BATTLE EXPERIENCES

No. 13 I AUG 1944

*E?attleYhperiences@a r e p u b x s b d mlpibarly by t h i s heacla_uarbers to

enable a t e in t r a i n i n g to psf$t from %he ht~astcombat expeficmoes of o w troops
now ff&ting the Gemm in F r ~ c e , Althstlgl? t h e experiences sf certain d t s a t
a particular Iceation are not necessarily rpplicaliLe t o all.u n i t s 5x1 all situations,
the item pb&hed wLll be those bsed an pmcideal e x p f i e n e e a d aye recommended
f o r c a m M amsideration by units which m y enc:omnter ~ i m i h probIPemo
r &ports
of aomoboratf-va m cankraqy axperfmcss are p % i c d a r 8 y deah=ed in order t h a t t h e
v&XBfw of t h e indfeated b t % l elesson may be d ! e t e m s d ,

I, ~ e r a X , ,'An speratima1 memoramdm 02 t h e 1st I d a n t s y D i v i s i o n con%afPls

law-o-y recent a%atemerataempFFasiaing the. a,dvantage of' con%bua3egmbfned
%rah&gof' %z%$a,n%ryand tank u n i t s &cla are %at fi&t tagether, Some exbracts fSPepn
the ht Mvisj.rnos &smssiom of t h e bfm%zy-$%nk If&se=,r~3~0'01srnare given in su&=
OEXdhg pE?Zi@Ti.@'S

2 , Fonuafdm 02 the '%em,'A sa%isfactaqs o h % %sf o ~%he problem cxf $jiagAlm

beheen * - a i m 5s believed ta E e in the a s f g n m n t ~by the Wmtiqr
P of one of h b r i f l e S ~ I X ? %s
, ~ ~aorbr the tank p P h % ~ m i aU
a.%

maar%flof.t~mrou-ka sf advance a d f - m h h e s i k ~ * ~ ~ t by ~ poy rao tre ~ h x ~09s"

-P d.swd meansu The a~sfgpnent& o d d "be csntybu-~fisas tli-e.p f i a ~ s o nimproves
pac-kise, The ~ ~ for cen-
squad lmadgr s h o a be prm5dled w i t h an S C R - S radio
+;iaa&w cka-aaon wiW h i s pla%om aia company c70mmdcroa, h eotpn%rywhere
%a=b'%-tat~k
mines a m 9flaeXy b ke enemkgl"&dg%hb k m nhay bz mw9mced by a aquad
s 4aqinmmo
- The use of e o h channels for
lers is no% almay.a feasiplffe, Fm-
TP, dIses not p r o d d e auP%ieient%yclose liaison, A nems of dirac:%crmmmica-
%%ambWem infantry and tan.la is r e q u 5 d o The Z a U m g Plavs hem % d s dd t h
S :mniexusphcme cw telephone slrr t2m ou%sfde ale certain tanks c m e c W
Bigpg ~ U ~ C ~ S a
e . h h %b h t s ~ ~ c a t i syskem o n of the b n k p prea~rmgedpymt(8cMesg rn smoke
and a m silyJa38, Since the Frrr'antq? hand and arm signals are not exactdy Wle sane
as those nomially used by the tanks, pre-arrangement i s necessary and practice i s
adwtsable, The foll-g have been used by the lst Division and are rec0mmended.s
a, Target DesignatLon, Basic infantry hand signals for direction, ccwmence
firing, and cease ffring;* The squad or platoon leader who i s directing the progress
of the tmh should be equipped with a mapon whch f i r e s tracer d t f o n I n order
t o pin-point the target quiclilyo
bo m s of bmditim For 7% EE9 the arm extended pointing with a l l fingers
exte- For PTP smoke, the s a w as f a r HE fo l l m d by covering the eyes w i t h the
hando 8 d y the tank will use machiae-gun f i r e unless the signal for HE or BP
i s given, AP w i 1 1 be used only when the target' i s seen by the tank commandee
Ce XWe.me~& standard vehicu3ss s i g n a l s are used t o c o n t r o l W
DBnte

-
%ere are given below s u b s b t i s l exbrqcts from some of the conclusians mached
by a board of ofYicers which recently completed a study of certain operations involv-
Fng close co-operation 'betmen ground and a i r farceso

lo Us8 of A i r W i t b h htiuery Bangee There i s a deFlnite need for air sap-

pc& Fe cases, even where the targets are ritkda range of Mandlg a t i l l e ~ ,
The z e b reason for .this i s the tremendous effect of 5OO-Lb and heavier bombs
agaimt highly organized defenses and casemated positions, Large bombs, by their
b b t , will damage f i r e control equipment and stun or k i l l the cmv& Casemates
We tipped off level by near hits whch also somtimes put the gun out of action by
pfllng d i r t i n f'mlit of the ports,, The gum w i l l . alwap be nautrallzed during tbs
a i r attacko The accuracy of the m g KUI, dstermFne the duration of the period
of neutralizationo The nature of the objective, not the a b i l i t y of the arM&ry
to reach it, should determine whether aircraft Fs t o be use&

2, 0 Bp Gbllnd *es must M s h the a;ir forces dewled and com

plete ih=n regarding the a3.r objectives, including a statement of the effect
desiredo
be T % d n g of the atr attack must be carefully and completely coordinated -with
t h grotpsj. f m s s pbns, including the ovffF-aU. f i r e plano
ea A g o d example of successful bo=ardbatim based on good plaaning i B fW-
nderhbd by a frequently employsd by cme UoS, division* Plan follcrs~s~B e r m
t h e planss arrive the a r t i l l e ~smothers the target with fire, thereby red* t b
loss from W Just befare the planes &ve, the a r t i l l e r y marks Gw t a r g e k d t h
red smokeo 'Ehe a r 6 i l b r - y then withholds i t s fire tmtil the b d i n g i s finishbd*
As t M ende, the NIAv resumes f i r e , cwering the advance of the W e O
Khich has been held outside of the danger ares during the bcdFng,
 i~-..~t,Ll~; x;per.i!,nccs!l
LJC published r s g . u ? e r l y by t h i s h e a d q i w r t e r s t o e,mble
u n i t s in . t ~ - ; i ~ i i ~ i:!;i! ; p " c ! f i t r"ra3 3hc ic.:-bo;t colct;at expsrion,-,os of O L i : ~ T O O ~ ) S
ni:,pv ii;&$i,lli; th,,)~~~~~n~i r ~ >yance, Alth::~& the G X ~ ) ; > I ' ~ U ~ . C ~ i)i'
B c a r t a i n Wits
ir:b CL p:,r.%iculnr lccaticln a r c n a t q a c o s s a r i l y ~ ; > y l i c a . b l c.to a l l uni'r;s i n 5 : l l sit-
.&+2c,aSl tk.r: j.tci-:ls _ ~ L i b l i ~ h e d h c t h ~ I~j eu~ 3 d011 1 r e c t i c a l C ' X ~ I F X ~ S Y L C Z Sand
ii,cormniie< -',c:y ~crc:f'ulc ~ ~ i ~ i d e ~by~ ~ u nt i it so vn~ h i c hm y enccjunJ~ersixdltir s rob-
2t3ue jjgrji-;yi;s &' c c r r i j b o r a t i v e cuil.ti.;ary e;rp ix i e ~ l c o oare y n r - ~ i c u l n r l yd e s i r e 2
ijll ordgr ?,lli;f +;.rle v a l i d i t y cf t h s irL:.iictitod L f i t t l c le;;go:+ m ; q bo delcrnined.

brainin[? 6efect.o obc~cr.ifcr1d u r i n z ccnlmnd of tho VIfI Corps

gill cjmljr,?.i:l,9f .!-
b';m i ~ i i dt j~i ~ I . : O I HG ~ ~ F ; J ; T:ire:- xio p i d d l e t ; i n B U 5 J m y o F O ~ ~ O ~ J L
i11 ca;ll?at 11~:.3
ifig j . ~a GU=-,-- . ,clcri
- ,,,c . .. ~*
GP 'thc d ~ ofc 2 s hl: :.ls is c,.rlCi s o w cii' his c o m ~ c n t s ~
;-'

: nak;: u a o ijf l h o i r
2,. ~ z , , i l u r . ~.to c;Tin f i x tc h ~ l pthorn f o m ~ i ~ d .'&ere Y~OU~.
an$ xrAu;unt;bt. r1cjr.g rcj.rc!~i~i;; firi;,
lL;<iyiL; :-;-i;~ f ; h i ; m i l l ~'to
, t k , s i r oyln li;sees by p';nLLitt,i~~g ~~be pinned do~mby
4,
has t i1G i':k -.
L,

01-93
tf.
6. Lick cf' t r a i n i r k ? f o r n i & t opcrh Lioi!,
S ~ ~ tailt
yijli;~:!,i(;ib i j ' f . j - i ~ ~ > z bi;:l:e~
U C .
F e e r i n g 1o s s of c c n t r c l and dis-
tc 1ik;vc; trc-o;?n 5 .$ c i g h t

7, Ft;.il;uc c ? f c o m k n d a ~ " st o prilvidc suf f i c i e n l ; depth i n c c ~ b a tf o r ~ ~ t i o m ~

T h i s li;ad& t o ~ v o r .m p l m s i s on 1 ~tssa?.
. ci:jnt:i.ct-. c a ~ ~ ~ n Ch,eeari t n t e s t o advanc
f o r #'(;or o f cxpusi11e h i 3 fla;!k. If h i s f o r : i ~ L i o I l kcid uep-th, h i s flankLwould ba
SOZuL"3.

. 8. ~ z p h k ~ s on .
i s o e e i n ~ a sgscj.i'ic t.-- i>en nhen no target is v i s i b l e , i
t h o e q i : q is I!:n.;;~~m to be In f r o n t , t;he i n f ' : . , n t r ~ ~snh o u l d i n tho area in
nLi
#,-, ck .i;hCy bt2]-i,2re h b ; ~t o b l e
 10, I1:.ilurc? t o d i g 1 Il p r o p t r l y nhen cot; advancingo

1 , I;':*ilu.ri: to pronmlj7 s3cure 2nd defsnd rr!l@~:n o t a d v ; n c i r ~ g ~ on o c c a s i o n s

:ihcil tit<+
a ~ f i + > i ilc?.s n p o ; ; ? . t i ~ r rai.i:k,. fire ~ n d f. o i l m ; i , d the f i r o he hai
: ~ ~ ~ c o r t r e d :;l.lch
hcun i:i o r crcjund o1.r p o s i t i o s ? ~:itlioui;b o i a g d.isc,~v,vered,

%~'tLL C u y ~ i ; L r ; . d i y : ~cellii:ral, 35th ~nfc.:i-tr.gzivisic!n, bijlic:rcs t h e t t h o f o l l o w i n g

~ t . : ll ~
q i~
l l j.9 ~ : ; i l : i ~ : i ~ e d.2nge:~to !;ar 01:irr.l f r o ~ . ~ .lint:
t; t r o o p s ic t h e cxe-
~ l :ii,~1
l t ~ : f 'c > i ; 3 ~ SU:~ : jj~l"k 0r b ~. ~. ~ il;;icicic!l-ia
: ~ ; ; ~ g
 11j9~ttlb j i ~ ; : ~ ~ f i ncre pub3 ish2drewlariy by t h i s hoc.dq~::.artarst o er~able
wii!;&i n t ~ . a i . l ; i ; l ~ L)rcfit fro13 "sic l e 2 a c t c;,nh.t - tl.l~l:;o i)i' GUL t ~ 0 0 p 9U.m
f i gliki;q< G9.2i;'c,~z iii fi'211c~;
la ~].i;)L101;d1' 1
I;i:~c: oxperic;~ices uuits at a
t ~ i 'c o r t ~ i n
p::rticu.lnT l a c ~ . t l , o , l>,re nf.,t; ~-lcccns:.riJ.y a 2 p l i c a t l c - t o a l l u n i t s i n al.1. s i t u a - .
.tiom, thf: items yi~tlli;yh.;::iill 11c those Se:.;ed cn p r a c t i c a l sxpci-ioncc: znci &re
l ' ~ ~ o t ~ ~f dr ~ l cia d
r $~ f u dl c~ilsid.r,retionby ' : n i t s n h i c h ray erlco-u:l,cr si1:lilar prob-
J.tjw,, s c o r r o b c j t~i ~
f i q ~ s i ;qf y e cr cc?n'ti.'er;r -:xi,cricnccs E . ~ Cp a r t i c l i l e r l y dcsiyed
i n o r d u r that; tkAev n l i t l i t ; g btha i--t;tliidtcd
- ,. . i3.t ; , i t ; i,;sson ~rfiybe d c t c r i i n e d o

