Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila City

JUAN DELA CRUZ,

Defendant-Petitioner,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. L-8700

For: Ejectment

RAVEN UY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

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MEMORANDUM

COME NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the

undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Supreme Court
most respectfully submits and presents this Memorandum in
the above-titled case and avers that:

THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiff-Respondent Raven Uy is of legal age, single, and

residing on 93 O. F. Roman St. Brgy. Balong Bato San Juan
City, where he may be served with legal processes and notices
issued by this Honorable Court;

2. Defendant-Petitioner Juan Dela Cruz is of legal age and

residing on Lot 1 Blk 2 Timawa St., Davao City, and may be
served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. On August 1, 2016, herein Plaintiff-Respondent sent a
Demand Letter for the payment of the rent and to vacate the
premises against Defendant-Petitioner;

2. On September 1, 2017, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a

Complaint for Ejectment dated September 1, 2008 against
Defendant-Petitioner;

3. On September 10, 2017, an Answer dated September 8, 2008

was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;

4. On November 7, 2017, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of

Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City in favor of the Plaintiff-
Respondent;

5. On February 1, 2018, a Motion for Reconsideration filed dated

January 8, 2018 by Defendant-Petitioner through legal
counsel was denied by Judge Pablito Roxas of Branch 70 of
the Regional Trial Court Pasig City;

6. On March 10, 2018, a Petition for Review dated March 5, 2009

was filed to the Court of Appeals by Defendant-Petitioner;

7. On August 17, 2018, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal

counsel filed a Comment dated August 10, 2018;

8. On October 13, 2018, as per Verification and Report from the

Judicial Records Division (JRD) no Reply was filed by the
Defendant-Petitioner;

9. On October 22, 2018, a Resolution was rendered by the Court

of Appeals denying Defendant-Petitioners Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO);

10.Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the

parties to submit their respective Memoranda fifteen (15) days
from notice, otherwise regardless whether or not Memoranda
were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision;

Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

11. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located
at 305 Lt. J. Francisco St., Krus na Ligas, Diliman, Pasig City
with improvements made by Defendant-Petitioner be returned
to his possession, but due to Defendant-Petitioners occupancy
thereat, the former cannot claim possession which left him
with the option of residing at 93 O. F. Roman St. Brgy. Balong
Bato St. San Juan City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-
Respondent is the registered owner of the land subject under
TCT No. 123456789 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The
property was sold to him by the now deceased original owners,
Spouses Teodora and Procopio Rizal. Said spouses were once a
client of Defendant-Petitioner as their previous legal counsel.

12. Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged

Lessee of the original owner of the land for a period of 1 year
and has been residing therein since January 1, 2016 and has
begun making improvements on the premises for his rice-
offering business;

13. Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately

the land for it was previously subject to a pending legal
proceeding and that there was still no urgent necessity of
utilizing or occupying it. When the event came that Plaintiff-
Respondent was able to enforce his right over the land,
Defendant-Petitioner, despite earnest and peaceful efforts of
the Plaintiff-Respondent still refused to vacate the land. This
led him to seek for assistance from the Barangay authorities
for intervention and/or to have an orderly settlement in
accordance with law. However, the Defendant-Petitioner still
persistently occupied the land without heed to the serious and
constant demand of the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it
unattainable to reach an agreement;

14. Due to fact that the parcel of land cannot be claimed

attributed to the uncooperative refusal of the Defendant-
Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was force to employ the
services of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of
ejection under the judgment of the courts of justice.

III. ISSUES OF THE CASE

 A.) WHETHER OR NOT THE TITLE OF PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS
VOID;

B.) WHETHER OR NOT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

HAS PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;

C.) WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT-PETITIONER

BEING A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH SHOULD BE
REIMBURSED FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON
THE LEASED PREMISES.

IV. ARGUMENTS

A.) The title of Plaintiff-Respondent over the said

property is void.

B.) The Plaintiff-Respondent should have filed the

case in the Regional Trial Court which has proper
jurisdiction over the case.

C.) The Defendant-Petitioner should be reimbursed

for the improvements made on the said property.

V. DISCUSSION

A.) It is necessary to underline that the Plaintiff-Respondent is

the registered owner of the parcel of land located at 305 Lt. J.
Francisco St., Krus na Ligas, Diliman, Pasig City, under TCT
No, 123456789 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City. In the
Philippines, the introduction of a legitimate certificate of title of
the real property is a convincing evidence of ownership of the
person whose name the certificate of title is entitled to.
 Recognized jurisprudence maintains the significance of a
certificate of title in proving valid ownership of a land. The
general rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof.

The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was used as basis. It

was stated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of
ownership and the questionability of the title is immaterial in
an ejectment suit. Moreover, Article 428 of the New Civil Code
enumerates the rights of an owner. The owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations other
than those established by law. The owner has right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it.

The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the title of

Plaintiff-Respondent over the leased property is void due to the
fact that it was later found out that his title over the property
is void because the said property is once the object of litigation
which he intervene subject to his profession as legal counsel of
deceased Procopio Rizal (Annex A). Moreover, it has been
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale is simulated resulting
into a null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.

It is questionable that the certificate of title of one 305 Lt. J.

Francisco St., Krus na Ligas, Diliman, Pasig City, under TCT
No, 123456789 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City entitles
Plaintiff-Respondent the right to exercise the aforementioned
rights, specifically, in this instant case, the right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover the land.

In the case of Fornilda v. Br. a lawyer is prohibited from

acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or
rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which
they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on
purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private
individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale
advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved i.e.,
the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
exercised by these persons.
 In the case of Lequin v. Vizconde, it is a well-entrenched rule
that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is
null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Moreover,
Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provides that if the price is
simulated, the sale is void, which applies to the instant case,
since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of
sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.

B.) Defendant-Petitioner forcefully assails that the case

should have been tried or commenced in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City which has the proper jurisdiction not in
the Metropolitan Trial Court.

In the case of Republic of the Philippines and National Power

Corporation v. Sunvar Realty Development Corp., it is ruled
that if the reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of
the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then
petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana to be filed with the RTC. Furthermore, the
requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional
facts, when and how entry into the property was made by the
defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the
filing of the complaint before the MTC, and not when the
jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed because the case is one for
accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

In unlawful detainer cases, the one (1) year period is counted

from the date of the last demand to vacate. Wherein, the
Plaintiff-Respondent herein last day of demand and notice was
in August 1, 2016 but it took more than a year and exceeded
the contract of lease before Plaintiff-Respondent filed a
complaint in the Metropolitan Trial Court where it should have
been in fact filed its complaint in the Regional Trial Court in
Pasig City.

C.) The third issue questions whether or not herein

Defendant-Petitioner should be reimbursed for the
improvements made by him on the said premises.

Under the case of Philippine National Bank v. Fernando

Pineda, citing the provision under the New Civil Code
specifically Article 1678 which provides that if the lessee
makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable
to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the
value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor
refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. With
regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be
entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the
principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them
by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

Defendant-Petitioner, has the option to remove the

improvements, even though the principal thing suffers damage
when the Plaintiff-Respondent refuses to reimburse the former
for one-half of the value of the improvements.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premise considered, it respectfully prayed

for that this Honorable Supreme Court that Defendant-
Petitioners prayer for writ of injunction be APPROVED for
having no cause of action and the petition AFFIRMED for
being meritorious.

Other just and equitable reliefs under the foregoing are

likewise being prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Pasig City for Manila City, Philippines. October 30, 2018.