1. Aratuc vs.

COMELEC

FACTS:
The instant proceedings are sequels of the Courts decision in GR no. L-
48097 wherein Aratuc et al sought the suspension of the canvass then being
undertaken by the respondent Board in Cotabato City.
The petitioners in the instant case filed complaints re allege irregularities
in the election records in the voting centers in the whole of Lanao Del Sur,
Marawi, parts of Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan
Kudarat. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after
the supervisory panel presented its report, COMELEC filed its order of
suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila.
The petitioners presented their objection with supporting handwritten report of
finger print experts.
Soon after, the COMELEC rendered its resolution declaring the final result
of the canvass. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, the
Commission on Elections shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers. Also, it was stated under administrative law that a
superior body or office having supervision or control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

2. Fabian vs, desierto

FACTS:
PROMAT participated in a government bidding including that of FMED.
Also, private respondent entered into an amorous relationship with the
petitioner. Later on, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties when petitioner tried to terminate their agreement,
causing the petitioner to file an administrative case against him. Soon, Graft
Investigator Eduardo Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents
guilty of grave misconduct. The case was then elevated into an appeal before
the Ombudsman who inhibited himself and transferred the case to the Deputy
Ombudsman which then rested in favour of Agustin and the Order exonerated
the private respondents from administrative charges. Fabian then elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the supreme court.

RULING:
NO. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize on appeal to this
Court. From decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman on administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the prescription in Sec. 30, article VI
of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of
this court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this
court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily hinder the court.

3. Torres vs. specialized packaging

FACTS:
The petitioners came to be employees of the Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation (SPDC). In three separate complaints, they charged
SPDC and the alleged labor recruiters with illegal dismissal, non-payment of
premium, overtime, 13th month pay and night differential. The cases were
then consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Nambi who later on rendered a
decision in favour of the petitioners due to the failure of the respondents to file
their position paper before the deadline.
Soon after, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was appeaed by the SPDC to
the NLRC, which set aside the ruling and ordered the case to be remanded to
LA Nambi for further proceedings. The LA then issued a second decision finding
petitioners employment to be illegally terminated. The case was appealed to
the CA who then dismissed the case finding the verification and certification
against forum shopping to be either effective or insufficient.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and the certification against forum
shopping executed by only two of the 25 petitioners have already satisfied the
requirements under section 4 and 5 of Rule 7.

RULING:
The requirement for verification has been substantially complied. The
two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly
have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the petition. However, for petitions for certiorari, a certification against forum
shopping is required under section 3 of Rule 46 of the rules of Court. The lack
of a certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its
submission after the filing of the petition.
4. G. R. NO. 147678-87, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
versus EFREN MATEO y GARCIA, Appellant, July 7, 2004

FACTS:

Ten (10) informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
against appellant Efren Mateo alleging that he did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent. The
trial ensued following a plea of not guilty entered by appellant to all the
charges. At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape.
However, the Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme
Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

RULING:
The case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
and disposition.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on
the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:

x x x x x x x x x
 (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not

preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favour of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the

Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point
of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence
would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the
recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of
inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in
automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been
given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

5. G. R. No. UDK-13384 The People of the Philippines versus Rodolfo

Bunaladi, October 18, 2004

FACTS:

Accused Bunaladi was charged with the crime of rape before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13. The trial court
rendered its Decision on 5 May 2004, convicting the accused and imposing
upon him the penalty of death by lethal injection. Accused timely filed a Motion
for Reconsideration assailing the factual findings of the trial court, and at the
same time praying that in the event the judgment of conviction is not set aside,
the penalty of death be not imposed in view of the age of the accused who was
more than seventy (70) years old at the time of rendition, of the trial court's
judgment. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court, in
its Order dated 2 June 2004, partly reconsidered its decision and lowered the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. In the same Order, the trial court
also directed the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court "for
automatic review."

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the instant case deserves to be dismissed.

RULING:

The case was dismissed. Section 3(d), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that no notice of appeal is necessary in cases
where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court and that the
same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in
Section 10 thereof. In this case, however, the penalty imposed by the trial court
after reconsidering its decision is reclusion perpetua. Under Section 3(c) of Rule
122, an appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by
the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua is duly interposed by filing a
notice of appeal. A review of the records of the case shows that no notice of
appeal was filed by the accused. Hence, the Court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the case.

11. ALTRES vs. EMPLEO (December 10, 2008; 573 SCRA 583)

FACTS: In July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career
positions in the city government to the CSC. The city government and the CSC
thereupon proceeded to publicly announce the existence of the vacant
positions. Petitioners and other applicants submitted their applications for the
different positions where they felt qualified.

Toward the end of his term, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.

The SangguniangPanglungsodthen issued Resolution No. 04-242[3] addressed

to the CSC Iligan City Field Office requesting a suspension of action on the
processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the city government until
the enactment of a new budget.
The SangguniangPanglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No. 04-266[4]
which, as per its policy against midnight appointments, directed the officers of
the City Human Resource Management Office to hold the transmission of all
appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor.

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to

availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of petitioners hence
the CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the
appointments issued to petitioners.

On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in

CotabatoCity,dismissed the appeal, it explaining that its function in approving
appointments is only ministerial.

Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City a petition for mandamus
against respondent Empleo or his successor in office for him to issue a
certification of availability of funds. Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied
petitioners petition for mandamus.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in which they maintained only

their prayer for a writ of mandamus which the trial court also denied.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to
comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same time
required petitioners to comply, within the same period.

Petitioners filed a Compliance Report and Respondents duly filed their

Comment, alleging technical flaws in petitioners petition.

Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum

shopping attached to the petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the
59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the
signing petitioners. They thus move for the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioners certification against forum shopping is

defective since it was not signed by all the petitioners and the insufficiency of
personal knowledge by the party executing the same.

RULING:The signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners

already sufficiently assures the Court that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the signatories are
unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient
knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of
the other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be contacted or are no
longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal of
the petition without defeating the administration of justice. The non-signing
petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the case.

12. UNITED PARAGON MINING vs. CA (August 4, 2006; 497 SCRA 638,
647 - 648)

FACTS:Respondent Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario) was a regular employee working

as a foreman of petitioner United Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC).

Cesario received a termination letter, informing Cesario that his employment as

foreman is terminated effective thirty days after his receipt of the letter. The
termination was on account of Cesarios violation of company rules against
infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee, it being alleged therein that
Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, as well as for unlawfully
possessing a deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.

As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance

machinery as mandated under the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing at
that time between UPMC and the United Paragon Supervisors Union. Having
failed to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to
voluntary arbitration.

The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in Cesarios favor, stating that

although the procedural requirements in the termination of an employee had
been complied with, the termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was
arrived at through gross misapprehension of facts hence ordered Cesarios
reinstatement.

UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision but the Voluntary Arbitrator
denied the desired reconsideration stressing that UPMCs management
misapprehended the facts.

UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel,elevated the case

to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunctionasserting that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave
abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of
substantial justice.
The CA, without going into the merits of the petition, dismissed the same on
grounds that(1)the petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy in order to
seek review or nullify decisions or final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter and
(2) that petitioner's ground of grave abuse of discretion, erroneous
interpretation of the law and denial of justice are actually dwelling on the
appreciation of facts, which cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after
finding that the proper remedy should have been a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI and not a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

2.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after
finding that the petition lacks merit because it dwelled on the appreciation of
facts which is NOT PROPER in PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

RULING:

The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been

committed by the CA in its challenged decision.

Being not a real party-in-interest, Daniel has no right to file the petition on
behalf of the corporation without any authority from its board of directors.

Given the reality that the petition was filed by Daniel in behalf of and in
representation of petitioner UPMC without an enabling resolution of the latters
board of directors, that petition was fatally defective, inclusive of the
verification and the certification of non-forum shopping executed by Daniel
himself.

13. HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM

(November 27, 2008; 572 SCRA 185)

FACTS:

Action for Reversion of Title

Spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and HilariaTabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Tambo, Iligan City, upon
which they likewise erected their residence. Living with them on the subject
property were Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio),Gregorios son by another woman.
 When Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the subject property with
Virgilio.Hilaria and Virgilio executed a Deed of Saleover the subject property in
favor of Jose C. Deleste (Deleste).

Upon Hilarias death, Juan Nanaman (Juan), Gregorios brother, was

appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses
Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate).Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the
regular administrator of the joint estate.

The subject property was included in the list of assets of the joint estate.
However, Noel could not take possession of the subject property since it was
already in Delestes possession. Thus, Noel filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI),an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the
subject property to the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.

Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard, decided, and appealed all
the way to the Supreme Court in Noel v. Court of Appeals. The Court rendered
its Decision in Noel, affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the subject
property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria,
such that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share therein to Deleste.
Consequently, the intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held to be the
co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in the
same.

Petition for Nullification of the Emancipation Patents (Heirs of

Deleste)
Deleste passed away sometime in 1992.The Heirs of Deleste, filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking
to nullify private respondents Emancipation Patents (EPs).

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a

Decisiondeclaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues
of ownership and the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land.

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its Decision. The
DARAB held, that the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of Deleste who
should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698at the time
the subject property was placed under the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer Program. The Heirs of Deleste filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Decision, but the Motion was denied by the DARAB in its
Resolution dated 8 July 2004.
 Petition for Prohibition
A Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents
Issued by DAR and the Corresponding [Original Certificates of Title] Issued by
the [Land Registration Authority], Injunction with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) was filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals.
Arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper
issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them, petitioners
prayed that a TRO be forthwith issued, prohibiting the DAR Secretary, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), the DARAB, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
as well as the RTC, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in the names of private
respondents . Petitioners further prayed that judgment be subsequently
rendered declaring the said EPs and the OCTs null and void.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HASTILY DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
LRA, AND DARAB ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REVIEWING [AND] OVERRULING JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSIDERING THAT
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF THE EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BELONGS TO THE JUDICIARY AND NOT VICE VERSA.

RULING:

Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the common law, extraordinary in the

sense that it is ordinarily available only when the usual and ordinary
proceedings at law or in equity are inadequate to afford redress, prerogative in
character to the extent that it is not always demandable of right, to prevent
courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law.

The writ of prohibition, is one which commands the person to whom it is

directed not to do something which, by suggestion of the relator, the court is
informed he is about to do. The only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend
all action and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.
 In this case, the Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioners reveal that
the same is essentially more of an action for the nullification of the allegedly
invalid EPs and OCTs issued in the names of private respondents. The writ of
prohibition is only sought by petitioners to prevent the implementation of the
EPs and OCTs. Such EPs and OCTs had become indefeasible and incontrovertible
by the time petitioners instituted their Petition for Prohibition, and may no
longer be judicially reviewed.

Private respondents EPs were issued in their favor and their OCTs were
correspondingly issued and subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds
of Iligan City. Petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals, instead to the
Regional Trial Court almost four (4) years after the issuance and registration
thereof. Petitioners failed to vindicate their rights within the one-year period
from issuance of the certificates of title as the law requires.

After the expiration of the one-year period, a person whose property has
been wrongly or erroneously registered in anothers name may bring an
ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration
Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for
damages against those responsible for the fraudulent registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby

DENIED. No costs.

14.VICAR INTERNATIONAL vs. FEB LEASING (April 22, 2005; 456 SCRA
588)

FACTS:

A Complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional

Trial Court of Makati by petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc. (Vicar),
against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing
Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing
and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint against Vicar,Carmelita Chaneco Lim
and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.

These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a

corporation engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of certain
heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a lease-
back provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to
have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the
same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30,315,494, Vicar claims to
have paid FEB an aggregate amount of P19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.

Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance

of about P22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63)
subdivision lots. These lots, in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation
as additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced
P17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have been applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several
Orders pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject
equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court (RTC)
quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latters Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order
dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.

On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against
the subject equipment.

The Petition was, however, dismissed by the CA because the Verification

and the Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner
Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to sign for and
on behalf of petitioner-corporation.

The day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretarys
Certificate but the CA denied the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari.
RULING:

The present Petition for Review is meritorious.

Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute,

for and on behalf of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against forum
shopping. Attached to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was the
Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the authorization and
affirmationwas supported by Vicars board of directors, who unanimously
approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002.

Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of

Lims authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its
behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretarys
Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicars board of directors
had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its
president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to
execute and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had
denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution --
authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and
the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist
at the time the Petition was filed.

The Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be
used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even
more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not
obstruct, the attainment of justice.

Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions are REVERSED and

SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to
continue the proceedings.
15. UY vs. WORKMENS COMPENSATION (April 28, 1980; 97 SCRA 255)

FACTS:

Ki Lam Uy, also known as Vicente Uy, was killed by robbers at the farm
house (bodega) of private respondent Lucy Perez.

Claimants-petitioners filed a Notice and Claim for Compensation in Death

Cases before the Department of Labor seeking to recover death compensation
benefits for the death of their father, Ki Lam Uy, from private respondent, Lucy
Perez.

A copy of the claim was sent to private respondent, Lucy Perez, by the
Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of Labor,
requiring the said private respondent to submit to said office the enclosed
Workmen's Compensation Form No. 3, Employer's Report of Accident or
Sickness.

For failure of private respondent to accomplish the required Employer's

Report, the Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit, after processing
the claim and the supporting evidence submitted by claimants-petitioners,
issued an Award, granting death compensation benefits to claimants-
petitioners.

Private respondent's counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file

his motion for reconsideration alleging that the cause of the death of the
deceased was not work- connected.

Private respondent filed the motion for on the grounds that the
respondent did not fail to controvert the instant claim for compensation; that
the Hearing Officer gravely erred in not giving the private respondent an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut claimant's claim after reception of the
latter's evidence and thereby violating the constitutional mandate of due
process.

The Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department

of Labor issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration in view of the
absence of an opposition thereto and set the case for hearing on the merits
until terminated and with no postponements.

After several hearings conducted, a decision was rendered which states

among others, "that although the respondent has failed to controvert the claim
within the period provided for, a hearing of the case, with notice to all the
parties was conducted to determine the compensability of the claim".

A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent, thru

counsel. Subsequently, an order denying said motion for reconsideration was
issued and likewise ordering the elevation of the entire records of the case to
the Workmen's Compensation Commission for review.

The respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a

decision reversing the decision of the Hearing Officer on the ground that the
deceased, Ki Lam Uy was not an employee of private respondent, thereby
absolving herein private respondent from any liability.

A petition for review was filed by the petitioners.

Private respondent in her answer to the instant petition claims that the
petition, not being verified by the petitioners but by their counsel, is fatally
defective.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review is defective since it was not verified by
the petitioners.

RULING:

The claim has no merit. In the past, it has been the constant rulings of
this Court that lack of verification is merely a formal defect.

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended

to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleadings are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination on a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement regarding verification
of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite.

16. In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani Inc., et. al

Facts:

Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity incorporated under the

laws of California. It is a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection of
Industrial Property and the TRIPS Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the
restaurant business, but it has never engaged in business in the Philippines.
Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations
organized in the Philippines. Sometime in 1991, Sehwani filed with the BPTTT
an application for the registration of the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the
letter O formed like a star). Its application was approved and a certificate of
registration was issued in its name on 1993. In 2000, Sehwani, Incorporated
and Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former
entitled the latter to use its registered mark, IN N OUT.

Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service mark

applications with the Bureau of Trademarks for the IN-N-OUT and IN-N-OUT
Burger & Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out Burger found out that Sehwani,
Incorporated had already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark IN N
OUT (the inside of the letter O formed like a star). Also in 2000, In-N-Out
Burger sent a demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from
claiming ownership of the mark IN-N-OUT and to voluntarily cancel its
trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not accede to In-N-Out Burgers
demand but it expressed its willingness to surrender its registration for a
consideration.

In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an

administrative complaint against the Sehwani, Inc. and Benita Frites, Inc. for
unfair competition and cancellation of trademark registration.

Issue;

Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an administrative body) have
jurisdiction of cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition).

Held:

Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has jurisdiction in cases involving
provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition) due to the following reasons:

Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions

of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, thus:

Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have
the following functions:

10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks;
cancellation of trademarks; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation
of patents and utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for
compulsory licensing of patents;
10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations
of laws involving intellectual property rights; Provided, That its jurisdiction is
limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided, futher, That availment of the
provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Xxx

Xxx

(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may
have been granted by the Office, or the suspension of the validity thereof for
such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which
shall not exceed one (1) year;

Xxx

(viii) The assessment of damages;

Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the

disputed mark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages
for violation of petitioners intellectual property rights, falls within the
jurisdiction of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had
jurisdiction to decide the petitioners administrative case against respondents
and the IPO Director General had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the
judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

17. Pajuyo vs CA G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.

FACTS

: Petitioner Pajuyo paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a lot,
where Pajuyo subsequently built a house. In 1985, Pajuyo and private
respondent Guevarra executed a Kasunduan wherein Pajuyo allowed Guevarra
to live in the house for free, on the condition that Guevarra would maintain the
cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra
promised that he would vacate the premises upon Pajuyos demand.

In 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that
the latter vacate the house. Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case
against Guevarra before the MTC. Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid
title over the lot since it is within the area set aside for socialized housing. MTC
rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo, which was affirmed by RTC. (MTC and
RTC basically ruled that the Kasunduan created a legal tie akin to that of a
landlord and tenant relationship). CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that
the ejectment case is without legal basis since both Pajuyo and Guevarra
illegally occupied the said lot. CA further stated that both parties are in pari
delicto; thus, the court will leave them where they are. CA ruled that the
Kasunduan is not a lease contract, but a commodatum because the agreement
is not for a price certain.

ISSUE:

Can the decision of the Regional trial court be appealed to the Court of appeals.

HELD:

Decisions of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are

appealable to the Court of appeals by petition for review in cases involving
questions of facts or mixed questions of facts and law while their decisions
involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to the supreme court by
petition for review.

18. KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and

managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B.
TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region
VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEA

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by

respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu
City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture
from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.
The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president
and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging
that Savages products are the object of unfair competition involving design
patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Savage contends however, that there was no existence of offense leading to
the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge had authority/jurisdiction to issue the

said searchwarrant

HELD:

YES, respondent judge has authority (Note: the search warrant issued
was,however, NOT valid).The authority to issue search warrants was not among
thosementioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has consistently
ruled that asearch warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the
exercise of itsancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may
entertain pursuant to itsoriginal jurisdiction. The authority to issue search
warrants is inherent in all courtsand may be effected outside their territorial
jurisdiction. In the instant case, thepremises searched located in Talisay, Cebu,
are well within the territorial jurisdictionof the respondent court.Petitioners
apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courtsfor IPR.
Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try
anddecide" cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest
exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including the issuance of
search warrants andother judicial processes) in any one court.

19. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. FASAP

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
presents a recurring question regarding the Courts requirement of a
certification of non-forum shopping.

Petitioners Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and Manolo Aquino, Jorge Ma. Cui, Jr.
and Patricia Chiong, in their capacity as Executive Vice-President Administration
and Services, Manager International Cabin Crew and Assistant Vice-President
Cabin Services, respectively, are before the Court seeking the reversal of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP-56850, dated January 31,
2000, dismissing their appeal and the resolution of May 11, 2000, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts on the conflict between PAL and respondents Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) and Leonardo Bhagwani are not
necessary for the Courts resolution of the petition. It is enough to state that on
May 14, 1997 FASAP and Leonardo Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against petitioners before the
Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision holding that PAL committed unfair labor practice
and illegal dismissal of Bhagwani and, consequently, ordered the payment of
damages. The NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the finding
that PAL was guilty of unfair labor practice, but affirming the rest of the
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

The necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for

certiorari is found in Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to Rule 46, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. These provisions require it to be executed by the corresponding
petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is made as to which party must
execute the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both natural and
juridical entities.[1] When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification
should be executed by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can
be called upon to execute the certification, although such a person may have
personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to.[2]

This Court has explained that a corporation has no power except those
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental
to its existence. The exercise of these powers is done through the board of
directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Given these corporate
features, the power of a corporation to sue in any court is generally lodged with
the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate the physical acts
needed to sue, which may be performed only by natural persons, to its
attorneys-in-fact by a board resolution, if not already authorized under the
corporate by-laws.

20. ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. QUITAIN

315 SCRA 150 (1999)

Facts: P filed a complaint for eminent domain against D. Instead of filing an

answer, D countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among other things,
that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper.

Issue: Whether the Motion to Dismiss should prosper.

Held: No. The issues raised by D are affirmative defenses that should be
alleged in an answer, since they require presentation of evidence aliunde.
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that if a defendant has any objections
to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense
to the taking of his property, he should include them in his answer. Naturally,
these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing.
Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due
process if, from aconsideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are
issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.

21. MARANAW HOTELS VS. CA

FACTS: In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the
latters hotel branches. In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of
Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service
provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later filed a
petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter dismissed
her. Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened
deporting itself as the real employer of Oabel. She lost in the labor arbiter but
the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw Hotels appealed before
the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition because
apparently Maranaw Hotels failed to append the board resolution authorizing
their counsel to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an appended Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping and board resolution but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.

HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a

subsequent MFR appended by the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and the
board resolution did not cure the defect. It negates the very purpose for which
the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve
similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and
juridical persons.

A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign

pleadings for the corporation. Specific authorization could only come in the
form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically
authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to
make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.

22. Vda de Melencio vs. CA

FACTS: The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land

particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-babas, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777 square meters covered
by TCT No. 20626 in in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The
entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one
child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Modia and
petitioner Amodias. The entire property was brought under the operation of the
Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World
War.

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of

Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby they extra-judicially settled the
estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject property to respondent
Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a consideration of P10,200.00. On August
10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and
constructed a beach house thereon.

On February 18 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement

with Absolute Sale, conveying the subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan for
and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar then filed a case against petitioners
Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
20626 alleging that the sale to Go Kim CHuan was an invalid second sale.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid certification and verification by only one of the
plaintiffs.

HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia Ni Cristo, 505
SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is material and crucial to relaxation of
the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a
patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot be denied, that the ends
of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits - after all
parties are given full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses - rather
than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum
shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be signed by all
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on
forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the
certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.

23. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice

FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of
Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all
creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan
Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00
representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some
properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he
incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others
that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not
attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum
shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the
case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money
claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice
Shekers will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money
claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the
estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would
be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims
which is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition
of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It
relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and
is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.

24. Five Star Bus Company vs. CA

FACTS: One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while
driving a bus owned by Five Star Bus Company collided with a mini-van driven
by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil action for damages against Five
Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years by reason
of the bus companys lawyers repeated request to reset the hearing of the
case. Until the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted
for resolution. The bus companys lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied.

The bus companys lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals but the latter court summarily dismissed the petition because said
petitions affidavit of non-forum shopping was not signed by the plaintiff or any
of its representatives but rather it was signed by the lawyer. The lawyer
explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was in a haste to
submit the petition at the earliest possible time in order to protect his clients
interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should
prosper.

HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the
affidavit of non-forum shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff
is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum
shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It
constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of
justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the
congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case
when there is substantial compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?

It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or
its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In
the case at bar however, the reasons provided by Five Stars lawyer are flimsy
and frail. Further, the case has been dragging on for years and such delay is
mostly attributed to Five Stars lawyer.

25. Docena vs. Lopesura

FACTS: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery
of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda
Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation
since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition.
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the
60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of
the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was

signed by only one of the petitioners.

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the

petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for
recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar
whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the
rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the
certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign

by all the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate
signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial
compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and
wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal
property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further

proceedings.

26. TIBLE and TIBLE COMPANY VS ROYAL SAVINGS 550 SCRA 562

FACTS: In 1977, Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) obtained a loan amounting
to P1.5 million from Royal Savings and Loan Association. The loan matured
however TTCI was not able to pay hence Royal savings sued TTCI. TTCI later
entered into a compromise agreement with Royal Savings but again TTCi was
not able to comply with it.
In 1981, the properties of TTCI were awarded to Comsavings via a public
auction sale where Comsavings was the highest bidder. It, however, took ten
years for the Deed of Sale to be issued in favor of Comsavings.
Upon issuance of the Deed, TTCI filed an action for Annulment of Deed of Sale.
This was eventually dismissed. TTCIs Motion for Reconsideration was also
dismissed.
In 2002, TTCI filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that, among others, that the Verification
Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by one Almabella Menla Vda. de
Tible, but there is no Special Power of Attorney, Board Resolution nor
Secretarys Certificate was attached thereto authorizing said signatory to sign
the Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of the other
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The petition is defective. The signature of the widow in the
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping of the petition
for certiorari was not ratified by any special power of attorney, board resolution
nor secretarys certificate executed by her co-petitioners authorizing her to
sign for and in their behalf.
But in the Motion for Reconsideration which TTCI filed after the CA denied the
Petition, TTCI have already complied with the requirement (theres now a
special power of attorney executed in favor of the widow), will this cure the
defect?
The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a partys
failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court
excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a
certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling
reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or
inequitable.
The Supreme Court noted that there are two pre-requisites for the relaxation of
the rules on the attaching of the Certification of Non-Forum shopping:

1. justifiable cause or plausible reason for non-compliance; and

2. compelling reason to convince the court that outright dismissal of the

petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.

27. MARANAW HOTELS VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the
latters hotel branches. In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of
Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service
provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later filed a
petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter dismissed
her.
Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting
itself as the real employer of Oabel. She lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC
reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw Hotels appealed before the Court
of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition because apparently
Maranaw Hotels failed to append the board resolution authorizing their counsel
to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with an appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and
board resolution but the CA denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.
HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a
subsequent MFR appended by the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and the
board resolution did not cure the defect. It negates the very purpose for which
the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve
similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and
juridical persons.
A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign
pleadings for the corporation. Specific authorization could only come in the
form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically
authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to
make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.
 28. BPI LEASING VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49
representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then imposed by Section 205 of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from
equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided
that finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be
subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means
that companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable
for "contractors percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to
"gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since
BLC had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-
computed its tax liabilities under the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the
amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the
amount of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the
P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it
should have paid for "gross receipts tax."

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund and held that
RR 19-86, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases
written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental
income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from
lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the RR.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied.
BLC then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. BLC submits that the
Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that RR 19-86 may be applied
retroactively so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that the petition be dismissed on the
ground that the verification and certification of non- forum shopping was
signed by the counsel of record and not BLC, which is in violation of SC Circular
28-91.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari substantially complies with SC
Circular 28-91.

HELD: The SC agrees with the respondents contention that the petition should
be dismissed outright for failure to comply with SC Circular 28-91, now
incorporated as Sec2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The court emphasized that
lawyers must be specifically authorized in order to sign the Certification for BPI
Leasing Company. Specific authorization must come in the form of a board
resolution issued by the board of directors.

29. CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Petitioner filed with BIR a claim for tax refund of the full amount of the
20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995. BIR inaction
prompted petitioner to file petition for review before CTA in order to forestall
the 2-year prescriptive period. CTA dismissed/rejected refund as discount
extended to Senior Citizens in granted as tax credit and not refund. CTA
reasoned that while petitioner may be qualified for a tax credit, it cannot be so
extended on account of its net loss in 1995. CA dismissed petition on the
ground that the person who signed the verification and certification of absence
of forum shopping failed to adduced proof that he was duly authorized by the
board of directors to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners president can sign the subject verification
and certificate without the approval of its Board of Directors.

HELD: Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court on Verification and Section 5,

Rule 7 on Certification against forum shopping are silent as to who are the
authorized signatory should be. But in one case decided by the Supreme Court,
it held that only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution
may sign the certification on behalf of the corporation.

30. MACTAN- CEBU INTERNATIONAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an
expropriation proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug,
Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of
Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the
original defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in
her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the
Republic which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941.
Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was
transferred to the Republic under a TCT.

Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the
Lahug Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of
MCIAA under a TCT.

In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC
of Cebu, alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation
(NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought
to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining
the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she
and other landowners could not agree with the NACs offer for the
compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before
the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled
Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which

rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their
expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and
instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of the NAC
that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same
price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport. Consequently, the
TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the
Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was
issued in its name. However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken
by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941
was taken ceased to exist.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA
was ordered to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property
denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price
paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the
Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.MCIAA appealed the decision
to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not it complies with the requirement of a certification of

non- forum shopping laid down on the Rules.

HELD: We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIANs claim that the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping accompanying MCIAAs petition was
insufficient for allegedly having been signed by one who was not qualified to do
so. As pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel Cordova signed the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping as Acting General Manager of the
MCIAA issued by the General Manager of MCIAA. Colonel Cordova did not
sign the Verification and Certification against forum shopping pursuant to his
appointment as assistant General Manager of the MCIAA, which was later
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

36. Young v. Keng Seng

Facts:

John Keng Seng filed a complaint for accounting of general agency, injunction,
turning over o f p r o p e r t i e s , a n d d a m a g e s , w i t h t h e RTC ( b r a n c h 5 ) ,
B a c o l o d C i t y a g a i n s t t h e h e r e i n petitioners Emilio and Tita Young.

The Youngs filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. RTC Bacolod
dismissed the case.

Months after, Keng Seng filed another complaint against Emilio Young for
accounting and damages with the RTC (branch 44), Bacolod City.
Young again fi led a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complainant failed to state g o o d , v a l i d a n d / o r w o r t h w h i l e c a u s e o f
a c t i o n a s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t , w h i c h t h e c o u r t denied. Young
filed an MR, adding the following grounds - that Keng Seng had fatally failed to
comply with the rule against forum shopping, as he had in fact
deliberately submitted afalse certification under oath as contained in the
complaint in the present suit.

The MR was granted and the case was dismissed. Keng Seng filed an MR, but
the presiding judge inhibited himself from hearing the case, so it was re-raffled
to branch 54.

Presiding Judge Magallanes of RTC Branch 54 issued an order finding that Keng
Seng had not violated the rule on forum shopping. Young filed an MR but were
denied.

CA also ruled that Keng Seng did not violate the rule on forum shopping - the
first case was dismissed in March 1997, while the second case was filed only in
June 1997.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner can still raise the alleged violation of the rule on non forum
shopping, even if h e f a i l e d t o c i t e i t a s a g r o u n d i n h i s m o t i o n
to dismiss the Second Case.

2. WON the CA erred in holding that respondent had not violated the rule on
forum shopping.

Rulings:

1. NO, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall

include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed.

Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that defences and objections
not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed
waived. However, courts shall nonetheless dismiss the claim when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that (1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, (3) the action is barred by prior
judgment, or 4) the statute of limitations has been crossed.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that petitioner is barred
from raising the ground of forum shopping in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court. If only for his failure to invoke such ground at the first opportunity in his
Motion to Dismiss filed in the trial court, his appeal should have been given
short shrift and denied outright.

2. NO. It is said that forum shopping is committed by a party who, having

received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another
court, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari. More
accurately, however, forum shopping is the institution of two or more suits in
different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs. It is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It
degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets.

37. Philippine Nails and wires v. Malayan Insurance

Facts:

Petitioner filed on July 28, 1993 a complaint for recovery of the contractual
liability of herein respondent under its Marine Cargo Policy No. LP-0001-08287
and its Endorsement No. LP-0001-91399. Sought to be recovered therein was
the sum of P2, 698,637.00, representing the insured value of the lost or
undelivered 377.168 metric tons of Prime Newly Hot Rolled Steel Billets,
including attorneys fees and costs.

Against the complaint, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated August 10,
1993, on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and improper venue. On
August 16, 1993, petitioner filed its opposition to the said motion.

On September 8, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to admit its amended

complaint, which the respondent court granted. Meanwhile, the respondent
court, presided over by the Honorable Aurelio Trampe, denied respondents
motion to dismiss. On October 18, 1993 respondent filed a motion for extension
of time to file an answer on account of a pending motion to dismiss. The
respondent court granted the motion for extension, and gave respondent a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of said order within which
to file its answer. On the theory that respondents period to file a responsive
pleading had expired, petitioner sought to have respondent declared in
default. Whereupon reception of petitioners evidence ex parte followed on
November 9, 1993.

The respondent Branch Sheriff served on respondent-insurers bank a notice of

garnishment on February 22, 1994. On February 23, 1994, respondent filed the
instant petition for certiorari. On March 2, 1994, it filed with respondent court
motion to stay the execution, and to approve the supersedeas bond. On March
7, 1994, this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner
and the RTC from implementing the impugned February 4, 1994 order.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty upon failure to attach a certificate of non-forum

shopping and a statement showing the material dates.

Rulings:

The Petition before the CA was in fact filed within the prescribed period. In this
light, we hold that the failure to state the material dates was merely a
procedural lapse that could be waived by the other partys failure to raise the
matter at the proper time.
We likewise hold that respondent is not guilty of forum-shopping. The test to
determine whether a party violated the rule against it is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another.

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is

identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is
an identity of parties in the appeal and in the petition for review
on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and
reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner may have mentioned in its
appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there can be no forum
shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal
before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the merits which
finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages
therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a
petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance
on the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced.

38. Employees Compensation v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On November 19, 1988, the deceased was infront of the Office of the Criminal
Investigation of the Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with another
policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who
had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his service firearm and
approached the deceased and without saying any word, he fired three
successive shots which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased,
however, although critically wounded, drew his side firearm and fired back,
twice hitting fatally Cesar Arcilla. Both fell, fatally wounded, and were rushed to
the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced dead upon
arrival. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same hospital, the day after.

Previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from
a family feud, wherein Sgt. Alvaran's son, stabbed the patrolman's nephew, a
day before (November 18, 1988). Such quarrel was aggravated when the latter
fired shots on the air and uttered defamatory words before the relatives of the
former.

The appellant subsequent filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD

626, as amended. The System [GSIS] denied the claim on the ground that at
the time of the accident the deceased was supposed to be at the Pasig
Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer and with a specific duty to perform.

Appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondent's [GSIS] ruling saying

that the contingency happened in the police station where her husband is a
member although at that time of the contingency her husband was assigned at
the Pasig Provincial Jail.

Respondent [GSIS], nonetheless, took a firm stand prompting appellant to

elevate her case to this Commission for review.

