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Roxas vs De Jesus

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco,Presiding Judge Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus. After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, SpecialProceeding
No. 81503 case was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of thedeceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.On March
26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. He thendelivered to the lower court a document
purporting to be the holographic Will of thedeceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the
probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as
administrator, he found anotebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and24
thereof, a letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in thehandwriting of the deceased Bibiana R.
de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 "and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not
written by alawyer.testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas deJesus and
Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased
mother They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language inwhich the holographic Will is
written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother Respondent Luz R.
Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de
Jesus because (a) it was notexecuted in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under
duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix actedby mistake and/or did not intend, nor
could have intended the said Will to be her last Willand testament at the time of its execution. August 24, 1973 - Judge
Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of theholographic w/c he found to have been duly
executed in accordance with lawRespondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a MR stating that the will was not dated as
requiredby Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will shouldcontain the day, month and
year of its execution and that this should be strictly compliedwith.December 10, 1973 Judge disallowed the probate of
the holographic Will on the groundthat the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year

ISSUE: WON the date "FEB./61 on the will is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of theCivil Code

HELD: We agree with the petitioner.The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688
of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the
present Civil Code omitted the phrase Ao mes y dia and simplyrequires that the holographic Will should be dated. The
petitioners submit that the liberalconstruction of the holographic Will should prevail.Respondent Luz Henson says the will is
void for non-compliance with Article 810 of theNew Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its
execution. Therespondent further contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article810 of the Civil
Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in theexecution of holographic Wills are strictly
construed.RULING OF SC:the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guardagainst
fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentaryprivilegeIf a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, andthe possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said Win should beadmitted to probateCourt found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was
there anysubstitution of Wills and Testaments As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should
include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of
fraud, badfaith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established the Willshould be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceasedBibiana Roxas
de Jesus is reinstated.

Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170 |
JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER

FACTS:Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate
proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed anopposition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished byimplication of law alleging that before Melecios death, the landwas sold
to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat. Trial court admitted
the will to probate and declared the TCTnull and void. However, the CA on appeal denied
probate on theground that it was undated.
ISSUE:W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article810 of CC.
HELD: YES. The law does not specify a particular location wherethe date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements arethat the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of thetestator. T h e i n t e n t i o n t o s h o w M a r c h 1 7 1 9 6 8 a s t h e
d a t e o f t h e execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph.
It states that this being in the month of March 17 th day,in the year 1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is thematter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is
noother than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows thatt h i s i s a
u n i l a t e r a l a c t o f M e l e c i o w h o p l a i n l y k n e w t h a t h e w a s executing a will.

Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August
1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a
forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on
the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.


The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of
the case bearing the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit,
but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longeravailable.

The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds
signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified
that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late
husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can
not be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the
deceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent
Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become
familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on
appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the
signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.

2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceaseds holographic will.

HELD:

1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased
and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was that of the deceased.

The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no
longer available.

The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that
she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the
said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her
motive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.

(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)

A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written by the testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare
that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.

The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.

Federico Azaola v. Cesario Singson


G.R. No. L-14003; August 5, 1960

FACTS:
When Fortunata Vda de Yance died, Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the probate of the formers
will, whereby Maria Milgaros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased
Cesario Singson. Francisco witnessed that one month before the death of the testator, the same was
handed to him and his wife.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the
will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the proponent was bound to produce more than one witness
2. WON 811 is mandatory

HELD:
1. No. Since the authenticity of the will was not being contested. But even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot
be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present
at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is
contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments. But it cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is
holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if the Court deem
it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of
the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the
Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

2. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not
mandatory.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to
construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by
giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, should
the Court deem them necessary.

Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a
peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's
name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such
was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written
above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole
heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid
as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with
another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind.
However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in
accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

Facts:
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two
(2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe
died, the said will was probated in 1939.

2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952
but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.

3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate
becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate
entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that
even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court
but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A
decision which is binding upon the whole world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-
examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will
was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to
the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the
signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in
accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and
none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or
reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is
believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be
established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is
distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require
evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in
court.

Gago vs. Mamuyac


G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on
July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared
that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the
first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the
second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly
revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another
witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the
original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of
the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the
same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the
testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Maloto v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four
heirs believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding.
However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last
will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and
a probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the
househelp under the instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the
will was sufficiently proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and
'animus' must concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of
destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's
paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be
the will and the burning though done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute
an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since
animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and
presence.

