Case Digest Torts&Damages

Espique,Daniel Jr., O.
Torts and Damages 5:30-7:30 Mondays
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with rape before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-3217). He was convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal
of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May
20, 1992.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the
event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held:
No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or
motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability
Air France vs. Carascoso
Facts:
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome
from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a
stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat
because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat
and was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for
damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified,
among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes
pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the
planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded
damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of
a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class
because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties. Air
France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made
by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Air France is liable for damages.
HELD:
Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa
aquiliana.
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract
to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when
Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class,
by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first
class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such
claim is simply incredible.
the SC even ruled htat, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents,
water paths, alter conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land
inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction July 1982:spouses instituted a
criminal action on February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case
spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE:
W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private property.
HELD:
YES. There is quasi-delict even if done in private property.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner
as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
Fabre vs CA Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the
bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being
his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway.
The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic
steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus
came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front
portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline
Antonio.
Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly
liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not
a common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were
ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?
Held:
Yes. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.
The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners,
the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10
Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
Calalas v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga a stool at
the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let
a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco
Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a
third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas,
taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held
liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to
Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage
Held:
(2) No. the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows
he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought
to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies
in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters
into the highway.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot and
operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case
was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents
moved for the suspension of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case
invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the
Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First
Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the
criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the complaint that it was the
driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the
collision; that a direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered and the
fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in their
answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such
action is principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is
quasi-delictual in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in
Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising
from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action
has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and
the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b),
Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has been
instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi
delict. The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the
other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. An example of
quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil
Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
upholding the decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict
until after the criminal action is finally terminated.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the
event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held:
No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or
motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence,
the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may
be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of
their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect
and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Far East vs. CA
Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then
Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a
restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt.
The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a

complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to
this Court with this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has, in the process, overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can
be the cause for breaching a contract.
Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the
cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can
aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable
tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to
underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing
contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission
complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an

