September 20, 2016

#5 | The Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken

Dirty Harry Reference

Uncertainty about capability: Robber didnt know if Harry had a bullet or not
o States have capability, often the other state doesnt know what the capability is
o Crucially, it is not always in the interests of states to reveal what they have, want
ambiguity about their tactical doctrines, weapons, so that other state cant predict or
strike you first
Thats why states keep secrets and why theres classified stuf
o This creates the opportunity that the robber could go free

Certainty about resolve: Robber knew that if Harry had a bullet, Harry would shoot, robber
could die
o 2 x 2 and 4 possible outcomes, what this means is that the robber essentially says
that I would rather have a 100% chance of living jail than a 50% of death even if I
could also go free
Robber options with varying outcomes: Harry has a bullet [50%]
Surrender and live in jail [100% chance of living]
Reaches for the gun and fights [50% chance of death]
Harry doesnt have a bullet [50%]
If robber surrenders, he lives in jail [100% of living]
Reaches for the gun and fights, lives and goes free [50% chance of
freedom]

Dirty Harry and the Anarchic World

In a crisis, State A wants state B to make a concession (i.e give up land), B can either fight [no]
or fold [yes]
o Fighting is costly and people die, roads get broken, want to avoid this situation
If B fight, it has a 50% chance of conquering A, or a 50% chance of being
conquered by A
If B folds, B has a 100% chance of loss of some land, like the robber B
would rather lose some of our land than run the risk of being
conquered
A is trying to get B to concede land without fighting, ideally A will show B that
A is much stronger prior to the crisis (through state interactions) so B wont
fight at all (will fold)
Disputes arent always a precursor to war, they are more like symbolic
of strength so that in a crisis the other side doesnt fight, it just folds
These eforts are costly, you have to spend money, ect

This is difficult in general because states dont want to reveal everything they have secrecy
and there is uncertainty where B may not understand As signal, B never knows what A has +
what As intentions are
o How does A win like Dirty Harry? B doesnt know what A has, they are uncertain
All B can know is As resolve to what use he ias
Given uncertainty about capabilities, A must show B that A is
resolved to use what A has even if B doesnt know what A has
Must show resolve to use what the state has (offensive
strategies)
B is forced to choose whether he will run risk, the other state must be forced to
think this
 If you build up weapons, even if you dont reveal the full set of
weapons, you may be able to win concessions even without fighting

Real-Life Situation

An actual example: Kim Jong Un is revealing some of his capabilities, removing doubt that his
rivals (USA, South Korea) that he has a nuclear weapon, they are quite sure now that he has
something
o Created some sense of ambiguity and because he sets them of every now and then
there is no question about his result, one thing is sure: If SK + USA attack, NK will use
nuclear weapons
USA + SK will not do anything or rebel groups or anything because they are
sure if there is some existential threat to the NK regime, NK will set of nuclear
weapons
All NK has to maintain is that he has nuclear weapons and test it, show
it works
Nuclear Deterrence: Simultaneously raise the risk of war but also signalling
results

Dealing with Uncertainty

Tragedy of GDP: Competition between states occurs despite each state just wanting security
o NK under Il Sung, there existed the hope of Korean reunification, but NK can only
ensure their security by making SK insecure, both just want security, but they freak
each other out
Uncertainty Problem: A can never be sure that B is seeking security + security
alone
o Cannot solve this problem, uncertainty/ofense/anarchy are always present in
international system

How to deal with this kind of political climate?

o Signal Resolve: Means and wills to defeat aggression, i.e. showing you have nuclear
weapons
o Build Reputation: Show the world state you arent someone who backs down all the
time

Lessons for International Politics

War and peace are not binary choices: Absence of war is not a sign that everyone loves each
other
o Absence of war may just reflect high costs, both sides have spent heavily to deterr the
others
Cold War: Absence of war, but only because each side bought thousands of
nukes
War then is not inevitable, we can prevent war
o Peace may not be cheap because states are always investing so they can get the ohter
to fold
o States may have incentitives to fight wars

Thinking Strategically & How to negotiate

Negotiating power comes from having options, credible threat from this case comes from
options
 o This type of thinking worth on

Playing One Of Against the Other

You want A to ofer you more money

o If you reject C + B, you can ask A for more money, but if A says no, you are out
o You can reject C, and ask Btsa

The Game Itself

A B

1 DC [A goes straight, B swerves] CD [B goes straight, A swerves]

2 CC [both parties lose, both chickens] CC [both parties lose, both chickens]

3 CD [A swerves, B goes straight] DC [B swerve, A goes straight]

4 DD [both dead] DD [both dead]

DD is the worst for both parts, and there are gains from mutual cooperation [both better of
swerving]

Lessons

In this game youre a player, is there a dominant strategy (something each player should do
every time?)
o DD: If you go straight all the time, the other person may do the same and then you die
Is it true though that I am preserving the chance of winning?
If you swerve too much, you develop a reputation for swerving which
means that other people may take advantage of you, going straight is
costless
o There is no dominant strategy in this game, you cant have the same move every time
If you go straight every time, one is creating a risk even if the other guy just
randomizes and flips a coin, well be dead eventually, or we will lose every
time if we swerve
Only way to play this game is to randomize, I have no dominant
strategy, I just dont want other people to predict what Im going to do

