Middle Way Series

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Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way
The four great logical arguments of the Middle Way are:
1. The investigation of the cause: the Diamond Splinters
2. The investigation of the result: refuting existent or non-existent results
3. The investigation of the essential identity: neither one nor many
4. The investigation of all: the Great Interdependence

1. The Investigation of the Cause: the Diamond Splinters

i. Refutation of Production from Four Extremes

Production from Self

On a mere conventional level, it is indeed true that an effect is produced from a
cause, but, if investigated on the ultimate level, production cannot be observed. If
production capable of withstanding logical analysis did exist, it must necessarily be a
production by means of one of the following four extremes: self, other, both or
neither (or causeless). But these are unreasonable.

As it is said in the Root Verses of the Middle Way:

Not from self, not from other,

Not from both and not from neither
Not for any entity at all anywhere,
Is there ever any production.

Why? For a thing to be produced from itself is illogical, because once something
exists with its own particular identity, it is pointless for it to arise once again. It is
like a child that has already been born and is not born again. If a seed, for example,
were produced over again, it would be produced again and again without end. There
would be no opportunity for the development of the other stages, such as the sprout,
the stalk and so on.

According to the Sakhyas who assert self-production, in the same way that
different manifestations, such as vases, can be created from the single nature of clay,
seeds and so on are of a single nature, and abandon their seed-like manifestation as
they are transformed into the manifestation of a sprout. If it is claimed that the
various stages such as those of the seed and sprout are one, in spite of the fact that
they have distinctions in terms of existing or not existing presently, colour, shape
and so on, then that is open to invalidation by consequential reasoning, since it
would follow that fire and water, or virtue and evil, must also be one.

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You might think that a seed and sprout are not equivalent to fire and water because
they belong to the same continuum. Yet a continuum is merely an imputation
based on the uninterrupted resemblance of momentary phenomena, and does not
really exist.

As it says in the Introduction to the Middle Way:

If one supposes that what has already been produced is re-produced,

Then the actual arising of a sprout and so on will never be discovered.
The seed would go on reproducing itself until the end of the world.
For you, there can be no difference between the seed as the active cause
And the sprout in terms of shape, colour, flavour, capacity or ripening.

If this seed of yours is no different from the sprout,

Then whilst the seed exists, there is nothing one might call sprout,
Or else, since they are identical, whilst the sprout exists
How could that [i.e. the seed] be apprehended? It is untenable.

And:

Only once the cause has disappeared does one see the effect,
So the claim that theyre the same is rejected even by the world.

It is not only according to treatises, but also the direct experience of worldly beings
that the effect follows the disappearance of the cause, and so since even they would
not accept the cause to be the same as the effect, self-production does not exist on
either of the two levels of truth.

Production from Other

You might agree that production from self is illogical, and think that just as a child is
born from its mother and a sprout is produced from its seed, production can only
occur from something other. It is indeed true that cause and effect are labelled as
other, but this is not a self-production that can be proven logically.

If the cause were proven to be inherently different from the effect, then the effect
would not need to depend on the cause, and both would be equal in terms of their
capacity. While something exists, it is unnecessary for it to be produced from
something else, just as two people who have already been born are not dependent
upon one another.

If one thing were to arise from another, it would follow that anything could arise
from anything else, like darkness arising from a butter lamp and so on, given that
there is no difference in terms of their being other.

It is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:

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 If things could arise on the basis of something other,
Well then, thick darkness should come from flames.

And:

For the cause and effect to be entirely other,

Is never feasible.
If the cause and effect were entirely other,
Causes would be just the same as non-causes.

Then you might say, In the case of anything truly different such as light and
darkness and so on, cause and effect would be unpredictable. But seeds and sprouts
and so on have an uncommon acting causal relationship of influencer and
influenced, and so the preceding cause produces a subsequent effect. And so there is
no question of anything arising from anything else, like darkness from flames and so
on.

Then, it is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:

You do not accept that barley, stamens, Kimshuka and so on

Can produce a rice sprout, because they lack the capability,
They are not within the same continuum, and are not similar.
It is the same for the rice seed, we say, because of being other.

In the same way that barley and flowers, stones and so on cannot be included within
the same continuum as the cause of a rice sprout or be said to be of similar type, so
too, the barley seed and its sprout, if they are established as truly other from the
perspective of ultimate analysis, cannot ultimate belong to the same continuum.

Even though this does not affect the ultimate conclusion that it is wholly
unacceptable for a things own producers to belong to its same continuum, it is
acceptable to classify a producer as belonging to the same continuum on the
conventional level, based on the ultimately incontrovertible point that things are not
inherently other, but arise in interdependence.

Moreover, since at any given time, either the seed or the sprout will be non-existent,
having not yet arisen or already ceased, how could it be feasible for them to be
influencer and influenced. These are mere imputations.

Although the seed and sprout do not exist at the same time, there is no fault because
they arise and cease like the up and down movements of a pair of scales. If this is
your claim, then while the seed is ceasing, it is approaching destruction and although
it exists in the present, it does not remain in the next instant. And the sprout, while it
is in the process of arising, is approaching production so it does not exist at the same
time as the seed. So there never could be any contact between the two, and the

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example of the scales is meaningless.

The Introduction to the Middle Way says:

If the eye consciousness already exists as other than its own simultaneous
producers,
Such as the eye and the co-emergent perception and so on,
What need is there for it to be produced?
If it does not exist, then the faults of this were already explained.

If eye consciousness already existed as something other than its own producers such
as the eye faculty and the visual object and so on, and also its concurrent mental
states such as sensation and perception, then there would be no need for its
production. If it did not exist already, then these could not be something other.

Therefore, the mind and mental states and the four elements that exist at the same
time are merely labelled as causes and effects, whilst if the mind and mental states
and so on were produced inherently as something truly other, that would entail the
faults already described.

So, regarding production such as that of the sprout from the seed, the crya
Ngrjuna said:

From a seed that is destroyed or intact,

The sprout is not produced,
So you taught that all production
Is just like magical creation.

As it is said, the appearances of dependent origination cannot withstand logical

analysis, and when investigated using reasoning that inquires into the ultimate, not
even the slightest so-called production may be observed. Yet, when left unanalyzed,
just like the appearances during a dream, a sprout appears to be produced from a
seed. This is simply the way in which the conventional is presented.

Similarly, at a merely conventional level, the continuum of similarity is said to

remain and cease, but ultimately, since no arising is observed in the beginning, there
can be no true ceasing at the end nor any abiding in the interim. Thus things are
devoid of arising, dwelling and ceasing.

Therefore, appearanceswhen viewed from the perspective of the non-paradoxical

unity of the two truthsare just like the examples of an illusion, dream, city of
gandharvas, reflection of the moon in water and so on.

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When analyzing in this way, using ultimate reasoning, because of the crucial point
that all phenomena lack inherent existence, seeds and sprouts and so on cannot be
established as having any essential identity, whether as truly identical, other or
whatever.

Others (the proponents of real entities within the Buddhist tradition) may say:
Although the other three types of productionself-production and so onmay be
refuted, if we do not accept production from other, wont we be contradicting the
normal conventions of the world, such as the fact that sprouts arise from seeds and
butter from curd? There is no contradiction. In reality, if we apply reasoning, then
not only at an ultimate level, but also conventionally speaking, arising is never really
observed. If production were observable and proven conventionally, then it would
follow that conventionally true phenomena such as the aggregates and elements
would become immune to ultimate analysis. It would also follow that ultimate or
truly existent arising would not be refuted. And it would follow that the equipoise of
noble beings would become a cause for destroying previously existent conventional
phenomena, which would lead to the extreme of deprecating the existent by labelling
it non-existent. In any case, what is claimed is not possible.

