIVESTED OF ALL
THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. IS HIS ARGUMENT
CORRECT?
NO. THE FACT THAT HE WAS STILL ABLE TO USE HIS U.S.
PASSPORT AFTER EXECUTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF
RENUNCIATION REPUDIATES HIS CLAIM.
FURTHERMORE, THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS, WHICH MUST BEPRESENTED AS
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND MUST
BE EVIDENCED BY AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION THEREOF.
MERE REFERENCE TO A FOREIGN LAW IN A PLEADING DOES
NOT SUFFICE FOR IT TO BE CONSIDERED IN DECIDING A
CASE.
BESIDES, AMERICAN LAW DOES NOT GOVERN IN THIS
JURISDICTION.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LAW?
SECTION 40(D) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND
SECTION 5(2) OF R.A. 9225.
UNDER R.A. 9225 IT IS PROVIDED THAT THAT ALL
PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO BECOME CITIZENS OF ANOTHER
COUNTRY SHALL BE DEEMED NOT TO HAVE LOST THEIR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THIS
ACT. THIS POLICY PERTAINS TO THE REACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. SECTION 5(2) REQUIRES THOSE
WHO HAVE RE-ACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND
32
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
WHO SEEK ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE, TO RENOUNCE ANY
AND ALL FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP.
SECTION 40(D) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
DISQUALIFIES THOSE WITH DUAL CITIZENSHIP FROM
RUNNING FOR LOCAL ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Casan Macode Maquiling v. Comelec et. al. 700SCRA
367 (2013) the declared policy of RA 9225 is that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act. This policy pertains to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires
those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who
seek elective public oce, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for any elective
local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks
to run for publicoce must be solely and exclusively
a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires
Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport
which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of
the individual as its national even a f t e r t h e Fi l i p i n o
h a s r e n o u n c e d h i s f o r e i g n citizenship, is to allow a
complete disregard of this policy.
o Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec, G.R. No.
198742, August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December
13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen.6
33
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections
this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13,
2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar,
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that
since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act
of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring
Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice
mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as
the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but
the appeal was dismissed y the second division and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer
held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when
she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007
elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply
to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship
in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
34
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially
sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her
Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath
before any public officer authorized to administer it
rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6,
2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v.
Comelec/LuisBautista/Robelito Picar/Wilma Pagaduan
678SCRA 267 (2012) -Remedy of a person who fails to File
the petition to disqualify a certain candidate within the
twenty-Five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of
the OEC is to File a petition for QW within 10 days
from proclamation of the results of the election as provided
under Section 253 of the OEC. Renunciation of foreign
citizenship to be valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225 The
language of Section5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any
ambiguity. In Lopezv. Comelec 559 SCRA 696
(2008),the Court declared it s categorical and single
meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot
run fo any elective public position in the Philippines unless
he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of Fling the CoC. The C o u r t a l s o
e x p o u n d e d o n t h e f o r m o f t h e re n u n ci ati on
a n d h e l d t h a t t o b e v a l i d , t h e renunciation must be
contained in an adavit duly e xe c u t e d b e f o r e a n
o c e r o f t h e l a w w h o i s authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that aant is
renouncing foreign citizenship
Term (Section 7)
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following their election.
35
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for ANSWER: It shall not be considered as an interruption in
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the continuity of his service for the full term for
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected (Sec. 4, Article VI).
which he was elected.

Term of Office: 3 years, commencing at noon on the

30th day of June next following their election.

In B.P. Blg. 881 members of the legislature included in the

enumeration of elective public officials are to be considered
resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy for another office, except for
President and Vice-President. The term of office prescribed
by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature, but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at
all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office.[Dimaporo vs Mitra (1991)]
Term Limits: No member of the House of Representatives
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
What is the rule on voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time?
o Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January
8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET.
AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Facts of the case: For four (4) successive regular
elections, both national and local elections, Abundo vied for
the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007
runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby,
however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office for a period of a little over one year and one month.

