Section 3
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
(1) Ramirez v Court of Appeals
-Defines Communication
-Other Imports from jurisprudence RA 4200
Facts:
A case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious
mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners
dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
Private respondent filed a criminal case for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by
one of the parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored
by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private
communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to
impart. It is a process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures) These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications
of meanings or thoughts which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange,
between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latters office.
(2) Zulueta v CA
-Standard or reasonableness: (1) Justified at
inception if there are reasonable grounds
that it will turn up evidence (2) Scope of
Intrusion is reasonable if measures used in
the serch are reasonably related to searchs
objectives and is not highly intrusive
-Right may be invoked against wife who
went to the clinic of her own husband and
took documents of private correspondence
between husband and paramour.
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision which
ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. The petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents
and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision
is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But
one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
(3) Navarro v CA
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique
Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police station to
report alleged indecent show in one of the night
establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then
having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fist
fight. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a
fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim
who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena,
the other media man , testified. Presented in
evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice
recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer
Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken
without the knowledge of the two.
Issue:
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in
evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping.
Held:
The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in
view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the
voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals,
248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
(4) Ople v Torres
-Test of reasonable expectation of Privacy:
(1)
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Petitioner alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.
Issue:
W/N the implementation of A.O. no. 308 insidiously
lays the groundwork for a system which will violate
the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.
Held:
In view of right to privacy:
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provide our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as
a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through
the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." A.O. No. 308
should also raise our antennas for a further look will
show that it does not state whether encoding of data
is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission
that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his
PRN.
The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of
assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of
the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files. The data
may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this
vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard
against leakage of information. When the access
code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear
of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for
whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system. It is plain and we hold
that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No.
308 may interfere with the individual's liberty
of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks
to prevent.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and
the common good. It merely requires that the
law be narrowly focused and a compelling
interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions.
(5) Vivares v STC
Facts:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas
College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures
of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the
students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled
in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO granted by
the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the
students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and
the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook
accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus,
the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well
as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the
childrens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is
proper.
Held:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme
Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be
availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance;
and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against
STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state
that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that
the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing,
and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking
Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking
site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy
must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that
the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that
their post (status) on Facebook were published
as Public.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to
have some privacy, then he must choose any setting
other than Public. If it is true that the students
concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see
them (as they claim), then how come most of
their classmates were able to view them. This
fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was
their classmates who informed and showed
their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures.
Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the
privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to
privacy. The manner which the school gathered
the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it
appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter,
being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered
them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students
according to the standards of the school (to which
the students and their parents agreed to in the first
place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
(6) Gamboa v Chan
Facts:
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion
in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to
privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-
Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of
habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the states interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
Ruling:
NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs
made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which
she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.
(7) Katz v United States
Facts:
The petitioner used a public telephone booth to
transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After
extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening
device to the top of the telephone booth and
recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence
against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have
the evidence suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was
denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention
that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was
granted.
Issue:
Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
protects telephone conversations conducted in a
phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction
as evidence against a person?
Held:
Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The
petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone
booth was a constitutionally protected area.
However, the Fourth Amendment protects
persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide
his self from public view when he entered the
telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the
uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to
do so simply because he went to a place where
he could be seen. A person who enters into a
telephone booth may expect the protection of
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as
he assumes that the words he utters into the
telephone will not be broadcast to the world.
Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and
not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Governments activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners
telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable
cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.
(8) Olmstead v United States
Facts:
Various individuals were convicted of liquor related
crimes, including conspiracy. The operation grossed a
substantial amount of money. The leading
conspirator and the general manager of the business
was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the
Petitioner). The main office of the business was in
Seattle and there were three telephones in the
office, each on a different line. There were also
telephones in an office the Petitioner had in his own
home, at the home of his associates and various
other places in Seattle. A lot of communication
occurred between Seattle and Vancouver, British
Columbia.
The information which led to the discovery of the
conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely
obtained by intercepting messages on the
telephones of the conspirators by four federal
prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along
the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of
four of the [suspects] and those leading from the
chief office. The insertions were made without
trespass upon any property of the defendants. They
were made in the basement of the large office
building. The taps from house lines were made in the
streets near the houses.
Various conversations were taped and testified to by
government witnesses.
