D. OBLIGATION TO COURTS mortgage.
The return was made but after a year, PNB filed for
I. Candor and Fairness
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
1. Komatsu Industries Inc v CA
FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC) granted
Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. (KIPI) a direct loan of P8M and a
P2M guarantee to secure the credit line with PNB. As security
thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by KIPI in
favour of NIDC covering a parcel of land with all its improvements
embraced in TCT No. 469737.
KIPI then executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed covering the
same parcel of land regarding letters of credit by PNB in favour of
KIPI with foreign suppliers worth US$1.5M. Upon full payment of
KIPIs account with NIDC and the 2M credit line with PNB, NIDC
executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage.
By virtue of this release, NIDC returned the owners copy of the
TCT to KIPI and registered the Deed of Release with the Registry of
Deed. However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due to
unsettled accounts based on the subsequent amendment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. KIPI contests the
foreclosure saying that the release by NIDC had the effect of
releasing the real estate mortgage.
Issue: W/N NIDCs Deed of Release is binding on PNB?
Held: NO. PNB was not a signatory to such agreement. It is a
separate and distinct personality from NIDC. NIDC was in no
position to state that Komatsus direct obligation PNB has been
fully paid.
In relation to Legal Ethics:
The Court reprimanded KIPI for insinuating that Padilla Law Offices
used the friendship and connection of retired Justice Teodoro
Padilla with the ponente of the CA decision for disposing the case in
their favour as a birthday and parting gift. When the said ponente
declined and unloaded case, it was still allegedly raffled to another
good friend of Justice Padilla. However, based on the records, the
case was directly raffled to the Second Division and there was no
prior ponente to whom it was assigned.
The Court said that it should prove its charges and refrain from
conduct tending to create mistrust our judicial system through
innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be
proffered.
2. In re: 1989 Election of the IBP
FACTS:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their
oath of office on July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court en banc.
However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the
alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of
certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were
done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities,
the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision
over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the
IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
Media reports done by Mr. Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr. Locsin in
the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation on the
anomalies in the IBP Elections.
The following violations are:
1. Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the
candidates for president, executive vice-president, the
officers or candidates for the House of Delegates and Board
of Governors
2. Use of PNB plane in the campaign
3. Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates
4. Formation of tickets and single slates
5. Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, and
entertainment to delegates
6. Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
7. Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws)
8. Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more
than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP
By-Laws)
9. Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding
at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws)
10. Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically:
1. Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the
"strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
2. Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections
and
3. Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules: Any violation of the rules
governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited
acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and
Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a
candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the candidates were in violation of the IBP
by laws
DECISION: YES.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in
the 1987 Constitution providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of 7 members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees
for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the
reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power"
erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
caused the corruption of the IBP elections.
The decision are:
1. The IBP elections held on June 4, 1989 should be as they are
hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the
House of Delegates of the following national officers:
a. officers of the House of Delegates;
b. IBP president;
c. the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or
repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-
Laws.
IBP By-Laws is strict in holding that the elections of the national
officers should be non-political this was not respected in the
previous elections.
The setting up of campaign headquarters, island hopping to solicit
votes, procurement of written commitments and distribution of
nomination forms, reservation of rooms, formation of tickets, slates
or line ups of candidates, printing and distribution of tickets and
bio-data and other acts made a political circus of the proceeding
and tainted the whole election process. The candidates not only
violated the IBP by-laws but also the ethics of the legal
profession which imposes on all lawyers to promote respect
for law and legal processes and to abstain from activities
aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system. The actuations of the candidates did not uphold the
honor of the profession nor elevate the public esteem.
Hence the court ordered to annul the previous IBP elections and
amended the by-laws. The original IBP by-laws was restored giving
the right to automatic succession by the Executive VP to the
presidency upon expiration of the two-year term.
3. Berenguer v Pedro Carranza
FACTS
A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July
15, 1966, for deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, in that he is aware of the falsity of an Affidavit of
Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to
the effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or
descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter of
fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one
son, father of the complainant, he introduced the same in
evidence.
Carranza raises the defense that he had nothing to do with the
preparation of the affidavit. The report of the Solicitor General
confirmed that Carranza had nothing to do with it. However,
respondent testified as to his being not very meticulous about the
petition because there was neither private nor government
opposition thereto.
Respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not
properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to present in
court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with
facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to
confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends
as a petition for Relief.
Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office,
[having] caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for
presenting evidence therein containing a false
statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of
the family litigations between his client and complainant herein,
which are rooted in successional rights [and that] respondent's
failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath
of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of
Court.
There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding
of the then Solicitor General Barredo that there was nothing willful
in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in
evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned
out to be false, in the preparation of which, however, he had
nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously cannot
be sustained.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza violated his oath for
prolongation of the cadastral suit.
HELD: A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost
seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every lawyer must
do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of
justice if courts cannot rely on the submission as well as the
representations made by lawyers, insofar as the
presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even
without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead
the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not
be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a
conduct far from impeccable.
Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose
conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should
not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted
against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful and
that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.
Respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a
repetition of an offense of this character would be much more
severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer
in public the reprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B.