On July 31, 1991, petitioner Commission affirmed the holding of the GSIS that
the death of private respondent's husband is not compensable under P.D. 626,
as amended. On appeal, respondent Court reversed petitioner Commission via
its assailed Decision.

Issue:

Did petitioner engage in "forum-shopping" in filing this petition?

Rulings:

Petition should be denied. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis

pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the other.

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-
36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action,
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the
action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in
the two (or more cases) pending, there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or
causes of action and (c) reliefs sought.

39. Coca-cola Bottlers v. Social Security

Facts:

Petitioner Company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for one
year, with a monthly compensation of P3, 800.00. In the contract, is the
provision that no employee-employer relationship shall exist between the
company and Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case of its
termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be
due him at the time of termination.

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the DOLE and the SSS whether he was an
employee of the company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative. As a result,
Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before (NLRC). In his complaint, he sought
recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded payment of
his 13th month pay, bonus and all other benefits.

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer
Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaintfor illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of
Petitioner Company.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Arbiter disposition. On petition for review
before the CA, the NLRC ruling was reversed. The appellate court ruled that
using the four-fold test, an employer-employee relationship existed between
the company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a petition
for review on certiorari.

On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his opposition to the companys

motion to dismiss, petitioners again, on March 1, 1996, moved for the dismissal
of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia

Issue:

1. WON respondent Climaco is guilty of forum shopping, which thereby called

for the outright dismissal of his petition before the Social Security Commission.

2. WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as

there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners posit that since the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the
same, the SSC cannot make a ruling on the issue presented before it without
necessarily having a direct effect on the issue before the NLRC. It was patently
erroneous, if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC
through a separate petition. Thus, petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty
of forum shopping.

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
rendition by two (2) competent tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent
tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a
favorable result is reached.

2. The elements of litis pendentia are absent. Petitioners contend that the
petition of Dr. Climaco before the SSC is defective because there were pending
actions between the same parties and involving the same issues in different
fora.

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously
explained, although the parties in the cases before the NLRC and the SSC are
similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for
in each tribunal, are different.

40. Ao-As v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) is a religious organization duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 8, 1967.

During the 1976 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed dividing the
North Luzon district (NLD) into two districts: the NLD Highland District (NLHD)
and the NLD Lowland District (NLLD), thereby increasing the number of
directors from seven (7) to nine (9).

Since the addition of two or more districts, an eleven (11) member board of
directors representing the five (5) districts managed the LCP without any
challenge from the membership until several years later when certain
controversies arose involving the resolutions of the Board terminating the
services of the LCP business manager and corporate treasurer since 1979, Mr.
Eclesio Hipe.

Aside from the present case, SEC-SICD Case no. 3556 entitled "Excelsio Hipe,
et. al. vs. Thomas Batong, et. al." and SEC-SICD Case No. 3524, "Domingo
Shambu, et. al. vs. Thomas Batong, et. al." respectively, sought to declare null
and void Board Resolution Nos. LCP-BD-6-89 and LCP-BD-7-89; and SEC-SICD
Case No. 3550.

On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss alleging again the
FORMULA OF CONCORD. Again, the SEC-SICD denied.

On September 14, 1992, [the Batong group] filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied.

On September 23, 1992, [the Batong group] filed with the SEC En Banc a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that
the SEC-SIDC acted with grave abuse of discretion in creating the management
committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857 is a case of forum shopping.

Rulings:

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can be committed in
three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata ). If the forum shopping is not considered
willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without
prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum
shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No.
3857 are entirely different from the causes of action in NLRC Cases No. 03-
01935-90 and 04-01979-90, Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV, and
SEC-SICD Cases No. 3556 and 3524. It is true that the causes of action in the
latter cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 for
the appointment of the management committee and for accounting "of all
funds, properties and assets of LCP which may have come into their possession
during their incumbency as officers and/or directors of LCP." However, the
creation of a management committee and the prayer for accounting could not
have been asked for in the labor (NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-
90) and forcible entry (Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV) cases.

41. G.R. No. 89070 BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE,

INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER
COSALAN and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents. May 18, 1992

FACTS:

COA issued a memorandum to Peter Cosalan, General Manager of

Beneconoting that cash advances received by officers and employees of
petitioner Beneco in the amount of P129, 618. 48 had been virtually written off
in the books of Beneco. Soon, COA issued another Memorandum, also
addressed to Cosalaninviting attention to the fact that the audit of per
diems and allowances received by officials and members of the Board of
Directors of Beneco showed substantial inconsistencies with the directives of
the NEA. The Audit Memorandum once again directed the taking of immediate
action in conformity with existing NEA regulations. Later on, Petitioner Beneco
received the COA Audit Report on the financial status and operations of Beneco
which noted and enumerated irregularities in the utilization of funds amounting
to P37 Million released by NEA to Beneco, and recommended that appropriate
remedial action be taken.

Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of Beneco

and what appeared to be mismanagement, respondent Cosalan initiated
implementation of the remedial measures recommended by the COA. The
respondent members of the Board of Beneco reacted by adopting a series of
resolutions including one which resulted in the ouster of respondent Cosalan as
General Manager of Beneco and his exclusion from performance of his regular
duties as such, as well as the withholding of his salary and allowances.
Aggrieved, Cosalan filed a complaint before the NLRC challenging the legality
of the board resolutions. NRLC rendered a decision reinstating Cosalan as well
as the payment of his backwages an allowances. Respondent Board members
appealed to the NLRC, and there filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner
Beneco did not appeal, but moved to dismiss the appeal filed by respondent
Board members and for execution of judgment. By this time, petitioner Beneco
had a new set of directors. They moved for reconsideration of the NLRC
decision, but without success. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
accepting and giving due course to respondent Board members' appeal
although such appeal had been filed out of time; and that the NLRC had acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding
petitioner alone liable for payment of the backwages and allowances due to
Cosalan and releasing respondent Board members from liability therefor.

RULING: Yes. There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial

justice and the prevention of serious miscarriage of justice that might have
justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day reglementary period for
perfection of an appeal by the respondent Board members. Accordingly, the
applicable rule was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal
is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an appeal within
the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and
no longer subject to review. 7 The respondent Board members had thus lost
their right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should
have forthwith dismissed their appeal memorandum.
The Court believe and so hold, further, that not only are Beneco and
respondent Board members properly held solidarily liable for the awards made
by the Labor Arbiter, but also that petitioner Beneco which was controlled by
and which could act only through respondent Board members, has a right to be
reimbursed for any amounts that Beneco may be compelled to pay to
respondent Cosalan. Such right of reimbursement is essential if the innocent
members of Beneco are not to be penalized for the acts of respondent Board
members which were both done in bad faith and ultra vires. The liability-
generating acts here are the personal and individual acts of respondent Board
members, and are not properly attributed to Beneco itself.

42. G.R. Nos. 79937-38 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B.
PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. February 13, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the RTC of
Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with
a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Subsequently, Private filed a complaint in the RTC of
Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter
including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants for the payment
of damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket

fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection which was
disregarded by Judge Jose Castro. The complaint underwent a number of
amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of
damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required. On the other hand, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the reassessment of docket
fees. The Court of Appeals then rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct
and proper docket fee has not been paid.

RULING:

Yes. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

43. G.R. No. 75919 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET

AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and
JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents. May 7, 1987
FACTS:

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester

Development Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to
compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. The docket fee
paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the
action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is
not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is
spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.

When the under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought
to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Soon after, the Court issued an order
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other
cases that were investigated and directed the plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then
that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in
the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.Still no amount of damages were
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. The other party
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint should be admitted.

RULING:

No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket
fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no complaint to
speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can
be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the
amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific
performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the
allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages
and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already
provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly
constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop
the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in
the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that
fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

44. G.R. No. 179878 NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

(NOPA), Petitioner, versus HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO
MANOJO CAMPOS, Respondents. December 24, 2008

Facts:

Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages,

docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. More than six years after NOPA
filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged
failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee which was denied by the
RTC. NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the
RTC. After that, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the Orders of the RTC. On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued
Resolutions dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER
FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC
RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS
PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Ruling:

No. A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the

partys knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to
the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.

The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on

the substantial rights of a litigant. The alleged deficiency in the payment of
docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.

Also, there is no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of

Appeals exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket
fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. There
was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former.

45. G.R. No. 175914 RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus HON. PABLO C.
FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 21, Naga
City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly
Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May
2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES,
Respondents. February 10, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from
respondents Tan and Obiedo, secured by real estate mortgages over
five parcels of land, all located in Naga City. When petitioner was unable to pay
the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo
agreed to an extension of the same thru a Memorandum of Agreement which
was signed by the parties. Still, the petitioner failed to pay his indebtedness.
Respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the
Registry of Deeds of Naga City, as a result of which, they were able to secure
TCTs over the five parcel of land in their names.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of
deeds of sales and damages. Petitioner paid the sum of P13, 644. 25 for docket
and other legal fees, as assessed by the office of the Clerk of Court which
initially considered the case as action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket fees requiring the
petitioner as well as respondent Tan to pay additional filing fees. Petitioner filed
for partial reconsideration which was soon denied by the Court. Petitioner had
not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which
thereafter denied the said petition and affirmed the order of the trial court.
Hence this instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious
reversible error in affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court
which are clearly contrary to the pronouncement of this Honorable
Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact that if the said judgment is
allowed to stand and not rectified, the same would result in grave injustice and
irreparable damage to herein petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount
assessed as a consequence of said Orders.

RULING:
No. A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for
a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value,
would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in
the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by
petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real
property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees
for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.

46. TACAY vs. RTC OF TAGUM (December 20, 1989; 180 SCRA 483)

FACTS:
 These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the
RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3
defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.

Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560.
The previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy
the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use the
property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay
reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each

defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and
exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars
the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case.

The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the
complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the
defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and
temporary restraining order against the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value
of the property are relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a
case for recovery of possession of property?

RULING:

Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of

property is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value
of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such
action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court
acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the
prescribed docket fees.

47. ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION vs. CA (October 15,

1991; 202 SCRA 753)
FACTS:

Original Development and Construction Corporation (ODECOR) sued

Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMC) for breach of contract and for damages.
ODECOR accused the two of divesting its customers which resulted to massive
losses for the corporation.

In ODECORs claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual,

consequential, exemplary and moral damages, the amount of which will be
proved at the trial; that for actual damages its claiming P2,272,193.10 but
the rest appears to be unspecified amount of damages which the trial court
could not assess. ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for the actual
damages specified as well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.

HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it because of non-payment of the
proper docket fees.

The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed
the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of reassessment of the proper docket
fee and if there is a deficiency ODECOR should pay the same. In the
assessment, the Clerk of Court determined that the claim for attorneys fee
which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the PRAYER
of the complaint hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have
included payment for the fees for the claim of attorneys fee. ODECOR was
then ordered to amend its complaint.

In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its

allegations in the first complaint except that it specified its claim for attorneys
fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monthly liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of the suit.

HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA ruled in favor HIGC and
enjoined the trial court from hearing the case.

ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
 No. The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The
terms used by ODECOR in its claims i.e. the amount of which will be proved at
the trial and the demand for attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of this suit are not
definite enough to be the basis of the computation of the proper docket fees.

While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff
must ascertain, in his estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to
determine the amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that
the complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court
of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge
mere guesswork as to these amounts, which is fatal.

48. BELLO vs. UBO (September 30, 1982; 117 SCRA 753)

FACTS:

A land dispute arose between Bello and Ubo. Bello is claiming ownership
over the property that Ubo and her son have been occupying for years even
paying taxes therefor. Ubo and her son (Porferio Regis) claimed that they
inherited said land.

Bello then filed a civil suit against Ubo and Regis. Summons were issued
by the court.

A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. What he did was
go to where Ubo and her son was residing. Ubo and Regis initially refused to
accept the same. But Yobia explained the nature of the Summons; that there is
a civil case filed against them; that they need to find a lawyer to assist them.
Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the summons. Thereafter, he detached
the copy of the complaint and handed it to Ubo and Regis. He however took
back the same afterwards; he also held on to the copy of the summons and
afterwards returned to his police station.

Despite signing the summons, Ubo and Regis did not file any responsive
pleadings nor did they appear in court. Eventually, the trial court declared
them in default and decided in favor of Bello.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar.

RULING:

No. A police officer is not one of those enumerated as a person

authorized to serve summons. The list provided in the Rules of Court is
exclusive. Yobia was not a sheriff or a court officer of the province where
service was made; and neither was he a person who, for special reasons, was
specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who issued the same.

Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper

person to serve the summons, still there was no valid and effective service
since he brought back the summons with him together with the copy of the
complaint. Since there is no valid service of summons, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis. Therefore, the ex parte
proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null and
void.

49. MONTALBAN vs. MAXIMO (March 15, 1968; 22 SCRA 1070)

FACTS:

August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo Maximo.
Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages sprang from a motor vehicle accident.
Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this same day
that the complaint was filed, summons was served on defendant Fr. Gerardo
Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio
Bautista a priest in the same parish church.

Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk
of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant
Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe on August 7, and "will be back on the first
week of November."

The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of

September 13, 1958.

Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment sentencing

defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the

Malabon Catholic Church, informing the latter of the lower court's decision.
 Defendant, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could
not comply with plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of
the said civil case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the same
incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court of Manila.

Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the

issuance of the writ of execution, and demanded payment of the amount set
forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the writ shows that in response to such
demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard up"4 and that
the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution. An alias writ of
execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy
Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and
purportedly belonging to defendant.

The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in

Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the
lower court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs herein, said defendant filed a
verified motion in the same case praying for the annulment of the entire
proceedings. His ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him "as
provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;" accordingly, the lower
court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision
by default" are "null and void."

The court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider
was rejected by the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the

defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.

RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an

inquiry into procedural due process is whether summons in a suit in personam
against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be
validly effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of
Court. A head-on collision of views becomes inevitable considering the
diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and
defendant, on the other. For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant
temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a
copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein."

The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was

grounded on their de facto power over defendant's person. Jurisdiction was
based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. If a defendant was absent
from the territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not enable the court's
officers to seize him and service could not represent this power. Hence, his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of
a judgment personally binding against him.

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts

have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country.

50. FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(April 9, 1987; 147 SCRA 194)

FACTS:

Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans

from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the payment of the
obligation stated in the promissory notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel
executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound
themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the payment of the latter's
obligation under the loan-accounts.

The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and
demandable. Hence BPI filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money
against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Rizal.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were declared in default for
failure to file an answer within the reglementary period.

The plaintiff filed a motion for execution of judgment before the lower
court. This motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued against
Filmerco and the Miguels. Pursuant to the writ of execution, respondent Sheriff
Villapana levied on and attached alleged properties of Filmerco and the
Miguels.
 The defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of
execution, notice of levy/attachment and to restrain the holding of the auction
sale. The motion was premised on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the defendants because no valid summons was served on them.
Subsequently, the lower court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion.

The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and without waiting for
the resolution of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the defendants filed
with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
injunction and preliminary restraining order against the lower court's decision
and orders.

The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration

was likewise denied.

The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them.
Therefore, they contend that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction over
their persons thus resulting in the nullity of its decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring

their persons within the jurisdiction of the court.

RULING:

In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons

upon the defendants could not be made because they moved out from their
given address and their whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's
return. Hence, the court resorted to substituted service of summons provided
for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer
to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at
defendant's former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case
may be, after his removal therefrom."

The Court found that no valid service of summons upon the defendant
spouses was effected since copies of the summons was left to a proper person.

51. Sps. MIRANDA Vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Luneta Motor Company (hereinafter LMC) filed suit against the spouses Lucila
and Pablo D. Java, et al., with the former Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila,
which docketed the same as Civil Case No. 63117. LMC sought to recover one
"Thames" jeep and the sum of P9,403.00, plus interest and attorney's fees from
defendants.

On March 11, 1966, LMC moved to declare the Java spouses in default for
failure to file their answer within the reglementary period, notwithstanding
notice. The trial court granted the motion.

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in

annulling the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 for want of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court.

HELD:

In declaring the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 null and void, the appellate
court found from the Sheriff's Return of Service,8 that summons was served on
the spouses Java by substituted service without effort at personal service. The
court a quo held that the said service was invalid and the lower court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of defendants (private respondents
herein) in Civil Case No. 63117, thus, the execution sale of the "Thames"
vehicle, as well as the sale of Lot 8015 to LMC, and the subsequent sale by the
latter to petitioners were null and void.

the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 20546 is hereby AFFIRMED

52. JOSE V. BOYON

FACTS:

This case arose from a complaint for specific performance against respondents
Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership
of a parcel of land subject of controverted sale. The CA held that the trial court
had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to
the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to
comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he
did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to
locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them
by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was
equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and
therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders
were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether there was valid service of summons.

HELD:

Petition has no merit.

In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of
service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts
and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions
in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure
to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

53. VENTURAZA V. C.A

FACTS:

On 22 September 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to

Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that
there had been no proper and valid service of summons upon them in
accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court 5
and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the
residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the
residence or dwelling house of the petitioners, and that since April 1985,
petitioners had been already residing at Aurora Street, Pasay City. 6 In an order
dated 20 October 1985, the court a quo denied the motion, for lack of merit.
Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was valid service of summons.

HELD:

It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to

personally serve the summons and after this has failed, a substituted service
may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the
proof of service.

The substituted service should be availed of only when the defendant cannot
be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown
by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of
such efforts.

t is only when a defendant can not be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be
effected in the following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants' dwelling house or residence, with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving the copies at defendant's
office or regular place of business, with some competent person in charge
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
including a valid service of summons.

54. keister v. Navarro

FACTS:

Special civil action of prohibition to prevent respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro

of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from enforcing his Order dated March 28,
1968 in Civil Case No. 10392 requiring the petitioner to answer the complaint
and from proceeding with the trial of the case, on the ground that the Court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
On December 1, 1967, the summons, with the complaint attached thereto, was
served purportedly upon petitioner at "c/o Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal." The receipt of service was signed by one
Vicente Basallote, Clerk of said Chuidian Law Office. 4

On December 15, 1967, the petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a special
appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
petitioner and moved to dismiss the complaint. It was asserted that the Court
had acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the
summons was improperly served at the Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal and not at the residence or place of business
of the petitioner, contrary to the requirements of Section 8 of Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the
person of the petitioner.

HELD:

The court finds the petition meritorious.

Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and
judgment without such service are null and void.

The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the
time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendants
former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after
his removal therefrom." 22 They refer to the place where the person named in
the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he
may be temporarily out of the country at the time. Similarly, the terms "office"
or "regular place of business" refer to the office or place of business of
defendant at the time of service. Note that the rule designates the persons to
whom copies of the process may be left.

55. Cezar V. Ricafort Bautista

FACTS:
Private respondent Specified Material Corp filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money (P1,860,000 plus 3% monthly interest) against petitioner due to
the latters failure to pay the construction materials it purportedly purchased
under a credit line from Specified.

Cezar had expressed willingness to pay Specified as long as an inventory is

made and the parties conflicting records as to materials delivered and actual
materials used are reconciled. After Cezar failed to show up in meetings for
verification of documents, Specified sent a final demand letter and later on
filed the complaint. Sheriff Marquez served the summons to Robles, an alleged
employee of Cezar.

As Cezar failed to answer the complaint, the respondent judge declared him in
default. Specified filed an amended complaint, raising the obligation to
P2,005,000, a copy of the which was personally received by Cezar. Cezar, by
way of special appearance, filed a motion to set aside decision arguing that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. After RTC denied the
motion, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment and preliminary
injunction with CA, which was dismissed. SC also denied the certiorari due to
non-compliance with procedural requirements.

After SCs resolution became final and executory, Specified moved for
execution however the scheduled hearing on was reset after Cezar filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing.

Issue: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction

Held:

Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent either
through service of summons or voluntary appearance. The service of summons
is intended to give official notice to the defendant or respondent that an action
had been commenced against it.

Whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to

the defendant in person and he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering the
summons to him.

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable

time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact that such efforts failed in the proof service. In the case, the
sheriffs return is patently defective for failure to state impossibility of personal
service.
However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired jurisdiction by
virtue of Cezars voluntary through his motion for re-setting the courts hearing
on the motion for execution.

An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction

of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant or respondent. A voluntary appearance is a
waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. The defendant may appear by
presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he
specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petition dismissed, judgment
affirmed.

56. Biaco vs. PCRB

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco.
While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch
manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank. As security
for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in
favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages
bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the
above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent
him a written demand,however, proved futile. Respondent bank filed a
complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa
Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses
Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled
against them; a writ of execution was served on the spouses. Petitioner sought
the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others,
that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served
on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal
service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision invoking that judicial
foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In this case, the
judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly
vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure
proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

57. E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd vs. Benito

FACTS: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao

City and with branch offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with
Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels
of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing
subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed
that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue
shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as
defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses,
there were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the
complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the
stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated
that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of
the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served
upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of
those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of
summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court
issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize
but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated
therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word
"manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.

HELD: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is

"restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction
expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Under the new Rules,
service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons
for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly
specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule
now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The
phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

58. Litton Mills, Inc. vs. CA Missing

59. Signetics Corp. vs. CA

FACTS: Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America.
Through Signetics Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of land with Fruehauf
Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages,
accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well
as the transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations
and improvements on the leased land, before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No.
59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease contract the
words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to
withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract.
Service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the
basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US PHILIPS
CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc.,
Las Pias, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly &
Management (TEAM) Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex,
Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics through
TEAM Pacific Corporation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14,
of the Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v.
Del Rosario and Pelington to the effect that the fact of doing business in the
Philippines should first be established in order that summons could be validly
made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. The RTC
denied the Motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the complaint as an
activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in
SigFil, which the petitioner insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM
holdings, Ltd.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
petitioner, a foreign corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had
since ceased to do business in the Philippines.

HELD: YES. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one
hand, the veracity and correctness of the allegations in the complaint and
proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in order to hasten a peremptory
escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be
served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its
"resident agent designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the
context it is used in Section 14, refers to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts
on behalf of a principal. The allegations in the complaint have thus been able to
amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the
petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other
than the petitioner itself. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not
engaged in business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief;
reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in Philippine courts for
acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities
Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it
would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a
matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment.
Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some good basis
(and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for
effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in
personam.

60. Jose vs. Boyon

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against

respondents to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel
of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to
respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to
by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to re
respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte
motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication and the judge
issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in default
and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to
submit their evidence ex parte. Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates,
was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court.
Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the
validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The court
issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted
respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the respondents
raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the
execution of the controverted judgment which the judge granted. Thereafter,
respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the trial
court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant
case.

HELD: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
by the service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted
service, where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the
Philippines. However, extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person if the
action is in rem or an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to
subject the individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan
burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial
court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents.
While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession
thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an
action for specific performance is an action in personam. Hence, summons by
publication cannot be validly served.

61. PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation under Singapore. Respondent is a

corporation organized under existing Philippine laws, for selling and leasing
laboratory instruments. Respondent entered into an agreement with the Perkin
Elmer Instruments Asia PTE LTD appointed respondents as sole distribution
agreement. The respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
and damages. The RTC denied the respondents prayer. Petitioner appealed, but
the Court of Appeals affirms the RTCs decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a proper service of summons and acquisition of

jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not there is a proper venue for respondents in civil case.

HELD:

1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the
manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court
and their submission to its authorit. The proper service of summons
differs depending on the nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff
or petitioner, whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. When the
case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons
can be made upon the defendant. In the case at bar, there is no proper
service of summons because the territorial service of summons was not
proper for actions in personam and the attachment of the property does
not constitute or even convert to quasi in rem.

2. It is a proper venue for civil case base on Distribution Agreement, it was

stipulated that if the dispute arise it will be resolved either in Singapore
or in the Philippines.

62. OBANA VS COURT OF APPEALS-Missing

63. MONTALBAN VS MAXIMO

FACTS: August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo
Maximo. Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages sprang from a motor vehicle
accident. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this
same day that the complaint was filed, summons was served on defendant Fr.
Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr.
Arsenio Bautista a priest in the same parish church.
Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk
of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant
Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe on August 7, and "will be back on the first
week of November."

The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of

September 13, 1958.

Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment sentencing defendant to

pay damages to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon

Catholic Church, informing the latter of the lower court's decision.

Defendant, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could not
comply with plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of the
said civil case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the same incident,
said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court of Manila.

Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of

the writ of execution, and demanded payment of the amount set forth therein.
The Sheriff's return to the writ shows that in response to such demand,
defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard up"4 and that the Sheriff
found no property that could be subject to execution. An alias writ of execution
was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy Sheriff
attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and
purportedly belonging to defendant.

The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in

Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower
court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs herein, said defendant filed a verified
motion in the same case praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings.
His ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided under
Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;" accordingly, the lower court "did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are
"null and void."

The court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider was
rejected by the court.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the
defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an

inquiry into procedural due process is whether summons in a suit in personam
against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be
validly effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of
Court. A head-on collision of views becomes inevitable considering the
diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and
defendant, on the other. For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant
temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a
copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein."

The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was

grounded on their de facto power over defendant's person. Jurisdiction was
based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. If a defendant was absent
from the territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not enable the court's
officers to seize him and service could not represent this power. Hence, his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of
a judgment personally binding against him.

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts

have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country.

64. MONTEFALCON VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for

acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the
RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of
Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner
Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for
Laurence since Laurence was born in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to
give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner
Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez
has his own family. Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the
service of summons(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge
Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He
filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the
court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in
tryingand deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person.
The appellate court granted Vasquezs contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons on

Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person.

HELD: Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, service of
summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time,
then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino
seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their
contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract.

65. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by
private respondent Danilo Guevarra. The repair cost of P76,800.47 was paid by
means of BPI Check No. 17819, dated 12 March 1991, drawn by Guevarra in
favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored, i.e.,
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (`DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested that
Guevarra should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the
demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

On 07 January 1993, the trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his
address in 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna. On 02 February 1993, Process
Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
submitted to the trial court a return on the service.

On 23 February 1993, petitioner, claiming that Guevarra had failed to file an

ANSWER within the reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. A writ of execution
levied on Guevarras Toyota Corolla was served on Guevarra personally but he
refused to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise over it, and stated that
he was not aware of any case instituted against him. He filed a
certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 38048) before the Court of Appeals, for the
nullification of the ex-parte judgment of 06 January 1994. Guevarra claimed
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a
defective service of summons on him. The appellate court, finding merit in the
petition, annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the
levy upon execution and the sale at public auction of the vehicle. It held, in its
now assailed decision of 28 June 1996, that the substituted service of summons
effected on private respondent was not valid and that, consequently, the
proceedings had before the trial court were nugatory and without legal effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a proper service of summons.

HELD: The summons must be served to the defendant in person. [Section 7,

Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court.] It is only when the defendant cannot be
served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be
made. [Section 8, Ibid.] Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by
stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such
efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.

66-70-MIssing
71. Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued
Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an
amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.

In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. specifically

denied any liability to the plaintiff (APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims
against it.

At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying
that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be
issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines in Taipei. Five days later APL filed an amended motion stating
that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view
of its "one China policy,"

The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was
"fatally defective in that it does not seek that a foreign court examine a person
within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary
because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c)
the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be
taken orally in open court and not by deposition."

By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of
APL. The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the
authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of
plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written
interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses by serving cross-examination."

Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 but was
denied. Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court, however, it was denied again.
Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to
this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of
September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it
will fail.

Issue:

WON foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-
China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take
depositions.

Rulings:

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines

has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such a person
or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

In the case at bar, the RTC has issued a commission to the Asian Exchange
Center thru Director Roces. It also appears that the commission is to be
coursed through the DFA to course all requests for the taking of deposition of
witnesses residing abroad to enable it and the Phil Foreign Service
establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner to
avoid delay in the deposition-taking.

That the deposition-taking will take place in a foreign jurisdiction not

recognized by the Philippines in view of the one-China Policy is inconsequential.
What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting
by authority of the Phil DFA and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the
Phil Court, in accordance with the Phil Rules of Court, pursuant to which
opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the
adverse party.

Depositions may be used, without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule
24 of the Rules of Court.

(c) xxx or (2) that the witness is out of the province and at a greater distance
than 50 kms from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines,
unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition xxx.

72. Sales vs. Sabino

Facts:

In RTC Pasig City, Cyril Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages
against, among others, Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabinos son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, Sabino, notified the defendants
that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of
Court, RTC- Pasig City.

On Dec. 27, 1995 and resumed on Jan. 3, 1996, the deposition on oral
examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in
the presence and with the active participation of Sales counsel, Atty. Villacorta,
who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial,
respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits DD
and EE with submarkings.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a Formal Offer of

Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD and EE. Also offered in evidence as
Exhibit BB is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the
May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658.

Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and asked that they be
expunged from the records on the ground that the
jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the
ROC were not complied with.

The TC admitted, among other evidence, Sabinos Exhibits DD, EE and

BB.

Sales MR was denied by the court so he went on certiorari to the CA imputing

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the TC in admitting in evidence the
deposition (Exhibits DD and EE).

CA affirmed the TC and effectively denied due course to and dismissed Sales
recourse, explaining that Sales active participation, through counsel, during
the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own exhibits, has
thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of
Sabinos evidence. Sales filed this petition.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) ROC were
satisfied by Sabino when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that
deponent has left the country but silent as to WoN at the time his deposition
was offered in evidence deponent is in the Philippines
2. Whether or not Sales in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of
his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith

Rulings:

1. YES. While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they

are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony
in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not
to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during
a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of
hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called
to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the admissibility of
a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23. Among these is when the witness
is out of the Philippines.

2. NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is

anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against
whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the
time his testimony is offered. But it matters not that opportunity for cross-
examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the
testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or
hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of
the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to
object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating,
therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in
court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not,
thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just
because he participated in the taking thereof.

73. Cariaga v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Theaccused is an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., and as such he
has access to the said company, with intent to gain, with grave abuse of
confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away electrical
equipment, supplies and materials totalling P7, 038.96 belonging to the
Company.

The Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
theft, qualified by grave abuse of confidence, under Article 310, in relation to
Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged, aggravated by the
use of motor vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance

On appeal by Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga who did not testify in open court during the criminal proceedings
against petitioner is admissible in evidence and properly considered by the trial
court.

Issue:

WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the
fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to
face.

Rulings:

The sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is
inadmissible.
Section 47 of Rule 130 reads: That testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the
Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of
the previous testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads: Section 1. Rights
of accused at the trial - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled: f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness
who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

74. Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the
existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post
office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an
emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section,
and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter. Merete likewise described the modus
operandi of the group.

For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the NBI in apprehending the group
responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.

At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in
front of the Esguerra Building. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were
Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver. Pasicolan alighted from the
jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan
gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero
and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag
to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their
motorcycle. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two
accused and brought them to their headquarters.

Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the
envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI
Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with
the NBI at that time.

Court finds the three accused, as principals, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft

Issue:
WON Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners
guilt the letters signed by the accused during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right.
Rulings:

The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence

the letters signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the
Constitution are invoked by petitioner:

Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds
names was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of
intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination.
To the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness
against himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the
handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is
not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention.

75. DBP v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P 100,000 from petitioner

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for purposes of
fi nancing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by
TCT No. T- 7609 and OCT No. P-4226. On 10 August 1979, Canadalla
procured another loan in the amount of P 150,000, which was
secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a
third parcel covered by OCT No. P- 6679. Since the piggery business
allegedly suff ered strong reverses, Canadalla failed to comply with
her obligations to the DBP. DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgages. Properties we re sold at public auction to the DBP, which
emerged as the only bidder.

Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property cove red by

TCT No. T- 7609. As to the p roperties cove red by OCT Nos. P- 4226
and P-6679, she had six years to redeem the same.

Subsequently, she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her

properties to her daughter, Rosalinda A. Canadalla- Go. Go off ered
to redeem the properties for P 526,882.40. In re sponse, the DBP
advised Go that the acceptable redemption price
was P 1,814,700.58. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the
DBP consolidated its titles over the subject p roperties and new
certifi cates of title we re issued in its name.

Go fi led with the Regional Tri al Court (RTC) of Makati City a

Supplemental Complaintfor the Exe rcise of Right of Redemption and
Determination of Redemption Price, Nullifi cation of Consolidation,
Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Thereafter, the DBP fi led its Comment.

During the hearing, Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it

was not under oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules
of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the admission or
denial of matters for which an admission was requested.

Issue:

WON matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules

of Court which are mere reiterations of the allegations in the
complaint and are specifi cally denied in the answer may be deemed
impliedly admitted on the ground that the resp onse thereto is not
under oath.

Rulings:

We have held in Po v. Court of Appeals that a party should not be

compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and to make a second denial of those al ready denied in
his answer to the complaint.

Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the scope of

matters that a party may request the adversary to admit are (1)
the genuineness of any material and relevant document described
in and exhibited with the request; and (2) the truth of any material
and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. The rule
authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an admission
implies the making of demands for admission of relevant and
material matters of factsand not for admission of matters of law,
conclusions, or opinions.

Since the afore-quoted allegations are matters of law or opinion,

they are improper matters and cannot therefore be deemed
impliedly admitted under Rule 26.
76, 78, 79 (CONSOLIDATED CASES)

G. R. N0. 102390. REY LANADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

G. R. No. 102404. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS

SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and
ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

FACTS:

The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged

unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up
a picket line in front of the companys Cabuyao, Laguna factory. NLRC issued a
TRO enjoining the UFE to desist from blocking, barricading and obstructing the
points of ingress and egress from NestlesCabuyao plant. To enforce the TRO,
Nestle sought the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary and the fire brigade
of Cabuyao.