I, Thtini:: c.,;w:i.:r;ts GG : ? - :ii c . ~ : ~ : . ( I ~cC~Ii. S O I : : ~ C : ~ a r e f r o 41-+e surgeon,

e ~ i i c 1 ~ - t i ~of
X= co-"ps:
8, ?*sr.:t::.tic:r!.
-C.--.l_-.-.-_l,-.-
Ti;ni. ~ ~ . . t : - : ; : ; ] . i i : :-..,
~,~~
,
flxFLck ':tirlli ~ : ; - t ; t a l i c f 1i ~ ,three
s 1:lc3iiical
, ,
hall' +rtl:cks.~!.;~ij.c'nt: 1it.tc:r bc;n.l,er r :!:kcis g:rct.lc;t.:? c r ~ oh z l f t r ~ c l rp e r corzpny t o
c v a c ~ l . b ccai?;ucltias t r i -th,.: ' r , r ~Lt:al:LolL~ 8 i . d & t ~ . t i d n ~:$~L~TE:
, : c ~ s s a r y , 1 i t t e r jeeps
a
f r o x i bhe n a t l i c u l oo~g.?nyvri-tb .-.acl~ci>!>l;:.: ,JC:!;UZ?~:? Carl r e i n f o r c e -the bn t t a l i o n
.half. tracks* B:ch neciic~,.lc,.!:!.igi:ny h ; . ~3s c.ro;,s-ccuntry cl;zl;ulen,ces and 24 l i t t w
beerers .to t7vccuat.z ccswltie.; f r ~ r , : the ks-tjt:giion o i t s t a t i c n r - The msdl.ca1 half
tr:zcZc3 of .the 'tank; b h t . t z l i ' j ~ l sf ~ 1 1~ ~ .i~ : ;~lt~~l h; i n dt h i tarik c o r i p u i e s a ~ SO d f ~ r
Yh2 problem .c!f ovncut~>ion kn s boc:; o j q j 2 e u
bd i v c l l - , ' : ~ ~ ~ i e t h ~ ~f J . e:~plo:aunt of t h e t&ril':-i~lfCintrJ'
t e a u k g rdlScli;c, d 111 ~1~ ,2 n i.,j .,cci ~ ~ i tf g
a ..Y cr usink: c . r r x r o d n d d i c t ~ ls e c t i u n s and tha
armred i x f a n t r y n o d i c a l s,r:ction l i ? ;;-,~ !lcaz 31' the non..~r.ucrctl. isf a ~ l t r y * They
a r c x ~ j t~ e - kup f w t h i s t y ~ oof oE\e~cttion= took_ f a c a c o r ~ s i o t i n gof a bat&-
talicnu of tanks cad a b a t laZion ol' arfia,ri:d i.nfzufry is brolcen dmri i n t o p l a t o o n
g r t i u ~ i n g s2nd ihe - h o i r ~ e 2 i c ; ~s o l ctious :;upp~rt c ~ r acif c;pc,rz-ticrio Thi;; area
is a.ko i n f i l t r ~ t x dwith. ~ t l ~ p ~ r -i tl lif ~a ngt r y f r u u r,n i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o r l * jL1l
e v e i l h b l c l i t t e r b e c e r s a r c s e n t u? by tjle : l i t t o r p l c t ~ n ~ of l s %hi.:medical C O L L
pany arid thtjse are ~-+i.~Sc,rcod by l i t t e r bc.ai>rsfro12 ~2.ai;oonsof tk.0 ccrps l i t t w
3'u';irors
c a - U ~ r , ~ d e r ; ej '~' iDl e r j t ~ ~ l c l ; ~ ~ of
--
i J r LClo*Lr fl Clo-thing is m m e n , o s s a i l y d e s t r o y (
La c l m . r i a g s.5,'t:ionu 1,:y rr;lutins c c i ; t i n g -f~i;cr,c.: i t could, i u mLnycases, be r o l l e d

dt. T r n i n i n ~ ;in F i r s t jLj.CIS

t l i ~ - i oun
r
--
(:It hzs becn obacrved t h a t f e w nounded rierl a:?ply
~id.(:rcL:;igc,fig b'.:l-.t ~ : ~ iu jtl t i l tl:i.~~ . i m~
d a r r i v z o . The i:liiividwl !.i'lc
s o l u i = f s r e s p ~ n s i b l f i t yfur Sirst sic? mu.^ ts i n d o c t r i m t e a c o c t i ? l m l l j . , q
 c, . : y T ; it suotic.zi t ; r , thr:'ha t.l,c;j.ji.1-1 i f i d ~i::t-iori i: ci21il.?r
E~::
trj .l;hlitiiiUGi.iiiO, tgr x:A:'tk ::;!;its - x c. z.br,v, -.
d, , , , ; - : ;
1 $;ru:- i!> t7.t i:.,:ls th.: n(:iu:ldi;d. ars
' 11 :I,

