Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.08.

05

William D. Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty. Origins of

Ancient Cynicism. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2006. Pp. xiv, 240. ISBN 0-268-02581-9. $48.00
(hb). ISBN 0-268-02582-7. $25.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Kostas Vlassopoulos, University of Nottingham

(konstantinos.vlassopoulos@nottingham.ac.uk)
Word count: 2058 words

Regrettably, the study of ancient philosophy and the study of ancient

cultural and intellectual history have long parted ways. Those studying
ancient philosophy pay little attention to the work of cultural and
intellectual historians, while they, in turn, pursue their agendas often
ignoring what scholars who work on ancient philosophy have to say. It is
a rare case that a study tries to bring the two subjects together, and this is
the greatest merit of the work under review here. The ancient Cynics have
long been seen as exceptional and outside the margins of Greek culture.
William Desmond makes a powerful argument against this perception, by
searching for the origins of Cynic ideas and attitudes within mainstream
Greek culture and society. He examines a wide number of different texts,
ranging from Homer and Hesiod to the tragic poets, Thucydides,
Herodotus, Xenophon and of course Plato and Aristotle. He also attempts
to contextualise Cynicism by viewing it as a reaction to contemporary
developments in Greek society during the classical period.

Chapter 1 looks at the various modern interpretations of Cynicism. Some

scholars see Cynicism as a symptom of the decline of the polis; others see
it as a critique of the emerging commercial spirit and the worsening of
social relationships; Cynicism can be seen as the psychological defence-
mechanism of social outcasts; or the intrusion of Oriental traditions into
Greek culture; or, finally, as a universal phenomenon of marginal
individuals in pursuit of freedom and autonomy, just as with hippies,
anarchists or anchorites. Desmond argues that although there is a grain of
truth in most of these different interpretations of Cynicism, they miss
what he sees as its essential defining characteristic: in contrast to modern
perceptions of the cynic as a nihilist, an ancient Cynic is an idealist who
bases his Weltanschauung on the wilful acceptance of poverty and toil.
Previous accounts of Greek intellectual and cultural history argued that
Greeks accepted wealth and despised poverty without second thoughts;
and that they valued leisure and had only contempt for labour and toil;
they thus end up portraying Cynicism as an abnormal and marginal
phenomenon.

In contrast, in chapter 2 Desmond argues that various forms of praising

poverty and toil were widespread in Greek culture and society throughout
its history; Cynicism is rather a re-adaptation, re-interpretation and
extension of these views on poverty and toil. Scepticism and even
hostility towards many forms of acquiring wealth (usury, trade, political
bribing, tyranny) were common, while elite authors could represent
wealth as a burden and a source of danger in a democratic society like
Athens. A number of authors came to argue that it is not wealth, but the
virtue of the person who uses wealth that should be desirable. Cynicism
adapted this idea to the extent that it is virtue itself which is the only form
of real wealth. Human needs are limited and nature itself can provide
everybody with what they need. On the other hand, while leisure was
much sought-after, different forms of praising toil as a source of wealth,
virtue and power were widespread in Greek culture. Desmond is
particularly effective here in describing the emergence of the 'imperial
work ethic' in the fifth century, as famously presented in the Corinthian
portrait of the Athenians in Thucydides. Cynicism adopted this praise of
toil by reinterpreting toil, not as a form of productive labour, for which
there is no need or use, but as the mental and physical effort needed in
order to break away from luxury and social convention and to embrace
nature. Cynic asceticism and frugality is their form of toil.

Chapter 3 looks at the issue of poverty and military valour. Desmond

shows that the necessity of poverty for military valour was a widespread
notion among Greeks; on the contrary, luxury brought effeminacy and
finally degeneration and destruction. He distinguishes between three
forms of this idea: the individual / ethical, the geographical / national and
the historical. On the individual and ethical level, poverty makes the
individual able to withstand hunger, toil and fatigue and thus makes good
soldiers. On the geographical and national level poor and mountainous
countries make people frugal and valiant, as opposed to the rich and
fertile countries that breed soft nations. From Herodotus and Hippocrates
to Xenophon and Aristotle the idea is common enough in Greek culture.
Finally, the idea lends itself as a scheme of historical periodisation,
whereby martial nations from mountainous and poor areas subdue the soft
nations of poor countries, only to be corrupted by luxury and be subdued
themselves. Desmond shows how the Cynics appropriated all these
different versions of the idea in order to explain how they can become
capable of fighting against luxury, greed and violence. What is most
fascinating about this chapter is the way Desmond explains how the idea
of poverty as a condition of military success remained a valid way of
understanding the world throughout the classical period: the Spartan
defeat of Athens, Agesilaus and the Persians, the Ten Thousand, the
Theban defeat of Sparta, Timoleon's success in Sicily could all be seen as
verifications of this essential truth: in contrast to Thucydides, it is not
resources that win wars, but the courage and heroism, which poverty
nurtures and luxury destroys. This is a very important suggestion and
should be taken seriously in future study.

Chapter 4 shows how Cynicism adopted two main themes from the
Eleatic tradition. The one is the negation of movement, change and
development and the assertion of the immutability of Being that goes
back to Parmenides. Despite the false appearance of diversity and change,
the Being is unchangeable, self-sufficient and all-encompassing.
According to Desmond, Cynicism is the application of the qualities of the
Eleatic Being to the Cynic sage, who is self-sufficient and unaffected by
external changes. On the other hand, the Eleatic ontology, in its negation
of common wisdom and the appearance of the senses, originates a
tradition in which the sage is looking for truths that are hidden and seem
ridiculous to the ignorant masses. This theme is again appropriated by the
Cynics in their disparagement of commonly-held and mainstream views
and values. But Desmond also shows the differences between Cynicism
and other traditions that stem out of the Eleatic legacy. In contrast to the
search for knowledge and science of a Democritus or Plato, the Cynics
negate them based on a radical interpretation of Eleatic epistemology.