Why does this result matter?

o Importance of reputation - doesnt mean going straight, rather means being
unpredicted
o If the other guy thinks you will swerve, you will always lose, if you dont swerve, you
will crash

Playing Chicken
 Nuclear threats are essentially the threats that leave something to chance
o You want the other side to think I dont want to run this risk at all, because nuclear war
is the worst thing ever, game of chicken usually used to represent the possibility of
nuclear war
In nuclear war, DD is the worst outcome = nuclear war
o It would be like throwing out the steering wheel in this example, i.e. Harry
You put the onus on it and you force the other person to make the last move
This is why you must build reputation in the hopes that others notice
Behave Irrationally: You do things that create a bit of ambiguity
In chicken, mutual defection is the worst outcome, usually only describes nuclear crisis
o Being chicken (CD) is better than dying (DD)

Prisoners Dilemma, Jervis, 171

Two criminals are arrested on the charge of bank robbery, they are put in two cells and the
police says:
o If you rat on your partner (defedr) and your partner stays silent you will go free and
your partner gets 25 years
Conversely, if you partner rats (D) and you stay silent (C)
If you stay silent (C) and your partner stays silent you will both get 5 years
for lesser charge of owning a weapon
If you rate (D) and your partner rats on you (D) you will both get 10 yyears

A B

1 025 - DC DC

2 5, 5 - CC CC

3 10, 10 - DD CD

4 25 yearss DD

Suckers Payof (CD)

When you stay silent and the other prisoner rats, you get 25 years and the other gets 0
o Some otucomes where CD is the worst, some situations where mutual defectiion is
preferable compared to being a sucker

Examples of PD in internationa politics

There are situations where there are advantages in cheating

o Truces: In truces between states, 1914-2001 truces broke dow [Reiter, 2009]
BD means they just keep fighting, neither side would haev had an advantage
 o Arms Agreements, Climate Change Negotiations
In PD cheating is the worst outcome

What Happens/Key Problem in tDilemna

No isnurace o r==r move

o Is there a move a player will take in each game?
o By defecting any time I am an
o Is there an equilibruim solution/
o Is there a move both players will take in each game?
YES: DD (even though they are btoh wrose of than if they stayed silent
[suboptimal]
Both have n interest in getting t 0to CC
The whole point of
There are ways in which you can get past this, hhaving frequent
cooperation at lower levels [one shot game with very high stakes, not
all games are like this]
Problem is that the great downside of this means ha
DC gives you a huge advatj

In PD GAME

DC = conquering other states/gaining advantage

CC = Peace at low cost
DD - costly war/costly peace (i.e. UK-USSR)
CD = being conquered, being at disavantage [unless nuclear war]
o Opportunity: A state can gain more by chating than by cooperating (DC)
depending on waht the state does
States dont want to be exploited (CD) because CD has
disproportionate costs fors tates
o No third pary mechanism that can guaratee a state will stick to its
considerations

Itrated games

Interated = done multiple times,

o In the 70s robert axelrod told other scholars to figure a solution to the
prisoners dilemma
solution : whats the best way of getting cooperation
Take for tat: if the game is played many times, i dont do one thing all
the time
I wait to see the outcome of a game, then next game i do
exactly what he does, simon says
What happens then is that the other guy watches what im
doing
If game was played once (itneractions were one shot) states would
always cheat, but states dont just interact once, they interact
frequently and on many levels
If you can over time build up a reputationf or cooperation, by
mirroring what the other guy does, u can get past this problem
Hve multiple small agreements > one big agreements to
observe tit for tat
If you play PD more than once u boserve and remembr the
other players actions

IMportance of reputation (whatever you do i do the same)

 September 27, 2016

#6 | More on the Security Dilemma + The Balance of Power and Alliances

Why Dont States Always Cheat

Two criminals will never see each other again in this game, in this case they have lots of incentive to
mutually defect (DD, winds out being the equilibrium solution, both parties do same thing all the time)
o If the game is played one time and criminals never see each other again, they would always cheat
o If I violate the peace treaty, I can conquer the other state and absorb them into my territory
If that were the conditions, you would get DD, fact of the matter is that most interactions
between states ARE NOT one shot, dont play games once and then eliminate the others
o States dont interact only once - so what happens if PD are played more than once?
Tit for Tat Strategy: You just mirror what your opponent did in the last game
Over time, the opponent will realize this pattern, and so if they cooperate, the
other person will almost certainly cooperate = move towards CC
o Recalling what the other side does is very important, observe + remember other players action,
this means that reputation is very important (I am trustworthy)
Can move from a place where DD is the equilibrium to CC being the equilibrium
Even when truces break down, the fact that people still continue to sign them is
a good thing
o Better to have a broken truce than no truce at all

Costs of Cheating (Jervis, 176)