t ~ ~ ~ 1 : 1;':~ ;,:2;,il2.nl2,;
*U A , : ~ ~ t ~ lo:. 3<ir!c, -,iJints loc2. to;] :;xi th::, ..,~fC'j . . ~ ; ~ l l ~ ~ i<?ld
.;d
hi;ib:lli:,lic:,b ,?l-c c,f ?j<,n u;:;d t!;.is pl~.>;:c,ee~ ~ ; . i b l _ ! l ~ nc~o ~l j:erd; t th~;w.i;uadsd 2rc;a
i b <!2 - ls,.(l~.;i/; ~ c ; i ~ ~,:i<
- - b ~ 5 e ,3~ -t;)ltj;z
l - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~LC,L- C ~ ~ ,
, , > ~ L ~ : L I st3. , jLr];,y : i f i ) ~ : l - L ; i l svacl.
~~~
at;: t:le~L fa?s!;.:r -LC th2 a,; r.:q,+r2edo
rr,.;kr

e O n x.,&+++G l ~ , S u c c e r c , f ~ l railid ey:icyia t;iol> sf -;70un![oddcptind;;: uljon the:

r:;lJ.c:ill:;*a'.
, L ,

fcx~5Tiir,iq
~-ji;psL;:;G~L~
. zu: r; i~t ourg.-cris ill li,.:~;~:i:l~:
, ~ , . , y ~ ~ ~ 4 v c ~:!;f ;or;;c!ilnel ard unit iristalla-

' . ii .:;nO U
I?:.jrr~l~::ILuI:~.
c;lcc & i t s seccIlLary mi ss;<;np
~ . uf
~ ~th:;
? bat.;,ali;,n i..: llot suit::blc fJr p t . ~ f o l . a
hpptlrellt d e s k , I-idle
-': chirigas a r e ; - ' ~ p i > lOS
y Tip s l r ; ~ l l
 TWELTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 16 I0 AUC 1944

rgattla m p e r i e n c e s w e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e G8-n~ i n m a c e , ~ l t h o u &t h e experiences of c e r t a i n units et a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items publiahed rill be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recomnended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problem~l. ~ e p o r t a
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be determined.

By c-nd of t h e Army Group Corrmandbr 8

He B e LEWIS
B r i e d i e r General, Z]SA
~ d j u t a n tGeneral
- I - - l - - - - C I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . c - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - "

The f o l l o w i n g i s f r m CO, I & R Platoon,

1, Inf, 9 t h D i v i s i o n s
aT r a i n i n g i n booby treps, mines a n d demolitions should be given t o a 11 I & R
parsorinel, The p l a t o o n s h o u l d be a u t h o r i z e d mine d e t e c t o r s f o r t h i s work.
b e More emphasis i n training should be placed on i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of enemy armor,
branches of s e r v i c e , r a n k or '@ado, and organizntion and employment of enemy u n i t e .
c . S u f f i c i e n t narkermnship t r a i n i n g should be given men armed with t h e t o n w
t o e n a b l e them t o f i r e from a n y p o s i t i o n .
d. F i r s t a i d k i t s should be a u t h o r i z e d f a r I & R jeep8 and m r e thorough t r a i n i n g
i n first a i d should be g i v e n I & R parsomel.

2 The f o l l o w i n g is f'rcan 3-2, Id, 9 t h D i v i s i o n ; .

a. W should have i n our i n t e l l i g e n c e p l a t o o n a number of men who can speak French
and/or German. Each a s s a u l t b a t t a l i o n should have a t l e a s t one interrogator who can
speak t h e language of t h e c o u n t r y and of t h e enemy.
b. ' m i n e d i n t e l l i g e n c e 2ersonnel should be amng. t h e f i r s t t o e n t e r a c a p t u r e d
f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n , con~~lsnd post, o r o t h e r inathllations t h a t rnay c o n t a i n documsnts or.
equipment of m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e value.

1. purposes and r e s u l t s . The 83rd D i v i s i o n has i n i t i a t e d , a n d v a l u e s t i & l y , a

c o u r s e of ir~structionf o r mplacements. ~ t purpose s is t o n d e b ~ k *many of t h e i d e a s
t h a t t h e s e men h d plcked up p r i o r t o a r r i v a l , and t o i n s t r u c t them i n s p e c i a l f i g h t -
i q t e c h n i q u e s and t h e u s e of c e r t a i n weapons. '310 a p p r e h e n s i o n of new men h a s been
reduced a n d t h e i r self-confidence and morale g r e a t l y b e n e f i t e d by t h e course.

2, Description. The c o u r s e lasts two and one-half days and is conducted by b a t t l e

experienced personnel. During t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h e men a r e t r a i n e d i n g o u p s of 12 and
are a s s i g n e d - t o s u b o r d i n a t e u n i t s by those groups. T h i s r e d u c e s t h e s t r a n g e n e s s of t h e
new o r e n i z a t i o n . he s u b j e c t s s t r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e a r e t
a. H m t o l i v e i n a fax h o l e , T h i s i n c l u d e s c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f o x h o l e and
means of p r e s e r v i n g h e a l t h and b o d i l y c l a n l i n e s s under such c o n d i t i o n s .
be The s p i r i t of t h e o f f e n s i v e . Emphasis is p l a c e d on t h e danger o f a l l o w i n g
themselves t o become pinned down and s u b j e c t s d t o mrtar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e .
c. The u s e and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n grenade, a n t i t a n k grenade and
t h e bazooka. About 25 p e r c e n t f i r e t h e a n t i t a n k grenade and thebazooka and a 1 1 ob-
serve t h e i r effectivenesa,
d* 3ome t a c t i c s and technique of hedgerow f i g h t i n g .

111 FIELD IMPROVISATIONS.

1. U s a s of t h e SCH 300. A b a t t a l i o n commander i n t h e 8 3 r d D i v i s i o n h a s used t h e

SCR 300 e f f e c t i v e l y f o r cammunication w i t h t h e b a t t a l i o n ammunition DP t o d i r e c t t h e
mvament o r r e a u p p l y q u i c k l y wherever needed* He a l s o recammends p l a c i n g an sCR 3120,
when a v a i l a b l e , at t h e b a t t a l i o n a i d s t a t i o n t o a i d i n t h e e v a c u a t i o n of wourdedo I n
general h e has f o u n d t h e set one of t h e most dependable means of colrnnunication w i t h i n
the b a t t a l i o n .

2 Improvised m u n t s f o r U. The 2nd D i v i s i o n a d n a n c e u f f i c e r r e p o r t e t h e use

of t h e f o l l o w i n g e x p e d i e n t s f o r d i r e c t machine gun f i r e a t r a n g e s of 100 y a r d s and
l e s s . They a r e g e n e r a l l y used only f o r f i r i n g s h o r t b u r s t s w i t h t h e l i g h t machine
m e o r more of t h e v a r i o u s t y p e s a r e s u p p l i e d t o each michine gun squad.
a. I n s t a l l a t i o n of a BAR bipod on t r u n n i o n of t h e U G . ~n improvised s t o c k s i u -
lar i n shape t o t h a t of t h e German MG 42, made f r m s h e e t mtital, r e i n f a r c e d with wood,
is a t t a c h e d by f o u r screws t o t h e p i s t o l grip. This, i n e f f e c t , c o n v e r t s t h e l 9 1 9 h
t o a 1919~6.
b. ~ t t a c h m e n tof two metal r o d s from t h e 105 m c l o v e r l e a f m u n i t i o n p c k , bent
i n t o r o c k e r shape. They a r e a t t a c h e d lengthways on each s i d e , one end t o t h e t r u n n i o n
and t h e o t h e r t o t h e e l e v a t i o n lug. ' f i e shoulder s t o c k d e s c r i b e d i n a above is used.
c. Attachment of a s p i k e , 1 2 t o 15 i n c h e s l o n g and l/2 t o 314 of-an i n c h i n d i a -
meter, sharpened a t one end and f i t t e d with a simple yoke a t the o t h e r . 'i'he yoke is
a t t a c h e d t o t h e t r u n n i o n w i t h a b o l t . A f l a n g e , t h r e e i n c h e s i n diameter, i s a t t a c h e d
t o t h e s t o c k about f o u r i n c h e s from t h e p o i n t . when a t t a c h e d , the s p i k e swings from
t h e trunnion. b e s h o u l d e r s t o c k m y b e used o r t h e gun f i r e d w i t h j u s t t h e p i s t o l
grip*
d. I n emergency t h e gun i s sometimes f i r e d with no mount a t a l l . l'he b a r r e l i s
l a i d o n a hedgerow or any convenient o b j e c t , and f i r e d i n s h o r t b u r s t s . Asbestos
gloves a r e sometimes used by t h e gunner.
 TWELTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 17 I I AUC 1944

a m t t l e B p e r i e n c e s u a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable

units i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ m n i sn France. Although t h e experierlces of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
particular l o m t i o n a r e not necessarily applicable to a l l u n i t s i n a l l situations,
t h e items published w i l l b e t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e r e c o m n d e d
far c a r e f u l c o n a i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be detarmined.

By cormand of t h e Army Group C o m n d e r :

H. B. r n I S
Brigadier Ceneral, U s
- - ------------.-----.--.-.. Ad j u t a n t General

(NCTrE; ?he following m a t e r i a l i s e x t r a c t e d f r a m a document prepared by t h e chief of

t h e A r m r e d S e c t i o n , Twelfth Army Group, a f t e r a v i s i t t o three s e p a r a t e tank b a t t a -
l i o n s which had p a r t i c i p a t e d in cambat.. These a x t r a c t s appear t o have s o m c h value
far a l l tank u n i t s , and f o r mny u n i t s of o t h e r arms, t h a t they a r e reproduced i n t h i s
farm t o permit wider d i s t r i b u t i o n . )

I TAM-INFANTRY -HONE C ~ C I I ~ O M .

1. U1 t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s were e n t h u s i a s t i c about t h e telephones mounted on t h e

backs of tank8 f o r c o ~ i c a t i o nwith i n f r n t r y leaders. They f e e l , however, t h a t
f u l l actvantage i s not teken of t h i s equipment f o r t h e following reasonas:
a. To nuke t h e i d e a completely e f f e c t i v e , a l l t a n k s ahould be s o equipped.. ?his
h a s not been done,
be B n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o o b t a i n tank f i r e support have been missed because a l l
of t h e i n f a n t r y were not i a f o m d t h a t t h e telephones had been i n s t a l l e d .

11 W I N I N G OF TANK REPIACBENTS

1. The need is f e l t f o r t r a i n i n g c o u r s e s f o r both comnissioned and e n l i s t e d tank

replacements. Such courses, i f w e l l planned, would r e s u l t i n i n c r e a s e d e f f i c i e n c y and
nrutual confidence. Reconnnendationa a r e f a r a two-weeh c o u r s e f o r each group, a l l
o t h e r t r a i n i n g t o be suapended during t h e period. Reconmended s u b j e c t s a r e a s f o l l o w s f
a. For Officers:: A r e f r e s h e r course of two weeks concentrated on r a d i o procedure
and r a d i o presence t o g i v e confidence i n t a l k i n g over t h e r a d i o , p l a t o o n maneuvering,
map reading, s l i d e x , f i r s t echelon tank maintenance (crew maintenance), tank weapons
and tank driving.
 be Far e n l i s t e d men: I n t e n s i v e t r a i n i n g i n d r i v i n g ; gunnery; r a d i o ; crew m i n -
tenance;, u s e of s i g h t s . binoculars and o t h e r tank equipment. These s u b j e c t s a r e
recommended because replacements most r e q u i r e d a r e of tank c-nders , d r i v e r s and
gunners.

I11 SUGGES'IXQIJS FOR SPECIAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE.

1. Use of a r t i l l e r y . a. A r t i l l e r y preparation should be concentrated on improved
r o a d s perpendicular t o t h e a x i s of advance. It has been found t h a t enemy tanks and AT
weapons f r e q u e n t l y amplace themselves on t h e s e roads.
b. A r t i l l e r y f i r e on hedgerows which do not contain a road should b e secondary.
F i r e on f i e l d s i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . .

2.. Suggestions f o r i n f a n t r y . a. I n f a n t r y acconpinying; tanks should a v o i d using

an opening t h a t a tank has j u s t used. The enemy f r e q u e n t l y l a y s on these openings
inmediately the passage of the tank i s observed.
b. White phosphorous grenades hive been v e r y s u c c e s s f u l l y used by i n f a n t r y t o
p o i n t o u t targeto t o t h e tanks.
ce I n f a n t r y s u p p l i e s such a s grenades and amnunition, and even r a t i o n s and n o t a r ,
can be c a r r i e d i n boxes on the r e a r of tanks. This p l a n b s been used and bas been
both s u c c e s s f u l and convenient.

IV RELIEF OF TANKS FOR REPmSHbIENT.

lLfter being i n a c t i o n f o r a considerable time, t a n k platoons must withdraw t o
r e p l e n i s h a m n i t i o n a n d f u e l . When the i n f a n t r y observes t h i s withdrawal, they f e e l
they a r e being d e s e r t e d and t e n 4 t o withdrew themselves. Thia has been avoided by
t h e following method*. one tank platoon completely fueled and with a m u n i t i o n i s kept
i n the r e a r . This platoon r e l i e v e s a platoon on t h e l i n e by i n f i l t r a t i o n , one tank
a t a time. When t h e r e l i e v e d platoon is assembled, i t proceeds t o t h e company dump,
r e p l e n i s h e s i t s f u e l and a,mmunition, and r e t u r n s t o a p o s i t i o n i n t h e r e a r of t h e l i n e
and r e l i e v e s t h e n e x t platoon by t h e same method. The i n f e n t r p n seeing a tank move
forward a t t h e same time a tank noves back r e a l i z e s that h i s support has not diminished.

V INFAN?RY-ARTIUERY C O O R D ~ O N . (Obeervations mhde by the o f f i c e r s i n b c a t e d . )

1. A d d i t i o m l FO'so am t h i s country observation is l i m i t e d , and a forward ob-

s e r v e r a t b a t t a l i o n s i s n ' t enough. We hive, t h e r e f o r e , placed a n a d d i t i o n a l forward
obeerver w i t h each f r o n t l i n e company, u s u a l l y about s i x on the d i v i s i o n f r o n t . me
c o q a n y forward observer i s a s s i s t e d by one sergeant and a r e b o operator-driver. He
has wire l i n e t o t h e l i a i s o n o f f i c e r a t t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n and a n 8CR 610. As
soon a s more open country is reached, t h e s e company observers w i l l not b e needed. How-
ever, a t p r e s e n t they l i v e with the i n f a n t r y wherever they goon--Executive O f f i c e r ,
2nd Division A r t i l l e r y .

2- W n a c t i o n under a r t i l l e r y fire. nqe have had to have our i n f a n t r y withdraw

two t o f o u r hundred yards b e f o r e s t a r t i n g a p r e p a r a t i o n before a n a t t a c k i n t h i s country.
I t h i n k the Germam g e t a s c l o s e a s posaible t o our f r o n t l i n e s t o g a i n some p r o t e c t i o n
f r m our e r t i l l e r y . ?hat seems t o be a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r t a c t i c s here. They w i l l
n o t t a k e what Isavenworth would c a l l a good defense position. No matter how f a s t they
a r e r e t r e a t i n g , i f you s t o p and d i g i n , they w i l l i n f i l t r a t e r i g h t back to the next
h e d g e r o r s e a - - ~ r t i l l e r y Commnder , 2nd Division.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. I8 12 AUC 1944

r a t t l e n p e r i e n c e s u are p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s o f o u r t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ e r m n si n France. d t h o u & t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p r t i c u l a r l o c a t l o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u h t i o n s ,
t h e itens p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and are recommended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l w . R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e r x c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l e r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By commnd of t h e ~ r m g w
. oup Comunder~.

B r i g a d i e r General, U S
~ dj u t e n t G e n e r a l

I IAUI\TCHIIJ'G OF BAILEY BRIDGE BY ' I ! ! .

The f o l l o w i n g i n c i d e n t of t h e I t h l i a n c a n ~ i g ni s e x t r a c t e d from a p u b l i c a t i o n of
t h e B r i t i s h war Officeg:

s m o t h e r i d e a developed d u r i n g t h e t r a i n i n g was t h e l a u n c h i n g o f e ~ a i l e ybricige

by t a n k s . 'lb c a r r y o u t t h i s t a s k , two t s n k s were employed, both e s p e c i a l l y f i t t e d ,
and one having t h e t u r r e t and gun removed. , h e t a s k was a c t u l l y e x e c u t e d most suc-
c e s s f u l l y d u r i n g t h e a s s a u l t , and t h e b r i d g e was s a f e l y h u n c h e d i n t h e f a c e of enem
o p p o s i t i o n on t h e f a r bank. A t that p o i n t i t would have been m p o s s i b l e t o have b u i l ;
r B a i l e y b r i d g e i n t h e n o m l way. T h i s b r i d g e was one o f t h e o n l y two a v a i l a b l e d u r .
i n g t h e f i r s t day of t h e c r o s s i n g e l

"We a r e s u c c e s s f u l l y u s i n g b a n g a l o r e t o r p e d o e s t b blow o p e n i n g s i n hedgerows f o r

t a n k s * We p l a c e two o r t h r e e t o r p e d c s s , d e p e n b n g on t h e h e i & t and growth of t h e
hed@;e, a b o u t f o u r f e e t a p a r t and about o n e - t h i r d t h e h e i g h t of t h e mund from ~ t bast s
fie have t h e t a n k s push t h e t o r p e d o e s through t h e h e a g e . * - - & p t a l n , E n g Combat gn.

I11 XEDIUb4 ARTILLERY.

1. "re men i n a b a t t e r y should be trajined a s computerso I have t r a i n e d my t e l l

phone o p e r t i t o r s , and, althougL t h e y my n o t be used a s computers, I f i n d t h a t they ca;
do 6 much b e t t e r job a s t e l e p h o n e o p e r a t o r s by having had t h i s training.
2. nIn o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e our a n g l e of t r a v w s e , we r e v e r s e t h e t r a i l spade - k i n
i t f l u s h w i t h t h e ground t o f a c i l i t a t e r a p i d movement.
 3. w'rirne f i r e , u n l e s s ob,sorveri, r e s u l t s i n hn e x c s s s i v e number of d u u s . *ere is
need f ' o r a p e r c u s s i o n f u s e s i m i l a r t c t h t t used tiy l i & t a r t j I l e r y . * - - I , & JOT, - j.I't-
i l l e r y Be t t a l j . o n (medium).

IV P I S FOR ,12.i.f-ig{s.
m. (Coriii11:s
7,-
o f a l i e u t e n a n t i n tke - i,m::>red ~ivlsicn)

1. I n t r a l n l n g tank crews, t o o much p r h c t ~

ce 111 acc1~l1.1n k si.eed ? n I ~ W Ir a n l p u l a -
t l o n chnnot b e C l - ~ e n .

2. fl;ve &kt. i t SC,> t o f i r e i n t o till ?.tll t l u i l r , i r L c s , rcc they i:;vu~*iab l ; c o n t ~ i n

s n i p e r s a n d m c h l n e gunners. 'iie e l s o c u t c m n i c a t i c n l i . ~ l e s2 , s v4e c?c~rel:cs.

3. nun t h e r e c e n t b r e a k - t h r o u g h we m v e d o u r t h n k s i u colrura a l o x t h e rokliu ~ m t l l

t h e l f t c ~ c iIj t & r A wtly i'irec on, t h e n w e a e p l o y e d o r pushed b y , de2enal1i.g on t h e m t u r e
of t h e t e r r a i n . If w e were n o i e b l e t o knc~ck o u ~t h e enemy k r i c r a n ~ i t a n k.un from a
f l a n k , vfe by-gassed it.

4 . Wrlhe anew u s e s .?'J c a l i b e r v;eapons e . g a i n s t t a n k s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r a n g e . A

tank t h E t r e c e i v e s .30 c a l i b e r f i r e is v e r y l i k e l y t o get a s h e l l i n a s h o r t L l r n e .

5 Wr p r o t e c t i o n a e i n s t b u t t e r f l y tombs w e d i g a l a r c e t r e n c h ?rid p ~ r h t a n k EI

o v e r i t , l e a v i n g a s m e l l e n t r t n c e h o l e on one end.

6. f l C a s u t l t i e s a a o n e crews of o u r tanks t b a t heve been s e t o n f i r e are s u r p r i s l n g 1 j

low, u s w l l y only one o r two. The s u l l erti,o f i r e d i r e c t e d a t crews, abandon] np tarrhs
is v e r y ~ n a c c u r s t e ,

7 0 #NO i n f l a m b l e r i t e r i e l s s h o u l d ev;:r be k e p t i n s i d e b tank.

8, WCcntinue t o f i r e a t a n eiieny t a n k u n t i l i t catch-es f i r e t o preveilt i t s r e 1 : ~ j . r

end immediate u s e a s pillbox.

9. W e m y weapons e r e u s u t l l y oic:sc: e t $he f i n e l d r i v e h o u s i n e of our t t ~ n k s .

l o o Wmnk crews s h ~ u l dwear s t e e l h e l m e t s o v e r t h e i r t a n k helmets.

11. flTanks s h o u l d adverice t h r o u c h t h e c e n t e r ~ f a field i n s t e a d of c l o s e t o t h e

hedgerows, i n o r d e r t o a v o i d bazookh fir6.n

1. ~ g u c c e s s f u la n d r a p i d e v a c u a t i o n o f wounded depends upon t

a. A g g e s s i v e n e s s o f unit s u r g e o n s - - t h a t is, k e e p i n g p e r s o n n e l a n d i n s t s l l a t i ~ n s
w e l l forward.
b. C l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n t a c t between d i v i s i o n s u r g e o n and s u r g e o n s o f sub-
ordirlate units.
c. E s t a b l i s h i n g ambulance l o a d i n g p o i r ~ t sa l o n g axis of advance."--3urgeon,
Armred Division.

2. % A r e e f f i c i e n t ambulance r o u t e m r k i n y s y s t e m from t h e f r o n t t o c l e a r l n e s t & -

t i o n s i s needed. bjany ambulance Cirivers l o s e t h e i r way and mdch t i m e 1s l o s t I n r e a c h -
ing t h e c l e a r i r ~station."-Captain,
~ 1st I n f a n t r ~ G
; ivision.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 19 13 AUC 1944

a k t t l e Dpariencesn are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i e heradquartera t o enable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops nor
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n France. U t h o u g h the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r a not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t e i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e reconmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which m y encounter similar problems. Reports
of corroborative or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By colr~llandof t h e ~ r ? n ycroup Carrmanderr t

Brigadier General, US1

Adjutant General

I COMBAT YIIAIW1NG9. (From i n f a n t r y platoon l e a d e r s o f t h e 9 t h ~ i v i e i o n )

-
1. Move. none of t h e f a t a l mistakes made by i n f a n t r y replacements i a t o h i t t h e
ground and f r e e z e when f i r e d upon. Once I ordered a q u a d t o advance from one hedgaro
t o another. During the movement one roan was h o t by a s n i p e r f i r i n g one round. Ihe
e n t i r e squad h i t t h e ground a n d froze. ?hey were picked o f f , one by one, by t h e aam
sniper.

2. Don't hwve. %!en should be taught t o play 'dead'--that i a , r a m i n p e r f e c t l y

s t i l l - - i f wounded by s n i p e r f i r e . I f they move, t h e s n i p e r w i l l f i r e again.

3. Follow Barregee. *?here i e a tendency, e s p e c i a l l y among new men, t o became

overconfident when the a t t a c k follows a heavy bmbardment such as t h a t o f 25 July 1944
hbny of them thought a l l t h e Germane i n t h e a r e a would be e i t h e r k i l ed or wounded, an
a l l they had t o do was t o t a k e over t h e ground. t
In t r a i n i n g i t ahou d be c o n s t a n t l y
s t r e a a e d t h a t a i r bombardment and a r t i l l e r y barrages do not d e s t r o y t h e memy but only
d r i v e them under ground and temporarily disorganize them, thereby m k i n g them, f o r a
s h o r t t i m e , m r e v u l n e r a b l e t o infantrynen following c l o s e behind t h e barrages.

4.
the BAR.
mow t h e BAR.
I have r e c e
"
n t l y
b e l i e v e t h e r e i a a need f o r more i n t e n s i v e t r a i n i n g with
l o s t t h r e e men who claimed they were expert U F l men and w e e
so c l a s s i f i e d on t h e i r Form 20'a. These men were k i l l e d because they were not m f f -
c i e n t l y t r a i n e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of this weapon. B e BBR i s a m a t s f f e c t i v e weapon
i n hedgerow f i a t i n g and should heve h i g h l y t r a i n e d personnel t o o p e r a t e it.

5 . Be A l e r t . won one occasion, t h e f a i l u r e of two n e w replacementa t o r e a l i z e t h

v a l u e of c o n s t a n t watchfulnes and a l e r t n e e s r e s u l t e d i n t h e l o s s of two of my noncom-
missioned o f f i c e r s . The men on t h e l i s t e n i n g p o s t m v e d back t o r e p o r t ~emmnau s i n g
 ~ jFch
J L ~ ~ E R ~t r
..;,,,1- , c s l l i n z o ~ itn 3ngI.l.sh. p~1-2r 2 t h e i r ahsc:r.ce, tni. GarrE~rs s l i p g e l
: ~ f '
i n t o our u r e a arlu k i 1;ed ~vro ,'fmy r~oncornr:lissj.orlAd o L f l.cers bef0-e t h e y were discovered.

1. ':he.
fclllowiny coaii011ts e r e s u m r i z e d fr.om st;tenr:r.%.z nr.30 b y t h e cG, -
iw,:mc?d ijivisi.on > i u d menikera of h i s sthfl', based upon ~ U G C ~ S S I operz.Lions
' ~ ~ ~ com-
zi:::ic~~{: 2-5 J u l y 1 5 h i 4 t ,
6. I l , E a c h i ~ ~ gcois ; ~ r . , o r e c? r i r ~ c i g l = sa ~ c ! t . e c t i c s u r : soundo ~ g : ~ r e s s i v e n e scapnot
~r
be i ~ ~ e ; c ~ i l e s i z e dSllccesu
. i n OLZ ~'ecenLY engzcenent is b e l i e v e d t o heve been c h i e f l y
due t o t h e f t ~ c t' i k i ~ ; u ! i t ~ 'i:er'e o r d e r e d not $0 s t 0 2 b u t tc !:.eei: d r i . ~ i ~ i g .C s one occa-
s i o n a ' u n i z r e p o r t e d i t was h e l d u;? by enemy m i n e f i e l d s * It was o r d e r e d t o cuah
tbsc,ugh s n d t a k e t h e l o s s e s . ,;:hen t h e l e ~ l d i n gt a n k drew fire, t h e o t h ' e ~ .t a n k s deployed
and o w h e d on throui!h, overrun;iing a n d knock] n ~ o u t ecerq r e s i s t e n c e or: t h e m v e . In
Imst c e s e s ;he Germins ~r;c\ul.l f ' i r e e few ro1lr.d~and e i t h e r r e t r e e t o r s u r r e n d e r . We
a r e ccjnvinced t h a t 31,ck. e L E r e s e i l ~ e n e s smearis fewer l o s ~ e sir both men and equipment.
Had vc s t c p p d ar?d at',e.m~ted.t c ruaneuver, t h e Garmiis would have brought a r t i l l e r y and
0i,f16r f i r e s upon us. '20 d e l a y or s t 0 2 i s p l a y i n g i n t c t h e enemy's hands.
b e flour edvance w a s cc,ntinued even wken c n e b a t t s l i o n was c o n p l s t e ? y c u t o f f f o r
a b c u t 36 hours. 3 : i a b a t t a l i o n continued t o f i [ & t i t s way f s - ~ m r d ~'The b a t t a l i o n in
r e a r tilso pushed e h e a d and t h e r e s ~ l twas e v e ~ t u e lr e e s tablisbment cf c o n t a c t between
bll .l:lits*"

111 LUCA'ilZi:IJ CF T ~ I i i l S I O i I.WTII.IkRY CP.

The a r t 1 l l e r y c o i m ~ n t i e ro f the 1st 11Ln~~iitrg D i v i s j on broke p r e c e d e n t d u r i n g r e c e n t

o p e r a t i o n s by l o c a t i n g h i s CP approxirmt e l y 6000 y h r d s i n f r o n t of the D i v i s i o n CP.
H i s a p l s A m t i o nwas:: I 1 l i k e my CP t o be i n the middle o f my b a t t a l i o n s . The communi-
c a t l o r l s a r e s h o r t e n e d , arid I can k e e p up h e t t e r w i t h what I s going on. I visited the
d j . v i s i n n cor-snander a t l e a s t twice each clay and k e p t a l i a i s o n o f f i c e r a t t h e d i v i s i o n
CP a t a l l t i m e s . "

Th e -
Corps A r t i l l e r y C o m n c i e r r e p o r t e d t h e f o l l o m i n g p l a n f o r u s i n g a chemical
Idortar B a t t a l i o n :

%e t h r e e c o n p a n i e s of t h e Corps chemical b a t t a l i ~ nwere armed w i t h 1 2 m o r t a r s

each. he f o u r t h was d i v i d e d i n t o a s e r v i c e company and a h e a d q u a r t e r s company. A
f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e r t e r w a s o r e n i z e a a n d t r a i n e d i n each company. The companies ( t h r e e
p l a t o o n s of four mortclrs e a c h ) were t r a i n e d under a r t i l l e r y d i r e c t i o n t o l a y and fire
t h e m r t a r s l i k e a n y o t h e r a r t i l l e r y v!etpono All 36 o f t h e s e m r k r s were used i n t h e
f i r e p l a n of t h e - D i v i s i o n when t h a t u i t jumped o f f on 7 July. Ten minutes a f t e r
t h e a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n was completed, the mrtar f i r e was brought down, By t h i s
tim t h e C-ermnshad c t ~ mo u t cf t h e i r f a h o l e s and m n y were kil l e d by these mrtars
a s shown by examination of t h e i r bodies. The m o r t a r s were used later to r e i n f o r c e
t h e f i r e s of t h e d i r e c t s u p p o r t tirtil3~e.r-ya n d d i d e x c e l l e n t work. To be used e f f e c t i v e 1
