2 ^ 2 ^ u^ie Qenesls

^/KANT'S

JOHN H. ZAMMITO

T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F C H I C A G O PRESS Chicago & London

The University of Chicago Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from
Rice University in partial support of the costs of publication of this
volume.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
1992 by T h e University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1992
Printed in the United States of America
01 00 99 98 97 96 54 32

ISBN (cloth): 0-226-97854-0

ISBN (paper): 0-226-97855-9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Zammito, John H., 1948-

The genesis of Kant's critique ofjudgment / John H. Zammito.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-226-97854-0. ISBN 0-226-97855-9 (pbk.)
1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der Urteilskraft. 2. Kant,
Immanuel, 1724-1804Aesthetics. 3. Aesthetics. 4. Judgment
(Aesthetics) I. Title
B2784.Z36 1992
121dc20 91-32390
CIP

T h e paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements

of the American National Standard for Information SciencesPerma-
nence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
To Martin Malia, mentor and friend
 Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1

Part One The Genesis of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

1. K a n t a n d t h e Pursuit of A u f k l r u n g 17
2. Kant's R e t u r n to Aesthetics: T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A r g u m e n t s
a n d t h e "Critique of T a s t e " 4 5
3. Validity a n d Actuality: T o w a r d Kant's P h e n o m e n o l o g y
of Subjective Consciousness 64
4. T h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l G r o u n d i n g of Taste: P u r p o s e
a n d Pleasure 89
5. T h e Beautiful a n d t h e Pleasant: Kant's T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
D e d u c t i o n of Taste 106
6. Kant's Philosophy of A r t in the Year 1788 124

Part Two The Genesis of the "Critique of Teleological

Judgment"

7. T h e Cognitive T u r n : T h e Discovery of Reflective

Judgment 151
8. T h e C o n t e x t u a l O r i g i n s of Kant's Critique of
C o n t e m p o r a r y Science 178
9. K a n t against E i g h t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Hylozoism 189
10. T h e P r o b l e m of O r g a n i c F o r m in the "Critique of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " 214
11. T h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy a n d the Third Critique 228

vii
 12. Kant's Attack o n Spinoza in t h e "Dialectic of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " 2 4 8

Part Three The Final Form of the Critique of Judgment

13. T h e Ethical T u r n in Kant's Critique of Judgment 263

14. T h e Sublime, t h e Symbolic, a n d Man's "Supersensible
Destination" 2 6 9
15. Aesthetics As t h e Key to A n t h r o p o l o g y : Lebensgefhl
a n d Geistegefhl 292
16. T h e Unity of M a n : M a n As a n "End-in-Himself" 306
17. T h e Unity of M a n k i n d : T h e H i g h e s t G o o d , History,
a n d Religion 323

Conclusion: T h e Ultimate M e a n i n g of t h e Third

Critique 342

Notes 347
Bibliography 427
Index 455

viii Contents
 ^ Acknowledgments

T h e r e a r e several individuals whose assistance I would like to ac-

* k n o w l e d g e as this work comes to press. As the dedication suggests, I
owe a g r e a t d e b t of g r a t i t u d e to M a r t i n Malia for his confidence a n d
solicitude. His careful r e a d i n g of various versions of this study a n d
his conviction of its significance h e l p e d k e e p t h e project alive. L a u -
r e n c e Dickey a n d Dallas C l o u a t r e r e a d earlier versions of my work
a n d I benefitted from t h e i r insights. Steven Crowell r e a d t h e ulti-
m a t e draft, a r g u e d o u t s o m e of t h e m o r e technical philosophical
issues with m e , a n d p r o v i d e d g e n e r o u s a n d timely counsel.
G e r s h o n Shafir h e l p e d m e c o p e with t h e academic p u b l i s h i n g
system.
I wish to t h a n k T . David B r e n t a n d t h e r e a d e r s a n d editors as-
sociated with t h e University of Chicago Press for their consider-
ation a n d professional execution, a n d D e a n Allen Matusow a n d
Rice University for a s u b v e n t i o n to s u p p o r t t h e publication of t h e
book.
Finally, I w a n t to t h a n k my wife, Katie, for a b i d i n g i n all its
senses.

ix
 Introduction

I
m m a n u e l Kant's Critique ofJudgment of 1790 m a r k e d a water-
shed in G e r m a n intellectual life, p r o v i n g a c o n d u i t t h r o u g h
which t h e most i m p o r t a n t ideas a n d ideals of t h e G e r m a n
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y passed to t h e g e n e r a t i o n of Idealism a n d
Romanticism. So rich is t h e Third Critique, however, t h a t it can
t h r e a t e n t o o v e r w h e l m t h e r e a d e r with t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of its phil-
osophical a n d cultural b u r d e n . O n e way to g r a s p this complexity is
t h r o u g h a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e text's composition which contex-
tualizes Kant's philosophizing a m i d t h e manifold impulses a n i m a t -
ing G e r m a n y at t h e time. I n particular, Kant's allegiance to t h e
A u f k l r u n g in its struggle against the Sturm und Drang for d o m i -
n a n c e in G e r m a n c u l t u r e proves crucial to t h e evolution of his in-
tentions.
K a n t revised t h e work substantially from his e m b a r k a t i o n u p o n
a "Critique of T a s t e " in late s u m m e r 1787 to t h e publication of t h e
finished Critique ofJudgment at Easter 1790. T h e major t h r u s t of this
study is to establish t h e shifts in conceptualization a n d a r g u m e n t
t h a t s h a p e d t h e Third Critique, a n d to relate these to Kant's earlier
works of p h i l o s o p h y of the 1780s. T h e r e have b e e n m a n y efforts to
a p p r o a c h Kant's works in t e r m s of t h e archaeology of t h e i r a r g u -
m e n t s . T h e so-called " p a t c h w o r k " theory of t h e First Critique is t h e
most f a m o u s . A similar effort has b e e n u n d e r t a k e n with r e f e r e n c e
1

to t h e Third Critique by such scholars as Michel Souriau, G e r h a r d

L e h m a n n , J a m e s M e r e d i t h , a n d Giorgio Tonelli, a n d my analysis
will set o u t from theirs. Weaving t o g e t h e r t h e genetic d e v e l o p m e n t
of Kant's versions of t h e Third Critique with considerations of t h e
context to which they r e p r e s e n t e d Kant's r e s p o n s e sheds light o n
t h e m e a n i n g of textual passages at their m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c j u n c -
t u r e s . H e n c e it proves worthwhile o n i m m a n e n t g r o u n d s . B u t since

1
r e a d e r s j u d g e d Kant's Third Critique against t h e b a c k d r o p of t h a t
wider context, this a p p r o a c h also illuminates t h e major i m p a c t of
t h e work o n its e p o c h . I n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g this process of g r o w t h a n d
c h a n g e certain possibilities c o m e to light which K a n t at o n e point
took seriously, t h o u g h after reflection o r c h a n g e of o r i e n t a t i o n
eventually a b a n d o n e d . T h e s e left vestigial traces in t h e final p r o d -
uct which a r o u s e d the speculative interest of his Idealist successors,
w h o w o u l d follow o u t t h e trail of these neglected possibilities. T o
retrieve this historical sense of t h e o p e n n e s s of K a n t i a n philosophy
a n d of vast metaphysical possibilities which s e e m e d latent within it
is o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t tasks this study sets for itself.
T h e h e r m e n e u t i c p r o b l e m posed by t h e Third Critique is why
K a n t s h o u l d have b r o u g h t his t r e a t m e n t s of aesthetics a n d teleol-
ogy t o g e t h e r with systematic i n t e n t . Since h e h a d a l o n g s t a n d i n g
interest in aesthetics a n d it was o n this project, his "Critique of
T a s t e , " t h a t h e e m b a r k e d o n c e h e c o m p l e t e d his Second Critique in
S e p t e m b e r 1787, t h e issue is: W h y did teleology i n t r u d e ? K a n t h a d
to t h i n k this c o n n e c t i o n in a creative m a n n e r , a n d t h e r e f o r e could
n o t simply have p u t these two topics t o g e t h e r casually. T h a t K a n t
m i g h t act in a m a n n e r u n d e l i b e r a t e in a n y t h i n g s h o u l d strike those
familiar with h i m as m a n or t h i n k e r as suspect from t h e outset. All
t h e m o r e so in o n e of his major e n t e r p r i s e s . S o m e effort to g r a s p
t h e work as a whole is t h e r e f o r e essential.
While t h e Third Critique has b e c o m e t h e object of i n t e n s e study
in r e c e n t years, t h e c o n c e r n s of m u c h of this literature lie else-
w h e r e . Disdaining teleology a n d even Kant's c o n c e r n with t h e sub-
lime, a g o o d deal of c o n t e m p o r a r y A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
chooses to neglect t h e unity of t h e work for t h e sake of a few cur-
rently i n t e r e s t i n g a r g u m e n t s a b o u t b e a u t y . Clearly, o n e can r e a d
2

t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " as a n a r g u m e n t largely con-

d u c t e d in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" a n d in the " D e d u c t i o n of
Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s . " It t h e n takes o n a delimited a n d c o h e r e n t
character, p o i n t i n g to t h e issue of "intersubjective validity" a n d
c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e d e d u c t i o n of asensus communis as t h e g r o u n d for
t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. T h a t was t h e original a m b i t i o n
which led K a n t to u n d e r t a k e a "Critique of T a s t e " a l o n g transcen-
d e n t a l lines. It is also w h a t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n philosophy almost
w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n tries to salvage from K a n t . U n d o u b t e d l y t h e
3

