A.C. No.
8096 July 5, 2010 counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership contract
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR.,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD
BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR.,
AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-3351 passed on July 17, 2008 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
in CBD Case No. 07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the disbarment case filed by the complainants
against the respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are
as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned
and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired respondent
Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1)
year effective April 17, 2006.2 The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the
Commission on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the
employment of Atty. Ignes.3 However, controversy later
erupted when two (2) different groups, herein referred to
as the Dela Pea board and Yaphockun board, laid claim
as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Pea
board filed Civil Case No. 17934 for Injunction and
Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2)
directors, Joselito T. Reyes and Carlito Y. Uy, who will
allegedly connive with Director Allan D. Yaphockun
whose hostility to the "present" Board of Directors, the
Dela Pea board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pea board also adopted
Resolution No. 0095 appointing respondents Atty.
Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann
as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD
and its Board of Directors, under the direct supervision
and control of Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar,
Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for Indirect
Contempt of Court6 entitled Koronadal Water District
(KWD), represented herein by its General Manager,
Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On
February 19, 2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799
for Injunction and Damages7 entitled Koronadal Water
District (KWD), represented herein by its General
Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas.
On March 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba
filed a supplemental complaint8 in Civil Case No. 1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 0799 dated February
16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the retainership
contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal
of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007.
In its letter10 dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also
addressed Eleanor P. Gombas insistence that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17,
2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated, the KWD or
OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need
of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of authority to
private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under
justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty.
Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local
Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the
Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD
and that said board had terminated Atty. Igness services
and requested to hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD
without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment
complaint11 against the respondents before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that
respondents filed SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case
No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority.
They likewise stated in their position paper12 that Atty.
Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC
had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Igness contract in
its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion13 in Civil Case No.
1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD),
represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor
Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme Investigative and Security
Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow
respondents can validly represent KWD until April 17,
2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contracts
pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped
representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in deference to
the OGCCs stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua
echoed Atty. Manns defense.15
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation 16
before the IBP with the following attachments: (1) the
transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28,
2008 in Civil Case No. 1799, and (2) the notice of appeal
dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008 Order
dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript
showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD
and Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.
In his report and recommendation,17 the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the charge against
Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had
valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from
April 2006 to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-
termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in
SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in
February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that they be
fined P5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party
without authority to do so, per Santayana v. Alampay.18
The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to
secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their
engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors
erred in dismissing the case because respondents had
no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and
appear as counsels of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA
Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-25.
Complainants point out that the retainership contract of
Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the
"Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al." in Civil Case
No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April 8, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) "for being filed by one not
duly authorized by law;" and that the authority of Attys.
Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm
since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Pea board lacks
the conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence,
according to complainants, respondents are liable for
willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to
represent KWD had expired on April 17, 2007, but he
and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD
after that date. He submits that they are not guilty of
appearing as counsels without authority. In their
comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar
arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from
private funds of the members of the Dela Pea board
and KWD personnel who might need legal
representation, not from the public coffers of KWD. In his
own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties
submissions, we find respondents administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the
need for OGCC and COA conformity if a GOCC hires
private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the
legal basis of this rule. Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title
III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the
OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all
GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9,19
issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins
GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms
to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same
Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or
the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may
be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be
secured before the hiring or employment of a private
lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v.
Capitol Steel Corporation,20 we listed three (3)
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a
private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in
exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the
COA must also be secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority
to appear as counsels of KWD?
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no
valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of
KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799.
Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was
engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the 4th
Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that
he and Atty. Ignes "presently stand as KWD legal
counsels," there is no proof that the OGCC and COA
approved Atty. Naduas engagement as legal counsel or
collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and
Mann are concerned, their appointment as collaborating
counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no
approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same
situation as the private counsel of Phividec Industrial
Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that
said private counsel of Phividec Industrial Authority, a
GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in
Phividecs behalf considering that the requirements set
by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied
with.21 Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority
to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as
collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not
notified of the pre-termination of his own retainership
contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys.
Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel
of KWD without authority, after his authority as its
counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA
approved his retainership contract for one (1) year
effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true
that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his
contract, the records still disprove his claim that he
stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified
manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on
March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of
stenographic notes22 in Civil Case No. 1799 taken on
January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely
urgent motion for the immediate return of the facilities of
the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was
compelled to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD
properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms.
Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not
appear to be a party to the motion, Atty. Ignes said that
KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of
the case. Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a
motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil
Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled
that it will not accept any motion for reconsideration in
behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but
Atty. Ignes later filed a notice of appeal23 dated February
28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of appeal
signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly
authorized by law, the RTC, in its Order24 dated April 8,
2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance
on January 28, 2008 was merely as counsel of Ms.
Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that
Ms. Gomba represents KWD per the case title. In fact,
the extremely urgent motion sought the return of the
facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes
filed and argued a motion with the interest of KWD in
mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further
validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of
KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This fact
was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the
notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of
KWD without authority?
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed,
respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as
counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents
have admitted the existence of Memorandum Circular
No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling in
Phividec.25 Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have
full grasp of our ruling therein that there are
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private
counsel and that for non-compliance with the
requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the
private counsel would have no authority to file a case in
behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels
of KWD without complying with what the rule requires.
They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD. They
presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition,
as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority
to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents authority as
counsels of KWD which question was actually raised
earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent
motion to disqualify KWDs counsels26 dated February
21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23, 2007 27
respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the
case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of this
case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by
the RTC that he needs OGCC authority to file an
intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe
that respondents are innocent of the charge even if they
insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar,
Jr. and Mann, as collaborating counsels, were paid not
from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts
were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD
without authority, and not merely as counsels of the
members of the Dela Pea board and KWD personnel in
their private suits.
Consequently, for respondents willful appearance as
counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is a
valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar
must always be exercised with great caution, and should
be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should
not be decreed where any punishment less severe such
as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish
the end desired.28 In Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of
P5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The respondent therein also appeared as private
counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a
GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of
P5,000 on each respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped
short of fully narrating what had happened after the RTC
issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April
13, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1799.30 As willingly revealed
by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified by the
Court of Appeals.31 We are compelled to issue a
reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show
candor and good faith to the courts.321awphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the
IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann,
Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are found
GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case
without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each, payable to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution.
They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents
personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176530 June 16, 2009
SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA
PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and
ELENA G. GARCIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
February 6, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 83994 which set
aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of
nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and
damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G.
Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G.
Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B.
Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners,
spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla
Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation
of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint
alleged that respondents inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land
located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the
name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit,
petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo
Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978
when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result,
TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT
No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners.
Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of
title, portions of the property were brought under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette
Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents
were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of
Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that
they were possessors in good faith, and that the action
had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents
(plaintiffs) evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject
land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been
awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion,
arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the period
for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the case based on the allegations in the complaint, and
that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had
no tenancy relationship.
In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted
the petitioners motion and dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had
jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the
CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered
CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On
November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion.4
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC,
which gave due course to the same.6 The records reveal
that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia
wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge
of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were
surprised to receive a communication from the court
informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for
disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was
no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether
they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one
of the plaintiffs was still in America.7
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in
favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October
24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated
and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to
the RTC for further proceedings.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.8
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties
was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the
CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the
principal relief sought was the nullification of the
purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject
property. It also noted that there was no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the
parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the
resolution of this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the
appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang
filed the notice of appeal without respondents
knowledge and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to
the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs
appellants brief failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court regarding the contents of an appellants brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
(Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the
PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over
respondents complaint.9
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on
both procedural and substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is
presumed to represent such client before the appellate
court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption,
thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed
to represent client on appeal. An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal,
unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC
would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty.
Magbitangs authority to represent respondents in the
case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no
agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney
may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly.
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first
appearance and validates the action taken by him.10
Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention
of benefits flowing therefrom.11 Respondents silence or
lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated
to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing
of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with
competence and diligence."12 Consequently, a lawyer is
entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.13 In light of such mandate, Atty.
Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without
waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was
understandable, if not commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there
must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is,
therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable
elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.14
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.15 Respondents complaint
did not contain any allegation that would, even in the
slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation
between them and the petitioners. We are in full
agreement with the following findings of the CA on this
point:
x x x A reading of the material averments of the
complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by
plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the
supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the
issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare
property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the
cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-
appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever
that could have brought this controversy under the ambit
of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA
awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the
latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary
to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely
civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial courts.
On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed
before the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that
the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to
aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper
resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the
appellants brief sufficient in form and substance as the
appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We
have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules
are intended to help secure, not to suppress, substantial
justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules
may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime
objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of courts.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February
6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA,
BRANCH 28, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum
to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings,
thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No.
639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and
for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real
name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon
himself the severest censure and a punishment for
contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise
calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended
Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including
the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July
1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter
alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly
tried and convicted when the contrary was true, and that
the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly issued
because respondent Court had already accepted a
property bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that
respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as
it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal
Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he
had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that
office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of
quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed
by petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as
a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of
Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled
"People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag"
(Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya,
First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner
with "Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article
298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for
short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his
imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then
Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK
3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis
Manangan v. Court of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No.
3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try
the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest
of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May
1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary
investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact,
disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was
filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time
Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias
Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through
counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit
Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of
the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B,
Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by
Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is
challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte
Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was denied
by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of
Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to
(1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27
March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion,
impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering
his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require
respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case
No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated
on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and
holding, among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the
Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is
not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German
Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly
through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the
Criminal Case be dismissed on the ground that the
accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such
that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over
his person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the
German Decision as a final judgment of conviction,
respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982
and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the
accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the
mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said
order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this
Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979,
shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court
of Appeals in another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No.
SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel
for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the
proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground that the
accused was already dead when the decision finding him
guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading
alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but
has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ."
In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982,
Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch
as "there is nothing on record to show that such
dismissal had been sought before the decision was
rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no
judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the
supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983,
filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for
the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on
the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of
respondent Court refused to declare the case closed and
terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July
1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan
Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by
the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has
not yet been served upon the accused as in full force