the m o r t a r crews muat be t r a i n e d a s u t i J l e r y m e n . f l
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 2 0 14 AUC 1944

# B a t t l e Experiences* a r e gublished r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable

u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s combat e q e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n France. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i ~ n s ,
t h e item8 published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recormnsnded
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l e m . R e ~ o r t s
of corroborative o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

Ey comnand of t h e Army Group Commander:

Brigadier General, USA

Adjutant General

WARNING TO PATROLS.

"he Germans w i l l l e t a p a t r o l get erroneous information i n o r d e r t o waylay t h e

troops t h a t t r y t o use the inf3rmation. On a e v e r a l occasions they have allowed cur
small p a t r o l s t o e n t e r v i l l a g e s and wander mound unmolested; when a combat p a t r o l
came t o t a k e over t h e v i l l a g e , i t encountered atrong resistance.*--&mormdum of
- Corps, 24 June 1944.

The method of having each d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n r e i n f o r c e d by a g e n e r a l support

b a t t a l i o n proved s u p e r i o r . It g e t 8 quick r e i n f o r c i n g f i r e s on m y t a r g e t holding up
t h e i n f a n t r y advance ( i f of s u f f i c i e n t importance t o j u s t i f y use of g e n e r a l support
Bns). It a l s o p e r m i t s planning f o r r e i n f o r c e d defensive f i r e s i n case of counter-
a t t a c k . The t h i r d advantage i s t o g i i e each i c f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n continuous support dur-
i n g displacement, s i n c e forward observers can f i r e e i t h e r b a t t a l i o n while t h e o t h e r is
displacing.-- Unit Report of t h e 1st lTlfantry Division.

It has been found p a r t i c u l a r l y eaay f o r our air OF'S t o s p o t 88 rmn guns when they
are f i r i n g a t high anglee againrrt our a i r c r a f t . When c l o s e a i r support m i s s i o n s a r e
flown i n t h e V Corps Zone, a d d i t i o n a l a i r Opts a r e u s u a l l y employed t o t a k e advantage
of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . These a r e u s u a l l y f u r n i s h e d f l a k maps i n advance by t h e a i r f o r c e
i r t e l l i g e n c e t o d i r e c t ' t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o suspected AAA locations.--Report from V Corps.
IV CHARACTERISTICS O F GHilKBN GUN POSITIONS.

A s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y of German gun p o s i t i o n s 80 f a r l o c a t e d i n t h e zone of t h e U S

V Corps i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b a t t e r i e s a r e u s u a l l y p l a c e d i n open f i e l d s w i t h open f i e l d s
a l l around. They are n e v e r found i n woods and r a r e l y i n hedgerows. F r e q u e n t l y they o r e
c l o s e t o a farmhouse which t h e p e r s o n n e l u s e f o r housing. F i r e ~ j o s i t i o n s f o r 3? guns
are f r e q u e n t l y found about 300 yards a p a r t on s i d e roads. These guns u s u a l l y move
a f t e r firing a feu rounds,-- Report from V Corps.

V COMBAT RAIWINGS,

COments of R i f l e Cmpany Commander, 9 t h Division:

1, "It i s mandatory t h a t a l t e r n a t e mortar p o s i t i o n s be s e l e c t e d two o r t h r e e hedye-

rows over and two o r t h r e e hedgerows i n r e a r of t h e primary fiosition. F a i l u r e t o mzke
use of a l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s c o s t me f i v e men of my m o r t a r platoon.

2. "The American s o l d i e r i s t o o c a r e l e s s i n unduly exposine; h i m e l f when i n view

of t h e enemy. I n d i v i d u a l l y he f e e l s t h a t some o t h e r n J o e n w i l l g e t s h o t and not he,
U n t i l t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s c o r r e c t e d , t h e b e s t camouflage is of l i t t l e v a l u e , "

1. " I n a r e c e n t m i s s i o n againat t a n k s W s h e l l a were used, but t h e smoke ! ~ r o d u c ~ d

by t h e burning phosphorous screened t h e withdrawal of some of t h e enemy t a n k s .

2. * A r t i l l e r y m e n need more p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n i n g a c q u i r e d by d i g g i n g - - a s a r t i l l e r y
p o s i t i o n s r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i g g i n g in.*--Captain, FA, 1st D i v i s i o r .

* S n i p e r s have not been a s n m e r o u s d u r i n g t h e r e c e n t f a s t moving phase of t h e

a t t a c k a s when t h e s i t u a t i o n was more s t a t i c . They u s u a l l y band t o g e t h e r i n s m a l l
groups r a n g i n g from f i v e t o f i f t y men. Our means of d e a l i n g with s n i p e r s i s t o sweep
t h e area a s c l e a n l y a s p o s s i b l e a s we advance, s p r a y i n g s u s p s c t e d s n i p e r positions w i t h
BAR f i r e . Movements of p e r s o n n e l i n areas i n t h e immediate r e a r of f r o n t l i n e a s h o u l d
be i n g r o u p s c o n s i s t i n g o f s e v e r a l men r a t h e r than g r o u p s of two or t h r e e , o r i n d i v i d -
u a l s . S n i p e r s w i l l not f i r e on l a r g e g r o u p s but w i l l a t t e m p t t o p i c k o f f i n d i v i d u a l s
and groups of two o r t h r e e . A l l men n e a r t h e f r o n t should be r e q u i r e d t o remain i n
f o x h o l e s d u r i n g b r i e f r e s t p e r i o d s o r o v e r n i g h t . Some t e n d t o leave t h e i r f o x holes
and wander around over t h e a r e a . They not only s u b j e c t thsmselves t o s n i p e r f i r e , but
i n v i t e a r t i l l e r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n s on t h e i r position^,^-- Company Cawnander, 1st Division.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 21 I S AUC 1944

'Battle Gxperiencesn a r e published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o eaable

unite i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r o m t h e l a t e e t combat experiences of our troopn now
f i g h t i n g the Germans i n France. Although the' experiences of c e r t a i n unite a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s in a l l s i t u a t i o n & ,
t h e itemu published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamended
f o r careful coneideration by u n i t s which may encounter simllar problgms. Reporta
of corroborative o r contrary experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y .of t h e indicated b a t t l e leaeon may be determined.

By command of the Army Group Connnrad@rI

&
Brigadier General, USA
Ad jutant General
...................................................................................
I (~MEW YARNINGS. (From a Company Connnander, l e t ~ i v i e i o n . )

1. 'Men ehould be required t o dig fox holea inetead of slit trencher. Even
"hough they may not be overrun by tanks, they are much b e t t e r protected againat enemy
$ e l l f i r e and s t r a f i n g . Coverr ovem fox hole8 a r e e s s e n t i a l t o protect againet t r e e
l u r s t e of artillery s h e l l s and b u t t e r f l y bombs. Recently there hae been a noticeable
l a x i t y o r carelesaneas toward digging in, due t o t h e f a a t m v i n g eituation. Numerow
c a n a l t i e s h a r e r e s u l t e d , especially in the v i c i n i t y of platoon and company C-
post8 t h a t were not dug in when it w a s known they would be t h e r e only f o r a s h o r t time.

2. W r i c t e r adherence t o t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s pertaining t o mvement of troop8 by

= t o r s should be emphaeized. This appliee t o distances between vehicle8 and s e l e c t i o n
of entrucking and detrucking are-. Departure from establiehed principle8 of motor
movement has no doubt been caused by our overwhelming a i r s u p e r i o r i t y and pow ground
observation due t o heavy vegetation and comparatively f l a t t e r r a i n . As we have m v e d
south, we find t h e t e r r a i n t o be more r o l l i n g o r h i l l y , o f f e r i q b e t t e r observation
f o r t h e emmy, He i e ale0 f l y i n g mare air missions during daylight bours. On one
occaeion, one unit warr loaded on t r u c b on t h e forward elope of a h i l l in view of
en= ground observation. AD soon as t h e trucks were loaded and about t o move out,
J e w opened up with h i s a r t i l l e r y , c a w i n g cerruoltier and damage t o vehicles.

3. When truck columrrs a r e = r i n g with W r tanka should be diaperred along t h e

column. Unless t h i s is done, t h e ensmy w i l l l e t the tanka a t the head p ~ by
s and
open f i r e on the t r u c b I n the rear.

4. 'Z'ield jackete, especially a t night, r e f l e c t l i g h t , thereby increasing die-

covery by the anmmy. We have smeared oure with green dye t o increase camou$'iags.R
(From a Field Artillery Information Wllletin fllom the North African Theater)

1. @It has been found that on long OP l i n e s , the practice of eatabliahing t e s t

s t a t i o m , permansntly manned, a t the baas of t h e OP h~ been adrantagaoun. On theae
l i n e s t h e breaks are caused mainly by e h e l l f i r e , and i t is necessary t o repaix. the
linea several times a day. The use of the forward t e a t etatione enables crews t o
e t a r t a t both ends of the l i n e simultaneously, find the br& and put the line back
i n service with miniitam delay.

2. 'Oling t o the large number of c i r c u i t s t h a t follow the same routes, unite

should devise some method of d i s t i n c t t a g marking of c i r c u i t e , e. g., large wooden
tam stenciled with unit code name.

3. 'Wire crews soon learn the l i t t l e tricka t h a t simplify the whole conmnmica-
t i o n problem. They service a l i n e properly and c a r e f i l l y during i n s t a l l a t i o n 80 that
breaks w i l l be minimized, thua allowing them t o get a normal amount of sleep. When
wire does gp out, repair c r m , instead of running up and down a l i n e with t e s t
c l i p s , check the location of enemy shelling and proceed t o the scene of the shelled
area, uatjally finding t h e i r trouble r i g h t there."

111 TACTICS OF CHlMILN RVANTRY IIWTITUK D l D E X S S .

(Notes The substance of the following description of the antitank methods

of German infantry units i a extracted from a B r i t i s h source.)

1. The defense planrs of G e m n infantry companies usually aaaign t o bazooka sec-

tions the r o l e of defending narrow tank lanes and defilated approaches. Open area8
a r e covered by A. T. guzm.

2. The bazooka is regarded as relatively s t a t i c , t o be f i r e d from a prepared

position. The grenade diecharger is treated as a mobile reserve weapon and held back
a t antitank Company Bq. Bazooka sectiona a r e usually allqted t o the infantry corn
paniea against which a tank a t t a c k is conaidered mst likely. Bazookae usually work
-
i n group6 of three, s i t e d i n a @Vm formation es indicated i n the achematic diagram
below. From t h i s formetion a t l e a s t two reapoars can engage a tank approaching from
any direct ion. 4
"7"

3 . The emplacement f o r the bazooka is ueually a "VV"shaped p i t , with t h e prongs

toward the enemy. The weapon is f i r e d from the m e t suitable prong, according t o the
direction of approach of the hostile tank. After loading the weapon, the loader takes
s h e l t e r from the back-blast i n t h e opposite arm. The loader, srmed w i t h a sub-machine
gun, i a responeible for protection of the position again& ground troops.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 22 16 AUC 1944

rmt t l e m a r i e n c e s f l a r e published regularly by t h i s headquartera to a m b l e

units i n training to p r o f i t from the l a t e s t wmbat srperisnces of our troops nor
fighting t h e t.Xmmm i n France. Uthough the w e r i e n c e s of oartain u n i t s a t a
partiaular location a r e not necessarily applicable to a l l U t e i n a l l situatiolur,
the iteme published w i l l Be those based on p a c t l e a l ezperienae and a r e reaom~bnded
f a r careful coneideration by unita which m y encounter similar problems. Reports
of oorroborative or contrary eo;prisncee a r e particularly desired i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e lesson mey be dsterminsd.

By -8 of the umy Group Cn~~.ander:

Brigpdiar Osnuwal* USA

Adjutant Oeasral
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o o o o o ~ - o o ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

(NOTE: The following cam~entswere nrade by the Cnmanndlng General of an linmored ~ i v i -

sion r o w d i n g recent o f f a a i v e ao2ion by his unit.)
1. Fi&ting i n hedgerow aountry. a. W ' e got i n t o trouble when we advanced too
rapidly i n t o an open area which had been uaed an a 1an-g field. It was too -11
for our tanks to maneuver i n but large enough f m the enerqy t o coordinate t h e i r f i r e
in. B e y l e t ua advanoe about 500 yarda into i t before they opened up. What we Aould
have done was to send a oouple of tanks and eonm infantry acrosa ahead.
b. @oneof our battalione which was most suaceesful stayed w e l l away from t h e
hedgerows. B i e battalion advanaed rapidly and suffered a W t no loaaes frcun books
fire. m t h e r thing thie battalion did was t o spray w e r y t r e e i n aight before awe-
ing i n t o the open. Ibis took a l o t of Amraln.lticm, but i t a l s o got r i d of a l o t of mor-
tar obsaners.
a. #On one occasion* one of our t a a k foraes euffered heavily from mortar tree
burets while carroealed i n a woods. The l o m e s stopped when the f o r m me moved i n t o
an open f i e l d . The martars were registered on the rooda but had no observation of t h e
field.

2. Reconnaissance. a. *Our reconnaiaaanoe elements worked very closely t o us--

jut ahead. They were alwaya accompanied by medium tanks. 'Iheir work was vary efffeut-
ive, as they could push aside minor reaietapce and furniah u s quiak and d e h i l e d infor-
=time
 b. *slow thinking on one occasion oatwed ua aoneidarable l o e s of tiam. he reoon-
naiasance unit oent t o reoonnoitar f o r a r i v e r crossing advanoed t o a bridge through a
narrow gorge which prevented the r e h i o l e r from leaving the road. They found B span out
of the bridge but located a nearby f o r & Zhey r e m i n e d i n place t o guard both bridge
and ford. when t h e engineer equipment t r i e d t o e o ~ l e forward to r w k , it could mt get
paet t h e reeonrraieeance rshicles. The reoomnaiessace p a r t y ahould have left perearnel
and reaporrs o f f the road at3 a guard. It should a l s o have prevebted other vehioler
entaring ahead of the engineer equipmsnt.

3. speed of advan-. a. *l%e aomnandar of a n a r m r e d unit mmt be alert to take

wary advantage of opportunitiee to use the roads, but he met be equally alert t o
know- when they =tt be uaed. I do not know any way to t e l l how this can be b e - -
i t mat just be aenaed. A corplpander who can do i t oan aake a l o t of tirim with rela-
t i v e l y f w losses.
b. '(Zn one occasion one of r p ~ r combat conxmnde encountered strong opposition. It
l e f t an i n f a n t r y force t o watch the h o e t i l e opposition and r e n t ole- around i t t o
reach i t e objective*
4. Air-Tank Team. *& our advance became nnre rapid, four dive bombers aommpanied
each of our columns a l l the time. a A i r Farce o f f i c e r was with each ool1wnn. I think
t h e planea aaved us severe lossee on a number of occasione. Onae we were threatened
by a l a r g e number of Gerrrnn tanka. One of the bombere disappeared f o r a few minutea
but soon came back with 15 o r 20 othcr planes* when rapid movement i a poseible, thia
tank-dive bomber aombirmtion simply cannot be beaten. m e knowledge t h a t the plane8
a r e with then g r e a t l y inareasea the oonfidence of the armor. They h r they w i l l
reoeive aarnlng of a t h r e a t and a r e willing t o move aheed boldly. I think t h i s team
dsould always be USsd such ~ ~ r d i t i ~ ~ . m

1. l h e importame of complete and imPediate reporte of h o e t i l e & e l l i n g ehould be

emphasized in training. W e e r e p o r t s should b nmds t o the neareat a r t i l l e r y unit i n
the quickeat m n e r poeaible. 'Ihey should i m l u d e avsrythiag rhioh may furnish the
a r t i l l e r y with any information about the h o e t i l e b a t t e r y or b a t t e r i e s , including the
deoigwition and location, by ooordinates, of the point Prom r h i a h the o b e m a t i o n -4
mdsm the d i r e a t i o n fronrrhich the s h e l l s a r r i v e , e a t i m t e d d i e t a m e t o the h o e t i l e
w, tiere d u r i w r h i d the s h e l l i w ocourred, n u d e r an8 type of gum firing. number
and caliber of s h e l l 8 and nature of the fir+-whether harraaeing, interdiction, eta.

2. % e l l iragp~enta, p a r t i c u l a r l y those which ehor the ahape and aaoring of t h e

r o t a t i n g band reoerrs, o r uhioh show the o r i g i n a l curvature of the ahell, o b u l d be
r e n t t o the a r t i l l e r y with, or immdiately following, the report.

3. While these r e p o r t s do not always give the a r t i l l e r y s u f f i a i s n t infor~aation

to b r i n g darn aotmter-battery on the h o s t i l e guns a t once, they frequently do ro and
even where they do not, e i t h e r by thsmselves or eonsidered i n conneetion with other
information, f'urnioh paluable indiaationa of h o ~ t i l eartill- habits of routine.--
Report from V Corpe.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 23 16 AUC 1944

r g a t t l e aFperienceem a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i a h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enablm

u a i t e in t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e~rperienoesof our troops nor
f i g P t i n g t h e Germns i n France. Although t h e e x p m r i e n c e ~of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are n o t n e a e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t e i n all e i t u a t i o n a ,
thm items published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e r p a r i a n o e and are r e c w n d d
f o r c a r e f u l considaration by u n i t s which m y encounter s i m i l a r problemm. Reportr
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order that t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e indioated b a t t l m l e s s o n m y be dstarmined.

BY e-nd of t h e may Croup Camsindart

I

B r i g a d i e r General, USI
Ad j u t a n t Genaral

The following items are e x t r a c t e d from Training Mumrandurn dated 8 July 194.4, of
one of our- Corps i n I t a l y t

1. ~ i r p l a n e~ 0 4 rn
. sm 300 r a d i o on t h e regimental ohannel i n a l i a i s o n plane
i e inveluable f o r r e l a y .

2. G e o ~ a p h i aCode. ~n a fast moving s i t u a t i o n when r a d i o is the o n l y f e a s i b l e

mesas of conmnn5cation, a simple, pre-arranged geographic code is v a l u a b l e t o coor-
d i n a t e supporting fires of adjacent u n i t s and t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e epcecution of flank
movements i n each o t h e r s ' zones.

3. Movement of cnnm~ndm e t e . a. The CP reconneiseance m e t be mede by a n

o f f i o a r who has a u t h o r i t s t o m k e the f i n a l selection a t the time. Once correrlnica-
t i o n f a c i l i t i e s have bee6 conmitted, only major c o n s i d e r a t l o n e should cauae a change.
b. 'Ihe e s t a b l i a b a e n t o f advance switching c e n t r a l e a t t h e next s e l e c t e d l o c a t i o n
of the CP g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s epeed and . f l e x i b i l i t y .
c. Corps headquarters should be n o t i f i e d a t l e a a t s i x hours p r i o r t o movement o r
a d i v i a i o n CP i f t h e nsr l o c a t l o n i a t o be near a Corps a x i a along which wire hae
a l r e a d y been l a i d , and 24 hours i n advanae i f a change of a x i s i a involved.
d. S a r d c e troops t h a t r e q u i r e wire c ~ c a t i o n wt s be wed with the CPta
and bivouacked near them. I ~ n gl i n e e t o supporting u n i t e l o c a t e d f a r t o the rear
cause a d r a i n on f a c i l i t i e s which r e s u l t s i n reduced commnicariaa f o r conbat troops.
e. one d i v i s i o n employe t h e procedure of l e a v i n g t h e Chief of s t a f f a t the o l d
l o c a t l o n u n t i l t h e Commmding ~ e n e r a lo r a s t a f f member telephones him from the new
l o c a t i o n t o come forward. Thia i c r t h e b e s t poaeible method o f diaplacsment. I n some
u n i t s when mire was not complete t o t h e new l o c a t i o n , a n a e s i a t a n t a t a f f member w i t h
i n s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of the a i t u a t i o n and no a u t h o r i t y to make decisions was l e f t a t
the o l d l o c a t i o n , which was an unsatiefhctory s o l u t i o n t o the problem.

4. Command Responsibility. It is the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of corm~andsrst o g.t infor-

m t i o n back to high- headquarters whether w i r e is in o r note AB long as a cormandor
has one runner with him, he i s not rout of conrmnication*.

11 USE OF GERMAN THREE INCH MDRTAR.

1. *Captured Germin three inch martars a r e being used extensively by t h e heary

weapon companies of t h i s division. Our a m m i t i o n i m i n t e r c h ~ n g e e b l ewith nmnrnit i o n
of German three inch mortars, and we usually use . i t a s we have had prematurea with
captured Cenmn ammunition. The G - moktar has a range of 4500 yardr, and an
excellent s i g h t which has a r e v e r e i b l e c o l l i n a t a r and mirror t h a t permits placing
aiming atakes in rear of the morkr.

2. 'The range t a b l e for the & m m n mortar with our nmalnition i s the reame as
our 81m range t a b l e except t h a t a @mils* oolumo m a t be added because the Gerrman
mrtar s i g h t i a p a d u a t e d i n hiils*. For ranges between 3290 and 4.00 yards addi-
t i o n a l incrarneata are used.*--Ordnance Officar, Division.-

*When p r a c t i c a b l e I l i k e to i n i t i a t e t h e a t t a c k t h i r t y minutee p r i o r t o d a n .
We h a r e c a u a t the m a b e off guard a t Uua time, and he does not l i k e night fighting.
In one instance m captured, with au& a n attack, a Gemmn position t h a t I do not
believe we could haro taken i f we had waited u n t i l dawn t o attack. The met c a r e f u l
daylight reconnaieaance nuat be m d e p r i o r t o auch a n attacker-Infantry ~eghental
comndor, - Division.

IV AAA AS FIEID ARTILLERY.

(Views of a n a s s i s t a n t Corps u t i l l e r y Commander and the Cnnm~nderof a n
Group who have employed an CUP B e t t a l i o n a8 f i e l d a r t i l l a r y and have c r e d i t e d i t
with d e s t r u c t i o n of a n anapurcition ctump, P f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y aad o t h e r targets.)

1. *one excellent use f c c t h e m weapons waa execution of 'tlme-oa-target* f i r e n .

Surprise and d m a l i z i n g e f f e c t me achieved by eynchronization, s o t h a t a l l initial
rounds from t h e b a t t a l i o n a r r i v e d et the t a r g e t together. The high v e l o c i t y and rapid
r a t e of f i r e of the 90 mn gun are desirable o h a r a c t e r i s t i c e f o r t h i s type firm. Nonml
t a r g e t s were bivouaa areas, corrmand poet areas, a n d known coneentratione of personnel.

2. a m s t r u e t i o n f i r e on protected t a r g e t s is not a f f e c t i v e using present a v a i l a b l e

amunition. It i s f e l t t h a t two-thirda point detonating and one-third white phoaphar-
oug w o u l d be an e x e e l l e n t ameLnition r a t i o f a r use of the gun a a f i e l d artil1ary.m
 TWELFTH ARMY C d 0 8 ~

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 24 I8 AUC 1944

'Battle Experiencesm are published regularly by t h i s h4adquarters t o enable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e a t c m b a t experienaes of our troope now
f i g h t i = the Germane i n France. Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e e t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t e i n a l l rituationtr,
t h e items published rill be those based on p r a c t i o a l experience and a r e recoolmended
f o r careful consideration by u n i t e which may enaounter aimilar p ~ b l e u u . Reports
of a o m b o r a t i v e o r contrary exgeriencer a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e l e r s o n may be determined,

By cd
- of t h e lrmy Croup Comnanders

Brigadier Genaral , USA

Ad jutant Ganeral
-------------o---------------------o-----o-------------------------------------------

I 29th DIVISION BA!WU N O W

(From an a f t e r combat report of t h e 29th Infantry Division f o r July)

1. Infantry against Armor.
W experience has been t h a t properly t r a i n e d , w e s a i v e i n f a n t r y caa
knock out enemy self-propelled guns and srmor i n c l o s e country where our offensive
amnor cannot operate effectively. maaeuver Bhould always be employed t o g e t t h e
enuuy vehicle i n t h e flank with the bazooka o r r i f l e grenade. It war, proved i n one
b a t t l e t h a t German Panzer o u t f i t r without heavy i n f a n t r y aupport were unable t o cope
with aggressive i n f a n t r y tactics.'

2. M t t l e Drille.
W' e have found t h a t when battalion8 and l a r g e r u n i t s a r e out of the l i n e ,
they ahould eonduct t r a i n i n g t o omphasiza m a r t n e a s and precieion and aimple b a t t l e
d r i l l s t o inculcate swiftners of movement i n cambat. Thoae used i n t h i a d i v i s i o n ares
a. The movement of e rquad f r o q hedgerow t o hedgerow at f u l l speed with at
l e a s t t e n yardr i n t e r v a l between men. All more forward on cnnmnnd.
be CoPling under eimulated a r t i l l e r y f i r e , t h a aquad brpake f o r the nearest
corer t o the f r o n t and then continues t o advance during l u l l 8 i n t h e f i r e .
c, Coming under simulated r i f l e o r machine gun f i r e , individuals use corer
a v a i l a b l e , open f i r e , and the bulk of t h e squad 1imneUlrW8 rapidly under t h e l e a d e r
t o outflank t h e f i r e , '

3. bbtorized Reinforcements.
'During the paet month, the d i v i r i o n ' a experience has shorn t h a t reinforc-
ing mechanized cavalry, armor, a r t i l l e r y , eta., f a i l t o employ proper methods f o r
approach t o combat. The move up i a too hurried and i n too l a r g e a maer, r e s u l t i n g
i n t h e clogging of roads and camplete 'diexuption of wire communications, A r u f f i c i e n t
f o r c e should be employed t o f e e l out the oppoaition while ataging t h e main body for-
ward by bounds from covered poeition t o oorered position. When a we& spot is
i t rnnr P O , -
~~~-~i,,,-,,,+h,,c ,m
n-, 1)
discovered, and not u n t i l then, the f u l l strength o f t h e uolumn ahould be dere1oped.n
4. Chin S t r a ~ s .
'It hae been foqnd t h a t ahin s t r a p s ahould be worn fastened t i g h t . If not
fastened uhen going over hedgerows and uhen h i t t i n g t h e ground f a s t , the helmet must
be held on with one hand o r i t w i l l be l o s t . The p r a c t i c e of not wearing the chin
s t r a p arose a s a r e s u l t of b l a s t from heavy air bombs and heavy a r t i l l e r y f i r e , which
a r e not present i n t h i s theater. However, a man without a helmet is l i a b l e t o head
i n j u r i e s from amall arms f i r e and s h e l l s p l i n t e r s m m