36
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat, Torres lost
no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition predicated on the three-
consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the
COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for
Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes
and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,
Catanduanes.
Ruling of the RTC: RTC declared Abundo ineligible to
serve as municipal mayor. The Court found Abundo to have
already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit,
2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the
aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and
occupied the position of and actually served as mayor for
over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to
June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a
month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundos second term as mayor.
Ruling of the COMELEC: It affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Just like the RTC, the COMELECs Second Division ruled
against Abundo and held that service of the unexpired
portion of a term by a protestant who is declared
winner in an election protest is considered as
service for one full term within the contemplation of
the three-term limit rule.
Issue: Whether or Not Abundo is deemed to have served
three consecutive terms.
Supreme Court Decision: No, Abundo has not served
for three consecutive terms.
In the present case, the Court finds and declares that the
two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a
disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
37
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local
office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary
interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term and it
bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004
election for the term starting was the duly elected mayor
which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of
the three-term limit rule.
Election / Vacancies (Section 8 and
Section 9)
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House
of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Regular Elections
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May.(Sec 8, Art VI)
Special Election
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law,
But the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Sec
9, Art VI)
The Constitution mandates that there should always be
adequate representation for every province or legislative
district. If a vacancy occurs in a manner contemplated in
the Constitution, then Congress has the authority if not the
duty to call for special elections.[Lozada v. COMELEC,
(1983)]
Salary (Section 10)
SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
38
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
OF THE SENATE, SPEAKER OF
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
HOUSE REP. & CHIEF JUSTICE
Representatives approving such increase.
OF THE SC

Salaries SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE 204,000

HOUSE OF REP., ASSOCIATE
The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of JUSTICES OF THE SC, &
Representatives shall be determined by law. CHAIRMEN OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
COMMISSIONS
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. [Ligot v. MEMBERS OF THE 180,000
Mathay, (1974)] CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

Philconsa v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-25554, October

1966

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs.

Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
OFFICIAL ANNUAL SALARY

PRESIDENT PHP 300,000

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting
VICE-PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT 240,000 Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of

39
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently increase becomes effective?

enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the
payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to
the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting
before December 30, 1969. period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary to all members of the Senate and the House of
of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit,
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the without distinction or separation between them. This
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the
Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took using the singular form and not the plural, thereby
part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only rendering more evident the intent to consider
on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of
the House who participated in the approval of said Act one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the
expired on December 30, 1965. singular, when combined with the following phrase all the
members of the Senate and the House, underscores that
in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
require that not only the term of all the members of the members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
House but also that of all the Senators who approved have expired before the increase in compensation can
the increase must have fully expired before the become operative.

40
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Party-list Representatives:
AMORES v HRET
GR 189600, 6/29/2010
SUMMARY:
Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as
representative of CIBAC for being overage to represent
youth. Change of affiliation must be made six months
before elections. Youth sector is represented by 25 30.
FACTS:
5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the
assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
as representative of CIBAC in the HoR.
Petitioner argues:
o Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of
nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was
the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
o Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth
Sector to OFW and families not affected six
months prior to elections.
Respondent argues:
o RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth
sector representative only applicable to first three
elections after the party list act.
o There was no resultant change in affiliation.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector
representatives apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING:
Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of
HoR representing CIBAC
HELD:
Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear.
If representative of youth sector, should be between
25 to 30.
Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW.
Sectoral representation should be changed SIX
MONTHS prior to elections.
Parliamentary Immunities (Section
11)
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
41
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

ANSWER : No. So long as he is an incumbent

congressman, and so long as Congress is in session,
o Privilege from Arrest whether or not he is attending it, he shall be immune from
arrest. (People of the Philippines V. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos.
What is immunity from arrest?
13287576, February 3, 2000)

ANSWER: Legislators are privileged from arrest while People v. Jalosjos, G.R. no. 132875-
Congress is in session with respect to offenses
76, February 3, 2000
punishable by up to 6 years of imprisonment.
People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
Purpose
What is the purpose of parliamentary
immunities? Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
ANSWER : It is not for the benefit of the officials; rather, it
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
is to protect and support the rights of the people by
and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
ensuring that their representatives are doing their jobs
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
according to the dictates of their conscience. It is
discharge the duties of a Congressman,
indispensable no matter how powerful the offended
including attendance at legislative sessions
party is.
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
May a congressman who committed an offense in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis
punishable for not more than 6 years, but is not of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to
attending session, be arrested? be represented.