independent actionable tort.
Calalas v. sunga
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at
the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let
a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco
Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a
third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas,
taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held
liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to
Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage
Held:
(1) No, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows
he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought
to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies
in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters
into the highway.
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
FACTS:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he
had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile.
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that
the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the
other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse;
but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the
horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE:
WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD:
YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms,
the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. V. Court Of Appeals
FACTS:
January 14 1985 7:50 am: Jose Bernardo, who has been managing a market stall for 5 years,
together with other meat vendors went to select meat from a jeepney . As he grasped the
jeepney bars he suffered from an epileptic seizure and fell to the ground. Romeo Pimienta
who initially thought he was joking saw him turned black so along with the other vendors
they brought him to the hospital where he died shortly from cardio-respiratory arrest The
jeepney's antenna got entangled with the open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat
stall
On February 6 1985,His widow Caridad O. Bernardo and their minor children , Jojo, Jeffrey
and Jo-an, all surnamed Bernardo filed for damages against BENECO. BENECO then filed a
third party complaint against the jeepney owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.
ISSUE:
W/N BENECO was solely liable for negligence in the electrocution and death of Bernardo
HELD:
YES. AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the P864,000.00 as net income loss is reduced
to P675,000.00 and the P100,000.00 as moral damages is also reduced to
P50,000.00.BENECO was grossly negligent
Violation of the Philippine Electrical Code which requires a minimum vertical clearance of 14
feet from the level of the ground since the wiring crosses a public street - barely 8 or 9 feet.
Another violation is the main line connected to the service line was not of rigid conduit
wiring but totally exposed without any safety protection.
BENECO failed to detect, much less to repair, for an inexcusably long period of 7 years the
uninsulated connection which caused the death of Jose Bernardo. Canave was well within his
right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that any municipal law
or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act
The amount corresponding to the loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors: (a)
the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and, (b) the rate
at which the losses sustained by the widow and her children should be fixed.
The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same
cannot be predetermined
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded
when the act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross negligence.
Gross negligence
Negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant but to serve to obviate his/her
spiritual suffering by reason of the culpable action of the defendant
PLDT vs. CA
Facts:
On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of
its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning
light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was
shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the
independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be
the one liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed
necessary barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very
cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he
and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes on PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid the injury. One
who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
Layugan vs. IAC
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of
their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that
defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result,
plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he
recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said
injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that
he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of
plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his
truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did not even put a warning
sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without
admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is
liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their insurance
contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries
and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount
agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the
petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs
that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.
Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the
petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted
kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano,
respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on
stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the
truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of
petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the
Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses
that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to
instruct him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear
that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his
vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the
brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could
have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to
intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that
he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to
destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at
the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which
would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by
Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would
be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not
all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any,
in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others.
Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of
the Civil Code has not ceased.
Batiquin v. Court of Appeals | Davide, Jr.
FACTS
On Sept 1988, Petitioner Dr. Batiquin performed a simple caesarean section on Respondent
Mrs. Villegas when the latter gave birth. Soon after leaving the hospital, respondent began
to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. The abdominal pains and fever
kept on recurring and this prompted respondent to consult with another doctor, Dr. Kho (not
Hayden). When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of respondent to check her out respondents
infection, she discovered that a piece of rubber material, which looked like a piece of rubber
glove and was deemed a foreign body, was the cause of the respondents infection.
Respondent then sued petitioner for damages. RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed,
ruling for the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable.
Ruling:
YES, UNDER THE RULE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR, DR. BATIQUIN IS LIABLE.
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence
of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened
provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to
belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged
wrongdoer. Under this doctrine the happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of defendant, and
that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrines not a rule of substantive
law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates
the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body,
which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no
other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her
uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean
section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez
Facts:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise,
(the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He
was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad
drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea
rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to
General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-
up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors
Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. After the police
authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed
against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present
action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents
of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation.
Spouses Vasquez argue that their sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners
employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from
overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and
subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the
fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor.
Issue:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
Held:
No. the facts and circumstances of the case show that the employee, during the incident,
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties. The mere fact that ABAD
was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioners
office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies
Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioners place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies Restaurant
and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to
a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting
within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer.
Caedo vs Tu Khe Thai
Facts: Yu was riding in his Cadillac driven by Bernardo saw a carratela about 8 meters away.
Instead of slowing down veered to the left to overtake and in so doing the car hit the
carratellas left wheel and skidded obliquely hitting the on coming car of Caedo who despite
slackened speed to avoid the collision was hit resulting to the injuries of Caedo and his
passengers. Yus driver was negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not the basis of the master/employers liability in civil law is not respondent
superior.
Held:
The basis of the master/employers liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather
the relationship of Pater Familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction, reflects the masters negligence
if he fails to correct it in order to prevent the injury or damage The owner of the car Yu was
not liable because he did not see the carretela at a distance, however, he could not
anticipated his drivers sudden decision to pass the carretela. The time element was such
that there was not reasonable opportunity for Yu to assess the danger involved and warn the
driver accordingly.
The Former owner of Motor Vehicle are liable for the tortuous acts of the new owner.
BLTB & Armando Pon vs. IAC
FACTS
A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided with a bus owned by
Superlines, when the former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus was coming
from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri,
as well as injuries to the wife of Rosales, and Sales. These people were passengers of the
petitioner's bus. Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and
Neri instituted separate cases ih the CFI against BLTB and Superlines, together with their
drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed in a different CFI. CFI ruled that
only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay
damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling. Petitioners contended that the CFI
erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual, since
if it were private respondents' intention to file an action based on culap contractual, they
could have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents filed an
action against all defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort.
ISSUE:
WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual
Ruling:
IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana
The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the
bus driver Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway
he was negotiating on had a continuous yellow line signifying a no-overtaking zone.
It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the
circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or
rounding a curve there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the
driver has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his negligence in driving
recklessly the truck owned by BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct and
immediate in view of the fact that the deat of or injuries to its passengers was through the
negligence of its employee.
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its
contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. They are presumed
to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extaordinary diligence.
In the case at bar, the appellants acted negligently.
BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though the liability of the driversprings from
quasi delict while that of the bus company from contract.
M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
Facts:
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One
day, they were working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using
two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled
by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no
side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track
where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that
Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of
the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails
slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf
and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because
the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also
alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the
tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the
track yet he continued to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD:
Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was
another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack
of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his
part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact
that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring
workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar
his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages
from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as
a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist

without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing
obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole
Facts:
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947,
without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby
causing his death. Afialdas sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil
Code, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages
it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall
cease only in case, the damage should arise fromforce majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed
Afialda.
HELD:
No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker of
the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the
goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing
damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the
risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the
Workmens Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.
Amado Picart vs Frank Smith, Jr.
Facts:
In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75 meter
long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while he
was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did
not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith
continued driving towards Picart without slowing down and when he was already so near the
horse he swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the
bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which
required several days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD:
Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But Smiths
negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that
Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the
other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last
clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smiths car has approached the horse
at such proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will
not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be
proportioned by reason of his contributory negligence.
spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