and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707,
entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v.
Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul
the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the
closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length
from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order,
dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision)
3
holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the
motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-
G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res
adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what
form the action for that purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court,
petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion
for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the
Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order,
respondent Court ordered the case archived until such
time that the accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a
Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting
disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present
Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is
that the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had
a pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and
should have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of
Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by
disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
Neither is there any indication in the records that the
property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and
petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias
Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged.
Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days
from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest
remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted.
Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with
grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is
in full force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on
the part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan
Decision, that was timely rectified. In the final analysis,
respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-
accused has already been arraigned and tried, let alone
convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again,
therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and
Second Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan
that has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case
neither holds water considering that not only is he
ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau
of Lands, Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also
because he was dismissed from the service on 27 March
1980 by the Director of Lands, who found him, with the
approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of
extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-
G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a
"Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition
for being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner
should be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor
General has also prayed that he be excused from filing a
Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition,
which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of
the records in the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M.
Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San
Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971
in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver
died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan
and knowing about the latter's death, assumed the
name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of
Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to
pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law,
using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine
Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that he was
admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise,
[Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position
as legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a
fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful
wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and
that assuming that there is sufficient basis to charge him
for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of
prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As
the Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German
Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23
February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for
the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon
Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name
is Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry
his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same
person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real
name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme
when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February
1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs
alleged that accused had died before the filing of the
Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of
death of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner
also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M.
Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with
the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out
that petitioner had also committed imprisonation when,
representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed
a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice
law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those
cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is
"really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the
petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the
two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September
30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought
this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for
which reason he apologizes to the Court promising that
he would not commit the same act if he is excused and
given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after
finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him
guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter
No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross
V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto
H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October
1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner be
subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the
National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was
suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This
mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for
contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the
foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to
claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan.
The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with
petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an
impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent
misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending
directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a
mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3
[d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the
pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that
Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan,
those statements actually refer to the person of Andres
Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long
since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is
apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the
Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack
of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court,
severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months
imprisonment, the same to be served at the Provincial Jail of
Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the
subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed
to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives and to
proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all
Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing
himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or
Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is
declared to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003]
DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADEO
E. BALON, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a
French national, filed a verified complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1]
[endif]
against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for
estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-
679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline
to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as
follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim
with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan
Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As
complainant encountered problems in pursuing his claim
which was initially rejected,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] his friend, a
certain Jesus Jess Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the
engagement of respondents services.
By letter[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] of October 21, 1998
addressed to Elde Management, Inc., ATTN: Mr. Daniel
Lemoine, under whose care complainant could be
reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had
not before met, that for his legal services he was
charging 25% of the actual amount being recovered. . .
payable upon successful recovery; an advance payment
of P50,000.00 to be charged [to complainant] to be
deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully
collected; P1,000.00 as appearance and conference fee
for each and every court hearings, conferences outside
our law office and meetings before the Office of the
Insurance Commission which will be also charged to our
25% recovery fee; and legal expenses such as but not
limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage
expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related
expenses, to be charged to complainants account which
would be reimbursed upon presentation of statement of
account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys
fees does not bear complainants conformity, he not
having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to
settle complainants claim, for by letter[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
of December 9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent
confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of
complainant in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy
coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS.
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when
complainant left for France,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] he, on the
advice of respondent, signed an already prepared
undated Special Power of Attorney[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action
against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of
complainants claim as well as to negotiate, sign,
compromise[,] encash and receive payment from it. The
Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23,
1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued
a Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to
complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full
settlement of the claim.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] The check was
received by respondent.
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines
in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the
same month.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] On inquiry about the
status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what
respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondents
letter[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] of March 26, 1999 that the claim
was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it
was still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan
Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00
representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to
Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the
offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainants personal visit to
the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed
that his claim had long been settled via a December 23,
1998 check given to respondent the year before.[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Complainant lost no time in going to the
law office of respondent who was not around, however,
but whom he was able to talk by telephone during which
he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his
claim.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a
December 7, 1999 letter[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] wherein he
acknowledged having in his possession the proceeds of
the encashed check which he retained, however, as
attorneys lien pending complainants payment of his
attorneys fee, equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of entire
amount collected. In the same letter, respondent
protested what he branded as the uncivilized and
unprofessional behavior complainant reportedly
demonstrated at respondents office. Respondent winded
up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:
Wewouldliketomakeitclearthatwecannotgiveyouthe
aforesaidamountuntilandunlessourattorneysfeeswillbe
forthwithagreedandsettled.Inthesamemanner,shouldyou
bebarbaricanduncivilizedwithyourapproached,wewillnot
hesitatetomakeaproperrepresentationwiththeBureauof
ImmigrationandDeportationfortheauthenticityofyourvisa,
DepartmentofLaborandEmploymentforyourworking
status,BureauofInternalRevenueforyourtaxation
complianceandtheNationalBureauofInvestigation[with]
whichwehaveagoodnetwork...
Whileit[isyour]prerogativetofilealegalactionagainstus,it
isalsoourprerogativetofileacaseagainstyou.Wewill
rathersuggestifyoucouldrequestyourlawyertojustconfer
withusforthepeacefulsettlementofthismatter.
(Underscoringandemphasissupplied)
As despite written demands,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the
insurance claim and to acknowledge the
unreasonableness of the attorneys fees he was
demanding, complainant instituted the administrative
action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that [i]t
appears that there was irregularity with the check, it
having been issued payable to him, but and/or AMADEO
BALON was therein intercalated after his (complainants)
name.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only
P50,000.00 in attorneys fees,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
complainant decried respondents continued possession
of the proceeds of his claim[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]and his
misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught
with difficulties.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
In his Counter-Affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] of February 18,
2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention
of the proceeds of complainants claim is in lawful
exercise of his lien for unpaid attorneys fees. He
expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn
them over once he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof,
he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of no
cure, no pay adopted by practicing lawyers in the
insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his
attorneys fees,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] which to him was
justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract
between him and complainant, the latter having rejected
respondents letter-proposal of October 21, 1998.[if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and
efforts he extended in pursuing complainants claim and
the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He
went on to assert that his inability to contact complainant
whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to
encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in
conformity with the Special Power of Attorney executed
in his favor.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator,
complainant echoed his allegations in his Complaint-
Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as
unreasonable respondents proposal in his October 21,
1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount
collected for his legal services.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] And he
presented documentary evidence, including the March
26, 1999 letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-
in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim
and suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of
Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainants claim at
P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999
letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that it
was made upon Garcias request, intended for a certain
Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcias
business partner.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001
Supplement[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] to his Counter-Affidavit
reiterating his explanation that it was on Garcias express
request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which
was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.
Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of
May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he had
talked to complainant about respondents retention of fifty
percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds for professional
fees less expenses,[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] he gave Garcia,
on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00
which, so respondent averred, is the amount of
insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less
attorneys fees and expenses.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Thus,
respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of
P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in
Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00,
P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his
(respondents) former address through his executive
secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at
the office of his (respondents) former employer
Commonwealth Insurance Company through his
subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments
at Dulcinea, and at Manila Intercontinental Hotels coffee
shop sometime in October 1999.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Respondent submitted the separate sworn statements of
Leonardo and Roxas.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over
of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent
alleged that there was no need therefor since he very
well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-
in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding
complainants claim.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected
complainants offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his
services, insisting that since there had been no clear-cut
agreement on his professional fees and it was through
him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered
its initial rejection of complainants claim, he is entitled to
a contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof. [if !
supportFootnotes][30][endif]
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with
his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred
representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment
and other representation expenses on various occasions
of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline
expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00;[if !supportFootnotes][31]
[endif]
and that his retention of complainants money was
justified in light of his apprehension that complainant,
being an alien without a valid working permit in the
Philippines, might leave the country anytime without
settling his professional fees.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and
Recommendation[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] of October 26, 2001,
found respondent guilty of misconduct and
recommended that he be disbarred and directed to
immediately turn over to complainant the sum of
P475,000.00 representing the amount of the
P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondents
professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by
complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, acting on the Investigators Report, issued
Resolution No. XV-2002-401[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] on
August 3,2002, reading:
RESOLVEDtoADOPTandAPPROVE,asitishereby
ADOPTEDandAPPROVED,theReportand
RecommendationoftheInvestigatingCommissionerofthe
aboveentitledcase,hereinmadepartofthis
Resolution/DecisionasAnnexA;and,findingthe
recommendationfullysupportedbytheevidenceonrecord
andtheapplicablelawsandrules,withmodification,and
consideringrespondentsdishonestywhichamountedtograve
misconductandgrosslyunethicalbehaviorwhichcaused
dishonor,notmerelytorespondentbutthenobleprofessionto
whichhebelongs,RespondentisherebySUSPENDED from
thepracticeoflawforsix(6)monthswiththedirectivetoturn
overtheamountofFiveHundredTwentyFiveThousand
(P525,000.00)Pesostothecomplainantwithoutprejudiceto
respondentsrighttoclaimattorneysfeeswhichhemaycollect
intheproperforum.(Underscoringsupplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final
action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration[if filed with
this Court, assails the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the
reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator
so that Garcia can personally appear for his
(respondents) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts
material to its resolution are either admitted or
documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP
Investigator that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
RULE1.01Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,
dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
xxx
CANON15Alawyershallobservecandor,fairnessand
loyaltyinallhisdealingsandtransactionswithhisclients.
RULE15.06Alawyershallnotstateorimplythatheisable
toinfluenceanypublicofficial,tribunalorlegislativebody.
xxx
CANON16Alawyershallholdintrustallmoneysand
propertiesofhisclientthatmaycomeintohispossession.
RULE16.01Alawyershallaccountforallmoneyor
propertycollectedorreceivedfororfromtheclient.
RULE16.02Alawyershallkeepthefundsofeachclient
separateandapartfromhisownandthoseofotherskeptby
him.
RULE16.03Alawyershalldeliverthefundsandpropertyof
hisclientwhendueorupondemand.However,heshallhavea
lienoverthefundsandmayapplysomuchthereofasmaybe
necessarytosatisfyhislawfulfeesanddisbursements,giving
noticepromptlythereaftertohisclient.Heshallalsohavea
lientothesameextentonalljudgmentsandexecutionshehas
securedforhisclientasprovidedforintheRulesofCourt.
xxx
CANON17Alawyerowesfidelitytothecauseofhisclient
andheshallbemindfulofthetrustandconfidenceinhim.
xxx
RULE18.04Alawyershallkeeptheclientinformedofthe
statusofhiscaseandshallrespondwithinareasonabletimeto
theclientsrequestforinformation.
xxx
RULE21.02Alawyershallnot,tothedisadvantageofhis
client,useinformationacquiredinthecourseofemployment,
norshallheusethesametohisadvantageorthatofathird
person,unlesstheclientwithfullknowledgeofthe
circumstancesconsentsthereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which
Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of
complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that he may come to possess.
This commandment entails certain specific acts to be
done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all
money or property received for or from the client [if !
supportFootnotes][36][endif]
as well as delivery of the funds or
property to the client when due or upon demand. [if !
supportFootnotes][37][endif]
Respondent breached this Canon when
after he received the proceeds of complainants
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who
had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-
fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to
complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23,
1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March
26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that
the claim was still pending and recommend acceptance
of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos. His
explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on
Garcias express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like
respondent, would not and should not commit
prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request
of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds
he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree,
for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant
who was kept in the dark about the release of the check,
until he himself discovered the same, and has to date
been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings
with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty
and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades
himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable
profession.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif]
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his
attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to account
for it.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] The lawyers continuing exercise
of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees
with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case
of disagreement or when the client contests that amount
for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not
arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] He can file, if he
still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper
motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such
fees.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt
to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial
determination so that his and complainants sharp
disagreement thereon could have been put to an end.
Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on
to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees
sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no
means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify
inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to
his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing
a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and
after complainant had discovered its release to him, he
was already asking for 50%, objection to which
complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had
to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one
year when all the while he has been in custody of the
proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any
rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement
to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions
from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total
of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia
in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is
bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to
believe that a lawyer like respondent could have
entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without
documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent
alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms.[if !
supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Not only that. As stated earlier,
respondents Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and
his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant
unequivocally contained his express admission that the
total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such
illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only
aggravates his misconduct. Respondents claim
discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who,
acting allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia some
amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly
suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent
reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank
check that was issued payable solely in favor of
complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan
Insurance[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] is clearly a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document which respondent
resorted to in order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to
expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a
good network reflects lack of character, self-respect, and
justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years
respondent has been in possession of complainants
funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The
deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its
discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt
of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a
grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good
moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in
his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already
delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that
complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that
he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such
incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit
complainants funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that
he has misappropriated them.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif]
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown
that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble
profession that is the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E.

Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and
gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a
lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.

Respondent is ordered to turn over to

complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of
P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice, without
prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to
recover his attorneys fees and purported expenses
incurred in securing the release thereof from
Metropolitan Insurance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against
capital punishment is the amplitude of legal protection
accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are
the safeguards designed to minimally reduce, if not
altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed,
there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by
the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed
the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further
addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But,
even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of
death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The
cases at bar, involving two death sentences,
apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate
judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two
separate informations filed before the Regional Trial
Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47,
with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention,
respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January,
1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's
Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by
means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife
and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice. 1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious
Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at
Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province
of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual,
and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by
means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a
girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus
thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her
will and consent and without legal justification, to the
damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha. 2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant
pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial
was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was
conducted by the trial court. 3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M.
of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center,
Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National
School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying.
When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to
pass through the kitchen door at the back because she
knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she
opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her,
poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and
told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on
the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the
moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant
Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed
her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the
other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then
inserted his private organ inside her private parts against
her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience
and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter
a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back
nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was
her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was
threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else
she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she
noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant
walked with her to the gate of the house and she then
proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived.
She did not see where appellant went after she left him
at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house,
she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything
about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant
went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's
Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the
incident for fear that appellant might make good his
threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked
permission from the latter if complainant could
accompany him to solicit funds because she was a
candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents
agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant
because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they
walked in silence, with Mia following behind appellant,
towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger
jeep which was empty except for the driver and the
conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the
vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the
poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought
her to a room where they staye d for three days. During
the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden,
complainant was not allowed to leave the room which
was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded
and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however,
never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was
forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was
always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant
brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's
Subdivision where she was raped by him three times.
She was likewise detained and locked inside the room
and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on
January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant
came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They
went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant
sought help. On that same day, she was released but
only after her parents agreed to settle the case with
appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the
District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was
examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the
following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative,
walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and
nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly
developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening
stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2
cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape,
laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with
slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers
with slight resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal
at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length.
Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in
erection with laceration. 4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal
opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration, which shows that complainant had
participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the
inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied
because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a
week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily
but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told
him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that
she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that
she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated
him because of what he did to her; and that she did not
notice if there were people near the boarding house of
her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to
remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that
even as appellant was doing this she could not shout
because she was afraid. She could not remember with
which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely
silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her
panty was being removed, and even until appellant was
able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day,
she did not know if he was armed but there was no
threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary,
appellant even courteously asked permission from them
in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant
walking ahead of her. When she was brought to the
Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was
afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant
was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier
of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were
other people inside. She likewise did not ask the
appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an
ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the
courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened
from the inside, and she added that there was a sliding
lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at
Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but she
never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime
she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She
never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that
when the latter arrived at their house in the morning of
January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak
and her eyes were swollen. When she asked her
daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely
kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with
appellant because she knew he was her teacher.
However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home
at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went
to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them
there, she went to the house of appellant because she
was already suspecting that something was wrong, but
appellant's wife told her that he did not come home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot,
Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the
police blotter. The following day, they went to the office of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI,
and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan
program where she made an appeal to appellant to
return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain
Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia
was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's
willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia
and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded
because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the
house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch
complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she
was crying as she reported that she was raped by
appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she
did not return within an hour. Because of this, she
immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter
was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal
hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia
and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements
before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their
house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the
case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just
settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia
Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No.
7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office,
which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S.
Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the
settlement because that was what her husband wanted.
Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not
allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what
actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime
in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS).
Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her
because she often told him "Sir, I love you." What started
as a joke later developed into a serious relationship
which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on
December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual
intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the
Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because
he was the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess.
At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at
his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she
then decided to spend the night there with him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of
January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS,
was looking inside the school building for her husband,
who was a security guard of PNS, when she heard
voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She
went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying
"Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa
at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately
opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and
Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they
were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two,
who were obviously caught by surprise, could not
answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left.
According to this witness, complainant admitted to her
that she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous
that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna
Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the
latter arrived from Manila around the first week of
February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero
executed an affidavit in connection with the present
case, but the same was not filed then because of the
affidavit of desistance which was executed and
submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn
statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna
Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she
confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and
reminded her that appellant is a married man, but
complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding
that she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around
7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for help
with the monologue that she would be presenting for the
Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her at the house
of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he
reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia
waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a
bench near the road where there was a lighted electric
post and they talked about the matter she had earlier
asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes,
after which complainant returned to her boarding house
just across the street while appellant headed for home
some fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for
appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at
PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store,
saw her sitting on a bench and asked what she was
doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely
replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena
proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw
Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of
her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw
complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that
they were quite intimate because they were holding
hands. This made her suspect that the two could be
having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that
his wife had finished her aerobics class and was already
waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to
see them seated on the same bench. Filomena further
testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the
relationship because his wife had a heart ailment. She
also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise
told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At
the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant
appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2",
claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia
was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena
clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of
January 21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did
not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was
pleading with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994,
appellant met Mia's mother on the road near their house
and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which
invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter,
complainant told him to ask permission from her mother
for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he
did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying
a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said
that it contained her things which she was bringing to her
cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion
where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had
snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already
late and there was no more available transportation, so
she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden.
Convinced that there was nothing wrong in that because
they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact
that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit
suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed
upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was
complainant who arranged their registration and
subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds
they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told
complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to
see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In
truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio
and went home to Pulot. He did not bring complainant
along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went
to the house of complainant's parents and informed them
that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's
parents said that they would just fetch her there, so he
went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside
the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he
decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while
waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session
with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him
back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's
room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey
had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her
what they were doing, but she merely answered that
what she was doing was of her own free will and that at
that moment her father was not supposed to know about
it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did
not know, however, was that appellant had already
reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not
to tell her because he did not want to add to her
apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that when
he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and
24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during
their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January
22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to
what she really wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew
that what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly
could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would
commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to
appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to
accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a
policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to
see him at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in
procuring transportation because, according to appellant,
the relatives of Mia were already looking for them and so
they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey
accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose
wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter
refused to help because of the complicated situation
appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station
whether a complaint had been filed against appellant
and after finding out that there was none, he told
appellant to just consult a certain Naem who is an
"imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's
house that same day and bared everything about him
and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry
complainant in Muslim rites but appellant refused
because he was already married. It was eventually
agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of
appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with
Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the
parents of complainant at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because
complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel
bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the
house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's
Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just
walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden
to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to
seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house,
Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio,
testified that the couple were very happy, they were
intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate
together, and it was very obvious that they were having a
relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even
called appellant "Papa." While they were there, she
would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash
clothes, and sometimes watch television. When
Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go
with appellant despite the fact the he was a married
man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She
never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the
slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been
kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that
several police officers lived within their neighborhood
and if complainant had really been kidnapped and
detained, she could have easily reported that fact to
them. Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and
the room where they stayed was never locked because
the lock had been destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that
appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was
Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia
to go home; that complainant's mother never went to his
house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who
fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought
him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again
met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed
him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him
at Naem's house the next day. The following morning, or
on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to
complainant's parents because they merely sent a child
to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that
her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see
her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told
her that within one hour he was be going to the police
station at the municipal hall so that they could settle
everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out
of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police
Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station.
Appellant waited at the police station the whole
afternoon but when complainant, her parents and
relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given
the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of
January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to
leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia
and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and
kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan,
delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters
from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1,
1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar
with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting
in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came
to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants.
However, he claims that he never knew and it was never
mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court,
that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because,
although he did not dissuade them, neither did he
request his mother to talk to complainants in order to
settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he
poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21,
1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at
the Sunset Garden but that was already on January 24,
1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they
never had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when
complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill
her if she refused to testify against him, although by the
time she testified in court, her father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had
several illicit relations in the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known
fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a relationship
with her because he wanted to change her and that was
what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that,
during the time when they were staying together, Mia
had allegedly asked permission to leave several times
but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on
January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents
wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her
when they left her parents' house on January 22, 1994,
but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house
after she failed to return on January 27, 1994. The bag
of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by
Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at
the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant
for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and
that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because
according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no
longer necessary since the complainants had already
executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having
signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in
connection with these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha,
denied that she delivered any letter to appellant when
the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She
admitted, on cross-examination, that she was requested
by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that
she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with
appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she
denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the
incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her,
the truth was that she was at the boarding house of Toto
Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the
claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21,
1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant
contending that she did not see her former teacher on
that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and
talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21,
1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant
were lovers, much less with intimate relations, since
there never was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the
following testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she
told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas
tayo;" that she answered "wala kang pakialam" when
Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship with
appellant; that she was the one who registered them at
Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left
her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994;
that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there
for five minutes, because the only other person who
went there was the room boy who served their food; that
they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for
transportation; and that she was free to roam around or
to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of
appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to
have sex with him and claims that the last time she went
to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI; that she
ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo"
when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him,
since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not
hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant
would leave her since she never brought a blade with
her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's
Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified
her signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4"
and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the
same as that appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then,
contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted
that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to
her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of
the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in
these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person
who visited appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at
around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he
asked her what she wanted and she said she would just
visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him
he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked
at the visiting area which is around ten meters away from
his post, and then he saw her hand over to appellant a
letter which the latter immediately read. This witness
declared that appellant never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney
driver, testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994,
he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point
and, when he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant
and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several
passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the
poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the
Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment 5
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty
of death in both cases. 6 By reason of the nature of the
penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this
Court on automatic review.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for
rape 7 and kidnapping with serious illegal detention 8 filed
by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal
Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a resolution 9 on
February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie
case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the
spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an
affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention. 10 However,
pursuant to a joint resolution 11 issued on March 11, 1994
by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape
and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were
nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with
no bail recommended in both charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the
judgment of the court below, on the following assignment
of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the
doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence adduced in a
prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision
reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA
303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-
appellant had consummated the crime of rape against
private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence
to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence
to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and
completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was
implied admission of guilt on the part of the accused-
appellant in view of the offer to compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant
be indemnified in the sum of one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes
committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death
penalty for each of the crimes charged on the accused-
appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly
committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No.
7659. 12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious
consequences. It exposes both the accused and the
accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention
the stigma of shame that both have to bear for the rest of
 their
lives. 13 By the very nature of the crime of rape,
conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the
fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its
occurrence. 14 This notwithstanding, the basic rule
remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to
the nature of the defense which the accused may raise,
the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any
material element, and the prosecution is then unable to
overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to
carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be
acquitted. 15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full
panoply of State authority, the accused is accorded the
presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse
the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not
enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of
his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be
strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 16 In other words, the
accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone
uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman,
provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing
and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an
appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a
prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while
rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be
severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in
mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be
proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent; 17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; 18 and (3) that the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which
amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court
that there was no rape committed on the alleged date
and place, and that the charge of rape was the
contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful
plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape
under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code are, first, that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the complainant; and, second, that the same was
accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond
peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual
congress with complainant against her will. Complainant
avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she was
sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other
hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends
that on said date and time, he merely talked with
complainant outside that house. We find appellant's
version more credible and sustained by the evidence
presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen
of the boarding house, appellant was already inside
apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how
appellant could have known that she was going there on
that particular day and at that time, considering that she
does not even live there, unless of course it was
appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on
anybody who happened to come along. But then this
would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from
the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate
victim was never established nor even intimated by the
prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story
is precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as
regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault. 20 It
will be noted that the place where the alleged crime was
committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding
house where several persons live and where people are
expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even
bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral
break or that the boarding house had remained closed
for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed
that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful
day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of
complainant because the latter requested him to help her
with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However,
they were not able to go inside the house because it was
locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a
bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of
appellant was substantially corroborated by defense
witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the
evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant
and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding
house, and that she even advised them to go home
because it was already late and appellant's wife, who
was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for
him at the school building. On rebuttal, complainant
could only deny that she saw Pielago that night.
Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction. 21
It was further alleged by complainant that after her
alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she
appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin.
of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is Then in the course of her narration, she gave another
inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to version and said that when she reached the boarding
remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
22
and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given
the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted
further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident her answers in order to cover up or realign the same with
impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from
as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and her testimony even on this single episode, thus:
apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty
of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock
person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all in the evening, do you remember where you were?
other things and circumstances related to the offense
which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even
the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty A Yes, sir.
flee where no man pursueth.
Q Where were you?
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend
to prove that the accused was at the scene of the crime A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan,
are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such Sir.
presence can be appreciated as a circumstance tending
to identify the appellant. 23 Consequently, it is not in xxx xxx xxx
accord with human experience for appellant to have let
himself be seen with the complainant immediately after Q Why were you there?
he had allegedly raped her. 24 It thus behooves this Court
to reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy
A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.
as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the
house, considering its strategic location vis-a-vis
complainant's boarding house which is just across the COURT:
street, 25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only
around thirty meters away. 26 Q Conversing with whom?