Carranza.

4. Munoz v People
FACTS
Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar,
connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade, and
Associates, must be held accountable for failure to live up to that
exacting standard expected of counsel, more specifically with
reference to a duty owing this Tribunal.
She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of
pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review
a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in
reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version
as to what transpired.
The background of the incident before us was set forth in our
resolution of July 12, 1971. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the
petition for review in Vicente Muoz v. People of the Philippines
and the Court of Appeals, and considering that the main issue
therein is whether petitioner Muoz is guilty of homicide through
reckless negligence, as charged in the information. The version of
the defense is inconsistent with some established facts
A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid
law firm was filed on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at
justification, because in law there is none, but it did offer what was
hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. If so, such optimism was
misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of
candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the
attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so
considered as such. It was then to say that the least a far from
meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of what was
therein contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing. While her
demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from
contrite. On the contrary, the impression she gave the Court was
that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach.
Even when subjected to intensive questioning by several members
of the Court, she was not to be budged from such an untenable
position. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of
the unfavorable reaction to, which her evasive answers gave rise.
There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of
her misdeed
When given an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her
appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum, there
was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and
so inexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends
itself. Her liability is clear.
Hearing was held on the same year. A "Joint Apology to the
Supreme Court" was filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by
Sedfrey A. Ordoez (supervisor of Sutton) and Delia Sutton.
The Court found that the "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate
to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. Some members
of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough. While
expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking that free
admission that what was done by her should not characterized
merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate
statements." If there were a greater sincerity on her part, the
offense should have been acknowledged as the submission
of deliberate misstatements. There ought to be, for the
apology to gain significance, no further attempt at
minimizing the enormity of the misdeed.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at
the expense of deviation from the truth. As set forth in the
applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more
certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to
the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim,
often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable
transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever
may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause."
What is more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court,
for candor and honesty takes precedence. It is by virtue of such
considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be
meted out to respondent Delia T. Sutton.
 5. Luis Artiaga v Enrique Villanueva
FACTS
This case is about the disbarment case filed by Artiaga against
Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.
The case started with the controversy over 2 parcel of lands with
revocable permit applications. Originally, the permits belong to a
certain Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, which was later on
sold to the client of Artiaga. However on a later date, when the
client of Villanueva filed for revocable permit application it was
found out that the area being claimed has already been titled to
the client of Artiaga. Hence the dispute was brought to the Bureau
of Lands for decision.
Initially the Director of Lands rendered a decision in favour of the
client of Artiaga, however it was appealed by Villanueva and the
decision was changed, after another appeal the final decision was
in favour of the client of Artiaga. The decision being final and
executory, an order of execution was issued, however, the client of
Villanueva remained in possession of the said parcel of lands.
Thereafter a series of motions and case where filed by Villanueva
as a dilatory tactics to seek a favourable ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is considered
unethical.
Ruling:
The court ruled that acts of Atty. Villanueva is in violation of
his oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to doing of
any in court. According to the court it was clear that Atty.
Villanueva caused his client to commit perjury so that the forceful
entry case will fall under the jurisdiction of the court, this is shown
by the intentional amendment to the original complaint, wherein
under the original complaint the time line was 1960, while on the
amended complaint the time stated is 1973, the court state that
the reason for such change is so that the action may still be filed or
entertained by the court, since the action prescribes one year after
accrual of cause of action.
The court further states that it is expected that a lawyer will
defend the clients cause with zeal, however in doing so it
should not disregard its duty to the court and the truth. Due
to his actions the client was in another case charged with perjury,
which is detrimental to the client.
The court also found that Atty. Villanueva is guilty of lack of condor
and respect for the court and the rights of his adversary, as shown
in the case, the client of Artiaga has already won the case,
however Villanueva filed urgent ex-parte motions and instead of
waiting for the result of such, he perfected his appeal, thus further
delaying the implementation of the first lawful order of the court.
Furthermore when his appeal was denied, Villanueva turned to
other venues such as CAR for positive results, in doing so he did
not disclose of the prior proceedings that was held in the court thus
securing an ex-parte proceeding. In this case the court found
Villanueva guilty of forum shopping.
6. Occena v Judge Paulino Marquez
FACTS
Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are
the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea,
and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963,
defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of
the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased
father's estate.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees,
dated November 18, 1965, asking the court to approve payment to
them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their
services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize
the executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the
estate and pay petitioners.
Respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of
petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at
P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. On
January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the
original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate
proceedings at P20,000.00.
Also, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court
against intervenor I. V. Binamira charging the latter of having made
false averments in this Court.
HELD:
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust,
his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration.
The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability
for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If
the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate.
The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees
is to request the administrator to make payment, and should the
latter fail to pay, either to:
(a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as
administrator
(b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the
court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct
the payment of his fees as expenses of administration.
Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons
interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value,
of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his petition directly
with the probate court.
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the
conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in
endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even
if to do so might work to the advantage of his client. The
conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers
should be characterized by candor and fairness.
It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false
allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a
document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing
counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the
practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well
as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately
made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to
his oath.
Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case,
is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.