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste is a l a n d m a r k in
t h e history of aesthetics, a n d o n e which has ever since served as t h e
starting p o i n t for n e w efforts. However, this study is devoted to
p r o v i n g t h a t only w h e n we pass b e y o n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c -

2 Introduction
d o n of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste d o we e n t e r t h e t r u e h e a r t of t h e Third
Critique.
T h e t h r u s t of a good deal of r e c e n t G e r m a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has
b e e n to retrieve t h e work as a whole, recognizing t h e r i g o r o u s p r o -
pensity to closure with which K a n t d e v e l o p e d his p h i l o s o p h y . 4

T h e s e insights p o i n t to a major systematic i m p o r t a n c e for t h e Third

Critique. I have d r a w n heavily o n this a p p r o a c h , a n d also o n Ger-
5

m a n studies of earlier vintage, stressing t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d archi-

tectonic relevance of t h e Third Critique in Kant's system, in seeking
to establish t h e unity of t h e w o r k . 6

I wish to p u r s u e Kant's effort to e x t e n d his t h e o r y of aesthetics

into t h e "metaphysical" d o m a i n s of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic,
c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e bold claim t h a t "beauty is t h e symbol of moral-
ity." By d r a w i n g t h e aesthetic a n d t h e ethical into this analogical
relation, K a n t essentially established t h a t aesthetics was only a p r o -
p a e d e u t i c c o n c e r n leading to a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d set t h e stage for a
transition to reflections o n m a n ' s ethical destiny in the n a t u r a l
world, which would form t h e most i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e "Critique
of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " A considerable interest in this idea of
7

teleology has d e v e l o p e d a m o n g scholars of Kant's ethical, histor-

ical, religious, a n d political p h i l o s o p h y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , ana-
8

lytic p h i l o s o p h e r s have c o n s i d e r e d t h e issue of teleology only as

p a r t of Kant's methodological writings o n n a t u r a l science. As 9

against this, G e o r g e S c h r d e r has offered a view of t h e place of tele-

ology a n d u n i t y in Kant's t h o u g h t which is m o r e in k e e p i n g with
t h a t p r e s e n t e d in this study, a n d which has b e e n a very i m p o r t a n t
source for i t . For a g o o d sense of t h e different potentials of these
1 0

two a p p r o a c h e s o n e m i g h t c o m p a r e t h e work of J o h n McFarland

with t h a t of Klaus D s i n g . O f course, this teleological i n t e r p r e t a -
tion has m e t with predictable r e s i s t a n c e . Nevertheless, Kant's
11

teleology d i d offer p o t e n t insights into issues of c o m p l e x h u m a n

e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s h a s b e e n e m p h a s i z e d especially by those w h o
12

see K a n t as c o n c e r n e d with "philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y . " T h i s13

study will u p h o l d t h e validity of that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

Archaeology of the Text

T h e "Critique of T a s t e " was b e g u n in late 1787 o n t h e basis of m a s -

sive p r e v i o u s writing o n t h e empirical p r o b l e m of aesthetics, b u t
with a n e w a n d crucial idea for a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g . W i t h
t h a t n e w idea, K a n t could readily m a r s h a l a considerable body of
material in r a t h e r s h o r t o r d e r (or t h o u g h t h e could) into a n e w Cri-

Introduction 3
tique. K a n t claimed in D e c e m b e r 1787 t h a t m u c h of his envisioned
"Critique of T a s t e " was "already in writing, b u t n o t quite p r e p a r e d
for t h e p r e s s . " H e p r o m i s e d it for Easter 1788. B u t for a d e c a d e
14

K a n t h a d a s s u r e d his c o r r e s p o n d e n t s t h a t t h e First Critique was al-

r e a d y in writing, b u t n o t q u i t e p r e p a r e d for t h e press. I n d e e d it
was, b u t in n u m e r o u s drafts a n d folios of widely varying orienta-
tion, which K a n t was only able to pull t o g e t h e r with t h e most gruel-
ing difficulty at t h e e n d of a decade's gestation. T h e Third Critique
was n o t so l a b o r e d a b i r t h , b u t it, too, went to full t e r m . Yet in t h e
a u t u m n of 1787 K a n t did have a burst of writing, based o n a burst
of insight, w h e r e b y t h e very idea of t h e possibility of a "Critique of
T a s t e " first arose in his m i n d . I n t o t h a t project K a n t t h r e w himself
t h e m o m e n t h e c o m p l e t e d t h e Second Critique, a r o u n d S e p t e m b e r
1787, a n d h e was in t h e h i g h tide of this "aesthetic" p h a s e w h e n h e
wrote his m e m o r a b l e letter of D e c e m b e r 1787 describing his new
w o r k a n d its motivating insight.
I n o r d e r to o r g a n i z e o u r archaeological investigation into the
genesis of t h e Third Critique, let us consult previous efforts to
d e v e l o p a c h r o n o l o g y of its composition a n d revision. T h e scholar
w h o i n a u g u r a t e d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d h a d t h e richest sense for
its implicationswas Michel Souriau. It was h e w h o first recog-
nized t h e revolutionary implications of Kant's theory of t h e fac-
ulty of j u d g m e n t for t h e entire t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e
editors of t h e Prussian A c a d e m y edition of t h e Third Critique a n d
its First Introduction, Wilhelm W i n d e l b a n d a n d G e r h a r d L e h m a n n
respectively, m a d e s o m e very useful c o n t r i b u t i o n s as w e l l . J a m e s
15

M e r e d i t h , in his w o r k f a r m o r e t h a n a m e r e t r a n s l a t i o n o n t h e
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, offered a r e m a r k a b l e p r o p o s a l for
t h e archaeology of t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " B u t t h e most
16

c o m p e l l i n g analysis of t h e c h r o n o l o g y of t h e composition of t h e
text is t h a t of Giorgio T o n e l l i . While I will d r a w o n the o t h e r s to
17

s u p p l e m e n t Tonelli's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it is from his results t h a t any

f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the genesis of t h e Third Critique m u s t
take t h e i r p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e .
Like S o u r i a u , Tonelli finds t h e key to t h e evolution of t h e
Third Critique in t h e n o t i o n of reflective j u d g m e n t . Tonelli shows
that t h e distinction of d e t e r m i n a n t from reflective j u d g m e n t
a n d t h e r e w i t h a clear sense of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t as s u c h ,
only a r o s e midway t h r o u g h t h e composition of t h e text. It did n o t
i n f o r m t h e original t r e a t m e n t of the a e s t h e t i c w h a t has c o m e
d o w n as t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" ( 1 - 2 2 of t h e Third Cri-
tique) a n d t h e early a n d p r o p e r l y t e r m e d p a r t ( 3 1 - 4 0 ) of t h e

4 Introduction
 very h o d g e p o d g e " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s . " T h e s e a r e
t h e most likely c o m p o n e n t s of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in its origi-
nal f o r m . I n d e e d , Tonelli connects t h e discovery of reflective
j u d g m e n t with t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment,
which h e d a t e s to s o m e t i m e p r i o r to May of 1789. O n l y after
working o u t t h e implications of t h e new idea of a faculty of j u d g -
m e n t could K a n t have u n d e r t a k e n the "Critique of Teleological
J u d g m e n t , " which Tonelli t h e r e f o r e dates after May 1789.
T h a t leaves substantial sections of t h e "Critique of Aesthetic
J u d g m e n t " still to b e a c c o u n t e d for. As to the body of material o n
art (4154) a n d the extremely i m p o r t a n t "Dialectic of Aesthetic
J u d g m e n t " (5560), Tonelli dates t h e m before t h e First Introduc-
tionthat is, before t h e clear c o n c e p t i o n of t h e faculty of j u d g -
m e n t . H e n c e h e assigns these sections of t h e work r o u g h l y to t h e
year 1 7 8 8 . 1 will suggest some modifications of this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
especially c o n c e r n i n g t h e "Dialectic." Finally, Tonelli c o n t e n d s t h a t
t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime" ( 2 3 - 3 0 ) was only c o m p o s e d after
a n d in t h e light of t h e First Introduction a n d t h e n inserted, with t h e
necessary transitional sections, into t h e already c o m p o s e d "Cri-
tique of T a s t e . "
Kant's "aesthetic" p h a s e of composition, which b e g a n as t h e
"Critique of Taste," carried into t h e new year of 1788, as h e d r e w
u p o n a massive body of material h e h a d a c c u m u l a t e d o n aesthetic
questions over t h e years a n d a r r a y e d these ideas in t e r m s of his new
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p r o a c h . K a n t p r o c e e d e d , in 1788, to b r i n g his
manifold reflections o n art a n d his specific grievances against Sturm
und Drang n o t i o n s of artistic g e n i u s into formulation in t e r m s of his
newly established t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy of taste. As h e did so,
h e surveyed a n d revised t h e prevailing critical t h e o r y of t h e late
e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d his work can only b e g r a s p e d against t h e
context o f t h a t "conventional w i s d o m " h e was correcting. H e n c e in
o r d e r to m a k e his work clear, it will be necessary to discuss key is-
sues in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y aesthetics, b o t h in t h e i r English origins
a n d in t h e i r G e r m a n a d a p t a t i o n s . Yet this material was, for Kant,
very m u c h "old business." W h a t q u i c k e n e d his a t t e n t i o n was r a t h e r
a latent implication in his aesthetics (which h e called a n "intellec-
tual interest in t h e b e a u t y of n a t u r e " ) , namely, t h a t n a t u r e itself
s e e m e d to show artistic design. T h a t led h i m to t h e consideration of
teleology as a cognitive j u d g m e n t , a n d to t h e composition of t h e
First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment by May 1789.
W i t h t h e idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " Kant's work took a d e -
cidedly cognitive t u r n . T h e time of t h e writing of t h e First Introduction

Introduction 5
was t h e h i g h p o i n t of Kant's confidence in t h e systematicity of his
whole philosophy, a n d of his n o t i o n that t h e Third Critique s h o u l d ar-
ticulate this systematicity. I n this context t h e work c h a n g e d n a m e s ,
b e c o m i n g t h e Critique of Judgment. 18
T h i s t u r n has b e e n t h e object of
t h e greatest scholarly a t t e n t i o n , n o t j u s t a m o n g those interested in a
genetic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e whole text, or in t h e specific c o n t e n t
a n d significance of t h e First Introduction, which is a most r e m a r k a b l e
f r a g m e n t in Kant's o p u s , b u t above all a m o n g those interested in t h e
very n o t i o n of a "unity of r e a s o n " or systematic totality in Kant's e n -
tire philosophy.
B u t s o m e t h i n g led h i m to r e t r e a t from his synthetic e n t h u s i a s m .
S o m e t h i n g led h i m to suspect a n excess of r e a s o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e to
perceive t h e n e e d for a "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h a t
d a n g e r was t h e idea of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e in n a t u r e : "hylozoism" o r
p a n t h e i s m , especially as it was b e i n g p r o p a g a t e d by J o h a n n H e r d e r
in t h e late 1780swhich brings us to t h e decisive m a t t e r of t h e Pan-
theism C o n t r o v e r s y a n d its i m p a c t o n I m m a n u e l Kant. Teleology
could b e linked to his two m o s t crucial metaphysical c o m m i t m e n t s :
to m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d to theism. T h e renaissance of Benedict
Spinoza a n d o u t b u r s t of p a n t h e i s t ontology in t h e late 1780s s e e m e d
to c h a l l e n g e t h e s e very convictions fundamentally. T h e ultimate
fabric of t h e Third Critique was p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e d by Kant's reaction
to t h e t h r e a t of this new " d o g m a t i c metaphysics" in the very midst of
t h e assimilation of his a n t i d o g m a t i c "critical philosophy." T h e r e -
fore, t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d especially Kant's
c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m in 72 a n d 73 ex-
presses the ultimate c o n c e r n s of the Third Critique.
Kant's struggle with p a n t h e i s m b r o u g h t o n what I s h o u l d like
to call a n ethical t u r n . H e u n d e r t o o k to f o r m u l a t e his theory of t h e
" s u p e r s e n s i b l e " as a r e b u t t a l to p a n t h e i s m . T h i s new a n d decisive
t u r n in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique o c c u r r e d in late s u m -
m e r 1789. I n w o r k i n g o u t t h e full implications of this new, ethical
t u r n , K a n t u n d e r t o o k t h e substantial revisions of t h e text which in-
t e r v e n e d b e t w e e n his a n n o u n c e m e n t to his p u b l i s h e r Francois d e la
G a r d e in O c t o b e r 1789 that t h e work was finished, a n d his delivery
of t h e first installment of t h e m a n u s c r i p t , r u n n i n g r o u g h l y t h r o u g h
50, in J a n u a r y 1 7 9 0 . I n early 1790, as p a r t of this s a m e t u r n , h e
1 9

r e v a m p e d the c o n c l u d i n g s e g m e n t of the "Critique of Teleological

J u d g m e n t . " Tonelli n o t e s t h a t K a n t "tripled t h e v o l u m e " of this
final s e g m e n t between F e b r u a r y 9 a n d M a r c h 8, 1 7 9 0 . Finally, in
20

M a r c h 1790, K a n t revised t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n in crucial ways a l o n g

similar lines.

6 Introduction
 T h e key to this ethical t u r n was the articulation of t h e idea of
the "supersensible," a c o n c e p t o n e can use in a textual analysis
a n a l o g o u s to Tonelli's with "reflective j u d g m e n t " to distinguish
t h e revisions t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e text which a t t e n d e d t h e ethical
t u r n . T h i s suggests t h a t t h e final form of t h e "Dialectic of Aes-
thetic J u d g m e n t " m u s t b e d a t e d to this final p h a s e . With this
ethical t u r n , K a n t recognized f u r t h e r possibilities latent all a l o n g
in his idea of b e a u t y a n d of reflective j u d g m e n t m o r e generally.
T h e result was a n intense revision of t h e e n t i r e work, now t o w a r d
t h e elaboration of t h e n o t i o n of t h e supersensible a n d t h e effort to
m a k e over t h e Third Critique into a vindication of Kant's notions of
theism, m o r a l f r e e d o m , a n d t h e "highest good." T h i s was a very
metaphysical t u r n in Kant, a n d o n e with m o m e n t o u s implications
for t h e genesis of Idealism.
T h e s e g m e n t o n t h e ethical t u r n will d e m o n s t r a t e h o w t h e anal-
ogy of t h e d e d u c t i o n s of t h e j u d g m e n t of beauty a n d of t h e p u r e
m o r a l choice b e c a m e a m o r e intimate a n d i m p o r t a n t association,
how b e a u t y n o w b e c a m e conceived as a "symbol of morality," a n d
how this m a d e relevant t h e consideration of t h e sublime, com-
pletely t r a n s f o r m e d t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " a n d , of
course, f o u n d c o n s u m m a t e expression in t h e "Methodology of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " in considerations of t h e historical c u l t u r e
a n d religious destiny of m a n k i n d .
I n s u m , we m u s t d e m a r c a t e t h r e e phases in the composition
of t h e Third Critique. T h e first, which l a u n c h e d t h e v e n t u r e , was
t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h to a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of aesthetics,
which o c c u r r e d in t h e s u m m e r of 1787, d u r i n g , a n d o n t h e basis
of, Kant's w o r k o n t h e Second Critique. T h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h m a d e
possible a "Critique of T a s t e , " a n idea which K a n t h a d long con-
sidered b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e sec-
o n d p h a s e , t h e most f a m o u s , c a m e with Kant's formulation of t h e
idea of reflective j u d g m e n t , a n d it is most aptly c o n s i d e r e d a cog-
nitive t u r n . H e e m b a r k e d u p o n it in early 1789, a n d it occasioned
t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " into a full-fledged
Critique of Judgment, i.e., a work which c o n s i d e r e d b o t h aesthetics
a n d teleology. B u t my most i m p o r t a n t claim is t h a t t h e r e was yet a
t h i r d t u r n , o c c u r r i n g in late s u m m e r or early fall 1789, which I
d e s i g n a t e t h e ethical t u r n . T h a t ethical t u r n resulted directly from
Kant's struggle with p a n t h e i s m , a n d i n t r o d u c e d a m u c h m o r e
metaphysical t o n e into t h e whole work, e m p h a s i z i n g t h e idea of
t h e supersensible as t h e g r o u n d of b o t h subjective f r e e d o m a n d
n a t u r a l o r d e r . It resulted in t h e inclusion of a discussion of t h e

Introduction 7
sublime, a c o m p l e t e r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic
J u d g m e n t , " a n d , in 1790, a n elaboration of t h e "Methodology of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d a revision of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e
whole book.

The Context of the T h i r d C r i t i q u e : Kant and Aufklrung

T h e contextual origins of t h e Critique ofJudgment lie in t h e p o l e m -

ical c o n c e r n of I m m a n u e l K a n t to drive t h e forces of the Sturm und
Drang from t h e i r p r o m i n e n c e in G e r m a n intellectual life in the
1780s a n d to establish t h e c o m p l e t e h e g e m o n y of t h e A u f k l r u n g ,
t h e m a n t l e of whose l e a d e r s h i p h a d fallen to h i m with t h e d e a t h s of
G o t t h o l d Lessing (1780) a n d t h e n Moses M e n d e l s s o h n ( 1 7 8 6 ) . 21

T h e A u f k l r u n g m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d n o t simply as a p e r i o d b u t as a
m o v e m e n t , a n d o n e struggling o n several fronts for intellectual
e m i n e n c e in G e r m a n y . As its leader, K a n t felt compelled to rebuff
t h e "excesses" of t h e rival Sturm und Drang m o v e m e n t . Earlier in 2 2

his c a r e e r K a n t h a d v e n t u r e d a m o r e literary t h r u s t at t h e rival

m o v e m e n t in Trume eines Geistersehers. B u t t h e c u r r e n t h a d n o t
a b a t e d . I n d e e d , in t h e 1770s it s e e m e d to have swollen to flood tide,
a n d , in t h e g r e a t s t a t u r e a c c o r d e d H e r d e r in G e r m a n literary a n d
aesthetic circles d u r i n g t h e 1780s, it still s e e m e d to b e t h e prevailing
p o i n t of view. U n d e r H e r d e r ' s l e a d e r s h i p t h e Sturm und Drang pa-
r a d e d its claims to privileged insight as t h e inspiration of "genius."
T h i s K a n t could abide n e i t h e r personally n o r philosophically. T h e
project of e n l i g h t e n m e n t itself a p p e a r e d to b e at stake.
Kant's life has s e e m e d so little e n m e s h e d in the m a t t e r of his
t h o u g h t t h a t m a n y of t h e b i o g r a p h i e s which have b e c o m e stan-
d a r d , r a t h e r t h a n seeking to e x p l o r e t h e motivating interests of
t h e p e r s o n , r e a d m o r e like s u m m a r i e s , in chronological s e q u e n c e ,
of his w o r k s . Yet Kant's concerns a n d values, i n d e e d even his
23

weaknesses, played a significant role in his writing, especially in

t h e 1 7 8 0 s . T h e years 1 7 8 1 - 9 0 constitute t h e d e c a d e of Kant's
24

struggle for recognition a n d t h e b e g i n n i n g n o t only of his r e n o w n

b u t also of his conflicts with religious, philosophical, a n d even
political authorities. I n 1781 Kant p u b l i s h e d what h e knew to be
o n e of t h e world-historical m o n u m e n t s in philosophy. Yet t h e
Critique of Pure Reason largely fell o n d e a f e a r s . T h e only review
2 5

of substance, t h e so-called Garve-Feder review of J a n u a r y 1782,

t h o r o u g h l y garbled his m e a n i n g . So a n x i o u s was Kant for s o m e
wider r e s p o n s e t h a t h e published a m o r e " p o p u l a r " version, t h e
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in t h e s p r i n g of 1783. N o t

8 Introduction
only did it fail to achieve its goal, b u t Kant now faced criticism for
ostensible inconsistencies between t h e First Critique a n d t h e new
Prolegomena. 26
I n t h e 1780s, Kant's letters reveal his sense of
time's foreclosure. Acutely aware of his a d v a n c e d years, h e felt
pressed to c o m p l e t e his m o n u m e n t a l labor a n d b e g r u d g e d dis-
traction, yet h e also h a d a n u r g e n t a n d certainly u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e
n e e d to b e u n d e r s t o o d . I n a letter to M e n d e l s s o h n d a t e d A u g u s t
16, 1783, K a n t e x p r e s s e d r e g r e t t h a t his colleague could n o t g r a s p
his a r g u m e n t s , a n d ascribed t h e difficulty to his o w n lack of sty-
listic elegance. It t r o u b l e d h i m , however, t h a t h e could find
n o n e a m o n g t h e first r a n k of G e r m a n y ' s p h i l o s o p h e r s n e i t h e r
M e n d e l s s o h n n o r J o h a n n T e t e n s n o r Christian G a r v e w h o
evinced any sympathetic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of his new work a n d
m i g h t aid t h e general public in recognizing its i m p o r t a n c e . It
m a t t e r e d so m u c h to h i m t h a t h e considered writing a p o p u l a r
course b o o k o n the First Critique. First, however, h e p l a n n e d to
work u p his m o r a l philosophy, which h e h o p e d would b e " m o r e
p o p u l a r " (mehrer Popularitt fhig). 27

O t h e r letters from t h e s a m e p e r i o d e c h o e d this c o n c e r n with

the r e c e p t i o n of his works a n d , b e h i n d it, a g r o w i n g f r u s t r a t i o n . 28

T h a t frustration h a d its e l e m e n t of h u m a n weakness. His p u b -

lisher J o h a n n H a r t k n o c h , w h o h a d the g o o d f o r t u n e also to p u b -
lish J o h a n n H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, p a i d a visit to H e r d e r in W e i m a r late in 1783. At t h a t
time h e i n f o r m e d H e r d e r t h a t K a n t believed h e could trace t h e
"neglect" (Nichtbeachtung) of his Critique to H e r d e r ' s i n f l u e n c e . 29

Kant's l o n g s t a n d i n g hostility to the whole of the Sturm und Drang,

of which H e r d e r was by t h e mid-1780s t h e d o m i n a n t intellectual
p r o d u c t , m a d e their situation o n e of rivalry, however little e i t h e r
of t h e m wished self-consciously to recognize it. T h a t K a n t was
c o n c e r n e d with "rivals" is clear from his sensitivity to reviewers in
the 1 7 8 0 s . 30

T h e origins of the Third Critique lie in Kant's bitter rivalry with

H e r d e r . I n his published works, with t h e obvious exception of t h e
direct reviews of H e r d e r ' s book, Kant scrupulously refrained from
m e n t i o n i n g H e r d e r by n a m e , b u t h e r e f e r r e d to h i m , as I will d e m -
o n s t r a t e , regularly a n d disparagingly. It is particularly i m p o r t a n t to
a t t e n d t h e l a n g u a g e of Kant's c o m m e n t s o n H e r d e r , for t h e r e t u r n s
out to be a r e m a r k a b l e consistency in the very words K a n t used
w h e n h e t h o u g h t of H e r d e r . T h a t Sturm und Drang, a n d specifically
H e r d e r , irked K a n t is evidenced t h r o u g h s o m e w i t h e r i n g Reflections
from t h e 1770s, t h e d e c a d e of his laborious silence a n d t h e h e i g h t

Introduction 9
of the Strmers volubility. T h i s hostility can be traced t h r o u g h the
original edition of t h e First Critique with its veiled references in t h e
preface to " i n d i f f e r e n t i s t s . " T h r o u g h o u t t h e early 1780s critics
31

h a r p e d o n Kant's lack of literary grace in t h e First Critique a n d t h e

obstacles to p o p u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g it p r e s e n t e d . W i t h exaspera-
tion K a n t p r o t e s t e d in his preface to t h e Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics t h a t p h i l o s o p h y m u s t sacrifice such glib accessibility for
t h e sake of clarity a n d p e n e t r a t i o n . It is n o t too farfetched to sus-
pect a n implied contrast with H e r d e r a n d even a little Kantian j e a l -
ousy. 32

T h e Third Critique was almost a c o n t i n u o u s attack o n H e r d e r .

At e a c h stage in t h e genealogy of t h e Third Critique we can discern a
clear a n d self-conscious aggression o n t h e p a r t of K a n t against t h e
positions a d o p t e d by H e r d e r . H e r d e r a n d t h e Sturm und Drang w e r e
t h e m a i n targets of Kant's t h e o r y of art a n d genius. I n d e e d , Kant's
hostility to t h e Sturm und Drang was o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o -
tives b e h i n d his entire e n t e r p r i s e of a treatise o n aesthetics. Sim-
ilarly, Kant's differences with H e r d e r o n history w e r e substantial
a n d crucial. N o t only did K a n t d e v e l o p his ideas o n history a n d cul-
t u r e in t h e " p o p u l a r essays" of t h e mid-1780s in explicit rivalry with
H e r d e r , b u t h e took t h e m u p a g a i n in 1 7 8 9 - 9 0 in t h e context of t h e
"Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " O n e can find fewer m o r e inti-
m a t e c o n n e c t i o n s t h a n t h a t b e t w e e n " I d e a for a Universal History"
a n d 83 of t h e Critique of Judgment. 33
At b o t h m o m e n t s K a n t self-
consciously challenged H e r d e r ' s primacy in this field. T h e battle
b e t w e e n K a n t a n d H e r d e r over t h e m e a n i n g of history, or m o r e
precisely over h u m a n destiny a n d the tension b e t w e e n n a t u r e a n d
c u l t u r e , was o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t literary events of t h e late
1780s in G e r m a n y . T h e controversy h a d e n o r m o u s i m p a c t u p o n
s u b s e q u e n t G e r m a n t h o u g h t , especially Friedrich Schiller.
T h e decisive continuity, however, is that of H e r d e r ' s t h o u g h t s
o n Naturphilosophie from V o l u m e 1 of his Ideen to his Gott: einige
Gesprche of 1787, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d of t h e observations in
Kant's reviews of H e r d e r from t h e mid-1780s to his r e m a r k s in t h e
"Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " of t h e Third Critique of 1790,
o n t h e o t h e r . I n d e e d , t h e key provocation for t h e final t u r n in
Kant's c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique was H e r d e r ' s Gott: einige
Gesprche. H e r d e r proves to be t h e u n n a m e d antagonist of m o s t of ,
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " 3 4

At each s t e p of o u r analysis, t h e n , this relationship with H e r d e r

will play a crucial role. While it will a p p e a r useful in t r e a t i n g Kant's
aesthetics, a n d familiar in t r e a t i n g Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history, t h e

10 Introduction
real p o w e r of this c o n n e c t i o n lies in its illumination of t h e contex-
tual sources of Kant's "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e
P a n t h e i s m Controversy.
For s o m e time, aggressive, secularizing rationalists, c e n t e r e d
in Berlin, h a d enjoyed t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h a t erstwhile skeptic in
m a t t e r s religious, King Frederick I I . B u t theological innovation
was still politically d a n g e r o u s . N o t only t h e established c h u r c h e s ,
b u t even t h e Pietist m o v e m e n t , which h a d o n c e b e e n a major
r e f o r m m o v e m e n t within o r t h o d o x Christianity, h a d by t h e late
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y b e c o m e a l a r m e d at t h e t r e n d of theological
rationalism in G e r m a n h i g h c u l t u r e . Earlier in t h e century, this
h a d led to t h e n o t o r i o u s p e r s e c u t i o n of Christian Wolff at t h e
University of Halle, which was only reversed by t h e succession of
Frederick II in 1740. More recently, in t h e 1770s, t h e controversy
g e n e r a t e d by Lessing's publication of t h e Wolffenbiittel Fragments
of H e r m a n n R e i m a r u s showed t h e seriousness of t h e situation.
Lessing h a d t a k e n , by t h e e n d of his life, a very bold a n d provoca-
tive stance o n t h e issue of t h e rationalization of religion which
t r o u b l e d a n d even offended t h e o r t h o d o x a d h e r e n t s of Protestant
C h r i s t i a n i t y . W h e n o r t h o d o x y assailed Lessing, t h e s p o k e s m a n
35

of theological rationalism, t h e e n t i r e A u f k l r u n g saw its political

a n d intellectual liberty j e o p a r d i z e d . T h e mobilization of t h e forces
of repressive o r t h o d o x y proves t h e indispensable b a c k d r o p for
Kant's c o n c e r n with A u f k l r u n g .
Kant's i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy ( 1 7 8 5 - 8 9 )
m u s t be linked to these considerations. T h e P a n t h e i s m C o n t r o -
versy b r o u g h t a b o u t a revival a n d vindication of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of
Spinoza in G e r m a n y in t h e later 1780s, b u t its ideological furor r e -
volved a r o u n d Lessing a n d his s t a t u r e as t h e leader of the G e r m a n
A u f k l r u n g . K a n t b e c a m e deeply e m b r o i l e d in t h e controversy
36

because h e saw Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m as a g r e a t t h r e a t to t h e se-

curity a n d stability of t h e cultural milieu in G e r m a n y . K a n t could
sense t h e shift in t h e political-religious a t m o s p h e r e , a n d h e worried
for t h e kind of " e n l i g h t e n e d " a t t i t u d e t o w a r d religion which h e ad-
vocated. K i n g Frederick II was a p p r o a c h i n g his d e a t h as t h e Pan-
theism C o n t r o v e r s y b r o k e o u t . H e was succeeded by t h e m o r e
o r t h o d o x , i n d e e d reactionary, Frederick William II in t h e midst of
t h e a f f a i r . Since t h e c o r o n a t i o n c e r e m o n y traditionally took place
37

in Knigsberg, a n d since K a n t h a p p e n e d to b e serving as rector of

t h e University of Knigsberg at t h e time, h e c a m e into p e r s o n a l
contact with t h e n e w king, b u t t h e latter's attentiveness to h i m was
n o t a n u n m i x e d blessing. Frederick William II's Minister of Justice,

Introduction 11
J o h a n n von Wllner, w o u l d confirm by his Edict of 1788 t h e a p p r o -
p r i a t e n e s s of t h e Aufklrung's anxiety over religious backlash.
I n d e e d , K a n t himself w o u l d feel the lash, a n d Fichte would b e
driven out u n d e r i t . 38

Kant's i m m e d i a t e c o m m e n t o n t h e p a n t h e i s m affair, "Was

heit: sich i m D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " of 1786, m a i n t a i n e d a n almost
O l y m p i a n indifference to t h e respective substantive concerns of
t h e d i s p u t a n t s , a n d confined itself for t h e m o s t p a r t to calling b o t h
sides to o r d e r from t h e v a n t a g e of the critical philosophy. Why did
h e i n t e r v e n e at all? A footnote late in t h e essay provides t h e answer.
It sets o u t with a protest from K a n t : "It is h a r d to conceive h o w
t h o u g h t f u l scholars could find s u p p o r t for Spinozism in t h e Critique
of Pure Reason." 39
Only because such a link h a d b e e n intimated did
K a n t feel c o m p e l l e d to e n t e r t h e bitter controversy. His p r i m a r y
objective was to distance himself from such d a n g e r o u s divagations,
to d e f e n d r e a s o n against Schwrmerei, a n d , if possible, to shift atten-
tion to his soon to b e reissued First Critique. T h i s was, after all, t h e
very t i m e w h e n Kant's "critical p h i l o s o p h y " was struggling p a i n -
fully for r e c o g n i t i o n . 40

However, K a n t soon discovered t h a t t h e p a n t h e i s t s t r e a m was

too s t r o n g to b e so quickly diverted. With t h e a p p e a r a n c e of
H e r d e r ' s Gott: einige Gesprche in 1787 t h e whole issue r e o p e n e d in a
n e w a n d , for K a n t , still m o r e provocative light. His bete n o i r e , t h e
Sturm und Drang, s e e m e d o n c e again to be stealing c e n t e r stage j u s t
at t h e t i m e t h a t h e was sensing a g r o u n d swell of interest in his o w n
critical philosophy. It was at this point t h a t t h e P a n t h e i s m C o n -
troversy e x e r t e d its most i m p o r t a n t influence o n Kantaffecting
his major critical works, especially t h e Third Critique.
Because his o w n disciples s e e m e d e n a m o r e d of these notions,
K a n t could only find the c o n t i n u e d i n d u l g e n c e in p a n t h e i s m p r o -
foundly d a n g e r o u s , a n d h e n c e h e d e t e r m i n e d to take a p e r s o n a l
h a n d in d e b u n k i n g Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . H e b e g a n that cam-
paign in t h e Second Critique, b u t it was primarily i n t o t h e Third Cri-
tique t h a t h e c h a n n e l e d these concerns, decisively shifting its
o r i e n t a t i o n in its final stages of composition. Placing Kant's inter-
vention in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy in t h e context of t h e latest
t r e n d s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science as well as in t h e context of
G e r m a n theology, however, it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t t h a t Kant's Third ,
Critique only succeeded in p r o v o k i n g his o w n most a d e p t disciples
to take u p Spinoza a n d "hylozoism" against h i m a n d t h u s led di-
rectly to t h e new metaphysics of n a t u r e which is o n e of t h e cor-
n e r s t o n e s of G e r m a n Idealism.

12 Introduction
 While this work focuses o n t h e Third Critique itself, it is w o r t h -
while briefly to consider its key a u d i e n c e , t h e g e n e r a t i o n of Ideal-
ism, a n d w h a t s h a p e d their r e a d i n g . Y o u n g G e r m a n intellectuals of
t h e 1790s, in o r d e r to ratify t h e i r e m e r g e n t cultural identity, wished
to see theirs as p r e e m i n e n t l y "Das L a n d d e r Dichter u n d D e n -
k e r . " G e r m a n Idealism a p p e a r s , in this light, as t h e expression of
41

a powerful intellectual m o v e m e n t of cultural nationalism in late

e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n y , which G e r m a n h i s t o r i o g r a p h y has
t e r m e d t h e " d e u t s c h e B e w e g u n g . " A r i p e n i n g p r i d e in l a n g u a g e
42

a n d in poetic gift, a n d a cultivated attentiveness to t h e u n i q u e a n d

o u t s t a n d i n g aspects of t h e c e n t r a l E u r o p e a n setting c o m b i n e d with
the aspirations for social a n d political p r o m i n e n c e in a particular
g r o u p of e d u c a t e d c o m m o n e r s to create a very p o t e n t national-
i s m . G e r m a n intellectuals f o u n d cultural identity in resisting t h e
4 3

d o m i n a n c e of F r e n c h l a n g u a g e a n d style in G e r m a n courts, espe-

cially P o t s d a m . T h e struggle to get free from Latin d o m i n i o n led
t h e m to a n e w theory of ethnic u n i q u e n e s s a n d creativity as well as
of t h e Greek, as o p p o s e d t o t h e R o m a n , origins of ancient g r a n -
d e u r . B o t h t h e ethnic a n d t h e G r e e k o r i e n t a t i o n p r o m o t e d t h e
4 4

idea of " c u l t u r e " in t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l sense, linking l a n g u a g e

with ecology, religion, a n d p o l i t i c s . T h i s vastly d e e p e n e d t h e Ger-
45

m a n sense of history a n d its process, a n d gave G e r m a n y a distinc-

tive m o d e l for its o w n self-invention as a n a t i o n . 4 6

T h i s e m e r g e n t G e r m a n c u l t u r e h a d a serious p r o b l e m , how-
ever. It s e e m e d to b e divided at t h e very core. O n t h e o n e side,
stressing t h e project of assimilating t h e new rationalism of t h e West
in questions of religion, politics, a n d history, stood t h e G e r m a n
A u f k l r u n g , led first by Lessing a n d later by Kant. Kant's " I d e a for
a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t " a n d " W h a t Is E n -
l i g h t e n m e n t ? " (both 1784) f o r m u l a t e d the typical A u f k l r u n g
stance o n m a n y of t h e key issues of the e p o c h . O n t h e o t h e r side
stood t h e Sturm und Drang, stressing linguistic u n i q u e n e s s , literary
genius, e t h n i c a n d religious tradition, a n d a s t a u n c h aversion to
W e s t e r n rationalism a n d its Latin classicist aesthetic. Its key figures
were H e r d e r a n d G o e t h e . If H e r d e r offered a theory, G o e t h e per-
sonified t h e spirit of a G e r m a n national literary c u l t u r e .
T h u s for Friedrich Schiller, w h o s o u g h t to place his o w n a n d
his nation's identity in t h e f r a m e of a g r a n d a n d unified c u l t u r e , t h e
project s e e m e d to reconcile t h e two traditions, a n d j o i n G e r m a n y ' s
foremost Dichter, G o e t h e , with its foremost Denker, Kant. Schiller
himself was, i n t h e 1790s, a s t u d e n t of t h e K a n t i a n philosophy as
well as t h e closest to a poetic p e e r a n d ally G o e t h e h a d . I n his effort

Introduction 13
to define G e r m a n greatness in t e r m s of a synthesis of t h e s e two fig-
u r e s , Schiller d r e w heavily o n Kant's Third Critique. 47
It was t h e o n e
w o r k by K a n t which G o e t h e recognized a n d accepted with e n t h u s i -
a s m . Schiller's effort to reconcile t h e two c u r r e n t s c u l m i n a t e d in
4 8

On the Aesthetic Education of Mankind (1795), a decisive anticipation

of a n d i n s p i r a t i o n for t h e y o u n g Idealists w h o e m a n a t e d o u t of t h e
T b i n g e n seminary: H l d e r l i n , S e n d l i n g , a n d Hegel. T h e y ex-
p r e s s e d t h e i r initial vision in t h e crucial d o c u m e n t "Earliest System-
P r o g r a m of G e r m a n I d e a l i s m . "
49

If they declared themselves Kantians, it did n o t m e a n they

took K a n t as t h e i r only lodestar. Many of t h e disciples K a n t r e -
c r u i t e d in G e r m a n y simultaneously r e v e r e n c e d Lessing a n d
G o e t h e , r e a d H e r d e r with attentiveness a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n , a n d
f o u n d Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m fascinating. I n d e e d , o n e of t h e
crucial facts t h a t m u s t b e retrieved from t h e context is t h e wide-
s p r e a d conviction of t h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of t h e K a n t i a n system
a n d of t h e a g e n d a for p h i l o s o p h y which t h a t c r e a t e d . K a n t con-
50

t r i b u t e d substantially to this sense of t h e o p e n n e s s of his system

a n d to t h e idea of its possible completion, a n d only very late, w h e n
it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t w h a t his disciples h a d m a d e did n o t suit
h i m , w o u l d h e give public notice t h a t his o w n works constituted a n
a l t o g e t h e r c o m p l e t e system, a n d t h a t his heirs h a d utterly m i s u n -
derstood h i m . 5 1

W h a t fascinated this new g e n e r a t i o n in t h e Third Critique was

t h e metaphysical potential it s e e m e d to suggest. I n Kant's associa-
tion of beauty with morality, n a t u r e with art, history with t h e
a c h i e v e m e n t of a j u s t society, they saw t h e p r o s p e c t for a c o n s u m -
m a t e vision of t h e o r d e r of t h e world as well as a cultural mission
for t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n . S o m e possibility which g l i m m e r e d in t h e
Third Critique s e e m e d to t h e m to cry o u t for retrieval. N a t u r e , art,
a n d history n e e d e d to b e welded into a g r a n d e r synthesis t h a n
K a n t himself h a d d a r e d . T h i s quest for a n "aesthetic solution," in
t h e p h r a s e of Schiller a n d H l d e r l i n , p r e o c c u p i e d t h e brightest
m i n d s of G e r m a n y in t h e 1790s a n d resulted in t h e genesis of
G e r m a n I d e a l i s m . T h i s "aesthetic idealism" f o u n d systematic
52

articulation in Schelling's writings of t h e late 1790s, a n d con-

t r i b u t e d greatly to t h e rise of R o m a n t i c i s m . Yet for all that,
53

this project, u n d e r t a k e n by Schiller, Wilhelm von H u m b o l d t ,

H l d e r l i n , Schelling, a n d H e g e l (as well as o t h e r s like Fichte a n d
Novalis) took f o r m u n d e r t h e aegis of t h e Kantianism of t h e Third
Critique.

14 Introduction
 S^SF Part One

T H E GENESIS O F T H E " C R I T I Q U E
OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT"
 Sf* One

KANT AND T H E PURSUIT

OF AUFKLRUNG

A
s a n Aufklrer, K a n t saw himself p a r t of a m o v e m e n t n o t
only in his nation b u t in E u r o p e as a whole. Yet t h e Ger-
m a n A u f k l r u n g s h o u l d n o t simply be assimilated into
t h e Western E n l i g h t e n m e n t a l o n g cosmopolitan-secu-
larist lines. G e r m a n y h a d a very distinctive t r a d i t i o n . G e r m a n cul-
1 2

t u r e in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was still very Christian: Christian

piety persisted vigorously in the u r b a n laity, a n d university c u l t u r e
r e m a i n e d distinctly Christian in o u t l o o k . T h e G e r m a n Auf-
3

k l r u n g was inextricably involved in t h e theological controversies

of t h e P r o t e s t a n t faith in G e r m a n y . Kant was n o t alone in b e i n g
" r o u s e d from his d o g m a t i c s l u m b e r s , " yet if h e a n d o t h e r G e r m a n s
s u r r e n d e r e d s o m e of their dogmatism in t h e face of criticism from
b e y o n d t h e R h i n e (and t h e c h a n n e l ) , they struggled to preserve as
m u c h of t h e dogma as they could. While this m e a n t a strained rela-
tion with o r t h o d o x y , it n e v e r a p p r o a c h e d t h e radical hostility to r e -
ligion of a Voltaire or a H u m e in t h e W e s t . If we a r e to ascertain
4

how K a n t c a m e to identify himself with A u f k l r u n g in its distinctive

G e r m a n sense, we have to look to Frederick II a n d his effort to in-
a u g u r a t e a n e w cultural e p o c h for Prussia u p o n his accession to t h e
t h r o n e in 1740. His two key innovations were t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t of
Wolff to his chair at t h e University of Halle a n d t h e creation of t h e
Berlin A c a d e m y . 5

T h e conflict between t h e rationalists a r o u n d W o l f f a n d t h e Pie-

tist successors of Christian T h o m a s i u s within t h e G e r m a n univer-
sity system h a d driven Wolff from his chair in 1 7 2 3 . With t h e res- 6

t o r a t i o n of Wolff's chair, t h e old struggle between rationalism a n d

Pietism r e s u m e d . Against t h e r e s u r g e n t Wolff, t h e Pietists b r o u g h t
forth a n e w c h a m p i o n : Christian A u g u s t Crusius. Crusius raised
t h e level of philosophical sophistication in t h e Pietist c a m p a i g n .

17
Professor of p h i l o s o p h y a n d later of theology at Leipzig starting in
1744, Crusius p u b l i s h e d his m o s t influential work, Weg zur
Gewiheit und Zuverligkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis, in 1 7 4 7 . I n 7

t h e 1750s, his disciples w e r e active in t h e circles of t h e Berlin Acad-

emy, w h e r e they j o i n e d forces with t h e F r e n c h anti-Wolffians in t h e
Newtonian-positivist t r a d i t i o n . 8

Wolff m a i n t a i n e d t h a t all k n o w l e d g e was g r o u n d e d in t h e

principle of identity, even Leibniz's f a m o u s principle of sufficient
r e a s o n , a n d since it was possible to d e d u c e t h e law of sufficient
r e a s o n from t h e principle of identity, formal logic served as a n
a d e q u a t e ontology. Actuality, in his view, was n o t nearly so i m p o r -
t a n t as t h e two forms of possibility, necessary a n d c o n t i n g e n t .
Rational a r g u m e n t established necessity a n d this w a r r a n t e d real-
ity. H e n c e Wolff subscribed to t h e ontological a r g u m e n t for t h e
existence of G o d . A corollary of this faith in t h e analyticity of all
k n o w l e d g e was Wolff's conviction that all forms of h u m a n activity
could be g r o u n d e d in a single faculty, which was cognitive. Ethical
a n d sensual discriminations could be derived from this single
cognitive faculty, even as specific cognitions could ultimately be
g r o u n d e d in t h e principle of identity. T h e result was a m e t h o d i c a l
b u t indiscriminate rationalism.
While Wolff a c k n o w l e d g e d allegiance to Leibniz, h e was by n o
m e a n s fully in s y m p a t h y with t h e latter's philosophy. H e a d o p t e d ,
for e x a m p l e , a firm dualism in his t h e o r y of substance, as between
m i n d a n d m a t t e r . H e rejected Leibniz's m o n a d s a n d t h e idea of p r e -
established h a r m o n y , a n d conceived of t h e material universe in
strictly mechanistic t e r m s far closer to Descartes t h a n t o Leibniz.
H e a c c e p t e d t h e Cartesian g e o m e t r i c m e t h o d as a p p r o p r i a t e for
physical science, a n d f o u n d it completely consistent with t h e
m e t h o d u s e d in p h i l o s o p h y a n d metaphysics. T h i s Cartesian ele-
m e n t in his t h o u g h t p r o v o k e d t h e revisionism stirring against
Wolff in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n philosophy.
Crusius attacked Wolff o n all these fronts. H e d e n i e d t h a t t h e
principle of sufficient r e a s o n could b e derived from t h e principle of
identity. T h u s formal logic a n d ontology r e m a i n e d distinct. In-
d e e d , Crusius a r g u e d t h a t formal logic was n o t particularly useful
in t h e latter, since it dealt m e r e l y with t h e possible, while philoso-
phy's real p r o b l e m s w e r e with t h e actual, with t h e b l u n t a n d intrac-
table existence of things. C o n s e q u e n t l y , m a t h e m a t i c s a n d m e t a -
physics did n o t o p e r a t e with identical m e t h o d s . By e m p h a s i z i n g t h e
disjunction b e t w e e n formal logic a n d t h e p r o b l e m s of existence,
C r u s i u s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t metaphysical issues w e r e n o t soluble

18 The "Critique of AestheticJudgment"

t h r o u g h analytic logic. T h e ontological a r g u m e n t could n o t b e u p -
9

held in this light, a n d t h a t r e s t o r e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of S c r i p t u r e a n d

revelation, a n explosive p r o p o s i t i o n in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n
theology. C r u s i u s f u r t h e r m o r e stressed t h e limitations of h u m a n
k n o w l e d g e , u s i n g a r g u m e n t s from skepticism to u p h o l d fideist
c o m m i t m e n t s in P i e t i s m . H e directed a t t e n t i o n to t h e concrete
10

h u m a n project of m a k i n g sense of e x p e r i e n c e , o u t w a r d a n d in-

w a r d . I n this light Tonelli observed t h a t Crusius's Pietism "allowed
his successors to b e m u c h m o r e receptive to English a n d F r e n c h
empiricism, sensationalism, a n d c o m m o n - s e n s e p h i l o s o p h y t h a n
were o r t h o d o x Wolffian r a t i o n a l i s t s . " 11

As Lewis Beck has a r g u e d , K a n t was n e v e r a n o r t h o d o x Wolff-

i a n . Tonelli has elaborated o n this h e t e r o d o x y by linking it to
1 2

t h e influence of C r u s i u s . T h e issues t h a t Crusius i n t r o d u c e d

13

into G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h y t h e distinction of logic from actuality,

t h e limitations of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h e distinction of
t h e metaphysical from t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d p r o v e d deci-
sive for Kant. H e b e g a n as a p h i l o s o p h e r of n a t u r a l science, con-
c e r n e d above all with t h e conflict b e t w e e n N e w t o n a n d Leibniz
over t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d metaphysical implications of t h e n a t u r a l
universe. I n 1755, w h e n h e b e g a n his lectureship at t h e University
of Knigsberg, Kant's m a i n interest r e m a i n e d t h e relation "be-
tween p h i l o s o p h y a n d n a t u r a l science, a n d especially t h e issues
which h a d b e e n i n a u g u r a l for e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n m e t a -
physicsthose of t h e Leibniz-Clarke d e b a t e a n d t h e m e a n i n g of
N e w t o n i a n i s m . K a n t p u b l i s h e d Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und
14

Theorie des Himmels, his most significant scientific c o n t r i b u t i o n o n

this t h e m e , in t h e s a m e year t h a t h e b e g a n his university teaching.
T h a t space, existence, a n d t h e distinction of n a t u r a l science
a n d m a t h e m a t i c s from p h i l o s o p h y w e r e crucial questions for K a n t
in t h e late 1750s a n d early 1760s is c l e a r . W h a t they led h i m to
15

investigate was t h e relation of actuality to sensibility, a n d t h u s t h e

role of sensibility in valid k n o w l e d g e . A n d it is in this context that
we m u s t place his r e c e p t i o n of t h e very different philosophical
project of A l e x a n d e r B a u m g a r t e n a n d G e o r g Friedrich Meier.
Alfred B u m l e r set t h e study of t h e Third Critique o n a new p a t h
by c o n n e c t i n g t h e issue of aesthetics to t h e epistemological con-
c e r n s of G e r m a n "school p h i l o s o p h y " in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 16

G e r m a n school philosophy, inspired by Leibniz, s o u g h t a logic

a d e q u a t e to i n d u c t i o n , by focusing o n t h e n a t u r e of c o n c e p t for-
m a t i o n at t h e level of individual empirical entities a n d the role of
sense in k n o w l e d g e . B a u m g a r t e n revised Wolffian philosophy
17

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 19

with a n e w t h e o r y of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h sensibility, which
h e called t h e "science of a e s t h e t i c s . " H e a n d his disciple, Meier,
18

investigated beauty a n d t h e fine arts for their cognitive potential.

B a u m g a r t e n m a d e t h e claim t h a t b e a u t y o r s e n s u o u s perfec-
tion (perfectio phaenomenon) consisted in a perfect clarity even in t h e
absence of distinctness. Clarity a n d distinctness h a d b e c o m e p r o m -
i n e n t in t h e lexicon of m o d e r n philosophy from t h e t i m e of
Descartes a n d played a n i m p o r t a n t role in Wolff's system. For
Wolff, clarity involved t h e ability to discriminate a n object of at-
t e n t i o n from its b a c k g r o u n d . It was a recognition of specificity.
Distinctness involved t h e precise analysis of t h e m a r k s which
characterized t h a t object. I n traditional l a n g u a g e , clarity d i s c e r n e d
entities, distinctness analyzed their p r o p e r t i e s . T h e process of dis-
t i n g u i s h i n g involved t h e c o m p a r i s o n of p r o p e r t i e s at a m o r e a b -
stract a n d universal level. T h a t entailed r e a s o n or logic. W h a t
B a u m g a r t e n , a m o n g o t h e r s , n o t e d was t h a t this abstracting process
lost p u r c h a s e o n t h e unity a n d concreteness of t h e entity as a whole.
B a u m g a r t e n p r o p o s e d to revise Wolffianism o n this i m p o r t a n t
question, a n d h e i n t r o d u c e d s o m e distinctions which were to p r o v e
stimulating to G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r s of t h e second half of t h e eigh-
t e e n t h century, a n d to K a n t in particular.
B a u m g a r t e n distinguished "extensive" versus "intensive" clar-
ity in conceiving of a n individual entity, i.e., the unity of a manifold
in its actuality. N o logical analysis of t h e particular p r o p e r t i e s could
a c c o u n t adequately for t h e i r c o m b i n a t i o n in a whole. T h i s unity o r
" p e r f e c t i o n " s e e m e d t o r e q u i r e a different a p p r o a c h . B a u m g a r t e n
linked "extensive" c o o r d i n a t i o n o r "perfection" in t h e s e n s u o u s
r e a l m of actuality with beauty. Beauty t h e r e f o r e took o n a cognitive
function. Aesthetic perfection was a n inferior kind of objective
k n o w l e d g e , r a t h e r t h a n a n entirely distinct a n d self-sufficient m o d e
of e x p e r i e n c e .
"Extensive" clarity was to be achieved by finding t h e most com-
plete articulation of t h e p r o p e r t i e s which j o i n e d t o g e t h e r to f o r m
t h e individuality of any entity. Beauty r e p r e s e n t e d t h e quantitative
m a x i m u m of this extensiveness"richness." For B a u m g a r t e n t h e
essential quality of extensive clarity was its "vivacity." By contrast, 19

B a u m g a r t e n associated "intensive clarity" with " p u r i t y . " But 20

B a u m g a r t e n d i d n o t get very far with t h e idea of "intensive clarity"

because h e m e a n t by it t h a t logical unity which Leibniz h a d articu-
lated b u t could n o t specify, a n d which K a n t was to find o n e of t h e
m o s t intractable p r o b l e m s of his o w n epistemology, the idea of a
singular "intuition." While vivacity o r richness m i g h t express t h e