42
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI
of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special
class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
o Privilege of Speech and Debate
What does speech or debate encompass?
ANSWER: It includes a vote or passage of a resolution, all
the utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their functions such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes casts in the halls of
Congress. It also includes bills introduced in Congress
(whether or not it is in session) and all the other utterances
(made outside or inside the premises of Congress) provided
they are made in accordance with a legislative function.
(Jimenez, V. abangbang, G.R. No. L15905, August 3, 1966)
43
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Speech and Debate Clause
In this case, a clarification of the scope and limitation of the
parliamentary immunity was made. There was reiteration
that, First, Congressional immunity is a guarantee of
immunity from answerability before an outside forum but
not from answerability to the disciplinary authority of
congress itself;
Second, to come under the guarantee the speech or
debate" must be one made "in Congress or in any
committee thereof." [Jimenez V. Cabangbang, (1966)]
Each House of the Congress can discipline its members for
disorderly conduct or behavior.
What constitutes disorderly behavior is entirely up to
Congress to define.
Although a member of Congress shall not be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof, such immunity, although
absolute in its protection of the member of Congress
against suits for libel, does not shield the member against
the disciplinary authority of the Congress. [Osmena v.
Pendatun, (1960)]
Can a senatorlawyer be disbarred or disciplined
by the Supreme Court for statements made during a
privilege speech?
ANSWER: No. Indeed, the senatorlawyers privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. The Court, however,
would be remiss in its duty if it let the Senators
offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on the Courts part to reinstill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of
justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew
that parliamentary nonaccountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of
their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of
congress against government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing the decisionmaking prerogatives
44
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
of Congress and its members. (Pobre v. Sen. Defensor
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug. 25, 2009)
Purpose
Note: The purpose of the privilege is to insure the
effective discharge of functions of Congress. The
privilege may be abused but it is said that such is not so
damaging or detrimental as compared to the denial or
withdrawal of such privilege.
Does publication fall under the scope of speech?
ANSWER: No, not all the time. The same shall be
made while Congress is in session and not during its
recess. However, if publication is made when Congress
is not in session, it is not privileged because
Congressman is said to be not acting as congressman.
(Jimenez, v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L15905, August 3,
1966)
Jiminez v. Cabangbang, 17 Scra 876
(1966)
17 SCRA 876 Political Law Freedom of Speech and
Debate
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused
the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place
him as the president. The planners allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being
used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to
have been published in newspapers of general circulation.
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a
sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said
that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from
suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even
libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.
45
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session
as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time
of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was
not in session when the letter was published and at the
same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
the lower court the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 phil. 863, Oct.
28, 1960
Sergio Osmea, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department
Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a
speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech,
he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he
may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower
house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution
before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the
resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun
filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court
has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the
power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been
violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
Conflict of Interest (Section 12)
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify
the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
46
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are
authors.
Incompatible and Forbidden Offices
(Section 13)
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
the term for which he was elected.(Art VI Sec
13)
Cannot personally appear as counsel before
any court, electoral tribunal, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies during his term of office.
(Art VI Sec 14)
Shall not be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or franchise or
special privilege granted by the government
during his term of office. (Art VI Sec 14)
Shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government when it is for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office. (Art VI Sec
14)

Disqualifications:
o Incomplete Offices
May not hold any other office or employment in
What are the prohibitions attached to a
the government during his term without
legislator during his term?
forfeiting his seat. (Art VI Sec 13)
May not be appointed to any office created or
ANSWER:
the emoluments thereof were increased during