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after A With my cousin, Your Honor.
the incident she went directly to her boarding house
where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never Q Your cousin's name?
presented as a witness to corroborate the story of
complainant, despite the fact that the former was the A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.
very first person she came in contact with from the time
appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan
boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even xxx xxx xxx
though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could
at least have testified on complainant's physical PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that
indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour, Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you,
possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all. will you please relate to this Honorable Court how that
rape happened?
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe
appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
to the boarding house to help her with the monologue
she was preparing for the school contest. This is even COURT:
consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her
the following day in order to solicit funds for her
Q Of what date?
candidacy in that same school affair.
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to
the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she
asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with xxx xxx xxx
a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin.
Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially
Q Then what happened?
A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn
Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen and then
when I opened the door somebody grabbed me
suddenly.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During that time were there other people present in
that boarding house where you said Danny Godoy raped
you?
A None, Sir.
COURT:
Q So, the house was empty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there and you were
conversing?
A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor. 27
(Corrections and emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through
the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a
knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not
sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by
the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's
theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-
legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer
scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither
support nor confirm the charge that rape was so
committed through forcible means by appellant against
complainant on January 21, 1994.
The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr.
Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and
the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual
intercourse with a man on the date which she alleged, do
not establish the supposed rape since the same findings
and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's
admission that coitus took place with the consent of
complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. 28
Further, rather than substantiating the prosecution's
aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission
of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of
extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more
credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a
later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of
employment of physical force. 29 In rape of the nature
alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the
complainant must be corroborated by physical evidence
showing use of force. 30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is
superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-
legal expert opined that it could not be categorically
stated that there was force involved. On further
questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force
was not applied. 31 He also added that when he
examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of
bruises. 32 The absence of any sign of physical violence
on the complainant's body is an indication of
complainant's consent to the act. 33 While the absence in
the medical certificate of external signs of physical
injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape, 34 the instant case is clearly an
exception to this rule since appellant has successfully
cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report
and the laceration corroborated complainant's assertion
that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same
cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been
held that such corroborative evidence is not considered
sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal
element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts
necessary to constitute another equally important
element of the crime. 35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was
not really strong because she was afraid of appellant.
Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as
she claims, we nevertheless strongly believe that her
supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident
that complainant did not use the manifest resistance
expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity.
36
She failed to make any outcry when appellant
allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house.
There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up
a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor,
removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers,
and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did
she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the
heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever
nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or
struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully
unconvincing to make this Court believe that she
tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by
appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or
objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was
not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a
woman defending her virtue and honor. 37 Her failure to
do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful
her charge of rape, 38 especially when we consider the
actual mise-en-scene in the context of her
asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-
stained dress are not essential, and need not be
presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to
prove rape. 39 We incline to the view, however, that this
general rule holds true only if there exist other
corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly
proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The
rule should go the other way where, as in the present
case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak
and no other physical evidence has been presented to
bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the
medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated
the existence of one of the essential elements of the
crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible
conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of
complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should
vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately
following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance
as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It
may well be doubted whether a conviction for the offense
of rape should even be sustained from the
uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court
is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time
when the alleged rape was committed and immediately
thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected
from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed
rape, appellant went to her parents' house and asked
permission from them to allow her to go with him to
solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere throughout her
entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was
armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to
leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor
intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was
afraid of the supposed threat previously made by
appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was
alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no
showing of any opportunity for him to make good his
threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On
the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant
respectfully asked permission from her parents for her to
accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged
ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was
so strangely normal as to be abnormal. 41 It seems odd, if
not incredible, that upon seeing the person who had
allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not
accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion,
and disgust. 42 Instead, she meekly went with appellant
despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of
neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally
have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design.
From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged
threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the
mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned
attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would
naturally be expected of a person who had just suffered
the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural
human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and
sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking
retribution for her outrageous violation, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters
of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at
a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it
with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must
free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every woman decrying her having been
sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the
abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish
and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that
their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from
disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses 45 will not apply where the
evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the
lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where
the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome
of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 46
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone
testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994
incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped
by a man. All that the victim had to testify to was that
appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if
she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and
had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that
confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's
testimony is credible. 47 The technique in deciphering
testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of
that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can
often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire
testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be
considered in relation to what else has been stated. 48
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely
leaves much to be desired. The court below made no
serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider
the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of
the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the
testimony of the offended party must not be accepted
with precipitate credulity. 49 In finding that the crime of
rape was committed, the lower court took into account
only that portion of the testimony of complainant
regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and
conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would
be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if
we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which
unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly
failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could
have been readily exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in
complainant's testimony which inveigh against its being
accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court.
Considered independently of any other, the defects
might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of
conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic
and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion
towards reversal of said judgment. 50 Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by
herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three
times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement
she made the same allegations. If this were true, it is
inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could
have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal
implications and, instead, filed an information charging
appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of
complainant's representations is further magnified by the
fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as may be
inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her
testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it
was similarly befuddled.
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it
was never explained how she was threatened with the
same in such a manner that she was allegedly always
cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands.
We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that
complainant now advances appears to be a common
testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for
three days and three nights and that she never noticed if
appellant slept because she never saw him close his
eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by side with
appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke
up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her. 51
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room
because it was always locked and it could not be opened
from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's
own testimony, as follows:
Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the
inside?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.
ATTY. EBOL:
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I
ask that the door be locked and opened from the inside.
COURT:
Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out
for yourself if you can open that door from the inside.
CLERK OF COURT:
Witness holding the doorknob.
COURT:
The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're
were (sic) inside you can open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that
you held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
Q And that is used when you are already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor. 52 (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even
at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering
token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances,
she made no outcry, no attempt to flee or attract
attention to her plight. 53 In her own declaration,
complainant mentioned that when they checked in at
Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information
counter where appellant registered. She did not do
anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was
admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room
boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If
indeed she was bent on fleeing from appellant, she could
have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape.
Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling
is the prosecution's failure to present these two people
she mentioned and whose testimonies could have
bolstered or corroborated complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon
of January 22, 1994, they left the house together and
walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony,
complainant stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is
highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives,
that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond
comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling
such fear in complainant that she could not dare take
advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of
appellant, and run as far away from him as possible
despite all the chances therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a
result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was
dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate.
This is absurd. Rather than support and commiserate
with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the
school authorities were heartless people who turned
their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That
would be adding insult to injury. But what is more
abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were
never heard to complain about this apparent injustice.
Such complacency cannot but make one think and
conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid
justification for the drastic action taken by the school and
the docile submission thereto by the Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony,
the trial court's decision was replete with sweeping
statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on
certain portions of appellant's testimony, declared them
to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to
conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in
effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on
the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the
weakness of that of the defense, which is totally
repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that
conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear
and compelling evidence of the prosecution. 54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he
and complainant were sweethearts. While the
"sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this
Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that
the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases,
either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are
against it. It is not improbable that in some instances,
when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or
her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of
instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court
would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to
admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the
records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is
fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
witnesses for the defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January
21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a
bench in front of the house where the sexual attack
allegedly took place, and the couple were talking
intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit
affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and
owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified
that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with
appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she
really loves him. 55 He heard her call appellant "Papa". 56
The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.
57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando,
testified on redirect examination that he asked Mia if she
knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;"
then he asked her if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she
again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to
give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if
appellant left her, she would commit suicide. 58 He could
see that the couple were happy together. 59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the
Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was
located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was
able to talk to the couple and that when he was advising
appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is
married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by
saying that no matter what happened she would not
leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would
kill her. 60 He also observed that they were happy. 61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the
couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside
one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and
she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir,
iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." 62 She tried
to dissuade complainant from continuing with her
relationship with appellant. 63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having
an intimate relationship with complainant, which were
substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were
never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of
complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained
denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed
assertions of appellant. 64 Mere denials are self-serving
negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary
weight greater than the declarations of credible
disinterested witnesses. 65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he
could have supplied. They were replete with details
which could have been known only to him, thereby
lending credence and reliability thereto. 66 His assertions
are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of
truth. This is not to say that the testimony of appellant
should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must
have colored his account, even on the assumption that
he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth.
Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not
strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is
enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some
basis in reality. 67
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's
testimony is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and
incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive
rule of law and is not an inflexible one. 68 It does not
apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many
grounds of the testimony and the supposed
inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness
to exculpate himself although not completely. 69
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers
is belied by the evidence presented by the defense, the
most telling of which are her two handwritten letters,
Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent to the latter while he
was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and
emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo
ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang
paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay
at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week.
pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko.
pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot
sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil
naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon
hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong
kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon.
ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago
nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong
luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na
gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi
manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito
ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna
kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka
lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at huwag
kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong
ano ang disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid
kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil
baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . .
(Sgd.) Mia Taha 70
3/1/94
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa
halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang
naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa
pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang
paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na
magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende
sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si
Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan
ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng wala
sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo.
hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo
ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil
gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa
iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga
magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong
iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan
lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi
ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang
kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na
saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto
kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko
kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas
ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong
ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong
puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang
ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi
makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan,
kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita.
March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko
matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng
tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati
ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong
lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang
ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong
makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.
Love you
(Sgd.) Mia Taha 71
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The
letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was
complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to
speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense
witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as
belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and
Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers
of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting.
The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in
ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and
refusing to give any probative value to these two vital
pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that
no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and
evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to
questioned document examiners, more familiarly called
handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting
experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This is so since
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person,
because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said
section further provides that evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made
by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. 73
The defense witnesses were able to identify
complainant's handwriting on the basis of the
examination papers submitted to them by her in their
respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully
examined and compared the handwriting on the letters
with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as
specimens for comparison and, contrary to the
observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are
convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one
and the same person. More importantly, complainant
herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the
questioned letters belongs to her.
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least,
why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this
conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero
and Filomena Pielago were your teachers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they have been your teachers for several months
before this incident of January 21, 1994, am I not
correct?
A That is true, sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they
have been your teachers you took examinations in their
classes in their particular subject(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some of those test papers are in the possession
of your teachers, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as
Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and with your
signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit
appears to be that of Mia Taha, please examine this and
tell the Honorable Court if that is your test paper?
A Yes, sir.
Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your
signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine
this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if you are
familiar with that.
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not
familiar with that signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that
in Math, are you familiar with that signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own
handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
A Yes, sir. 74
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that
she never delivered any letter of complainant to herein
appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-
rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at
the provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord
because he knew that what Casantosan said was a
blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor
requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the
witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason
whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion
to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit
appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned
out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for
the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise
made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt.
This inference does not arise in the instant case. In
criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a
legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards
the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in
such cases the accused is permitted to show that the
offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. 75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the
defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of
the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of
marriage did not come from appellant but was actually
suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim
leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could
be converted into a Muslim so he could marry
complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was
first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact
that he was already married. On top of these, appellant
did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother
actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these
cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified
that present during the negotiations were herself, her
husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself
was never present in any of said meetings. 76
It has been held that where the accused was not present
at the time the offer for monetary consideration was
made, such offer of compromise would not save the day
for the prosecution. 77 In another case, this Court ruled
that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts
to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and
the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and
traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of
the relations between the parties. 78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may,
however, create serious doubts as to the liability of
appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges. 79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to
appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of
desperation and exasperation with the way she was
being treated by her parents, complainant threw all
caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig
ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila,
hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban,"
obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in
helping appellant out of his predicament. It could,
therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was
merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order
to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the
moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was
forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in
rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly
required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great
caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor
to their character humiliates their entire families. 80 It
could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to
save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her
daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues
of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would
not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration,
that is not always the case as this Court has noted a
long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of
false charges of rape. 81 While this Court has, in
numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction
rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially
where the offended parties were very young and
presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to
secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the
Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and
acquitted the accused when there are strong indications
pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were
merely motivated by some factors except the truth as to
their commission. 82 This is a case in point. The Court,
therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the
prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral
certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct
of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of
complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of
fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted
as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her
develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her.
83
Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in
a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains
in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a
measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these
ruminations do not rule out such other legal options
against him as may be available in the arsenal of
statutory law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the
presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge
a person with rape if it is not true. In the process,
however, it totally disregarded the more paramount
constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or
more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the
guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such
case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each
presumption and determine what logical or social basis
exists for each presumption, and then determine which
should be regarded as the more important and entitled to
prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered
that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does
not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence
unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of
the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation,
is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner,
the presumption of innocence continues. 84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases
has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the
testimony of the complaining witness, on the theory that
she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and
subject herself to the stigma and indignities her
accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The
rape victim who decides to speak up exposes herself as
a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but
also irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded
society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind
that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact
denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the
object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be
titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will
squirm through her testimony as she describes how her
honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing
movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of
her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that
she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the
sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity
will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome
of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah
because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault
of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead
to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation
rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the
reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out
openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth
regardless of its consequences. . . . 85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is
founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a
mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not
overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability
that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so. 86 Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an
uneven contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused
must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. 87 This is in
consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must
be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than
upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. 88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and
principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming
evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not
encounter any difficulty in concluding that the
constitutional presumption on the innocence of an
accused must prevail in this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor
was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. 89 In the
present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all
been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from
the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing
this charge which they themselves instituted, several
grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the
prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts
on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself
went to fetch her at her parents' house the day after the
alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant
courteously asked her parents to permit her to help him
solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left the
house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her
parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It
is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from
these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious
intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty.
One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was
committed under such inauspicious circumstances as
described by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the
Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic
bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This
bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as
hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant
by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a
ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first
allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was
merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal,
all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents
who passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her
locked inside the room which they occupied, whether at
Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she
could not unlock the door from the inside. We must,
however, recall that when she was asked on cross-
examination about the kind of lock that was used, she
pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then
ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and
then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She
was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted that
the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also
be opened from the inside in the same manner. This
demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the
prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of
Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied by
the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be
locked because the lock thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision,
they walked along the national highway in broad
daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample
opportunity to seek the help of other people and free
herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly
kidnapped and abused by the latter. 90 In fact, several
opportunities to do so had presented themselves from
the time they left complainant's home and during their
extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of
complainant the day after they went to Sunset Garden to
inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This
was neither denied nor impugned by Helen Taha, her
husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the
allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the
police about her missing daughter was not supported by
any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter,
nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly reported
the incident ever identified or presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the
commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court
rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the
slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 91 It is true that, as
a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does
not have to be proved. 92 Where, however, the evidence
is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the
evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a
reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order. 93
Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or
her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be
reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an
elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be.
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's
refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging
to complainant which was presented and duly identified
by the defense, on its announced supposition that the
clothes could have easily been bought from a
department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded
on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact
that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to
elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant
about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our
impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of
discretion by the court below. Matters which could have
been easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and
supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis
a conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early
and highly regarded disquisition of this Court against the
practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner
adopted by the trial court:
It has been observed that justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered where trivial objections to the
admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to
its materiality or technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it
is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early
stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule
safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the
battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance
may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of
proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact
shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal,
often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case
for a new trial, a step which this court is always very
loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof
in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its
form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial
judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty, upon
final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant
and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this
course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the
Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct
judgment. 94
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the
records of these cases sufficient and substantial
evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of
appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to
repeat this age-old observation and experience of
mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital
punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that
Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on
December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its
publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine
Times Journal, 95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is
sometimes misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant
Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of
rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the
Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be
released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for
any other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY
GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE
DE LEON
Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio
Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to
cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a
columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher
and chairman of the editorial board, respectively,
of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based
on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in
his column, "On the Beat," and published in the
July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of
general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The
complaint avers that the article tends to impede,
obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains
averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does
not only cast aspersions on the integrity and
honesty of complainant as a judge and on his
ability to administer justice objectively and
impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased
and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and
that the article is sub judice because it is still
pending automatic review.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt
proceedings where the alleged contumely is
committed against a lower court while the case is
pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt
of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure
to do an act, in such a manner as to create an
affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. As a matter of practical
judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt
properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with
respect to a given controversy. Partly because of
administrative considerations, and partly to visit
the full personal effect of the punishment on a
contemnor, the rule has been that no other court
than the one contemned will punish a given
contempt.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the
general rule that the power to punish for
contempt rests with the court contemned is that
contempt proceedings are sui generis and are
triable only by the court against whose authority
the contempt are charged; the power to punish
for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a
court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes: and in order that a court
may compel obedience to its orders, it must have
the right to inquire whether there has been any
disobedience thereof, for to submit the question
of disobedience to another tribunal would operate
to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and
statutorily recognized exceptions to the general
rule, both under Philippine and American
jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior
court may also be tried by the proper regional
trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court
may be caused to be investigated by a
prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in
and tried by the regional trial court, or the case
may be referred to it for hearing and
recommendation where the charge involves
questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court
ruled that "in the interrelation of the different
courts forming our integrated judicial system, one
court is not an agent or representative of another
and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and decorum which
are not its own. The appeal transfers the
proceedings to the appellate court , and this last
court becomes thereby charged with the
authority to deal with contempts committed after
the perfection of the appeal." The apparent
reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a
punishment for contempt would be missed if it
were regarded as the resentment of personal
affronts offered to judges. Contempts are
punished as offenses against the administration
of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial
order is punishable by the court which is charged
with its enforcement, regardless of the court
which may have made the order. However, the
rule presupposes a complete transfer of
jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is
authority that where the contempt does not
relate to the subject matter of the appeal,
jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed
against a court or judge constituting one of its
parts or agencies, as in the case of a court
composed of several coordinate branches or
divisions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the
exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a
given matter has been transferred from the
contemned court to another court. One of the
most common reasons for a transfer of
jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The
cases involving venue deal primarily with the
question whether a change of venue is available
after a contempt proceeding has been begun.
While generally a change of venue is not
available in a contempt proceeding, some
jurisdictions allow such a change in proper
circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has
jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders
entered by its predecessor, although where the
successor court is created by a statute which
does not extinguish jurisdiction in the
predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction
before the contempt occurs is necessary to
empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review
have produced numerous instances where
contempt against the trial court has been
punished in the appellate court, and vice versa.
Some appellate courts have taken the view that a
contempt committed after an appeal is taken is
particularly contemptuous of the appellate court
because of the tendency of such contempts to
upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with
the jurisdiction of such court.
need to protect the courts and the people from
improper professional practice. To the substantial
extent that disciplinary action remains a
punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by
another court than the one contemned furnish an
exception to the rule against punishing for
contempt of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime,
usually misdemeanors, which are often
punishable in other courts than those against
which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against
another court has been allowed to stand on the
basis that the failure of the defendant to make
timely objection operated as a waiver of the right
to be
tried before the court actually contemned.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed
applicable to the present incident, is that where
the entire case has already been appealed,
jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the
appellate court where the appeal completely
transfers the proceedings thereto or where there
is a tendency to affect the status quo or
otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for
indirect contempt against herein respondents, it
has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has
accordingly resolved the same.

8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be

disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main
case, which circumstance may require a transfer
of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified
only in the main case, because of matters which
do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding,
the regular judge should sit in the contempt
proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is
absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is
entered by another judge and made returnable to
the proper court, the regular judge may punish
for violations of orders so entered.

9. Where the same act is a contempt against two

or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a
contempt against the other.