One of the big things that defers states from cheating is the notion that DD may be very costly
o Logic is that if you are a state, you need to think about raising the costs of defection for others
You want the other side to C and avoid D, so how do we make the other side not D?
o For CC = Increase Gains [Opportunity costs from cooperation]: Sign a treaty which has more
mutual benefits, i.e. bring them into some kind of organization that gives them returns
One logic pattern is to focus on trade, USA in reaching to China b/c increase the gains
from cooperation with China, they will have less incentive to be aggressive
o For CD = Decrease Gains from Conquest: In practise doesnt make any sense, no state is
going to say Im going to be poor so that I cant be attacked, so its unrealistic
Most of the time you are trying to get richer, not poorer
o For DD = Increase the Costs [Deterrence]: If we both defect, it will be costly for the both of
us
Mirrors CC, i.e. US policy towards China for past 25 years, has simultaneously involved
trading with China and the WTO, have clearly focused on CC BUT the USA has also
through the 90s not withdrawn from East Asia, has strengthened its allies v.s. China
Has bases in Japan, Korea, Philippines, on the one hand we will Increase Gains
but we will also Increase the Costs [balancing coalition against Chinese]
Increasing Gains and Costs arent mutually exclusive
You can buy arms or you can form alliances for balancing purposes

All this PD stuf is an abstract depiction of how you get away from DD and hopefully to CC
o Generally treaties or some kind of trade arrangement are used to facilitate this

The Security Dilemma

SD: An increase in the security of one state decreases security of others (Jervis, 169)
o This isnt about intention, not meaning that a state is necessarily threatening another state, this
can happen when states are just looking out for their own security even without meaning to
Uncertainty: General level of uncertainty, i.e. German insecurity leading to WWI
Fungibility: British had predominant naval base only for trade, werent focused on
Germany, only wanted to deal with their colonies, but the Germans were concerned
about how it could also be used to blockade Germany [they are close to being
landlocked]
You can be uncertain about the other states intentions
 But also the capabilities are important as well, many military technologies have
many diferent uses, i.e. navy can be intended to be used to maintain sea lanes
can also blockade ports allowing food supplies to arrive

Security Dilemma and Rank Ordering

Bad Outcomes Good Outcomes

CD: I disarm, the other arms and attacks
o UK nothing, USSR builds a railway
DD: We are both armed, this might result in an
expensive, costly war, consequences for both
o UK builds and Russia builds
CC: Both cooperate, gains accrue to both
DC: Other side disarms, I attack and make
gains, still incentive to defect as you can make lots
of gains

Dilemma: 1 (DC) with risk of 3 (DD), 2 (CC) with risk of 4 (CD)

o By cheating, you get an advantage, you can win the jackpot
o By cheating you can be worse of if the other side does the same (DD)
You lose benefits of cooperation in CC, opportunity cost [the foregone benefit]
If other side cheats, costly war or costly peace
o But defecting (DD) may be preferable to being conquered (CD) except in nuclear war

This would not be a dilemma if CC was always #1, in the international system, you generally win more if
you choose to D and the other chooses C, CC is RARELY the #1 choice in the international system

What Do We Learn?

In SD, potential losses must be weighed against potential gains

o Often, fear of losses (fear of CD) outweighs prospective gains (CC), why?
Anarchy: Commitment Problem, in which there is a deal which benefits me at the
present, and I expect the other person to break the deal so I wont sign it
Anarchy is a constant, what changes though is the relative trustworthiness of
governments, some are more trustworthy than others
Commitment Problem is more variable, some governments find it harder to
commit to settlements compared to other kinds of governments
The loss in the case of CD may be very bad, loss of sovereignty or land
Extreme case is complete invasion, sometimes the overall cost of CD exceeds
the potential costs of CC, and states would rather than cooperating choose
defect
o When states fear the worst outcome (CD) this can inhibit cooperation

The Problem of Cheating

Under anarchy, there is always the possibility of cheating (the commitment problem)
o There are no guarantees, no 9-1-1 you cau can call, no court that enforces agreements
Therefore the possibility of cheating is always there, what mitigates the problems of
cheating is the trustworthiness of governments
Situations states want to avoid are CD (conquered) and DD (costly war)
Situations states want to be in are CC (cooperation) and DC (conquering others)
How do states prevent the other side from defecting so that the other side has no
incentive to defect? Increase the gains from CC or increase the costs of DD

States wont attack if the cost of war exceeds benefits (i.e. nuclear war)
 o Think of DD in chicken: No one wants nuclear war, most wars are not of this existential variety,
but the broader logic holds, the more you exceed costs of DD the more the other is likely to
cooperate
Deterrence: Raise the cost of war, raise the costs of an action that the other party
would have taken or done anyways in order to stop the other party from doing that
action
To deter, you increase capability and you signal resolve
Compellence: Raising costs to make someone do something they wouldnt have done

Balance of Power

The most obvious way of increasing capability is increasing power, but this limits the scale of what you can
do, you are limited by factors such as the size of your economy, more efficient way of scaling up your
capability is to form allies

Defining the Balance of Power with Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixons Secretary of State, Diplomacy: When a
group of states must deal with each other, there are only two possible outcomes
o Either one state becomes so strong it dominates all the others and creates and empire
Or no state is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that goal, the state that wants to
become a hegemon is kept in check but other weaker members

States seek to be a hegemon to ensure survival, states behave aggressively for security
o If this state is unchecked however, the outcome will result in an empire
o In practise, a global hegemon has never occurred, rather, it is more frequent to see regional
hegemons and states can dominate their region (i.e. USA)