Seeking to transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse
in Taguig during the strike, Nestle hired 6 cargo trucks from brothers
Constancio and Jesus Alimagno. Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis
Santos of Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss said transfer of
products, as the matter was not covered by the TRO. However, in bad faith,
Santos instead ordered the PC to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front
of the plant gate so that the trucks can get out of the plant. The PC and the fire
brigade began hitting the strikers with truncheons and water cannons. With
gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound.

Meanwhile, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez was on his way home. He
arrived at the Nestle factory while the dispersal was ongoing so he stopped his
car. At that time, one of the cargo trucks, driven by PacificoGalasao, was
leaving the Nestle compound at full speed. To avoid stones being thrown at his
direction, the truck driver drove in a crouching position. However, he lost
control of the truck and bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez resulting to his death.

. Spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, sued Nestle,
Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, PacificoGalasao, and PC/Capt. ReyLaada for
damages. After defendants filed their answers to the complaint, the Hemedez
spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts
set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents
appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their
verified answer to the request for admission. The Hemedez spouses moved to
strike out said answers and to declare the matters sought to be admitted as
impliedly admitted, contending that defendants themselves and not their
counsel should personally answer the request for admission. TC denied the
spouses motion as well as the MR. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the counsel of a party to whom a written request for

admission is addressed under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer
such request for his client?

RULING:

No. Section 21 of Rule 138 states that an attorney is presumed to be

properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client.
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized
exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the
instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the
Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both
directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to
appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must clothe the former with an
adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate
resolution. On the other hand, Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that
(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure.

77. G.R. No. 131466. CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE

DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and FLORINA DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON,
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, LAS PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO
LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO LACALLE, respondents.
November 27, 1998

FACTS: The heirs of Veronica Moreno filed before the RTC of Las Pinas a
complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" against Cristina Diman, Clarissa
Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman. After joinder of the
issues, the Dimans served a request for admission of the truth on several
matter. However, there was no response on the part of the other party. The
Dimans then filed with the Court a Manifestation with Motion to Require
Plaintiffs to Answer Request for Admission as well as a Motion for Summary
Judgment which was denied by the trial court. The Dimans moved for
reconsideration and submitted a supplement to motion for reconsideration.
Again the Trial Court rebuffed the Dimans. Aggrieved, the Dimans commenced
a special civil action of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals.But once again their efforts met with failure. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court.

RULING: YES. A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the

consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is
the law which makes that determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for
the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as
mandated by law. Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26
of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written
request that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound
within the period designated in the request, to file and serve on the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the
party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters
of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.

It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It

declares that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact
-- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by
admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or
not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a
summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant as the case may be.

Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of

opposition advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary
judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken
grounds cited by the Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no
hesitation in declaring that it was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Trial Court to have refused to render a summary judgment or one on
demurrer to evidence. In no sense may the Trial Court's errors be considered,
as the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of September 9, 1997, as mere
errors of judgment correctible by appeal, untarnished by any capriciousness or
whimsicality.

80. G.R. No. 172175 SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D.

ZEPEDA, petitioners, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
October 9, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of

foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent
Chinabank before the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur. They alleged that they
obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T- 23136. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in
paying their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which was
allegedly granted by Chinabank. However, they were shocked when the
 respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it
emerged as the highest bidder.

Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the trial
court. As a result, it filed an answer with affirmative defences and counterclaim
which was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. Aggrieved, respondent
bank filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was granted by the
Court of Appeals ruling that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing its orders. It ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of
petitioners complaint because they acted in bad faith when they ignored the
hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of Chinabanks
affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabanks written interrogatories;
and the complaint states no cause of action. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was later on denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action; and (2) Whether
the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer
respondents written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of
the Rules of Court.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The Court found out that the allegations in the complaint sufficient to
establish a cause of action for nullifying the foreclosure of the mortgaged
property. The fact that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the
property and that the title was consolidated in respondent banks name did not
preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure. Precisely,
petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings based on circumstances obtaining
prior to and during the foreclosure which render it void.

(2) Yes. In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written
interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank
should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.
Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or

managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to
take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve
answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of
any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion,
order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorneys fees.
Due to respondent banks filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot
be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a
prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3.

86. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (June 11, 1992; 209 SCRA 732)

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages against private

respondent spouses, William and Ma. Jajorie Uy, before the RTC for padlocking
the commercial stalls rented by petitioner from private respondents at Virra
Mall Shopping Center, Greenhills, San Juan.

Private respondents failed to file their answer within the reglementary

period. Private respondents filed an appearance with motion for extension of
time to file answer. The trial court denied the motion for having been filed out
of time. Subsequently, petitioner moved to declare the former in default and
for reception of his evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted petitioners
motion and set the reception of evidence and a copy of the order was served
on and received by private respondents.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte and the trial court issued a
judgment of default against private respondents. Petitioner then filed an ex-
parte motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court granted and
accordingly issued the writ upon petitioners filing of a bond.

Private respondents appealed to respondent Court of Appeals,

challenging the validity of the writ of execution because it was granted without
proper notice to them and without hearing.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting private respondents

petition for certiorari and set aside the order of the trial court granting the writ
of execution. A motion to reconsider thedecision was denied hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a defendant declared in default regains ipso facto his
standing in court as to be entitled to notice of proceedings subsequent
to a final judgment or order rendered against him.
Whether or not a party who has been declared in default entitled to
notice of a motion for execution pending appeal of a judgment by
default.

RULING:

The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit.

The Court holds that a party declared in default is entitled to notice of

the motion for execution pending appeal. This interpretation is consistent with
the nature and effects of being in default as well as with what has been
jurisprudentially laid down with respect to executions pending appeal.

"The remedy of the defaulted party is to file a motion to set aside the
order of default if no judgment has been rendered yet. If there is already
judgment, the defendants recourse is to file a motion for new trial, or a
petition for relief from judgment, or appeal the judgment, or file a special civil
action for certiorari. This is the reason why a defaulted defendant is entitled to
notice of final orders or judgments.

Consistent with this right to notice of final order or judgment is the right
to notice of the motion for execution pending appeal of the default judgment.
Without such notice, the various recourses available to the defaulted party
after judgment would be rendered illusory.

87. MALANYAON vs. SUGA (May 7, 1992; 208 SCRA 436)

FACTS:

Private respondents, filed a Petition for Annulment of Proceedings,

Injunction with Application for Preliminary Injunctions and Restraining Order
with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against petitioner Jaime
Malanyaon and Emma Perfecto.

After filing said petition, respondent judge issued a corresponding

restraining order against petitioner which led the latter to file an urgent motion
to disqualify respondent judge from further sitting in judgment that there is a
client-lawyer relationship between said judge and private respondent's counsel
Atty. Vicente de Lima as shown by the latter's appearances in Special
Proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.

Petitioner was personally served in his office a notice of hearing on the

pre-trial and contempt proceedings. However, petitioner felt chilly and went to
see his doctor who ordered him to stay in bed for a couple of days as he had
just been released from Mother Seton Hospital where he was confined.
Thereafter, petitioner immediately sent a letter to the respondent judge
requesting for the deferment of his appearance on the scheduled hearing but
said letter was not filed on time due to the stormy weather.

Upon petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing of he was declared in

default and ordered arrested. Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to lift the Order
of Arrest against his client which was denied. Thereafter, petitioner was airlifted
and confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center where he was operated
for a gall bladder dysfunction.

Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift his Order of Arrest, to set
aside the order of default and to reset the hearing on account of his illness and
subsequent surgical operation.

Respondent judge lifted the Order of Arrest of the petitioner but denied
his motion to set aside the order of default and the resetting of the scheduled
hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying Petitioners motion to lift the order of default in spite of
the fact that the former had already lifted the order of arrest against the latter
after finding petitioner's absence in the hearing excusable due to the
Petitioner's illness as supported by the affidavit of the his physician stating the
severity of his illness which caused the him not to attend the scheduled
hearing.

RULING:

The respondent court's act of ordering petitioner's arrest is patently

illegal. There is nothing in the Rules which authorizes the trial court to order the
arrest of the party in default. A party declared in default merely loses the right
to be notified of subsequent proceedings and the right to take part in the trial,
11 until the order of default is lifted.
 The failure to appear at the pre-trial hearing was uncontrovertedly due
to illness, the default order may be set aside on the ground of accident over
which petitioner had no control as in the case at bar. Inasmuch as the
respondent judge had already lifted the order of arrest after finding petitioner's
absence excusable, it therefore follows that said judge should have also set
aside the order of default. Thus, the basis for lifting petitioner's order of arrest
should also apply to the order of default since both orders were issued on
petitioner's non-appearance.

88. CIRCLE FINANCING CORPORATION vs. CA (April 22, 1991; 196 SCRA
166)

FACTS: Spouses Roberto Jurado and Fortunata Jurado executed a deed of

mortgage over real property belonging to them in favor of Tacing Regoso as
security for a loan obtained from the latter. The promissory note evidencing the
obligation stipulated payment thereof by the Jurados in eighteen (18) monthly
installments.

With the spouses' consent, Tacing Regoso assigned all his rights and
interests over the promissory note and the deed of mortgage in favor of Circle
Financial Corporation.

Circle Financial Corporation (Circle) sent a letter to the Jurado spouses,

together with a statement of account, demanding payment of P12,186.00,
alleged to be the balance of their obligation. A subsequent letter, from Circle's
attorney, also demanded payment in the amount of P11,752.90.

The letters having gone unheeded, Circle requested the Provincial Sheriff
of Bulacan to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted over the
Jurado's land. The Sheriff scheduled the auction sale and notice of the sale was
received by the Jurados. The spouses sent a letter to the Provincial Sheriff,
advising them that the loan secured by the mortgage had already been paid. A
copy of the letter was given to Circle.

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale nevertheless proceeded as scheduled,

and the property was awarded to Circle as the lone bidder. The Jurado spouses
thereupon filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the
annulment of the foreclosure sale, and for recovery of damages. Circle filed an
answer with counterclaim.

The Trial Court set the case for pre-trial and notices were sent to the
parties and their counsel by registered mail. On the day appointed for the pre-
trial, there was no appearance by Circle or its co-defendants or any of their
counsel. Consequently, they were declared in default and evidence of the
Jurado spouses were received ex parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered
judgment against all the defendants.

Respondents filed a "Verified Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default

and Judgment," alleging that it had not received notice of the pre-trial and
drawing attention to what it claimed to be valid defenses set forth in its answer.

But the motion was peremptorily denied as "not meritorious". Circle

appealed to the Court of Appeals but the verdict of the Court of Appeals went
against Circle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court's
refusal to set aside the declaration of default entered against Circle and the
default judgment thereafter rendered.

RULING:

The Court declares correct the pronouncement of both the Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals that Circle's motion for new trial was defective, not
only because it failed to allege either by separate affidavit or in the body of the
motion itself, the particular facts claimed to constitute the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence entitling it to relief, but also because it failed
to demonstrate with any degree of persuasiveness, by affirmative averments,
either in its aforesaid motion or in any other pleading, that it had in its favor a
meritorious defense to the action for annulment of the foreclosure sale on the
ground that the mortgage debt had been fully paid.

89. ALEX LINA vs. CA (April 9, 1985; 135 SCRA 637)

FACTS:

Private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig) a case for sum of money with damages. Petitioner Alex
Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. When no
answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, private respondent
Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default. Thereafter, the
motion was set for hearing.
 Petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention to
the fact that he had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive
pleading within the reglementary period. Respondent judge issued an order
declaring defendant (herein petitioner) in default and allowing plaintiff (herein
private respondent) to adduce its evidence ex parte.

Defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint. Subsequently,

respondent court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff (herein private
respondent). Petitioner filed a motion to set aside decision. Thereafter,
respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set aside
decision.

Petitioner filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for

certiorari/prohibition, which was denied in its decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the order of default was issued in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default
was rendered without an order of default being furnished petitioner and
where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to
evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court's affirmance

of the questioned order of the trial court. The granting of additional time within
which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Under the Rules of Court, there are remedies available to a defendant in

the Regional Trial Court [Sec. 3, Rule 18; Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; Section 2 of
Rule 38; and Sec. 2, Rule 41]

Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies.
Instead, he went to the appellate court on certiorari/prohibition.

90. AKUT vs. CA (August 10, 1982; 116 SCRA 213)

FACTS:

Respondent Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. as plaintiff filed a complaint

against herein petitioners as defendants in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental claiming ownership of a parcel of land and to declare as null
and void the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of petitioners-
defendants Heirs of Saturnina Akut.

Petitioners were served with summons, and after the expiration of the
15- day reglementary period for petitioners to file their answer, respondent
Insular Life filed a motion to declare petitioners in default. The next day,
petitioners filed their answer.

Petitioners filed a motion to set the hearing of respondent's motion to

declare them in default and another motion asking the trial court to accept and
give due course to their answer.

The trial court issued an order declaring petitioners "in default for their
failure to file answer within the reglementary period and without further
standing in the case, " denying their motion to admit answer, and ordering that
the case "be calendared for the ex-parte reception of evidence for the plaintiff
at the next available [calendar] date." The trial court denied reconsideration
ruling that "the denial of a motion to lift order of default is merely interlocutory,
there being no judgment rendered as yet." But petitioners timely perfected
their appeal to respondent Court of Appeals from the default orders by record
on appeal. In its resolution, respondent appellate court however, motu proprio,
dismissed the appeal, "it appearing that the appeal in this case being from an
order declaring appellants in default which is interlocutory and not
appealable ... " The motion for reconsideration was denied per its Resolution;
hence the present petition to set aside respondent appellate court's dismissal
of their appeal and to set aside the order of the trial court declaring them in
default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period and to
restore their original standing in the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring petitioners in default and in denying their motion to set aside the
order of default.

RULING:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

 In their motions which were duly supported by affidavit of merits,
petitioners aver that their failure to file their answer to the complaint within the
15-day reglementary period was due to accident, mistake or excusable
negligence citing as reasons their failure to get the services of counsel on time
and the fact that two of the petitioners were then sick. Petitioners further
maintain that they have a valid and meritorious defense since the property in
litigation was registered in their name under Original Certificate of title, that
they have been in actual and continuous possession of the land since time
immemorial and that the subsequent sale of said property and the issuance of
the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Titlein favor of their co-petitioner is
valid and legal.

Under these undisputed circumstances, the Court finds petitioners to be

entitled to relief from the order of default and to have their full day in court,
which they seek now instead of asking petitioners to needlessly wait until the
trial court shall have rendered a default and ex-parte judgment against them,
as illogically contended by respondent in its comment.

91. Matute v. Court of Appeals

26 SCRA 768G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106January 31,
1969(L-26751)

Facts:

On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-
blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S.
Matute, filed in Special Proceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition
praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in
such capacity. Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the
date of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true,
just and complete account of his administration and that he is not only
incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his
charge consisting of five haciendas. The respondent Matias opposed the
allegation that it is completely without basis and false. Records show that he
made an accounting and the same was submitted to the court. That his
competence to act as administrator has been established to the satisfaction of
the court. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on
December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs
submitted their respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to ousts
Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of
the movants exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving,
irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which never
properly identified nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias
filed with leave of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to
Evidencewhich avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify
and support the motions for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias
S. Matute. The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-
administrator. Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed
order removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other
hand, the petitioner advances the reason in support of the order of removal
that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce
his evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to
dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is

applicable to special proceedings such that its disregard by the probate court
amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the
above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by
the Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued
the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without
giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit
reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf
in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The
Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave
abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.

92. Continental Cement corporation V. C.A

FACTS:

The Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against

the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Before the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the petitioner filed two
successive motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings, which
were both granted.The last day of the second extension was May 28, 1985. On
May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action. The
motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both for lack of merit and for having been
improperly filed." On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner
in default for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive
pleading during the extension granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of default is proper.

HELD:

Accordingly, the court held that in issuing the order of default before the
expiration of the period for the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the
petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The judgment by
default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff,
was therefore also invalid.

93. DENZO (Phils.)inc. v. intermediate appellate court

FACTS;

A fire broke out at the Nippondenso Building at Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati, Metro
Manila. The building was owned by the Kayamanan Development Corporation
(hereafter, simply referred to as KAYAMANAN), and was then under lease to
Denso (Phils), Inc. (hereafter, simply DENSO). The fire caused extensive
damage. A year or so later, KAYAMANAN instituted an action against DENSO in
the Regional Trial Court at Makati.

Summons was served on DENSO on June 10, 1985. It would seem, however,
that the summons (together with the accompanying copy of the complaint) was
not referred by DENSO to its counsel until June 22, 1985. This prompted the
latter to file on June 25, 1985 a "MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
ANSWER," pleading the late referral, the need to attend to other legal work of
equal importance, as well as the time requirement for study of the factual and
legal points involved in the action, and praying, in consequence, for an
additional period of 15 days from June 25 within which to present the requisite
responsive pleading.

ISSUE: whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: NO

Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file answer was, therefore,

improperly denied for lack of proof of service on the respondent, said motion
having been seasonably filed and, as already fully shown, there being no
impediment to its being heard ex-parte. No pretense is made that the motion
was denied as having been filed merely for delay, but even if that ground were
read into the otherwise clear terms of the order of denial which do not even
hint thereat, it would still be belied by the fact that what was sought was only
an extension of the original reglementary period as well as that prima facie
meritorious reasons were pleaded for the desired extension.

94. JOESTEEL CONTAINER V. COMMONWEALTH FINANCING.

FACTS:

The Commonwealth Financing Corporation filed an action against the Joesteel

Container Corporation before the City Court of Manila for the recovery of a
certain amount of money, as deficiency on the proceeds of an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage executed by the defendant in favor of the Plaintiff. The
summons, which ordered the defendant to answer the complaint and enter into
trial on August 12, 1965, and a copy of the complaint were served upon the
defendant through its General Manager on July 13, 1965. On the date set for
the hearing of the case, or on August 12, 1965, counsel for the defendant
appeared before the court and asked for an extension of time to answer the
complaint, but the motion was denied. Then, on motion of the plaintiff, the
defendant was declared in default and the Deputy Clerk of Court was
commissioned to receive the evidence. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
had 20 days from service of summons on July 13, 1965, within which to file an
answer to the complaint and the period expired on August 2, 1965. On August
13, 1965, the defendant filed a motion to lift the order of default, but his
motion was denied. On August 21, 1965, a judgment by default was rendered
against the defendant. The defendant appealed, but the Court of First Instance
of Manila denied the petition for relief.

Considering that the defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case
within which to file an answer to the complaint or on August 12, 1965, (Zenith
Films, Inc. v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-26619, March 27, 1971. 38 SCRA 120), on
which day the defendant filed a motion for extension of time within which to
file an answer, so that the City Court gravely abused its discretion in declaring
the defendant in default, the Court RESOLVED to SET ASIDE the order of default
and the judgment rendered by the City court of Manila in Civil Case No.
137730, entitled: "Commonwealth Financing Corporation, plaintiff, versus
Joesteel Container Corporation, defendant," and to REMAND this case to the
court of origin for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring
defendant in default.

HELD:

CASE AT BAR. Where defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case
within which to file an answer to the complaint or on August 12, 1965, on which
day the defendant filed a motion for extension of time within which to file an
answer, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring defendant in
default, and the order of default and judgment rendered by the said court in
the case should be set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

95. NAGA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Several days before the date of the aforesaid agreement, or, on July 21, 1962,
the Pacific already made deliveries to the job site at Naga City of roofing
materials to be used in the construction of the mentioned Naga City public
market. The total value of the materials delivered plus the cost of installation
from July 21, 1962 to October 19, 1962 amounted to P250,312.76.

On July 19, 1963 the Pacific filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint against the Naga (docketed as civil case 54547), alleging in essence
that only P107,030 of the total obligation of the Naga refused to pay the
balance thereof in the amount of P143,282.76.

On August 5, 1963 the Naga filed a motion with the trial court requesting for an
extension of 15 days, to expire on August 20, 1963, within which to file its,
answer, counsel stating that The inability to prepare and finalize defendant's
answer on time is due to the burden of other equally if not more urgent
professional work on the part of the undersigned counsel. The said motion was
granted. On August 16, 1963 the Naga filed another motion for an additional,
extension of 10 days within which to file its responsive pleading, counsel
alleging this time that the extension . is requested for the reason that
counsel is presently verifying certain material facts and information relative to
the transaction.

The court a quo however, denied the foregoing motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: YES

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned

orders of the trial court declaring the Naga Development Corporation in default
and denying its motion to set aside the said default order, is hereby affirmed.

The judgment by default, rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, ordering the Naga Development Corporation to pay the Pacific
Merchandising Corporation the amount of P143,282.76 is hereby affirmed, with
the qualification that the Naga Development Corporation shall be allowed to
prove, during the process of execution of the said judgment, whatever
payments it had made to the Pacific Merchandising Corporation, either before
or after the filing of the complaint, which constitute a proper deduction from
the principal sum ordered to be paid.

96. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz

FACTS: A complaint for replevin was filed by respondent against Alpine Lending
Investors (Alpine) and Zenaida Lipata. The complaint alleges that Zenaida was
respondents former neighbor who pretended to help respondent in securing a
Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office (LTO). Zenaida then used
respondents registration papers and mortgaged the vehicle to Alpine.
Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. The LTO showed respondent
the Chattel Mortgage Contract bearing her forged signature. Forthwith,
respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and demanded the
release of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on condition
that Zenaida should first be charged criminally. Respondent then caused the
filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City complaints for
falsification of private document and estafa against Zenaida. Alpine when
informed, still refused to turn over the vehicle to her. Instead of filing an answer
to respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to dismiss on
the ground that it is not a juridical person, hence, not a proper party in the
case. The RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss. RTC denied Alpines MR and
then directed respondent to file her amended complaint within ten (10) days.
However, respondent filed her Amended Complaint with an accompanying
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint two (2) days late. RTC admitted the
amended complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to
admit amended complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not
accompanied by a notice of hearing. RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge for
lack of merit. Alpine moved for a reconsideration, but this was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended

complaint.

HELD: The trial court was correct in admitting respondents amended

complaint.
As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was
a motion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no
responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in
Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Courts ruling in
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., considering that respondent has the right to
amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the
amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words,
the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In
fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her amended
complaint. It has always been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings in order that the real controversies between or
among the parties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits
without delay.

97. de Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories

98. Fortune Motors vs. CA

FACTS: In 1981, Joseph Chua and Edgar Rodrigueza executed separate surety
agreements in favor of Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation to cover obligations
incurred by Fortune Motors whether they be enforced or thereafter made (from
the time of said surety contracts). In 1982, Fortune Motors secured cars from
Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO) via trust receipts and
drafts made by CARCO. These were assigned to Filinvest Credit Corporation.
Later Filinvest, when the obligation matured, demanded payment from Fortune
Motor as well as from Chua and Rodrigueza. No payment was made. A case
was filed. Rodrigueza averred that the surety agreement was void because
when it was signed in 1981, the principal obligation (1982) did not yet exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surety agreement is void.

HELD: No. Future obligations can be covered by a surety. Comprehensive or

continuing surety agreements are in fact quite commonplace in present day
financial and commercial practice. A bank or financing company which
anticipates entering into a series of credit transactions with a particular
company, commonly requires the projected principal debtor to execute a
continuing surety agreement along with its sureties. By executing such an
agreement, the principal places itself in a position to enter into the projected
series of transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship agreement, there
would be no need to execute a separate surety contract or bond for each
financing or credit accommodation extended to the principal debtor.

99. United Overseas Bank vs. Rosemoore Mining

FACTS: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Hereon Rosemoor) in

order to secure a credit facility amounting to 80Million executed a mortgage
agreement with United Overseas Bank Phils. (Hereon Bank) which covered six
(6) parcels of land all registered under Rosemoor. Rosemoor defaulted which
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. The bank was the highest
bidder in all of the properties. Hence the filing of the case by Rosemoor before
the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing of 2 actions in 2
different courts).

Manila RTC: (Personal Action) Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining
proceeds of the loan. However, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case
because it contends Rosemoor is violating forum shopping, having initiated a
case in Malolos RTC. However the motion to dismiss was denied, likewise it was
dismissed by the CA holding that there was no forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action) Rosemoor second action was filed her to restrain the
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure the loan which was not due
yet. As it here, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case due to violation of
forum shopping but the likewise it was denied by the RTC and CA.

Issue: Whether the venue of the filing of the cases resulted to forum shopping.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling
of the lower courts that there was no violation of forum shopping. The Malolos
case was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the
consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the
loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. While
the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, the
right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the foreclosure of the properties
mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due. Moreover, the Malolos case is
an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting
the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the
enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City,
and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff
resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff. It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case
that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the need to secure a writ of injunction
because the consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged properties in favor of
the Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be commenced where
the properties or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for
injunction would be dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was
warranted in filing the Malolos case and cannot in turn be accused of forum-
shopping.

100. Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. vs. CA

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration,

Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's
products in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The Dealership Agreement contained a
stipulation that All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed within the
proper Courts of Quezon City. Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in
the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages
and breach of contracts, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order. Kubota filed two motions One for the dismissal of the case on the ground
of improper venue .The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing
its counsel was not available. The court issued an order allowing the issuance
of preliminary injunction and a motion denying the motion to dismiss on the
reason that Umimasters place of business is in Tacloban City while Kubotas
principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accord with the the Rules of
Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the
election of the plaintiff. Hence,the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota
appealed both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion in a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA.
Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held that: the
stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did
in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to
the proper courts of Quezon City. Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for
reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting
the venue to a specified place.

HELD: No. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine
enunciated that as long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or
restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the
venue of the action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing the venue.

101. POLYTRADE VS BLANCO

FACTS: Polytrade filed a case against Blanco in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Blanco moved to dismiss the case upon the ground of improper venue
invoking Section 3, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which states that venue may be
stipulated by written agreement. According to Blanco, they agreed to sue and
be sued in the courts of Manila. Blanco says that because of such covenant he
can only be sued in the Courts of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid.

HELD: Venue was properly laid. An accurate reading of the stipulation the
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila, does not preclude
the parties from filing suits in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant. The
plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila
alone is the venue is totally absent therefrom.

102. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS VS SCHONFELD

FACTS: Klaus Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident of New Westminster,

British, Columbia. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental
engineering and water supply and sanitation.

PaciCon Philippines, the petitioner, is a corporation duly established and

incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary
purpose of PPI is to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical
services. PCIJ, a Tokyo- based company decided to engage in consultancy
services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. PCIJ employed Schonfeld as
Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. Later on,
Schonfeld received a letter from PCIJ informing him that his employment has
been terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI was not successful in the
water and sanitation sector in the Philippines.

Schonfeld filed a case against PPI and PCIJ. PPI moved for its dismissal on the
ground that venue was improperly laid and that the respondent is a Canadian
citizen .

ISSUE: Whether or not venue is not properly laid.

HELD: The court ruled that the settled stipulations regarding venue is that
whle they are considered valid and enforceable. Venue stipulations in a
contract do not as a rule, supersede the general rules set forth in Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. In this case, they should merely be considered an agreement on
national forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not
exclusive, but rather, permissive.

Further, the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be

rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen does not warrant
the application of the principle. The court ruled that Philippine courts may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it choose to do so, provided that the
following requisites are met:

1. That the Philippine Courts is the one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to,

2. That the Philippine Court is in the position to make intelligent decision as

to the law and the facts, and

3. That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have a power to enforce its
decision.

103. LEVITON INDUSTRIES VS SALVADOR

FACTS: Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a complaint for
unfair competition against petitioners Leviton Industries before the CFI of Rizal
(RTC), presided by respondent Judge Serafin Salvador. The complaint
substantially alleges that plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York,
United States of America. The defendant Leviton Industries is a partnership
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at
382 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City; while defendants Nena de la Cruz
Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant Domingo Go
acting as General Manager of defendant Leviton Industries. That plaintiff,
founded in 1906 by Isidor Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical
wiring devices in the United States under the trademark Leviton, which various
electrical wiring devices bearing the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton
Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since 1954; that
due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public,
the same are well known to Filipino consumers under the trade name Leviton
Manufacturing Co., Inc. and trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use
of plaintiffs trademark and trade name in the Philippines, defendants (Leviton
Industries) began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast, fuse and oval
buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.

That Domingo Go, partner and general manager of defendant partnership, had
registered with the Philippine Patent Office the trademarks Leviton Label and
Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse under Certificate of Registration Nos.
SR-1132 and 15517, respectively, which registration was contrary to
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of
plaintiffs right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the
trademark Leviton but likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in
distinguishing its trademark; and that the use thereof by defendants of its
products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and likely to
deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling defendants to pass
off their products as those of plaintiffs. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A
of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed for damages. It also sought the
issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit defendants from using the trade
name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark Leviton.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of

action, drawing attention to the plaintiffs failure to allege therein its capacity
to sue under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents,

failed to allege the essential facts bearing its capacity to sue before Philippine
courts.

Ruling: Yes. We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co.,
Inc. had failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue
before Philippine courts. Private respondents action is squarely founded on
Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166. Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants
to a foreign corporation, whether or not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, the right to seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine
courts. But the said law is not without qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates
as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trade mark of the suing
foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that it be
an asignee of such registered trademark. The said section further requires that
the country, of which the plaintiff foreign corporation or juristic person is a
citizen or domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations or juristic entities the
same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty, convention or law,
All that is alleged in private respondents complaint is that it is a foreign
corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to comply with the requirements
imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, must be averred
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the
Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out, explicitly sets
down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution thereof. It is
therefore incumbent upon private respondent to comply with these
requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be
that private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our
rules on pleadings require that the necessary qualifying circumstances which
clothe it with such right be affirmatively pleaded.

104. BULAKHIDAS VS NAVARRO

FACTS: Bulakhidas, a foreign partnership, filed a complaint against a domestic

corporation, Diamond Shipping Corporation, before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal for the recovery of damages allegedly caused by the failure of the said
shipping corporation to deliver the goods shipped to it by petitioner to their
proper destination.The complaint alleged that plaintiff is "a foreign partnership
firm not doing business in the Philippines" and that it is "suing under an
isolated transaction." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action against defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the

Philippines can institute an action before our courts is already wen settled in
this jurisdiction.

HELD: It is settled that if a foreign corporation is not engaged in business in

the Philippines, it may not be denied the right to file an action in Philippine
courts for isolated transactions.

The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation law was not to prevent the
foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from
acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps
necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the
purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to
obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing
redress in the Philippine courts.

105. ANTAM CONSOLIDATED VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On 9 April 1981, Stokely Van Camp. Inc. filed a complaint against
Banahaw Milling Corporation, Consolidated, Inc., Tambunting Trading
Corporation, Aurora Consolidated Securities and Investment Corporation, and
United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of money. In its
complaint, Stokely alleged: (1) that it is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of Indiana, U.S.A. and has its principal office at 941
North Meridian Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, U.S.A., and one of its subdivisions
"Capital City Product Company" (Capital City) has its office in Columbus, Ohio,
U.S.A.; (2) that Stokely and Capital City were not engaged in business in the
Philippines prior to the commencement of the suit so that Stokely is not
licensed to do business in this country and is not required to secure such
license; (3) that on 21 August 1978, Capital City and Coconut Oil Manufacturing
(Phil.) Inc. (Comphil) with the latter acting through its broker Rothschild
Brokerage Company, entered into a contract (RBS 3655) wherein Comphil
undertook to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long tons of
crude coconut oil to be delivered in October/November 1978 at the c.i.f price of
US$0.30/lb. but Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital City
covered its coconut oil needs in the open market at a price substantially in
excess of the contract and sustained a loss of US$103,600; that to settle
Capital City's loss under the contract, the parties entered into a second
contract (RBS 3738) on 3 November 1978 wherein Comphil undertook to buy
and Capital City agreed to sell 500 long tons of coconut crude oil under the
same terms and conditions but at an increased c.i.f. price of US$0.3925/lb.; (4)
that the second contract states that "it is a wash out against RBS 3655" so that
Comphil was supposed to repurchase the undelivered coconut oil at US
$0.3925 from Capital City by paying the latter the sum of US$103,600.00 which
is the same amount of loss that Capital City sustained under the first contract;
that Comphil again failed to pay said amount, so to settle
Capital City's loss, it entered into a third contract with Comphil on 24 January
1979 wherein the latter undertook to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to
buy the same quantity of crude coconut oil to be delivered in April/May 1979 at
the c.i.f. price of US$0.3425/lb.; (5) that the latter price was 9.25 cents/lb. or
US$103,600 for 500 long tons below the then current market price of 43.2
cents/lb. and by delivering said quantity of coconut oil to Capital City at the
discounted price, Comphil was to have settled its US$103,600 liability to
Capital City; (6) that Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so Capital City
notified the former that it was in default; (7) that Capital City sustained
damages in the amount of US$175,000; and (8) that after
repeated demands from Comphil to pay the said amount, the latter still refuses
to pay the same. Stokely further prayed that a writ of attachment be issued
against any and all the properties of Antam, et al. in an amount sufficient to
satisfy any lien of judgment that Stokely may obtain in its action.
In support of this provisional remedy and of its cause of action against Antam,
et al., other than Comphil, Stokely alleged that: 1) After demands were made
by respondent on Comphil, the Tambuntings ceased to be directors and officers
of Comphil and were replaced by their five employees, who were managers of
Tambunting's pawnshops and said employees caused the name of Comphil to
be changed to "Banahaw Milling Corporation" and authorized
one of the Tambuntings, Antonio P. Tambunting, Jr., who was at that time
neither a director nor officer of Banahaw to sell its oil mill; 2) Unicom has taken
over the entire operations and assets of Banahaw because the entire and
outstanding capital stock of the latter was sold to the former; 3) All of the
issued and outstanding capital stock of Comphil are owned by the Tambuntings
who were the directors and officers of Comphil and who were the ones who
benefited from the sale of Banahaw's assets or shares to Unicom; 4) All of the
petitioners evaded their obligation to respondent by the devious scheme of
using Tambunting employees to replace the Tambuntings in the management of
Banahaw and disposing of the oil mill of Banahaw or their entire interests to
Unicom; and 5) Respondent has reasonable cause to believe and does believe
that the coconut oil mill, which is the only substantial asset of Banahaw is
about to be sold or removed so that unless prevented by the Court there will
probably be no assets of Banahaw to satisfy its claim. On 10 April 1981, the
trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of Stokely upon
the latter's deposit of a bond in the amount of P1,285,000.00. On 3 June 1981,
Stokely filed a motion for reconsideration to reduce the attachment bond. On
11 June 1981, Antam, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Stokely, being a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
the
Philippines, has no personality to maintain the suit. Thereafter, the trial court
issued an order, dated 10 August 1981, reducing the attachment bond to
P500,000.00 and denying the motion to dismiss by Antam, et al. on the ground
that the reason cited therein does not appear to be indubitable. Antam, et al.
filed a petition for certiorari before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 14
June 1982, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Antam, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, they filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order.