10. While professional disciplinary proceedings

have been resorted to as a punishment for
contempt, the more recent view is that
punishment is of secondary importance to the

G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO
PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by
petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao
Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed
a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of
Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority,
grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to
the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners
from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing
lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room
B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." 2
However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4
showed that respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent
is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself
as a lawyer.
In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a
practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that
the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the
subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty.
Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against
petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were
drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005
parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and
another for the parking incident on the same date but
which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding
the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he
is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204,
2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."7
However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00
oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the
instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a
practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary
copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-
affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that
respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City
with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building,
Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to
the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an
affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the
complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not
read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that
the two complaint-affidavits contained the same
allegations with respect to his occupation and office
address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent
should be made liable for indirect contempt for having
made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and
that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is
liable for indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized
practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting
as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The
liability for the unauthorized practice of law under
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the
nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished
because they are an affront to the dignity and authority
of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of
justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-
settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and
no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it
clear that he intended to commit it.11

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports

respondents claim that he never intended to project
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear
inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the
drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result
of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation

that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to
make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where
we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of
law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing
court pleadings on behalf of his client;12 appearing before
court hearings as an attorney;13 manifesting before the
court that he will practice law despite being previously
denied admission to the bar;14 or deliberately attempting
to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not
licensed to do so.15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show

that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended
to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable
for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to
illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove

respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as
an attorney and act as such without authority, he is
hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his
future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent

is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his
future actions.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN,
CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN
ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO,
MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T.
WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS,
INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of
the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors,
officers, stockholders and related interests totaling
P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful
and P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the
Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.3
Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to
its depositors, creditors and the general public, and
ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding of
GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as
mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the
Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant
to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages"
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth
Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying
Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc.,
Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents
Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don
Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the
PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties comments, this
Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-
0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank,
"actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan,
et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the
acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he
advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to
bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its
petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK
which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group.
It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that
respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year
prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year
1986. The said section prohibits a former public official
or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with
within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were
transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division
to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied
the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in
its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing
the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that
the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former
government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the
prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central
Bank could not waive the objection to respondent
Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4)
the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory,
thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive
issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut
our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we
trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical
standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and
other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards
did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were
not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct
of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the
client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at
times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's
other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early
post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly
from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural
rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over
time, but the variation in early America was far greater.
The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony
and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had
the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the
regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can
be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal,
positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period:
the duties of litigation fairness, competency and
reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark
ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-
century, American legal reformers were filling the void in
two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the
highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a
new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers.
This concise statement of eight statutory duties became
law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a
lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics
in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-
nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the
Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulations e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath
and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty
and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started
to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client
privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality.
Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of
service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as
in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods,
these standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in
their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually
ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form
of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The
bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by
lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes
gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the
oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of
bar associations themselves. Local bar associations
formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form
again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had
left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably
the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a
comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several
states codes, and it was the foundation for the American
Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and
duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full
measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned
the form and function of the canons. Among their
concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by
which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
"Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in
which the former government lawyer represents a client
in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26
On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers. 27 For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the
canons through new canons, individual amendments and
interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one
canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with
problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon
36 was minted which disqualified them both for
"adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts."29 The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the
government lawyers largely discretionary actions would
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf
of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private
practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate
in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with
any matter he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend
many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in
1933 and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted
as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was
growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA
Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational
and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to
replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical
principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility
were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became
the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969,
the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model
Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August
1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used
the "restatement format," where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule.
The new format was intended to give better guidance
and clarity for enforcement "because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The
Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and
reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive
improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with
Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite
nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was
drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities.
On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly
with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon"
with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and
"congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse
interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it
is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and
later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the
Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue
of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first,
the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention"
made by the former government lawyer on the "matter."
The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion
342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as
well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
particular situation and specific party, and not merely an
act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which
was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates
the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General,
viz:40
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists
that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum
dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of
the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor
Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya,
then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota
P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a
conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza),
who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation
of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said
memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference
with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank
can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it
may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board,
it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal
stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court
in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March
29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in
filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said
minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor
General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision
and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General
Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board,
dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section
29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a
repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together
with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or
needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-
praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In
fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising
the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter"
under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given
in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29,
viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners or
agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the
same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather
all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within
the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a
petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities
of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the
functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall,
with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the
banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell,
assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and
assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section
34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set
aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that
the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No
restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its
actions under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in
an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order
or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance
and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean
the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of
business. Provided, however, That this shall not include
the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run
on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of
this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of
argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza
falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the
"matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the
plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also
given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru
the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore,
is not the same nor is related to but is different from
the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case
No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks
owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does
not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it
involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether
the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-
gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution
and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged
banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other
words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not
an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution
and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the
"intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene"
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous
feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or
between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others. 42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the
word "intervene." Under the first interpretation,
"intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if
the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.43 Under the second interpretation,
"intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to
the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where
the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer "should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the
broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or
passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended
only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had "substantial responsibility."
The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of
the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent
Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the
special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it
has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then
sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid
as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in
the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the
parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we
note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal
role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist
the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors
against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not
strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the
part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off
from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not
been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in
the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar
will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered
by the private sector and it is unlikely that government
will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is
not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present
income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and
cause the firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to
enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye
on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused
to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive
the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the
tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court
found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of
disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent
Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It
was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only
after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than
four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which
were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan
and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the
very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners
motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which
will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted
that granting a disqualification motion causes the client
to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51
The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again
often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52
The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse
effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the
official independence of lawyers in the government
service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who
has the security of knowing he or she can find private
employment upon leaving the government is free to work
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands
by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He
adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job
affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the
ability to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case
at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the
office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot
be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent;
it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse
to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any
undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation
of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our
law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer
may extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former
government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the
lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be
remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of
gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative
exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57
No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening
of restrictions as to former government attorneys will
have any detrimental effect on that free flow of
information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably,
the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4
and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03
in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who
"switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides"
carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in
the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on
the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be
divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no
inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case
at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not
working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the
action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides
for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule
6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of
loyalties while still in government service.61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to
prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of
the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The
greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies."63 Prof. Morgan,
however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a
private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had
just been disloyal to his or her last client the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm
that law firms want the best government lawyers the
ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified
or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no
charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised
Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye
in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of
Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.
significant decisions based on friendship rather than on
the merit says more about the present officials than
about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of
will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not
seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility
that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order
to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view,
among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should
be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga
opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza
was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted
by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard,
qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make
relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their
concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to

curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of
former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again
warns against extending this concern too far. He
explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what
appears to be an employees influence may actually be
the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x
x."67 More, he contends that the concern can be
demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make

A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983
HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
Herminio R. Noriega for complainant.
Emmanuel R. Sison in his own behalf.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981
by Herminio R. Noriega against Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison
"admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976) on the ground
of malpractice through gross misrepresentation and
falsification.
Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a
regular and permanent employee of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as a Hearing Officer and
as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil service
rules and regulations, more particularly ... the prohibition
of government employees to practice their professions";
that to circumvent the prohibition and to evade the law,
respondent assumed a different name, falsified his
Identity and represented himself to be one "Atty. Manuel
Sison", with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon
City, "at the times that he will handle private cases"; that
"Manuel Sison" is not listed as a member of the Bar in
the records of the Supreme Court; that under his said
assumed name, respondent is representing one Juan
Sacquing, the defendant in Case No. E01978 before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila,
submitting pleadings therein signed by him respondent)
under his assumed name, despite his full knowledge
That "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the Bar and that
his acts in doing so are illegal and unlawful. 1 Xerox
copies of pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and
notices are annexed to the complaint to support the
material allegations therein.
As requireD, respondent filed his Answer on August 20,
1981. He attached thereto a copy of the written
authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for him to appear as counsel of Juan
Sacquing, a close family friend, in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court JDRC of Manila, Respondent
alleges that he never held himself out to the public as a
practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to
Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free;
that he never represented himself deliberately and
intentionally as "Atty. Manuel Sison" in the Manila JDRC
where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always
signed the minutes as "Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in
one instance, he even made the necessary correction
when the court staff wrote his name as Atty Manuel
Sison"; that due to the "inept and careless work of the
clerical staff of the JDRC", notices were sent to "Atty.
Manuel Sison", at 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City,
where respondent's parents conduct a printing office and
establishment, which notices were honored by the
personnel of said office as respondent's family has
called respondent by the nickname "Manuel"; that
respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this error
of the JDRC since he "could use his nickname 'Manuel'
interchangeably with his original true name as a formal
name, and its use was not done for a fraudulent purpose
nor to misrepresent"; and, that this administrative case is
only one of the numerous baseless complaints brought
by complainant against respondent, the former being a
disgruntled loser in an injunction case in the SEC heard
before respondent as Hearing Officer.
In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially
emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability
attached to the law profession. There is no denying that
the profession of an attorney is required after a long and
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself
and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but
rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing
necessarily arising from and attached to the same by
reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an
officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal
profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall
of the United States Court when he said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life
may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it
ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On
the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that
its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion
ought to be exercised with great moderation and
judgment, but it must be exercised. 2
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a
punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
3
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 4
This Court has also held in re Atty. Felizarda M. de
Guzman 5 that to be made the basis of suspension or
disbarment, the record must disclose as free from doubt
a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its
disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him
until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court,
that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the
allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of
the respondent. There is no evidence that the
respondent has committed an act constituting deceit,
immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly
and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case
without attorney to do so. 6
There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for his appearance as counsel for the
defendant in the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with
authority given by the Associate Commisioner Of SEC,
Julio A. Sulit, Jr.
This Court also holds that under the facts complained of
supported by the annexes and the answer of respondent
likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and the
reply of the complainant, the accusation that respondent
with malice and deliberate intent to evade the laws,
assumed a different name, falsified his Identity and
represented himself to be one "ATTY. MANUEL SISON"
with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the
times that he will handle private cases, is not
meritorious. Neither is the charge referred to is that
pending the slantiated. The only case DRC Case No. E-
01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant. It being an isolated case, the same does not
constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent
did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because respondent and defendant therein were close
family friends. Such act of the respondent in going out of
his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should
not be allowed to be used as an instrument of
harrassment against respondent.
The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein
the respondent was dismissed from the service because
being a government employee, he appeared as counsel
in a private case, cannot be applied in the case at bar
because the respondent in said Zeta case had appeared
as counsel without permission from his superiors.
Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service
rules, the complainant however states that the basis of
his complaint for disbarment is not the respondent's act
of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of
another name. 7
A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas
there is indeed a pleading entitled "Objection/Opposition
to the 2 Formal Offer of Evidence" (Annex "C" to the
Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as "Manuel
Sisori", counsel for defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao,
Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however, no
showing that respondent was thus motivated with bad
faith or malice, for otherwise lie would not have corrected
the spelling of his name when the court staff misspelled
it in one of the minutes of the proceeding. Moreover, We
find no reason or motive for respondent to conceal his
true name when he have already given express authority
by his superior to act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in
the latter's case pending before the JDRC And while it
may be True that subsequent errors were made in
sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel
Sison, ' the errors were attributable to the JDRC clerical
staff and not to the respondent.
At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to
be more careful and cautious in signing his name so as
to avoid unnecessary confusion as regards his Identity.
At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives
that prompted the complainant in filing the present case.
An examination of the records reveals that the
complainant was a defendant in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 1982 filed by
the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc. and Teofisto Jiao
against seven (7) respondents including the
complainant, seeking to oust the complainant and his
codefendants from acting as officers of the Integrated
Livestock Dealers lnc. then pending before respondent
as Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial decided the
case against the herein complainant. From this
antecedent fact, there is cast a grave and serious doubt
as to the true motivation of the complainant in filing the
present case, considering further that other
administrative charges were filed by the complainant
against respondent herein before the SEC, JDRC and
the Fiscal's office in Manila.
We hold that complainant's repeated charges or
accusations only indicate his resentment and bitterness
in losing the SEC case and not with the honest and
sincere desire and objectives "(1) to compel the attorney
to deal fairly and honestly with his client;" (Strong vs.
Munday 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 21 A. 611) and "(2) to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney."
(Ex parte Brounsal Cowp 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p. 581;
see In re de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225, Sept. 31,
1959, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 6, p. 242).
In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or
necessity to refer this complaint to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen
against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit
and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in San Dionisio, Paraaque City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 211762 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a
resident of the United States of America (USA), he
entrusted the administration of the subject property to
respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent,
through a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA)3
dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently
sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho ("Ho"), as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated November
15, 2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 1508145 issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent for having
violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and
prejudice.
6
In his counter-affidavit, respondent denied any formal
lawyer-client relationship between him and the
complainant, claiming to have merely extended his
services for free. He also denied receiving money from
the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate
taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his
former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque ("Roque")
and one Danilo Diaz ("Diaz"), who offered the subject
property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless,
respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious
SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT
No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and
because he was also in need of money at that time.
Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received
his proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully
settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery.
Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and
promised to repay the value of the subject property.
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court
resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on October 21,
2008, the parties stipulated on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered
by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of
Paraaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's
Duplicate Certificate of the property of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a
certain Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled
in year 2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was
issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February
1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and
was not signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the
mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee on the
aforementioned property of complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about
the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto
Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the
person whom he claims to have falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that
the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was
taken out from his office.8
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner
Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that respondent had
undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client
without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by
the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his
possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD
deduced that respondent violated various provisions of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report of Commissioner De Mesa
through Resolution No. XIX-2011-24810 as follows:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty
of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and
for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts,
Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent
violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold
complainant's property, which was entrusted to him,
without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court
concurs with the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use
of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized
mortgage and sale of his client's property for his
personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's
property without his knowledge or consent, and partook
of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His
contention that he merely accommodated the request of
his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to
confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he
was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected
thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner
De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the
subject property were effected using the owner's
duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping
and custody during complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP
Board of Governors correctly recommended his
disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
Canon 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client which may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the
respondent lawyers and ordered his name stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious
dishonesty and professional misconduct. The
respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and
simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious
Deed of Sale, but also and even worse sharing in the
profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the
property subject of the Deed of Sale.
In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent
lawyer for having deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared personally
before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He
was found guilty of grave misconduct.
In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his
unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden
duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to
prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and
to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the
members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice
of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation
of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability."13
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no
formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There
is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity,
for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another.141wphi1
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the
penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as
recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP
Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice xxx" (emphasis
supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only

substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.15 Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court
therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence
has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U.

CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and
the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is
DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the

Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country for their information and
guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24
December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar
with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting
a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant, while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the
complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of
the complaint by moving from one place to another, such
that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged
place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985,
that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent's success in evading service of the complaint
and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to
"suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice
of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to
the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an
Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that
he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she
was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy
was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime
in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her
private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the
son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his
marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason
Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted
that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as
evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained
that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla,
she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid
risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be
in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she
had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan
Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay
for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her
pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or
Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed
investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set
the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both
parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared
and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent
did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled
and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he
put clarificatory questions to the complainant;
respondent once again did not appear despite notice to
do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and
rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for
2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to
appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered
respondent to have waived his right to present evidence
and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective
memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8
December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his
memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this
Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and
testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met
for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school
classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986,
p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of
her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that
respondent started courting her but nothing happened of
the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively
pursued their education, respondent as a law student at
the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16);
respondent continued courting her, this time with more
persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would
come of it since she was married but he [respondent]
explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio
since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid,
p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid,
12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her
[complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single"
as her status explaining that since her marriage was void
ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as
such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge
Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14,
1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason
Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit
B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state
up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid,
pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his
disappearance until she found out later that respondent
married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City
(ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch
II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No.
816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist
(Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally,
complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed
for being moot and academic when respondent was
considered automatically separated from the service for
having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant
Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted
marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares.
There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May
1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem
in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with
complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by
claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and
void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration
of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as
to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended
defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio
(Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each
other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this
Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were
to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow.
For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument,
his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was
deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As
noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that
she was still legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their
marriage, respondent went through law school while
being supported by complainant, with some assistance
from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished
his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child
safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that
respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member
of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the
purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a
petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of
the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims,
or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it
does not speak well of respondent's moral values.
Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent
there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he
made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as
he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a
secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent

Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him
and supported him through law school, leaving her
without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem
while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission
to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this
error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR

respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall
be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan
Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this
resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts
of the land.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4748 August 4, 2000
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces
disbarment for having penned a Decision1 dated January
30, 1995 long after his retirement from the Judiciary on
January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested complainant
Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint2 filed before the Office of the
Bar Confidant on April 21, 1997,3 complainant sought the
disbarment of respondent enumerating the following
particulars to support her contention that the questioned
January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the
retirement of respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior
to his retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch
17 of RTC-Roxas City, with the initial of the one who
received it for filing with the court-record except the
Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records) admitting, and
the Decision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to
the retirement were all type-written in the same type-
[writer] except the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and
the Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2) documents
appear to have been type-written on the same type-
[writer].
c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally
offered their evidence one year after the last witness was
presented last December 10, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their
evidence but it took them one (1) year and five (5) days
to file such a simple pleading. It goes against the normal
human experience when plaintiffs who are allowed to
present evidence ex-parte are usually very quick in
having things done because there is no opposition but in
this case it took plaintiffs a while to formally rest which
was only fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr.
Alovera. This timing is highly suspect.
d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed
badges of fraud. It was not received by the trial court.
Page 67 shows this clearly. It would not be surprising if
the same was also inserted into the records on a much
later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be made to
explain this too.
It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A.
Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on
January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the
records.
e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order
(p. 87) admitting the formal offer was even received by a
Court staff for filing with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995
Decision (pp. 88-93) which was allegedly decided five (5)
days after the Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) was
allegedly issued. What a swift action from a retiring
judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the
counsel for the plaintiffs but is shown to have been
received by one of the plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995
(p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer
such as Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in the locality
and who is in Court almost everyday that he will not
follow up if there is already a decision rendered in a case
where he was allowed to present evidence ex-parte or
even be told about it.
i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of
Mr. Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court
staff who received them for filing in the court records.
Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as
purely speculative and not based on personal
knowledge, the respondent, in his Comment4 dated
August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply self-serving
complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful
scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186
would reveal that respondent observed due process
when he resolved the said case against complainant. 5 It
was only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him
in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a
resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision,
which ostensibly having become final was also executed,
did the matter get out of hand.6 His said decision,
respondent argued, may only be impeached, annulled or
otherwise set aside under three (3) modes,7 all of which
were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of
time, or like an action to annul the judgment, though still
available, should not have been filed in the same court,
which rendered the questioned decision, but should have
been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals.8 As to the
absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned
decision, respondent shifted the blame to the then OIC
Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad,
contending that after the decision was rendered on
January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and he surmised
that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive and record
the decision, might have lost it "momentarily."9
In a Resolution10 dated October 22, 1997, this Court
referred the instant case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
While in the process of investigation, three (3) incidents
occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz
Chapter, approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 on
December 17, 1997, questioning the order, dated
November 28, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17,
Roxas City, which ordered the suspension from the
practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto
Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22,
1997, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
(TRO) in G.R. No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A.
Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela," ordering the
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
enforcing and/or implementing his questioned order
dated November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186,
which ordered the suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs.
Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela,"
under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was still
pending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997
which ordered respondent's suspension from the
practice of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation11 by the
Office of the Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998,
inquiring from the Court whether to proceed with the
investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned
incidents.
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of
the Bar Confidant to proceed with the investigation of the
instant case.12
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher,
Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer, Concepcion
Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special
proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas
City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of Regional Trial
Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the complainant herself
testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs.
Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the January 10,
1993 proceedings inside his chambers. Respondent
himself did not testify and neither did any other witness
testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who
both failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their
oral testimonies, respondent offered and presented their
respective affidavits.13 Complainant chose not to object
thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel,
to cross-examine them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated
November 17, 1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant,
are as follows:
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres,
Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria
Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs")
through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an
action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15,
Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V.
Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late
Faustina Borres. The action sought, among others, the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in
the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land
with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in
Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of
land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186
was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default
and ordered the Borres heirs to present their evidence
on July 30, 1993.14
It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres
heirs were able to start presenting their evidence ex-
parte on October 8, 1993. For lack of material time,
however, the presentation of evidence was again reset to
November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and
reset to December 10, 1993.15
On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and
civil actions scheduled for trial, which commenced at
about 10:00 in the morning, before Br. 17, including Civil
Case No. V-6186, which was listed number four in the
court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing
and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17,
took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz
appeared for the accused in a criminal case16 before Br.
17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and
resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the hearing of
criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was
called at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs as
well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside
the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in
the morning without Civil Case No. V-6186 being
heard.17
At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty.
Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court
stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City,
while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that
Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the
proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was
hesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its
own court stenographer. She relented though when told
that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no
available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17
and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the
chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned her
to enter the chambers, which is separate from the
courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge
Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she did
not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the
stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty. Villaruz to start
the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by
Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to be
Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called. At that instant Judge
Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just continue,"
and then went out of the chambers.18 Judge Alovera
would occasionally return to the chambers in the course
of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and listen
while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his direct examination
of the witness and presenting documentary evidence.19
The proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon, with
Judge Alovera making only two rulings in the course
thereof, including the one he made at the end when he
ordered the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence
on January 20, 1994.20
From this point on, complainant would establish how the
January 30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case
No. V-6186 came about.
Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31,
1995, or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated
his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC
Branch Clerk of Court.21 As part of her functions as such
OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would
first be received by her from the judge, and would stamp
them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt as
well as her initial or signature.22 This is in accordance
with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.23
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon,
court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to
type the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge
Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it,
Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to
decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft
decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as
Judge Alovera was dictating it.24
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired
Judge Alovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman,
later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186,
behind him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he
uttered to the latter, "Receive this, receive this, " referring
to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which he
was holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he
continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the
Plaza Miranda. And give copies to these two, pointing to
the plaintiffs who were at his back.25 Almost
instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not receive
it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not
argue with him anymore so as not to embarrass him for
being her former superior.26 She then went out of the
office while retired Judge Alovera, as well as the two
plaintiffs were still inside.27 At about the same time, Mrs.
Concepcion Alcazar, another employee of Br. 17 and the
clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings
therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17
while trying to have her co-employees receive the
questioned decision. Nobody, however, received the
same because it was already seven (7) months after his
retirement.28 A little later, she found the questioned
decision, together with the formal offer of exhibits of
January 20, 1995 and the order of January 25, 1995, on
the top of her table. Although she noticed that these
records were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of
procedure, she went on to attach the said records to the
expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186.29 She even gave a
copy of the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs,
Ireneo Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was received
for him by Ireneo Borres.30 After keeping the expediente,
she then entered the questioned decision in her
logbook.31
The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned
decision executed when, on January 31, 1996, the
lessee of the property, which is the subject matter of Civil
Case No. V-6186, surrendered possession of the said
property in favor of the Borres heirs,32 Said transfer of
possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution
issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding
Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of
Court Susan Mendoza Arce.33
Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in
Japan together with his husband who is employed at the
Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what
happened to her property in Panay, Capiz. 34 She was
thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, which
resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a
Petition for Relief from Order, questioning the January
30, 1995 decision and the January 19, 1996 Writ of
Execution.35 She also prayed "that disciplinary and
contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in
the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration
of justice."36
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No.
V-6186 as he was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at
the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order.37
In the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed that
the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly filed by the
plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995,
while the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was
issued on January 31, 1995. He concluded then that the
said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995.
When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused
to answer and just kept quiet.38 He likewise observed
that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186
submitting the same for decision, except for the order
made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during
the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers, where
he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of
exhibits.39 Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes during
the said proceedings and who was not a member of the
staff of Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on the
records as the official stenographer in the course
thereof.40 Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997,
Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by
complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the
possession of the property in question. In the same
resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995
decision null and void, the same not being filed with the
clerk of court and not properly rendered in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court.41
Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous
proceedings, coupled with the prayer of complainant in
her petition for relief "that disciplinary and contempt
proceedings be taken against those involved in the
perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of
justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the
said anomaly.42 After considering the testimonies of
Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the
investigation, together with the documentary evidence
presented, he concluded, thus:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances the
following facts are established that:
1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10,
1993. What transpired was a mock or simulated trial
inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty.
Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a
court stenographer from another court, were present. No
Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present
as there was actual court session in open court going on
at that time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge
Jose O. Alovera and remained with him even after his
retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the
record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in
Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the
table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the "Offer of Exhibits"
of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order"
dated January 25, 1995, after the retirement of Judge
Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the
exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings
of having been received by the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though
dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the court on
August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and
because he was no longer a judge his submission was
refused.
- CONCLUSIONS -
The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though
dated January 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR No.
issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the
pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty.
Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or
any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could
have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later.
Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated
January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have
been made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer
of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge
Alovera dated January 30, 1995.
xxx xxx xxx
The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were
made after the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no
longer a judge.
The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera
constitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave
misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from the
practice of law and ultimately their disbarment.43
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant
recommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring
that it found more than sufficient evidence to sustain
complainant's charge against respondent that, indeed,
the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186,
which divested complainant of her property in Panay,
Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirement
from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.
This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be well-taken. Respondent has thus
sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity
of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten
his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that
the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that
pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its
commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause for
money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients
and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn
agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law44 to be forgotten afterwards nor is it mere words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must
uphold and keep inviolable at all times.45 This oath is
firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are
applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the
vanguard of our legal system.1wphi1 When respondent
took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he
made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. 46 In
this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon
and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on how
respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in
having the questioned decision dated January 30, 1995
come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting
the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely
abused his relationship with his former staff, pompously
flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge. Respondent
disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court,
who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or
pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry.47 In
so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded
public confidence in courts and lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its
demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a
failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure
from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded
by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by
this Court as the disciplining authority48 for there is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that
of law.49
Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to
present substantial defense to refute the charges against
him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a valid
explanation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him.50
Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in
this case, the Court finds as appropriate the
recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant
in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the respondent
brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and
calls for the severance of respondents privilege to
practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is
hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys
and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

ADMIN. CASE No. 3637 January 24, 2001
RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC. Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA, Respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this
Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross
misconduct on the part of the latter. The complaint
alleges as follows:
1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant over a
parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay,
Negros Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T - 55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the
registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D.
Granada. A copy of this Real Estate Mortgage is
herewith attached as - Annex "A". 1wphi1.nt
2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage
the respondent submitted a Special Power of Attorney by
virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and
empowered by the registered owners Pedro Torres and
Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of
land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this Special
Power of Attorney is herewith attached as Annex "B".
3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid
parcel of land over which the respondent represented
that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended
and released a loan to the respondent in the amount of
P91,427.00.
4. That complainant subsequently and much later
learned that the respondent was not at all authorized and
empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada
to mortgage the aforesaid parcel of land when it was
joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the
aforesaid Oscar D. Granada for removal of cloud on title
with preliminary injunction and damages. A copy of this
complaint is herewith attached as Annex "C".
5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the
hearing conducted in connection therewith Oscar D.
Granada specifically and categorically denied having
executed and signed the Special Power of Attorney,
Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the
complainant in support of his application for a loan.
6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 60,
was subsequently decided against the respondent
wherein the aforesaid Court found that the Special
Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and
falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Granada and
Lolita L. Granada have not signed the same and wherein
the Court also made the finding that the defendant,
considering that he has benefited from the said, falsified
document, is presumed to have a hand in the
preparation of the same. A copy of this Decision is
herewith attached as Annex "D".
7. That the respondent has not appealed from the
aforesaid Decision thereby making the findings of fact
made therein final as against him.
8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in
presenting to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified
Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a
betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no
man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to
continue further in the practice of law .1
Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his
comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross
misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing
any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from
complainant rural bank. According to respondent, he did
not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the
special power of attorney appointing him (respondent) as
attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of
attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgage
the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of
complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if
indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to
the forgery. He cited the findings of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 1-C, thus:
Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla
has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses, Atty.
Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually
benefited from the said falsified documents, he is
presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-
annex "D".)2
Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from
complainant rural bank without depriving it of the
opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as
to ascertain the genuineness of the special power of
attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus,
respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances,
it cannot be said that he employed deceit and gross
misconduct against complainant rural bank.
After receipt of respondent's comment, the Court
referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced
their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the
matter was resolved on the basis of their respective
pleadings and the annexes attached thereto. From these
pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo, established the following uncontroverted
facts:
Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro
Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by virtue of a special
power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and
concomitantly executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of the complainant bank covering the property of Pedro
Torres and Oscar D. Granada. With such security,
complainant extended to the respondent his loan in the
amount of P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the
respondent to pay the loan, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed by the complainant bank. Later, Oscar
Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged
property filed a complaint against the respondent and the
complainant for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and Special Power of Attorney. After the trial,
the court declared null and void the said Special Power
of Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being
products of forgery. This decision was not appealed by
the defendants.
There is no showing that respondent, despite the
adverse decision, returned or offered to return the
money he took from the complainant bank. The bank
then instituted this disbarment proceeding against the
respondent.3
The IBP found from the above facts that respondent
violated his oath as a lawyer to do no falsehood, thus:
This office believes that the actuation of the respondent
constitutes a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer. The
findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental
has persuasive effect in this proceeding.
As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C, entitled
"Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L. Granada vs.
Ernesto H. Pilla, et al", the plaintiffs Granada spouses
have not signed the questioned Special Power of
Attorney in favor of the respondent and the said
spouses' signatures as appearing in the Special Power
of Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for
actually they have not executed nor granted a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of herein respondent
authorizing him to mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of
the said spouses in the mortgaged property. The trial
court stressed that:
"...Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H.
Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of the spouses,
Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually
benefited from the said falsified documents, he is
presumed to have a hand on the same.
Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted
that he notarized the said documents, Exhibit "A" and "B"
with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures
appearing in the said documents were the signatures of
Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro Torres, registered
owners of the property in question."
Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the
questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor of the
respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:
"Q Now, compaero, will you please relate to this
Honorable Court the circumstances under which you
notarized this Special Power of Attorney now marked as
Exh. "A" on April 21, 1975?
"A Yes, sir. I remember that on that same day, April
21, 1975, defendant Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla personally
appeared before me and he brought along with him this
Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. He told
me to notarize it. I asked him about the signature of Atty.
Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature and he said
"Yes". I also asked him about the signature of the other
principal and he said also "yes". With that assurance and
being a brother lawyer I accommodated him. Knowing
that he will not do anything that is illegal and I have
confidence in him considering that he is a lawyer and he
knows what he was doing, I accommodated him."
(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case
No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental)
If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the
falsification of the Special Power of Attorney, why did he
not explain before the trial court or before this office the
circumstances on how he obtained the same. He did not
even bother to identify his alleged client who provided
him the forged Special Power of Attorney. Instead,
respondent is banking on his defense that the
complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to
prove that he forged the Special Power of Attorney. He
relied on the argument that his transaction with the
complainant bank was purely commercial business and
did not involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is
true that the respondent maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity as he asserted, why did he
represent before the notary public that the signatures
appearing in the Special Power of Attorney were the
signatures of the real owners if he was not actually
aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the
respondent is misrepresentation constituting gross
misconduct at the very least. This is a violation of his
oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man.4
In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-
00-175, dated 7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors,
substantially adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but
modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as follows:
...to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, said recommendation is with
modification that Respondent be SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for THREE (3) years for
misrepresentation.5
We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar.9
Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the
IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years is approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty.
Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of misconduct. He is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its
finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the
courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal
record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case