In short, from the perspective of ultimate analysis, no phenomena whatsoever may

be observed that are established as genuinely existent, whilst from the perspective of
reasoning inquiring into the conventional, things are observed. That these two
points are consistent, and established as a single reality is the assertion of the
followers of the Middle Way beyond extremes.

Yet those who speak of real entities disagree, for they consider emptiness and
dependently originating appearance to be mutually opposed. They believe that
whatever is refuted by ultimate analysis must be completely non-existent even on a
conventional level, just like the horns of a rabbit. Or else, that whatever exists
conventionally, such as pillars and vases, could never be refuted by ultimate
reasoning. They conceive of some independent object of negation separate from the
conventional phenomena that are the basis of negation and they consider emptiness
which for them is the refutation of a separate phenomenon called true existence
and appearances, the basis for that refutation, to be directly opposed to one another,
like the total non-existence of the horns of rabbits and the real existence of the horns
of cattle. Asserting this to be a unity, by mentally binding these two to an entity
such as a vase is tantamount to claiming that emptiness is an affirming negation, and
in the end it does not even go beyond the views of the proponents of true entities.
This point has already been well made by the great logicians of the past.

Production from Both

The Sakhyas who speak of primal substance and an almighty god assert
production from both self and other, but this carries the faults mentioned in both the
earlier positions. As it is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:

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 Production from both is inherently unreasonable,
Because it would entail the problems already explained.

So, this position is unacceptable from the perspective of either of the two truths.

Production without Cause

As for the assertion that there is no arising from self, from other or from both, but
that there could be production without any cause, it is said [in the Introduction to the
Middle Way]:

If the world were devoid of any cause, then it might be apprehended

Like the fragrance and colour of a blue lotus in space,
Yet this world is apprehended in all its rich variety,
And so, just like ones own mind, it should be known to arise from causes.

This has already been refuted in more detail above, in the context of the
philosophical schools,1 where it was shown how it entails either permanent
existence or non-existence.

In this way, when analyzing properly using the logical arguments that refute
production from the four extremes of self, other, both and neither, no phenomenon
whatsoever may be seen to arise in the beginning, and therefore to possess the other
features of remaining in the middle or ceasing in the end. And so the conceptual
elaborations of the eight extremes2 such as ultimate arising and so on are pacified
with regard to these unceasing mere relative appearances, and this should be
understood as the unity of appearance and emptiness. This is taught more
elaborately in the Introduction to the Middle Way.

ii. The Refutation of Production from Four Alternatives

When analyzed, production can not be established as occurring in any of these four
possible ways:

1. Several causes producing a single result

2. Several causes producing several results
3. A single cause producing several results
4. A single cause producing a single result

You might think that it is only possible for several distinct causes, such as the object
of a visible form, the unimpaired sense faculty, the immediately preceding mental
attention, an unobstructed appearance and accommodating space, to produce the
result of a single visual consciousness.

In which case, since several distinct causes produce only a single result, the object,
faculty and so on do produce the visual consciousness, but it must follow that there

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can be no other cause for its singularity. Similarly, as long as a single cause is
incapable of producing a single effect, there is no cause for singularity or plurality,
one-ness or many-ness. And since there is no knowable phenomenon that does not
fall into either category (of one or many), whatever is singular or plural must either
remain that way forever or never come into being at any time or place. This is
because there is no cause for being singular or plural.

You might think that several causes produce several effects, the immediate intention
of wishing to look producing the visual consciousness of a mental nature, the
support of the eye faculty producing the apprehension of the object, and the apparent
object such as a vase producing its own particular mental features. In that case, since
it would be produced by these various causes, it would have the various features just
described, such as having a mental nature and so on, and so that eye consciousness
would become many, equal in number to its aspects described above. If that is
accepted, then the resultant visual consciousness is not produced by these causes
such as the intention and so on. The particular aspects such as the mental nature, the
endowment with the features of the object and so on are produced individually, but
the one who possesses these aspects, the visual consciousness itself, has no cause
and is therefore not produced by anything.

You might respond by saying that the apprehension of the object and the other
aspects are not separate, in the sense that they are nothing other than consciousness.
But then it would be meaningless to call this several causes producing several
effects. It becomes several causes producing a single effect, and the problems
involved in such an assertion, i.e. because one and many are uncaused, things must
be either permanently existent or non-existent, have been explained above.

You may think that there is still no fault because the aspects and the possessor of
these aspects are of the same essential identity, and only labelled as separate based
on conceptual distinctions. In that case, the causes such as attention, would perform
their function for the conceptual distinctions, the imputed phenomena such as the
mental nature and so on, but the substantially existent consciousness itself would not
be produced by any cause, and so consciousness would be causeless.

If you claim that the essential identity of the effect is one, but its aspects are multiple,
then this leads to the fault of the qualities being separate from that which possesses
them.

You might consider that the single cause of a blue flower produces several effects,
such as that flowers own subsequent similar type and the visual consciousness of
sentient beings, for example. The question is: does that cause, i.e., the flower,
perform this production by itself exclusively, without relying on any other factors, or
is it done together with other assisting factors, such as the faculties? In the first case
of production by itself alone, since it would not be able to produce a plurality, this
implies causeless production. Similarly, since one cause also can not perform the

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function of producing one effect, then it follows that the single and the multiple must
both lack causes, and once again there is the fault of production occurring without
any cause, as explained above.

If the object, like the blue [flower], produces the visual consciousness in dependence
on other causes, such as the appearance, sense faculty, attention and so on, and you
say that it has been produced by other causes as well, the result will cease to be
singular, because it will possess several features or qualities that have been produced
by the various causes, such as the object, faculty and attention.

Then, it might be said that a single cause only produces its own single result. If that
were the case, then since a cause such as the eye faculty could only produce the
result of its own subsequent resemblance, and could never perform the function of
producing anything else, such as a visual consciousness directly apprehending an
object, there would be no cause for beings visual or audial consciousnesses and so
on, and so these effects would be impossible, with the absurd consequence that
everyone would be deaf and blind.

As it says in the Two Truths of the Middle Way [by Jnagarbha]:

Several things do not produce just one thing,

And many things do not create a multiplicity.
One thing is not produced by many things.
And from a single thing, a single thing is not produced.3

This was stated in accordance with such reasoning.

Moreover, other arguments might be given in response to one who asserts that
several causes, such as the appearance, faculty and attention, give rise to a single
result, such as visual cognition. [For example,] even if it is granted that the resultant
eye consciousness does not have several qualities and is singular, it is impossible for
any knowable phenomenon to be truly singular, as in the case of a visual
consciousness devoid of its accompanying mental states, such as the ever-present
states and so on.

You might think that many causes produce many effects, but then since it would be
impossible for several causes to produce only a single effect, it would be quite
meaningless to speak of a gathering of several causes. When singular phenomena
cannot be established, the many that they go together to produce will not be
established either, and will not exist.

