Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of
a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies
to all those belonging to the same class.
HELD: Yes, the petition is already moot and academic. The Supreme
Court held that there is no need to pass on the merits of the
various legal issues raised as in accordance with the ruling in
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, promulgated
on February 28, 1974, a suit of this character has become moot
and academic with the effectivity of the 1971 Constitution and the
consequent abolition of the House of Representatives.
FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from
Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs,
a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants
moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted.
Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA
without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.
HELD:
YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed
its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower
court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
because the same was issued without the summary hearing -
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal
manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792).
It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with
dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary
legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear
and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights
of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of
the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same
would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel
was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon
his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse
without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
NATURE
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable
Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to
obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting
him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to
continue occupying the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof, with costs to said respondent
FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the
petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the
office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor
on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the
date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from
the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment
as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District,
with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila
and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its
Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim
appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office
was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a
new oath-After his appointment and qualification as judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as
executive judge, performed several executive acts-On May 19, 1938,
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the
herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was
approved by the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act
No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior
to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed
statute
HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of
First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same
branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another
court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial
district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to
the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment
has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a
public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly
created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible
with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and
enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent
in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment
(46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed
(11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to
accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under
consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his
favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the
petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is
unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment
offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation,
had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled
him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of
the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the
necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he
voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would
later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment
by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was
issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted
is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
Facts:
Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5 th Branch of Courts of
First Instance of Manila
He received a new ad interim appointment issued
(Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge
in the Court of First Instance of the 4 th Judicial District with
the authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of
Manila and Palawan
The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa
(respondent), judge of 4th Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan
Dela Costas appointment was approved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging
that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional
Issue:
Whether or not Zandueta may question the constitutionality of C.A.
No. 145 by which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first
instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside over the Court of
First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor
Held:
No. Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the
constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He should know that his ad
interim appointment was subject to approval by the
Commission on Appointments. If the said commission
disapproved, it would become ineffective and would cease him
discharging the office. Zandueta is free from to accept or not
the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the
Commonwealth. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so.
When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to
an office newly created or reorganized by law qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts
inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and
receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to
have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of
appointment, and he cannot question the constitutionality
of the law by which he was last appointed.
He is exempted from the said rule if he did not accept the new
appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of
legal exigencies.
99 PHIL 738
EN BANC
BENGZON, J.:
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition
for mandamus compelling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section
5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
EN BANC
FERNANDO, J.:
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question
before it was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time
of its enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found
unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual
obligations must prevail over the assertion of community power to
remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that
such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice
Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance
of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the
eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could affect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works
injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law the debtor is not even required to pay
interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in
10
the United States. The conclusion to which the foregoing
considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication,
it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test
of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That
before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was
admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent
to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact
to which legal consequences are attached.
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993. (Digested)
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to
order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the
country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted
that the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations
yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further
assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.
ISSUE:
HELD: