Consti 2 Cases Section 12

Gamboa vs. Cruz [G.R. No. L56291, June 27, 1988]
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with
other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant, meanwhile, during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect
of robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of the complainant while the latter is being investigated. An information of
robbery has been filed against the herein petitioner.
During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on the other hand, the petitioner, with the
assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed
this motion on the ground that the conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional right to counsel and to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners right to counsel and to due process was violated during the line up.
HELD:
No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it be 1973 or 1987.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the investigating officers tries to elicit or ask
information from the accuse,even though the questions appeases to be innocent. At this point of stage, the assistance of the
counsel is needed in order to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips
fo the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he was not asked any question nor to answer. The police line up is
not wart of custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not entitled to right to counsel.
People vs. Macam [G.R. Nos. 9101112, November 24, 1994]
Facts:
Prosecutions version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito
Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to
have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had
taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncles gun then declared a hold-
up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs.
After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo
and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.
Defenses version:
Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benitos house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying
him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the
accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun
and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins
inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan.
Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just
arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they
went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his
brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced
to admit certain things.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation against the respondent, and After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their
even before the adversary judicial proceedings against the accused begins. faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for
identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.

While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line up, the moment there is a move
to elicit admissions or confessions, even a plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and admissible.
in the presence of the counsel.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is
considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses
identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal
line-up.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest
because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house served as a looked out.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.

Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter,
chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
People vs. Judge Ayson [G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] People vs. Pinlac [G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988]
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio Citystation. It was alleged that he
was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PALmanagement notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining That investigation was scheduled inaccordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent Agreement signedby it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter wassent by
by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit teamwere given to him, and he refuted
that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he wasprevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence however this did not ensue. Twomonths after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence
by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was by theprosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that theconfession was
taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did notadmit those stating that accused was not
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and tohave counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors
was denied. Hence this appeal. was denied. Hence this appeal.Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admissionand statement of accused.Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only towitnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not presentin case at
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. bar).This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be awitness against himself. It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not aprohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than specific question, incriminatory incharacter, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). give awitness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it andcould be waived.Rights
in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:1) he shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be usedagainst him.3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make astatement. But unless
and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at thetrial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
People vs. Bolanos [G.R. No. 101808, July 3, 1992]
Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco
Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the
deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was
allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police
station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated where he
formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to Andans house where he showed the police where the bags of
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
People vs. Andan [G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997]
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila
when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andans wife but there was nobody inside the
house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet
until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where
she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the
lot and abandoned it.
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers
to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andans nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime.
The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A
Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the investigation,
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered
a request that they talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the
truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and the
media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since no lawyer
was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives,
Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-
feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his fathers house
at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty
and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and
cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
RULING:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal
mayor has operational supervision and control over the local police and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andans confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered
the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellants confession
to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994]
Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia Naitonal Vocational School in del Carmen, Surigao del
Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting and Disbursement Officer to hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines. That while being in the said position, he intentionally, feloniously and without lawful authority
appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the
Philippines in the total amount to PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account for the said amount during the audit.
People vs. Dy [G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988]
Facts: Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting
a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence
that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a
statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was
not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he was nowhere to be found. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.

On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD No 1606, conferring to it original and exclusive jurisdiction Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by
over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the RPC the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as
evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under
November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of the investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a
bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is
transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Quiones-Marcos however opined that since Navallo had competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated
already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of
case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was however docketed in custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being
Sandiganbayan. A new order of arrest for the petitioner was issued by the Sandiganbayan. guilty of the crime.

Navallo filed a motion to quash contending that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him
before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit

Held: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit of custodial
investigation. A person may be subject to malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long
as there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with convincing justification.
People vs. Alicando [G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995]

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking
her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body
and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house.
Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On
the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from
appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of
which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the
PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed of his right
to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a language he could not
understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional
right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated section
3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his
convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with
due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to
the lower for further proceeding.
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992 Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS
THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
THEREOF
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1alf
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect felonies;
for human rights.
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided,
That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates province pays said fees.
any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the
to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also
dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
whatsoever.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor,
or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence (b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person
in any proceeding. arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by
any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
be null and void and of no effect. (P4,000.00).lawphi1

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees,
executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
violation of law.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1
 CONSTI 2 CASES SECTION 10

Rutter vs. Esteban [G.R. No. L3708, May 18, 1953] .
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid
outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27,
1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has
been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that
had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint
also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot
be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-2: December 14, 1979]
Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the public. It sold to Augusto Padilla and Natividad
Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on instalments. The vendees then
transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma Chavez. The agreements of sale on
instalment and the deeds of sale contained the restriction that The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by
the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
any other lots belonging to the Seller.
Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name of Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas and Co. claims
that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate. Feati Bank, on the other hand, maintains that the area along
the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution
No. 27 s-1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Later on, Feati Bank commenced construction on the said lots for
a building devoted to banking purposes. It refused to comply with the demands of Ortigas & Co. to stop the said construction.