Finally, a short epilogue looks at the survival of Cynic themes in later

philosophical traditions.

This book raises a number of issues of wider importance. The author has
shown very convincingly that Cynic ideas and approaches are re-
adaptations and modifications of ideas that had wider currency within
Greek society and were by no means as marginal as previous scholarship
thought. But his very success in showing this creates a number of
problems.

One problem is that most modern scholars working on ancient Greece

adopt a monolithic and functionalist approach to culture. Expressions like
'the Greek tradition' or 'the average Greek believed' betray what Pierre
Bourdieu has called 'the synoptic illusion'. A culture is not a uni-
dimensional or unified whole, but rather a set of sets. M. I. Finley once
argued that 'the judgement of antiquity about wealth was fundamentally
unequivocal and uncomplicated. Wealth was necessary and it was good; it
was an absolute requisite for the good life; and on the whole that was all
there was to it' (quoted on p. 18). Desmond shows very convincingly that
this assessment is wrong and that various forms of praising poverty were
common in Greek culture before Cynicism. But how is one to proceed
from here? For surely, both Finley's and Desmond's assessments describe
attitudes that coexisted within Greek culture. Should we talk about
antithetical cultures? Should we see a single attitude, but variations
according to the context? Should we see a difference between the
'aristocratic ideal' and 'Greek popular morality'?1 Desmond is particularly
successful in showing that elite authors were capable of accepting certain
forms of praising poverty and toil. It is thus not simply a class difference;
but here one would expect more detailed discussion of the Greek
distinction between penia and ptocheia than the cursory treatment it gets
in pp. 31-4. But his philological method of finding traces of the praise of
poverty in all sorts of different texts and contexts does not help him in
raising these wider methodological issues.

On the other hand, one should look more outside the canon of texts.
Although Desmond has read extensively outside philosophical texts, he is
still too dependent on the views expressed by elite authors like Xenophon
and Plato. Given the origins of many Cynics and the social world that
they chose to inhabit, one should look in more detail into the world of the
lower classes. But here it seems that the author does not have the
necessary methodology to face this task. Statements like 'the difference,
perhaps, is that the 'many' do not think through their assorted opinions to
construct a consistent ethical outlook. Aristophanes' characters both
denigrate the rich and envy them...The philosopher, by contrast, seeks a
coherent and comprehensive moral system' (p. 65) are very problematic.
The elitist perspective that the poor and downtrodden have no consistent
outlook and can create no new ideas, a task that awaits the educated and
the philosophers, has been exploded a long time ago by modern
historians;2 while using the characters of Aristophanes to show what the
many thought, is, if anything, at least highly contestable. One little
example of the variety of lower-class sources not explored in the book
will suffice: 'This is the beautiful tomb of Manes, the son of Orymaios,
the best of Phrygians there ever were in wide Athens. And by Zeus, I
never saw any woodcutter better than me. He died in war'.3 The possible
connections between the praise of skill and manual labour and death in
war would have provided excellent material for this book.

One other issue is relevant here and needed more elaboration. The Cynic
is double faced: on the one hand he despises and scorns the rich, the
luxurious, the powerful; freedom of speech, a vital instrument for a
Cynic, is best guaranteed under a democracy. But on the other hand, a
Cynic is still an elitist of sorts: only he has reached the real truth by
embracing nature and he despises the masses for their stupidity and crass
materialism; he lives by using the fruits of nature and begging and scorns
those who do real manual labour in order to make a living. The
combination and contradictions of this double side is not brought out with
sufficient clarity and elaboration in the book and surely merits more
study.

Another aspect that needs more attention is Athenocentrism, the equation

of Athenian culture with Greek culture. Desmond argues that Athens and
democracy play an essential part in the rise of Cynicism, while on the
other hand showing the widespread origins of Cynics, many of which
came from the wider 'colonial world'. How is one to bring these two sides
together? Here the author has little to offer, mainly suggesting, without
offering any evidence, that Athens was not isolated, but influenced other
cities and that many cities had similar conditions and faced similar
problems with Athens (p. 68).

Finally, although the author makes an admirable and well-aimed attempt

to connect the study of ancient philosophy with social, economic and
cultural history, in a number of cases it ends up in very problematic
statements and accounts. His perception of ancient economies is
extremely primitivist and rather outdated (pp. 45-9): arguments like
'agricultural conditions did not change radically during the classical
period' (p. 75) are belied by recent findings. His statements that
mercenary service disappeared in the fifth century (p. 109) and that Greek
poleis fought their wars with mercenaries in the fourth century (p. 139)
are both outdated and misleading. His statement that 'Greek wars did not
pay, and were regarded primarily as contests for honor, not wealth' (p.
169) is equally problematic: the Athenian empire does not fit very well
into this perspective.4

Having said all this, the virtue of a good and inspiring book is to raise
new issues and generate further reflection. In this respect, this is a very
successful and interesting book that deserves to be read by a wide
audience.

Notes:

1. See the different approaches in C. Dougherty, L. Kurke, eds, The

Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration,
Cambridge, 2003.
2. See e.g. C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a
Sixteenth-century Miller, London, 1980.
3. IG, I3 1361.
4. For all these military issues, see H. van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths
and Realities, London, 2005.

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