Issue:
W/N the use of evidence of private telephone
conversations between the defendants and others,
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
Held:
The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching. There
was no seizure. The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants. The language of the amendment cannot
be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendants house or office. The intervening wires
are not part of his house or office, any more than are
the highways along which they are stretched.
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of
telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus
depart from the common law of evidence. But
the courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing
an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth
Amendment. The reasonable view is that one
who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to
project his voice to those quite outside, and
that the wires beyond his house, and messages
while passing over them, are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those
who intercepted the projected voices were not in the
house of either party to the conversation.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against
a defendant, unless there has been an official
search and seizure of his person or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material
effects or an actual physical invasion of his
house or curtilage for the purpose of making
a seizure. [The court thought], therefore, that the
wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to
a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, [t]he common-law rule is that the
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means by which it was obtained. A
standard which would forbid the reception of
evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical
conduct by government officials, would make
society suffer and give criminals greater
immunity than has been known heretofore. In
the absence of controlling legislation by Congress,
those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders
to justice may well deem it wise that the
exclusion of evidence should be confined to
cases where rights under the Constitution
would be violated by admitting

Section 4 Freedom of Expression
(1) US v Bustos
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to
the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery
charges, involuntary servitude, and theft. The justice
denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges
were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the
victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary
justice, instigated the charges against him for
personal reasons. He was acquitted. The
complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General
but it wasnt acted upon. Criminal action was
instituted against the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty
and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants
filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection
made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion.
All except 2 of the defendants appealed.
Making assignments of error.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are
guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held:
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself
laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This
was in the Philippine Bill.
In the American cases it was held, there were
references to public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. It
also said the guaranties of a free speech and a
free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law
is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on
the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of
the basest sort.
The right to assemble and petition is the
necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of
the part of free speech. Assembly means a
right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges
made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public
opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result
of this. Privileged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer.
Public policy is the unfettered administration
of justice. Privilege is either absolute or qualified.
Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost
by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints
made in good faith against a public officials
conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if
the statements were found to be false, the
protection of privilege may cover the individual
given that it was in good faith. There must be a
sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
It is true that the particular words set out in
the information, if said of a private person,
might well be considered libelous per se. As a
general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of
the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable.
But as suggested in the beginning we do not have
present a simple case of direct and vicious
accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
These respectable citizens did not eagerly
seize on a frivolous matter but on instances
which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an
investigation by a judge of first instance to
convince him of their seriousness. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner
of commenting on the conduct of the justice of
the peace was proper. Defendants thus were
acquitted.
 (2) People v Alarcon
Facts:
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the
Court of first Instance of Pampanga in criminal case
No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador
Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein
except one of the crime of robbery committed in
band, a denunciatory letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc,
was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
herein respondent, Federico Magahas who, as
columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an
article published by him in an issue of that paper.
The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the Court
of First Instance of that province to cite Federico
Mangahas for contempt. On the same date, the lower
court ordered Mangahas to appear and show cause.
Mangahas appeared and filed an answer, alleging,
among others, that the publication of the letter in
question is in line with the constitutional Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) guarantee of freedom of the press.
Issue:
Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for
contempt inasmuch as the robbery-in-band case is
still pending appeal.
Held:
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes
criminal contempt, which is summarily punishable by
the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is
ended. It must, however, clearly appear that
such publications do impede, interfere with,
and embarrass the administration of justice
before the author of the publications should be
held for contempt. What is thus sought to be
shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments is the all-important duty of the court
to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case.
Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal
offense (Lee Yick Hon vs. Collector of Customs, 41
Phil., 548), and in considering the probable effects of
the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair
and reasonable inference consistent with the theory
of defendant's innocence will be indulged (State v.
New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N. M., 102, 177 p. 751),
and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law
exists as to the guilt of one of constructive
contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice the doubt must be
resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted.
(3) Ayer Productions PTY Ltd v Capulong
Facts:
Australian film maker Hal McElroy and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned
the filming for commercial viewing the peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue) to oust then President Ferdinand
Marcos. They consulted with General Fidel V. Ramos
and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who played major
roles in the events. While General Ramos signified his
approval, Senator Enrile wrote a letter stating that he
would not approve of the use of his name or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television
production for commercial exploitation, and advised
petitioners that in the production or exhibition of said
or similar film, no reference (whether written, verbal
or visual) should be made to him or any member of
his family.
The film producer deleted the name of Senator Enrile
in the script and proceeded to film the motion
picture. Senator Enrile then filed a Complaint with
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking to enjoin
McElroy and Ayer Productions from producing the
movie. Senator Enrile alleged that the production of
the film without his consent and over his objection
constitutes a violation of his right of privacy. The trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering
McElroy and Ayer Productions to desist from filming
the movie, and from making any reference to
Senator Enrile or his family or any fictitious character
identifiable with them. McElroy and Ayer productions
questioned the trial court decision in a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court, claiming their
right of freedom of speech and expression.
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting
aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
respondent trial court.
The freedom of speech and expression includes
the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or through television. In our day and
age, motion pictures are a universally utilized
vehicle of communication and medium of
expression. Along with the press, radio and
television, motion pictures constitute a principal
medium of mass communication for information,
education and entertainment.
This freedom is available in the Philippines both to
locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Commercial purpose does not affect
the availability of the right. The circumstance
that the production of a motion picture is a
commercial activity is not a disqualification for
availing the freedom of speech and of
expression. Private sector-owned media facilities
commonly require to be sustained by being devoted
to revenue producing activities. To exclude
commercially owned and operated media from the
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of
speech and of expression can only result in the
drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in
the country.
Prior restraint presumed invalid. It may be observed
at the outset that what is involved in the instant case
is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the
respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of
expression by petitioners. The Judge restrained
petitioners from filming the entire proposed
motion picture. Because of the preferred
character of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and of expression, a
weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates
measures of prior restraint upon the exercise
of such freedoms. The invalidity of prior
restraint does not, of course, mean that no
subsequent liability may be imposed upon a
person claiming to exercise such constitutional
freedoms.
Privacy of a "public figure" necessarily narrower than
that of an ordinary citizens. A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy is permissible where
that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters
of a public character. The subject matter of the
movie relates to the non-bloody change of
government that took place in February 1986. Such
subject matter is one of public interest and concern
as it relates to a highly critical stage in our history. It
has passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression
and coverage by any form of mass media.
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs,
and his character, has become a 'public personage. It
includes, anyone who has arrived at a position where
public attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some
extent at least, their right of privacy because: they
had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complain when they receive it; or that their
personalities and their affairs had already become
public, and could no longer be regarded as their own
private business; and that the press had a privilege,
under the Constitution, to inform the public about
those who have become legitimate matters of public
interest.
Private respondent is a "public figure" because of his
participation as a principal actor in the events of the
change of government in February 1986. Because his
participation was major in character, a film
reenactment that fails to make reference to such
would be grossly unhistorical.
(4) Borjal v CA
Facts:
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed
before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing
and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory
and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking
among others the solicitation letters he send to
support a conference to be launch concerning
resolving matters on transportation crisis that is
tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao
however was never named in any of the articles nor
was the conference he was organizing. The lower
court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed
before the SC contending that private respondent
was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the
published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to
constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Held:
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but
it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. These requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar. The element of
identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso
who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would
not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit
in the freedom of the press and that privileged
communications must be protective of public
opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while
in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of
public interest as the declared objective of the
conference, the composition of its members
and participants, and the manner by which it
was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its
activities as being genuinely imbued with
public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a
public figure and even otherwise is involved in a
public issue. The court held that freedom of
expression is constitutionally guaranteed and
protected with the reminder among media members
to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise
thereof.
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communications those
which are not actionable even if the author has acted
in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of
the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those
containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre
belong "private communications" and "fair and true
report without any comments or remarks."
(5) Reyes v Bagatsing
Facts:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of
the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from
Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy
which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has
been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing.
The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence
reports that indicated that the rally would be
infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City
Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy.
Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to
provide protection to the US embassy from such
lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under
our constitution we adhere to generally accepted
principles of international law.
Issue:
Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of
the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should
be granted the permit.
Held:
No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the
protection of foreign diplomats from any
lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law. But
the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which
upholds and guarantees the rights to free
speech and peacable assembly. At the same
time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor
cannot be invoked if the application thereof would
collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the
clear and present danger test. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In
this case, no less than the police chief assured that
they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a
peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be
applied yet because there was no showing that
indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius
(besides, theres also the question of whether or not
the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by
the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this
case).