Only way of preventing this under anarchy, when there is no enforcer, is through help of other states
o Self-Help: Ideally, someone trying to become a hegemon will be checked by another state
You would expect that weaker state to form alliances, there are two goals:
To prevent any one state from becoming a hegemon
Ideally to do this without fighting a costly war

The Purpose of the Balance of Power and What it Responds to

Balance of Power is meant to prevent the rise of the hegemon, cannot let one state dominate system
o The Balance of Power preserves or defends the Status Quo (who are currently the most popular
states in the system, meant to preserve that power)
In East Asia balancing is really between US, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China
The most powerful state in East Asia is not China, balancing is meant to
preserve the Chinese from becoming the most powerful state in East Asia
May or may not prevent war, the primary goal is to prevent the hegemon from rising and
in the course of that you will avoid fighting a costly war, sometimes must fight one
At the end of the day you dont let a new hegemon come up, you succeed
o Alliances: Pooling resources and coordinating action to raise costs of war for potential aggressor
Prevent the hegemon from expanding their power by combining forces with others
Logic: Fighting 3 states is harder than just fighting 1

Another important problem: In a balancing coalition, states must credibly commit to defend each
other
o NATO: If one member of NATO is attacked, the other member must defend that territory, they are
bound to it by the charter, this raises things, in alliances not enough to say youre allies
You must convince your rival that if they attack, your alliance member will intervene on
your behalf, some alliances are more credible than others

Balance of Power responds to shifts in the distribution of power, no great power grows at the same rate
forever
o Some states will rise, other states will fall, you have a rising + declining power at the same time
o Mismatch between distribution of power and the distribution of benefits
After WWII, USA + USSR most powerful states in the system, they could design
international organizations as they wanted and do what they wanted
USA in particular set up the IMF, World Bank
1945-1950 China had almost no say in the design of these institutions, they were poor
 o 65 years later, situation has changed, China wants international institutions that suit its own
interests (i.e. heavy state-led investments in infrastructure, designed its own alternative to World
Bank)
Distribution of benefits, who gets to set priorities for developments, doesnt match
capabilities, we should have more say in development policy

o UN Security Council, initially when it began China wasnt part of it

The strongest states set up the international system to their benefit
But when new strong states rise, those routes come to be challenged
Rising powers are cut out of the benefits, they challenge to gain benefits (my turn)
Revisionism: Revising the rules of the international system, a challenge to the status
quo

Two Types of States

Great Power: A great power doesnt need to be able to beat up or win the strongest state in a war, but
must be able to inflict heavy costs on others (i.e. Germany, lost both times, but engaged USA + UK in a
long fight)
o Amending definition, you should be able to project force to other areas as well

Status Quo Powers: Seems all great powers have same ambitions, isnt true, some happy with SQ some
not
o States that are the most powerful either immediately or have so in the recent past (i.e. USA)
o Have investment in current situation, USA might be 50% bigger than China but not its influence
Benefits that theyre getting are much greater than the relative power it has right now
These states more likely to balance and try and preserve the status quo by
joining forces with other states, get benefits either more or equal to relative
power

Revisionist Great Power: Either already the most popular state in the system, or going to be in the
future
o Unlike the status quo which gets benefits that exceed its relative power, Revisionists get benefits
that are much less than its relative powers, most likely to be balanced again, they will likely join a
coalition to balance
Does the Balance of Powers Prevent Wars

No, if it prevents war, thats great, primary goal is to prevent rise of hegemony
o People think balancing is meant to prevent war and thats not the primary focus
Sometimes to prevent rise of hegemon you must fight war and win the war
Desert Shield Coalition wanted to prevent Saddam from driving into Saudi Arabia, the US
in particular, became Desert Storm
This was a balancing coalition, their goal was to prevent Iraq becoming
hegemon in the middle east, to do that they have to fight in order to get it out
of war
Ideally, that coalition would have gotten Hussein to leave Kuwait without fighting
He didnt, so they had to fight
o Balance of Power can limit wars
BoPS role is to prevent change in status quo

Types of Alliance Behaviour: Who to Join

Balancing is a strategy for the stronger states joining the status quo
o Stronger states more likely to join balancing coalition
o Their goal is to stop the rise of a hegemon, and it is done for survival

Bandwagoning: Joining the revisionists, this is a strategy for weaker states

o Joining forces with aggressor, goal is one of two things:
o Do it for profit motive (jackal behaviour, follow tiger) or survival
You cant profit very much from joining a balancing coalition, thats mostly for retaining
lands and keeping things as they are status quo
o The aggressor is a bad guy, after hes finished of the others, hes going to me
 If USA doesnt have a presence in East Asia, smaller states might bandwagon with China
o Right now because USA is there, there is someone to balance with Asia

InternalIncreasing ones own military capabilities (M, 157)

o States doing this quite frequently, buying guns, etc., but it has a limit because of GDP restrictions
o You want to find a way of defending yourself without buying all these weapons, spending money
Extnerla Directly pooling resources with others (your enemy is my enemy)
o A variant of external balancing is called Ofshore Balancing: Supporting allies that are near
potential aggressor, you wont commit your own troops to allies and wont sign a mutual defence
But you will provide other forms of support, where this becomes a sharp edged problem
is that you wind up supporting a local ally that will put down a rising challenger
USA did this in Southern Africa, did not commit own forces to rebellions in
Angola and Mozambique (Marxist-inspired forces trying to knock over
Portuguese, USA supported Rhodesians) leads to proxy wars

Driven by diferent motivations and incentives, Fear: You think a rising power will win a war, so you dont
want to piss it of + Profit: You think a rising power will win a war, and you want to profit from it
o A state joins rising power to survive, join rising power to increase power
Your choice of bandwagon is really predicated on whether or not you think the rising
power is going to win, if you are a status quo power you dont just think about what I
have relative to the other guy
But you also think at what point will my allies switch when you look at a rising
power (credible commitment, switch allegiance)
How can I show that I am committed to also bumping him of?