The assertion that one cause produces several effects is also unsound, since it
presupposes a single cause that cannot be divided into parts, and this is impossible. It
can be seen that a single cause such as a seed would be incapable of producing its
effect, the sprout, without relying upon other conditions, such as earth, water,

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warmth, time and so on.

It is also not the case that a single cause gives rise to a single effect, since this is
contrary to direct experience, namely the successive production of a variety of
effects like the sprout, the flower, the fruit and so on, from a variety of causes and
conditions such as the seed, water, fertilizer, heat, moisture and so on.

Therefore, when thoroughly examining, a truly singular phenomenon that lacks a

plurality of features or qualities cannot be established at all, whether as a causal or
resultant entity. And without any such singular phenomenon, then the plural too,
which must necessarily be composed of the singular, must also be non-existent.

Nevertheless, in the case of a thing such as a sprout, even though it consists of

several parts such as its colour and shape and so on, they are still labelled as one
thing, i.e. a sprout, based on their similarity of type and so forth. And also in the case
of a single phenomenon such as a particle, when dividing it according to its features,
such as substance and direction, it is labelled as multiple. Yet it is simply through the
power of dependent origination or dependent definition, that these are
conventionally designated as causes and effects. When analyzing with ultimate
reasoning, they cannot be established according to any of these four alternatives of
single, multiple, etc., and therefore since these conventional entities do not
withstand investigation, they should be understood to be just like the appearances
during a dream.

Although this reasoning is sometimes called the investigation of both the cause and
the effect: refuting production according to the four alternatives thus giving a total
of five great logical argumentsand ultimately there is no real contradiction in
explaining it that wayit seems reasonable to include it within the category of
investigation of the cause, so that there are a total of four great logical arguments.

There are also other arguments which investigate the cause, effect and identity, such
as, for example, the division into the three times of past, present and future, i.e., the
result that was produced in the past has already arisen and has now ceased, so it is
not produced. The result of the future has not yet arisen in the present, and so it is
not produced. And finally, the present result has already been established as its own
identity and so it would be meaningless for it to be produced again.

2. The Investigation of the Result: Refutation of Existent or Non-

Existent Production
This is divided into an actual explanation and elimination of doubts.

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i. Actual Explanation
Regarding the effect that is produced, if one examines whether it is an existent effect
that arises or a non-existent one, or one that is both or neither, the Introduction to the
Middle Way says:

If it is something existent, what need is there for its production? But if it does
not exist, what could be done to it?
If it is both [existent and non-existent], what can be done? And if neither,
what can be done?

If you consider that the result to be produced is something existent which develops,
this is unreasonable. Why? If it is existent, then it must exist having already
established to its own identity as a sprout and so on, and being existent, it would be
unnecessary for it to be produced anew. It is just like a grain of barley, which, having
ripened once, does not need to ripen all over again. If something already existent still
needed to be produced then that would lead to the fault of production continuing ad
infinitum.

Well then, you might think, It is something non-existent that is produced. But in
that case, it would be impossible to produce. For example, even if someone were to
go to great lengths to assemble hundreds of causes and conditions, they would still
never be able to produce the non-existent horns on the head of a rabbit.

You might think that the effect, such as the sprout, was formerly non-existent, but is
made anew into something existent by the causes such as the seed. It is not so. Since
existent and non-existent are mutually contradictory, they could never combine on
the basis of a single entity. In terms of actual entities, there are no phenomena
whatsoever that were formerly non-existent, and later changed into something
existent. Causes and conditions could not transform unconditioned space, for
example, into the identity of a conditioned, existent phenomenon.

Thus, simply on a conventional level, effects appear based on causes. Formerly, prior
to the gathering of their causes and conditions, they did not appear, and now, when
the causes and conditions are assembled, they do. The mind relates these two stages
to one another, and then there is the merely conceptual statement, This did not exist
before, but now it is arising!

Similarly, one mentally relates earlier and later occasions and, in relation to a given
phenomenon, thinks, This existed previously, and then it did not exist.

Thus, the phenomena that are conventional entities simply appear by the force of
dependent origination, and in reality there are no existent phenomena whatsoever
that transform into non-existent ones, and there are no non-existent phenomena
that transform into existent ones.

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It is similar in the case of conditioned formations arising anew and finally ceasing, or
the continua of similar type remaining and not remaining, the perception of an
existent self of the individual or phenomena and the perception of no-self. The
explanation is similar to that given in the case of existent and non-existent
phenomena. They are all merely appearances on the conventional, relative level, and
ultimately, they are empty of their own essential identity. At the level of the genuine
nature of things, there is no observation of any features such as the transformation
of something existent into something non-existent or non-existent into existent, of
any going or coming, arising or ceasing, increasing or decreasing.

ii. Eliminating Doubts

You might wonder how it is that production of results should be asserted, given that
neither existent nor non-existent effects are produced, and that, aside from these
two, no third mode of production is possible. It is asserted that the arising of effects
is nothing other than the undeceiving appearance of dependent origination, and
when analyzed as to whether it is existent or non-existent, it is not established in any
way whatsoever, but is just like the example of a magical illusion and so on.

It is impossible for a knowable phenomenon to be both existent and non-existent

since these two are directly opposed to one another. And it is also impossible for a
phenomenon to be neither existent nor non-existent, because it is impossible for
there to be some third option in between these two directly opposed positions.

Well then, you might think, just as it is impossible here to have the option of
neither, there can not be this option of neither in the context of freedom from
conceptual elaboration of the four extremes, such as existing, not existing and so on.
And, you might think, Just as in the assertion made without specifying not existent
and not non-existent, it is impossible for there to be a third option between direct
opposites, so the natural state can be understood through the two negations, and
there is nothing meaningful in defining what nothing whatsoever means. Thus,
apart from the rather deceitful position of asserting nothing at all, our own tradition
does not make any kind of definite statement about how things are. This might be
how spiritually immature beginners think it is, but it is not like that at all.

As long as one still maintains a basis for conceptual reference, there can not possibly
be an apprehension that does away with the four extremes altogether. Therefore,
whatever assertions are made by applying particular distinctionslike saying, There
is no snake in this house, but there is a vasethey are conceptual references
involving particular conceptual ideas, and so they are not beyond the realms of
ordinary conceptual thought. In the actual state of simplicity, in which all conceptual
focus has subsided, there are no assertions or conceptual references whatsoever with
regard to the four extremes. Even so, it is quite unlike the dull confusion of not
having realized ultimate reality, or a state of unconsciousness. It is a state difficult to
express by words or through examples, that isas it says in Rhulas _Praise to the

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Great Mother Prajpramit_beyond words, beyond thought and beyond
description. It is simplicity that is discerned by means of ones own individual
awareness, in which all doubts have been cut through: a non-conceptual primordial
awareness free from dualistic perceptions, but naturally luminous like the shining
sun.

3. Investigation of the Essential Identity: Neither One Nor Many

To begin with, there is an analysis of the essential identity of all conditioned and
unconditioned phenomena to determine whether or not there is true singularity. In
the case of those conditioned phenomena of the five aggregates possessing physical
form, there is a division into above, below, the cardinal and intermediate directions
and the centre. Through this, it can be seen that, for something such as a vase,
singularity is simply a conceptual notion applied to the various features that are the
basis for such an imputation. True singularity is not established, and the same applies
in the case of its component parts. The body and the limbs are also divided into parts
in the same way.