Issue: Whether Stokely Van Camp, Inc. has the capacity to sue, in light of three
transactions it entered into with Comphil, Antam, etc. without license.

Held: The transactions entered into by Stokely with Comphil, Antam, et al. are
not a series of commercial dealings which signify an intent on the part of
Stokely to do business in the Philippines but constitute an isolated one which
does not fall under the category of "doing business." The only reason why
Stokely entered into the second and third transactions with Comphil, Antam, et
al. was because it wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the failure of
Comphil, Antam, et al. to deliver the crude coconut oil under the first
transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to make good on their
obligation. Instead of making an outright demand on Comphil, Antam, et al.,
Stokely opted to try to push through with the transaction to recover the amount
of US$103,600.00 it lost. This explains why in the second transaction, Comphil,
Antam, et al. were supposed to buy back the crude coconut oil they should
have delivered to the respondent in an amount which will earn the latter a
profit of US$103,600.00. When this failed the third transaction was entered into
by the parties whereby Comphil, Antam, et al. were supposed to sell crude
coconut oil to the respondent at a discounted rate, the total amount of such
discount being US$103,600.00. Unfortunately, Comphil, Antam, et al. failed to
deliver again, prompting Stokely to file the suit below. From these facts alone, it
can be deduced that in reality, there was only one agreement between
Comphil, Antam, et al. and Stokely and that was the delivery by the former of
500 long tons of crude coconut oil to the latter, who in turn, must pay the
corresponding price for the same. The three seemingly different transactions
were entered into by the parties only in an effort to fulfill the basic agreement
and in no way indicate an intent on the part of Stokely to engage in a
continuity of transactions with Comphil, Antam, et al. which will categorize it as
a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Stokely, being a foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines, does not need to obtain a
license to do business in order to have the capacity to sue.

106-110 Missing

111. Cokaliong Shipping v. Amin

Facts:
On May 5, 1992, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages, with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Attachment, against Carlos A. Go Thong Lines and Eugenio
Manubag, Jr. The case was filed with the RTC of Cebu. The petitioner alleged
that by reason of defendants negligence, a collision took place on April 3, 1992
between its vessel, the M/V Filipinas Tandag and Go Thong Lines vessel,
the M/V Our Lady of Lourdes.

Defendants filed an Answer with Counterclaim, denying negligence on their

part and alleging that the collision was caused by the faulty, erratic and
erroneous maneuvers of petitioners vessel.

On February 1, 1993, private respondent, as insurer of Go Thong Lines, filed a

Complaint against herein petitioner .The case was filed with the RTC of Makati,
Branch 135, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-319.Respondent
claimed that it had paid the insured the amount of P2,420,325.59 and, by
virtue thereof, had been subrogated to the rights of Go Thong Lines against
petitioner.

Petitioner filed on August 3, 1993 a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 93-319
(Makati Case) due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 11660 (Cebu Case) on the
ground that the two cases involved the same parties, the same causes of
action and the same issues. . But petitioners motion was denied by the trial
court which held that there was no similarity of causes of action

Issue:

WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as there
are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action.

Rulings:

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in
the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other.
As regards the first requirement, it is evident that petitioner is a party in both
cases, i.e., as plaintiff in the Cebu Case and as defendant in the Makati
Case. Private respondent claims, however, that since it was not impleaded as a
party in the Cebu Case, there is no identity of parties to warrant the dismissal
of its complaint in the Makati Case. This contention has no merit. Private
respondent filed the complaint in the Makati Case as a subrogee of Go Thong
Lines.
As to the second requirement, a reading of the allegations of the respective
complaints of the parties shows that the asserted rights are founded on an
identical set of facts which gave rise to one basic issue, that is, whether the
collision between the two vessels was due to the negligence of the employees
of one vessel or those of the other vessel. Indeed in the Cebu Case the parties
agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether the collision was due to
petitioners negligence or that of Go Thong Lines. This is the same issue raised
in the Makati Case instituted by Go Thong Lines insurer against petitioner.

112. Suntay v. Aqueous

113. FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes v. Trajano

Facts:
On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Certification
Election with The Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed
the petition on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and
the same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court, docketed as
G.R. No. L-49771.

Private respondent admitted: that as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent
filed a similar petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment but the petition was denied by the MED Arbiter and the Secretary
of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-
profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or
organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-
49771) assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code. On May
1, 1980, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the
Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions
the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice; and that in the
exercise of such right, private respondent filed another petition for certification
election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (NCR-LRD-N-2-050-86).

On April 17, 1986, the Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition,
declaring that a certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the petitioner.

Issue:
WON respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition
for certification election, despite the pendency of a similar petition before the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 49771) which involves the same parties for the same
cause.

Rulings:
The Petition is devoid of merit. At the time private respondent filed its petition
for certification election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code
was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70.

In order that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the
same cause may be availed of as a ground to dismiss a case, there must be,
between the action under consideration and the other action: (1) Identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2)
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the Identity on the two preceding particulars should be
such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action wig,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for
certiorari pending before the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-49771) wig not
constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election under
consideration, for while in the former, private respondent questioned the
constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the
latter, private respondent invokes the same article as already amended.

114. Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon

Facts:
This concerns a Komatsu Bulldozer which was delivered to Neville Y. Lamis Ents.
by Santiago Maningo as evidenced by a Memorandum Agreement. In Civil Case
No. 1395 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Maningo sought, among other
things, the payment of the value of the bulldozer from Neville Y. Lamis Ents.
who moved to dismiss on the ground of multiplicity of suits and improper
venue.When the motion was denied, we granted the petition for certiorari and
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1395.

In granting the petition, We found that Civil Case No. 1395 was a duplication of
Civil Case No. 35199 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which Neville Y.
Lamis Ents. had previously filed against Santiago Maningo. In Our decision We
said, among other things, that: "Similarly, the private respondent's claim for
the purchase price of the tractor [the Komatsu Bulldozer] is barred. This claim
should have been set up in Civil Case No. 35199, of which, in one of the causes
of action it was alleged that there was a misdelivery of tractor for which reason
the plaintiff therein asks for the delivery of the tractor specified in the
Memorandum Agreement."
In the instant petition, Neville Y. Lamis Ents. complains that Civil Case No. 147
is not only again duplicitous but it also disregards Our decision in G.R. No.
57250. Hence We are asked to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 147.

Issue:

WON Civil Case No. 147 should be dismissed.

Rulings:
The petition is impressed with merit. It is obvious that tile private respondent is
embarked on a campaign of harrassment by filing suit after suit against the
petitioner.

While it is true, as We have said, that the private respondent's claim for the
purchase price of the Komatsu tractor is barred in Civil Case No. 35199 and in
any suit for that matter, there is nothing in Our pronouncement to prevent the
Rizal Court of First Instance from deciding the question of possession in respect
of the tractor. Therefore, litigation in any other case of said possession is not
only unnecessary and improper but it is also barred by Our decision in G.R. No.
57250.

115. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line
under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the former credit
of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending on 30 April
1997. The spouses Beluso constituted, other than their promissory notes, a real
estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. T-31539 and T-27828, as additional security for the
obligation. The Credit Agreement was subsequently amended to increase the
amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of P2.35 Million pesos and
to extend the term thereof to 28 February 1998.
To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to
them by UCPB, the spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a
total of P350,000.00.

On 2 September 1998, UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total
obligation of P2,932,543.00 plus 25% attorneys fees, but the spouses Beluso
failed to comply therewith. UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the
spouses Beluso to secure their credit line, which already ballooned
to P3,784,603.00.

On 9 February 1999, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment,

Accounting and Damages against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City. On 23
March 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Beluso

On 8 May 2000, the RTC denied UCPBs Motion for Reconsideration, prompting
UCPB to appeal the RTC Decision with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals denied UCPBs Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit. UCPB thus filed the present petition

Issue:

WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error
when it failed to order the dismissal of the case because the respondents are
guilty of forum shopping.

Rulings:

Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the
following instances: SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal,
an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of
section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)

When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when
the ground for the dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i)
that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the
complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time,
it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile
absent condition precedent, as the case may be

UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the spouses Beluso on 15 January 1999 with the RTC of
Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso
filed Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were allegedly
two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue at the time of
the filing of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of
Makati. This will still not change our findings. It is indeed the general rule that
in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the
same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this
rule is not absolute. According to this Court in Allied Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals.

116. G.R. No. 95223. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 and EKMAN & COMPANY,
INC., respondents. July 26, 1996

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,

[1]
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation to set aside two orders, dated October 8, 1984 and November 15,
1984, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132, in Civil
Case No. 7500. It appears that on October 8, 1981, private respondent Ekman
& Company Inc. (Ekman & Co.) obtained a loan in the amount of P5,700,000.00
from petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (hereafter called Allied
Bank). Private respondent executed a promissory note, secured by
US$750,000.00 deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in
Hongkong. The transaction involves what is called in banking parlance as a
back-to-back loan.

Allied Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent
Ekman & Co. in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. Upon the reorganization of the judiciary
in 1983, the case was transferred to the RTC in Makati. Allied Bank alleged that
after applying private respondents dollar deposit to its indebtedness, there
remained a balance of P387,936.08, exclusive of interest and other charges
owing to it but despite demands made on private respondent Ekman & Co., the
amount had not been paid. Thereafter, the case was dismissed by the RTC for
failure of Allied Bank to prosecute its case. However, upon petitioners
explanation that it did not know that its case had been transferred to Makati as
a result of the reorganization of the courts, the RTC reconsidered its order and
directed that summons be served on private respondent Ekman & Co.

It appears that private respondent itself had filed a complaint against

petitioner, for accounting. The case was also filed in the RTC of Makati. Ekman
& Co. alleged that on April 8, 1981, it had obtained a loan in the amount of P5,
700, 000.00 from petitioner Allied Bank upon the security of a $750,000.00-
dollar deposit which was earning 14.5% interest per annum; that it asked Allied
Bank for a statement of account and the return of its deposit which Allied Bank
had applied to the payment of the loan but Allied Bank refused the demand.

Petitioner Allied Bank moved to dismiss said case but it was denied by the
trial court. Its motion for reconsideration was also denied. Soon after, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which later on dismissed
their petition. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Petitioner Allied Bank.

RULING:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 7500,
now pending before Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED
CONSOLIDATED with Civil Case No. 649 pending in Branch 136 of same court,
the two cases to be heard and decided by the latter court.

In the case at bar, not only was petitioners action in Civil Case No. 649
brought ahead of private respondents action, it is also the appropriate case for
determining the parties rights.Petitioners action (Civil Case No. 649) is for
collection of a sum of money, whereas private respondents action (Civil Case
No. 7500) is simply for a statement of account apparently to enable it to pay its
obligation to petitioner. Private respondents claim is more in the nature of a
defense to the action for collection. As such it should be asserted in Civil Case
No. 649 rather than in a separate action.

117. G.R. No. 157557 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL

AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner, vs. RAMON YU, TEOFISTA
VILLAMALA, LOURDES YU and YU SE PENG, Respondents. March 10,
2006
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated
property which ws later on dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and remanded the case to the trial
court. Hence this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the action barred by res judicata?

RULING: Yes. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action.20Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to
reversion has long been nullified, they have not an iota of right over the
property and thus, have no legal personality to bring forth the action for
reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that
the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the
dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states
no cause of action.

Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because

respondents again seek to enforce a right based on a sale which has been
nullified by a final and executory judgment. Recall that the question of validity
of the sale had long been settled. The same question, therefore, cannot be
raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.

118. G.R. No. 122181. JOSE A. LINZAG and the HEIRS of CRISTOBAL A.
LINZAG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
Regional Trial Court,Branch IV, Mati, Davao Oriental, PATRICIO S.
CUNANAN, ORLANDO SALVADOR, MANUEL P. BLANCO, JR., JOSE
MANUEL SERRANO and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of Mati, Davao
Oriental, respondents. June 26, 1998

FACTS:

At the cadastral proceeding involving Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of
First Instance of Davao Oriental sitting in Mati, Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag
filed his claim over said Lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise
filed a claim.One Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion to award Lot No. 1222, as
an uncontested lot, in his favour. Soon, the cadastral court, on the basis of the
foregoing, issued an Orderdeclaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-
interests had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse
possession of Lot No. 1222, in concept of an owner for a period of at least 30
years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original claimant Patricio
S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot. Petitioners filed an action
for annulment of title and reconveyance with damagesagainst private
respondents Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador before the Court of First
instance of Mati, Davao Oriental which was later on dismissed by the trial court.
Aggrieved, Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this
petition and Civil Case No. 571.

RULING: NO. In sum, the Court found that all the requirements for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. This petition should,
therefore, be dismissed. The difference in the form of the actions instituted is
immaterial. The petitioners may not escape the effect of the doctrine by merely
varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao
vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76, 85).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should
not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity in them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public
that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies
over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated (Ibabao vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs. Caparas, supra, at p. 59).As this
petition is already barred by the judgment in Civil Case 571, We see no other
course of action but to resolve to dismiss this petition.

119. G.R. No. 156224 HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS, Petitioners, versus

AURORA A. BUCAL, DEMETRIO,
BUCAL, ARTEMIO F. ABALOS,LIGAYA U. ABALOS, ROMULOF. ABALOS,
JESUSA O. ABALOS,MAURO F. ABALOS andLUZVIMINDA R.
ABALOS, Respondents. February 19, 2008
FACTS:
The instant case arose when petitioners father, Panfilo, began to execute
the said decision ordering for the partition of the intestate estate of Panfilo. In
opposition, respondents, who are children and in-laws of the now deceased
Faustino, filed on January 8, 1986 a case for Quieting of Title, Possession,
Annulment of Document and Damages with Preliminary Injunction. Soon, the
trial court directed the parties to maintain the status quo and later on ordered
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Due to the several proceedings, the controversy was narrowed down to
only two (2) properties, namely: the fishpond located at Linoc, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, locally known as Duyao, and the fishpond located at Canaoalan,
Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Pinirat. Eventually, the trial court
rendered is decision partitioning the property to the parties. Both Panfilo and
respondents elevated the case to the CA, assigning the alleged errors of the
trial court. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the petition
unmeritorious. Panfilo moved for reconsideration of the Decision but was
denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in failing to consider the finality of
the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465.

RULING: NO. Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial identity
of parties, still there exists substantial identity only when the additional party
acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former
action. In this case, while it is true that respondents are legitimate children and
relatives by affinity of Faustino it is more important to remember that, as
shown by their documents of acquisition, they became owners of the subject
fishponds not through Faustino alone but also from a third person (i.e., Maria
Abalos). Respondents are asserting their own rights and interests which are
distinct and separate from those of Faustinos claim as a hereditary heir of
Francisco Abalos. Hence, they cannot be considered as privies to the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied
solely on their untenable defense of res judicata instead of contesting the
genuineness and due execution of respondents documentary evidence.

Moreover, Panfilo erred in repeatedly believing that there was no

necessity to implead respondents as defendants in Civil Case No. 15465 since,
according to him, the necessary parties in a partition case are only the co-
owners or co-partners in the inheritance of Francisco Abalos. On the contrary,
the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all other persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Not only the co-heirs
but also all persons claiming interests or rights in the property subject of
partition are indispensable parties. In the instant case, it is the responsibility of
Panfilo as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15465 to implead all indispensable parties,
that is, not only Faustino and Danilo but also respondents in their capacity as
vendees and donees of the subject fishponds. Without their presence in the suit
the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality against them. Being
strangers to the first case, they are not bound by the decision rendered therein;
otherwise, they would be deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

Finally, it must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff

seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties;
and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. It is only
properties owned in common that may be the object of an action for partition;
it will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject
property. Thus, in this case, only the shares in the lots which are determined to
have been co-owned by Panfilo, Faustino and Danilo could be included in the
order of partition and, conversely, shares in the lots which were validly
disposed of in favor of respondents must be excluded therefrom. In this
connection, the Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of fact and
the partition ordered by the appellate court as these are amply supported by
evidence on record. Furthermore, the rule is that factual issues are beyond our
jurisdiction to resolve since in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure this Courts power is limited only to review questions of
law when there is doubt or difference as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts.

120. G.R. No. 121534. JUAN M. CASIL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS; HON. URBANO VICTORIO, SR., BRANCH 50, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANILA; and ANITA U. LORENZANA, respondents. January 28,
1998]

FACTS:

Private Respondent Anita U. Lorenzana is the lessee of a government

property located on Bilibid Viejo Street, near Quezon Boulevard, Manila. After
the building on said land was destroyed by fire, Petitioner Juan M. Casil and
private respondent entered into a written agreement authorizing the former to
develop and administer the property. They also agreed that rentals from the
tenants would be divided equally between them. Thus, buildings, stalls and
cubicles were constructed on the subject property and leased to tenants.
Private respondent allegedly found that the tenants, except for one or two, had
been paying their rentals on time, but that petitioner was not properly
remitting her share thereon. Thus, she wrote the tenants informing them that
she had already terminated her contract with petitioner and urging them to pay
directly to her. Petitioner countered by asking them to ignore private
respondents letter.
 Petitioner then filed a complaint against private respondent for Breach of
Contract and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72362 before Branch 45
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.However, before submitting her answer,
private respondent filed before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
her own separate complaint against petitioner for Rescission of Contract,
Accounting and Damages. Petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss the
Second Case on the ground of litis pendentia. Subsequently, private
respondent filed her opposition to said motion. Thereafter, Judge Urbano C.
Victorio, Sr. denied the motion. The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed
the petition for certiorari, thereby affirming the trial courts denial of the said
motion. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is Litis Pendentia in this case.

RULING: The court sustained the petitioner. In order that an action may be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res adjudicata in the other.

In this light, there is identity of subject matter and of causes of action, for
the same evidence presented in the First Case will necessarily be presented in
the Second Case, and the judgment sought in the Second Case will either
duplicate or contradict any judgment in the First Case. It is beyond dispute,
therefore, that a judgment in the First Case will constitute res adjudicata to bar
the Second Case.

As a final note, the following guidelines for the dismissal of a complaint on the
ground of litis pendentia laid down by this Court in Allied Banking Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals should be taken into account. Given, therefore, the
pendency of two actions, the following are the relevant considerations in
determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether
the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action
or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the
action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the
parties.Since the First Case was filed earlier, it will be in accord with
jurisprudence to abate the Second Case.

121-125 Missing

126. DELOS REYES vs. CA and SPOUSES CAIA (January 27, 1998; 285
SCRA 705)

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, dismissed a civil

case for recovery of possession of real property with damages filed by
petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower
court.

Petitioners seek the nullification of the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals which affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of
petitioners herein by imputing to the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1)
in reckoning the 30-year prescriptive period of real actions as provided under
Art. 1141 of the Civil Code from the date of issuance of the questioned TCT or
annotation of the transaction when petitioners' mother, original owner of
subject property and when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and
Zenaida Caia and consequently holding petitioners guilty of laches; and, (2) in
not applying Arts. 1409, 1410, and 1422 of the Civil Code.

Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13,405 square

meters originally owned by the spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes.
Evarista delos Reyes sold to spouses Catalina Mercado and Eulalio Pena 10,000
square meters of the property. The vendees were able to secure Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26184 covering not only the 10,000 square meters of
land bought by them but also the remaining 3,405 square meters left unsold. In
turn, the Pena spouses sold the whole property to a third party who later
conveyed the same whole area to another party. Eventually, the land was
acquired by private respondents herein, Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia,
through a "Deed of Exchange." Later, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42753 was
issued in the name of the Caia spouses who since then exercised full ownership
and possession over the property.

Petitioners, filed an action against respondents for reconveyance of

3,405 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. 42753 claiming that
this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of their
10,000 square meters they had bought from Evarista delos Reyes. However,
the case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of laches. As already
adverted to, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Can an action for reconveyance of real property covered by the Torrens

system filed after more than thirty (30) years prosper against the holder for
value?

RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition. Petitioners argue

that their cause of action still subsists because it accrued either when TCT No.
42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and his sister Zenaida Caia. This is incorrect.
A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right
of another arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case,
petitioners' cause of action accrued when the Pena spouses caused the
registration in their name of the entire 13,405 square meters instead of only
10,000 square meters they actually bought from Evarista delos Reyes. For it
was on this instance that the right of ownership of Evarista over the remaining
3,405 square meters was transgressed and from that very moment sprung the
right of the owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for
reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them.

When respondents Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia as fourth transferees

in ownership dealt with the land in question, they were not required to go
beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of their
transferor. For all intents and purposes, they were innocent purchasers for
value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a
clean title, i.e., there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis
pendens at the back thereof. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the
title to the property. Therefore it would be the height of injustice, if not
inequity, if a valid transaction transferring the subject property to them be set
aside just to accommodate parties who heedlessly slept on their rights for more
than a third of a century. This is not conducive but anathema to good order.

127. AGNAR vs. BERNAD (May 9, 1988; 161 SCRA 276)

FACTS:
 Private respondents, the spouses Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar, as
plaintiffs, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, a civil action against the
defendants-spouses, the herein petitioners, praying for the annulment of a
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, damages, and attorneys fees with preliminary
injunction. The petitioners, timely filed their answer specifically denying the
allegations in the complaint.

The trial court, acting through the respondent Judge, issued an order
denying the petitioners motion. The respondent Judge based his order on a
strict or literal construction of section 2, Rule 9, of the Revised Rules of Court
which, in essence, provides that defenses or objections, except the failure to
state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer,
are deemed waived.

On appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the case, as stated at

the outset, was certified to this Court for resolution" Since the instant petition
involves a pure question of law on the correct interpretation of section 2, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the affirmative defense of prescription may be validly set

up for the first time in an amended answer.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Prescription and estoppel cannot be invoked against the State. If the

plaintiffs complaint or evidence shows that the action had prescribed, the
action shall be dismissed. Prescription cannot be invoked as a ground if the
contract is alleged to be void ab initio, but where prescription depends on
whether the contract is void or voidable, there must be a hearing.

128. FERRER vs. ERICTA (August 23, 1978; 84 SCRA 705)

FACTS:

A complaint for damages dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on
January 6, 1975 (Civil Case No. Q-19647) was filed by petitioners against
respondents.
 It was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, were the
owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car. Said vehicle was allegedly driven by
their son Dennis Pfleider, 16 y/o without proper official authority, the vehicle
without due regard to traffic rules and regulations thereby causing physical
injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which
injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at
different hospitals for more than two (2) years. They prayed that defendants be
ordered to reimburse them for actual expenses as well as other damages.

Defendants put up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis

Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle and
alleging that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not
passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and that,
consequently, defendants had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.

At the pre-trial, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present.

Consequently, defendants-private respondents were declared in default and
the plaintiff petitioners were allowed to present their evidence exparte.

Private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and
subsequent pleadings" on the ground that "defendants' failure to appear for
pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect." This was opposed by
petitioners. In view of this, the motion of private respondents was denied by
respondent Judg. Thereafter, respondent Judge rendered judgment against
private respondents, and ordered them to pay to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs for actual expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; for actual
expenses for the care, medicines of plaintiff; for moral damages; for exemplary
damages; for attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

Respondents filed an MR of the decision and of the order denying the

motion to set aside order of default, on the ground that case states no cause of
action and that the action has already prescribed, the case being filed only on
Jan. 6, 1975, more than 4 years from date of accident on December 31, 1970",
likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore, the action has already
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 was subsequently filed by

defendants-private respondents on September10, 1975, alleging that their
defense of prescription has not been waived and may be raised even at such
stage of the proceedings.
 Respondents filed Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleging that
their defense of prescription has not been waived and may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings to which the petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.

On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the

order of default, issued an order absolving defendants from any liability on the
grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action because it does not
allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the
vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company; and
(b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed
more than four (4) years after the date of the accident, and the action to
recover damages based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years.

Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private

respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.

RULING:

No. the instant petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the

ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of
the plaintiff. Thus, the Court held that where the answer does not take issue
with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription,
his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a
waiver of the defense of prescription. It was explained that the defense of
prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not
deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon
the preceding pleading.

In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with

the question of prescription. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges
that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff occured on
December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed
on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because
of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year period begins from the
day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.
129. CASTILLO vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE MADRIGAL (June 27, 1991; 198
SCRA 556)

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf
and in representation of the heirs of Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Manila for annulment of contract and
transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages against private
respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal and/or Susana Realty, Inc. and public
respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Manila.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by
the statute of limitations.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the decision was affirmed in toto. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

Petitioners' action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of

title and/or reconveyance with damages is subject to prescription; and
The complaint states a cause of action against private respondents.

RULING:

The action for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis

is the alleged void contract of sale.

However, the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a

parcel of land alleges that some of the defendants bought said land from their
co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the
purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title
of their vendors, there is a failure to state a cause of action.
 By reason of this failure, private respondent is presumed to be an
innocent purchaser for value and in good faith, entitled to protection under the
law.

Petition is DENIED.

130. RUIZ vs. CA (October 21, 1997; 79 SCRA 525)

FACTS:

The late Pedro V. Garcia was a businessman with substantial

shareholdings in V. C. Ponce Co., Inc. consisting of shares of stock and real
properties. Sometime in 1977, an internal conflict developed and besieged the
company, engendering suits between respondent Garcia and V.C. Ponce Co.,
Inc. over the formers funds and assets.

Respondent Pedro V. Garcia engaged the legal services of herein

petitioners, Attys. Vivencio M. Ruiz and Emilio D. Castellanes, and an
Agreement denominated as a Contract of Retainership was executed by them.

Respondent unilaterally terminated the said Contract of Retainership on

the alleged ground that the petitioners, his lawyers, failed to settle amicably
his (Garcia) differences with V. C. Ponce Co., Inc. Petitioners were paid
attorneys fees up to the month of July, 1982. Thereafter, the petitioners Ruiz
and Castellanes manifested their withdrawal as counsel for Pedro V. Garcia and
moved that their attorneys lien be put on record, in the cases involved. Such
motion was granted by the trial court.

Petitioners Ruiz and Castellanes brought their action For Collection of

Sum of Money and for Specific Performance.

While the said case was pending before the said lower court of origin,
Pedro V. Garcia died. And so, after notifying the trial court of the demise of their
client, counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, invoking Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court.

The lower court issued an Order dismissing petitioners complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals handed down its challenged Decision

granting the dismissal of the case and denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding that the instant
case for recovery of attorneys professional fees which had not been
adjudicated by final pronouncement is abated by the death of the defendant-
client and should therefore be dismissed in accordance with Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129, it is beyond
cavil that if the defendant dies before the Court of First Instance or the Regional
Trial Court has rendered a judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is
required to file a money claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the
defendant dies after the said court has rendered a judgment and pending
appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted
by his executor or administrator or legal heirs.

The core of petitioners argument is that action should not be dismissed

since their complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties,
as well.

Petitioners contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they

are claiming include real properties, their Complaint is captioned as For
Collection of Money and for Specific Performance. Obviously, the petitioners
themselves, who are lawyers, believed that their cause of action against the
private respondent is in the nature of actio in personam.

Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a

particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or
personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof. In the present case, petitioners seek
to recover attorneys fees from private respondent for professional services they
rendered to the latter. Attorneys fee is basically a compensation. In its ordinary
sense, the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to
compensation by fees for specific service.

Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorneys fees is

basically a monetary claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an
action that does not survive. Petition is DENIED.
131. LANDAYAN V. BACANI

Facts:

Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta,

Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. He died intestate in Urdaneta. On
February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse
of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document,
entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated
between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar
represented himself in said document as "the only forced heir and descendant"
of the late Teodoro Abenojar.

On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a
judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar,
and that private respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership and
possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of
extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that
the said deed of extra- judicial settlement and the subsequent deed of donation
executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose
Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared null and void.

As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that
the action of the petitioners had already prescribed, the same having been filed
more than 18 years after the execution of the documents that they seek to
annul.

After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent Judge

issued an Order sustaining the contention that the action is barred by
prescription and dismissing the case as a consequence thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint based on prescription is proper.

HELD: The court finds the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be
precipitious and erroneous. Although the principles relied upon by the
respondent Judge are legally correct, he had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-
judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract and not a void one. This
question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground for the
annulment of the contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private
respondent Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be considered
as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an
extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased.
The Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent
Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding
judgment thereon.

132. DULAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.

Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon

Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February
8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD")
and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.

ISSUE:whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action.

HELD:

The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to

constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on
the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while
Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was
Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
133. PARANAQUE KINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Upon the very face of the plaintiffs Complaint itself, it therefore indubitably
appears that the defendant Santos had verily complied with paragraph 9 of the
Lease Agreement by twice offering the properties for sale to the plaintiff for
P15 M. The said offers, however, were plainly rejected by the plaintiff which
scorned the said offer as RIDICULOUS. There was therefore a definite refusal on
the part of the plaintiff to accept the offer of defendant Santos. For in acquiring
the said properties back to her name, and in so making the offers to sell both
by herself (attorney-in-fact) and through her counsel, defendant Santos was
indeed conscientiously complying with her obligation under paragraph 9 of the
Lease Agreement.

ISSUE: The legal issue presented before the for resolution is whether the
aforequoted complaint alleging breach of the contractual right of first option or
priority to buy states a valid cause of action.

HELD: We do not agree with respondents contention that the issue involved is
purely factual. The principal legal question, as stated earlier, is whether the
complaint filed by herein petitioner in the lower court states a valid cause of
action. Since such question assumes the facts alleged in the complaint as true,
it follows that the determination thereof is one of law, and not of facts. There is
a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.

134. MERILL LYNCH FUTURES V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Merrill Lynch Futures Inc (MLFI) is a nonresident corporation not doing business
in the Philippines and duly organized and existing under the laws of Delaware.
It entered into a Futures Customer Agreement with Lara spouses. Orders were
transmitted to MLFI by Lara spouses through Merrill Lynch Philippines Inc., a
Philippine corporation servicing MLFIs customers. Lara spouses became
indebted to MLFI, which the latter claimed from the Laras. The Laras refused on
the ground that the transactions were null and void, because Merrill Lynch
Philippines had no license to operate as a commodity or financial futures
broker. MLFI filed a complaint with the QC RTC for recovery of said debt. Laras
moved to dismiss on the ground that MLFI had been doing business in the
Philippines; hence MLFI is prohibited by law to maintain or intervene in any
action. Laras alleged they were not aware Merrill Lynch Philippines had no
license to do business in this country.

ISSUE: Whether or not MLFI may sue in the Philippine Courts to establish and
enforce its rights against Sps. Lara, in light of the undeniable fact that it had
transacted business in this country without being licensed to do so?

HELD:

(YES)

In other words, if it be true that during all the time that they were
transacting with ML FUTURES, the Laras were fully aware of its lack of license
to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to those transactions had
made payments to, and received money from it for several years, the question
is whether or not the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML FUTURES
capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum.

135. RAVA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

This case arose from a contract of leases between Rava Development

Corporation (RAVA, for brevity) and Wheels Distributors, Inc. (WHEELS, for
brevity), over a parcel of land with existing buildings and improvements
thereon, situated at No. 3, Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City.

During the existence of said lease, or on August 1, 1985, RAVA and Frabal
Fishing & Ice Plant Corporation (FRABAL, for brevity) effected a merger for the
purpose of strengthening their economic stability and efficiency (Rollo, pp. 16,
85). As a result of said merger RAVA was absorbed by FRABAL. Consequently,
RAVA transferred the leased premises to FRABAL.

WHEELS filed a complaint against RAVA and FRABAL for specific performance
and damages with the Regional Trial Court.RAVA and FRABAL moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that the respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the
nature of, or subject matter of, the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD:

The contention of RAVA and FRABAL is untenable.

The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of

lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the
averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]).

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the

complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.

136. Del Bros vs. CA

137. D.C. Crystal vs. Laya

138. Marcopper Mining vs. Garcia

139. Banez Electric Light vs. Abra Electric

140. Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank

FACTS: Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines

Inc. (CMI).Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six
causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in violation of the Board resolution,
the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant Bank in
excess of what they were lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of
their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities established
under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the
capital stock and that the Articles of Incorporation were fraudulently amended
by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court on the
ground that the class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a
showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently
numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.

HELD: The action at bar is not a class suit.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1)
that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute requires that the
complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a
class and the number of members in the said class so as to enable the court to
determine whether the members of the said class are so numerous as to make
it impractical to bring them all to court. The complaint in the instant case failed
to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the trial court
could not infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that
they cannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are
representative of the other stockholders. The statute also requires that the
subject-matter of the controversy be of common interest to numerous persons.
In the instant case, the interest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and
the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit was several, not
common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of the
appellants and the CMI stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a
right, if any, only to his respective portion of the stocks. No one of them had
any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was entitled.

141. U Dalandan VS Julio

FACTS: On September 24, 1932, during the lifetime of Clemente Dalandan and
Victorina Dalandan, they executed a notarial document whereby said Clemente
Dalandan, sold, ceded, and transferred by way of pacto de retro sale to
Victorina Dalandan, fifty (50) plots or "salt beds" (banigan), which form part of
the one hundred and fifty two (152 plots or "banigan" found on six (6) parcels
of land, situated at Las Pias, Rizal subject to the right of Clemente Dalandan
to repurchase the said fifty (50) plots or "banigan" for the same amount of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) within ten (10) years from September 24, 1932,
the date of said pacto de retro sale. Before the expiration of the expropriation,
Clemente and Victorina executed another notarial document waiving the 10
years period of redemption or repurchase to pay P4000 at anytime without any
limitation as to the period of redemption or repurchase. The document also
expressly provided that in the event of death of Victorina Dalandan, the
redemption price of P4,000.00 shall be paid to Engracio Santos and Eleuterio
Santos (both grandsons of Victorina Dalandan) at P1,500.00 each, and to
Victoria Julio (daughter of Victorina Dalandan), the amount of P1,000.00.