September 29, 2016

#7 | The Balance of Power/Alliances and Intro to WWI

Two Problems with Balance of Behaviour, Collective Action & Coordination

Not just in realm of international alliances and politics but also range of other contexts
o Collective Action and Collective Action: These both lead to a behaviour called Buck
Passing, or getting another state to shoulder burden of deterring or defeating a
threatening state (159-162)
Something Mearsheimer is wrong about in page 159 (Balancing and buck-
passing are two types of balancing/alliance behaviour) and no such thing as
bandwagoning (139) BUT smaller states do bandwagon, even if larger states
dont

o There are two types of alliance behaviour: Balancing (joining status quo states to
prevent rising power) and Bandwagoning: Joining rising power to profit from change in
distribution of power
Buckpassing is a refusal or failure to balance, buckpassing is NOT a form of
balancing, you dont join an alliance, you hope that someone else does it for
you

What is Collective Action?

Collective Action: When everyone in a group gains if something is done, but someone has to
contribute
o There is no third party enforcing compliance or making people to do something
There is an incentive for individuals not do the work and try to get the benefit
 o In an ideal world, everyone will contribute, but there are incentives to get a free ride,
you do nothing and any benefit comes from others contributing

Example #1: Roommates, everyone benefits from a clean house, but someone has to clean
Non-Example #2: Police, everyone benefits from law and order, but someone has to pay for
taxes
o This is not collective action because a third party [government] is forcing you to pay
your taxes
Example #3: Alliances, everyone benefits from preventing hegemon, but someone has to
commit resources

Collective Action Problems

Collective Action Problem: Arises when some people skip paying the costs and get the benefits
o If a state doesnt contribute troops to a collective force, the alliance wins the war, that
state that hasnt borne the costs will still benefit, that state has buckpassed and gotten
a free ride
Freerider is a broader class of people who are not paying their share, within an
alliance you call that person a buckpasser, why buckpassing is refusing to
contribute to an alliance

NATO and Freeriding, Gulf War 1991: Part of the deal was that troops from Muslim majority
states were not combat troops, compared number of combat troops that US invested
o USA comprised 90% of fighting forces, how is this free-riding?
There is Collective Action: Many states including NATO declared war on Iraq
There is Collective Good: Everyone benefits from Iraq losing the war
Everyone benefits from Iraq not being the hegemon in the Middle East
o Does anyone benefit equally? US might benefit more, is US getting 90% of the all gain?
90% of the cost was shouldered by US, and the other states combined only invested
10%, got more than 10% of the benefits i.e. large European economies gained a lot
from a war like this
They dont even have to buy guns or anything if USA is spending 3.3% of GDP
on defence, other states are free riding on the US dime or have passed the
buck to the USA
People started complaining about this, 1990s US wanted these people
to start pulling their weight
o Free-riding can cause worse problems, in 1991 the coalition still won the Iraq war, US
decided to pick up the buck, but when buckpassing becomes fear you get a more
worrisome problem
Coordination Problem: When allies fear free-riding (buckpassing)
A collective action problem can become a coordination problem
Donald Trump: I am going to downgrade U.S. Security commitments to
allies in Europe and in East Asia, logic is that they have been freeriding
too long
Therefore, those places must increase their defensive spending
When everyone fears buckpassing, everyone begins to
buckpass

Diference between Collective Action + Coordination is that Collective Action, you can still get
the goods, end the war, etc., but in a Coordination Problem no one contributes at all
o No one gets the good, and alliance can breakdown, either everyone sticks together so
everyone benefits, but if everyone fears buckpassing everyone buckpasses
o In a coordination problem there are two equilibriums:
1st Equilibrium: Either everyone joins + 2nd Equilibrium: Or no one joins
You dont get choices because everyone has to think that the other
person will contribute to join, this logic used frequently to understand
revolutions
Revolutions are often unanticipated, i.e Arab Spring, Berlin Wall
 Because nobody in those societies think that if they go to fight or protest
others will join
They think they will wind up on their own and security forces will crush them
Collective action you can stumble through even if there are some
freeriders