47
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Incompatible office No senator or member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned and controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries during his term without forfeiting his seat
(Sec. 13, Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
Note: Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be
automatic upon the members assumption of such
other office deemed incompatible with his seat in
Congress. However, no forfeiture shall take place if the
member of Congress holds the other government office
in an exofficio capacity.
Forbidden office Neither shall a senator or a member
of the House of Representatives be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Note: With this, even if the member of the Congress is
willing to forfeit his seat therein, he may not be
appointed to any office in the government that has
been created or the emoluments thereof have been
increased during his term. Such a position is forbidden
office. The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public office.
The provision does not apply to elective offices.
The appointment of the member of the Congress to
the forbidden office is not allowed only during the term
for which he was elected, when such office was created or
its emoluments were increased. After such term, and
even if the legislator is reelected, the disqualification no
longer applies and he may therefore be appointed to
the office.
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July
15, 2009
Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352,
January 18, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
48
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter,
filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in
the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board
of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the
PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that
respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate when he accepted and held the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the
Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by
the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official.
Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector
individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman
during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC
Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the
PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision
read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross,
or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree
49
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the
PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification
and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC
likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the
second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter.
II. THE ISSUE
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and
decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED
the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the
second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have
decided on the constitutional issue because it was
not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui
generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not
raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to
when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may
[rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until
such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain
sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court
could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC,
the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to
this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended
several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16,
1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No.
50
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation
of private corporations by law is a recognition that the
PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show
that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but
also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs
contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in
recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC
that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the
time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter
and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case
before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys
adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision
must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section
16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate
the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the
Corporation Code just like any other private corporation,
the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as
an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in
discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be
classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence,
nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by
international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a
subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under
the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that
the PNRC is a private corporation within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that
must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
51
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an
important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden
refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue
of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never
raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC
has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947,
and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the
countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to
the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
only have negative consequences to those who depend on
it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter
that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in
its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of
the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
Inhibitions and Disqualifications
(Section 14)
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
1. Cannot personally appear as counsel before
any court, electoral tribunal, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies during his term of office.
(Art VI Sec 14)
2. Shall not be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or franchise or
special privilege granted by the government
during his term of office. (Art VI Sec 14)
3. Shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government when it is for his
52
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office. (Art VI Sec
14)
Certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC Case.
He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in
IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares.
He acquired them after the contested election of
Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been
filed before SEC, and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC.
Before he moved to intervene, he had signified
his intention to appear as counsel for respondent,
but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances that there
has been an indirect "appearance as counsel
before ... an administrative body" and that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. [Puyat v De Guzman,(1982)]
Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.
113 SCRA 31 Political Law The Legislative Department
Appearance in Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats
rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de
Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties
53
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he
argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to
appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative
body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez
inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He
instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said
SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a
legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner
granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave
to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder
of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman
must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body
under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing.
He bought the stocks before the litigation took place.
During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the
constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an
act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly
or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with,
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts
of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral
Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission. Courts martial and military
tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included.
Sessions (Section 15)
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of
54
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Is Congress considered in session during a
recess?
ANSWER: No. It is not in session. During a recess, a
congressman who has committed an offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment
may be arrested.
Kinds of Session
When is the regular session of Congress?
ANSWER:
Congress convenes once every year on the 4th Monday of
July, unless otherwise provided for by law. It continues in
session for as long as it sees fit, until 30 days before
the opening of the next regular session, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. (Sec. 15, Art. VI)
Special Sessions under the Constitution
o Article VII, Section 4 (4)
o Article VII, Section 10
o Article VII, Section 11
o Article VII, Section 18
What are the instances when there are special
sessions?
ANSWER:
A. Due to vacancies in the offices of the
President and Vice President at 10 oclock
a.m. on the third day after the vacancies
(Sec. 10 of Article VI)
B. To decide on the disability of the President
because a majority of all the members of
the cabinet have disputed his assertion
that he is able to discharge the powers
and duties of his office (Sec. 11 of Article VII)
C. To revoke or extend the Presidential
Proclamation of Martial Law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus (Sec. 18 of Art. VII); and
D. Called by the President at any time when
Congress is not in session (Sec. 15 of Art. VI).
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the What is a Mandatory Recess?
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all
its respective Members. ANSWER:

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
A mandatory recess is prescribed for the 30day period
before the opening of the next regular session, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. This is the
minimum period of recess and may be lengthened by
the Congress in its discretion. It may however, be
called in special session at any time by the President.
(Sec. 15, Art. VI)

3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,

punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and

from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, What are the instances when Congress is voting
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three separately and voting jointly?
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses
shall be sitting. ANSWER

56
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

Who are the elected officers of Congress?

SEPARATE JOINT

1. Choosing the 1. When revoking ANSWER:

President (Sec. 4, or extending the
Article VII) proclamation 1. Senate President

2. Choosing the suspending the 2. Speaker of the House

President (Sec. 4, privilege of writ 3. Such officers as deemed by each

Article VII) of habeas corpus house to be necessary

3. Confirming (Section 18, Art.

nomination of Vice
President (Sec. 9,
Article VI)
4. Declaring the
existence of a state
of war in joint
session (Sec. 23,
Article VI)
5. Proposing
Constitutional
amendments (Sec. 1,
Article XVII)
How is election of officers done?
VII)
2. When revoking
ANSWER: By a majority vote of all respective
or extending the
members (Section 16, Art. VI).
proclamation
suspending Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. 298 SCRA 765,
Martial Law November 18, 1998
(Section 18, Art.
VII)

Officers of the Congress (Section 16 (1)) SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T.

57
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R.
No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened
for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the
agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of
20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the
Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement
of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while
those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During
the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that
the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP --
numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No
consensus was arrived at during the following days of
session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body
that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that
Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to
Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
petition?
Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion
in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim
that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of respondents.
58
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It
is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the
Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator
Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held
that, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not
provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. However,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to
use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or
the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be
said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the
office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of
his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not
gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the
minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan
came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
A quorum is such number which enables a body to
transact its business. It is such number which makes
a lawful body and gives such body the power to pass a
law or ordinance or any valid act that is binding.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the

Quorum is based on the proportion between those
Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and physically present and the total membership of the body.
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules Note: In computing quorum, members who are outside
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been the country and thus outside of each Houses
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
jurisdiction are not included.
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

Quorum (Section 16 (2))

What is the effect if there is no quorum?

What is a quorum?
ANSWER

ANSWER:
In the absence of quorum, each House may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of