In short, all that possesses physical form and is composed of material particles may
be broken down to its basis, which is the infinitely small particle. And, according to
the logic explained before, for that most subtle particle to be surrounded by particles
in the various directions, it must have sides, which means it must have parts, and so
on, in an infinite regression. If not, then however many subtle particles are gathered
together, they could never grow any larger. Thus, all phenomena with material form
lack true singularity.

In addition, the eight or the six collections of consciousness can not be established as
truly singular since they consist of various cognitive acts and mental states, take
various features as their focus, and arise in different forms from the gathering of the
four conditions, and then cease.

By analyzing everything that has the nature of arising and ceasing deriving from its
own causes, even the subtlemost indivisible moment can not be established, and so
all phenomena included within mind and matter lack any true singularity. As for
non-concurrent formations, they are simply imputations made upon the occasion of
mind and matter, and so they lack any essential identity. Unconditioned phenomena
are imputations made with regard to the eliminated aspects of objects of negation,
and are also lacking in any essential identity.

In short, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena can not be shown to have
any true singularity, and since this is not established, plurality that is made up of
what is singular must also remain unestablished. And so, since there is no mode of
true existence aside from being truly singular or plural, it must follow that
individuals and phenomena are proven to be without inherent identity, just as it is
explained more elaborately in The Ornament of the Middle Way.

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4. Analysis of All: The Logical Argument of Great Interdependence
All phenomena do not come into being through their own inherent identity, but as a
result of the coming together of causes and conditions, and when there are no
conditions they do not arise. Even at the time when they appear, they appear whilst
lacking any inherent existence, since they are like reflections, brought about by
causes and conditions. Free from any conceptual elaborations such as being
permanent or non-existent, going or coming, arising or ceasing or being one or
many, they appear whilst lacking true reality.

When evaluating in this way, using reasoning investigating the ultimate in

accordance with the actual nature of things, they are found to be mere unfailing
dependent arising. Otherwise, if they were truly established in any way, such as
arising according to the four extremes or four alternatives, or being existent or non-
existent, or permanent or impermanent etc., then that would be inappropriate as an
explanation for the conventional, and would result in a deprecation of all
conventions.

According to the Middle Way tradition, for whom the unreal illusory appearances of
dependent origination and emptiness arise in the same reality, all the conventions of
mere appearance are extremely reasonable. This being so, the conventions of the
world, as well as the supermundane conventions of the Four Truths, Three Jewels
and so on, are all perfectly established.

This king of reasonings, the Great Interdependence, includes all the other types of
ultimate logic, such as the Diamond Splinter and so on, because they are all
concerned with the seemingly real, unexamined appearances of dependent
origination. When analyzed, no causes, effects or essential identities whatsoever can
be established. The extensive variations of this logic that investigates the meaning of
dependent origination are to be found in The Root Verses of the Middle Way and
elsewhere.

Conclusion
Therefore, at the relative level, cause, effect and inherent identity appear in that way,
and are labelled with such conventions. Ultimately, causes, effects and inherent
identities lack any true nature, being emptiness with the identity of the three doors
of liberation. The emptiness in which the two truths are inseparably united like this
is the dharmadhtu, the object to be realized through the path of the Middle Way. It
is the supreme of all that might be realized, the mother of the victorious buddhas
and their heirs.

This point concerning equalness in which the truths of appearance and emptiness
are indivisible is just like the sphere of space, and is beyond the realm of conceptual
thought, unimaginable and inexpressible, yet with non-conceptual wisdom, it can be

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meditated in the manner of pure self-knowing awareness. During the post-
meditation phase, one has the confident certainty that all things appear yet lack true
reality, just like the examples of a magical illusion, dream, reflection, magical
creations and so on. And, with the wisdom that thoroughly discerns the two truths,
one is brought to an undeluded realization concerning all the categories of the
ground, path and fruition.

Through comprehending the meaning of emptiness in this way, all the enlightened
qualities of the path and fruition of the Great Vehicle will arise.

Taken from Mipham Rinpoches , with supplementary material from Khenpo

Ndens commentary.

| Translated and edited by Adam Pearcey, Rigpa Translations, 2005.

1. i.e., earlier in the text of the . See Gateway to Knowledge, Vol I,

Rangjung Yeshe Publications, 1997, pp. 64-5.

2. The eight extremes are: arising, ceasing, permanence, non-existence, coming,

going, plurality and singularity.

3. This is verse 14 of the text. Khenpo Nden gives the quote with the lines in a
slightly different order, but I have followed the original.

15
Profound Instruction on the View of the Middle Way
Namo Majurye!

Once you have gone through the training in analysis

And developed confidence in the crucial point
Of how the individual is devoid of self,
Then consider how, just as the so-called I is
An unexamined conceptual imputation,
All phenomena included within
The five skandhas and the unconditioned are the same:
Labeled conceptually as this or that.

Although we apprehend all these various phenomena,

When we investigate and search for what's behind the labelling, it cannot be found.
And when we reach the ultimate two indivisibles,
Even the most subtle and infinitesimal cannot be established.
It is the same for all that appears through dependent origination:
Entities themselves arise dependently,
Whereas non-entities are dependently imputed.

So, whether an entity or non-entity,

Whatever is conceived of uncritically,
Once it is analyzed and investigated,
Is found to be without basis or origin
Appearing yet unreal, like an illusion, dream,
Reflected moon, echo, city in the clouds,
Hallucination, mirage, and the like.
Appearing yet empty, empty yet appearing
Meditate on the way empty appearances resemble illusions.

This is the ultimate that is categorized conceptually.

It has the confidence of a mind of understanding,
And is indeed the stainless wisdom of seeing
The illusory nature of post-meditative experience.
Yet it is not yet free from focus on apprehended objects,
Nor have the features of a subjective mind been overcome,
And so, since it has not gone beyond conceptuality,
The true reality of natural simplicity is not seen.

Once this kind of certainty has arisen,

Even clinging to mere illusion
Can be understood as conceptual imputation.
There is apprehension, but no essential nature to the perceived,

16
And even the perceiving mind cannot be found,
So, without clinging, one is brought to rest in natural ease.

Remaining like this, all perceptions,

Both external and internal, are not interrupted.
Yet within this fundamental nature, free from grasping,
All projections imposed upon phenomena,
Have never arisen and never ceased to be.
So, free from the duality of perceiver and perceived,
We rest in the all-pervading space of equality.
This is beyond any assertions, such as is or is not.
And, within this inexpressible state of true and natural rest,
An experience dawns that is free from the slightest trace of doubt.

This is the actual nature of all things,

The ultimate that cannot be conceptualized,
And can only be known individually
The non-conceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Once you become familiar with this state,

In which emptiness and dependent arising are an inseparable unity,
The ultimate condition in which the two truths cannot be separated,
That is the yoga of the Great Middle Way.

Those who wish to realize this swiftly

And make evident non-dual, primordial wisdom
Beyond the domain of the ordinary mind,
Should meditate on the pith instructions of Secret Mantra.

This is the ultimate profound and crucial point

Of the progressive meditations on the Middle Way.

So, begin by thoroughly refining your conduct,

And then arrive at certainty, experientially and in stages.
With confidence in the illusory nature of empty appearance,
This is what it means for nothing to be removed or added on the path.
And, within the equality of the all-pervading space of perfect wisdom,
There is complete liberation.