If everyone buckpasses, you get a breakdown

o Big Fear: Expect others to free-ride, no one joins an alliance (buckpassing)
o Problem: Trump is coming from a reasonable position in an empirical sense which has
been articulated by US for many years, the problem is what will happen if does what
he says hell do
The fear is that alliances will break down, fear is the expectation that everyone
who will free ride and someone like Germany or Europe will make a deal with
Russia
In expecting others to free-ride, a main power makes a deal with the
aggressor
If US breaks it alliances, someone like Russia can also expand its
influence
The aggressor can also attack, because the costs of war are not high enough to
deter them
The goal of an alliance is to raise DD, if alliance breaks down, DD falls
Costs of doing something aggressive + revising international order
becomes less
If key thing about alliance is credible commitment to defend and
contribute and defends others, and Trump destabilizes that, then you
have incentives to break the alliance + make a deal with other
countries (i.e. Russia, I wont complain about their activities in Ukraine
as long as they dont bother me)

Donald Trump: If I threaten to withdraw, others will have no choice but to contribute to the
alliance more
o BUT this logic is not stable because they may not want to spend another 2% of GDP of
defence, so they may think, why dont we just get out of NATO and make a deal with
someone else?
We know these people are freeriding BUT we would rather have them
be a freerider and stay in the alliance than run the risk of breaking the
alliances

Three Outcomes of US and NATO

There are three outcomes concerning US and NATO:

o Status Quo Option: USA accepts freeriding and pays for NATO
o Trump Option: USA spends less on NATO and the Germans and others pay more
o Biggest Fear Option: The Germans + Japanese say that this is too much of a hassle to
raise our defence spending and change constitution to accommodate greater
contribution to NATO
We would rather do a deal with someone else [Germans with Russia, Japan with
China]
In which case alliances are gone and have broken down and USA doesnt have
what it wants, which is influence in Europe and influence in East Asia

USA is a regional hegemon [wants a balance of power in the world]

o Regional hegemon ideally doesnt want other regional hegemons because before they
became a hegemon, they had to bump of everyone else in the region [deter others
from being hegemon]
Logic: If US can have a balance of power in East Asia before China becomes
hegemon then they dont need to spend a lot of money fighting them when
China wants to be hegemon
 What looks like freeriding is actually the cost that US is paying in order to maintain its
influence and presence in Europe + East Asia, this is not an accident, USA alliances are
basically a type of deal
o They pay for these countries to freeride in NATO + in exchange they have a military
presence in East Asia + Europe, because of this presence they dont have a hegemon
rising in these areas
In East Asia initially worried about USSR now they worry about China
o Donald Trump is saying that I can get them to take the costs + up their defence
spending because those people are freeriding by threatening to leave the alliance
The risk is that they decide they dont want to do this and will buckpass &
appease the other potential hegemons instead [this is the biggest fear]
This makes the achievement of hegemony & expansion for China + Russia
much easier
It is this downside which has made it a much more charged issue, on an abstract level most
people believe NATO members are freeriding to some level, but what is the risk that you run if
you actually make them pay?

Coordination Problems

Alliances can break down in a couple ways:

o Ending an Alliance: Great power can end an alliance because it feels no one else is
paying for it
This is Donald Trumps threat, if I make this threat they will pay
o Deals with Aggressor: Alternatively, a great power can make a deal with the aggressor
because its cheaper than deterring the aggressors and because nobody else is
contributing in the alliance
I have to single handedly deal with the aggressor anyways so might as well
make a deal
WWII in particular, lots of situations in the leadup to WWII that approximate
this behaviour, because it was impossible to form a viable alliance against Nazi
Germany
o Aggressor Attack: If alliance breaks up in either of these mechanisms, the rising power
can attack
Because the cost of war has become less, easier to fight one state versus
many

The Three Cs: Three Problems in International Politics

Commitment Problem: Generally concerns rivals or enemies, everyone benefits from an signing
an agreement or peace, but there is an absence of a third party enforcer
o One side may fear that the other will break the agreement in the future
o Fear that the other side is going to break the deal in the future, so may not sign deal
Collective Action Problem: Concerns alliances, everyone benefits, but some people pay and
others dont
Coordination Problem [Stag Hunt]: Also usually concerns alliances, everyone would benefit
from a deal but everyone thinks others will have a free ride, so one moves to create the deal
o I dont sign the deal right now because I think that the other will break the deal in the
future

Diference Between Collective Action and Coordination Problems

Two players A + B, both benefit from action Z that they both have to pay for
o Collective Action Problem: B doesnt pay the cost because she thinks A will pay
Outcome: You can still stumble through and get by in this situation
Members in NATO buckpass because theyre relatively confident US will pick up
costs
 o Coordination Problems: B doesnt pay the costs because she thinks A wont pay

The Beginning of WWI and Why it Happened

Two super blocks are deterring each other: UK/France/Russia (Triple Entente) and Germany/AH
o These alliances had stifened over a period of time around late 19th century, alliances
had solidified
o This should have led to a high cost of war, if Germans chose to fight they would be
fighting on two fronts at the same time, Eastern front against Russians + Western front
against French and UK
In fact the war was very costly, lasted 4 years, 8.5 million casualties, very
bloody
Had a low chance of success, there was a general stalemate, men in trenches
Not much movement in trenches so the stalemate lasted for a long tim

Why did WWI happen anyways? What do alliances actually do?

o Balance of Power responds to shifts in distribution of power, the previously strong
states are getting weaker and previously weak states are getting stronger
Leading to WWI, those weakening states were Britain and rising states were
Germany
Unified Germany was very big and it became a prominent industrial power in
Europe
Germans went from a very low position to being a preeminent force
o Mismatch between distribution of power [relative power] and distribution of benefits
[influence]
The strongest states set up the international system to their benefits through
colonies
Rising powers are cut out of the benefits, most of the world occupied + split
between UK and French, Germany started in the game late, limited to some
African colonies
Germans were cut out of the colonial benefits for the most part
Revisionism: Rising powers challenge to gain benefits

Structural Factors Leading Up to 1914

Rising powers changed European balance, Britain and France dominant powers in Europe,
three changes
o German Unification, 1871: Germany was stronger than France/UK but had fewer
colonies
Germans unhappy because they didnt have a lot of colonies, they couldnt have a lot of navy power,
couldnt monitor the seas like UK could
Germanys not landlocked but only has 2 ~ 3 decent sized
ports
o Rise of Russia: Russia seeking more and more territory in the
Far East, it was expanding
Power became unbalanced, actual power of Germany was much more than the
benefits it was getting, conversely, actual the actual power of Britain and
France much less than benefits they getting [Mearsheimer, 220 has a graph]
Russia and AH in competition over Eastern Europe

Alliances Before 1914

Forming Alliances:Germany allied with AH and Italy, as AH gets weaker Germany needs to be
sure that Russia doesnt get stronger, decides to form a Triple Alliance in order to increase their
power
 o Conversely France decides to ally with Russia, Russia most likely interested in allying
against Germany, goal was to box Germany in, Germany couldnt fight on two fronts
simultaneously
UK was wooed by both sides: UK had a long standing rivalry with Russia in South Asia
o But UK also deeply worried about Germany and how Germany may control Europe
o Whichever side the UK joins would change the balance of power, wasnt clear who they
would join
o UK joined France-Russia, formed the Triple Entente, I dont want a big germany in my
backyard
This clearly signals to Germany that Russia, France, and UK dont want them to
be a hegemon, so they have two options: Either to submit or to be aggressive

Lets say if the Germans want to be aggressive, what is the timing on the graph telling you?
o You want to strike when you are gaining over the UK
o You dont want to strike when your allies are losing power in comparison to the other
rivals
Two problems: If Germany holds out a little while, their advantage over the UK will continue to
rise because the UK is going down and Germany is going up, so if you just look at it the
incentive seems to be just wait
o BUT the other problem is that their allies are weakening, flat lining of power on the
graph

They can see that the other guys wont become a hegemon so I can either:
o Germans know that the window of time is pretty short, as Russians get stronger their
allies [AH] will be more irrelevant, then it will just be Germans against France, Russia,
UK
o TIMING PROBLEM: Germany has made everyone else insecure, but everyones allied
response is making them deeply insecure, they get even more insecure as their allies
become stronger
Security Dilemma: What looked like a defensive move on the part of the UK
very much scared Germans, Germans looking at this and thinking these guys
are trying to box us in
If im going to be aggressive I better do it now because it will get much worse
later

October 6, 2016

#9 | Using Examples of WWII to Demonstrate the Balance of Powers

How WWII Occurred

WWI: Sometimes, rising powers cannot be deterred [balancing may provoke them/make them
insecure]
o Churchill: 1914-1945, one long war, aftermath of WWI impacted WWII
o Germans felt if they didnt do something in 1914 they would get squashed by USSR,
UK, France
When this happens, alliances are necessary to defeat rising power
The point of a balancing alliance is to the deter the other guy or beat him, the
goal is to stop the rising power from becoming a hegemon, maintain the status
quo

If Balancing Doesnt Work

 In WWI, the alternative was an alliance against Germany: Either it did not prevent war or
provoked Germany by making it insecure, so if balancing doesnt work then should we balance
at all?
o We should still balance, however, because balance coalitions have forced other
aggressors to back down, i.e. U.S. led alliance in Europe prevented USSR from
responding after WWII
Cant say that balancing never works

When Everyone Buckpasses

A sense in Europe that things have changed a lot, WWI settlement (Versaille)
o French + British ganged up on the Germans and forced them for reparations, territory,
disarmament, Germany had to give up their navy & stand down their arms

Germany sufered from heavy economic depression and humiliation in 1920s

o Led to Rise of Fascism: When it came up politically in 1933 they did have popular
support
Promised return to national greatness + militarism/authoritarian leadership
Had a top/down leadership, was quite popular in Germany
o Soviets were involved and comung from the side + second di

Sturctural Problem: Shifting Balance

Germany increase power relative, this was a violation of the Treaty of Versaille
o Germany in the present and near future (1950) J
o USSR had large natural resources that German did not including food,k0pk
o USSR has influence as well

Strategic Goals

UK and France want to prevent rise of Germany, want to prevent high costs of WWI
o Germany: Want to expand power relative to UK + France and prevent the rise of USSR
fundamentally changing the balance of power in Europe,
o =ight now we have a balance of power where the Germans are odwn,
o USSR: Wnated to prevent war with Germany until strong enough to fight
Tricky bargaining situation, this set of interests, this rules out a ballancing
alliance
British and the French have two options, they know that Germany and SSR wnjo
o Pre-Emptive Wars are legal, preventive wars are not