No. 1-C, since respondent actually benefited from the
falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the
falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed to
rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he
had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give
credence to respondent's negative assertion that he did
not know that the special power of attorney issued in his
favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or
ought to know that parties to a public document must
personally appear before the notary public to attest that
the same is their own free act and deed. In utter
disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the
special power of attorney to be notarized without the
parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter,
respondent presented the same to complainant rural
bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus
apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification
of the document especially considering that it was he
who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, "the settled rule is
that in he absence of satisfactory explanation, one found
in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification."6 Further, "if a
person had in his possession a falsified document and
he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification."7

Respondent's acts clearly fall short of the standards set

by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." The fact that the conduct pertained to
respondent's private dealings with complainant rural
bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.8
Possession of good moral character is not only a good

A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010[ Formerly CBD
Case No. 08-2175 ]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1
with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct
which she detailed in her Position Paper2 as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she
became his lover and common-law wife. In October
2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper
San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a
religious group known as the Faith Healers Association
of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although
he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in
November to December 2007, prompting her to return
home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her
back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his
followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with
drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007,
the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a
bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed
stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the
women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia),
having received information that she was weak, pale and
walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous
area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social
Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two
women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group
refused to release her, however, without the instruction
of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and
PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and
reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against
respondent. Additionally, complainant charges
respondent with bigamy for contracting a second
marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the
subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley
G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted
documents including the following: Affidavit3 of Delia
dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1
Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the
Certificate of Marriage5 between respondent and Leny H.
Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract6 between
respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics
Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the
marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April
27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H.
Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City,
Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution 8 of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran
and the Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-
Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention
against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint
of herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008
Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to
submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof,
and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense
in a verified pleading,"11 he did not file any
Answer.1avvphi1
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on
September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly
notified, only complainants counsel was present.
Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the
CBD, in his Report and Recommendation12 dated
September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a
mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and
Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in
the world can countenance. The subsequent detention
and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct
[which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the
respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral
conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated
case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala,
the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for
maintaining extra-marital relations with a married
woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case,
not only did the respondent commit bigamy for
contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and
Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his
secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently,
tortured her to the point of death. All these
circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is
made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice
but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by
Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the
Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED
the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the
IBP Commissioners evaluation and recommendation
well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the state upon those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege.15 When a
lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right
to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it
behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present
evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body
and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in
the Roll of Attorneys.16
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never
attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the
charges brought against him, suggesting that they are
true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008
manifesting that he would come up with his defense "in a
verified pleading," he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers Oath
reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that
I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial
Prosecutor on complainants charge against respondent
and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears
special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-
accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening
the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it
is clear now that there was really physical restraint
employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario
Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private
complainant was fetched by the two women and police
officers, complainant was already freely roaming around
the place and thus, could not have been physically
detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario
be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict her
freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always
accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could
be impossible for her to escape especially considering
the remoteness and the distance between Upper San
Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a
resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association
had the express and implied orders coming from
respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding
Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can be
gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita
Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty.
Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled
the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution
in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein
co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of
complainants witnesses, and that the allegations against
him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges
against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
against a lawyer.20
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly
immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct,
respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a
lawyer.21
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is
DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately
executory and ordered to be part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married
Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they
had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay
and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband.
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a
daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been
living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a
graduate of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with
the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at
her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was
over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed
the representations of respondent and thought things
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second
child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no
avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant
even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No.
3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2
respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with
the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a
Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long
been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips
abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 3.
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in
their Greenhills residence because respondent and
Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know
and accept the fact of his second marriage before they
would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in
Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally
to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew
legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in
June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt
and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989
with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days
after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was
connected with, the woman who represented herself to
be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating
with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with
Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad
and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered
Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with
her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that
the said house was built exclusively from her parents'
funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed
the present allegedly malicious and groundless
disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states,
among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that
Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children
with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos
Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to
give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the
Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of
Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent
reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered
by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila
and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later
1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that
altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it,
had been prima facie established by complainant's
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima
facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in
the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary
and indispensable to at least create probable cause for
the offense charged. The statement alone of
complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by
respondents in support of their respective positions on
the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that
the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence
to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but
the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and
Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein
she charged respondent with making false allegations in
her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in
the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married
to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by
the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in
the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22,
1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According
to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was
because respondent wanted to impress upon the said
IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within
the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that
such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184
14
of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the
Commission; and that the act of respondent in making
false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy
to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have
the original copy of the marriage certificate because the
same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she
annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on
what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in
her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22,
1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent
with the requirement of good moral character for the
practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that
respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that
it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie
Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor
because he spent so much time with her, and he was so
open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate,
respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to
have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her
Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to
Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the
fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married
before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui
who testified and admitted that he was the person
responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not
present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on
this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence,
consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a
garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of
the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of
the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she
acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary
value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who
was not presented during the hearings. Further, the
respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she
was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of
her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims
that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as
willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral
indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she
believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his
true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by
complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of
Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother,
Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and
her husband since the late 1970s because they were
clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch
Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986,
would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
averred that respondent committed disrespect towards
the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24,
respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to
show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment.
Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos
Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the
Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time
respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does
not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single
woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or
without any firm commitment to another woman. The
reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became
aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for
the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all
contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines
in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only
talked to each other because of the children whom he
was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission
fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should
deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a
normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint
for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED
for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a
falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does
not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is
a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate
of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to
the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions
prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission
to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).
26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty.
Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with
him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left
him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of
the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a
far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs
with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she
exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her
intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least
aroused respondent's suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her
to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never
exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this
woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their
marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent
and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation
that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing
her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to
the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes
her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
30
This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage

attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that
she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal
bride would verily recall the date and year of her
marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a
lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when
she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the

information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the
defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly

to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the
court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against

respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality,
is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for

attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof,
with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia
Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant
[Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the
respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles
from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent
Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached
as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in
Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of
filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours
because they did not settle their accounts as demanded.
After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and
while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold
(sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced
her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the
morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop
in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the
complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting,
respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did
every time they met. Along the way, complainant was
wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she
just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt
Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold
(sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand
was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt
and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to
respondent informing him that she decided to refer the
case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the
case folder from him. The communications transpired
was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with
other lawyer
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
respondent
(Does this mean I cannot see you
at 6:16:11 pm
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take
advantage of the situation.
at 6:17:59 pm
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if
you dont have relationship with her.
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by - "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the
respondent situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of
feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its not taking
At 6:32:43 pm advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is
an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I
can show u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not
by respondent do it again. Will you still see me so I can
show you my sincerity)
at 6:42:25 pm
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent
another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I
dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri.
Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what to do so you may
forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then
another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm
saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n
me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time
behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of
admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to
provide legal services to the complainant; that he met
with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March
2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case
which complainant was intending to file against the
owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of
a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant
rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to
him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt
Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have
been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1)
there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed
by complainant against respondent pending before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal
name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since
she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because
the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was
archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao,
Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a
man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never
bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was
respondent who always paid for their bills every time
they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July
2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner
Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the
penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-
117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond
the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing
with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether
respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or
which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by
which we deal with respondents actuations shall have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our
liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree
of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of
Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their
possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in
good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the
practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character of members of the Bar. They
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one
of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are
called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free
from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less
than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in
Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality,
not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout
their legal career, in order to maintain their good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They
may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was
defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing
complainant on the lips.
13
In his Answer, respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I
kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right
face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We
said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered
(sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right
hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant
(sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No
intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast
holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying
"sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor,
IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should
say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each other.
So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa
and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen
minutes then she arrived. And so I said she opened
my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like
that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes,
okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas
Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her
case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her,
would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said
yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after
discussing matters about her case, so I said its about
9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go.
So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I went to
the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me
then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told
me just drop me at the same place where you have been
dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that
was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So,
before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say
tilted her face towards me and when shes already facing
me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good
night. She went down the car, thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I
have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside
my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so
then at the same corner. So before she went down ,
before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered
her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her
again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the
lips and thats it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of
immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must not simply be
immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as
constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the
practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married
woman. This court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in
illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly
immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to
have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had
carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would
flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was
disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and
misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies
to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to
for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as
a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that
awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with
another married woman and left complainant with whom
he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such
acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession," warranting respondents
disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married
complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act
of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus,
lacking the good moral character required by the Rules
of Court, respondent was disqualified from being
admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent
woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied
his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that
degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore,
disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or
is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of
kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual
and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in
turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing
her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be
considered grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use
and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure
her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves
no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant,
and she must establish the case against the respondent
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by
the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that
"he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a
basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation,
qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar,
complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden
of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed
complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after
the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text
message, respondent immediately extended an apology
to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and
respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place
where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a
private place or a more remote place where he could
freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances,
respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be
imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When
deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon
the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may
deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither
be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer
strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client,
to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an
isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to
the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38
a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female
client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which
constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and
conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to
practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed
and considering that this is respondents first offense,
reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what
she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor.
Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come
out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral
conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents
is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be
corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent
is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and
cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future.
SO ORDERED.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be

exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most
weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they
are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show
the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law.
The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is
meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of the offense should also
be considered.36