(6) Pita v CA
Facts: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor
Ramon Bagatsing, policemen seized and confiscated
from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to
be obscene, pornographic, and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public. Among the
publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was
dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA,
he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES. It is basic that searches and seizure may
be done only through a judicial warrant , otherwise,
they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC
countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the
serach of the premises WE Forum and Metropolitan
Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a
defective warrant. There is a greater reason in this
case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The
fact that the instant case involves an obscenity
rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
political case, because speech is speech,
whether political or "obscene". The authorities
must apply for the issuance of the a search
warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order. They must convince
the court that the materials sought to be
seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough
to warrant State interference and action. The
judge must determine WON the same are
indeed "obscene": the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause
exist, a search warrant will issue.
(7) SWS v Comelec 2001
Facts:
Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-
stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing,
and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the
other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features
news- worthy items of information including election
surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an
election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and
release to the media the results of such survey as
well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states
that it intends to publish election survey results up to
the last day of the elections on May 14,2001
Issue :
WON 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.
Held:
What test should then be employed to
determine the constitutional validity of 5.4?
The United States Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien:
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral
regulations and is said to have "become canonical in
the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the O
'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at
least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet
criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the
causal connection of expression to the
asserted governmental interest makes such
interest "not related to the suppression of free
expression." By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class
of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other
opinion takers. Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of
free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless
fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely,
that the restriction be not greater than is necessary
to further the governmental interest.
As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-
minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing"
candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such
aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech
creates the danger of such evils To summarize
then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
(8) 1-United Transport v COMELEC
Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No.
9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national
and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited
forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign
or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private
properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous
subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals,
such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g)
shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or
operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18
(n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as
regards the application of Resolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), vis--vis privately owned public utility
vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals to post election campaign
materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No.
13-0214, which denied the petitioners request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are constitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with
them. Pursuant to the assailed provisions of
Resolution No. 9615, posting
an election campaign material during
an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of
revocation of the public utility franchise and
shall make the owner thereof liable for
an election offense.
The assailed prohibition on
posting election campaign materials is an invalid
content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free
speech clause. A content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
which is merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the
time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even
if it restricts the right to free speech, provided
that the following requisites concur:
The government regulation is within
the constitutional power of the Government;
it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and
The incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be
posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails
to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid
content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no
necessity to restrict the right to free speech of
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or
permit to operate and not the ownership per se of
PUVs and transport terminals. In the instant case, the
Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC
during an election period. As worded, Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC
supervisory and regulatory powers over the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation, inter alia, of transportation and
other public utilities. The COMELECs
constitutionally delegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to
the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals, but only to the franchise or permit
to operate the same.
The posting of election campaign material on
vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of
political expression, but also an act of
ownership it has nothing to do with the
franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6)
of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine. The captive-audience
doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the
speech can be restricted. The captive-audience
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to
be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot
be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which
undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others. Such selective
restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of
captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-
audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to
the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not
forced or compelled to read
the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they
incapable of declining to receive the messages
contained in the posted election campaign
materials since they may simply avert their
eyes if they find the same unbearably
intrusive.
Lehmans case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to
restrict the posting of election campaign materials on
PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government,
which prohibits political advertisements on
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the advertising space on the buses was not a public
forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, although incidental to the
provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended
for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to
decide which type of advertisements would be
placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of
the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be
placed on its properties.
(9) Diocese of Bacolod v Comelec
Facts:
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet
(6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH
Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote
and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team
Buhay with a checkmark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay
with an X mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay,
while those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
Issues:
(10) Whether or not the size limitation and its
reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Courts power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case
was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or
any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions
made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the
removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a
content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners
right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are
considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does
not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by
this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of
a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion
to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction,
the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the officialactions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the
utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper
in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness
is the prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in
this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to
speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of
their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws,
and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However,
the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority
to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens
expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that
the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for
it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin
may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue, fostering informed and civic
minded deliberation. On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin
is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint
or censorship refers to restrictions based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved
at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger
test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size
of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the
tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by
the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates
as an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a
restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizens private property. Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on,
or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.