On December 1960, the defendants were notified in writing that the plaintiffs
are now ready to pay the amount of P4,000.00 to them but the defendants (in
spite of the fact that they received the said notice in writing) refused to accept
or receive the said amount from the plaintiffs. Due to the refusal of, the
defendants to accept the payment of P4,000.00, the plaintiffs are forced to
consign or deposit the amount of P4,000.00 in court. The defendants, filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no
cause of action; and (2) granting that it stated a cause of action, it is already
barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid cause of action.

HELD: As a rule, the complaint should contain allegation of ultimate facts

constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

Neither is it proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not

stated, or incorrect inferences from facts stated, for they are not the ultimate
facts required by law to be pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded,
because so far as they are correct they are useless, and when erroneous, worse
than useless. - (I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court [1957 Ed.] P. 109.)

And to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged
in the complaint and no other should be considered.

The allegation of nullity of a judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and

not a material allegation, is not deemed admitted by the party who files a
motion to dismiss. (Quiambao v. Peralta, G. R. No. L-9689, January 27, 1958.)

142. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice

advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in
Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over
by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine
others submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order
authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL)
subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for
new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano
(replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum
revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then
Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Director of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying

that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR
declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies

available.

HELD: Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.

143. SANTIAGO VS PIONEER SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK

FACTS: Emilia Santiago who is the petitioner in this case is the owner of a
parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Manila. On April 7 1983, she executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Construction Resources Corporation of the
Philippine (CRCP). On April 8 1983, CRCP executed a Real Estate Mortgage over
the Disputed Property in favor of FINASIA Investment and Finance Corporation
to secure a loan of P1 Million. The mortgage contract specifically provided that
in the event of default in payment, the mortgagee may immediately foreclose
the mortgage judicially or extrajudicially. The promissory note evidencing the
indebtedness.

On July 29, 1983, FINASIA executed in favor of Pioneer Savings an Outright Sale
of Receivables without Recourse. CRCP failed to settle its obligation and the
bank opted for the foreclosure of the mortgage. The notice of auction sale was
scheduled and when this came to the knowledge of Santiago, she filed a
complaint with the RTC of Valenzuela to invalidate the REM. The RTC issued a
TRO enjoining the sale at a public auction of the subject property. The
petitioner further assailed that she was not aware of any REM she had
executed in favor of the defendant bank.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a cause of action.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the determination of the sufficiency of a
cause of action must be limited to the facts alleged in the complaint and no
other should be considered. In this case, however, a hearing was held and
documentary evidence was presented, not on the Motion to Dismiss but on the
question of granting or denying the plaintiffs application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The Counsel for the plaintiff admitted that evidence
presented That being so, the trial court committed no reversible error.

144. ASIA BANKING VS WALTER OLSEN

FACTS: February 6, 1920 the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. obtained a
loan of P200,00 from the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land
in Tondo. After the land had been purchased, the defendant corporation, Walter
E. Olsen & Co., Inc. executed in favor of its codefendants and of Mr. A. D. Gibbs
a promissory note for the amount of P200,00 and a mortgage upon the land to
secure the payment of the P200,000 and a mortgage upon the secure of
payment of the P200,00.

On April 25, 1921, the defendant corporation Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc.
through its president and treasurer, Mr. Walter E. Olsen, one of the defendants,
mortgaged the same land to the plaintiff to secure the payment of the loan of
P200,000.

The complaint prays that judgment be rendered against defendants and each
and every one of them jointly and severally for the sum of P200,000, with
interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from November 4, 1920. All the
defendants, except Mr. Walter E. Olsen, subscribed a document wherein they
agreed that a judgment be rendered prayed for in complaint. The judgment
appealed form dismisses the complaint as to the defendants Walter E. Olsen
John W. Marker, Louis McCall, B. A. Green and Theobald Diehl, sentencing the
defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. to pay the plaintiff within three months
the sum of P200,000, with interest at 9 percent per annum from November 4,
1920.

ISSUE: Whether or not this is error in the judgment of the court.

HELD: Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court
took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part
thereof, without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no
error. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the
authenticity of these documents. Under section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the authenticity be deemed admitted. The effect of this to relieve
the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence.
The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider,
without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. The
judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

145. PELTAN DEVELOPMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of
land which they have been occupying, cultivating, planting, staying, and
introducing improvements thereon and neither one of petitioners was in
possession thereof. They had the land surveyed but the processing and
approval of their application were held in abeyance despite the absence of any
opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates of title on said
land in the name of Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their title
from spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Carlos, however the respondents assail
that the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their application for a free
patent, the improvements they introduced to the land were bulldozed by one of
the petitioners. They filed a complaint that by virtue of the spurious title
produced by the petitioners and the illegal destruction of the respondents
plants and dwellings, their rights for a free patent to the land were
substantially prejudiced by petitioners and hold them liable to pay for actual
and compensatory damages. Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on
affirmative defense on grounds that the respondents have no cause of action
against them and they are not the real party of interest in the action they
sought to assert as they have no subsisting title to present over the disputed
property. Their contention was based on a former jurisprudence that the
government thru the Solicitor General should be the real party of interest to file
a motion for cancellation of the certificate of title. In answer, the respondents
re-asserted their cause of action to their complaint and showed their rights,
interest and claims to have been violated thereby placing them to a status of
real party of interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a
real party of interest. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals ruling
that the lower court should have treated the action as accion publiciana to
determine which party has the right to possession. The petitioners now file a
petition for review and pray for the cancellation of the notation of lis pendens
on their certificate of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their
action against the petitioners?

HELD: The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled

rule that the cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and to resolve the motion to dismiss based on failure to state cause of action,
only the facts in the complaint must be considered. The court held that the CA
failed to appreciate the fact that the title of the petitioners were validly upheld
by the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038).
Every court should take mandatory judicial notice to court decisions when
resolving motion to dismiss as required by Rule 129, section 1 of the Rules of
Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as one based
on their actual possession of the land and their pending application for a free
patent thereof. It also committed a reversible error to treat the issue as one of
accion publiciana since the decision has already been rendered by the court
before upholding the title of the petitioners as valid and genuine. Therefore, it
is no longer an option to treat the case as one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were
not praying for the reversion of the land to the government such complaint
would still result to the same under the Regalian doctrine. The respondents
have no right over the land as they admit that neither they nor their
predecessors owned the land which is construed that the land in dispute
remains to be a property of public domain. If there is any person with real
interest to the land it should be the government. The SC reversed and set aside
the decision of the CA and cancelled the annotation of lis pendens to the
petitioners title.

146-150 Missing

151. Legaspi-Santos v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In April 1958, Civil Case No. 1692-M, was filed with the CFI of Bulacan, for
partition of properties left by their deceased parents, Fidel Legaspi and
Gregoria Cristobal. During the pendency of the case, Josefa Legaspi-Santos,
filed a complaint in intervention claiming a share in the properties involved, as
daughter of Fidel Legaspi before his marriage to Gregoria Cristobal.

In June 1980, after more than twenty (20) years, said Civil Case No. 1692-M,
was decided by the trial court, dividing all the properties left by Don Fidel
Legaspi involving more than 50 parcels of land among plaintiffs and defendants
(as children of the second marriage), and dismissing for lack of merit the
intervention of herein petitioner Josefa Legaspi-Santos (only child of his first
marriage)
On August 14, 1980, intervenor Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed a motion for
extension of time. within which to appeal the aforesaid decision. The trial court
gave her 30 days. On September 15, 1980, Josefa Legaspi-Santos again moved
for another extension of 20 days within which to perfect her appeal. The motion
was granted by the court. On October 8, 1980, Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed
another motion for extension of 20 days within which to perfect her appeal but,
this time, the lower court, in its Order of October 13, 1980, denied it on the
ground that the period for perfecting her appeal had expired on October 7,
1980, in which case there was no more period to extend and the court had
already lost jurisdiction to act on the motion.

Issue:

WON not the appeal interposed by Josefa Legaspi-Santos from the decision of
the trial court, dated June 18, 1980, was perfected on time

Rulings:

It is not denied that the period for appeal expired on October 7, 1980 and that
the third motion to extend the time to perfect petitioner's appeal was filed one
(1) day late.

In Galima, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 140, the rule was laid down that
the motion for extension of the period for filing the record on appeal must be
filed before the expiration of the 30-day period. "The miscomputation by
counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the same, nor prevent
the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and executory character
of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is to the
interest of everyone that the date when judgments become final should remain
fixed and ascertainable."

In the case at bar, our attention is invited by the private respondents that
petitioner has not even filed the notice of appeal and her appeal bond within
the period of 30 days from receipt of the decision. "The petitioner made a
motion for extension of time to perfect her appeal without filing the necessary
notice of appeal and appeal bond and it was only as late as January 16, 1981 or
one hundred twenty-one (121) days after her deadline to perfect appeal when
she filed them.
152. Mangali v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On August 23, 1974, there is no dispute that Lot No. 2 (one of the nine lots
included in O.C.T. No. 12192 of the Bulacan Registry of Property) was sold
a retro on October 8, 1929 by the registered owner Arcadio Mendoza in favor of
one Gregorio dela Cruz for P500.00; that Arcadio Mendoza on May 2, 1935,
subsequently, in a deed of absolute sale, sold his 'right to redeem' to Liberate
Mangali for P500.00; and that Liberate Mangali, thru a deed of reconveyance
executed by Gregorio dela Cruz on May 6, 1935, redeemed the property also
for the sum of P500.00. These transactions are not only registered or annotated
on the Original Certificate of Title No. 12192.

Court holds that the testimony thereon is vague, uncertain, biased, self-serving
and unbelievable. Besides, why was not a written document executed when
after all, the other transactions were all written and registered.

After this decision was promulgated, it appears that within the reglementary
period for appeal private respondents filed their notice of appeal bond and
record on appeal but due to objections on the part of petitioners, the trial court
issued on January 29, 1976 the disputed order.

Purportedly in complaince with the foregoing order, respondents filed on March

1, 1976 their amended record on appeal. This was Windy 19 days after their
having received the said order. In consequence, on March 15, 1976, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for having been filed out of time allegedly
in violation of Section 7 of Rule 41.

Issue:

WON Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Br. VII, can give due course to their
appeal.

Rulings:

Court has repeatedly held that while the rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as they
are deemed indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary
to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
We reiterated the same ruling in Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, thus: These provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing
the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken,
are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly discharge of judicial business (Alvero vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil.
428). The time can be extended only if a motion for extension is filed within the
time or period provided therefor. In the case at bar, no motion for extension
was ever filed by petitioner Macabingkil before March 23, 1968, and, as such,
the said decision of March 1, 1968 has already become final and executory. To
reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect
an appeal as required by the Rules has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory.

153. Valdez v. Ocumen

Facts:

On March 9, 1957, the justice of the peace court, after due hearing rendered a
decision in case No. 224 ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the
possession of the questioned Lot No. 3005, to vacate its premises, and to pay
the costs. Notice of said decision was sent to the parties on April 30, 1957,
defendants receiving their copy on May 24, 1957. On May 29, 1957, defendants
filed with said court a notice of appeal and an appeal bond of P25.00 without,
however, paying the appellate court docket fee of P16.00, as required under
Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court. Acting upon said notice of appeal, the
court, on the same date, issued an order forwarding the records of the case to
the CFI of Isabela but stating therein "without however the docket fee for
appeal". The Clerk of Court of First Instance received the records on July 25,
1957, at 3:30 P.M. Defendants paid the appellate court docket fee of P16.00
only on the following day, July 26, 1957.

Resolving plaintiff's motion filed on July 29, 1957, to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period (15 days from
notice of the judgment) provided in the Rules of Court, and defendant's
opposition thereto, the Court of First Instance on August 28, 1957, issued an
order dismissing the appeal.

Defendant's motion for reconsideration of said order on the ground of its

alleged illegality having been denied, defendants instituted this present appeal.

Issue:

WON the trial judge correctly and properly dismissed said appeal.

Rulings:

Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court, provides: Appeal, how perfected.An
appeal shall be perfected within fifteen days after notification to the of the
party judgment complained of, (a) by filing with the justice of the peace or
municipal judge a notice of appeal; (b) by delivering a certificate of the
municipal treasure were showing that the appellant has deposited the
appellate court docket fee or in charactered cities, a certificate of the clerk of
such court showing receipt of the said fee; and (c) by giving a bond.

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, in order to perfect an appeal from
the judgment of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Court, an appellant must,
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, (1) file with the justice of the
peace or municipal judge a notice of appeal, (2) deliver a certificate of the
municipal treasurer or of the clerk of Court of First Instance in chartered cities,
showing that he has deposited the appellate court docket fee, and (3) give a
bond.

In the case under the consideration, while defendants did file with the Justice of
Peace of Roxas, their fee of P16.00. It was only on July 26, 1957, that is, 61
days after filing their notice of appeal evidently, beyond the reglementary
period of 15 days from notice of judgment as provided under the aforequoted
section of the Rules of Court, that they elected the payment of the same. Their
appeal, therefore, was never perfected in the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
and the trial judge correctly and properly dismissed said appeal, as it acquired
no jurisdiction thereon.

154. Alvero v. De La Rosa

Facts:

On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S.
Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly
admitting having sold said land to Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944. On
July 13, 1945, Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations made
therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land. On July 21, 1945,
Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying Alvero's alleged
ownership.

Judge of the CFI of the City of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Victoriano.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial,
which was denied; On January 8, 1946, Alvero filed his notice of appeal and
record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-
appeal bond. On January 14, 1946, Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the
appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.

On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss,

alleging that on the very same day, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually
filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time,
the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the
following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa,
ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of
appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond
was filed too late. On January 23, 1946, Alvero filed a petition for the
reconsideration of the said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his
appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON the petition for certiorari filed in this case, should be dismissed.

Rulings:
Yes. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended
merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt
or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. Hence, the
period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28,
1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired
on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on
appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his
appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.

The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an
extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court
below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his
act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been considered
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.

155. FJR Garments Industries v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The city court of Pasay City on March 11, 1978 rendered a decision ordering
Kapisanang Magkakapitbahay Damayan at Abuluyan, Inc. to vacate the lots
and to restore the owner, FJR Garments Industries, to the possession thereof
and to pay the accumulated back rentals.
The decision was served on Kapisanan on July 6, 1978. Nine days thereafter, or
on July 15, 1978, Kapisanan filed a notice of a appeal but it did not pay the
docket fee of P20 and the appeal bond of P50 and post the supersedeas bond
of P107,860, as required by sections 2 and 3, Rule 40 in relation to section 8,
Rule 70 and section 5 (12), Rule 141, Rules of Court.

The city court "disapproved" Kapisanan's appeal. Without filing any motion for
reconsideration, Kapisanan filed the next day in the CFI of Pasay City a petition
for relief from judgment on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence
consisting of the alleged misinterpretation made by a member of Kapisanan in
paying only the postage stamps for the notice mailed to adverse counsel
instead of the docket fee and appeal bond. However, the lower court
dismissed the petition for relief because of its finding that Kapisanan's failure to
appeal was due to its inexcusable neglect.

Kapisanan filed on August 28, 1978 a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals to annul the lower court's order.

Issue:
WON the lessee should be allowed to pay the docket fee and file an appeal
bond after the 15-day period.

Rulings:
We hold that the failure of Kapisanan to perfect its appeal was not a pardonable
oversight. It is not entitled to relief from judgment because there was no fraud
or excusable neglect which prevented it from seasonably appealing to the CFI.
Moreover, its petition had no affidavit of merits. Furthermore, its failure to file a
supersedeas bond rendered the city court's judgment immediately executory.

The fact that even before the expiration of the 15-day period the city court
declared Kapisanan's appeal "moot and academic" is of no moment since the
fact is that during that period the lessee did not attempt to pay the docket fee
and appeal bond.

Rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.

156. G.R. No. 129718 SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner

vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and EVANGELINE
SURLA, respondents. August 17, 1998
FACTS:

Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo

Tomas University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar
Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had
accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the
child. Petitioner hospital filed a complaint which was soon dismissed by the trial
court. Petitioner also filed before the same court an Omnibus motion seeking
for clarification as why the trial court denied his Reply and Counterclaim. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied by the
trial court. Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by
way of a special civil action for certiorari under rule 65. Said petition was
dismissed by the Curt of Appeals. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be

dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-
forum shopping.

RULING: The petitioner is entitled to partial relief. A counterclaim partakes of

the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case
x x x, only this time it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It
stands on the same footing and is tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent action.

In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim,

although not totally unavailable, could have well been ineffective, if not futile,
as far as petitioner is concerned since no single piece of evidence has yet been
presented by it, the opportunity having been foreclosed by the trial court, on
the dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the records to be reviewed
by the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an undue
protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting
claims and to serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice.

157. G.R. No. L-26768 FAUSTINO GOJO, petitioner-appellant, vs. SEGUNDO

GOYALA and ANTONINA ALMOGUERA, respondents-appellees. October 30,
1970
FACTS:

Appellee Goyala together with his now deceased wife Almoguera sold to
appellant by a "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale" a certain parcel of agricultural
land having an area of approximately two and one-half hectares for P750.00,
the repurchase to be made, according to the deed, within one year. About ten
(10) years after the execution of the said document, the vendee filed with the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon the present case against the vendors by
way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of the land described and
involved in the "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale." The complaint was dismissed for
failure to submit amended complaint. Apellant was then declared in default
with respect to the appellee. After he presentation of evidences, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring the deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable
mortgage and ordered the delivery and restoration of the land. Dissatisfied with
the decision, appellant appealed the Court of Appeals which certified the case
to the Supreme Court for resolution since said appeal involves a purely
question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in: (a) declaring the plaintiff in
default; (b) deputizing or commissioning the clerk of court to receive the
evidence of the defendant; and (c) rendering judgment in favour of the
respondents.

RULING: YES. The thrust of appellant's argument in respect of the first

assignment of error is to the effect that there is no occasion for the trial court
to declare him in default in respect of appellee's counterclaim in this case, for
the reasons that: (a) the said counterclaim "falls within the category of
compulsory counterclaim" which does not call for an independent answer as
the complaint already denies its material allegations; and (b) the dismissal of
the complaint in this case without prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the
said counterclaim.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Court also ruled,

that the trial court committed reversible error in ordering the same. It is true
that under Section 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to
prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, but it is
obvious that the said provision cannot apply when the order supposedly
ignored is a void one, as in this case. Here, the trial court ordered petitioner to
amend the complaint only because it was informed that one of the defendants
had died, the court directing that the plaintiff should name the heirs of the
deceased as defendants in lieu of said deceased.

Besides, in line with the principle underlying Sec. 2 of Rule 17, it is not
proper to dismiss a complaint when a compulsory counterclaim has been
pleaded by defendant. The reason is obvious. Under the cited provision, the
right of the plaintiff to move for the dismissal of an action after the defendant
has filed his answer is qualified by the clause providing that: "If a counterclaim
has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court." With this limitation, the power of the court to
dismiss the complaint upon motion of plaintiff, which is usually without
prejudice, is not purely discretionary. The purpose is to avoid multiplicity of
suits over the same matter which would necessarily entail unnecessary
expense and, what is worse, possibility of conflict and inconsistency in the
resolution of the same questions. The same considerations would obtain, if the
defendant were the one to ask for dismissal. The best interests of justice
require that conflicting claims regarding the same matter should be decided in
one single proceeding. Dismissing the complaint without prejudice, as the trial
court has done in this case, albeit upon motion of the defendant, will not
prevent the undesirable multiplication of suits and reventilation of the same
issues in the subsequent action that may be filed by virtue of the reservation
made in the disputed order of dismissal.

158. G.R. No. L-11647 FLORENTINO NAVARRO and BEATRIZ

VINOYA, petitioners, vs. HON. ELOY BELLO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, JUAN CABUANG, FLORENTINA BAUTISTA,
FLORENCIO GALICIA and CONSOLACION BAUTISTA, respondents. January
31, 1958

FACTS:

Petitioners-plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI of Pangasinan praying

for the annulment of transfer certificates of title Nos. 15967 and 15968 and the
corresponding deeds of sale executed by respondents Florencio Galicia and
Consolacion Bautista in favor of respondents Juan Cabuang and Florentino
Bautista over lots Nos. 20774 and 32540, of the San Carlos Cadastre, claiming
ownership of said parcels of land, and alleging actual possession. Soon after,
the court rendered decision adjudicating the defendant's counterclaim for
damages, declaring the respondents owners of the disputed parcels of land,
and dismissing the complaint. As a result, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Another motion for
reconsideration was filed but was also denied by the trial court. A notice of
appeal was also filed by the petitioners but it was also denied. Thereafter, a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with injunction seeking the annulment of
a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint

RULING: The writ of certiorari is granted, and the decision of July 30, 1956 of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in its case No. 13099 is hereby set
aside, and said court is directed to proceed with the trial of the entire case on
the merits.

But in any event, whether or not plaintiffs have answered defendants'

counterclaim, they have the right to prove the averments of their complaint,
including their claim that it was by court order that they secured possession of
the parcels in question from defendants. And if plaintiffs are able to prove such
allegations, then the court must dismiss defendants' counterclaim for damages,
since the illegal usurpation of defendants' possession allegedly committed by
plaintiffs, which is the basis of the counterclaim, would not have been proved.
In short, the issues of the counterclaim partakes of the nature of a special
defense which, even if not specifically challenged by plaintiffs in a reply, is
deemed controverted (Rule 11, sec. 1, Rules of Court; Rosario vs. J. Martinez,
92 Phil., 1064; Luna vs. Apacible, 79 Phil.,8). There was, therefore, no occasion
for plaintiffs' default on defendants' counterclaim, and the order of the court
below declaring them in default, as well as the judgment by default, is
improper and void.

Since the ownership of the disputed land was put in issued by the allegations of
the complaint and the special defenses in the answer, the correct procedure,
assuming that the declaration of default was properly entered, should have
been for the trial court to set the complaint and answer for the hearing. The
lower court, even in the case of a true default on the counter claim, could not
deny the petitioners-palintiffs the right to be heard and produce evidence in
support of their complaint, as that pleading was valid and had not been
stricken from the records. Their having defaulted on the counterclaim, if they
did so at all, did not operate to deprive the plaintiffs from any standing or
remedy in court in connection with their complaint.

159. G.R. No. L-1387 MENA LAMA, petitioner, vs. CONSOLACION N.

VDA. DE APACIBLE, and EUGENIO ANGELES, Judge of First Instance of
Batangas, respondents. August 27, 1947

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in his

petition dated March 24, 1947, praying judgment: (a) revoking the appointment
of the receiver in civil case No. 3932 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
with declaration of nullity of the orders issued by respondent Judge Angeles on
January 14, 17, and 21, 1947, as having been issued without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion; (b) declaring null and void the
proceedings had before the same judge on March 13, 1947, and issuing a writ
of prohibition commanding him to desist from further proceeding with the case
until further orders of this Court; (c) declaring null and void the order of the
same respondent judge made in open court denying petitioner's motion to
declare respondent Apacible in default in that case, and issuing writ
of mandamus directing said judge to enter another order declaring respondent
Apacible in default for failure to answer petitioner's counterclaim and allowing
petitioner to present his evidence in support of said counterclaim; and (d) for
general relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of

discretion.

RULING: NO. The respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion in

proceeding, as he did, commencing the hearing on the merits and postponing
its continuation until further assignment as prayed by the therein defendant
himself. In the same way, the court find absolutely no showing of abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge in reserving until after the presentation of
evidence on the merits the resolution of the appointment of receiver. As to the
appointment of receivers, it is a well settled principle that the determination
thereof must primarily start from the fundamental and well-settled principle
that the matter of the appointment of a receiver is largely within the discretion
of the court to which the petition is addressed, provided that court is one of
those to which the law of the rules grant the request power. However, the
receiver should be made to file a bond pursuant to Rule 61, section 5.
160. G.R. No. L-25889 HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, JAIME E. LAICO and LUZ LOS
BANOS-LAICO, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
CHIVI and ANGELINA CHIVI as representative of the deceased MARTA
B. CHIVI, respondents-appellees. Ernesto J. Seva for petitioners-appellants.
January 17, 1973

FACTS:

Spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta
B. Chivi, representing to her that the land was not registered either under the
Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that
although the land was covered by a pre-war free patent application, the
application had not been approved and no patent had been issued. At the
instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for registration of the land in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. While the application was pending, Chivi
sold her rights and interests in the land to the herein petitioners-spouses Jaime
Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00.Soon, the Laicos discovered that a free
patent title was issued to Sierra.

The Sierras filed a complaint against Marta B. Chivi, assisted by her

husband, and the Laicos in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6184, praying that they (plaintiffs) be allowed to repurchase the land
under the provisions of the Public Land Act. Soon after, the Sierras and the
Laicos, without knowledge to the Chivis, entered into a compromise to
amicably settle Civil Case No. 6184 between themselves. Said agreement was
approved by the trial court resulting for the dismissal of the case. In this
regard, the Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition
the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the
therein respondents from proceedings with the execution and with the sale at
public auction until further order. The CA rendered a decision declaring all the
proceedings, as well as the orders, decisions and processes null and void.
Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari brought by the Laicos.

Issue:

Whether or not the cross-claim in this particular action can stand after
the complaint in the same action was dismissed with prejudice.
RULING:

NO. The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose
entirely out of the complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded.
Hence, under the principle above enunciated, it could not be the subject of
independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon which its life depended.

Under the circumstances above set forth the dismissal of the cross-claim
should have followed the dismissal of the complaint as a matter of course,
without further proceeding; and in setting the said cross-claim for pre-trial and
receiving evidence thereon and then rendering judgment against the cross-
defendants the court committed such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

161-165-Missing
166. MACARAEG vs. CA (January 20, 1989; 169 SCRA 259)

FACTS:

A case involving an agricultural land was filed over the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

The judgement of the Court of Agrarian Relations went in favor of the

plaintiffs.

On appeal, the CA (respondent court) affirmed the agrarian court's

judgment basing its decision ground that there is an alleged procedural defect
at the pretrial stage that was not raised by the petitioners, hence, deemed
waived.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in not applying the

principle of res judicata.

RULING:

The appellate court found that there is no Identity of the parties and the
subject matter as between the present case and a former case docketed as
CAR Case No. 2582-T '73. Such identity is an indispensable requisite of the
doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's
findings with respect to the non-applicability of the said doctrine in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary.

The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact of the court of Appeals
are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court provided they are based on substantial evidence.

Petition is DISMISSED.

167. LUCENTA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BUKIDNON (June 20,

1988; 162 SCRA 197)

FACTS:

This petition originated from an action for recovery of possession

instituted by the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon against
the private respondent. At the pretrial, the issue was reduced to whether or not
the property given by the petitioner in exchange for the private respondent's
house consisted of only around 600 square meters or the whole of the
petitioner's lot. Both parties admitted that they entered into an oral contract of
barter. Both also belong to a cultural minority group. Initially, the petitioner
insisted that only 600 square meters of his lot was offered in the barter
agreement. After trial, the petitioner filed a memorandum adopting a different
theory of his case. He attacked the legality of the barter itself on the ground
that the same was not made in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu. The trial court did not pass upon
the issue of the legality of. the barter as the same was not raised in the
pleadings, at the pre-trial and during the trial. Instead, it upheld the oral
contract of barter and ruled that based on the preponderance of evidence
presented in court, what was bartered by the petitioner was his whole lot.
Hence, this petition.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, he filed this petition for certiorari asking us to set aside the
decision of the trial court. He contends that the latter court should have
decided and passed upon the validity and legality of the verbal agreement on
the following grounds: (a) the fact that the petitioner and private respondent
are members of the cultural minority and that the exchange made between
them involving a parcel of land was not in writing, are both specifically alleged
in the pleadings and therefore, the trial court should have taken cognizance of
the same; and (b) although petitioner did not specifically pray for the
annulment of the verbal agreement of exchange, there was a general prayer in
his complaint upon which the respondent court may grant or decide such issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

RULING:

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit

When the petitioner filed his complaint, it was for the recovery of
possession of the remaining area of his lot outside of the 600 square meters
which he claimed was the only subject-matter of the barter. Although he
alleged that he and the private respondent are both members of the cultural
minority (in fact, they are brothers), he filed suit not for the purpose of
impugning the validity or legality of the verbal contract, but rather, to give
strength to the same as it is more common for members of cultural Minorities
to practice barter as a means of trade and commerce than for those who are
not. Furthermore, during the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue to
be litigated upon is whether the verbal agreement pertains to the exchange of
the house of the private respondent for the entire land of the petitioner or for
only six hundred (600) square meters thereof. The petitioner is bound by what
was agreed upon in the pre-trial.

168. SON vs. SON (December 29, 1995; 251 SCRA 556)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

169. SESE vs. IAC (July 31 1997; 152 SCRA 585)

FACTS:

Another case involving a land dispute.

In this petition for review, by way of appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, as supplemented by, and in conjunction with, Republic
Act No. 5440, the petitioner, Amancio Sese, impugns the Decision of the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution, denying his Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed. The questioned decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
(formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), set aside and reversed the decision of
the trial court.

The Resolution of the appellate court, curtly denied Sese's motion for
reconsideration saying: "A second review of the records does not yield any
cause or reason for a finding favorable to the defendant-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in their decision to not affirm the decision
of the RTC.

RULING:

There is, indeed, merit to the petitioner's contention that the Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in holding that the
land in question was fully identified by the private respondents herein; In
holding that the private respondents have successfully proven their title to the
land in question; In not holding that the petitioner herein is the true and
absolute owner of the land he bought from his predecessor-in-interest; In not
affirming the decision of the trial court.

The first assignment of error involves the question of the Identity of the
land while the second and third focus on the issue of ownership. The resolution
of the issue of ownership is dependent upon the determination of the Identity
of the land. We thus endeavored to resolve first the latter.

As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the record
or are based on substantive evidence. However, this rule admits of certain
exceptions.

The rule may be that admissions made by the parties during a pre-trial
conference and incorporated in pre-trial order are binding but this rule is not
without exceptions. In order to prevent manifest injustice, the admissions made
by the parties during the pre-trial were disregarded by the lower court, as in
this case, the SC did not hold otherwise. It would be contrary to the objective of
the law if the SC were to constrain to rule that the land subject of this
controversy were the same land being occupied by the petitioner if the
evidence negates such claim. To so hold would unduly prejudice the substantial
rights of the petitioner who stands to lose his property if only because of mere
technicality, inaccuracy of language, or plain carelessness.
 Thus in order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real
property, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must
prove not only his ownership of the same, but first, he must satisfactorily prove
the identity thereof. In this case, failing to fix the identity of the real property
they claim, the respondents action must fail. And this, in fact, was what the
trial court has decided. And for such failure, the issue of ownership need no
longer be passed upon by us.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are set asideand
the judgment of the trial court is hereby REINSTATED.

170. VELASCO vs. APOSTOL (May 9 1989; 173 SCRA 228)

FACTS:

Originally sued as defendants were Dominador Santos, Alice Artuz, and

Norberto Santos, with plaintiffs claiming actual, moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney's fees. After an answer was filed by said defendants, private
respondent Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. was impleaded as a defendant in an
amended complaint filed by the petitioner with an allegation that the N/S
taxicab involved was insured against third party liability with private
respondent at the time of the accident.

In its answer to the amended complaint, respondent Maharlika Insurance

Co., Inc. claimed that there was no cause of action against it because at the
time of the accident, the alleged insurance policy was not in force due to non-
payment of the premium thereon. It further averred that even if the taxicab
had been insured, the complaint would still be premature since the policy
provides that the insurer would be liable only when the insured becomes legally
liable.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff finding that the
evidence on the negligence of defendant Dominador Santos was
uncontroverted and the proximate cause of the accident was his negligence.

Maharlika Insurance Co. was exonerated on the ground that the policy
was not in force for failure of the therein defendants to pay the initial premium
and for their concealment of a material fact.

From the decision of the court a quo, petitioners elevated the case to the
Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari, with the averment that
only questions of law are involved.
 Petitioners fault the respondent-judge for considering private
respondent's defense of late payment of premium when, according to them,
"the same was waived at the pre-trial" hence private respondent's evidence of
late payment should be disregarded supposedly because, as We understand
petitioners' argument, private respondent had thereby admitted that such fact
was not in issue. They theorize that what was stipulated in the pre-trial order
"does not include the issue on whether defendant Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc.
is liable under the insurance policy, even as the premium was paid after the
accident in question."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

RULING:

Petitioners' position is bereft of merit.

When the pre-trial order but was examined the Court found no
discernment of any intimation or semblance of a waiver or an admission on the
part of Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. Although there is no express statement as
to the fact of late payment, this is necessarily deemed included in or
ineluctably inferred from the issue of whether the company is liable under the
insurance policy it had allegedly issued for the vehicle involved and on which
petitioners seek to recover.

A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and

every issue that is to be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues that are
impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary
implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are
expressly stipulated.

It would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent company to

knowingly disregard or deliberately abandon the issue of non-payment of the
premium on the policy considering that it is the very core of its defense.
Correspondingly, the court also cannot but perceive here an undesirable resort
to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a defense duly averred.

Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, evidence to

prove such late payment was introduced without any objection by the adverse
party. This lack of objection amounts to an implied consent conferring
jurisdiction on the court to try said issue.
 In the petitioners reply to respondents' comment, they categorically
stated that respondents' point regarding the lack of objection to the evidence is
well taken, hence they do not insist on this ground to review respondent court's
decision. However, in their amended reply, they reverted to their original
position that it was a mistake for the trial court to have considered the defense
of lack of payment of premium.

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

171. YU V. MAPAYO

FACTS:

Facts:

Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from

defendant Mapayo the sum of P2, 800, which represented an unpaid balance of
the purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant. The
defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he alleged that the
engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the same amount for the
repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on
the price of the engine and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.