FACTS:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters,
Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is charged.
14-year-old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but
avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident.
Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision
over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the
circumstances.
After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to
this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the respondent
Ruling:
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how
minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that
minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle
of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body
was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that
the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, As the doctrine usually is
stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which
is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident.
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent
that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee
as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for
help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all
efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it
is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to
impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we find
supported by the evidence: There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the expert
evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water
was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against
the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his
drowning.
MR. AND MRS. ROMEO FERRER and ANNETTE FERRER vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA
FACTS:
A complaint for damages dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975
(Civil Case No. Q-19647) was filed by petitioners against respondents.It was alleged that
defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car.
That on December 31, 1970, said vehicle was allegedly driven by their son Dennis
Pfleider, 16 y/o without proper official authority, drove the above-described vehicle without
due regard to traffic rules and regulations thereby causing physical injuries to plaintiff
Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required
medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two (2) years. They
prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them for actual expenses as well as other
damages. Defendants put up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider
exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle aforementioned and alleging
that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the
strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and that, consequently, defendants had
no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.
At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were
present. Consequently, defendants-private respondents were declared in default and the
plaintiff petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex parte.
On June 26, 1975, private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and
subsequent pleadings" on the ground that "defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was
due to accident or excusable neglect." This was opposed by petitioners.
On the same date, respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents, and
ordered them to pay to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following amounts: (1)
P24,500.00 for actual expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; (2) P24,000.00 for
actual expenses for the care, medicines of plaintiff Annette for helps from December 31,
1970 to December 31, 1974; (3) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (4) P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; (5) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (6) costs of suit.
On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of default, issued
an order absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint
states no cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his
parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible for
the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the
defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than four (4) years
after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi-delict
prescribes in four (4) years.
ISSUE:
whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents'
failure to allege the same in their answer.
HELD:
No. As early as Chua Lamko v. Dioso, et al., this Court sustained the dismissal of a
counterclaim on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the
answer of the plaintiff. Thus, this Court held that where the answer does not take issue with
the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to
specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of
prescription. It was explained that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact
not appearing upon the preceding pleading. Again, in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific
Commission House, this Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer, overruling the appellants'
invocation of Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that "defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in tile answer are deemed waived."
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of
prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused
the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is
undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for
damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. 8
The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident. 9
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED, without

pronouncement as to costs.
Kramer v CA
FACTS:
in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to
Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision
with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-
Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with
it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the
Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation
for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch
was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on
board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served
as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard
dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended
from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private
respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations
RULING:
Yes. QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF

THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. In Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It
is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of
action has arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4)
YEARS. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict
is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4)
year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
COUNTED FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2)
vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a
Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other
party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this
case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by
alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May
30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
Gotesco v Chatto
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter,
plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater,
owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even
then were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie.
Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The
theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs
managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street
they walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1)
day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said
hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Due to
continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July
1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in
Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she
had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.
ISSUE:
Whether Gotesco is liable
RULING:
Yes .Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to
force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong,
admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural
engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus Lim Ong is not an
engineer, he is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It
does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. (TSN, June 14,
1985, p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of
their theater cannot be equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce
sacrilege in our jurisprudence."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed
caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could
not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present

proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent
Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to
overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident
in question. It was no shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have
been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and
maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the
leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the
nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were
duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy
were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as
regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the
purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by
ordinary or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: "Where
a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that
caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits
of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That presumption or inference

was not overcome by the petitioner.
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one
to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should
not have been guilty of negligence.
NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without
prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the
allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of
floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees,
and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no
direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that
the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a
fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a
fortuitous event
Held:
The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of
the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss
or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private
respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by
definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his
active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the
typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, vs.PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO

FACTS:
The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos) collided with the truck
of PEPSI, driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses
sued Bonifacio and Pepsi. The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-
COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the
plaintiffs damages.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court,
but absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in
these lection of its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the basis for its decision:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant

company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle
crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him
by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a
member of the Safety Council. Our Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that In order
that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experiences and record of service. Defendant Company has taken all
these steps.
ISSUE:
Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.
Held:
Yes.Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers. The uncontradicted
testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect
that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination
and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination,
consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all
of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety
Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147(1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief,
our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant
may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license;
he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service."
Gatchalian v. CA and Delim
Facts:
On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound
was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by
respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign
an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was
among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to
recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering
and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense
force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the
waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid,
but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
Issues:
Whether The appellate court erred in ruling that the waiver was invalid
Held:
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may
not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need
to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the
vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too
signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed
and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private
respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against
the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute
and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common
carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported
waiver is offensive to public policy.
NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam,
causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without
prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the
allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of
floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees,
and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no
direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that
the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a
fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria
Held:
We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused
by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes
that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous
events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate,
maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the
spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

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Espique,Daniel Jr., O.

Torts and Damages 5:30-7:30 Mondays

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS

Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines

Air France vs. Carascoso

Whether or not Air France is liable for damages.

Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court

W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private property.

YES. There is quasi-delict even if done in private property.

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff

Fabre vs CA Case Digest

Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Yes. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.

Cinco vs. Canonoy

Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines

Far East vs. CA

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a

complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. V. Court Of Appeals

Layugan vs. IAC

Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Batiquin v. Court of Appeals | Davide, Jr.

Whether or not petitioner is liable.

Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez

Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

Caedo vs Tu Khe Thai

BLTB & Armando Pon vs. IAC

M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist

Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole

Amado Picart vs Frank Smith, Jr.

Whether or not Smith is negligent.

spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED, without

Yes. QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF

b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and

Whether Gotesco is liable

Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present

of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That presumption or inference

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, vs.PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant

Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.

Gatchalian v. CA and Delim

Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

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Case Digest Torts&Damages

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