In a place where people suffer drought and dehydration,

Hearing that there is water does not dispel thirst;
It is only by drinking that relief is found.
And this is how it is for learning and experience so the stras say.
Someone with only dry, theoretical understanding,
Who is worn out by all kinds of reasoning and ideas,

17
Does not need sporadic practice; but, when meditating in proper stages:
Will swiftly gain acceptance of the profound.

Jampal Gyepe Dorje

wrote down whatever came to mind,
On the twenty-ninth day of the eleventh month of the Water Dragon year (1892).
Through this, may all beings realize the meaning of the profound Middle Way!
Magalam!

| Translated by Adam Pearcey, Rigpa Translations, 2006.

18
Clarifying the Essence: A Summary of the
Instructions on the View of the Middle Way
by Rongtn Sheja Kunrig
O svasti!

In devotion, I pay homage to, and take refuge in, the guru and supreme deity: grant
your blessings, I pray!

The summary of the instructions on the view on the Middle Way includes advice on
1) decisively eliminating conceptual elaboration 1 through the view; 2) taking the
meaning into experience through meditation; and 3) bringing about enhancement
through action.

Meditation
Taking the meaning into experience through meditation has two aspects: 1) calm
abiding (amatha) and 2) penetrating insight (vipayan).

Vipayan
The instructions on vipayan themselves are divided into two: 1) meditating on the
selflessness of the individual, and 2) meditating on the selflessness of phenomena.

These two incorporate meditations on 1) outer emptiness, 2) inner emptiness, and 3)

the emptiness of both [outer and inner]. As any attachment to the truth of the two
forms of selflessness must also be eliminated, it is also necessary to meditate on how
they both lack true reality, and so 4) the meditation on the emptiness of emptiness is
also taught.

Together, these four forms of meditation on emptiness include all the necessary
means of cultivating the view of emptiness, with nothing lacking. Meditating on the
first three forms of emptiness eliminates imputation2 regarding phenomena (chos
can; dharmin), while meditating on the emptiness of emptiness eliminates imputation
regarding the nature of phenomena (chos nyid; dharmat).

As ntideva said:

When notions of real and unreal

Are absent from before the mind,
Then, there is no other possibility,
But to rest in total peace, beyond concepts.3

19
This summary of the instructions on the view of the Middle Way was composed by the
great Rongtn at glorious Nlendra.

| Translated by Adam Pearcey, 2016

1. spros pa; prapaca

2. sgro 'dogs; samropa

3. Bodhicaryvatra, IX, 34

20
Madhyamakvatra: Collection of Reasoning
Oral commentary by Khen Rinpoche Namdrol

Motivation
Please listen to this explanation with the supreme motivation of bodhicitta, wishing
to attain perfect awakening for the sake of all sentient beings.

Introduction to the Text

The Collection of Middle Way Reasoning

The great master rya Ngrjuna was prophesied by the Buddha himself in the Root
Tantra of Majur (Majurmla Tantra):

Four hundred years after I,

The Tathgata, have passed away,
A monk called Nga will appear
Who will benefit my teachings.
Reaching the bhmi of Perfect Joy
And living for six hundred years,
This great being will perfect
The science of the great peacock,1
And will understand the meaning of various stras
And the meaning of the absence of reality.
When he leaves behind his mortal body,
He will be reborn in Sukhvat.
And ultimately, he will certainly gain
he perfect fruit of buddhahood itself.

He was also prophesied in the Great Cloud Stra (Mahmegha-stra) and the Stra of
the Great Drum (Mahbherhrakaparivarta-stra).

rya Ngrjuna's two main treatisesthe so-called body treatisesare Root Verses
on the Middle Way (Mlamadhyamakakrik) and Sixty Verses on Reasoning. The text
we are concerned with here is the Introduction to the Middle Way or
Madhyamakvatra by Candrakirti, which is a commentary on the meaning of the
Root Verses.

Generally speaking, Ngrjuna composed treatises on all five sciences. Those on the
science of the inner meaning, i.e., the Buddhadharma, primarily teach the aspects of
view and conduct. In describing the view and the conduct of the Dharma, Ngrjuna
employs both scriptural quotations and reasoning. The treatise that mostly uses
quotations from the scriptures is the Compendium of Stras (Strasamuccaya). It

21
draws from the sutras in order to explain and clarify the aspects of view and
conduct.

There are three collections that mainly employ reasoning in order to clarify the view
and the conduct of the buddhist teachings. They are the Collection of Reasoning, the
Collection of Praises and the Collection of Advice.

The Collection of Praises relates mainly to the final turning of the Wheel of Dharma.
It includes eulogies in praise of the ground, the path and the fruition.

The Collection of Advice relates mainly to the first turning. It includes the advice to
the king known as the Precious Garland2 as well as the Letter to a Friend.3

According to some past scholars the Collection of Reasoning was originally referred
to simply as the collection or the teachings of logical reasoning and the number of
texts it contained was not specified. Others, such as Mabja Changchub Tsndr4 and
the omniscient Gowo Rabjampa,5 insist that the Collection of Reasoning contains a
specific number of texts. They differ in the texts they identify; yet they agree on the
principle that the number of texts in the collection is fixed.

Mabja Changchub Tsndr said that the Collection of Reasoning contains six texts.
Among these, he said, two texts are likened to the body, and this is clear because it is
stated so in Candrakrtis commentary to Sixty Verses on Reasoning. The two body-
like texts are Root Verses on the Middle Way and Sixty Verses on Reasoning. In
addition, Mabja Changchub Tsndr goes on, there are four branch or limb-like
treatises. He claims that this derives from Candrakrtis Commentary to the Sixty
Verses on Reasoning, where it is explained how these four texts are elaborations upon
the two fundamental treatises. However, this text only describes Refutation of
Objections 6 and Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness7 as extensions of the main two
treatises. It does not mention Crushing to Fine Powder8 or Conventional Existence, 9
which are the other texts Mabja Changchub Tsndr includes among the collection.

Gorampa disagrees with Mabja Changchub Tsndr because of this very point. It is
clear, he says, that Refutation of Objections and Seventy Verses on Emptiness are
branch-like treatises, because the way in which they are extensions of the main two
treatises is clearly explained. As for Crushing to Fine Powder, Gorampa believes that it
too may be counted as a branch-like treatise, and in this it seems he is in agreement
with many past scholars. He also agrees that the main topic of Crushing to Fine
Powder is the refutation of the so-called sixteen topics (Skt. padrtha) of the
dialecticians. As it says in the text itself:

22
 With the pride of intellectual knowledge,
They seek to engage in debate.
In order that they might relinquish such pride,
I shall explain the Crushing to Fine Powder.10

So, Crushing to a Fine Powder is included among the branch-like treatises.

Mabja Changchub Tsndr includes Conventional Existence among the branch-like

treatises. This is because the teachings of the Root Verses of the Middle Way on how
all phenomena are naturally beyond arising and empty might cause one to doubt
whether all phenomena are non-existent even at the conventional level, rather like
the horns of a rabbit or the horns of a donkey. Therefore Conventional Existence was
taught, it is said, in order to dispel this misunderstanding, and to show how at the
conventional level all phenomena are illusory and dream-like. So Mabja Changchub
Tsndr claims that there are six texts in the Collection of Reasoning, and that one of
them is Conventional Existence.

The Omniscient Longchenpa also states that there are six texts in the Collection of
Reasoning, the sixth being Conventional Existence.