The Court disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs. Defendant Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an
answer that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court.

The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court
scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered
plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel
refused to comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to
present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court
asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the
plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked to his demand that he
would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.This prompted the court to
dismiss the case on ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, hence this
appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to
prosecute

HELD:
NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law. The
defendant was not able to support his special defenses. The answer admitted
defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, and pleaded special defenses
hence the plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for the defendant to
come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Judicial
admissions do not require proof.

172. LOPES V. LIBORO

FACTS:

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully

the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of
Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3,
1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed.

Allegedly, the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the

appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the
language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and
after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

The do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of
discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of
Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the
petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for dismissal
of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the
discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party
offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed
except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the
sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be
reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for
a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after
the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or
demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion has
been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or
signed. (64 C. J., 164.)
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced
their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only,
but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.

173. MENESES V. Secretary of agrarian reform

FACTS:

Records show that the complaint for just compensation was first filed in the
RTC, but this was dismissed in the Order dated June 22, 1994, for the reason
that the determination of just compensation must first be filed with the DAR.36
Conformably with said ruling, petitioners filed the complaint with the DAR,
which dismissed the same on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide valuation cases covered by P.D. No. 27.37 Because of said dismissal,
petitioners went back to the RTC for the re-opening of the case. Petitioners'
case was obviously thrown back and forth between the two venues, and with
the RTC's second dismissal, they were left hanging and without any recourse,
which, of course, is iniquitous considering that their property has already long
been expropriated by the government and its fruits enjoyed by the farmer-
beneficiaries.

On the propriety of the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the
LBP and adopted by the DAR Secretary the Court finds that the CA erred in
sustaining its propriety.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining its propriety.

HELD: Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,28 provides that a judgment on
the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. The essential
question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment
on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory
relief.29

In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered
issues, as it made specific denials of the material allegations in the complaint
and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery by petitioners.
Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the
same since in the first place, the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor
counter-claimants or cross-claimants.

What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment,
a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of actions, which may
be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions
on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding
any material fact, except as to the amount of damages, and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and which may be applied for by
either a claimant or a defending party.

174. Sps. Hontiveros V. Regional trial court of ilo-ilo

FACTS:

On 03 December 1990, petitioners, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros,

filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros
and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Petitioner alleged
that they are the owners of a parcel of land and also alleged that they were
deprived of income from the said lands consisting of rentals from tenants of the
land and that private respondents withheld possession of the land in bad faith.

In their answer, private respondent Hontiveros denied the allegations and

invoked that he and respondent Ayson were not married. On the contrary, they
alleged that the possession of the subject property had already been
transferred to petitioners since 1985 by virtue of writ of possession.

Moreover, considering the foregoing facts, respondents assert petitioners

were receiving rentals from the lands, hence, the complaint has no cause of
action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made, considering that petitioner Augusto and respondent Gregorio are
brothers. On 16 May 1991 petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert the
allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
between the parties but the same were unsuccessful. Respondents answered
the Amended Complaint and denied the same.

On 19 July 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment of pleadings on the

ground that respondents did not tender an issue.
 On 23 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners
motion and at the same time dismissed the case on the ground of unverified
complaint pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code and therefore, it did not
believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this present
case.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it
does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were
made prior to the filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code?

RULING:

Yes, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that verified
complaint of earnest efforts to a compromise only because the trial court could
not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The Court emphasized that the absence of the verification required in Article
151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the
complaint. Such verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct.

Under Article 151 of the Family Code, No suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed.

Petitioners contention that Article 151 of the FC does not apply to the case is
correct since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Under the
subject provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the
husband and wife; parents and children; ascendants and descendants; and
brothers and sisters.

Respondent Ayson and Petitioner Hontiveros (Maria) are considered

strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Art. 151, therefore, they are
not members of the family. In several jurisprudence, the Court already decided
that whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members,
the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer
mandatory.
175. RIVERA V. SOLIDBANK

FACTS:

Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solid
bank approved the application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net
amount of P963,619.28. However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that
Equitable Bank employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation
and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Solidbank then
informed Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return
of all the monetary benefits he received. When Rivera refused to return the
amount demanded within the given period, Solidbank filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money. 963,619.28. He signed an undated Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged
receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and
promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever,
directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest
of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their
stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their
successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning the
business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of
any kind.

ISSUE: whether the parties raised a genuine issue in their pleadings, affidavits,
and documents, that is, whether the employment ban incorporated in the
Undertaking which petitioner executed upon his retirement is unreasonable,
oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence

as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false
claim. The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by
the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary
judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties
are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take
the place of a trial.[29] The evidence on record must be viewed in light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all
favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
176. Bitanga vs.Pyramid Construction Engineering

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and
damages with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the petitioner and wife Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint
that, it entered into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which Bitanga is
the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building located in
Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural
works on the construction project. However, Macrogen failed to settle
respondents progress billings. Petitioner, through his representatives and
agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of Macrogen would
be paid and relying on the assurances made by petitioner, respondent
continued the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the
construction project since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation
thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been complied with
by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) a case for arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking
payment by the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the
arbitration case could be set for trial, Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a
Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting as signatory for and in behalf of
Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed
to pay respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments.
Petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty under the
Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of
respondent, by virtue of which he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed
the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen.
Upon joint motion of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the
Compromise Agreement. Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the
monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. Hence
respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen,
which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to
locate any property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33,
with the Planters Bank, Buendia Branch. Respondent then made, a written
demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the liability or to point
out available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to
cover the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal demands on petitioner.
Yet, respondents demands were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his
Answer to respondents Complaint. As a special and affirmative defense,
petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still available to him as a
guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According
to petitioner, respondent failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from
Macrogen the amount due under the Compromise Agreement, considering that
Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were more than enough to
pay for the same. Given these premise, petitioner could not be held liable as
guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the
creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should
fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified
by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor
unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to
all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as
the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of
excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latters demand for
payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the
debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his
office, petitioner still failed to point out to the respondent properties of
Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of
the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to set up the
defense of excussion.

177. Ontimare vs. Elep

FACTS:

178. Pineda vs. Heirs of Guevara

FACTS: The Guevara Heirs filed an action for the nullification of the certificates
of title of a parcel of land in Marikina. Defendants were the estate of the late
Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez,Jose Perez, Roy Guadalupe, Lino
Bucad and Florentino Pineda. According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants
illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of the
property. Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the
defenses of lack of cause of action, prescription, laches and estoppel. He
averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual possession of
the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner.
Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer
with compulsory counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos Perez,
purchased the property from the late Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in
Perezs name for taxation purposes. The rest of the defendants, including the
estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answerwith counterclaim, raising the
same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. The late Pedro
Gonzales allegedly bought the property from the Municipality of Marikinain a
public bidding on 25 April 1966 and had allowed defendants to occupy the
property.They asserted that the Guevara heirs never actually occupied the
property. On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed. During the hearing, the parties presented oral
arguments and were directed to file their memoranda. After submission of
memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action
on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal,
claiming the denial of their right to due process. CA set aside the RTCs decision
reinstating the action. The appellate court ruled that a complaint cannot be
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court based on laches since
laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under said provision. Although the
RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other affirmative defenses raised by
petitioners in the answer, such as lack of causeof action, prescription and res
judicata, the Court of Appeals discussed them and ruled that none of these
affirmative defenses raised were present to warrant the dismissal of the action.

ISSUES: (I) Whether or not the appeal of the heirs of Guevara was improperly
elevated to the Court of Appeals since, according to them, it raised a pure
question of law; and
(II) Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground
of laches without conducting trial on the merits.

RULING: On the first issue, Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise
before the Court of Appeals the objection on the improper mode of appeal
taken by the heirs ofGuevara. This, he failed to do. The issue of improper
appeal was raised only in Pinedasmotion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
pass upon this issue. For an issue cannot be raised forthe first time on appeal.

On the second issue, in reversing the RTCs order of dismissal, the Court of
Appeals held that "laches could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint as it
is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not entirely correct.

Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss.
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks
a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. Whether or not
the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual
determination by the trial court.

179. Manufacturers Hanover Trust vs. Guerrero

FACTS: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
Hanover and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought
payment of damages for:
a.Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account
with the Bank
b.A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification problems
c.Unauthorized conversion of his account
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerreros account is governed by New
York law, and such law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual
damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ),
contending that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages only.
The Walden Affidavit was presented by the Bank to support its Motion for PSJ.
The RTC and CA denied the Banks Motion for PSJ, stating that the Walden
Affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied
on by the Bank to support its Motion.

ISSUE: Whether the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law
and jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ.

HELD: NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence.
The SC denied the Banks petition for lack of merit. The CA considered the New
York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and
24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be followed in proving foreign law.

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

180. Evadel and Development vs. Soriano

FACTS: Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with

petitioner as buyer over a parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of land
known as the Imus Estate. Upon payment of the first installment, the
petitioners introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the property with
concrete walls. Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off
by the petitioners exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square
meters. A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents
against petitioner. The trial court, by way of a summary judgment, ruled in
favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioners good faith or bad faith as
a builder should have been peremptorily disposed of by the trial court.

HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is
covered by the TCT of respondents. With this admission, petitioner can no
longer claim that it was a builder in good faith. Moreover petitioner, as a real
estate developer is presumed to be experienced in business and ought to have
sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine the metes and bounds of
the land it acquires.

181. Estrada vs. Consolacion (June 29, 1976; 71 SCRA 523)

182. RIVERA VS SOLIDBANK

FACTS: Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program.
Solidbank approved the application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net
amount of P 963, 619. 28. He signed an undated Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt
of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised that
he would not anytime, in a manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in
any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate
or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or
employees, and their successors- in interest and will not disclose any
information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its
plan, processes, or data of any kind.

However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank employed Rivera as

Manager of its Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers
Banking Group. Solidbank then informed Rivera that he had violated the
Undertaking and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received.
When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period,
Solidbank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money.

ISSUE: whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which

petitioner executed upon his retirement is unreasonable, oppressive, hence,
contrary to public policy

HELD: In determining whether the contract is reasonable or not, the trial court
should consider the following factors: (a) whether the covenant protects a
legitimate business interest of the employer; (b) whether the covenant creates
an undue burden on the employee; (c) whether the covenant is injurious to the
public welfare; (d) whether the time and territorial limitations contained in the
covenant are reasonable; and (e) whether the restraint is reasonable from the
standpoint of public policy. At first glance, the post-retirement competitive
employment ban is unreasonable because it has no geographical limits;
respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any
competitive bank within the proscribed period. Although the period of one year
may appear reasonable, the matter of whether the restriction is reasonable or
unreasonable cannot be ascertained with finality solely from the terms and
conditions of the Undertaking, or even in tandem with the Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim. However, a distinction must be made between restrictive covenants
barring an employee to accept a post-employment competitive employment
(restraint on trade) and restraints on post-retirement competitive employment
in pension and retirement plans. A restriction in the contract which does not
preclude the employee from engaging in competitive activity, but simply
provides for the loss of rights or privileges if he does so is not in restraint of
trade. The strong weight of authority is that forfeitures for engaging in
subsequent competitive employment included in pension and retirement plans
are valid even though unrestricted in time or geography. The reasoning behind
this conclusion is that the forfeiture, unlike the restraint included in the
employment contract, is not a prohibition on the employees engaging in
competitive work but is merely a denial of the right to participate in the
retirement plan if he does so engage. A post-retirement competitive
employment restriction is designed to protect the employer against
competition by former employees who may retire and obtain retirement or
pension benefits and, at the same time, engage in competitive employment.
Moreover, the Undertaking and the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim do not
provide for the automatic forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received under
the SRP upon his breach of said deeds. Thus, the post-retirement competitive
employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking of respondent does not, on
its face, appear to be unreasonable. The terms of the Undertaking merely
states that any breach by petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to
a cause of action for protection in the courts of law.

183. BITANGA VS PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and
damages with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the petitioner and wife Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint
that, it entered into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which Bitanga is
the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building located in
Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural
works on the construction project. However, Macrogen failed to settle
respondents progress billings. Petitioner, through his representatives and
agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of Macrogen would
be paid and relying on the assurances made by petitioner, respondent
continued the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the
construction project since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation
thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been complied with
by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) a case for arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking
payment by the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the
arbitration case could be set for trial, Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a
Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting as signatory for and in behalf of
Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed
to pay respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments.
Petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty under the
Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of
respondent, by virtue of which he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed
the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen.
Upon joint motion of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the
Compromise Agreement. Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the
monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. Hence
respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen,
which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to
locate any property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33,
with the Planters Bank, Buendia Branch. Respondent then made, a written
demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the liability or to point
out available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to
cover the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal demands on petitioner.
Yet, respondents demands were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his
Answer to respondents Complaint. As a special and affirmative defense,
petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still available to him as a
guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According
to petitioner, respondent failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from
Macrogen the amount due under the Compromise Agreement, considering that
Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were more than enough to
pay for the same. Given these premise, petitioner could not be held liable as
guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the
creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should
fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified
by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor
unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to
all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as
the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of
excussion, he must set it up against the creditor upon the latters demand for
payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the
debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his
office, petitioner still failed to point out to the respondent properties of
Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of
the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to set up the
defense of excussion.

184. JUGADOR VS DE VERA

FACTS: On December 13, 1949, the plaintiff Federico T. Jugador filed a

complaint against the defendant Zacarias de Vera in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, alleging that in October, 1948, the plaintiff agreed to construct a
residential house at No. 33 Bulosan St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, for the
defendant who undertook to pay to the plaintiff the total sum of P18,500 which
he fully received to his complete satisfaction on December 1948 but he failed
to pay in full the construction price.

On April 22, 1949, the defendant executed in favor of the plaintiff a certificate
of indebtedness and promised to pay to Jugador Construction the sum of
P3,500 as liquidated unpaid balance of the contract price, P500 on or before
May 15, 1949, and to make all sincere and serious effort to pay P2,000 so as to
leave in June, 1949, only a balance of P1,000 payable monthly at P100
beginning August 1, 1949. Notwithstanding the repeated demands, the
defendant only made a partial payment of 900, leaving P2,600 as his balance.

The petitioner filed a complaint and the court issued a writ of attachment to
the defendants property. The defendant averred in his answers that the
petitioner did not complete the house in accordance with the prescribed plans
and specifications. As an answer, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment, on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff. The CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is no legal basis for the rendition of the summary
judgment.

HELD: Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment

"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on file,
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as to a matter of law."

In the case at bar the court in effect held, as a matter of law, that there was no
basis for the counterclaim for damages, considering the facts appearing in the
pleadings and plaintifff's affidavit in support of his motion for summary
judgment, unopposed by any counter-affidavit which the defendant had the
right to present.

185. WARNER, BARNES AND CO VS LUZON SURETY

FACTS: On September 17, 1952, the plaintiffs, Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the
defendant, Luzon Surety Co., Inc., of the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus
the costs and P1,500 for attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond
in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Agueda Gonzaga. As an administratix, he violated the conditions of
her bond "(a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate
that had come into her hands, more particularly, the sum of P67,861.22 that
she had received form the United States Philippine War Damage Commission;
(b) by failing to pay or discharge the approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by
failing to render a true and just account of her administration in general, and of
the said war damage payments in particular.

The defendant filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. The plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment, alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the
defendant in her Answer raise only questions of law, and the plaintiff believes
that said defendant cannot produce counter-affidavits that would raise any
'genuine issues as to any material facts.'

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered a summary judgment

sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P6,000, P900 for
attorney's fees, plus the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the erred in sentencing the defendant.

HELD: The contention is tenable. Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of

Court, a summary judgment may be rendered upon proper motion except as to
the amount of damages.1wphl.nt

There being no proof regarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by the
plaintiff, no judgment thereon may be rendered herein. It is, however, argued
by the counsel for appellee that said fees are in pursuance of article 2208 of
the Civil Code, providing that attorney's fees cannot be recovered except
"where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim"; and it alleged in the
complaint that the appellant had so acted in this case. While the provision cited
authorizes the collection of attorney's fees under the situation contemplated
herein, it does not dispense with the effect of section 3 of Rule 36.

186-190 Missing

191. People v. Derpo

Facts:
Rhodora Hara was in her fourth grade, accused-appellant offered to shoulder
the expenses of her education. Rhodora's father accepted the offer. She
enrolled in Casiguran High School, for which reason, Rhodora had to stay in the
house of the accused, also upon the latter's invitation. On July 16, 1971 she
was awakened by the kisses of appellant. Appellant left the room frustrated
and with a warning not to tell anybody what happened and threatened to kill
her. Rhodora kept silent about the incident.

On August 22, 1971, at about midnight, appellant went to her room under the
pretext that he would give a tablet to relieve the pain of a toothache Rhodora
was then suffering from. However, after taking the tablet, Rhodora started to
feel drowsy until she fell asleep. When she woke up, appellant was lying on top
of her. Before he left, appellant threatened to kill Rhodora if she would report
the incident to anybody. The incident was repeated on September 30, 1971 and
October 3, 1971. Finally, also at about midnight of November 27, 1971.

Accused was then charged with rape in four separate criminal complaints in
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (now Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon). The
four cases were tried jointly. Thereafter, a joint judgment of conviction was
rendered by the lower court. Hence, this appeal seeking the reversal of the
conviction.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred in denying the accused appellants motion for New
Trial.

Rulings:

The lower court did not commit an error in denying the appellant's motion for
new trial based on "newly discovered evidence" for failure to meet the
following conditions, namely, (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is
of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

192. People v. Molina

Facts:

This case arose from the killing of Pedro T. Ong. He succumbed almost instantly
to seven bullet wounds found later to have been caused by a single shot from a
30-centimeter firearm. In due time, Rosalito Molina was arrested and charged in
the Regional Trial Court of Aurora with the murder of Ong. After trial, the
accused was found guilty.

The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of two eyewitnesses,

namely, Felicidad B. Poblete and Rosalinda Libed. Two other witnesses swore to
having seen Molina near the scene of the crime shortly before it was
committed. The rest of the witnesses for the prosecution testified only on
events that transpired after the killing except that the victim's wife also
suggested the motive for the crime.

For his part, the accused-appellant offered the defense of alibi and claimed he
was in Manila at the time of the commission of the crime.

The trial court rejected the alibi, describing it as fabricated, and refused to
believe the defense witnesses on the ground that, as relatives of the accused
or employees of his cousin who exercised much influence over them, they had
testified only to help Molina. His documentary evidence was dismissed as
"unverifiable."

Issue:

WON accused-appellant was guilty.

Rulings:

The Court is not prepared to affirm the decision not because it is long and
convoluted but because the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The inherent incredibility of
witnesses Poblete and Libed has sown the seeds of suspicion that the evidence
against Molina has been fabricated, and rather awkwardly at that. The
convergence of events in this case is, plainly, too coincidental to deserve belief
and the other improbable declarations of the government witnesses have
added to that disbelief. The defense of alibi may be weak, and perhaps it was
really Molina who killed Ong, but the prosecution has failed to prove the
accused-appellant's guilt and so he must go free.

193. People v. Escober

Facts:

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified people was charged with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide before the RTC of Quezon City in an
Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with
the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March
2, 1983.
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant
Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not
Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed
counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de
Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober

took the witness stand to testify in his defense, as well as Macario Punzalan, Jr.

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February
8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after the
promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court,
Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the
prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on
August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he
filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was
likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings between
Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated
November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 69658
and the automatic review.

Issue:

WON respondent judge erred in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration

of January 10, 1984 decision.

Rulings:

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-
1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and
insertions. The decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems
primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended
Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or
exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-
appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without
pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober
should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have
been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior
strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not particularly state the
factual bases for such findings.
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the
requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should
have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment.
However, since the records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a
determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now
before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord
the accused-appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

194. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), owner of Lot 20-A, Block E-
74, filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Gavino
Mendiola, alleging that without its knowledge and consent Mendiola had
unlawfully occupied the said lot and on December 23, 1959, constructed a
house thereon, and had refused to vacate the premises and to remove the
improvements despite demands to do so.
In answer, Mendiola admits the ownership of PHHC over the lot in question and
the receipt of notice to vacate, but denied that he is unlawfully occupying the
same, claiming that PHHC had caused the transfer of his house to the lot and
approved the sale of Lot 20-A, Block E-74 to him; and that thereafter PHHC
without justification sold the lot to Antonio Ilustre who is not qualified to buy it.
He likewise counterclaimed for damages.

At the pre-trial, the PHHC presented its evidence, all documentary exhibits (A,
B, C, D, & E). Defendant Mendiola likewise marked his evidence (Exhibits "1-5").
Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Trial Court appointed a
commissioner to receive the evidence for the defendant.

On March 1, 1968, the Trial Court rendered judgment against PHHC. On appeal
by PHHC, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's decision. Hence, this
petition for review filed by the National Housing Authority, succeeding to the
powers and functions of the now defunct PHHC, by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 757 (1975).

Issue:

WON PHHC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding Lot 20-A to

Antonio Ilustre.

Rulings:
Although, ordinarily, the action of an administrative agency would not be
disturbed by the judicial department, later developments in this case show that
on March 23, 1964, even before the present suit was instituted on November
13, 1964, Antonio Ilustre, an Army Officer, had transferred his rights to a third
party and that Ilustre has since died. Obviously, Ilustre Himself had no real
need for the property. On the other hand, Mendiola, a recognized squatter, has
continuously and uninterruptedly occupied the property since 1959.

Under the circumstances, we hold that the justice and equity of the situation
are with Mendiola. As opined by Inspector Alfredo T. Baguio, in his undated
Memorandum to the PHHC General Manager, "the award to Antonio Ilustre by
raffle was not satisfactorily explained and hardly bears justification." He then
recommended that "Antonio Ilustre should be awarded another lot outside
Block E-74" ( ' Exhibit "5"). Indeed, pursuant to Resolution No. 531 of the PHHC
Board (Exhibit "A"), the subdivision of Block E-74 (Malaya Avenue Subdivision)
was intended for "squatters in the Central Bank Subdivision and Mahabang
Gubat area, totalling 72". Mendiola was included in that original group. Antonio
Ilustre, a Major, was not. He was an "outsider". Specially so, with his transferee.
Moreover, the same PHHC Board Resolution "provided further that in case of
transfer priority shall be given to the co-owner under equal circumstances."

195. Leo v. To-Chip

CASE 201

G.R. NO. 114323. JULY 23, 1998

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS COURT OF APPEALS AND

PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC.

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment

rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL
AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED.Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned
and controlled by the Government of India while private respondent is a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
They entered into a contract on February 26, 1983 whereby the private
respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the
petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS
($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of
credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship
MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at
Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner
and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not
reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private
respondent had already received payment and despite several demands made
by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement.
Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the
private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
with Class G cement cost free at the petitioners designated port. However,
upon inspection, the Class G cement did not conform to the petitioners
specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was
referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which
stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of
the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to
execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in
Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule
of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court
refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the
required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the
foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the
foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's
ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the
parties; thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.
The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any

court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions"
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not

necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country
in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court
mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure
to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL
GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is
REVERSED.

CASE 202

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT

OF APPEALS

FACTS: An important constitutional question has been injected in this case

which started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question
squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section
14 of the Constitution.

On May 21, 1984, Victorino C. Francisco (petitioner) leased his apartment in

Makati to Winai Permskul (respondent) for a period of one year for the
stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the
private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to
answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when
caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent
vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus
the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased
premises to restore them to their original condition.

Winai Permskul sued in the MTC of Makati. The MTC rendered a summary
judgment in favor of Permskul which was affirmed by the RTC of Makati.
Defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on
September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on
December 1, 1987. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violates Article VIII Section 14 of the
Constitution in sustaining the memorandum decision of the RTC.

HELD:

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing

therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the

court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.

Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present
charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The
provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been
virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all
courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same,
viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of
how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws.

Decisions and resolutions of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and

distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which they are
based. Such findings may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself,
or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution
appealed from. This provision of BP 129 authorizes a memorandum decision.
This kind of decision is one rendered by an appellate court and incorporates by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision
or under review. The reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is to
avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court in the
decision of the higher court. It is also to avoid repeating the findings or
conclusions of the lower court, which are being adopted or approved. To be
valid however, such decision must not simply incorporate the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law of a lower court by remote reference. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to
the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court
in an annex attached to it and made an indispensable part of the decision.

CASE 203

G.R. No. L-59606. JANUARY 8, 1987

EDMUNDO ROMERO, FELIZA F. ROMERO, JOSE ADORABLE AND
GERONIMO CASAES

VS

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. COURT OF AGRARIAN

RELATIONS AND TIMOTEO IBARRA

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on

January 26, 1982 by the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals affirming
in full the decision rendered on August 31, 1981 by Branch II of respondent
Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Naga City, petitioners
allege violation of their constitutional rights to due process and the equal
protection of the laws.

On March 8, 1979, Timoteo Ibarra (private respondent) filed with the Court of
Agrarian Relations an action for reinstatement with damages against Edmundo
Romore, Feliza F. Romero, Jose Adorable and Geronimo Casaes (petitioners).

The agrarian court found and the parties agree that the main issue raised in
said case was factual in character whether or not private respondent was the
bona-fide agricultural tenant- farmer (now agricultural lessee) on the two
parcels of agricultural land subject-matter of the complaint. As a matter of fact,
this is the crucial issue because the resolution of all the other issues depends
upon its resolution.

The Court of Agrarian Relations ruled in favor of private respondents that he is

the bona-fide tenant-farmer, now agricultural lessee of the two (2) parcels of
land in question. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and said
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
No notice of the receipt of the records from the Court of Agrarian Relations was
issued by respondent Court of Appeals. Neither was any notice issued by
respondent Court of Appeals that it was dispensing "with the usual practice of
requiring the parties to submit to Us their memoranda in lieu of briefs."

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether not there is violation of petitioners constitutional rights to due

process and equal protection of laws.

HELD: In addition to alleging violation of their constitutional rights to due

process and to equal protection of the laws, petitioners contend that the
findings of fact in the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, as affirmed in
toto by respondent Court of Appeals, are not supported by substantial evidence
and the conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law. Petitioners claim
that had respondent Court of Appeals not dispensed with the usual practice of
requiring the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in the of appeal briefs
they could have pointed out to respondent Court of Appeals which findings of
fact in the decision of the lower court are not supported by substantial
evidence and which conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law.

In the case at bar, petitioners had the right to appeal from the decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations to the Court of Appeals. And since Section 18 of P.D.
No. 946 provides, following the general rule, that "the decisions or orders of the
Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari only on questions of law," petitioners should be given the
opportunity to correct errors in the findings of fact made by the trial court. And
this is particularly necessary in agrarian cases where no motion for rehearing
or reconsideration is allowed in the Court of Appeals (Section 18, Ibid.)

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic

validity of a decision is the perception by the parties-litigants that they have
been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate before j judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled with a
clear conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to
dispassionately charge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on
their fellowmen.

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals

affirming in full the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is set aside and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to enable the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen days from
notice, after which respondent Court shall render a decision upon the points
raised and discussed in said memoranda that were not touched upon in the
decision of the agrarian court which was adopted by the appellate court as
basis for its original judgment of affirmance.
 CASE 204

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075. OCTOBER 9, 2007

ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM VS JUDGE JUANITA C. TIENZO

FACTS: On the second charge relating to Civil Case No. 4884, complainant
alleges that respondent judge rendered a decision in violation of the
Constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the same
requisite.

Complainant further charges that respondent judge issued an order written in

English language, and in fashion that does not benefit an RTC Judge which
thereby demonstrates her incompetence and lack of diligence. However,
complainant discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing matter in his
administrative complaint was merely at the behest of his former colleague,
Feliciano Buenaventura, a retired judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.

In this case, respondent judge ruled in this wise, to wit: After a cursory study
of this appealed case of Unlawful Detainer, this Court finds that the procedural
due process has been complied with under the Summary Procedure. The
Decision of the Lower Court cannot be disturbed by this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge rendered decision in violation of the

constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.

HELD: YES.

Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing

mandate, thus:

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or

final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and
filed with the clerk of court.
Although we have sustained the validity of memorandum decisions on several
occasions, we laid down specific requirements for the proper utility thereof:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the

findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only
by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision
is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no

study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its
decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the
facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the
decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article
VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will
rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum

decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive
excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity
that this kind of decision may be resorted only in cases where the
facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of
the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed
in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where
 the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform

to this requirement. The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed
decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the same as compliant with
procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere in the
decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts, which led to the
filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent
judges factual findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she
based her conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the
constitutional directive.

CASE 205

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT

OF APPEALS

**CASE REPEATED

CASE 206

G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN
VERGARA, JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON,
MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine
Saballa),
MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their
respective behalves and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA
and DELFIN SABALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C.
GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch
12; SPO3ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC;
and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO

FACTS: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in

Dr. A. Santos Ave., Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested
by Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November
19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).

The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria

P. Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their
monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.

It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers,
respondent Bolao included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the
inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed Order dated
October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:

7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are

directed to pay their respective monthly rental regularly starting the
month of August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly appointed
Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further notice.

Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special

Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to
enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a
return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with
petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had
already collected from them three months advance rentals.

On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners

to explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the
October 5, 1999 order of the probate court. It was granted. Petitioners were
cite in contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to
undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate courts order for them
to pay rentals.They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing
was due to financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites,
receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why they are freezing
the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.
 Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated
November 16, 2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On
December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.

On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. On January 3, 2002, the appellate court
ordered the temporary release of petitioners. After due proceedings, the
appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002 denying the petition
for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the motion for
indirect contempt of court filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao against the
lessees is not the proper remedy and that the order of the court a quo granting
said motion and declaring that the lessees are guilty of indirect contempt is a
reversible error.

HELD: YES.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he
performs it. (7a) because herein subject order is not a special judgment
enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides:

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the

performance of any act other than those mention in the two preceding
sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution
and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is
rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the
same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys
such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate
payment on demand. The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the
full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment
obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee,
or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the
judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his
authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees
shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn
over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that
issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to
receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to
the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued
the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary
account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court
of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the
deposit to the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court
shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the
judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while
the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided
by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by
check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable
to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed
of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the
option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied
upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any,
and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property
of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal
or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property,
or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like
manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
 (c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the
judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests,
royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual
delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by
serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or
control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days
from service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment
obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If
not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for
the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check
issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the
judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said
garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid
directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have
the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to
deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment
obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph
(a) with respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while
Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts
such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title; sale
of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of
improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal
property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of
Section 9 as quoted above. Until and unless all the means provided for under
Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for
contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by
the courts. In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., we held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of
court (for failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency)
would, in effect, violate the Constitution.
 Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their
continued refusal to comply with the probate courts order to pay rentals to the
administratrix nor could they be held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ
of execution issued by the probate court, which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the
goods and chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum
sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal
properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real
properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and
make return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.

It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the
execution calls for payment of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of
the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of
the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter
the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied
upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any,
and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the
personal or real property of the judgment obligor, which has been levied
upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal
or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real
property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner
and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its
sheriff to collect from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should
they fail to pay, from petitioners personal/real properties sufficient to cover the
amounts sought to be collected. It was not addressed to petitioners. It
pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments,
and it was due to the latters failure that the writ was not duly enforced.
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
Decision dated November 16, 2001 of the trial court.
 CASE 207

G.R. Nos. L-32450-51 June 10, 1971

HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA in his capacity as Provincial
Governor of Camarines Sur, MARIANO S. TRINIDAD, in his capacity as
Provincial Vice Governor of Camarines Sur, EMILIO C. TIBLE JR.,
HILARIO R. ABONAL and NICANOR A. ORINO in their capacities as
Members of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur; The PROVINCIAL
ENGINEER of Camarines Sur; the PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines
Sur, and the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of
Camarines Sur, and PLUTARCO CAMANO, et al., respondents

FACTS: This case is about the order issued by the respondent judge giving due
course to and granting the motion for reconsideration, allegedly defective for
want of notice of hearing filed by private respondents herein as Petitioners. The
private respondents herein were employees of the provincial government of
Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge
fund budget. The provincial board of province of Camarines Sur passed a
resolution which approved the road and bridge fund budget of the province for
the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of herein private
residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases before the respondent judge
sitting at Naga for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their
reinstatement and payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their
respective positions previously occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of
the road and bridge fund budget. After the pre-trial, the parties were given five
(5) days from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their respective
memoranda, after which the two cases would be deemed submitted for
decision Private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow
them to present additional evidence consisting of the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 to which on
July 25, 1969 herein petitioners filed an opposition dated July 24 1969.
Respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents
seeking to reopen the two cases. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated September 10, 1969, which motion
does not contain any notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing.
Private respondents filed a request addressed to the clerk of court to set for
hearing on November 24, 1969, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring
herein petitioners to submit within five (5) days from receipt their opposition to
herein private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the order dated
September 10, 1969, but Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique Amador did not file
any opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration.

Respondent judge issued its order, reopened the two cases and allowed them
to present their evidences. The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor
of the respondents declaring the resolution null and void. The Provincial Fiscal
as counsel for herein petitioners received a copy of the aforesaid decision of
April 27, 1970. The petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique A.
Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated June 6, 1970 for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of
court. Private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that the
decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom had been
interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their
receipt on May 12, 1970 of the aforesaid decision. Petitioner filed their
opposition on the ground that they had complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in
connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution,
relying on the cases of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath
Construction, Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co.,Magno vs. Ortiz, in
Re Disciplinary Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul AImacen in L-27654, Cal ero vs.
Yaptinchay, and Sebastian vs. Cabal, et al., where this High Tribunal repeatedly
enunciated that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court are mandatory in relation to See. 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the said order
which granted the motion for execution. The branch clerk issued a writ of
execution. The petitioner filed a supplement to their urgent motion. The
respondent judge denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari contending that respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in considering the subject motion for reconsideration a mere
scrap of paper, and that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard"
citing Borja vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and Sun, Un Giok vs. Matusa.