I1 E3'mmVE b R T I L u R Y USE.
nIn my opinion the enemy has h a b i t u a l l y tucked himself i n c l o s e t o our f r o n t
l i n e elements i n order to prevent ua fram bringing our mortar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e s
down on him. We h a b i t u a l l y have had t o place aome a r t i l l e r y preparation on t h e enemy
f r o n t l i n e s . The moat e f f e c t i v e uae of a r t i l l e r y I have found has been t o bring time
f i r e dorn f o r about 20 minutes preceding the i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t and under cover of t h i s
firm t o make a tank s o r t i e ( t a n k s with rhino attachments) t o a depth of about 308 t o
4 O O yards. The time f i r e prevents t h e enemy from ueing bazookas against the tanks,
p i n s him t o t h e ground, and causes heavy c a s u a l t i e 8 among thoee who attempt t o evade
t h e tanke o r t o s h i f t t h e i r positions.' -- Major Cen. W. M. Robertson. Camnanding 2nd hf.

I11 CHMdAN DEFEbWS AND SJCCIGSTIONS FOR USE OF 1.2 MORTAR

1. P corpe chemical o f f i c e r recently inspected a German position, captured with

t h e help of a r o l l i n g barrage f i r e d by 4.2 mortars. The mortar f i r e d exclusively
and increased t h e range 200 yard8 a t specified t h a intervals. Some of the f a c t s
and c o n c l u i o n a of t h e c h d c a l o f f i c e r 'a report followr

2. The mortar f i r e a s q u i t e accurate a8 t o rerrge but mas not always evenly

d i s t r i b u t e d along the l i n e of impact. lhch band of f i r e a s about a
yard8 wide.

m A l l of t h e hedgamws oacupied by the Germans had paths i n rear of them.