Gorampa disputes the inclusion of Conventional Existence. In the first place, he

objects to this on the grounds that it was not translated into Tibetan. He goes on to
say that it probably did not exist even in India because Candrakrti fails to mention it
at the end of his Clear Words11 commentary upon the Root Verses on the Middle Way
when listing all the Madhyamaka texts that he had studied. If Conventional Existence
really was the work of Ngrjuna, Gorampa argues, then Candrakrti would certainly
have studied it. This is the relevant section of Clear Words:

What I have shown here is based on my study of the Compendium of Stras,

the Advice of the Precious Garland and In Praise of the Authentic, and also, for
a long time and with great effort, the Kriks from the treatise of rya
[Ngrjuna] , and the Sixty Verses on Reasoning, Crushing to Fine Powder and
Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness as well as Refutation of Objections too. I also
looked into the [Four] Hundred Verses and so on, and many profound sutras,
as well as the commentary composed by Buddhaplita and that which was
well explained by Bhvavivekaall these texts one after anotherand I have
also included what I have discovered through my own investigations,
bringing everything together in order to delight all those with intelligence.12

It is because it is not among the works listed here that Gorampa feltConventional
Existence was unknown in India.

As stated earlier, Mabja Changchub Tsndr was amongst those earlier scholars
who believed that Conventional Existence should be included in the Collection of

23
Reasoning. Mabja Changchub Tsndrs main teacher was Lotsawa Patsab Nyima
Drakpa13 who actually translated the Introduction to the Middle Way from Sanskrit
into Tibetan, as it says clearly in the translators colophon at the end of the text:

by the Indian abbot Tilaka Kalasha and the Tibetan translator, the monk
Patsab Nyima Drak.

And, what is more, Mabja Changchub Tsndr was not just an average student; he
was one of the four great disciples of Patsab Nyima Drakpa, the so-called four sons
of Patsab , i.e., Geshe Putowa from Central Tibet, Sokpa Yeshe Jungne from
Changthang, and Tsangpa Sarb and Mabja Changchub Tsndr from Tsang.14

So it seems strange that one of the principal students of this great Tibetan translator
who worked in collaboration with an Indian scholar to translate Candrakrtis text
would consider a non-existent text to exist, and, not only that, but also for it to be the
work of Ngrjuna, and to be included within his Collection of Reasoning. If there
were a reason to doubt the existence of the text in India or its authorship, Mabja
Changchub Tsndr would surely have been aware of it. There is no obvious reason
why he would endorse a spurious text, or its subject matter, or why he might wish to
see it included in the Collection of Reasoning. Lotsawa Patsab Nyima Drakpa was
one of the great translators and Mabja Changchub Tsndr was his direct disciple.
They would certainly have known whether or not there was a text by rya
Ngrjuna called Conventional Existence. And they would certainly not have
attributed existence to such a text if there were no grounds for doing so. This must
be our conclusion too, if we investigate the matter. Hence, Gyalse Shenpen Taye, the
Omniscient Longchenpa and others include Conventional Existence in the Collection
of Reasoning and the reasons for its exclusion provided by Gorampa may be
considered insufficient.

The Treasury of Secret Mantra Scripture15 is a text belonging to the category of terma
related to the cycle of Deshek Dpa, and it includes statements by Vimalamitra, Guru
Rinpoche, Namkhe Nyingpo and Vairotsana. This text also refers to a six-fold
Collection of Reasoning, but it gives the sixth text as Beyond All Fear.16 According to
Indian scholars and the earlier Tibetan commentators Beyond All Fear_is a work of
rya Ngrjuna. Nevertheless, it is a commentary on the Root Verses on the Middle
Way, and therefore differs from the other body-lilke or branch-like treatises of the
collection. All the same, earlier scholars considered it an auto-commentary to the Root
Verses_composed by Ngrjuna himself. More recently however, Gorampa and
others have expressed doubts about this, primarily because the text includes a
citation from ryadevas Four Hundred Verses.17 ryadeva was Ngrjunas pupil,
and it seems unlikely that in commenting upon a text that he himself had written,
Ngrjuna would quote his own student. So there are those who doubt the
attribution of Beyond All Fear to Ngrjuna.

24
Gorampa and others who have questioned its attribution to Ngrjuna have also
expressed further misgivings about Beyond All Fear. Why, they ask, would
Candrakrti have composed his Clear Words commentary to the Root Verses if
Ngrjuna himself had already composed an auto-commentary? And, furthermore,
why is it that there are no quotations drawn from Beyond All Fear in the writings of
Buddhaplita? The answer can only be, Gorampa and the others claim, that the text
in question is not in fact a genuine work of Ngrjuna.

Whether or not Ngrjuna wrote Beyond All Fear, it is perhaps best not to include it
in the Collection of Reasoning. It is preferable to classify it as a commentary on the
Root Verses. If all the commentaries composed by Ngrjuna were to be included in
the Collection of Reasoning we would have to include his commentary on Refutation
of Objections and other texts and we might end up with something more like an
eight-fold collection!

There are eight commentaries on the Root Verses in the Tengyur, one of which is
Beyond All Fear. There are also those by Devaarma, Guamati, Guar, Sthiramati,
Buddhaplita, Bhvaviveka and Candrakrti. Although there is some controversy
over whether or not Beyond All Fear is an auto-commentary (i.e. by Ngrjuna
himself), the fact that it is a commentary is beyond dispute. And according to the
Treasury of Secret Mantra Quotations it is one of the six treatises in the Collection of
Reasoning.

According to Gorampa, there are only five texts in the Collection of Reasoning.18
Among these, the two likened to the body are Root Verses on the Middle Way and
Sixty Verses on Reasoning. Although they are both body-like texts we can draw a
distinction between the two. Some past scholars explained that the Root Verses teach
a freedom from the eight extremes of elaboration, i.e., ceasing and arising, non-
existence and eternalism, coming and going, multiplicity and singularity, whereas
the Sixty Verses on Reasoning teaches a freedom from four extremes, i.e., arising,
ceasing, existence and non-existence. Others have explained that the Root Verses
refute the assertions of true existence made by both Buddhist proponents of true
entities and non-Buddhist trthika philosophers; whereas the Sixty Verses on
Reasoning refutes only the assertions of true existence made by proponents of entities
within the Buddhist tradition. Mabja Changchub Tsndr explained the difference
between the two texts in the following way. He said that the Root Verses teaches
emptiness of inherent nature by means of elimination and negation; whereas the
Sixty Verses on Reasoning teaches emptiness of inherent nature by exclusively
establishing the illusory nature of the conventional.

In any case, these are the two body-like treatises and the so-called branch-like
treatises extend from these.

25
According to Gorampa, the first branch-like treatise is the treatise refuting the
views imputed by others. The views imputed by others are the sixteen categories of
words and meanings of the dialecticians, and the treatise that refutes these is
Crushing to Fine Powder.