60
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as each House may provide.
Note: The members of the Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason of absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a nonbailable offense (more than 6
years) is certainly authorized by law and has
constitutional foundations (People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No.
13287576, February 3, 2000)
Avelino v, Cuenco, 83 Phil., 17 (1949)
Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco
83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department
Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his
right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He
requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On
the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening
of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand
by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other
Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however,
together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying
tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions
being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino
and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad,
among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then
moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad
however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his
gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili
then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it
was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not
to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Taada was
subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco
be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office
thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the
case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot
take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should
61
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The
SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in
the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,
what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session
and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not,
by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve
senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different
had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was
in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a
continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was
there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning
session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session
that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence,
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that
a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the
House does not mean all the members. Even a majority
of all the members constitute the House. There is a
difference between a majority of all the members of the
House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring
less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did
not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on
March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC
take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to
bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be
right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president.
There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;
one being confined and the other abroad but this does not
change the number of senators nor does it change the
majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this
case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only
12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there
was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume
jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with
the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum
upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
that any new session with a quorum would result in
Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco
group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been
trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no
avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC
believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy
the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys
ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been
legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that
the majority of all the members of the National Assembly
constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said
provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as
to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to base the majority, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on
actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated
to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
house or for other causes which make attendance of
the member concerned impossible, even through
coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in
order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was
intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere
oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the
members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that
Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National
Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3)
Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United
States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the
actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21,
1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted
a majority.
Rules: Discipline of Members (Section 16 (3))
Each house may punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its
members:
1. Suspension (shall not exceed 60 days)
2. Expulsion
Other disciplinary measures:
A. deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the record
B. FINE
C. IMPRISONMENT
D. CENSURE
Senate expelled Senator Alejandrino for disorderly
conduct for assaulting Senator de Vera during one of
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
their debates in session. Senate adopted a resolution
depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments of his office for the period of
one year.
The Court held that the resolution was illegal since it
amounted to expulsion and it would deprive the
electoral district of representation without any means to
fill the vacancy. The Senate had no authority to suspend
an appointed Senator like Senator Alejandrino.
[Alejandrino v. Quezon, (1924)]
Rules of Proceedings
o Each House shall determine its own
procedural rules.
o Issues may either be:
Political- On matters affecting only internal
operation of the legislature, the
legislatures formulation and
implementation of its rules.
Justiciable - when the legislative rule
affects private rights.
o Spouses Dela Paz, et. Al V. Senate Committee,
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Jurisdiction and Publication
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the
PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA.
De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the
scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After
the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure
area for he was carrying with him 105,000.00
(P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him
45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in
writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in
violation of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group
was later released but the s were confiscated by the
Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was
issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it was to conduct
involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the
case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of
any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as
the matter does not involve state to state relations as
provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further
claim that respondent Committee violated the same
Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the
members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail
the very same Senate Rules because the same were not
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
published as required by the Constitution, and thus,
cannot be used as the basis of any investigation
involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has
jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3),
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:Each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This
provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of
full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in
the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own
rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the
case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a
matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate.
The issue partakes of the nature of a political question.
Also, the signatures were properly obtained as
evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and
it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in
accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation were also published in two newspapers of
general circulation.
Journals and Records (Section 16 (4))
Probative value of the Journal
The Journal is conclusive upon the courts.
But when the contents of the journal conflicts with that
of an enrolled bill, the enrolled bill prevails over the
contents of the journal.
Congress may validly continue enacting bills even
beyond the reglementary period of adjournment. When
the journal shows that Congress conducted a sine die
session where the hands of the clock are stayed in order
to afford Congress the opportunity to continue its
session. All bills enacted during the sine die session are
valid and conclusive upon the Courts.
The Journals are conclusive evidence of the contents
thereof and Courts are bound to take judicial notice of
them. [US vs Pons (1916)]
Matters mandated by the Constitution to be
entered in the Journals
o Article VI, Section 16 (4)
o Article VI, Section 26 (2)
o Article VI, Section 27 (1)
Matters required to be entered in the Journal
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Yeas and Nays on third and final reading of
a bill
Veto message of the President
Yeas and Nays on the repassing of a bill
vetoed by the President
Yeas and Nays on any question at the
request of 1/5 of members present.
Article XI, Section 3 (3)
Journal v. Enrolled Bill
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based
mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other
cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort
to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its
due enactment. [Astorga v. Villegas, (1974)]
The Enrolled Bill Theory
An enrolled bill is the official copy of approved legislation
and bears the certifications of the presiding officers of each
House.
where the certifications are valid and are not withdrawn,
the contents of the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the
courts.
RATIONALE OF ENROLLED BILL THEORY- An enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution [Astorga vs Villegas, (1974) citing Field vs.
Clark].
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Respect due to a co-equal department requires the courts
to accept the certification of the presiding officer of the
legislative body. [Casco vs Gimenez (1963)]
A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts.[Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
(1947)]
o Casco Phil. Chemical Company v. Gimenez, 7
SCRA 347
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro
Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the
Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in
the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea
and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued
vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to
Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the
tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and
formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components
are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining
urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of
Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to
the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood
and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde
appearing in this provision should be construed as urea
and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea
and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea
formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde
should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It
is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time
of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from urea
and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea
formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress
during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent
the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts.
The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
o Telentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA
630
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political
Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality
of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added
Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did
not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives
as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it
passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate
Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and
substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes
note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the Interval between the session of one Congress and that
challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent
with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with of another.
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is
that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
15. The Electoral Tribunals Section 17
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
has been done.
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
14. Adjournment Section 16 (5) contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
What is the rule on adjournment? nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
ANSWER:
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
than 3 days, nor to any other place than that in which
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
the two Houses shall be sitting. (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
Chairman.

What is adjournment sine die?

Composition

ANSWER:
What is the composition of the electoral tribunal
(ET)?

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
ANSWER:
1. 3 Supreme Court Justices designated
by the Chief Justice
2. 6 members of the Chamber
concerned (Senate or HoR) chosen
on the basis of proportional
representation from the political
parties and parties registered
under the partylist system (Sec. 17,
Art. VI).
Note: The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its chairman.
o Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)
Bondoc v Pineda
FACTS:
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were
rival candidates for Representative for 4TH district of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107
votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP
Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was
consistent with truth, justice and self-respect and that
they would abide by the results of the recounted votes
where Bondoc was leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party
(LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his party when
he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and
rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to HRET from its resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH
THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET
BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL
OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO
WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID
HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY
POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL .
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI

THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE What is the jurisdiction of the Electoral
TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND
Tribunals?
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.

HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS ANSWER:

VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL Each electoral tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF contests relating to the election, returns, and
THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO qualifications of their respective members (Sec. 17, Art.
SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD
VI, 1987 Constitution). This includes determining the
REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT
validity or invalidity of a proclamation declaring a
OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
particular candidate as the winner.
2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN.
CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH
Note: The electoral tribunal has rulemaking power
COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND
(Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. L84297, Dec. 8, 1988).
INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF
PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION
OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL It is independent of the Houses of Congress and its
decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court only
3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY upon showing of grave abuse of discretion.
OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O
UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, The mere fact that the members of either the Senate or
DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM the House sitting on the electoral tribunal are those
POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER which are sought to be disqualified due to the filing of an
PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!
election contest against them does not warrant all of
Jurisdiction them from being disqualified from sitting in the ET.

What is an election contest?