3
(Whether theee paths were made by t h e Oermanr o r whether the hedgerowe w e r e s e l e c t e d
f o r oooupation becauee of the pathe, ms not indicated.) Sunken ramla w a r 0 uaed,
e i t h e r a s positiona o r f o r coarrrmnicatiom.

4. To increase the effectivenese of mortar f i r e , t h e observer thought, f i r e

d a t a (by platoons, i f necmsaary) ahould be calculated t o place t h e l h e 8 of ippgact
on eunlron roads and on o r just back of hsdgerows, inetead of f i r i n g a rrgularr p a t t e r n
on a a u a m r m n t basis. P l u u n w of t h e barrage aan be improved i f aerial photoe
a r e available f o r elaminntion f o r possible positions. lbrward mvement of the bar-
regcb should be on call of t h e i n f a n t r y , r a t h e r than on a time schedule. White
phosphorous w i l l cause a b u t the same numbar of a a s u a l t i e s a8 HE on troops in the
open and rill cause =re c a e u a l t i e s on troop8 dug in, if they do not have ovorherd
cover. Its psychological e f f e a t a l s o is believed t o be p e a t a r . 'Ihe 4.2 awdrtar is
coneidwed b e t t e r adapted f o r f i r i n g WP than the 10- howitzer, p a r t l y becauao of
the g r e a t e r peraentage of VP anarmnition allowed (50% c o q a r e d with S).

End
 TWElgTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 25 2 0 AUC 1944

BBattle Experienaer* a r e published reg-llarly by t h i s headquarters t o enable

u n i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t fram the l a t e s t cambat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n France, Although the erperiencee of c e r t a i n u n i t a a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily appliaable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l e i t u a t i o n s
t h e itam published w i l l be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommendad
f o r careful conaideration by u n i t e which may encounter rimilar p r o b l a ~ . Reports
of aorroborative o r contrary experiences a r e . p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t t h e
r a l i d i t y o f the indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
By u m u n d of t h e Army Group commander:
3.1.a.
H. B, IS
Brigadier General, USA
--------.---..--------------..-------..-- M ju t a n t General

From t h e report of b AG? observer:

@Sinceonasaunicatione d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e b a t t l e e f f i c i e n c y of a u n i t , every
r o l d i e r must be taught t o protect wires fram -em I have reen many instances
where l i n e r had f a l l e n down and were being deatroyed by passirrg vehiclee i n the .
preeenea of other r o l d i e r e who f a i l e d t o take even the eimplest atop t o correct the
situation.

*It is reconmended t h a t a l l branches s t r e s s the f a e t t h a t wire l i n e s must be pro-

tected from harm by a o l d i e r e regardleas of t h e i r branch o r rank. A l l Signal
Corps u n i t e and o,.hers concerned with wire l i n e s m a t be taught not t o leave loose
wirea on t h e made even i f t h i r wire is of no f u r t h e r value, The e i g h t of wire be-
ing run over and further d e e t r o y d cnnnot help but e r e a t e i n the mind of a s o l d i e r
t h e Impreasion t h a t wire is not important.*

11 U S OF RADIOS IN FORWARD w.
.
I m q m r i m c e d t m p s are o f t e n l e d t o believe t h a t use of low-gowered i n f a n t r y
radio a e t s rill draw f i r e a s a r e s u l t of being located by Qerman d i r e o t i o n finding
equipm ent. Careleaaness i n providing necessary camouflage and i n radio s e c u r i t y is
t h e real reason these radio s e t s a r e subjected t o mamy f i r e . Exposure of a aran o r
vehicle carrying a radio o r reference i n t h e c l e a r t o a nearby landmark w i l l provide
t h e enemy with a good t a r g e t , but d i r e c t i o n finding equipment rill not. Direation
finding equipment of a s u f f i c i e n t aocuraay t o provide information f o r a r t i l l e r y f i r e
is r e l a t i v e l y immobile and muat be s e t up some milea i n r e a r of t h e en- lines. The
lor-powered i n f a n t r y radio eeta do not furniah s u f f i c i e n t s i g n a l f o r t h i s d i r e c t i o n
finding equipment to obtain accurate information. Location by d i r e c t i o n f i n d i w b-
comas a p o s a i b + l i t y only when done in conjunction with poor camouilage o r poor
radio eocurity.
- -I-
Repmduced by /he Engineer Reproduct/onBet,
.,
/Zth Armv Group
 SCOUTING rn PmoLLmG.
1. A corga Camrgndar i n I t a l y make8 the following conmentst
a , 'It should be slqphasized that ground once gained cheaply ahould be
held. Tima a f t e r tiae a p a t r o l is s e n t out t o determine t h e enemy strength on
aome h i l l and f i n d s that the h i l l i a unoccupied. Abmat invariably the e n t i r e
p a t r o l comes back t o report. Then ~ a m su n i t is ordered forward t o occupy t h e
hill. It morsa forward and f i n d s the h i l l a l i v e with Gewans who smother them
r i t h f i r e from machine p i s t o l s , l i g h t machine guns, and mortars.
b. m'lhe same thing hold8 true at bridgea. Several times a p a t r o l h a
found a bridge not b l o m end the e n t i r e p a t r o l haa come back t o report. Before
sane other u n i t cam g e t up t o s e i z e the bridge, the Genaana have b l o m i t . 4

2. A b a t t a l i o n exeautf re i n I t a l y reaonnnends t 'At n i g h t , don't use b i r d

o a l l e as eigndlm. m e r e are no birds i n the b a t t l e arm--they dl leave. How-
ever, cats and dog8 s t i c k around, s o dog barks and cat howle a r e a l l r i g h t i f well
done. The Cernans m e cat howls a l o t . If a Cennan use8 a c a t howl, l i e down and
anawer.him t h e rraeas ray. Be w i l l then mme toward you and you oan g a t him w i t h
your bayonet

The followin& i e extracted from a B r i t i s h War Office publication dealing

with counter-mortar o r w i m t i o n effected by same u n i t 8 i n I t a l y ;

1, 'A d i v i s i o n found it neceesary t o s e t up a countar-mortar o r g a n i x a t i o ~ ,

on t h e l i n e s of a counter-battery organizarion. One division had a counter-mortar
o f f i o e r with an a g e i s t a n t , together with an a s e i s t a o t aounter-mortar o f f i c e r i n each
brigade. fFheee were a s s i s t e d by an adequate e t a f f and p r i d e d with n e a e a w y traaw-
port. In general, all personnel were from the divisional a r t i l l e r y .
a. w'lfre most sucaeomhrl methods of engaging located h o s t i l e mortars were
i n t h e f o l l o r l n g ordarr 4.2 mortars, 3.7 a i r buret, guns f i r e d a t extraordinary
elevation.
be mortars were p l o t t e d and l i s t e d by tha d i v i s i o n a l counter-mortar
officer.
a. mcnnnplnicatian n s provided froan t h e divisional counter-mortar o f f i c e r
t o e a d of the brigade a s s i s t a n t counter-mortar o f f i c e r s , t o divisional a r t i l l e r y
Hqrs arad t o t h e d i v i r i o n a l oouater-battery o f f i c e r s . Comsrtnication ma a l s o pro-
vided fiam t h e a s s i a t a a t counter-mortar o f f i c e r t o eaoh 4.2 mortar company, t o eaah
mortar OP snd t o appropriate divioional a r t i l l e r y units.
2. a. m&othsr unit s e t up tm counter-mortar OPB i n emah b a t t a l i o n and
~ i t e dthaal a t l e a s t 9 0 yards apart. Theae w r e manned by e i t h e r o f f i c e r r or senior
rJOOs, Battalion OP p a r t i e s were given i n s t r u c t i o n on the c h a r a c t e r i e t i c s of mrtar
f i r e t o help thar i n l i s t e n i n g f o r and i n identify* aortare.
b. ' O h made a Claortrep8 report which included time, t h e code eiga
of the OP an8 the g r i d bearing. If t h i s 8mortrepbgave an i n t e r s e c t i o n o r pointed
t o a known poeition, the unit aountar-mortar o f f i c e r arsanged f o r immediate count-
mrtar f i r e . '
End
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 26 26 AUC 1944
" B a t t l e Experiences" are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e e t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p 8 now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n France. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of o e r t a i n u n i t s st a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s published w i l l be t h o s e based on practical e x p e r i e n c e end a r e reconmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s a h i c h may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

Eiy c a m a n d of t h e Army Group Commander:

B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l , USA
Ad j u t a n t General

I FIGlfl'INC THE CWLIAN TANK AND INFAMI'FlY TEAM.

1. An o f f i c e r of t h e XM Corps on J u l y 28/29 had a n e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o

o b s e r v e German armor and i n f a n t r y e t t a c k i n g us. The t a c t i c s employed by the Germans
w i l l probably be r e p e a t e d . His n o t e s , which f o l l o w , a r e based on c l o s e o b s e r v a t i o n
over a 36 hour p e r i o d .

2. "The e a s e and r a p i d i t y with which t h i s s m a l l a t t a c k i n g f o r c e made i t s pene-

t r a t i o n , achieved end s a t on t h e o b j e c t i v e , denied t h e East-Rest r o a d and i n t e r f e r e d
w i t h t r a f f i c on t h e North-South r o a d , p l u s t h e p r o b a b l e similar employment of s m a l l e r
groups on i d e n t i c a l m i s s i o n s make t h i s a n a l y s i s of what t h e y d i d and how t h e y did it
of more t h a n o r d i n a r y i n t e r e s t ; i t l i k e w i s e p o i n t s t o c e r t a i n remedial equipment, t r a i n -
i n g p r a c t i c e s , and t e c h n i q u e s t h a t can e a s i l y s t o p such p e n e t r a t i o n s i n t h e f u t u r e .

3. "The Germans advanced w e s t w a d i n t h r e e p a r a l l e l columns, each c o n s i s t i n g of

t m k s accompanied by i n f a n t r y . The c e n t e r column moved down t h e main road s h o o t i n g
r a p i d l y and moving a t a f a s t r a t e . It went from h i l l t o h i l l w i t h t h e accompanying
i d a n t r y s p r e a d o n l y one f i e l d o u t on b o t h s i d e s d o g t r o t t i n g t h r o u g h t h e f i e l d s and
over t h e hedgerows. The c e n t e r column t o t a l e d o n l y approximately eii;ht t r a c k - l a y i n g
v e h i c l e s . ~t l e a s t t h r e e of t h e s e were t a n k s , one o r b;o were probably s e l f - l a r o p e l l e d
guns and t h e o t h e r s probably h e l f - t r a c k t r o o p c w r i e r s . Tottil f o r c e s s e n t t o c a p t u r e
and hold t h e main c r o s s r o a d c o n s i s t e d of two c o m ~ ; a n i e sof i n f a n t r y and p r o b a b l y n o t
more t h a n t e n t a n k s . The number observed by t h i s o f f i c e r i n c l u d e d o n l y t h e t r a c k -
l a y i n g v e h i c l e s named above and p o s s i b l y a p l a t o o n of i n f a n ~ r y .

4. "Throughout t h e n i g h t , t h e Germens r e a c t e d f o r c e f u l l y by f i r e and l i m i t e d

movement t o any approach. T h e i r t a n k s moved s l o w l y and c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i l e n t l y .
Immediately a f t e r f i r i n g , e a c h moved t o a new p o a i t i o n 25 t o 5 0 y a r d s away from t h e
p o i n t w e d i n f i r i n g . The n o i s e d i s c i p l i n e of t h e t a n k crews and accompanying infan-
t r y raa s u p e r i o r . No t a l k i n g , s h o u t i n g , o r any sound, except machine gun and cannon
f i r e and s t a r t i n g of motors, c a r r i e d over 100 yards. The Germans always eased t h e i r
t a n k s forward, t r a v e l l e d a t low speed and were-remarkably q u i e t i n a l l operations
e x w e p t f i r i r i g . They used long b u r s t s o f the!%? r a p i d f i r i n g machine guns t o discourage
g u e s t s , I f pressed a t a l l , t h e y s h o t f l a r e s which brought down t h e i r own a r t i l l e r y
and m o r t a r s on t h e i r f l a n k s . T h e i r handling of t h e i r t a n k s was bold and s u r e . They
a c t e d as i f they knew e x a c t l y where they wanted t o go and how. and t h e n went t h e r e
with vigor and determination.

5. * A similar d i s r u p t i o n by a comparable German e f f o r t can, I b e l i e v e , be pre-

vented i n f u t u r e by augmenting p r e s e n t AT p r a c t i c e s by some of t h e following:
a. Equip numerous v e h i c l e s w i t h a smoke grenade t h a t could be lashed t o zome
well-known, widely disseminated, and r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e s p o t on t h e vehicle--possibly
t h e s t e e r i n g column. Upon the approach of an enemy t a n k , use of the grenade i n t h e
normal c a n a l i z e d r o u t e of tank sp1,rcach w i l l probably slow up t h e t a n k . The Germans
f e a r our use of g a s , and no t a n k normally w i l l advance i n t o t h e unknown hazards of a
smoke screen.
b. Give any u n i t s e n t out a l ~ n gt h e main road down which enemy u n i t s may come a
supply of standard mines. I f t h e s e a r e , a s a m a t t e r of p r a c t i c e , t i e d t o g e t h e r with
a l i g h t cord p r e v i o u s l y l a i d a c r o s s t h e road, they can be pulled out on t h e road from
a concealed p o s i t i o n a s t h e t a n k approaches.
c. The l i b e r a l spraying of t h e hedgerow with t a n k machine gun f i r e completely d i s -
courages r i f l e m e n o r bazooka f i r e r s from aiming over o r around a hedgerow. For t h i s
purpose s l o t s should be dug through t h e hedgerow a t such angles and l e v e l s t h a t f i r e
from t h e t a n k ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e road. cannot go t h r o u g h t h e s l o t , but s o s i t e d a s t o
permit a r i f l e grenade o r a bazooka t o be aimed and f i r o d when t h e t a n k reaches some
a l r e a d y s e l e c t e d p o i n t . The f i r e r must have cover from t h e tank s p r a y while he is
aiming and f i r i n g . When the f i r s t t a n k i s immobilized, and perhaps burning, t h e f i g h t
becomes a standard i n f a n t r y f i g h t w i t h standard t e c h n i q u e s working a s e f f e c t i v e l y a s
ever. a

11 SOKE BRITISH PATROLLING METHODS.

1. A r e p o r t from t h e I t a l i a n t h e a t e r d e s c r i b e s s p e c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and methods

adopted by a E r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n d u r i n g a lteriod when i t s primary mission was p a t r o l l i n g ,
a. The b a t t a l i o n commander d ~ s i g n a t e da f i e l d o f f i c e r a s b a t t a l i o n p a t r o l l i n g
o f f i c e r . The p a t r o l l i n g o f f i c e r e s t a b l i s n e d a p a t r o l l i n g headquarters and n p a t r o l l i n g
OP i n t h e b a t t a l i o n area. The headquarters included a b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r , c e r t a i n i n t e l -
l i g e n c e personnel and o p e r a t o r s f o r t h e OP. The commanding o f f i c e r l a i d down g e n e r a l
p o l i c i e s anu t h e p a t r o l l i n g o f f i c e r handled a l l d e t a i l s .
b. One p a t r o l , with a raission of l i q u i d a t i n g an enemy o u t p o s t , e s t a b l i s h e d a base
w i t h i n r a d i o range of p a t r o l l i n g h e a d q u a r t e r s and from t h a t base moved o u t on the mission.
T h i s base, with its caannunication f a c i l i t i e s , permitted c o n t i n u a l c m u i c a t i o n with t h e
b a t t a l i o n and would have c o n s t i t u t e d a s u r e r a l l y i n g p o i n t i f i t had been needed. It
a l s o a s s i s t e d i n t h e evacuation of c a s u a l t i e s .

2. Another p a t r o l , with t h e mission of determining whether a c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n was

occupied by t h e an-, advanced unobserved t o within about 600 yards of t h e p o s i t i o n .
The a r t i l l e r y then l a i d smoke on t h e suspected p o e i t i o n , following t h i s with a f i v e
d n u t e HE concentration. When t h e a r t i l l e r y concentration was f i n i s h e d , t h e p a t r o l
opened f i r e with f o u r Bren guns s ~ a r c h i n gsuspected a r e a s . Observers posted a t vant-
age p o i n t s i n r e a r waited f o r r e t u r n f i r e . The Germans opened with t h r e e guns from
t h e suspected p o s i t i o n s end t h e s e uere e a s i l y and a c c u r a t e l y located by t h e observers,
The p a t r o l withdrew without a cnsuhlty,
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 27 27 AUC 1944

.Battle Exparimcam a r e published r e a a r l y by t h i a headquartera t o =able

unite in trainin& t o profit ?ram the latest aambat experionem of our t r o o p now
fighting the G e m m m in Franoe. Although t h e slperianaes of o e r t a h unit8 a t a
particular leuation a r e not neaeaearily applicable fa a l l units i n all eituations,
the i t a m published w i l l be those barred on praatiaal eqmrlanae a8d are r e u e d
for a a r d u l uonsidecation by units which may ancountor slmllar problaar. Reports
ab c m b a r a t i v e or aaatrary ~ i o n u are a ~pazeticulerly dmired i n ordm that tho
v a l i d i t y of t h e W c a t a l b a t t l e lea8uai nuy be detsrminbd.
By euunand cb the Group 6-m:

1. p i r e and E4amuve.r. .The more fararable terrain and the m t u r e of Caman defense
arem enoountard d- r o e a t oparatiom M e made -sib18 mare &festive use of
maasurer. I n t h e i r withdrawals, the G- noPaallg organize a t a r r a i n feattwo rlth
a crmall group of iniantry and a f a w e l l mplaaal and ammaflagdl tanb. I hare f o a
tht by wing o m unit t o aontaia the mcaap a8b another unit of abmt similar rtrengbb
t o m o i t the am@s ilanEr and rear, r e a r e ablo t o faroo the a e r y t o 8urrendar apt
rlthdrar. We have alea fotmd t h a t ths terrrain is b e w a b g more fararable fm t h e .ti
plcrgmeat of hemy madine gum in support of r i f l e un5ts by -he& firs.

20 ~ e i ~ atnObh8tivem.
t mmsssigning an objwtive t o a subordinate unit,
mare attention, inaludixq ground reoonnaiaeanee wherever poeaible, ahould be girea to
muho af approaoh and aziss of corrmaMi~tion. Rimant4 my r e g b m t rsa giren an ob-
jeative that c a d be reached by mg tanka emd W - t r a c k s anly after tm ecimpanies ab
angSnears had worked a day d a night t o elear t h e i r rout.,
30 Pmoloment of 81 nau YaPrter8. ' .W8 ure new u n p l o y i q our mortars farther bmk -
than re did in the early etagee of t h e mngaign. Thir l a d w t o the reduotimi In the
mer of snipers and ieolatsd groupe t h a t bad foraed t h e selection of forward mortar
positions f o r a e ~ u r i t yreaeao. Wo hare fotmd the f i r e of the 81 mn mortar t o be -8
effective againat dug-in p i t i m a than that ab 105 mm artillery.
4. D Tnqv s n i p e r aotivities, in opinion, have been greatly n u q g q ' a t e d a
Moat of the bullet8 dleged t o have been f i r e d by s n i p r e , actually were rioachets iran
the fmt lines, f r o m individuals who ha& been by-paeaed, o r fran the reapom ai sane
of our ~triggerr-happ~r~individnals. During the f a t ming pbase of t a i a operati=, the
snipare, if any, are retreating as rapidly as the delaying farase
 3. Fezman Poaitiana. 'A n e w type of enemy maehine gun auplaeenent has bcm o b
a e r ~ e dreaently. ~t o o n s b t s of a care in a hedgeror large enough f o r a maahine gun,
anmunition, several dwa of food supply, and two men. The only opening is on t h e for-
ward s i d e of the hedgeror. h his disaourages withdraral and forcee men to fight u n t i l
they a r e ldlled or have to s w e n d s r . we hnve found the f i r e f r a n t h e m poaitiam t o
be inaccurate-poasibly unaimed. On one oacasion an e n t i r e cunpany inourroil only meven
oasualtiea while oroasing an opening w i t h i n the f i e l d of auch a position.
6 . Uae of m e . W
' e have: used smoke effeotirely, both offeumirely and defemirel:
One especially effeotive use of smoke oucnrred &en a can- ras out off from the re-
rminder of i t s battalion by f i r e of anmy tanka. On request of the b a t t a l i o n aannandar
aur a r t i l l e r y quickly plaaed smoke on t h e position. The company was a b l e t o r e j o i n the
b a t t a l i o n and suffer& only a few tasualties. ,

7. German Markizw of t h e i r Frant Line. 'One of t h e f e u accaaioxm t h a t our goel-

t ions have been bombed by eatsay a i r c r a f t , the enemy ground t m o p f i r e d green f la~ertr
t o mark t h e i r positions.
8. 'The ~ermanea r e nar attempting t o c o d u s e
Enerqg W e a r k American Unifonae.
us by rearing captured American helmeta and f i e l d jackets. A unit the s i z e oi a pla-
toon rare seen marching along the road dreseed in t h i e manner. They w i l l also use tha
m e of exposing thanselvea t~ vier i n our clothing, and y e l l i n g to our men in an sff o r
t o entice than t o ahor thsmselvee.n--Rqimental C a m a n d o r , 12th Infan*.

If COlMESTTS OF AN INFANlRY BATTALION C m q a

'I am using l i g h t machine guns in my heavy ~~ caupnny,

f a r t h e r farward w i t h great= apeed while a u r r t a b h g fewer losmes
T h e l i g h t machine gun is juet aa e f f e c t i v e foas the shorter rangee enaounterred in t h i n
t y p e of terrain. I keep q y heaviee on my jeep t r a i l e r a s o they can be readily moved up
if aacurate long range f i r e i8 dseired.
20 Guns. s m u t 8 a r e .quipped with tamny gun6 f o r use in spraying hedge-
row positiom. The additional ammunition supply ha8 preeented no serioraa problan. I
have one jeep and trailer loaded with anmnmiticm with each r i f l e company, and one with
each heavy reapom platoon.
3. 60 mn Y[ortars. .I have used my bo nm mortare rw off eatively againat auto-
matie weapons. When moving agairmt intennittent remietame, o m mortar i m attached t o
r i f l e platoon. When strong reeiatanae i a encountered, the mort8ra remert t o the weapon;
platoon an3 are fifeti f'ran positions 75 t o 100 yarder in rear of the leading d€SW1nt8e
4. Enemy ~ i a r m i t i o ~ nCo~$rerg
. t o ecnns repmtr coneemin& s~lemydispoeitione, I
M e always enaountsred en- r i f l m e n and autamatia reapom in positions one o r two
hedgerow8 f- of the* tanks.n-Battalion Cmmanrler, 22nd Infantry.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 28 28 AUC 1944

r g a t t l e D p e r i e n c e s n are published regularly by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t i r m t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ s r r o a n ei n Fance. ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences of c e r t a i n unit8 a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c e b l e t o all u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n a ,
t h e it- published w i l l be thoae based on p r a c t i c a l experienca azld a r e r e c o - m n d e d
for c a r e f u l considera t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Report8
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e b s s o n nay be determined.

BY c-nd of t h e wmy cxoup Comtiandert

B r i g a d i e r General, U a
Adjutant General

I TANX RIDIN2 DOUGHBOYS.

1. Infantrymen rode tanks i n t o combat and b ~ t !i n~f a n t r y and tank personnel were
e n t h u s i a s t i c about the r e s u l t s achieved by the 22nd I n f a n t r y Regiment and t h e 66th
Armred Regiraent i n t h e r e c e n t breakthrough. ?he Corrmending O f f i c e r of the 22nd
I n f a n t r y mkes t h e f o l l o w i n g c o m n t a r e g a r d i n g t h i s type of action.

2. a l b c t i c a l Advcrntagee.
a. m m i n f m t r y tire above enemy machine gun f i r e which i s g e n e r a l l y e e t a t graz-
in& l e v e l .
b. he i n f a n t r y becomes a m a r e f l e e t i n g t a r g e t f o r enemy autonratic weeponso It
is d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e enemy t o t r a v e r s e and e l e v a t e a machine gun from a dug i n hedge-
row p o a i t i o n t o bring a c c u r a t e f i r e on a tank m v i n g from e i g h t t o t e n m i l e s per hour.
c. The tank t u r r e t a l s o provides some p r o t a c t i o n a g a i n a t s m a l l anne f i r e .
d. ?he infantrymen on tanks a r e i n a good p o s i t i o n t o t o e s g e n a d e s i n t o fox holes.
8. The infantrymen a r e a b l e t o provide e x c e l l e n t p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e tanks f'rm
enemy bazooka and a n t i t a n k grenade f i r e .
f. The infantrymen h e l p t o provide o b s e r v a t i o n f o r t h e tank crews.
g. This p r a c t i c e undarmines t h e Gernrsn t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e of s h o o t i n g t h e i n f a n t r y
following the tanke. When G-n d o c t r i n e i s undermined, t h e e f f i c i e n c y of t h e i r
o p e r a t i o n s i s p e a t l y reduced,
he When t h e advance i e r e t a r d e d by AT gune, i n f a n t r y can d i s m u n t , deploy and b r i n g
a u t o m i t i c f i r e on enemy gun positions.

3. amoblems which ~ i s e ,
a. Command and staff o r ~ n i z a t i o nand coordination.
b. T r a m p o r t a t i o n f o r i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t i n g weapons i n o r d e r t o rmke them r e a d i l y
a v a i l a b l e f o r h o l d i n g the o b j e c t i v e .

4. 'The i n f a n t r y and armr a r e n o t o r g n i z e d t o work t o g e t h e r , and c a r e f u l end

thorough planning a r e , t h e r e f o r e , e s e e n t i a l f o r such an operation. The command pro-
blem wals p a r t i a l l y solved by ha r y b a t t a l i o n colnrrand&e r i d e i n t a n k s
 -

with t a n k b a t t a l i o n oommndara--directing t h e a t t a c k by radio.'

1. ad+ of t h e V Oafpa r e p o r t s that i t has beccnm unnecesrsary t o r e q u i r e a G-4

(3-4) p e r i o d i c r e p o r t d a i l y and has made it a weekly report. However, r e p o r t s of
b a t t l e l o s s e a of equipment a r e required d a i l y from t h e Divisionta ordnance Officer
based on the Ordnance M a t e r i a l W e Report each day.

1. B e following a e c u r i t y procedure was developed i n t h e V Carps f o r a use i n a

s t a t i c situation:
a. Division8 evacuated c i v i l i a n s from the area within a p p r o x h t e l y two kilometers
of the f r o n t l i n e s , f i x e d i n place those i n t h e next two t o four kilometsra, and estab-
l i s h e d a l i n e i n rear of which c i r c u l a t i o n f o r a n announced d i s t a n c e up t o six kilo-
metere rae permitted. A l l o t h e r c i r c u l a t i o n required a pas8 from the C i v i l ~ f f a i r a
Section.
b. P a t r o l of these l i n e s , which created t h r e e zones, was miinteined by m i l i t a r y
perraonnel in t h e forward a r e a s , and combined m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n p a t r o l s , plus a
j o i n t MP--Gendarme-C~emtorized p a t r o l i n the r e a r areas.
c. The evaauation of a i v i l i a n e was accomplished by Division C i v i l Affairs.Officera
and C i v i l A f f a i r s Detachments, using d i v i s i o n refugee control p o i n t s and Corps t r a n a i t
a r e a s , to ~ n q yassembly aenters.