A.C. No. 5916 July 1, 2003
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-
Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F.
Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming
an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are
summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent
refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling
[t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in
replacement for previous checks issued to the
complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between
the parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated
June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith effect
immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of
P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time,
preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in
a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a
request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from
June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within
which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao.
Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint
proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel
never made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has
he paid his indebtedness."2
In his Answer3 dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons
that because all of his proposals to settle his obligation
were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise
to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the
Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because of the following:
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of
the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully
appearing as an attorney for a party to case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the
facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that the
offense with which the respondent is being charged by
the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a
special law, and is not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident
therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as
a violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is
issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an
obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank,
through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the
Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules,
for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P.
22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the
complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27,
would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable
Supreme Court would not countenance;
"(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds
enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules,
clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged
issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, is
NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, by the Supreme
Court; and
"(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of
the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This is because, the door to the law profession swings
on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a
clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful
conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath
as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless
check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is
inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the
doubt."4
5
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.
Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing
on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the
parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing,
respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed
himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his
principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys fees).
Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to
settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of
payment for attorneys fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-
CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for
the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on
leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency.
Complainants counsel objected and Commissioner
Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another
case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a
loud voice, "Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my
family is more important."6 And, despite the objection
and the warning, he arrogantly left. He made no effort to
comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness
before leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,7 Commissioner
Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the
attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the
latters claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that
involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that
[w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted
against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the
latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of violation
of BP 22."8 The "refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude
towards complainants counsel and the [commission
sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against
him."9 Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,10 the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and
resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two years. The Resolution, together with the records
of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action,
pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period of
suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 11
In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this
Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he
issued several worthless checks, he contends that such
act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is
evident from the records that he made several promises
to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his
obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he
refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the
blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that
the latter had refused to accept the formers plan of
payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous
failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the same
debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had
voluntarily committed himself to the payment of his
debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had
no real intention to settle them is evident from his
unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in
incurring debts without any intention of paying for them
puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay
their financial obligations. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.12
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly
issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the
 deleterious effects of such act to public interest and
public order.13
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." In Co
v. Bernardino,14 the Court considered the issuance of
worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an act
constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended
or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside
of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law
confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto,
38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
"The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's
propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct
on his part, though not related to his professional duties
as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in
serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find
him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he
eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit
very much delayed.
"While it is true that there was no attorney-client
relationship between complainant and respondent as the
transaction between them did not require the
professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from
this Court.
"As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re
Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it
can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and
client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice
Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not
assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust
relation which exists between attorney and client, as well
as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to
a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him x x x.
"Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring
lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of
law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice
Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not related to his professional
duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy
lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals of the
bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to
harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad
in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to
be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified
support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in
which respondent dealt with Commissioner Cunanan
during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was
expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We
cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He
should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary
authority over him by virtue of his membership therein. 15
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of
the officer assigned to investigate his case. Assuming
that he had a very important personal matter to attend to,
he could have politely explained his predicament to the
investigating commissioner and asked permission to
leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed
dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without
the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege.16 It demands a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law.17 In this case, respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law
and justice.18
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his
gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for two years. However, in line with Co v.
Bernardino,19 Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.20 and Saburnido v.
Madroo21 -- which also involved gross misconduct of
lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient
in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of
gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one
year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the
court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7494 June 27, 2008
WILSON CHAM, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in
occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter,
vacating the same without paying the rentals due.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998,
respondent entered into a Contract of Lease2 with
Greenville Realty and Development Corp. (GRDC),
represented by complainant as its President and General
Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by
GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon
City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a
term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent
informed the complainant that she would no longer
renew the same but requested an extension of her stay
at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a
commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental
during the extension period. Complainant approved such
request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per
month for the period beginning 1 October 1999 until 30
June 2000.
Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to
October 2000 without paying her rentals from July to
October 2000. She also failed to settle her electric bills
for the months of September and October 2000. The
Statement of Account as of 15 October 20043 shows that
respondents total accountability is P71,007.88.
Sometime in October 2000, a report reached
complainants office that respondent had secretly
vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the
door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainants
repeated written demands for payment of her obligations
despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant
to file the present Complaint.
In her Answer,4 respondent alleged that she had
religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated
the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that
she transferred to another place because she was given
notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to give
way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which
never happened until presently. Respondent actually
wanted to ask that complainant to account for her
deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so
since she did not know complainants address or contact
number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to
the complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment
unit.
After the mandatory preliminary conference conducted
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, the parties were given time to submit
their respective Position Papers per Order 5 dated 17
February 2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his
Position Paper.6 Respondent, despite the extension
given, did not file hers. Hence, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 8 September 2006, Investigating Commissioner
Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and
Recommendation,7 recommending the imposition of the
penalty of three-month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that
herein respondent be held guilty of having violated the
aforequoted provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and imposed upon her the penalty of three
(3) months suspension from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed
Resolution No. XVII-2006-5858 dated 15 December
2006, amending the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and approving the dismissal of the
Complaint, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.
We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors. The Complaint should not be
dismissed and respondent must face the consequences
of her actions.
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract she
executed with GRDC, respondent was able to occupy
the apartment unit for a period of one year, from 1
October 1998 to 30 September 1999, paying a monthly
rental of P8,000.00. Upon the expiration of the lease
contract9 on 30 September 1999, the same was
renewed, but on a month-to-month basis at an increased
rental rate of P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement,
respondent was able to stay at the leased premises until
October 2000, undoubtedly incurring electric bills during
the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is,
indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt.
Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent
has existing obligations that she failed to settle.
Annex "D"10 of the Complaint is a letter dated 11
September 2000 signed by complainant and addressed
to respondent demanding that she settle her unpaid
rentals for the period of three months, particularly, from 1
July to 30 September 2000. The letter appears to have
been received by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex "H"
of the same Complaint is another letter dated 30 August
2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier demand for
respondent to settle her unpaid rentals, as well as her
unpaid Meralco bills. This second letter of demand was
sent through registered mail and received by one Nonie
Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of
both letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint.
Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must
be deemed to have admitted them. Section 11, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed
admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damage,
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where it is the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment. 11
Apropos is another well-settled rule in our jurisprudence
that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact
of payment.12 In Monfort v. Aguinaldo,13 the receipts of
payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the
best evidence. A receipt is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money or goods have been
delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to
discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was
unable to produce receipts or any other proof of payment
of the rentals due for the period of 1 July to 20
September 2000.
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully
failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid rentals and
electric bills constitute "just debts," which could be any of
the following: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or
(2) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.14
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral
duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they
became due. Respondent should have complied with
just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and adhered
to high ethical standards to preserve the courts integrity,
since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when
respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts,
such act already constituted a ground for administrative
sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her
unpaid obligations, and without the complainants
knowledge and consent. Respondents abandonment of
the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent
and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondents defense that she does not know where to
find the complainant or his office is specious and does
not inspire belief considering that she had been
occupying the apartment unit and paying the rents due
(except for the period complained of) for almost two
years. How she could have dealt with complainant and
GRDC for two years without at all knowing their office
address and contact numbers totally escapes this Court.
This is only a desperate attempt to justify what is clearly
an unjustifiable act.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 15
In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial and legal system is ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay
their financial obligations. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.16

The Court stresses that membership in the legal

profession is a privilege.17 It demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent
to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for
the practice of law.18 In this case, respondent fell short of
the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of
law and justice.19

Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her

professional or private capacity is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment
because good character is an essential qualification for
the admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege.20 The Court has held that
the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,21 for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years
suspension from the practice of law,22 or a suspension of
six months upon partial payment of the obligation.23

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by

respondents gross misconduct. The case at bar merely
involves the respondents deliberate failure to pay her
just debts, without her issuing a worthless check, which
would have been a more serious offense. The
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for three
months, a penalty which this Court finds sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of

gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one
month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt
of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of

respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the
court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment
are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such,
close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment
and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms
of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A
classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting
versions of the facts as culled from the records are
hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met
sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a
lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"),
the biological father of her minor daughter, for support.
Her former classmate who was then a Barangay
Secretary referred her to respondent. After several
meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand
letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the
continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to
give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical
operation their daughter would need for her congenital
heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission,
she and respondent started having a sexual relationship.
She narrates that this twist in the events began after
respondent started calling on her shortly after he had
sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent
allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid.
Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances
towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet
inducements such as the promise of a job, financial
security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for
the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to
these advances, assured by respondent's claim that the
lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had
already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced
complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3
("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was
denoted as the father in the birth certificate 4 of her
daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was
not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she
claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the
document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only
way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter
medical and educational support. Respondent
purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in
the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she
signed the document "without even taking a glance at
it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised
complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer
for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of
turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and
promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon
thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001,
respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political
campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of
Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual
relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the
money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the
case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino,
complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well
as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case
was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August
2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only
when said cases were filed that she finally understood
the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her
interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to
her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance
that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional
state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent
was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully
belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as
a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she
filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version.
According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who
would file the aforementioned action for support.
Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda
Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay
official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand
letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated
through an emissary. He learned that because of
Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was
strained so that in order to settle things the spouses
were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided
she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is
not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who
asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the
proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He
also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the
case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate
for an out-of-court settlement of no less than
P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount,
negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to
P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
postdated checks in equal amounts within four months.
Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to
rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a
total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was
P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and
voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared,
the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies
forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was
for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made.
He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a
former bank employee who speaks and understands
English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing
P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When
complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary
handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she
allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the
complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed
that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of
his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her
thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that
his marriage was already annulled. Strangely,
respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate
that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital
liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his
colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school
classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met
at his residence where she was actually introduced to his
wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence
several times and actually spoke to his wife, a
circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to
beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected
President of the Association of Barangay Council
("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for
the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus,
he was known in his locality and it was impossible for
complainant not to have known of his marital status
especially that she lived no more than three (3)
kilometers away from his house and even actively
helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for
support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant
moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a
suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base.
But months passed and the promised job never came so
that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the
money she received from Aquino was about to be
exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for
financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for
Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to
her pleas, he also advised her "to look for the right
man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist
her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared
and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to
Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship
with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly
financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months.
Since then, they have ceased to meet and have
communicated only through an emissary or by
cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue
the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from
the United States would have arrived. Respondent
agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial
assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since
then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went
to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was
in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting
up and she wanted him to relay the message to
respondent. According to this friend, complainant
showed him a prepared complaint against respondent
that she would file with the Supreme Court should the
latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was
being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and supporting documents,
the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After
presenting the parties' conflicting factual versions, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of
complainant and concluded that respondent clearly
violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly
showed that he is wanting in good moral character,
putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member
of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of
which throughout the passage of time have been
compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic)
every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent
kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house
and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the
reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals
the numerous visits and regular calls all because of
[l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming
financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of
the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December
2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the
financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent
was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will
merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning 18
("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion
to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning
dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He
reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more
detailed account of the events that transpired between
him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays
complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would
stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the
IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare
allegations that she failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-
opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine
who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the
Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the
Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the
matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny
that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" 20 in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of
immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next
question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by
his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who
was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order
to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the
question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to
respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of
financial security and because of her need for legal
assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are
insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her
into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated
woman like herself who was of sufficient age and
discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be
easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job
and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no
showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or
helplessness on her part.29 Respondent's numerous
visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily
prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves
that he courted her despite being a married man,
precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her
P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled
her financial dependence as she never denied pleading
with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent
lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondent's assertion that it was
impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting
marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced
by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who
was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She
admitted that she knew his residence phone number and
that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran
as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she
never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met
and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she
lived near his residence, that she helped him in his
campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not
to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a
married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just
plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom
she had known for only a short time without verifying his
background, if it were true that she preferred "to change
[her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We
believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit
were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most
logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent
sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking
advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to
force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit
without letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged
that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was
clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart
ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all
cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple
of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by
signing without even reading a document she knew was
related to the support case she intended to file. The
Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a
single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it
before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not
fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent
even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will
not give the money for Alexandra's medical and
educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit
of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it
shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation
with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the
latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also
goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign
the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a
college graduate or that she knows and understands
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple
sentences that are understandable even to a layman.
The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the
part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing
and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code.
We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in
entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the
amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also
of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33
Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that
Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as
paternity remains to be proven. As complainant
voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she
experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is
bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted
as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case. Again,
we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot
be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how
strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of
misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount,
he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the
amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining
P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her
as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this
matter but simply ordered respondent to return the
amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a
discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much
Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's
claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00.
However, complainant insists that she should have
received more as there were two postdated checks
amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned
over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the
amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only
P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have
it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single
evidence to prove that there existed two postdated
checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent admits that there is
actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no
evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify
his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously,
there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by
respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It
was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where
respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers
that he cannot recall what the check was for but he
supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a
huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but
evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either
party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on
mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written
assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to
subject the veracity of the assertions through the
question and answer modality. With the inconclusive
state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is
called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial
evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to
remand the case to the IBP for further reception of
evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for
respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's
DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds
exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral
damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one
that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to
remain in the legal profession and be allowed the
privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the
Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private
interest and affords no redress for private grievance. 38
The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity.
There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross
immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a
womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily
differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore,
heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where
any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v.
Castillo,46 respondent was found to have sired a child
with another woman who knew he was married. He
therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out
the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the
Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott
v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with
a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive
evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined
P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate
despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein
respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as
mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering
further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without
prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case
involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the
client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado
M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is
REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of
respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called
up the published telephone number and pretended to be
an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an
expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case
will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at
the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator
and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se
are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change
our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by
the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from
all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar
acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C.
No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4,
2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were
required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April
25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional
pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306
and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the
legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention
to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18
Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes
and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that
an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. 21
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only
a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also

permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement
of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as

attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007[Formerly CBD
Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan
Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2
and 7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present
complaint are as follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an
application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all the
requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a
permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of
respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to
Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent
Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows,
quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his
family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and
Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs.
Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the
construction of the building of the abovenamed person
has started and that the undersigned and his family, and
those other families mentioned above are respective
owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the
high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs.
Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention the
unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse
effects to the undersigned and his above referred to
clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to
their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the
building would only be a regular and with standard height
building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the
same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory
foundation already occupies portion of the vacant
airspace of the undersigneds residential house in
particular, which readily poses danger to their residential
house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and
damage to property, loss of life and for the protection of
the safety of all the people concerned, they are
immediately requesting for your appropriate action on
the matter please at your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal
Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal
Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub
par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was
already full compliance on the part of the owner of the
Building under construction with the requirements
provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National
Building Code and on the part of your good office, your
compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304
of the same foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable
legal effect of the non-compliance with said Sections
301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by
all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to
penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the
original, partly supplied)
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the
application for building permit because of a personal
grudge against his wife Susan who objected to
respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano,
respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still
subsisting.5
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his
Complaint Affidavit6 he filed against respondent before
the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3
(e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and
(c)8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).9
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005, 10
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of
the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that
respondent allegedly opposes the application of his wife
for a building permit for the construction of their
commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the
complainant was that his wife was not in favor of
Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married
man. And the other reason is that respondent was not
authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the
construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find
respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the
charges and accusations of complainant. We find no
clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the
disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is
proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant
to overcome the presumption and establish his charges
by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of
the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on
the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55
SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74;
Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)
12
By Resolution of June 25, 2005, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-
Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review 13 filed by
complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule
1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda
Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with
Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December
17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his
influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan
to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in
violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as
the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant
maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29,
200515 Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants
complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and
Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of
which joint resolution reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September
13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz
addressed to the Building official appears to be not an
opposition for the issuance of complainants building
permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to
whether compliance with the requirements for the
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the
Office of the Building Official after conducting an
investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the
Building Code for constructing without a building permit
committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia.
Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records
disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation
had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a
building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent,
the same is being processed pending approval by the
Building Official and not of the Municipal Zoning
Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the
allegation that respondent was engaged in the private
practice of his law profession despite being employed in
the government as Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into
consideration the explanation and clarification made by
the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside
from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is
no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds
the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and
7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used
his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his
own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is
nothing to show that he opposed the application for
building permit. He just inquired whether complainants
wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by
the National Building Code, on top of expressing his
concerns about "the danger and damages to their
properties, health and safety" occasioned by the
construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building
permit was filed on September 28, 2004, 17 whereas the
questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and
received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal
Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day,
ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e]
notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal
action against you."18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 19
from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed,
complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as
she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal
Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the
building was to be constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent
engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law while
he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a
position coterminous to that of the appointing authority,
suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his
private practice is not prohibited.20
It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted
contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage
is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable,
for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17,
1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA, 21 when the
Family Code of the Philippines had already taken
effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to
have had the impression that the applicable provision at
the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. 23 For while
Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code
shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification
thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to
grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community."24 Gross immoral conduct on the other hand
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.25
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la
Cruz,26 this Court declared that the therein respondents
act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral
conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after
the mitigating following circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second
marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he
has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble
intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described
to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support
his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and
husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have
parted ways when the mother and child went to
Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 27
In respondents case, he being out of the country since
1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his
claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable
provision when he contracted the second marriage
abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife
abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted,
until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is
no showing that he was romantically involved with any
woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has
remained an absentee even during the pendency of this
case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted
marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community in which
they have been living in fact elected him and served as
President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999
and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code
provisions which applied at the time he contracted his
second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of
his residential community towards his second marriage
notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of
contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.28
In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the
Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he
was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there
until he came back to the Philippines together with his
second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as
"ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v.
Rafanan:29
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be
well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be
able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes. 30
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.