OZAETA vs. CUARTERO


G.R. No. L-5597
May 31, 1956
FACTS:
Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos
PalancaTaguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had
been duly established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of
evidence presented was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married
Rosa Gonzales in which marriage they had eight children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive
evidence of an existence of a fact during the life time of the testator
RULING:
Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive
evidence of an existence of a fact during the life time o f the testator of the said Will .
Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said document that
since 1923 and for some years there after he maintained amorous relations with Maria
Cuartero and had by her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally
fed and support ed. He said nothing about having married Maria ; on the contrary, he
declared that for grave reasons he regarded her unworthy of being the guardian o
f the persons and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa Joson de
Fer nandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their persons, and
property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage to
Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him
were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will
may not be taken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he made said
statement he was about 76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left
to live.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel

Facts:

1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of
and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed
his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what
occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is
Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an
action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the
1939 decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was
not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set
aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery).
Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.
JIMENEZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 184 SCRA 367 (1990)

DOCTRINE: The probate court, as a rule, cannot pass with finality on issues affecting
ownership of property. Jimenez holds that this limitation applies also to proceedings in
intestacy where an intestate court can only pass upon on issues of title on a provisional
basis only. And despite a ruling of the intestate court on the matter, the parties are not
barred by res judicata from instituting a separate and subsequent action to thresh out the
matter.
FACTS: The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced 4
children, namely Alberto, Leonardo, Sr. Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of
the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.
1. After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with
whom he begot the 7 petitioners.
2. Lino died on Aug. 11, 1951 while Genoveva died on Nov. 21, 1978.
3. April 1979, Virginia Jimenez (Virginia) filed a petition praying to be appointed as
the administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva.
Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the spouses, which
included herein co-petitioners and the four children of the union of Lino and
Consolacion.
4. October, 1979 - Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. (Leonardo Jr.) son of
Leonardo Jimenez Sr., file a motion for the exclusion of his fathers name and
those of Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles from the petition, as they are children of
the union of Lino and Consolacion and not of Lino and Genoveva and because
they have already received heir inheritance consisting of 5 parcel of lands in
Pangasinan.
5. March 23, 1981 - Petitioner Virginia was appointed administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Lino and Genoveva.
6. May 21, 191 - She filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino and
Genoveva including 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.
7. Leonardo Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on
the ground that these had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto,
Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father Lino.
8. September 29, 1981 - The probate court ordered the exclusion of the 5 parcels of
land from the inventory. On appeal the CA dismissed the petition for the
annulment of order of the probate court dated in September 29, 1981, because
Genoveva had admitted that the subject parcel of land had been adjudicated to the
children of the previous nuptial; and the subject properties could not have been
acquired during the marriage of Lino to Genoveva because they were already
titled in the name of Lino even prior to Lino and Genovevas marriage.
9. 2 years after, petitioner filed an amended complaint to recover the
possession/ownership of the subject 5 parcel of land as part of the estate of Lino
and Genoveva and to order private respondents to render the accounting of the
produce. The private respondents moved to for the dismissal of the complaint on
the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment and by prescription and
laches.
10. On the other hand the petitioner contend that the action was not barred by prior
judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality
the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate
action; and the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches
because private respondents forcible acquisition pf the subject properties
occurred only after the death of petitioners mother, Genoveva in 1978.
11. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. On appeal,
IAC likewise dismissed the said complaint.
ISSUE: WON in a settlement proceeding, the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership and whether res judicata exist to bar petitioners present action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the 5 parcel of land.
HELD: No
Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
Since the probate court's findings are not conclusive, being prima facie, a separate
proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action.
It has been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at
bar.
Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in
Sp. No. 5346, is an action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy, while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. While admittedly, the CFI of
Pangasinan had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement
by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding.
Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand, was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, in the exercise of the court's general jurisdiction, in the determination of the
issue of ownership of the disputed properties. Since the determination of the question of title
to the subject properties in Sp. No. 5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred
from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.

MANINANG vs. CA

June 19, 1982

FACTS:

Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by
Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also
provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

ISSUE:

Was Bernardo preterited?

HELD:

In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was
a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has
not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been
preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not
indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the
lower court.