2 . Thie system became inoperative a s d i v i s i o n s moved r a p i d l y forward i n the a t t a c k

OKily a s i n g l e s e c u r i t y l i n e beceme necessary, f a n a r d of which c i v i l i a i u were evacuated
and i n r e a r of which the presence of c i v i l i a n s waa desired s o a s t o provide p o t e n t i a l
places for refugciew.

l?? ENEblY M a W M LOCATION BY FIEID AFCIULERY OBSERVATION BATTALIONe

"is b a t t a l i o n 'has demonetrated t h a t m o r t a r s can be looated with our present

equipment under s p e c i a l conditions. I n t h i 8 instance t h e base waa a c r o s s the v a l l e y
and a t a e l i g h t l y higher e l e v a t i o n thhn the mortars, ~t was noted t h a t mortars did
not f i r e d i r e c t l y t o the f r o n t , but a t an oblique t o the f r o n t , which placed them
close t o our lines. Thie apparently is a c o m n p r a a t i c e of the enanlye TO use our
present equipment the base must be e x a c t l y surveyed i n , a s c l o s e t o the f r o u t l i n e 8
as p o s s i b l e , preferably w i t h i n 1200 t o 1500 metare, and t h e sound outpost located
with and protected by f r o n t l i n e i n f a n t r y elements. Due t o t h e mobility of mortars,
f i r e should be brought down on mortar8 inmediately a f t e r they a r e looated. A d i r e c t
telephone l i n e between the mortar baee sound detachment Cp and nearby a r t i l l e r y w i l l
f a c i l i t a t e t h i s . ~ p a r i m e n t sshould begin inrmediately, w i n g captured mortars and
aranunition t o determine the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of our present equipuezat i n the l o c a t i o n of
enemy martars.@--Report of 8 t h FA Obsarvktion ~ t t a l i o n .

V HANDLEW OF PWt3 BY DIVISION MP'S.

"Ib.ree e n l i s t e d nen of the Division I@ Company are asslgaed t o each i d a n t r y

regiment a s ESCORT G u m . p r i s o n e r s are taken from regimental CP(8, and in many
cases b a t t a l i o n CPta, escorted t o the prisoner of war inclosure, and there i n coc-
junatian with v a r i o u s i n t a r r o g a t i o n teams a r e searched, i n t e r r o g a t e d , and evacuated
t o the ~ r m yp r i s o n e r of w a r incl0sure.n -Repart of provost W a t h l , 2nd ~ n fDive
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 29 29 AUC 1944

r g e t t l e m p e r i e n c e s l a r e p u b l i a h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p s now
f i g h t i r i g t h e w r m s i n prranoe. ~ 1 t h o u g ; ht h e e x p s r i e n c e s of c e r t e i n u n i t e a t a
P a r t i c u l a r l o a e t i o n are n o t n e c e e m r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t e i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item p u b l i s h e d w i l l b e t h o s e based o n p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d a r e r e c o r n e n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems, Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e e a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

BY comnand of t h e wmy c r o u p Comrsnderl

B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l , USA
Adjutant ~ e n e r a l

I EhiPI.OYnlENT OF TANK D 3 l B O m .
1. # m e a t oare must b e e x e r c i s e d i n c m i t t i n g towed t a n k d e s t r o y e r s t o i m r e
t h a t r o u t e s e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e a s y e n t r a n c e t o and e x i t from p o s i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
rrhen t h e r e i s no tenk t h r e a t .

2. * I n p r e s e n t o p e r e t i o n s most r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s h o u l d b e done i n s m a l l v e h i c l e s
end on f o o t u n l e e e an a c t u a l t a n k t h r e a t hes been e s t a b l i s h e d . The b+8'e of t h e
r e c o n n a i s s p n c e p l a t o o n draw h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e .

3. *The secondary misaion of TD'a should be e x p l o i t e d t? t h e f u l l e e t . gne com-

PanY m y have a n Z n d i r e c t f i r s m i s s i o n , 3hiSe t h e remaining two a r e on d i r e c t f i r e
missions. By u s i n g t h e r e s e r v e company on t h e secondery m i s e i o n , a f i r e e f f e c t corol
p a r a b l e t o t h a t of a f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n c a n b e o b t a i n e d , Another a d v a n t a g e i e
t h e t f i r e m y be c a l l e d f o r t o e u p p o r t t h e companies engaged i n t h e i r p r i m r y m i e s i o n
during a tank attack.

4. )Care must be taken t h a t units whose m i s s i o n i s e n t i t a n k d e f e n s e r e c e i v e com-

p l e t e t a n k w a r n i n g based on f a c t s , % l e e a l e r t s t e n d t o mike gun crews s k e p t i c a l .
some i n f s n t r y u n i t e r e p o r t any t r a c k v e h i c l e a 3 a t a n k , t h w d e s t r o y i n & t h e e f f i c i e n c y
o f t h e a n t i t a n k warning e y s t e m . l - ~ ~ f t e r~ c t i o nR e p o r t of 3 2 1 s t TD B a t t a l i o n .

XI IL??I!L~?Y A I R OP PEFENSm TACTICS.

"The Carmans b v e a p p a r e n t l y e t u d i e d t h e current e v a s i v s t a c t i c s of t h e a p p l a n e s ,
and t h e y t r y t o b r a c k e t them w i t h time f i r e . The h i r OPle have adopted t h e p o l i c y of
avoidink: c r o s a r o a d e and perrmnent l m d m a r k s , because i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h e Germans
z a r o i n on t h e s e p o i n t s , t h e n r a i s e the b u r e t a when a p l a n e i s over.#--29th ~ivieion
a r t i l l e r y Report.
 #The Division Ordnance O f f i c e r devised a system of a s s i g n i n g m i n t e m n c e t e a m t o
each r e g i m n t as i t is placed i n r e a e r v e o r o t h e r w i s e becones a v a i l a b l e , i n order t o
supplement the maintenance of ordnance equipment and m k e necessary replacementee#--
Report of G-4, 3 0 t h Division.

(The follorrirle c m e n t s are e x t r e a t e d from t h e A f t e r Action Report of t h e gi-gnal

O f f i c e r o f t h e 30th ~ i ~ i s i o n . )

1. 9 d i r e g t wire from +3 t o t h e D i v i s i o n ~ t i l l e r yS-3 speeds up a h e l l r e p o r t 8

and o t h e r comrmnicationa and r e l i e v e s awitchboard o p e r a t a r s .

2. # A t e l e t y p e w r i t e r has been moved t o t h e G-2 t e n t and t h e convenience t h i s

a f f c r d e ha8 been l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a 200 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n t e l e t y p e t r a f f i c .

3 . # p a c s i m i l e equipment bas been u e d on s e v e r a l occasions t o t r a n s m i t l i n e

r o u t e w p e t o h i ~ h e rheedquartera.

14. 9 Inasmuch a s t h e m a j o r i t y of t r o u b l e on f i e l d w i r e l i n e e r e s u l t s from opens,

a s t a n d e r d t r o u b l e c a r d baa been introduced, acd the w i r e chief uses a n RE-65-Bt e a t
s e t t o t a k e a c a p a c i t y reading. T h i s i e e n t e r e d on a c a r d , and the w i r e c h i e f a180
i n t e r y e t 8 it i n t o d i s t a n c e t o t h e t r o u b l e and @ v e s e t h i a infarlllation t o t h e t r o u b l e
team when i t is dispatched. The c a r d becones a p e r m n e n t record f o r a p a r t i c u l a r l i n e ,
and i f r e p e a t e d t r o u b l e o c c u r s i n any v i c i n i t y , t h e wire chief r e f e r s the t r o u b l e t o
t h e c o n a t r u c t i o n o f f i c e r , who i n v e s t i g a t e 0 t o s e e whether t h e l i n e should be re-policed
o r re-routed.

5. 'It is SOP f o r adjacent regiments i n d i f f e r e n t d i v i s j o n a t o monitor channel 33

of SCH 300 t o provide p r m p t o o r r e c t i o n in ceee,of f i r i n g on one another.#

BRITISH PA'IROLLIIG HINT l

A B r i t i s h p u b l i c a t i o n s t a t e s c aIn t r a i n i n g f o r p a t r o l l i n g , it is r a r e l y r e a l i z e d
t h a t , once c o n t a c t has been m d e , c a u t i o n a n d concealment mst be o a e t aaide, and
every man must a c t b o l d l y and speedily. Noise, p r o p e r l y c o n t r o l l e d , is a powerful
moral wea?on far t h e attackere.#

When t a n k 8 a r e ordered t o m v e at a i d t , a f t e r a bivouac has been e e t a b l i a h e d ,

t h e carmanding o f f i c e r s of i n f a n t r y u n i t s i n t h e v i c i n i t y ehould be n o t i f i e d , as the
sound of t h e mvement of t h e t a n k s w i l l normolly draw a r t i l l e r y and m r t a r f ire.#--
Report of 709th m k B a t t a l i o n .

Reproducedby I-hefngheer Reproducf/bnDeL, /2th Army G r o q

 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 3 0 3 0 AUC 1944

a g e t t l e p p e r i e n c e s f l are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o snable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t frorn t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germns i n France. ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u h r l o o a t i o n a r e not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
the itema publiehed w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recornended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s whlch mag encounter similar p r o b l e m . Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be determined.

By ccmxrmnd of t h e Group C o m n d a r 8:

p i g a d i e r General, US^
hd jutant General
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 1 1 0 0 ~ ~ . - 1 0 - ~ I - - - - - - - - 0 ~ - . 0 - -

-
NOTBa The following paragraphs a r e a l l a x t r a c t e d from r e p o r t s snd comments of
l i o n c a m ~ a n d e r eof the 22nd I n f a n t r y Regiment.
batta-

'More emphasis in t r a i n i n g should be p h c e d on d i s c i p l i n e . In my b a t t a l i o n , cam-

pany wnrmandere who had w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d companies m v e d f a s t e r i n a t t a c k and i n c u r r e d
f e ~ caa s u a l t i e s than those i n whose companies d i s c i p l i n e was l a x . We a r e i n c u r r i n g
h ~ a v yc a s u a l t i e s among our o f f i c e r s and noncomnissioned o f f i c e r s , p a r t l y because they
I9ave t o l i t e r a l l y l e a d t h e men by t h e hand t o i n s u r e accomplishment of t h e i r mi8sion.a

1. W l l y 75 percent of c a s u a l t i e e s i n c e D-Day have been i n c u r r e d while hold-

i n g ground i n rrtatic o r defensive o p e r a t i o n s . To a v o i d t h e e e c a s u a l t i e s , I hove used
the following m a t h o b t o good advantage a
a, w i n g t h e day I plaue m y automatic weapom i n d e f l l a d e on the high ground.
and then n e t h e r e a t o f t h e b a t t a l i o n behind t h e high ground.
b. ~t night 1 e s t a b l i s h w e l l a n n e d p l a t o o n o u t p o s t s and m v e t h e r e s t of t h e
platoon8 back about 400 yards. I permit t h e outpoata to fire. If t h e i r f i r e dram
enemy a r t i l l e r y f l r e , t h e main body of t h e u n i t is not eub jected t o it.
c. o t h e r n i g h t s I have moved mgr e n t i r e b a t t a l i o n a a b o r t d i s t a n a e t o the flank
after dark. The on aeverd occasionr, s h e l l e d t h e vacated area throughout
t h e n i g h t , while my men d e p t p m c e f u l l y i n the new area.@

NOTE1 Similer mbthodr have been used m c c e s e f u l l y a e i n s t the Japansee i n t h e R c i f i ~ .

 1.. Hold Your Fire. @Do not f i r e on enemy p a t r o l e . It diecloeea t h e l o c a t i o n
of your flank8 ao t h a t a r t i l l e r y f i r e can be brought down on your po8ition.r

2. watch f o r WP, Wlhe only t i m I have Been t h e Gerrnana use rrhite phosphorus
s h e l l s is when t h e y were determining range. You can alwaya look f o r a n a r t i l l e r y
c o n c e n t r a t i o n t o f o l l o w e i t h e r a white phosphoru s h e l l o r a t i m e - f i r e b u r s t o r

3. Uae HE and Move. 1 have e f f e c t i v e l y used my 57 mn a n t i t a n k guns with HE

s h e l l s on d i r e c t f i r e missions. ~t ie b e s t t o f i r e not m e than t e n rounds and
t h e n g e t out.#

IV SUCCESSFUL INFAN'IRYGANX COOPERATI ON.

-
NOTE: The a t t a c k described below was a s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n demonatrating t h e e f f e c t -
i v e ~ e s sof c l o s e i n f a n t r y - a r t i l l e r y - t a n k t e m o r k made p o s s i b l e through p r i o r planning,
e x c e l l e n t timing, and capable 1eader ship.

-.
1. WTbe 22nd I n f a n t r y , advancing n o r t h , had reached t h e i r o b j e c t i v e i n the v i c i n -
i t y of The regiment on t h e r i g h t had been unable t o take t h e i r o b j e c t i v e , a
h i l l , due t o heavy f i r e from t h a t h i l l , of what was e s t i m a t e d to be one i n f a n t r y com-
pany. It was decided t o have a f o r c e of t h e 22nd Infantry. assist i n the capture of
the h i l l by a t t a c k i n g from t h e north w i t h cne r i f l e company and one t a n k company. A
map rctconnaissance was made and an a r t i l l e r y f i r e plan grepared by t h e c o m n d e r s con-
cerned t h e n i g h t before t h e a t t e c k . The t i m e cf a t t a c k was s e t f o r 0835 and an LD
s e l e c t e d about 1600 y a r d s from t h e o b j e c t i v e . m r i n g t h e day before the a t t a c k , t h e
for- commander ( t h e I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n CO), t h e r i f l e company c o m n d e r , and t h o t m k
c s q q v c o m n d e r , nsde s grcund reconnai8sance up t o the II) where they r e r e stopged
by machine gun f i r e .

2. Mfie a t t a c k jumped o f f on time with one platoon of r i f l e m e n r i d i n g on t h e

tanka of each tank platoon and on r e i n f o r c i n g tank deetroyer vehiclea. A 45-minute
a r t i l l e r y barrlage was placed i n f'ront of t h e e t t e c k i ~ l gf o r c e , beginning .st H-hour and
moving forward a t 13-minute intervals. The o b j e c t i v e was taken at 10130 h he a t t a c k -
i n g f o r c e i n c u r r e d only two c a s u l t i e s , captured 40 prisonera, and e i t h e r k i l l e d c r
f o r c e d t h e withdrawal of t h e remaining elements which had been occupying t h e hil1.r

END

Reproducea'by Lnq~Repro. L?e/r: /2th Army Group