According to our own tradition, once again the two body-like treatises are the Root
Verses on the Middle Way and the Sixty Verses on Reasoning. Then, among the
branch-like treatises, Refutation of Objections is said to be an expansion of the first
section of the Root Verses on Examining Conditions. The Root Verses teaches how
there can be no arising of something from itself or from something other than itself,
and therefore brings certainty in the non-arising of all phenomena. The proponents
of entities respond by saying that if this were the case, then even Mdhyamika
reasoning is without true nature. And since this reasoning is without true nature
then it is not able to refute the claims made in favour of true existence. It is therefore
unreasonable, they say, to claim that all phenomena are ultimately beyond arising, or
beyond the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism. It is said that Refutation of
Objections was composed in order to refute such arguments. In the text, it is stated
that from the point of view of reality itself, the Mdhyamikas have nothing to refute,
and have no reasoning by which they might do so. From the conventional
perspective however, even though reasoning is not truly existent, the Mdhyamikas
are still able to refute the assertions made by the proponents of entities, rather like a
magically-created, illusory army warding off attack. For example, in the first verse of
the Refutation of Objections, it is said:19

If all entities are non-existent

By their very nature, then
Your words also lack reality
And can not refute true existence.

In his response, Ngrjuna makes such statements as:20

Since there is nothing whatsoever to refute

I do not refute anything.
Therefore when you say that I refute
That itself is incorrect.

Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness is an expansion of the section of the Root Verses on

Examining the Conditioned, which includes a discussion of how arising, dwelling
and ceasing cannot be established. The proponents of true entities respond to this by
pointing out that in many profound sutras taught by the Buddha, it is stated that
conditioned phenomena are subject to arising, dwelling and ceasing. The
Mdhyamika replies that this is true only from the mistaken viewpoint of the
conventional. This is the essence of the discussion found in the Seventy Stanzas on
Emptiness.

26
So Refutation of Objections and Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness are direct extensions
from the body-like treatises.

Gorampa, as it was said earlier, identifies only five texts in the Collection of
Reasoning. The omniscient Longchenpa identifies six texts, and his list accords with
that of Mabja Changchub Tsndr.

Among the New Translation schools, the Gelugpas claim that the Precious Garland is
the sixth text in the collection. Gorampa opposed this by pointing out that the
Precious Garland is classified as advice, and therefore belongs to the Collection of
Advice, not the Collection of Reasoning. In Candrakrtis Clear Words, for instance,
which I quoted earlier, it is referred to as the _Advice of the Precious Garland_.

In any case, whether five or six texts are included, this is what is known as rya
Ngrjunas Collection of Reasoning.

1. i.e., alchemy.

2. Ratnval (rin chen phreng ba). See Ngrjuna, Buddhist Advice for Living and
Liberation: Ngrjuna's Precious Garland, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins, Ithaca: Snow
Lion, 1998.

3. Suhllekha (spring yig). See Nagarjunas Letter to a Friend with Commentary by

Kyabje Kangyur Rinpoche, trans. Padmakara Translation Group, Ithaca: Snow
Lion, 2006.

4. (?-1185).

5. , the famous Sakyapa scholar (1429-1489).

6. Vigrahavyvartan-krik (rtsod pa bzlog pa'i le'ur byas pa). See _The

Dialectical Method of Ngrjuna, trans. K. Bhattacharya, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1978.

7. nyat-saptatikrik (stong pa nyid bdun bcu pa'i le'ur byas pa). See
Nagarjunas Seventy Stanzas: A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness, David Ross
Komito, Snow Lion, 1999.

8. Vaidalya-stra (zhib mo rnam par thag pa).

9. Vyavaharasiddhi (tha snyad grub pa).

10.

27


11. Prasannapad (tshig gsal). See Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way, trans. M.
Sprung, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

12.

13. (1055-1145?).

14. There so-called Four Sons of Patsab are referred to in a verse of Taktsang
Lotsawa:

As regards the Great Middle Way, the supreme tradition of Nagarjuna,

The excellent clarifications made by Candra[krti], translated by Nyima
[Drak],
Came down to the four sons.

There are different ways of listing them. According to one, they were: (1)
Gangpa Sheu, who was learned in the words, (2) Tsangpa Dregur (
or ), who was learned in the meaning, (3) Mabja Changchub
Tsndr, who was learned in both words and meaning, and (4) Shangthang
Sakpa Yeshe Jungne, who was learned in neither words nor meaning. Shakya
Chokden names Tsangpa Sarb () as the son who was learned in the
words and Daryulwa Rinchen Drak as the son learned in the meaning. See
Tashi Tsering, Madhyamakavatara of Acarya Candrakirti, Sarnath: Central
Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 2005, p. 48 and Shakya Chokden, Three
Texts on Madhyamaka, trans. Komarovski Iaroslav, Dharamsala: Library of
Tibetan Works and Archives, 2002. p. 23.

15.

16. Mlamadhyamakavrittyakutobhaya ( )

17. Catuataka (bzhi brgya pa). See Sonam, R. (trans.) Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas,
Gyel-tsap on ryadevas Four Hundred, Snow Lion, 1994.

28
18. This is also the assertion of Khenpo Namdrols teacher, Khenpo Tsndr. See
Preliminaries to the Explanation of the Prajpramit

19.

20. Verse 64:

29
Oral Commentary by Khenchen Namdrol Tsering (contd)

The Text Itself

The text we are explaining here is the Introduction to the Middle Way, and to do so
we will use its auto-commentary. There are four main parts to the explanation:

1. The Meaning of the Title

2. The Translators Homage
3. The Main Part of the Text
4. The Conclusion

1. The Meaning of the Title

The Sanskrit title of the auto-commentary is Madhyamakavatarabhashya-nama. In
Tibetan, it is , or A Commentary to the Introduction to the
Middle Way.

Madhyamaka (Middle Way) here refers to the treatises of the Middle Way. This is
indicated in the text of the auto-commentary itself when it says:

In order to supplement the treatises of the Madhyamaka, I wish to compose

an introduction to the Middle Way,

Generally speaking, Madhyamaka refers to the freedom from all extremes. As it is

said in the Samdhirja Stra:

Existence and non-existence are extremes,

Purity and impurity are extremes as well,
Thus, having relinquished both extremes,
The wise do not dwell even in the middle.

The meaning expressed by the term Madhyamaka is, we could say, the sphere of
reality (dharmadhtu), beyond all extremes. This can then be further divided into the
Ground Madhyamaka, the unity of the two truths; the Path Madhyamaka, the unity
of skilful means and wisdom; and the Fruition Madhyamaka, the unity of the two
kayas.

The Ground Madhyamaka, the unity of the two truths, is beyond all extremes
because it is beyond the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. The Path Madhyamaka,
the unity of skilful means and wisdom, is beyond the extremes of exaggeration and
denial. The Fruition Madhyamaka, the unity of the two kayas, is beyond the extremes
of sasric existence and the peace of nirvana.

In terms of the literature expressing Madhyamaka, there are Madhyamaka texts that

30
are the actual words of the Buddha and Madhyamaka treatises. The first of these, the
Madhyamika teachings of the Buddha, are found in the Prajpramit sutras of the
intermediate turning on the absence of characteristics. The Root Verses of the Middle
Way is primarily a commentary on the Prajpramit sutras, as is the Ornament of
Realization (Abhisamayalankara) of Maitreya. The Introduction to the Middle Way,
however, is usually said to be a commentary on the Stra of the Ten Bhumis
(Daabhmikastra), and not the Prajpramit stras. Only its explanation of the
twenty types of emptiness could be said to be a commentary on the Prajpramit,
whilst its explanation of the three dharmas of ordinary beings1 and the ten trainings
of the noble ones2 are given according to the Sutra of the Ten Bhumis.

