MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS
AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO,
PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
Facts: Antonio Avelino Sr. died intestate. His daughter, Maria, petitioned the court to
issue to her letters administration. The other heirs, (the Respondents), moved to
convert Marias petition into an action for judicial partition. The court granted the
respondents motion and allowed partition on the ground that it was only one heir
(Maria) who was opposed to the partition. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether partition was proper considering that one heir was opposed to the
partition?
Held: Yes. The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and
risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his
heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the court.
Since the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age it is (our)
view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court1 should apply.
As to the contention that the extent of the estate has yet to be determined, this can be
done in the partition proceedings.
In cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in
this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings.
1
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition.
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and
Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator,
and after filing an opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco, assisted by their
corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria appointed as administratrix of the
estate & letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos were issued
in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00. The
Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition. In his Commissioners report dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he
issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their
appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the
properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out
of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend.
He reported that those who were present agreed not to partition the properties of the
estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 & divide the
proceeds equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos
(Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate based on Glorias absence & change
of residence. The Court ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale
afterthe payment of the sum ofP36,000 which shall remain in custodia legis, then
divided among the heirs after payment of
necessary taxes. Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of
land in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Original
Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter. In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia
, Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the order of
the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFIs order was null and void and of no effect, the
same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently
false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in
claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused
them to be deprived of their property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title
issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void, hence this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annul
the CFIs order.
HELD:
The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of
fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of
judgment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as
additional ground therefor The veracity of Atty. Taneos report was doubtful. There
was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving
at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to
sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. The Commissioner's
Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the
signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto. It
was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to
afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved
the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity
thereto. The CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment
for lack of due process.
The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the respondents' right
to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. An
action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI
judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose.
In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale
by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void
judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent
transfers are void ab initio.
The petition was denied.
Rebusquillo v Domingo (2014)
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda
R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and
EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI
CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014
Doctrine:
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement. (Art. 1346, NCC)
Facts:
Petitioner was one of the seven children of deceased, Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria
Villareal. Both of them died intestate. The deceased left a parcel of land in Legazpi
City. In 2001, respondent Emelinda (daughter of petitioner), made petitioner sign two
documents. In 2003, the petitioner discovered that the two documents were an
affidavit of self-adjudication, and a deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent
spouses. Petitioner then filed an action to annul the two documents before the RTC.
In the respondents answer, they admitted the execution of the affidavit and deed, but
they argued that it was with the consent of all the heirs of Eulalio and Victoria, and
that such was agreed to be done to facilitate the titling of the property. Respondents
further argued that the petitioner received the amount of Php 50,000 for the sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The CA reversed the RTCs decision and said
that the affidavit and the sale were valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication and the sale are valid
Held:
No. The petition is granted. Both the affidavit and the deed of sale are void.
Ratio:
An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the
decedent. (Sec. 1, Rule 74, ROC). As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the
sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of
the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had
perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is the only daughter and
sole heir of spouses Eulalio and Victoria. The falsity of this claim renders her act of
adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.
In effect, Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self- Adjudication is void, the subject property is still
subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject
property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents
was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of
respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the
ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of
Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes
place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties
conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation,
when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their
real agreement.
In the present case, respondents admitted that the purpose of the sale was to
facilitate titling and not the transfer of ownership.
[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R.No. 176831 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against
his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel
petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for
the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his
mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs
their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable
reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation
and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her
son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC,
at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought
review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by
testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the
matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not
the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as
basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the
writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character
of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose
of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is
a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and
the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform
the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used
to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in
the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly,
issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be
issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles.
Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy
of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate.
The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the
Court grants the demurrer.
ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
(SpecPro 2016)
Posted on June 29, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings
HELD:
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not
become parties to the probate proceedings.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such
that with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends
to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice
of hearing.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the
case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the
amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the
clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has the
right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case
cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment. However, the
party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of courts assessment
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can
be no determination of whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the the clerk of courts assessment.
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.

Montener vs. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 174975, Jan 20, 2009

Facts: Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at
the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners
herein are their three children.

Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint"
for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. They claim to be
the first family of Alejandro.

Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss becasue Discangcopan

failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopans
petition which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for
the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.

Issue: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for Complaint for the judicial
partition of properties.

Held: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present the clerk of courts
assessment.