ISSUE:
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts
or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant.
its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the
legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate HELD:
end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e. the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is good order or safety of the general welfare of the people. This general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress
as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing vested
whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. rights arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other hand. Said
case is not present in this petition.

Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of
police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986] Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment
law's constitutionality. upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor
more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
the court. transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of welfare of society and the public interest.
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank. 2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of
funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To 3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since
mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee
for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome
the said presumptions.

Issue:

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt

2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.
Ganzon vs. Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450, July 25, 1983 NDC vs PVB 192 SCRA 257 [1990]
FACTS: Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling claims
for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative against the Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted
complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct. at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the
dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished. Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent
ISSUE: Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in Los Baos, Laguna.
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and remove During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
local officials. companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed
by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717.
RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is
not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do
allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. interests on loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot
simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law
gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private respondent without
justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse interest of greater number.
of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the traditional
purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and
permanent. other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection
clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the government, should have been created only by
general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any demonstrated
connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
BPI vs SEC [G.R. No. 164641, December 20 2007] upon by the parties. By approving the Rehabilitation Plan, the SEC hearing panel totally disregarded the efficacy of the mortgage
For resolution is a petition seeking to nullify the 30 January 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77309[2] agreements between the parties, and sanctioned a mode of payment which is solely for the unilateral benefit of the ASB Group.[21]
upholding the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) approval of the rehabilitation of the ASB Group of Companies (ASB This is so because in the event that the secured creditors such as itself would not agree to dacion en pago, the ASB Groups
Group) in SEC En Banc Case No. EB-726.[3] obligations would be settled at the selling prices of the mortgaged properties to be dictated by the ASB Group,[22] rendering
BPIs status as a preferred creditor illusory.[23]
The antecedent facts are as follows:

The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), through its predecessor-in- interest, Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), extended
credit accommodations to the ASB Group[4] with an outstanding aggregate principal amount of P86,800,000.00, secured by a BPI further claims that despite its rejection of the Rehabilitation Plan, no effort was made to resolve the impasse on the valuation
real estate mortgage over two (2) properties located in Greenhills, San Juan.[5] On 2 May 2000, the ASB Group filed a petition of the mortgaged properties. With no repayment scheme for secured creditors not accepting the Rehabilitation Plan, the same
for rehabilitation and suspension of payments before the SEC, docketed as SEC Case No. 05-00-6609.[6] Thereafter, on 18 August has become discriminatory.[24] Moreover, any interference on the rights of the secured creditors must not be so indefinite and
2000, the interim receiver submitted its Proposed Rehabilitation Plan (Rehabilitation Plan)[7] for the ASB Group. The open-ended as to effectively deprive secured creditors of their right to their security,[25] BPI adds.
Rehabilitation Plan provides, among others, a dacion en pago by the ASB Group to BPI of one of the properties mortgaged to the
latter at the ASB Group as selling value of P84,000,000.00 against the total amount of the ASB Groups exposure to the bank. In In its Comment,[26] the SEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the terms and conditions of the Rehabilitation
turn, ASB Group would require the release of the other property mortgaged to BPI, to be thereafter placed in the asset pool. Plan do not violate BPIs right as a creditor because the dacion en pago transaction contemplated in the plan can only proceed
Specifically, the pertinent portion of the plan reads: upon mutual agreement of the parties. Moreover, being a secured creditor, BPI enjoys preference over unsecured creditors,
thus there is no reason for BPI to fear the non-payment of the loan, or the inability to assert its preferred right over the
x x x ASB plans to invoke a dacion en pago for its #35 Eisenhower property at ASBs selling value of P84 million against the total mortgaged property.[27]
amount of the ASBs exposure to the bank. In return, ASB requests the release of the #27 Annapolis property which will be placed
in the ASB creditors asset pool. [8] On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution relied on by BPI is a limit on
the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SECs approval of the Rehabilitation Plan was an
The dacion would constitute full payment of the entire obligation due to BPI because the balance was then to be considered exercise of adjudicatory power by an administrative agency and thus the non-impairment clause does not apply.[28] In addition,
waived, as per the Rehabilitation Plan.[9] they stress that there is no coercion or compulsion that would be employed under the Rehabilitation Plan. If dacion en pago fails
to materialize, the Rehabilitation Plan contemplates to settle the obligations to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at
BPI opposed the Rehabilitation Plan and moved for the dismissal of the ASB Groups petition for rehabilitation.[10] However, on selling prices.[29] Finally, they claim that BPI failed to submit any valuation of the mortgage properties to substantiate its
26 April 2001, the SEC hearing panel issued an order[11] approving ASB Groups proposed rehabilitation plan and appointed Mr. objection to the Rehabilitation Plan, making its objection thereto totally unreasonable.[30]
Fortunato Cruz as rehabilitation receiver. The petition must be denied.
The very same issues confronted the Court in the case of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings, et al.[31] In this
case, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (MBTC) refused to enter into a dacion en pago arrangement contained in ASBs proposed
BPI filed a petition for review[12] of the 26 April 2001 order before the SEC en banc, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Rehabilitation Plan.[32] MBTC argued, among others, that the forced transfer of properties and the diminution of its right to
part of the hearing panel. It argued that the Order constituted an arbitrary violation of BPIs freedom and right to contract since enforce its lien on the mortgaged properties violate its constitutional right against impairment of contracts and right to due
the Rehabilitation Plan compelled BPI to enter into a dacion en pago agreement with the ASB Group.[13] The SEC en banc denied process. The Court ruled that there is no impairment of contracts because the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and the
the petition.[14] appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspends the action for claims against the ASB Group, and MBTC may still enforce
BPI then filed a petition for review[15] before the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the SEC en banc erred in affirming the its preference when the assets of the ASB Group will be liquidated. But if the rehabilitation is found to be no longer feasible, then
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan despite being violative of BPIs contractual rights. BPI contended that the terms of the the claims against the distressed corporation would have to be settled eventually and the secured creditors shall enjoy
Rehabilitation Plan would impair its freedom to contract, and alleged that the dacion en pago was a mode of payment beneficial preference over the unsecured ones. Moreover, the Court stated that there is no compulsion to enter into a dacion en pago
to the ASB Group only.[16] agreement, nor to waive the interests, penalties and related charges, since these are merely proposals to creditors such as
MBTC, such that in the event the secured creditors refuse the dacion, the Rehabilitation Plan proposes to settle the obligations
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that considering that the dacion en pago transaction could proceed only to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at selling prices.
proceed upon the mutual agreement of the parties, BPIs assertion that it is being coerced could not be sustained. At no point
would the Rehabilitation Plan compel secured creditors such as BPI to agree to a settlement agreement against their will, the CA Rehabilitation proceedings in our jurisdiction, much like the bankruptcy laws of the United States, have equitable and rehabilitative
added. Moreover, BPI could refuse to accept any arrangement contemplated by the receiver and just assert its preferred right purposes. On the one hand, they attempt to provide for the efficient and equitable distribution of an insolvent debtors remaining
in the liquidation and distribution of the assets of the ASB Group.[17] BPI filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was assets to its creditors; and on the other, to provide debtors with a fresh start by relieving them of the weight of their outstanding
denied for lack of merit.[18] debts and permitting them to reorganize their affairs.[33] The rationale of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and
viable rehabilitation,[34] by preserving a foundering business as going concern, because the assets of a business are often more
Before this Court, BPI asserts that the CA erred in ruling that the approval by the SEC of the ASB Groups Rehabilitation Plan did valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated.[35]
not violate BPIs rights as a creditor.[19] It maintains its position that the dacion en pago is a form of coercion or compulsion,
and violative of the rights of secured creditors.[20] It asserts that in order for the Rehabilitation Plan to be feasible and legally The Court reiterates that the SECs approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair BPIs right to contract. As correctly contended
tenable, it must reflect the express and free consent of the parties; i.e, that the conditions should not be imposed but agreed by private respondents, the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-
judicial power.[36] The SEC, through the hearing panel that heard the petition for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting
as a quasi-judicial body and thus, its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the freedom to
contract.

Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en pago approach does not render it defective on the
ground of impairment of the right to contract. Dacion en pago is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt.[37] The undertaking really partakes in a
sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to
be charged against the debtors debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain, and
cause or consideration must be present.[38] Being a form of contract, the dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected
without the consent of the parties involved.

We find no element of compulsion in the dacion en pago provision of the Rehabilitation Plan. It was not the only solution presented
by the ASB to pay its creditors. In fact, it was stated in the Rehabilitation Plan that:

x x x. If the dacion en pago herein contemplated does not materialize for failure of the secured creditors to agree thereto, the
rehabilitation plan contemplates to settle the obligations (without interest, penalties and other related charges accruing after
the date of the initial suspension order) to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at ASB selling prices for the general
interest of the employees, creditors, unit buyers, government, general public and the economy.[39]

Thus, if BPI does not find the dacion en pago modality acceptable, the ASB Group can propose to settle its debts at such amount
as is equivalent to the selling price of the mortgaged properties. If BPI still refuses this option, it can assert its rights in the
liquidation and distribution of the ASB Groups assets. It will not lose its status as a secured creditor, retaining its preference
over unsecured creditors when the assets of the corporation are finally liquidated.[40]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated 30 January 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77309 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.