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
ANSWER:
Where a defeated candidate challenges the
qualification and claims for himself the seat of the
proclaimed winner.
Note: In the absence of an election contest, ET is
without jurisdiction.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a member of the HoR,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualification ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The phrase election,
returns, and qualifications should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity
of the contestees title. (VinzonsChato v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 172131, Apr. 2, 2007)
In the absence of election contest, what power
does each House have over its members?
ANSWER:
The power of each House to expel its members or even to
defer their oath taking until their qualifications are
determined may still be exercised even without an
election contest.
o Dimaporo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 179285,
February 11, 2008
o Abayon v. HRET, G.R. 189466, February 11,
2008
THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first
nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat
in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo
was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of
an incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon,
were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the
Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for
the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the
others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and
security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction
over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he,
that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as
first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question
must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before
the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD:
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution,5 identifies who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees
are elected members of the House of Representatives no less
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. 10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
o Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,
2013
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO
B. TAN, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc
Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and
affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether
or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member of
the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the
correctness of petitioner submission.The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18,
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18,
2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of
the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which
petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis.
On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May
14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due
process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a
violation of her right to due process of law because she was
not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to
strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the
fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course
or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the
case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012
when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when
the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence.
Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity
given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only
requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to
be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The
petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the
duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born
citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
o Limkaichong v. Comelec, G.R. No.
178831-32, April 1, 2009
583 SCRA 1 Political Law The Legislative
Department Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the
1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival,
and some other concerned citizens filed
disqualification cases against Limkaichong.
Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines because when she was born her
father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage
to Limkaichongs dad. During the pendency of the
case against Limkaichong before the (Commission on
Elections) COMELEC. Election day came and votes
were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing
declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days
after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared
Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding
their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates
with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing
and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition
before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras
petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed
winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET
which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proclamation done
by the COMELEC is valid.
Whether or not COMELEC should still
exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
The proclamation of Limkaichong was
valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May
17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,
Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting
of the incorporated directive
suspending her proclamation. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively suspended the execution of
the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.
Since the execution of the May 17, 2007
Joint Resolution was suspended, there
was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.
A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order
or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5)
days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if
not pro forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order and
ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after
Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably
held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Member of the lower house, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his
case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latters election,
returns and qualifications. The use of the word
sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
16. The Commission on Appointments
Section 18
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
1. Composition
What is the composition of the Commission on
Appointments (CA)?
ANSWER:
1. Senate President as exofficio
chairman
2. 12 SENATORS
3. 12 members of the HoR (Sec. 18,
Art. VI)
Note: A political party must have at least 2 elected
senators for every seat in the Commission on
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
Appointments. Thus, where there are two or more
political parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission
on Appointments. It is not mandatory to elect 12 senators
to the Commission; what the Constitution requires is
that there must be at least a majority of the entire
membership. (Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971,
October 20, 1992)
How are the 12 Senators and 12
Representatives chosen?
ANSWER:
The members of the Commission shall be elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political party and party list. Accordingly, the
sense of the Constitution is that the membership in the
Commission on Appointment must always reflect political
alignments in Congress and must therefore adjust to
changes. It is understood that such changes in party
affiliation must be permanent and not merely
temporary alliances (Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344,
December 21, 1989 ). Endorsement is not sufficient to get
a seat in COA.
What is the jurisdiction of the CA?
ANSWER:
CA shall confirm the appointments by the President
with respect to the following positions: HAPCOO
A. Heads of the Executive departments.
(except if it is the VicePresident who is
appointed to the post)
B. Ambassadors, other Public ministers or
Consuls
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VI
C. Officers of the AFP from the rank of
Colonel or naval captain
D. Officers of the AFP from the rank of
vested in him by the Constitution (i.e.
COMELEC members) (Bautista v. Salonga,
G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989)
o Drilon v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 180050, July 31,
2009
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE
VENECIA, et al 594 SCRA 743 (2009)
Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the
Commission on Appointments should be lodged
before the respective Houses of Congress and not
with the Supreme Court.
The Senate and the House of Representatives
elected their respective contingents to the
Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second
week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to
respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for
one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no
report or recommendation was proffered by the
Legal Department, drawing Representative Taada to
request a report or recommendation on the matter
within three days. Hence spawned the filing by
Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al.,
alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty
(20) members who signed herein, is
constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA.
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that the
Senate contingent in the CA violated the
constitutional requirement of proportional
representation. The Senator avers that political
parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than
they were entitled to in the CA and the political party
PRP and other Independents cannot be represented
in the CA.
The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman
Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA has
neither the power nor the discretion to reject a
member who is elected by either House, and that
any complaints about the election of a member or
members should be addressed to the body that
elected them. Villar further explained that
instructions have been given to transmit the
original copies of Senator Madrigals letters to the
Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the
Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.
Madrigal, not satisfied with the CAs action, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President
and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA.
The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon
et al. and Madrigal et al.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme
Court is proper.
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HELD:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed
been rendered moot with the designation of
a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to
the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is
withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No.
183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that
she sustained direct injury as a result of the act
complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege
that she or her political party PDP-Laban was
deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-
Laban possesses personal and substantial interest
to confer on her/it locus standi.
Senator Madrigals primary recourse rests with the
respective Houses of Congress and not with this
Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates
that prior recourse to the House is necessary before
she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villars
invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.
o Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987,
the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section
18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in
a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. On the basis of this development,
the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments
by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner
and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The
chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13,
1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission
on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by
the respondent.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the realignment will validly change
the composition of the Commission on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section
18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to
change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly
elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in
that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.
2. Organization Section 19
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
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which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions,
but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
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(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
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(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If
the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.

SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.

SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be

enacted.

SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for

a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws
or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition
therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.

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