ISSUE: Whether the notice accompanying the motion dated June 6, 1970 and
filed on June 8, 1970 for the reconsideration of the decision dated April 27,
1970, complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD: NO, but the deficiency of the notice of hearing in the case was cured
when the clerk of court set the motion for hearing and the court took
cognizance of the motion on the date set for hearing thereof by the clerk of
court.

In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the defendants received a copy of the
order of dismissal on October 7, 1955, and on October 31, they moved to
reconsider the said Order. The motion for reconsideration did not contain a
notice of hearing, but on December 6, 1956, a motion was presented asking
the clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on
December 22. The motion was opposed on the ground that it contained no
notice of hearing and therefore should be considered as a mere scrap of paper,
which did not toll the running of the period for the judgment to become final.
Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and set aside its order of dismissal. It is
patent in the Canonoy case that the failure on the part of counsel to set the
date of hearing of his motion was not due to neglect or negligence on his part
but because he could not do so as he did not know the date or the month when
the next yearly section of the court in Pagadlian would take place as there was
no showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had already fixed the
date for the next term. It is evident therefore that the circumstances which
compelled the court to regard the notice of hearing in the Matusa case; as
having been remedied or which justified the failure inability of the counsel in
the Canonoy case to fix a date for the hearing of his motion, dip not obtain in
the instant case. Here, the clerk of court did not set the motion of herein
petitioners for reconsideration of the decision for hearing on a definite date,
much less did the respondent Judge take cognizance of the said motion for
reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds hearing every business day
throughout the year in Naga City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case. Neither
did herein private respondents file an opposition to the aforementioned motion
of herein petitioners for the reconsideration of the decision, so as to bring the
case at bar within the purview of the doctrine in the case of Macasero vs.
Saguin; 23 much less were the merits of the said motion for reconsideration of
the decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited to the motion for
the reconsideration of the order granting the motion for execution.

To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4,

5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are
clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of the
movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without the
requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for appeal.
Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves
the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to determine
whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear
him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within
which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to serve
of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and
that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
estate the time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15),
do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the
peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and
to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar
would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be
subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon all to the
consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the
general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty
as to when to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may
be ignored. We had to draw a line where and did when we promulgated on
January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a
language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a
valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of
equivocation or misunderstanding.

CASE 208

G.R. No. L-35858 August 21, 1979

LIBRADA N. FIRME and FLORENCIO FIRME, petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO REYES, HON. SIMEON M. GOPENGCO, as Presiding Judge of
Branch XXV of the Court of First Instance of Manila, G. A.
MACHINERIES, INC., SHERIFF OF MANILA and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: The procedural issue in this case, which had already been resolved by
the Court of Appeals in a decision from which the petitioners did not appeal, is
whether the petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's
adverse judgment against them was a mere scrap of paper because it had no
notice of hearing and, hence, the said judgment had become executory.

In Civil Case No. 62906 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision
dated March 1, 1971, declaring Arsenio Reyes the owner of a 165-square-meter
lot and the house standing thereon located at 2371 Del Pan Street, Sta. Ana,
Manila and ordering the spouses, Librada N. Firme and Doctor Florencio Firme,
to pay Reyes rentals for the use and occupation of the house plus P1,000 as
attorney's fees.

The Firme spouses received on March 27, 1971 a copy of that decision. On April
13, they filed a motion for reconsideration, which did not contain any notice of
hearing. Copies of that motion were furnished the adverse parties.

Reyes, the winning party, filed a motion dated May 3, 1971, praying that the
decision be declared executory and that a writ of execution be issued. He
contended that the motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper
because it was not set for hearing. The Firme spouses opposed the motion for
execution but the Trial Court denied it on August 30, 1971. Hence, the lower
courts judgment was regarded as executory and a writ of execution was issued
on October 7, 1972.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the Firme
spouses be given merit.

HELD: NO.

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial or
reconsideration should contain "a written notice" which should be served on
the adverse party. "Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all
parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof." The
notice shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. "No motion
shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party
or parties are not affected. " (Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court).

In the leading case of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuano, 42 Phil. 81, 84, it
was held that a motion for new trial, sans notice of hearing, did not merit any
consideration. "It was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court. It
presented no question which the court could decide. The court had no right to
consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance" with
Rule 15. "It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the
court." (See Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil.
866 and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).

The written notice referred to in section 2 of Rule 37 is that prescribed in

sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The provision in section 6 of Rule 15 that no
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of such notice
is intended to enable the court to find out whether or not the adverse party is
in conformity with the motion and, if he objects to it, to give him an opportunity
to file his opposition (Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-
24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 982-983).
The trial court may properly decline to act on a motion for the reconsideration
of its decision when such motion lacks the notice of the time and place of
hearing (Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., 121
Phil. 1221).

Without such a notice of hearing, the motion to set aside the judgment does
not suspend the running of the period within which to perfect an appeal
(Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-31869, August 8, 1973, 52
SCRA 246, 257-8)

CASE 209
G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36;
SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of

the Second Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted
the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent
Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court
may be extended.

HELD: Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg.

129, reduced the period for appeal from final orders or judgments of the
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to
fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from
final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted
from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal
remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal
is required and a record on appeal is no longer required except in appeals in
special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides
that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a
record on appeal is required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides
that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof
disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered

rightly states, to avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration
of justice under the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order
or judgment.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and

respondents, the Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better
served if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the
time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of
their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure
which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the
other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an
appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the
purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final
disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in
order.

The Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule
shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of
time to file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of
thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of
Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for
extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs.
Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not
suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48
SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period
for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of
Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).

All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and
determined on the merits.
 CASE 210
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ, FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO

VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES

FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and,
on the 15th day thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started
to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order
of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were
well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in

lieu of dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideraiton.

HELD: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply
to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners
seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules, which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies.

Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court that
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we
aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become
final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

**Additional Info only reading purposes**

The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states
that a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 141524 September 14, 2005)

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no
longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa
Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court promulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to
appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is
counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does
not have the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of
the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on
appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or
final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended
from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of
the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims
to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments
of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is
based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in
a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned
the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said
motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in
criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing
appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in
criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same,
no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3
of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster
and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that
gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor
a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where
liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and
unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No.
170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That
question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants

that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15

days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity
of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions,
such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and
final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the
notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will
be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final
orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period
rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case,
will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at
the same month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt
herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25
June 2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should,
as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the
use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice
of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)

NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is
considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code,
light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the
penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is
not a light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore
mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its
judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the
accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced
in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to
appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to
appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion
for Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28
August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the
judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or
until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus
committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of
immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the
remedies prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the
motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to
allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing on 25
August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted,
petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under
the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration. xxx

As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is

also applicable to criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal
cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not
applicable to this case, considering that petitioners Motion for Probation was
filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No.
192164 October 12, 2011)

CASE 211
G.R. No. L-28486 September 10, 1981
FRANCISCO MAGNO, ESPERANZA MAGNO, EULOGIO MAGNO, AMELIA
MAGNO VASQUEZ, ULPIANO VASQUEZ, JOSE O. MAGNO, NICANOR P.
MAGNO, FELECITAS O. MAGNO, and LOURDES O. MAGNO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MARIANO BENEDICTO of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija and DONATO M. VERGARA, respondents
FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on December 2, 1967.

Before the Bulacan Court of First Instance, in Civil Case No. 3198- M (Bulacan
Case), which was an action between members of the same family for partition
of war damage payments received from the United States Government,
judgment by default was rendered on September 9, 1966 in favor of petitioners
herein, as the plaintiffs in the said case, and against private respondent Donato
M. Vergara and his father-in-law, Meliton Magno, jointly and severally, as
defendants therein. Judgment having become final, the corresponding Writ of
Execution was issued and the properties of private respondent were levied
upon and scheduled for sale at public auction.

Private respondent resorted to an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ

of Execution before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No.
275 (Annulment Suit) against petitioners and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff,
as defendants, upon the main contention that judgment in the Bulacan Case
was procured by means of extrinsic fraud committed by petitioner Francisco
Magno against private respondent. Essentially, the extrinsic fraud allegedly
consisted in assurances made by Francisco Magno to private respondent during
a confrontation between them that it was never the intention of petitioners to
involve private respondent in the suit and that he would be excluded
therefrom. Convinced, private respondent was lured into inaction only to
discover later that judgment was rendered against him and execution against
his properties ordered. Private respondent also prayed for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to restrain the enforcement of the judgment and of the Writ of
Execution pending the determination of the Annulment Suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the Complaint filed before the Nueva
Ecija Court constitute extrinsic fraud as to justify said Court in exercising its
jurisdiction to interfere with and set aside the judgment of the Bulacan Court
and to enjoin the execution thereof.

HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing allegations contain
ultimate facts which, if substantiated, could constitute extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic
fraud is one which prevents the losing party from defending the action brought
against him.

We think it sufficiently appears from the testimony of Baker that he was misled
by the statement of Judge Walker, who was the attorney of Craddock and Stotts
He had a right to assume from his version of their conversation that the case
would not be taken up without notifying him. It appears that he thought that
the court had no jurisdiction because an attempt was made to foreclose in the
same action a mortgage on real estate which was situated in another district in
the same county. He says it was understood that he should be notifed when the
case was to be taken up, and did not appear at the adjourned term because no
depositions had been taken by either party, and he relied upon his
understanding that the case would not be taken up without notice to him. He
stated that Craddock was only present during a part of the conversation that
he had with Judge Walker. Judge Walker was not a witness in the case, and
there is nothing to contradict the testimony of Baker. It is true Craddock
contradicted his testimony in regard to some other matters which occurred
during the conversation, but we do not think there is any contradiction of
Baker's testimony with regard to the postponement of the trial. There was no
negligence on his part in placing reliance upon the statements made to him,
and, while we do not think that any fraud was intended to be practiced upon
Montague, the result was that Montague was deprived of his right to appear
and defend the action and this constituted a fraud in law. This principle has
been recognized in the case of Lawson v. Bettison 12 Ark. 401. Relief against
fraud in judgment and decrees has also ' been recognized as a ground for
equitable jurisdiction Where by mistake or fraud a party has gained an unfair
advantage in proceedings in a court which must operate to make that court an
instrument of injustice, courts of equi ty will interfere and restrain him from
reaping fruits of the advantage thus improperly gained In the application of the
principle an injunction will be granted against ajudgment taken in violation of
an agreement to continue the case, where there is a good defense to the
action. Beams v. Denham 2 Scam. (111) 58; Sanderson v. Voelcker 51 Mo. App.
328; Brooks v. Twitchell 182 Mass. 443, 65 N.E. 843, 94 Am St. Rep. 662.

CASE 212
G.R. No. L-22822 August 30, 1968
GREGORIA PALANCA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE AMERICAN FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TIBURCIO
EVALLE, in his capacity as Director of Patents, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: On May 14, 1958, petitioner-appellant Gregoria Palanca filed with the
Philippine Patent Office, Department of Commerce and Industry, an application
to register the trademark, "LION and the representation of a lion's head,"
alleging that she had been using the trademark since January 5, 1958 on
bechin (food seasoning). The application was opposed by herein respondent-
appelee. The American Food Manufacturing Company, on the ground that
petitioner's trademark was similar to its (respondent's) trademark "LION and
representation of a lion" previously adopted and used by it on the same type of
product since August 3, 1953.
After hearing, the Director of Patents, on June 14, 1961, rendered a decision in
favor of American Food Manufacturing Corporation due to prior use. The record
shows the petitioner's counsel was furnished with copy of the decision on June
16, 1961.3 No appeal was taken from the decision of the Director of Patents
within the reglementary period from June 16, 1961.

On December 14, 1961, however, herein petitioner-appellant filed with the

Patent Office a petition to set aside the aforementioned judgment of June 14,
1961, invoking section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, alleging fraud and/or
negligence committed by her former counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Medel, in that
the latter failed to file a memorandum before the case was submitted for
decision; that she had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the
proceedings in the case; that her counsel had not informed her of the decision
thus preventing her from resorting to all the legal remedies available to her;
that she came to known of the decision only about the latter part of October,
1961, through her friend, Mr. Domingo Adevoso; that she had evidence to
disprove the claim of opposer The American Food Manufacturing Company that
it had been using the same trademark even before 1958; and that she had
evidence to show that the bechin that the opposer sold prior to 1958 were not
of the "Lion" brand but of the "Lion-Tiger" brand, another trademark of opposer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Director of Patents erredin denying the petition to set
aside judgment and resolving that there was no fraud perpetrated against
petitioner-appellant, as contemplated under section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court.

HELD: NO.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order

entered against a party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to that effect. Not every kind
of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has
held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment. 7 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.
On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during
the trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which
did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to be true and

fraudulent, were all committed by her own counsel, and not by the successful
party or opponent in the case. Hence, petitioner-appellant had not shown
extrinsic fraud that would warrant the setting aside of the decision.

CASE 213
G.R. No. L-8222. June 25, 1956

GREGORIO TARCA and RODOLFO TARCA CASTRO, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs. ANGELES CASON VDA. DE CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action

seeking to annul the judgment rendered in a registration case (G.L.R.O. Record
No. 54794) which was jointly heard with another case concerning recovery of
two of the lots that were the subject of registration (Civil Case No. 8853), on
the ground that said judgment was obtained through fraud. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss which, as amended, disputed the sufficiency of the complaint
on three grounds; (a) that the court had no jurisdiction of the person
of Defendant; (b) that the cause of action was barred by a prior judgment; and
(c) that the complaint states no cause of action.
After Plaintiffs had filed their objection to said motion and Defendant had
replied, the court found the motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the
alleged fraud on which the cause of action of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if
committed, is not extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in the former
case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein because it was
part and parcel of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect their
interest. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.
The facts which, according to the complaint, constitute the alleged fraud on
which Plaintiffs base their cause of action to annul the judgment rendered in
the former case, are: (1) the concealment by Defendant of the true traces of an
old sugar mill and of the house of their predecessors-in-interest by indicating
some big stones within the perimeter of lot No. 8 is the ocular inspection
conducted by the court, because the truth is that said traces are on the
western side of lot 8, located in another property belonging to Defendant; (2)
the refusal of the trial judge to conduct an ocular inspection of the other side of
Cabatuan creek to see for himself the location of the true traces of said sugar
mill and house without any justifiable reason; (3) the mysterious disappearance
of the record of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the
trial judge as above adverted to.
But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which
allegedly constitute the fraud on which the action of Plaintiffs is predicated, are
matters which have transpired in the course of the ocular inspection made by
the trial judge in the former case and which said trial judge had already
considered and passed upon in his decision. It even appears that when the
ocular inspection was made, both parties were present with their counsel, and
the objection of Plaintiffs to the indication of the traces or remains of the old
sugar mill and house determinative of Defendants possession has been duly
noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due consideration by
him. And it likewise appears that these matters have also been taken up
by Plaintiffs in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals but that
said court did not decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the findings
of the trial court. It is therefore evident that the alleged fraud now advanced
by Plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic or collateral but intrinsic
in the sense that they have not only been raised but were the subject of
adjudication by both the former court and the Court of Appeals and as such it
cannot be considered as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered in
the former case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fraud indicated by complainant are sufficient to annul
judgment rendered in the former case.
HELD: Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the
litigations. Were not these the rule there would be no end to litigation, perjury
being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the
losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary
falsehood to his adversarys proofs. But the settled law is that judicial
determination however erroneous of matters brought within the courts
jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a
party to meet and repel his opponents perjured evidence. (Almeda vs. Cruz,
47 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1179, 1180.)
It is true, as Plaintiffs claim, that when the former case was appealed to the
Court of Appeals they discovered that the record of the proceedings concerning
the ocular inspection made by the trial court has mysteriously disappeared
and for that reason the Court of Appeals could not act properly on the issues
raised concerning said ocular inspection, but why did not Plaintiffs take the
necessary steps in order that the record of said ocular inspection may be
located or reconstituted as required by law? It is preposterous to contend that
such disappearance is the result of a conspiracy between the trial judge and
the Defendant. In any event, it was the concern of Plaintiffs to have the matters
investigated in due time, and this they failed to do. But this
circumstance alone cannot certainly be the basis of annulment of a judgment
duly rendered and affirmed by the appellate court and which has become final
long ago.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellants.

CASE 214
G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986
BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C.
LUNDANG, and ALFREDO VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third
Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS: On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1981, which reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the petitioners and/or their
successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of
the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. In
their complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the
petitioners alleged that through fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear
that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and as a
necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession
of the property in question.

On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction before the
appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a subsequent
motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without
jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the
Supreme Court is empowered to review the judgment of said appellate court.
Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court.

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied
upon by the petitioners is only intrinsic and thus, even on the assumption that
it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the same has no merit. It dismissed
the petition. The petitioners elevated this decision to us.

On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the

petition. Notwithstanding proof that a copy of the petition was served on the
respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no comment has been filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fraud mentioned is intrinsic in nature.

HELD:Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of
the rule 'where it is one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a
trial, or real contests, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner
by which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the
case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic

fraud, hence false testimony being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic
and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in acting fictitious cause of false testimony is
intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic fraud takes the form of
acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v.
Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment
(Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).

Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is

bereft of any factual basis, hence, even on the assumption that this court has
jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners cause of action must fail.

A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate
court on this case shows that even on the assumption that all the facts alleged
in the petition are true, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit
because the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-G.R.
SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from
presenting an of his case to the court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island
Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In the
case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured
by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the
disputed property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding
the fraud to be intrinsic in nature.

CASE 215
G.R. No. 79244 December 10, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MATEO
AYLLON SR., (Deceased) ERLINDA S. AYLLON petitioner- appellant,
vs.
PRIMA A. SEVILLA, PILAR A. SALAZAR, MERCED A. PABELLO MARCOS
AYLLON ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and and VICENTE AYLLON AYLLON
ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and VICENTE AYLLON respondents-appellees.
FACTS: A petition for probate of a holographic last will and testament of Mateo
Ayllon Sr. was filed on 7 November 1977 by the petitioner with the Court of First
Instance (Now Regional Trial Court), Branch VI, of Guiuan Eastern Samar. The
case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 459. In said will, the testator
made disposition of specific properties to the petitioner, as his surviving spouse
with whom he had no children, and to the respondents, as his sons and
daughters by a first marriage. The respondents opposed the probate, and so
hearings were held until the case was submitted for decision at about the end
of 1981. .

While the case was awaiting the court's decision, the Petitioner, without the aid
of a lawyer, entered into a verbal amicable settlement with the respondents.
Relying on the verbal settlement and believing that she will be given one-half
(1/2) of the house and lot situated at Concepcion Street, Guiuan Easter Samar,
in return for her abandoning the rest of the properties willed to her, petitioner
wrote her lawyer a letter requesting the latter to file a motion to dismiss the
case. Petitioner's lawyer complied with her request. On 14 March 1984, the
case was dismissed. However, the respondents apparently did not comply with
their verbal agreement with the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed an
affidavit with the court on 22 March 1984, asking for the withdrawal of her
motion to dismiss and for revival of the case.

On 7 September 1984, the trial court reconsidered the order of dismissal, and
revived the case. But, on 10 September 1985, the court issued an order
recalling the order of 7 September 1984, thereby reviving the order of dismissal
of 14 March 1984, on the grounds that (1) the case was amicably settled, and
(2) the petitioner failed to present three (3) witnesses who could Identify the
handwriting of the testator in the disputed holographic will, as provided under
Article 811 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration of order of the trial court
dismissing the case but it was denied. Upon petitioner's appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter court required the petitioner to file a Record on Appeal
within Sixty (60) days from notice. The counsel of the petitioner received the
notice on 11 February 1987, so that the last day to file the record on appeal
was on 12 April 1987. But, instead of preparing and eventually filing the Record
on Appeal, the petitioner's counsel filed an Appeal Brief dated 28 February
1987, but actually filed through the mails on 17 March 1987. Hence, in a
Resolution dated 29 May 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on
account of failure of counsel of the petitioner to filed a record on appeal, which
is required in appeals in special proceedings, under Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129,
and Section 29 (b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of

Appeals of 29 May 1987. It was denied. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari, with the petitioner praying that her case be revived, and that she be
allowed to submit a record on appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the sixty-day period within which a party may file an
appeal already lapsed.

HELD: YES.

Petitioner's counsel failed to file a record on appeal despite due notice and the
period of sixty (60) days given to him to file said record on appeal. Instead of
filing the record on appeal, as required, what the petitioner's counsel did was to
file an Appeal Brief. And even after petitioner's counsel received a copy of the
respondents' Motion for the Dismissal of the Appeal for failure of the petitioner
to file a record on appeal, nothing was done by petitioner's counsel to correct
or amend the erroneous procedure he had taken. Thus, it is clear that the
failure of the petitioner, through counsel, to file the record on appeal was not
inadvertent. In other words, petitioner's counsel ignored compliance with the
requirement of filing a record on appeal, as provided for by the Rules. Hence,
there is no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, in dismissing
petitioner's appeal.

CASE 216
G.R. No. L-56171 January 31, 1983
NIDA GABA, RODOLFO GABA, NATY A. UY and MARIANO
TAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, NILO CABANG, Deputy Sheriff, and PEDRO F.
MARTINEZ. respondents.

FACTS: Pedro F. Martinez sued Nida Gaba, Naty A. Uy and Lilian C. Gabriel and
their respective husbands for the recovery of the sums of P20,000 and P3,000
plus damages.

Nida Gaba and the Uy spouses answered the complaint through lawyer Tirso L.
Manguiat. Although duly served with the summons, the Gabriel spouses did not
answer the complaint. They pleaded the defense that they borrowed from
Martinez only one amount of P10,000 and not P20,000 and that all the interests
due were deducted in advance.

The trial court set the case for pre-trial and an order was sent to the parties
counsels through mail. At the pre-trial on July 16, where only plaintiff Martinez
and his counsel appeared, Gaba and the Uy spouses were declared in default
for their non-appearance. Lilian C. Gabriel was declared in default for her
failure to answer the complaint. The clerk of court was commissioned to hear
the evidence.

A copy of the decision was received on August 22, 1980 by registered mail by
Manguiat's clerk, Alfredo Chico. On September 8, 1980, Martinez filed a motion
for execution with notice to Manguiat by registered mail. On that same date,
September 8, Manguiat filed an urgent motion to set aside the order of default
with the advertence that the clerk of court should submit the motion for the
immediate consideration by the trial court and, alternatively, that it be set for
hearing with notice to the parties.

Defendant Manny Tan, husband of Naty A. Uy, verified that motion. He alleged
that defendants' failure to appear in court was due to fraud or excusable
neglect since no notice of the trial was sent to them and their counsel. A copy
of that motion was furnished Martinez's counsel by registered mail. The trial
court in its order of November 12, 1980 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Several months later, or on February 11, 1981, the Gaba, Uy and Gabriel
spouses filed the herein petition for certiorari through another lawyer, Camilo
R. Flores. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Manguiat, a resident of
2401 Singalong Street, Manila (no longer holding office at the City Court
Compound). The Gabriel spouses, who are abroad, were later dropped as
petitioners. Manguiat alleged that Alfredo Chico, who received copies of the
notice of pre-trial and decision, had ceased to be his clerk in December, 1979,
that his other clerk was Chona M. Seminiano and that Chico did not turn over to
him the said papers. Manguiat did not attach any affidavit of Chona.

ISSUE: 1.Whether or not petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was
unduly inflated by the trial court.

HELD: Manguiat's claim that he was deceived by his alleged former clerk
(Chico) cannot be taken seriously in the light of the incontestable fact that
although his other clerk, Chona Seminiano received on August 1, 1980 a copy
of the order of default, yet it was only on September 8, or thirty-eight days
later, when Manguiat filed a motion to set it aside, He was not conscientious in
attending to his clients' interests.

As to petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by
the trial court, it should be observed that petitioners Mariano Tan and Nida
Gaba -in a letter to respondent deputy sheriff dated January 6, 1981 asked for a
period of fifteen days within which to satisfy the judgment (p. 95, Rollo). They
did not contest the validity of the judgment and the levy.

Since the said judgment had long become final and executory when the
petitioners filed on February 11, 1981 their petition for certiorari and as there is
no clear showing that they were deprived of due process or that the said
judgment was procured by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud, it can no
longer be set aside. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in rendering and enforcing that
judgment.

With reference to the alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment,

particularly with respect to Rodolfo Gaba the same should be first raised in the
trial court. The record does not show that the lower court's attention was called
to the alleged improper implementation of the writ of execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with cost,-against the petitioners. The

writ of preliminary injunction is cancelled.

CASE 217
G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974
FELIXBERTO W. FERRER, as administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE SPOUSES ESTEBAN F. FERRER, SR. and MIGUELA
WENCESLAO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YANG SEPENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: This case was certified to this Court as involving a pure question of law
by resolution of August 2, 1974 of the Court of Appeals

In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was set
for November 8, 1967. At the hearing, plaintiff-appellee and counsel appeared
while only counsel for defendant-appellant was present. The trial proceeded
and plaintiff introduced his documentary evidence supporting his claim against
defendant, all of which were admitted without objection by defendant's
counsel. After plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel moved for
postponement on the ground that defendant was not present in court. The trial
court denied the motion and declared the case submitted for decision. On the
same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.

Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for new
trial allegedly on the ground of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" in that
defendant "early in the morning of said November 8, 1967 ... had stomach
trouble and consequently I was not able to go to the court for said trial" as per
defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion. The trial court denied the motion
on the following grounds:

1. That the alleged stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable

negligence since it is merely one which could not physically prevent him from
appearing in court;

2. That the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact
constituting the valid defense which the defendant may prove if given the
chance to introduce evidence;

3. Finally, because it is not in dispute that appellant is indebted to the late

Esteban Ferrer, Sr. in the amount of P20,750.00 as set forth in Exhibit A which
appellant signed and did not deny as shown by the fact that appellant in his
Answer did not deny the same under oath thereby giving rise to the
presumption that he is deemed to have admitted it (Section 3, Rule 8, Rules of
Court).

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.

HELD: NO.

We find it necessary to tarry on this point of division in the appellate court.

Defendant-appellant's averment of "stomach trouble belatedly presented after
three weeks, without any specific statement of its nature and gravity was
patently inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction the existence of
"accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against by reason of which his substantial rights have been
materially affected, as required by the Rules of Court.

But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer

from serious stomach trouble which physically prevented him from appearing
and giving his testimony at the scheduled trial, his failure to submit in addition
an affidavit of merits showing the valid defense which he may prove as against
plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to his cause.
The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for
new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be
accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e. affidavits showing the facts (not mere
conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which
the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would
serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the
parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil or
ineffective.

The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his motion
for new trial as required by Rule 37, section 2 was submitted by defendant-
appellant. Such failure is fatal to his cause and is decisive on the question of
law presented by his sole assignment of error.

CASE 218

G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983

JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, and SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS: This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari of an order of

the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
dismissing the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 339-V-76 and of the
subsequent order denying a motion for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.

In May 1975, the petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents, spouses
Renato Macapagal and Corazon Macapagal, entered into a written contract,
entitled "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng Tirahang Bahay" whereby for and in
consideration of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner undertook to construct
a residential house for the private respondents under the terms and conditions
therein provided for. The construction of the house was attended by some
misunderstandings between the parties, with the petitioner claiming that he is
entitled to certain amounts which the private respondents refused to pay, and
the latter in turn alleging that the petitioner should pay them damages for
having abandoned the job.

Sometime in March 1976, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan against the private respondents and the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement. Before any trial was conducted, however, the
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the same does not state a cause of action. The petitioner filed an opposition to
the said motion to dismiss. The Judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Realizing, perhaps, the weakness of their position in sustaining the order of the
respondent Judge in dismissing the complaint, the private respondents, in their
memorandum, resorted to additional grounds for upholding such dismissal.
They now contend that this petition for certiorari may not be entertained
because it is being utilized as a substitute for appeal, and that it was filed out
of time. Neither of these contentions of the private respondents find support in
applicable rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant proceeding is a petition for certiorari and
whether or not is was filed out of time.

HELD: NO.

The instant proceeding is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Republic Act No. 5440. It is illogical, therefore, to claim that the petitioner is
resorting to this proceeding as a substitute for appeal, it being an appeal in
itself.

The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim
that the motion for reconsideration was defective for being pro-forma and for
failing to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court regarding such a
motion. We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
may be considered pro-forma, the same having called the attention of the trial
court to a point which the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the
complaint. The requirement which the petitioner supposedly failed to observe
in filing his motion for reconsideration was the failure to attach an affidavit of
merit to the same. Private respondents argue that a motion for reconsideration
is equivalent to a motion for new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when
the motion for new trial is filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to the
motion. Once again, private respondents misinterpreted the rules. While it is
true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial if
based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran, 1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called
"motion for reconsideration" which is not called as such in Rule 37 is the term
commonly used to refer to a motion for new trial under subdivision (c) of
Section I of Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if the motion for new trial is based on any of
the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section I of Rule 37, to wit, fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed
for a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration under subdivision (c) of
the same section.

The timeliness of the filing of this petition may not be validly questioned. The
order dismissing the complaint was received by the petitioner on January 25,
1977. The motion for reconsideration was received on February 1, 1977. The
order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on
March 21, 1977. Within fifteen days thereafter or on April 4, 1977, the instant
petition was filed before this Court.

CASE 219

205 SCRA 537 JANUARY 27, 1992

VILLANUEVA VS CA

(CANNOT FIND SA NET UNG FULL CASE)

CASE 220

G.R. No. L-57204 March 14, 1988

FORTUNATO BORRE, ARTURO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO MANALANG, JOSE
MANALANG, VIRGINIA SANTOS, VIRGILIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCO
FERNANDEZ, GLORIA DE LA FUENTE, DIONISIO CASTANEDA, SR., YOLY
ANG ESPINA, JACINTO MOLINA, BENIGNO MONDERO, SALUD VIRAY,
DEMETRIO CHICA, CRISANTA BRILLANTES, MILAGROS GALLARDO,
FERNANDO ABES, MODESTA GABEON, AMPARO GARA, RAMON GARA,
RAMESES TAMOAN, FELIMON DORADO, FLORENTINA PERALTA,
ADELAIDA ABAYGAR, MARINO ABAYGAR, FIDEL CAYANAN, ABDON
SARMIENTO, ROSARIO SISON, LAURA LUMABI, and RUPERTO
TORREFIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE ARTEMON D.
LUNA, and THE MANOTOK SERVICES, INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS: On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private

respondent Manotok Services, Inc. to recover rentals paid by them alleging that
the land leased to them by the company was actually public land, forming part
of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did not belong to the
company.
On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed the complaint
on November 11, 1980 on the ground that the company's ownership of the
property was recognized by the State with the passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670.

On December 13, 1980, petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that

respondent company's titles covered lots which were portions of the Estero de
Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and therefore should not have been included
in those titles because these portions are public property which cannot be
appropriated and titled by private persons like the respondent company. The
trial court denied the motion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was
received by petitioners on January 12, 1981.

A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the
ground that a subsequent survey showed that the lots occupied by petitioners
are not covered by respondent company's titles, and hence, are neither
covered by Pres. Dec. No. 1670. In its order dated January 20, 1981, the trial
court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court order on January
30, 1981.

The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal from
the dismissal of their complaint, petitioners filed by registered mail a notice of
appeal and a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal.
However, they did not file their appeal bond until February 2, 1981 for which
reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-day period for perfecting
appeal having expired.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari but their petition was
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was
due to "excusable negligence".

HELD: NO.

This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on the
timeliness of filing the appeal bond, a requirement for perfecting an appeal
which had been dispensed with by Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court.
Although this new procedural rule may be given retroactive effect, the extent of
its retroactive application is, however, limited to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its approval and does not extend to actions which
had already become final and executor.
Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rules of Court required
the filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. In the
case at bar, although the notice of appeal and the motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal were filed within the reglementary period, the
appeal bond was filed two days late, or after the period for perfecting an
appeal had lapsed. Inasmuch as the appeal was not perfected on time, the
decision of the trial court became final and executory on January 31, 1981. The
trial judge committed no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set forth
in Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal.

Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal
is not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal
shall be dismissed.

There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals. This Court has repeatedly held that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. As Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal is not
a natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law

Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence justifying the failure to file

the appeal bond on time, the period within which to perfect an appeal cannot
be extended to accommodate the appellant. Petitioners' mistake in believing
that the Office of the Clerk of Court would be closed on Saturdays does not
constitute "excusable negligence" which would justify a liberal application of
the pertinent rules on the perfection of an appeal. Petitioners' counsel, a
practitioner in the Metro Manila area, should have known or exerted effort to
inquire about office hours in courts on Saturdays instead of assuming that
Saturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much less a grave one
at that, as alleged, was committed by respondent Judge in dismissing
petitioners' appeal.

CASE 221

G.R. No. 174536 OCTOBER 29, 2008

 ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., Petitioner
VS.
LAGUNA LAKEDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES

CASE 222

G.R. No. 168985 JULY 23, 2008

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and

TADAHIKO HASHIMOTO

VS.

ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband,

JONES B. ALABANZA,

FACTS:On September 27, 2002, respondent Alabanza filed a complaint against

petitioners Arts 21 and Hashimoto for and in behalf of her husband for non-
payment of salaries, separation pay and 13th month pay.

Respondents husband was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of

Arts 21 and had been with the company from 1975 to 1997. He was compelled
by the owner, Hashimoto, to file his involuntary resignation on October 17,
1997 on the ground that Arts 21 allegedly suffered losses. Respondents
husband demanded payment of his money claims upon resignation but was
told that rank and file employees will be paid first and thus waited for his turn.
Respondents husband made several demands but Arts 21 just kept on assuring
him that he will be paid his money claims. Respondents husband died on
August 5, 2002 with his claims still unpaid.