Strategic Opitions

UK/France can either fight against Germany in a preventivie war in late 1930a, or they can
balance with USSR, buckpassing, Germany can either fight if no balancing coaltiion forms or
dont fight everyone at once, USSR wanted ot wait and bandwagoned with Germany until they
become strong enoguh
o USSR bandwagon with germany until stronger or balance with uk/france against
germany
o Uk/France appeased, buckpassed in 1938
o Germany signed treaty non-aggession act in Aug 1939 USSR
o Germany invaded Poland September 1, 1939
 UK/France declared war after invasion of Poland (but war actually began May
1940)
Germany had occupied Austria, Czech
Germany attacked USSR in 1941
Up to summer of 1940 there was no real fightig until Germany attacked
USSR in 1941
o This brought USSR, UK, FRANCE on one side
o Balancing coalition ended war at VERY HIGH COST
o Us was very important in supplying the soviets in particular when they were overrun by
germans

Lessons From WWII

1914 a balancing coalition didnt prevent war, failure to balance made war more likely
o Logical Fallacy: One argument/premise is that if UK/France had held firm in 1938,
Hitler may have been less ambitious and might have backed down, Hitler wanted to be
hegemon
Not to say that would change the type of guy he was but could scale back his
ambitions
o I.e. Buckpassing in late 1930s increased Hs greed, Caveat: Hitler may not have been
deterred
Preventative War: BUT a strong coalition could have defeated Hitler before
Germany became strong, there still would have been a war but maybe it would
be less deadly
o Final Thoughts on WWII: Because of the lack of balancing (low cost of DD) made the
war worse/longer than it may have been (i.e. if Hitler was beaten in 1938 earlier in the
game)
Could have prevented Hitler from becoming hegemon with lower costs

The balance of power may not stop a rising power from fighting war- balancing can raise
tension (WW1) BUT the lack of balancing (buckpassing) doesnt stop a rising power either
(WW2)
o Balancing can afect the Likelihood of War, i.e. when it is clear that the cost of war is
too high, war may be avoided, and Outcome of War: Alliances determine who wins or
loses
If I can deter the rising power I must defeat them, that is why I form alliance

International Organizations

Three definitions for same thing: International regime, organization, and institution [used
interchangeably]
o Definition: A set or sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures, sometimes deals can be unsigned [implicit] mostly we talk about
explicit [charter]
International Organizations are groups of states, are set up by states
States set up IOs, IOs dont set up states (sometimes they can recognize new
states)
This means that states can choose to flout decisions made by IOs
I.e. IOs can sanction states but states can choose to ignore them
US ignored ICJ verdict in Nicaragua when court fell in favour of
Nicaragua, China rejects Hague tribunal ruling on island claims
States can choose to leave IOs if its not working for them, i.e. Brexit

The Puzzle of IOs

 Why should we care about IOs? What kind of functions do IOs have for people only thinking
about security?
o The world consists of states in anarchy, who are competing with each other, to some
degree a zero sum game, but in the middle there are some enduring institutions for
cooperation with states
Remember that alliances are temporary and easily broken
Why do states set up IOs at all? Why dont they cooperate whenever it
suits them (i.e. form alliances) and avoid IOs altogether?

Recall barriers to cooperation, i.e. Fear of CD: If I cooperate, other defects, problem of
uncertainty about other state intentions/capabilities [a large part of the fear is that I dont
know whats going on]
o Benefit of DC: States benefit from conquering other states, I dont want to give up
cheating
o Solution: Through alliances by raising the cost of war [DD] which is very costly, or you
raise the benefits of cooperation [CC] which helps to lower the costs, i.e. through trade
IOs lowering the cost of cooperation through two mechanisms, they make
cooperation cheaper and easier, they help to facilitate things and relieve
uncertainty
Even if you dont care about IOs, you still might find some use
How Does Cooperation Happen? Basic Principle One of IOs

You have to reduce the cost of cooperation, make it easier and you can reduce uncertainty
IOs to some degree can mitigate anarchy (making it less bad)
o Basic Principle One: Transaction Costs, or the costs incurred during the process of
buying and selling, on top of the price of whatever is changing hands (i.e. having to
walk to mall to buy shirt)
Infrastructure is seen as a way to reduce transaction costs
If you reduce transaction costs, each individual transaction becomes cheaper
+ increases
Part of Coasess theory studying firms and wondering why big
businesses dont just subcontract for all services? [i.e. why do firms
exist?]
Transpacific Partnership (TPP): Market Failure occurs when states dont
deal because the cost of doing the transaction is too high, i.e. this usually
happens during trade deals
Think about singing a trade deal for 180 diferent states - whats likely
to happen is that you will sign it with bigger states and skip it with
smaller states because the trade cost is very high, the high transaction
cost of starting a trade agreement may deter states from engaging in a
transaction
If you lower transaction costs, states will interact more to their mutual benefit

How do IOs Lower Transaction Costs?

IOs create common rules and expectations:

o Which lower the cost of interactions
o Which provide third party mediation and enforcement
IOs are enduring, it might take a while to set up but the impact lasts a long time
o Everyime you must set up a new agreement or alliance is very costly
o States dont have to start negotiations from scratch every time
Problem with Brexit: Now the UK has to negotiate new deal with EU on tarifs,
movement of people, this is going to take them years [that is the transaction
costs]

o Basic Principle T