# 2 4 . P A S T O R
v s . C A G O , V a
n e s s a J e n i f f
e r D i z o n WILLS & SUCCESSION 3-A
Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR,
petitioners,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) andSofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of analleged holographic will of Pastor
Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor
of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS.
Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of
Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will.Consequently, Quemada
instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance
of alleged properties of estatewhich included the properties subject of the legacy which were in
the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimedto be the owners in their own rights, and
not by inheritance. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. Theorder was
affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to
the probate courtafter denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate
court, all pleadings of both parties remainedunacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr.and Sofia on the ground
of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was
still pending in another court, the probatecourt issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving
the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS andruling in effect that the legacy to
Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly
toQuemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain
75% for himself as legatee.Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was
ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution
and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate
court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after
resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with
the CA a petition for Certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing
the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied
as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic
validity.
RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. The Order sought to be executed by the assailed
Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of
the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for
and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated
pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership
and possession of real and personal properties. The Probate Court did not resolve the question of
ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that theissue of ownership was
the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error
for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the
question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in
dispute.

Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife (Maxine),
their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel)
which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One willdisposed of his
Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for
probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to
probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for
Maxine and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered
into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978,
Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency
of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimms will. However,
pursuant to thecompromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss.
The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that
the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was
void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedents wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction in denying
Ethels motion to dismiss.

HELD:

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, in denying Ethels motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with
the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the
two cases.

Pascual COSO, vs.


Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with
her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish
duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the
testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground
of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez.
There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have
that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been
variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will,
the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as
to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of
the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still
operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the
making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a
person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence
destroys the testators free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the
time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario
Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy
his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud
be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his
property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such
disposition is voluntarily made.

TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-


appellee, vs. PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.

On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant,
died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition
for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual,
who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent. Opposing the petition,
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the
validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the
testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
ISSUE:
W/N the will should be disallowed because of undue and improper influence and fraud

RULING:
NO. That to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers
and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 596; Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979,
30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 196); that the contention that a will was
obtained by undue influence or improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or
suspicion, as it is enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it
may have been exercised (Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually
exercised (Ozatea vs. Cuartero, ante; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is
on the person challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution
(Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a
will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante); nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty
addressed to the testator (Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January 1956), or omission of relatives,
not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronel, 45
Phil. 416).
Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to
establish actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testarix by the proponent.
Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased
"did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page 7, 27 January 1962), which does not
amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of
contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testarix, placed the title
in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters to
mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to
overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix. Because if the mind of the latter were really
subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse
to the deception averred.lawphi1.et

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testarix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the
instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumetism of the
testarix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relatives or
friends is, likewise explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those
interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recriminations that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire
to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
during her lifetime.

We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding the appellant's evidence established at
most grounds for suspicion but fell far short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or
influence. Considering that testarix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she
expressed no objection to his being made the sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of
her own rights, we find nothing abnormalin her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
Appellants invoked presumption of undue influence held to exist by American authorities where the
beneficiary participates in the drafting of execution of the will favoring him; but since the will was
prepared by Atty. Pascual, although nephew of the proponent, we do not think the presumption
applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would follow the instructions of the testatrix;
and a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of
having conspired to falsify a statement, except upon clear proof.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole
and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he
had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging
that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of
concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence
making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except
the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590

FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was
a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate
of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter)
and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the
institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased died intestate.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance
of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of
Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a
legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to
other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that
the legitime be completed.

BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ


64 SCRA 452
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate
children.

Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial
will, which was written in English. In thatwill, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised andpartitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal
assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.There
after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate
in favor
of their 6 children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
itsallowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
RULING:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formalvalidity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on
its face it appears tobe intrinsically void.But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was
void and in converting the testate proceeding into anintestate proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid
and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors andimpair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
themeantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving
spouse.

Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu


1967 | JBL Reyes
Nature:
Direct appeal from judgment of CFI dismissing the complaint of Tirso Reyes and ordering
the same to deliver to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties received by hisdeceased wife under
the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto.
Parties:
Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes
y Barretto,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTSLucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
Facts:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they acquired
vastestate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936),h e
left his share in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of the minors) and Lucia
M i l a g r o s Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
andhis nephew and nieces.
The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow).
Asappointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her in her
ownb e h a l f a n d a s g u a r d i a n o f t h e m i n o r M i l a g r o s . I t w a s a p p r o v e d , a
n d t h e e s t a t e w a s distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took immediate
possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs and issuance of new titles in
her name.Upon Marias death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed
two wills
: in the first,she instituted
Salud and Milagros
as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same andleft all her properties in favor of
Milagros alone.
The
later will was allowed
and the firstrejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian
of the children of Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was
not
the daughter of the decedent Maria by herhusband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.

TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of thee s t a t e o f B i b i
ano is null and void
ab initio
(not merely voidable) because thedistributee (Salud), predecessor of Tirso e
t . a l . , w a s n o t a d a u g h t e r o f t h e S p s . Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of
partition was decreed on the basis of
Art. 1081 (OCC)
(
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included,
shall be null and void
). As Milagros was the only trueheir of Bibiano, she was entitled to recover from Salud
and her successors all theproperties received by her from Bibianos estate, in view of
Art. 1456 (NCC) whichstates that property acquired by mistake or fraud is held by its
acquirer in impliedtrust for the real owner.Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as
her legitimate heir, Tirso now fallsback upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which
was given in usufructto Maria. Hence, this action for the recovery of the one-half portion
thereof.

This actionafforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership; not only of
the fishpondunder litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to
Salud, for being as p u r i o u s h e i r , a n d n o t e n t i t l e d t o a n y s h a r e i n t h e
e s t a t e o f B i b i a n o , t h e r e b y d i r e c t l y attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
Issues/Held:
(1)
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void
ab initio
and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
NO.

(2)
W/N Milagros action is barred by the statute of limitations.
YES.

Ratio
(1)
Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied!

Salud admittedly had been instituted heir inBibianos last will and testament
t o g e t h e r w i t h M i l a g r o s . H e n c e , t h e p a r t i t i o n h a d between them could not be one
such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
null and void under Art. 1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or
descendants, but of heirs (without distinctionbetween forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the
fact that Salud did not happen tobe a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being
one of the heirs expresslynamed in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free
portion of his estatet o w h o m s o e v e r h e c h o s e . W h i l e t h e s h a r e ( ) a s s i g n e d
t o S a l u d i m p i n g e d o n t h e legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to
be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will
a share smallerthan her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was
no preteritionor total omission of a forced heir here. The view that the partition in question is void for
being a compromise on the civil statusof Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous.
A compromise presupposes thesettlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties;
and the conditiono f S a l u d a s d a u g h t e r o f t h e t e s t a t o r B i b i a n o , w h i l e u n t r u e , w a s
a t n o t i m e d i s p u t e d during the settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise
over issuesnot in dispute. While a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the
law nowhereforbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a
claimantto the estate.At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for
distribution of estate), it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines
thepersons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.
Where a court has validlyissued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become
final, the validityor invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud was not her child,the act of
Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles
her to belief. This contention is unfounded.
First , t h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t w h e n B i b i a n o s e s t a t e w a s j u d i c i a l l y
s e t t l e d a n d distributed, Salud knew that she was not Bibianos child. Thus, if fraud was
committed, itwas Maria who was solely responsible; and neither Salud nor her minor children can
beheld liable therefor. Second , granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be
obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed a
long time ago.
At the time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years
later(1944). On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of
fraudthe court decree distributing her fathers estate and the 4-year period of limitationstarted to run,
to expire in 1948. Conceding that Milagros only became aware of thetrue facts in 1946, her action still
became extinct in 1950.
Her action was barred inAug. 1956, when she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting
the decree of distribution of Bibianos estate.
There is no evidence of an alleged verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the propertiesreceived by
Salud, which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the action.Granting that there was
such promise, it would not bind Tirsos wards, who are the real parties-in-interest. An
abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration, cannot
bind his wards, being null and void asto them unless duly authorized by the proper court
Dispositive:
CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it orders Tirso to reconvey toMilagros the
properties enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as it denies any
right of Milagros to accounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must beGIVEN DUE COURSE

NUGUID VS NUGUID

GRN L-2344 17 SCRA 449

JUNE 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived
by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted
Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their
opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a
consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete
nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.

Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:

The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence
will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for.
It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is
to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort,
expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question.

Cayetano vs. Leonidas


o GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
o EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issues.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters,
Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the
only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication,
adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among
others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh
US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not the will was valid


o Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issues.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen
and the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the
national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the
national law of the decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of
Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA
and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate
court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

ACAIN vs. IAC

FACTS:

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The
will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to
his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property
shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:

Was there preterition?

HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to


intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he


must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or
real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in
the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not
an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left
by the deceased.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82

FACTS:

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a
French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1 st part to the widow, and
2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2 nd part,
1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews
opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a
real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Crisologo vs Singson

Facts:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death deathwhether
this happens before or after that of Donya Leona's deathConsolacion's share shall
belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.

Issue:

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Held:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.


A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o f ideicommissa
kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime,
shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it
merely provides that upon appellee's deathwhether this happens before or after that of
the testatrixher share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.It is of the essence of a


fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to
preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.

The last will of the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar,
the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or
to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix.

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