Petitioners invoke Art. 291 of the Labor Code and contend that
respondents husband voluntarily resigned in October, 1997, thus the cause of
action has already prescribed since the case was filed in 2002 only, beyond the
three-year-period within which money claims should be filed.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay

respondent over P4M. Petitioners filed an appeal along with a motion to reduce
bond, attaching receipts for cash bond amounting to P290K and appeal fee for
P170.00. The motion was denied and petitioners were given 10 days within
which to file the required bond. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which the NLRC denied ordering the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection
thereof due to non-compliance with the bond requirement. The resolution
became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued by the Labor
Arbiter upon motion by respondent. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition was dismissed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the cause of action of respondent has already

prescribed.

2. Whether or not the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an

appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is an indispensable
requirement for the perfection of the appeal despite the filing of a motion to
reduce the amount of the appeal bond.

HELD:

1.NO.

Based on the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter, it was petitioner Arts 21
which was responsible for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When
petitioners husband filed his resignation he immediately asked for the
payment of his money claims. However, the management of Arts 21 promised
him that he would be paid immediately after the claim of the rank-and-file
employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation.

Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though
without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied
upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would virtually
sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. The
principle of promissory estoppel is a recognized exception to the three-year
prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the

burden of establishing the following elements: (1) a promise was reasonably
expected to induce action or forbearance; (2) such promise did, in fact, induce
such action or forbearance; and (3) the party suffered detriment as a result. All
the requisites are present in this case. The Court, therefore, finds ample
justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Art. 291 of the
Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if respondents claims will be
brushed aside on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioners own
action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the
required period.

2. YES.
 Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the
Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer to the
NLRC may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission, in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in

cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final
and `xecutor. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they
prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favour upon
the dismissal of the employers appeal. It is intended to discourage employers
from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their
employees just and lawful claims.

The failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a

bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award is fatal to their appeal.
Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC mandates, among others,
that no motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious
grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to
the monetary award. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny their motion
to reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that
petitioners did not present sufficient justification for the reduction thereof is
generally conclusive upon the Court absent a showing that the denial was
tainted with bad faith.

Furthermore, appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory

privilege. Parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the
statutes or rules allowing it.

CASE 223

G.R. No. L-43252 September 30, 1976

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORAZON JEREMIAS (REMIAS) and GERINIMO PERECHO, defendants.
CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., movant-appellant.
 CASE 224
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
MANUEL D. MEDIDA, Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Cebu, CITY
SAVINGS BANK (formerly Cebu City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.)
and TEOTIMO ABELLANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO

FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of

redemption over the subject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of
the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu
City Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana, President of the City
Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings and Loan Association,
Inc.), to obtain a loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a
similar loan application and the subject lot was offered as security.
Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.

The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the
same, petitioner association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. The land was sold at a public auction to CSB being the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which was also registered.
No redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property was
cancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.

Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale at public auction and for the
cancellation of certificate of sale issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale was in violation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial
court sustained the validity of the loan and the real estate mortgage, but
annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to comply with
the notice requirement of Act 3135.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial
appeal to the CA, assailing the validity of the mortgage executed between
them and City Savings Bank, among others. The CA ruled in favor of private
respondents declaring the said mortgage as void or the reason that the
mortgagor spouses, at the time when the said mortgage was executed, were
no longer the owners of the lot, having supposedly lost the same when the lot
was sold to a purchaser in the foreclosure sale under the prior mortgage. This
holding cannot be sustained.

Preliminarily, the issue of ownership of the mortgaged property was never

alleged in the complaint nor was the same raised during the trial, hence that
issue should not have been taken cognizance of by the Court of Appeals. An
issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor ventilated during the trial
in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process

ISSUE: Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extra judicially
foreclosed and sold at a corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly execute a
mortgage contract over the same property in favor of a third party during the
period of redemption.

HELD: It is undisputed that the real estate mortgagein favor of petitioner bank
was executed by respondent spouses during the period of redemption. During
the said period it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of
the foreclosed property since the rule up to now is the right of a purchaser of a
foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has
expired without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under
mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the
expiration of the redemption period and the conveyance of the master deed.

The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the
redemption period and has the free disposal of his property, there would be
compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil Code for the constitution of another
mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would create an inequitable
situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the opportunity, which
may be his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through
another mortgage.

CASE 225
G.R. No. 102128 November 6, 1992
ABUNDIA ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA VILAS VDA. DE PINILI, ALFONSO ARTUS
and AGUSTINA DELA RIARTE, respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of

Appeals affirming that the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City which
dismissed petitioner's action for reconveyance against private respondents.

The property in dispute is a 744-square meter lot which is a portion of Lot 2723
of the Dumaguete Cadastre, situated at Taclobo, Dumaguete City, registered on
27 October 1922 in the name of Rufina Lazaga under Original Certificate of
Title No. 66-A. On 16 February 1939, Geronimo Pinili, deceased husband of
private respondent Demetria Vilas Vda. de Pinili, acquired one-half (1/2) of said
Lot 2723, which contained a total area of 2,402 square meters, as evidenced by
TCT No. T-5448 issued in his name, 2 while the other half was purchased by a
certain Alfonso Artus. The 744-square meter lot in dispute is part of the portion
now owned by private respondents.
Petitioner now seeks the reconveyance of the disputed lot as she alleges that
the property is owned by her mother, Maria Lazaga, who had it declared in her
name in 1915 for taxation purposes, and that she and her mother have been in
the peaceful and public possession and enjoyment thereof. She asserts that by
means of deceit and fraud, the disputed property was included and made part
of Lot 2723 and subsequently registered in the name of Rufina Lazaga under
OCT No. 66-A. Petitioner claims that she discovered the fraud only sometime in
1985 when private respondents required her tenants to pay rentals to them.

Private respondents in turn maintain that they are the owners of the land in
dispute, which is registered in their names under TCT No. T-1365, and that
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Maria Lazaga, does not even appear to be
a survey claimant in Lot 2723 in the 1918 cadastral proceedings.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the
land in dispute was subject of a cadastral proceeding but Maria Lazaga did not
file an answer to claim any interest in the land as required by Act No. 2259,
Sec. 9 and the tax declaration presented by petitioner covers a different land.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in considering an issue which was not raised in
the briefs of the parties.

HELD: A careful study of the petition reveals that it raises factual issues which
this Court could have dismissed outright under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
But We brushed aside technicalities and gave due course to the petition if only
to be satisfied that respondent Court of Appeals did not, contrary to the
petition, misapprehend the facts.

As regards petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals considered ground

other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court, it is settled
that the appellate court may uphold the judgment of a lower court on grounds
other than those relied upon by the trial court. 7 In fact, even if issues are not
formally and specifically raised on appeal, they may nevertheless be
considered as long as they are closely related to the error properly assigned or
upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly
assigned is dependent. 8 The Court of Appeals, in the case before Us, can
hardly be said to have treated issues not brought before the court a quo. What
the appellate court merely did was to make a strict scrutiny of the evidence on
record, and that its ruling that petitioner's Exh. "F" pertains to a different land
does not mean it violated the principle that an issue which has not been raised
in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Simply put, all
that respondent Court of Appeals did was to take into account a ground or
issue closely related to or intimately interwoven with the error properly
assigned.

126 Missing
227 CALIWAN VS OCAMPO AND PASILONA

On September 4, 2004, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while Caliwan

was singing inside her house and hosting a party on the occasion of her
birthday, stones were thrown on the roof of her house coming from the
direction of SPO4 Mario Ocampo's house, her neighbor. She reported the
incident to the barangay officials, which called the parties for conciliation.

The Ocampo's, on the other hand, gave their version of the incident as follows:
At about 10:30 in the morning of the (sic) September 4, 2004, they noticed the
loud voices, laughing and singing of Rufina Caliwan and her guests, which they
later came to know was due to her on going birthday celebration. Around 10:30
in the evening of the same day, Rufina Caliwan went out of her house with her
visitors. Apparently drunk, she suddenly shouted the following: "Hoy bumaba
kayong lahat dyan. Anong gusto nyo, barilan o bugbugan? Tama ang sabi ni
Dahlia na mga inggetera kayo. Mga pangit kayo. Mga putang ina nyo. Masama
ang mga ugali nyo. Bukas paglabas nyo pagpapatayin ko kayo." To prevent any
untoward incident, they just waited when Rufina Caliwan went inside her house
and just reported the matter to the barangay. A conciliation proceeding was set
by the barangay regarding the matter on October 14, 2004 at the barangay
hall of Barangay 201 Kalayaan Village. After the conciliation proceedings, Ofelia
Ocampo and Rhodora Pasilona were about to go home at about 12 noon, when
Rufina Caliwan suddenly assaulted Rhodora Pasilona, while uttering "Tarantada,
Putang ina mo. Hayop kang bata ka!" The barangay officials who were present
witnessed the whole incident. Rhodora Pasilona, thereafter, went to the Pasay
City General Hospital to seek medical attendance for the injuries she sustained.

The charges and counter-charges being interwoven were consolidated and

investigated jointly. In its February 24, 2005 Resolution,8 the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City, through Assistant City Prosecutor Eva C. Portugal-
Atienza, recommended the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner for
lack of evidence, and recommended that petitioner be charged with light
threats and slight physical injuries. Two separate Informations for light threats
and slight physical injuries were filed against petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City.

Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a

Resolution9 dated March 2, 2006 finding a prima facie case and/or probable
cause for the offense of light threats against SPO4 Mario Ocampo, and for the
offenses of grave oral defamation and slight physical injuries against Ofelia
Ocampo and Rhodora Pasilona, and consequently ordered the filing of
corresponding information against the respondents.10 The DOJ also ordered
the dismissal of the rest of the charges, as well as the withdrawal of the
Informations for light threats and slight physical injuries against petitioner.

A perusal of the records and a careful evaluation of the factual allegations in

the information including the supporting documents attached thereto will show
that there exists probable cause to continue with the proceedings of the case.
The matters raised by the accused are evidentiary in nature which should be
properly threshed out in a full-blown trial. The findings of the Department of
Justice is not a rubber stamp for the court to follow.

As correctly pointed to by the private prosecutor, the instant motions failed to

comply with the three-day notice rule provided for under Sections 4 and 5 (Rule
15) of the Rules of Court. These motions are considered litigated motions as
the rights of the private complainant may be clearly impaired, hence they
cannot be heard ex-parte. As the requirement for notice was not followed, the
same is fatal and the motion is just a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE

MOTION OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE MOTION FILED WAS DEFECTIVE, AND
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO THE RIGHTS OF THEREIN NAMED ACCUSED.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

The charges against petitioner are light threats17 and slight physical
injuries,18 to which the applicable rule is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Section 19 thereof provides:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions,
or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory

order issued by the court;
An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does
not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.19 The word
"interlocutory" refers to something intervening between the commencement
and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy.20 Interlocutory orders merely rule on an
incidental issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they
leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.21

The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court is an interlocutory order.
Similar to an order denying a motion to dismiss, an order denying a motion for
withdrawal of information is interlocutory as it does not finally dispose of the
case nor does it determine the rights and liabilities of the parties as regards
each other.

The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and
the case falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the
Regional Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari
despite the clear prohibition in Section 19.

228-Missing
229 REPOL VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas (Ceracas) were candidates for
Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16
May 2001, Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes
more than Repol.

On 23 May 2001, Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court
of Tarangnan, Samar. Claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the
elections in Precincts 3A, 5A and 71, Repol prayed for revision of the ballots in
these precincts. Judge Francisco Mazo dismissed the election protest on 28
August 2001. On certiorari, the COMELEC First Division reversed the dismissal
order of Judge Mazo in a Resolution dated 22 May 2002 for being issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC First
Division directed the trial court to reinstate the subject election protest,
conduct the revision of ballots from the protested precincts and render its
Decision with immediate dispatch. On 18 September 2003, the COMELEC en
banc denied Ceracass motion to reconsider the Resolution dated 22 May 2002.
The COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto the reinstatement of Repols election
protest. This time around, trial and revision of the ballots ensued with Judge
Roberto A. Navidad presiding.

On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared Ceracass proclamation void and
proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar.

Repol filed before the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. On 5
January 2004, the trial court granted Repols motion and issued a writ of
execution. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the trial courts judgment to the
COMELEC.

During the pendency of Ceracass appeal with the COMELEC and without
waiting for the trial court to resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining order,
writ of preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the writ of
execution, docketed as SPR No. 1-2004.[5] On 12 January 2004, the COMELEC
First Division issued the assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the
status quo ante. The Order reads in part: Accordingly, effective immediately,
private respondent Noel Repol, is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
assuming the duties and functions of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western
Samar until further orders from this Commission. In the meantime, petitioner
Violeto Ceracas shall assume the post of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan,
Western Samar.

ISSUES:

WHETHER THE COMELEC IS EMPOWERED UNDER ANY STATUTE, RULE, OR

JURISPRUDENCE TO ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE IN EFFECT OVERTURNING THE
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL
COURT AND SUSPENDING INDEFINITELY, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND
HEARING, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH WRIT.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. The main issue to be resolved in this petition is

whether the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the status quo ante Order
which effectively overturned the trial courts grant of execution pending appeal
in Repols favor. This issue is not mooted even if the next elections are just a
few weeks away. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government.[17] To set aside the resolution of the issue now will
only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. A cursory
reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the so-called status quo ante
Order reveals that it was actually a temporary restraining order. It ordered
Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime.
The status quo ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the
directive was qualified by the phrase until further orders from this Commission.
This violates the rule that a temporary retraining order has an effective period
of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELECs denial of the
preliminary injunction. Thus, the status quo ante Order automatically ceased to
have any effect after 1 February 2004 since the COMELEC First Division did not
issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

While the hearing on Ceracass application for a writ of preliminary injunction

was held on 29 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve the
application. Instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their
memoranda until 3 February 2004 on their respective positions on the life span
of status quo ante orders and whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be
granted in the case. Clearly, the COMELEC First Divisions indecision on the
matter not only worked injustice to Repol but also failed to dispel the
uncertainty beclouding the real choice of the electorate for municipal mayor.

Ceracas was Guilty of Forum Shopping

We must point out that Ceracas is guilty of forum-shopping. At the time he

instituted SPR Case No. 1-2004 with the COMELEC, he had a pending omnibus
motion to reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of execution with the trial
court. In addition, Ceracass appeal of the trial courts adverse decision was also
pending before the COMELEC.[21] Forum shopping is an act of a party, against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[22] It may also be the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[23]

Due to a clear showing that Ceracas was forum-shopping, the COMELEC First
Division, following our ruling in Santos,[24] should have dismissed outright
instead of giving due course to Ceracass petition in SPR No. 1-2004.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

230-Missing
231 REPUBLIC VS TACLOBAN CITY ICE PLANT
FACTS: On March 18, 1986, the newly-organized Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), placed under sequestration two parcels of land and
a building thereon, which are collectively known as the Price Mansion, in
Tacloban City, believing that it belonged to Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez. Private
respondent Tacloban City Ice Plant (TCIP), a family corporation, asserting
ownership of the Price Mansion, sought the lifting of the order of sequestration.
It claimed that the Price Mansion had been sold to it by the children and heirs
of the original owners, Walter Scott Price and Simeona K. Price, in a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Sale dated March, 1978.[2] In view of this claim, the
PCGG conducted hearings at which Engineer Wilson Chan, director of TCIP, and
Professor Esteban A. Ocampo of the National Historical Commission testified.
According to Engr. Chan, the Price Mansion, located beside TCIPs Tacloban Plaza
Pensione, had been acquired by TCIP in 1978 for the purpose of converting it
into a commercial complex. TCIP in fact commenced construction immediately
after the purchase by making the necessary excavations and laying out the
scaffoldings but was not able to proceed with its plan in view of local opposition
to the commercialization of what was thought a historical landmark. Prof.
Ocampo corroborated TCIPs claim. He testified that when he went to Tacloban
City in 1978 in behalf of the National Historical Commission, he met Mr. Joseph
Ch. Chan, TCIP president, who assured him that TCIP was not going to demolish
the Price Mansion. It was his impression that the Chan family owned the
property.

On the basis of these testimonies, the PCGG held that TCIP had sufficiently
substantiated its claim to the bonafide ownership of the subject property and
that the [Price Mansion] does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined by
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended, series of 1986.

However, despite its order lifting the sequestration, the PCGG did not give up
its possession of the Price Mansion. In February 1990, TCIP sold the Price
Mansion to the other private respondent Allied Banking Corporation.

TCIP filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Compliance to compel

petitioner, represented by the PCGG, to make a complete turnover of the
property to it. The court declared petitioners motion for reconsideration moot
and academic in view of the finality of the resolution of June 28, 1989, with the
result that the Sandiganbayan had lost its jurisdiction over the subject property.
It ruled that although the Price Mansion was formerly a sequestered asset of
Benjamin Romualdez and under custodia legis, from the moment the
Sandiganbayan ordered the deletion of the property from the list of assets of
Romualdez, the property lost its character as ill-gotten and the Sandiganbayan
lost its jurisdiction over the property.
ISSUES: whether or not the sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion.

HELD:

[W]here between the first case wherein the judgment is rendered, and the
second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, but
there is no identity of causes of action, the judgment is conclusive in the
second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is
termed conclusiveness of the judgment. Thus, a judgment rendered upon one
installment of a contract, is conclusive between the same parties in a
subsequent action upon another installment, but only as to those matters that
have been actually or directly controverted and decided in the first case, and
no others. Accordingly, the defense of fraud or want of consideration may be
pleaded and proved in the second case, if it has not been presented and
actually decided in the first case.

It is noteworthy that TCIP is itself named in the amended complaint in Civil

Case No. 0035 as among the corporations controlled by Benjamin Kokoy
Romualdez. It would therefore seem that it would make no difference whether
the Price Mansion is declared the property of TCIP or that of UBC since in either
case it might be considered property of a corporation owned or controlled by
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez.

WHEREFORE, petitioners alternative prayer is GRANTED and the

Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to conduct a hearing and determine the claim of
ownership of the Universal Broadcasting Corporation and the right of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, to retain possession of the
property in question.

232 GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

FACTS: private respondent, Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr., was a retained

counsel for petitioner company, an arrastre and stevedoring operator since
1976 when it was established up to 1 June 1984. As retained counsel, he was
given a monthly fee of P 1,000.00, representation allowance of P 500.00 and
100 liters per month as gasoline allowance. On 1 March 1984 private
respondent asked for an increase in retainership fee. Instead of giving the
same, petitioner discarded the previous arrangement and on 30 March 1984
proposed that private respondent specify, instead, the legal fee for every legal
case to be handled by him, effective 1 June 1984.

On 9 and 16 July 1984, in three pending cases handled by private respondent

for petitioner before the lower Courts, private respondent filed
Manifestations/Motions for the payment of attorney's fees based on quantum
meruit. The same were granted by the respective Trial Courts.

Challenging the aforesaid Orders, petitioner resorted to Petitions for Certiorari,

not appeals, before the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which decided
against petitioner in a consolidated Decision dated 25 June 1985.

ISSUES:

I. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE PROPER LEGAL REMEDY TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER IN BRINGING THE THREE (3) QUESTIONED ORDERS FROM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APPEAL OR
CERTIORARI?

II. IS PRIVATE RESPONDENT ATTY. FLORENTINO G. DUMLAO, JR. LEGALLY

ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALLEGED ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE THREE (3) CASES,
NOW THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL BY CERTIORARI?

HELD:

For an appeal to lie, Orders or Resolutions of any Court must be final. The test
in determining whether or not a judgment or order is final is whether or not
something remains to be done by the Court. A final judgment, order or decree
is one that finally disposes of, adjudicates or determines the rights or some
right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some
definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is
reversed or set aside (Puertollano, et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73698, December 3,
1987, 156 SCRA 188).

In this case, the Orders of the Trial Courts are, indeed, final in character
because they finally disposed of the matter of attorney's fees, and nothing
more remained for the respective lower Courts to do. No further questions can
come on the issue before the Trial Courts except the execution of said Orders.
They concluded the right of private respondent to said claim until reversed or
set aside. As the Appellate Court had ruled, therefore, appeal was the proper
remedy. But since no timely appeals were interposed, the questioned Orders
have become final and the issue of private respondent's entitlement to those
fees deemed to have been laid at rest. WHEREFORE, the judgment under
review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

233-237 Missing
238 PROVOST VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a
parcel of land. Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land owned by petitioner
Dolores Miranda Provost.

Sometime in May 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two
lots. In 1994, the Ramoses, believing that the Provosts encroached on a portion
of their lot, demanded the return of the encroached area but the latter refused.
The Ramoses thus had a relocation survey and the relocation survey showed
that the fence was indeed on their land.

The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used
had been disapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and was
replaced with a correction survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. Upon request
of petitioners Provosts, another relocation survey was done using the approved
cadastral survey plan. This relocation survey showed that the fence was within
petitioners property.

On December 26, 1994, the Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages and with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the MTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint and held that the
Ramoses failed to prove their ownership and possession of the disputed area.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by the
Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a
disapproved survey plan.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court

reversed the RTC decision and ordered the Provosts to vacate the area, remove
the fence, and pay damages.

ISSUE: That respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction
in deciding the appeal of private respondents outside of the issue raised in the
decisions of both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.

HELD: We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for
recovery of ownership or accion reivindicatoria.[9] Section 8, Rule 40[10] of the
Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case brought
on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant case, the MTC of
Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction
but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based
on the findings of the MTC.

In this case, we find that private respondents failed to identify the property
they seek to recover. They relied on the old survey plan, the technical
descriptions of which did not indicate the accurate measurements and limits of
their property. The technical descriptions under the old cadastral survey plan
cannot be the basis to delineate the boundaries of the lots or determine their
respective areas for the obvious reason that it was not approved. Moreover,
private respondents failed to prove open, continuous and adverse possession
of the disputed area. That their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in
the concept of owners since World War II based on the early tax declarations, is
insufficient to delineate boundaries.[14] Also, they admitted that Asterio Aboc
is the tenant of Rosario Abanil.[15] They merely claimed that a portion of the
land where Abocs house was once built, is part of their property. Such claim
without further proof of title does not suffice to define the boundaries of the
adjoining lots. It thus appears clearly that the contested area was part of
Abanils lot sold to petitioner Dolores Provost.

239 SERRANO VS GUTIERREZ

FACTS: On 22 March 2000, the spouses Anselmo and Carmelita Gutierrez

(respondents) filed a complaint for forcible entry with application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction with temporary restraining
order and damages[1] against the respondent Gutierrez.

Respondents, in their Answer,[3] denied the allegations in the complaint. By

way of affirmative defenses, respondents claimed that the subject land was a
portion of the estate of their friends Albino Morales, and as heirs of Albino
Morales, they were in actual, adverse, continuous and physical possession
thereof.

The MTC rendered its Decision, where it found that the real issue involved the
question of ownership and not mere possession de facto since both parties
claimed that they were the absolute, lawful and legal owners of the aforesaid
property. Thus, the lower court refused to assume jurisdiction by insisting that
it can only resolve the issue of possession de facto and not de jure,[7] and
consequently, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondents duly appealed to the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga. On 16 July 2001,
the RTC rendered its Decision[8] ordering petitioners to vacate the premises
and surrender possession of subject lot to respondents. Interestingly, the trial
court cited its approval of the dismissal by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, invoking the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40[9] of the
Rules of Court, the RTC deemed itself capable of resolving the issue of
ownership and thus ruling in favor of respondents.

Aggrieved by said order, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court
of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the instant
case involves an agricultural land and thus, appropriate jurisdiction vested with
the DARAB. Petitioners further questioned the adjudication of ownership in a
mere ejectment case.

On 21 May 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision

affirming the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE: Petitioners contend that since the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the
RTC can only decide the case on appeal if it has original jurisdiction. Petitioners
proffer that the assessed value of the subject property is less than P20,000.00,
thus outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HELD: We find no merit in the cause of petitioners. SECTION 22. Appellate

jurisdiction.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such
cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had
in the court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by
the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the
Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition
shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law
that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought
to be reviewed.

Primarily, the above quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.[16] Clearly then,

the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTCs appellate
jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC
irrespective of the amount involved.
The RTC made an exhaustive and definitive finding on the main cause of action.
The trial court is capacitated to make this finding in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Section 8,
Rule 40, by allowing the RTC to try the case even if the MTC had no jurisdiction
so long as the MTC had conducted trial on the merits, demonstrates that
remand is expendable. A remand to the MTC, therefore, has become
inefficacious in view of the judgment of the RTC. Given the sufficiency of
evidence presented before it, the RTC may, as it did, resolve the case on the
merits.

240 ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V VELASCO

FACTS: Here is the petition for dismissal that Hon. Judge Tirso DC. Velasco be
purged from the judiciary. It made reference to a litany of glaring errors
committed by respondent Judge disregarding the mandatory notice
requirement in reconstitution proceedings; reviving a long interred petition;
disregarding the Decisions of the Court and its warning to take extra care in
reconstitution proceedings; relying on incredible and unbelievable evidence;
bad faith in disallowing the appeals of Ortigas and the Republic of the
Philippines; and allowing execution pending appeal and argued that
collectively, these errors amply establish Judge Velascos gross bad faith and
connivance in the fraudulent reconstitution of the fake titles. The seriousness of
the charges and the penalty thereto corresponding have impelled the referral
of the case to the Court En Banc.

These are the allegations filed against the judge: Proceeding with
Reconstitution Case Without Jurisdiction; Unwarranted Dismissal of Appeals;
Unwarranted Order of Execution Pending Appeal; Disregard of Factors Cogently
Militating Against Reconstitution.

HELD:

The respondents acts herein condemned are of so serious and indefensible a

character as to call for the penalty of dismissal from the service, specially so
when it is considered that the disciplinary proceeding at bar is not the first
initiated against him. The record reveals that there been eight (8) other
administrative cases filed against him, and while six of which of these have
been dismissed,[35] one is still pending[36] and another resulted in the
imposition on him of a fine of P20,000.00 for ignorance of the law, with a stern
warning that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[37]
VI. Deliberation and Voting by the Court

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, the conclusions in this
per curiam resolution were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. Except for four (4) Justices
who abstained from voting on account of their close personal association with a
party but whose identities are not disclosed, all the Members of the Court
whose signatures appear hereunder concurred in this judgment. One justice
took no part because he was on leave during the deliberations.

WHEREFORE, Judge Tirso D. C. Velasco is hereby DISMISSED from the service,

with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Immediately upon
service on him of notice of this adjudgment, he shall be deemed to have
VACATED his office and his authority to act in any manner whatsoever as Judge
shall be considered to have automatically CEASED.

241 GSIS V GINES

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul the January 19,
1988 decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-09361 entitled "Bengson
Commercial Bldg., Inc., represented by its President Romualdo F. Bengson,
Plaintiff-Appellee versus Government Service Insurance System, Defendant-
Appellant" which affirmed the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVI, San Fernando, La Union in Civil Case No. 2794 for having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction and to prohibit the trial court from: a) enforcing the writ of
garnishment it issued for the sum of P2,760,000.00 and; b) engaging in the
selective piece-meal execution of the Court of Appeals decision.

FACTS: Private respondent Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BENGSON, for

brevity) obtained a loan from the petitioner Government Service Insurance
System. The Provincial Sheriff of La Union enforced the foreclosure and
conducted a public auction sale wherein the GSIS emerged as the highest
bidder, acquiring BENGSON's mortgaged properties.

BENGSON filed against the GSIS a petition for annulment of the GSIS's
foreclosure of its mortgage loan.
The petition was granted by the RTC.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and became final and
executory.

ISSUE: whether the January 19, 1988 decision of the Court of Appeals, which
has been partially executed, can still be challenged.

GSIS contends that the directives embodied in the decision are too vague and
incapable of implementation, thereby voiding the entire decision. The directive
of the Court of Appeals for the GSIS to "restructure" the loans of BENGSON is
incapable of accomplishment because there is nothing in the decision itself, nor
in any of the papers submitted by the parties, which gives the parameters as to
how said loans will be restructured. 35 Being a void judgment, it may be
assailed or impugned at anytime. Furthermore, the directive to restructure,
without any given frame of reference, actually infringes on the constitutional
right of GSIS to the non-impairment of obligations and contracts and to due
process.

BENGSON, on the other hand, contends that GSIS cannot invoke the remedy of
certiorari after its failure to appeal the January 19, 1988 decision.

HELD:

The petition must fail. that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the reglementary period allowed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. . . Thus, if no appeal is perfected on time, the decision becomes
final and executory by operation of law after the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal . . . Being final and executory the decision in question can no
longer be altered, modified or reversed by the trial court or by the appellate
court . . . Accordingly, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right, to a
writ of execution the issuance of which is a ministerial duty compellable by
mandamus. To permit a party to appeal from said partially executed final
judgment would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality of judgments long
enshrined in this jurisdiction.

242-Missing
243 VELASCO V ORTIZ

FACTS: Private respondent Tan Sim Te was the ward of petitioner Ely Chan Sa
Velasco and her husband Lorenzo Velasco. Sometime in 1974, Lorenzo suffered
paralysis of his right hand and consequently lost the use of that hand. On 28
January 1975, Lorenzo was examined by Dr. Raul V. Idea, a neurologist, who
found him suffering from "asphasia" and a "tumor on the left cerebral
hemisphere, probably metastatic."

As anticipated, Lorenzo Velasco died on 28 February 1975.

On 24 May 1975, petitioner in her personal capacity and in her capacity as

administration of the intestate estate of Lorenzo Velasco, filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for the recovery of property and
annulment of certain documents alleging, among other things, that private
respondent Tan Sim Te had misappropriated and converted to her own use the
bank deposits of the deceased Lorenzo Velasco. In her Answer, Tan Sim Te
countered that the withdrawals had been made by her upon the instructions of
Lorenzo Velasco to whom the monies were allegedly given and who allegedly
used the same to pay his creditors and to defray his hospitalization and
medical expenses.

After trial, on 17 March 1979, the trial court then presided over by Judge
Augusto L. Valencia rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

On 10 May 1979, or four (4) days after the 30-day reglementary period to
appeal had lapsed, private respondent through her new counsel Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez, filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.

Private respondents new counsel sought to excuse the tardiness of the filing of
the Motion for New Trial by pleading "excusable negligence." Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez stated that his professional services had been engaged only on 18
April 1979 and

". . . Believing in good faith that the undersigned counsel still have thirty (30)
days from April 18, 1979 within which to file the appropriate pleadings and/or
motions to vacate and/or appeal the judgment and due to daily court
appearances and other professional engagements, he deferred action on the
matter. It was only yesterday (i.e. 9 May 1979) that the undersigned counsel
was informed that the former counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Acejas, has not
filed any petition or motion insofar as the decision is concerned despite the fact
that he realized that the period within which the defendant can have the
judgment set aside or vacated has already lapsed . . ." 7

The trial court, by that time presided over by respondent Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz,
granted the Motion for New Trial in an order dated 26 July 1979. In this order,
Judge Ortiz held that the excuse offered by private respondents new counsel
constituted excusable negligence and that the "newly discovered evidence"
would probably alter the result of the case. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of this order; the trial court refused reconsideration in an order
dated 18 October 1979.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGE COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN ALLOWING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

HELD;

Yes. There is no dispute that at the time the Motion for New Trial was filed, the
reglementary period to appeal had already lapsed and that Judge Valencias
decision dated 17 March 1979 had already become final and executory. It is
firmly established that a judgment which has become final and executory can
no longer be altered and modified, and much less set aside by the court which
rendered it since such court has already lost jurisdiction over the case. 8
Thereafter, the power and prerogative to order suspension of the rules of
procedure is reposed, not in the court which had rendered such decision, but
rather in an appellate court and ultimately this Court, and then only upon a
showing that otherwise the imperious demands of substantial justice will be
thwarted.

It also seems useful to point out that where the reglementary period to appeal
has not yet expired, a Motion for New Trial under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules
of Court is the appropriate remedy. Where, upon the other hand, the judgment
involved has already become final, the appropriate recourse is either to a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, or
in an appropriate case, a petition for annulment of judgment. It is not mere
coincidence that the principal grounds which justify grant of the Motion for New
Trial under Rule 37, are the same grounds which must be shown in a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38: fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.

244 ANTONIO V CA

FACTS: On July 25, 1988, an Information was filed against both Severino
Antonio and Carlito Antonio, blood brothers, charging them with the crime of
murder. On September 18, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment finding
Severino Antonio guilty of murder. petitioner Severino Antonio appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS.

IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN EXCUSING THE ADMITTED CONTRADICTIONS AND

INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES AS TRIVIAL,
INSIGNIFICANT AND UNIMPORTANT.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

NO SUFFICIENT MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING WAS SHOWN.

HELD: After carefully examining the records of these cases, we find the above-
quoted allegations to be untenable. The court sees no reason to set aside the
findings of fact of the trial court, which are supported by the testimony of
witnesses who have no reason whatsoever to testify falsely against the
accused-brothers. A witness testimony ought to be entitled to great weight
when his accusing words are directed against a close relative. It goes beyond
logic and normal human experience for a kinsman to prosecute a blood
relative. He risks the ire and reprisal of other relatives, if he were not guided by
truth and motivated by a quest for justice. Time and again, we have ruled in a
catena of authorities that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses should not be disturbed because the trial judge is in a better position
to rule on questions of fact, he having observed the deportment of the
witnesses and their manner of testifying during the trial, except when it
appears in the record that the trial court had overlooked, ignored, or
disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance that, if
considered, would alter the result. The petitioner and accused-appellant failed
to demonstrate that their case falls under such an exception.

As to the other alleged contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the

testimony of the prosecutions witnesses, we find that they relate only to trivial,
insignificant and unimportant matters and consequently do not materially
impair or impugn the very testimony of said witnesses.

In denying a demurrer to evidence, the court need not state that the
prosecution has established proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that
words of similar import, such as those stated in this case the essential
elements of the crime charged, - be present to indicate that there was a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Therefore, the trial court
did not commit any error in its Order dated July 16, 1991 denying the
appellants demurrer to evidence for there was sufficient compliance.

it is our holding that this argument is without merit, because motive is not
essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.[52]
The fact that the witnesses had positively and categorically identified the
accused as the malefactors, negatives the need for establishing the motive for
the killing of the victim.