Regarding the treatises of the Madhyamaka, mention has already been made of
Ngrjunas Root Verses of the Middle Way and the rest of his Collection of
Reasoning.

So, the text we are presently concerned with_Introduction to the Middle Way_
belongs to the category of expressing literature of the Madhyamaka, and, in
particular, to the category of Madhyamaka treatises. The main body-like treatise is
the Root Verses of the Middle Way, and this Introduction to the Middle Way is a
commentary on its meaning. So, the Middle Way of the title mainly refers to the
actual text of the Root Verses.

Introduction or Entrance here signifies that this is a clarification of the Root Verses,
particularly of its more difficult points. For example, the Introduction to the Way of a
Bodhisattva (Bodhicaryvatra), clarifies the activity of a bodhisattvathe six
pramits, the four means of attracting disciples, the four immeasurables and so on.
In the same way, the Introduction to the Middle Way clarifies the points from the Root
Verses of the Middle Way that are in need of clarification.

So, what is the method of introduction? The various commentaries explain this
slightly differently. Gorampa says there is introduction to both the vast and
profound. As for the profound means of introduction, the Root Verses of the Middle
Way employs numerous types of reasoning in order to establish emptiness, much
more extensively than the Introduction to the Middle Way. When explaining these
various types of reasoning, the great scholars of the Svtantrika School use the
principles of autonomous syllogism, whereas those of the Prsagika School, to
which Candrakrti belongs, use the principles of absurd consequence. Thus, in the
Introduction to the Middle Way, the profound means of introduction is the
explanation of the logical arguments from the Root Verses according to the principles
of consequence.

As for the vast means of introduction, vast here refers to the presentation of the
paths and bhmis, which are only referred to indirectly in the Root Verses itself. In
rya Ngrjunas Precious Garland, there is brief mention of the three dharmas of

31
ordinary beings and ten trainings of the noble ones, where it says:

Its root is bodhichitta,

That is stable like Sumeru, king of mountains,
Compassion that extends throughout space,
And wisdom that is non-dual.3

And:

Just as in the rvaka vehicle,

Eight rvaka stages are explained,
In the Mahyna there are
The ten bhmis of the bodhisattvas.4

This is all that is said in the Precious Garland; it is not treated extensively. And in the
Root Verses the paths and stages are only mentioned indirectly.

In the Introduction to the Middle Way the three dharmas of ordinary beings and ten
trainings of the noble ones are discussed in great detail, based on the Stra of the Ten
Bhmis. This is the vast means of introduction.

The root text of the Introduction to the Middle Way says:5

Those skilled in the ways of the profound and vast,

Will gradually attain the ground of Perfect Joy.

Gorampa describes the means of introduction in terms of scripture and instructions,

for as it is said in the root text:6

This way of explanation I, the bhiku Candrakrti,

Have drawn from the Madhyamaka treatise,
And here set down correctly according to scripture,
And in accordance with instructions.

I think there is something slightly odd about this explanation. The Madhyamaka
treatise, or the scripture that is referred to here is the Root Verses, and, as we have
already seen, this is precisely what is to be introduced. So to say that it is also the
method of introduction creates some problems. It would be fine to say that the
instructions, passing from Ngrjuna to ryadeva and so on down through the
lineage of masters, constitute a means or method that is used in the Introduction to
the Middle Way, but to say that the scripture to be introduced is also the method of
introduction is perhaps a little confusing.

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2. The Translators Homage
The text says:

Homage to the youthful rya Majur!

This accords with the general guidelines laid down for the translators homage.

The text continues:

In order to supplement the treatises of the Madhyamaka, I wish to compose

an introduction to the Middle Way,

This has already been explained above.

1. Bodhicitta, compassion and wisdom.

2. The trainings of the ten bhmis.

3. Chapter 2, verse 75:

4. Chapter 5, verse 40:

5. Chapter 6, verse 7bc:

6. Chapter 11, verse 52:

33


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Middle Way Aspiration
by Khenchen Shenga
Guiding light of this world, crowning glory of the kya clan,
Seniormost of buddhas heirs, precious wisdoms treasure,
Successors to these teachings, noble Ngrjuna and your spiritual sons,
I prostrate before you all, the supreme of guides for living beings!

Buddhaplita, you who realized the Middle Way beyond extremes,

Master of the bodhisattvas enlightened actions, ntideva,
Upholder of the great tradition of the Prsagika, Candrakrti,
Respectfully, I bow before youthink of me with great compassion!

From this day on, throughout all my future lives,

May I gain the freedoms and endowments and meet with buddhas teachings.
Accepted by an authentic spiritual teacher,
May I serve him well, with all three kinds of faith!

Having fully received instructions from my supreme and noble guide,

On the definitive meaning that is the intent of the profoundest sutras,
May I reach conclusive certainty through the three kinds of wisdom,
And gain the conviction of one who relies upon the Dharma!

Taking faith and great compassion as the basis of my path,

And never forgetting the Three Jewels, the objects of my refuge,
May I embark fully upon the path of the Mahyna,
And arouse a mind of bodhicitta that is uncontrived!

With the courageous willingness to sacrifice even life and limb,

May I give away to others all that I own and have within myself,
And, guarding my mindstream with the purest moral discipline,
May I never stray beyond the boundaries of my vows!

Seeing all who do me harm as equal to some priceless treasure,

May I honour them with a mind of joy and great respect,
And always, in all my lives to come, may I rely
Upon this wondrous conduct born of a noble heart!

The naturally pure absolute, which is the basic nature of reality,

Is entirely beyond the realm of concepts such as is or is not.
May my failure to understand and false ideas be cleared away,
So that I come to see the true nature of everything directly.

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May I go beyond the four extremes of the mistaken mind,
Clinging to false ideas of existence, nothingness, both or neither,
And may I come to see the genuine approach of the Middle Way,
Just as it has been taught by all the great and learned masters!

All outer and inner things are beyond arising from themselves,
From something else, from both or without any cause at all.
May I adopt and avoid in the proper way whatever I should
Of these phenomena the world fully believes to be real.

May I abandon all falsely conceived notions of a self,

Thinking it is identical to the aggregates, distinct from them and so on,
And, through the sevenfold reasoning of the chariot,
May I gain certainty that it is but a dependent imputation!

All knowable things have always been empty by their very essence.
May I now eliminate entirely the pain of my conceptual thoughts,
With their mode of perceiving which obscures genuine reality,
Thinking for example that things abide forever or even partially persist.

May I manifest my own true nature, which is the excellent meaning,

Conveyed through examples such as gold within rock, or a lamp inside a vase,
According to the vision of the noble and glorious lord Ngrjuna,
And may I complete all the stages and paths to gain the dharmakya!

Then may I manifest continuously in many billions of emanations,

To all the buddhas heirs throughout the far reaches of space itself,
And to infinite oceans of beings of every type, lesser and greater,
Guiding each and every one according to their minds capacity!

From now until I reach that perfect level of attainment,

In all my lives, may I realize and skillfully teach to others,
The meaning of the Middle Way beyond all extremes,
And become the equal of glorious Ngrjuna and ryadeva!

I, the beggar monk Shenpen, made this prayer of aspiration related to the sources of
virtue, so that in this and all my future lives I may uphold the flawless scriptural
tradition of noble Ngrjuna and his spiritual heirs and teach it to others.

May it be virtuous!

| Translated by Adam Pearcey, Rigpa Translations, 2005.

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