20 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

quantitative c o m p l e t e n e s s of p r o p e r t i e s in any individual entity,
this "perfection" gave n o real p u r c h a s e o n t h e logical, o r better
ontological, p r o b l e m of its integral o r systematic unity. H e n c e t h e
admission t h a t it was "confused." "Confused" m e a n t lacking dis-
tinctness, i.e., t h e logical-analytic discrimination of p r o p e r t i e s
t h r o u g h which u n d e r s t a n d i n g m i g h t m a k e precise w h a t distin-
g u i s h e d t h a t particular entity from b o t h similar a n d different o b -
jects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . While B a u m g a r t e n recognized t h e
i n a d e q u a c y of Wolffian analytic rationalism, h e could n o t resolve
t h e issue of t h e relation of rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n to sensible actu-
ality. K a n t was to take issue with t h e B a u m g a r t e n - M e i e r position
precisely t h e r e .
K a n t c o n s i d e r e d B a u m g a r t e n t h e foremost Wolffian a n d took
h i m as a foil in d e v e l o p i n g his o w n a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m of sen-
sibility a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h a t m e a n t K a n t h a d to follow h i m into
the question of b e a u t y a n d its place in philosophy. Kant's c o n c e r n
with aesthetics, t h e n , m u s t b e g r o u n d e d in this epistemological in-
terest. W h a t first interested K a n t in t h e B a u m g a r t e n - M e i e r project
was strictly this epistemological issue r e g a r d i n g t h e laws of sensible
k n o w l e d g e , this p r o b l e m of "confusion" a n d t h e relation of t h e aes-
thetic a n d t h e logical in t h e cognition of a n actual individual entity.
K a n t was primarily a n d professionally e n m e s h e d in t h e Aufkl-
r u n g ' s epistemological project. H e was n o t interested in fine art, in
its system, in creativity or artistic taste. I n a Reflection from t h e m i d
1750s, K a n t p u t this quite clearly: " T h e beautiful sciences a r e those
which m a k e r e a d y to h a n d the rules for the inferior capacities of
k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is, confused k n o w l e d g e [die unteren Erkennt-
niskrfte, d.i. die verworrene Erkenntnis]." 21
B u t t h e G e r m a n Aufkl-
r u n g m u s t b e seen as m u c h in a n ideological as in a n epistemological
light.

Frederick II, the Berlin Aufklrung, and Cosmopolitan Taste

Frederick II's effort to b r i n g Prussia into the cultural m a i n s t r e a m

of t h e E u r o p e a n w h i c h for h i m m e a n t t h e F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n -
m e n t stimulated cosmopolitanism in central E u r o p e . T h e official
l a n g u a g e of t h e P o t s d a m c o u r t was F r e n c h ; t h e King of Prussia d e -
clared G e r m a n i n e p t for literary o r cultural expression; a n d F r e n c h
l a n g u a g e a n d F r e n c h m e n d o m i n a t e d his new a c a d e m y in Berlin.
H e even selected Pierre M a u p e r t u i s as p r e s i d e n t (174659) of this
academy.
M a u p e r t u i s ' s allegiance was to a positivist p r o g r a m of n a t u r a l

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 21

science a l o n g t h e lines of J e a n d'Alembert's Preliminary Discourse to
the Encyclopedia. At t h e instigation of t h e king, M a u p e r t u i s e m -
ployed a series of prize c o m p e t i t i o n s in t h e Berlin A c a d e m y in t h e
m i d - 1 7 5 0 s to d e b u n k G e r m a n "school p h i l o s o p h y " (Leibniz a n d
Wolff) as well as G e r m a n religion (Pietism). T h e academy's
p r o g r a m was quite simply Newton's physics w i t h o u t Newton's
G o d . Ironically, such " F r e n c h " t h o u g h t h a d its origins in Britain.
I n d e e d , Voltaire himself a c k n o w l e d g e d a "new trinity" for t h e
c o n t i n e n t : B a c o n , N e w t o n , a n d L o c k e . T h e British i m p u l s e to-
22

w a r d s sensationalism, set off by H o b b e s a n d Locke, h a d p r o -

gressed by m i d c e n t u r y into t h e writings of Hartley a n d H u m e .
T h e latter's works b e c a m e available in G e r m a n y in t h e 1750s
t h r o u g h a four-volume translation of his essays, a n d they w e r e
widely r e a d . 2 3

While a cultural-nationalist reaction eventually t h r e w off this

t u t e l a g e to foreign t h o u g h t , a n u m b e r of G e r m a n s s o u g h t u r g e n t l y
to b r i n g themselves a b r e a s t of t h e m o r e sophisticated c u l t u r e from
a b r o a d , t h o u g h in t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e a n d in t e r m s of their indige-
n o u s philosophical, religious, a n d literary c o n c e r n s . T h e leaders
24

of this discriminating assimilation of foreign e l e m e n t s into a Ger-

m a n A u f k l r u n g were t h e so-called " p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r s " of
Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, Lessing, a n d M e n d e l s s o h n . I n t h e 25

1750s, w i t h o u t a n d p e r h a p s even against Frederick IPs p r o g r a m -

matic g u i d a n c e , t h e i n d i g e n o u s A u f k l r u n g f o u n d its first articula-
tion in t h e j o u r n a l s this trio f o u n d e d for G e r m a n literary life. T h e y
distilled a n d b r o a d c a s t t h e E u r o p e a n E n l i g h t e n m e n t to t h e rest of
central E u r o p e , i n c l u d i n g Kant's Knigsberg.
T h e Berlin A u f k l r u n g b r o u g h t to K a n t a whole new set of in-
terests. K a n t took very seriously his status as a Prussian official
obliged to i m p l e m e n t Frederick's p r o g r a m , b u t it was also a m a t t e r
of p e r s o n a l cultivation. I n a G e r m a n of t h a t e p o c h , the m a r k of
"taste" was A u f k l r u n g , a cosmopolitan a c q u a i n t a n c e with t h e best
of foreign t h o u g h t a n d discrimination. N o t only was Kant in con-
tact with t h e Berlin A c a d e m y a n d t h e u p p e r echelons of t h e cul-
t u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y in t h e capital, b u t h e was also voracious in his
r e a d i n g of t h e l e a r n e d a n d critical j o u r n a l s that e m a n a t e d from
t h e r e . T h e publicity of t h e Berlin A u f k l r u n g , b o t h t h r o u g h t h e
2 6

a c a d e m y a n d t h r o u g h t h e " p o p u l a r philosophy," conveyed to K a n t

t h e vivacity of intellectual discourse in t h e wider world.
K a n t was a n utterly u n t r a v e l e d m a n , living in a r e m o t e East
Prussian city. Yet from t h e very first h e strove to achieve cos-
m o p o l i t a n i s m , to w i d e n his intellectual h o r i z o n s if h e could n o t

22 The "Critique ofAesthetic Judgment"

widen his physical ones. Kant wished to b r i n g himself abreast of
distant e n v i r o n m e n t s , to feel at h o m e in a wider world t h a n his
provincial city. We find evidence of this cosmopolitanism in Kant's
a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t h e would give lectures in physical g e o g r a p h y ,
starting in 1 7 5 7 . H e a n n o u n c e d t h a t such a course would be a p -
27

p r o p r i a t e "for t h e rational taste of o u r e n l i g h t e n e d t i m e s . " T h e

28

w o r d i n g is very i m p o r t a n t . K a n t h a d a very s t r o n g desire, in those

early years, to b e a fashionable m a n , to show his "taste." Beck
notes that " d u r i n g t h e years t h a t h e was Dozent h e was often called
'the galant m a s t e r ' a s p r u c e dresser, a p o p u l a r teacher, a n d a
welcome guest in t h e best society of his c i t y . " H e r d e r , w h o was
29

Kant's s t u d e n t from 1762 to 1764, has given us a magnificent por-

trait of this Kant:

Playfulness, wit, a n d h u m o r w e r e at his c o m m a n d . His lec-

tures were t h e most e n t e r t a i n i n g talks. His m i n d , which e x a m -
ined Leibniz, Wolff, B a u m g a r t e n , Crusius a n d H u m e , a n d
investigated t h e laws of n a t u r e of N e w t o n , Kepler, a n d t h e
physicists, c o m p r e h e n d e d equally t h e newest works of Rous-
seau . . . a n d t h e latest discoveries in science. H e weighed
t h e m all, a n d always c a m e back to the u n b i a s e d k n o w l e d g e of
n a t u r e a n d to t h e m o r a l w o r t h of m a n . T h e history of m e n
a n d p e o p l e s , n a t u r a l history a n d science, m a t h e m a t i c s a n d
observation, were t h e sources from which h e enlivened his
lectures a n d conversations. H e was indifferent to n o t h i n g
w o r t h k n o w i n g . N o cabal, n o sect, n o prejudice, n o desire for
fame, could ever t e m p t h i m in the slightest from b r o a d e n i n g
a n d illuminating t h e t r u t h . H e incited a n d gently forced o t h -
ers to t h i n k for themselves; d e s p o t i s m was foreign to his na-
ture. 3 0

H e m a d e a very s t r o n g effort in t h e case of s t u d e n t s like H e r d e r ,

a n d also J a k o b Lenz, a n d even with his recalcitrant c o n t e m p o r a r y
a n d friend J o h a n n H a m a n n , to m a k e t h e m as a c q u a i n t e d with t h e
wider intellectual world as h e could, a n d to take u p from t h e m
w h a t e v e r they m i g h t b r i n g to his attention of this wider world as
well. 31

Kant c o m p e n s a t e d for his Knigsberg provincialism n o t only

with a g o o d d a s h of Prussian francophilia, b u t also with a taste for
things English. T h e crucial m e d i u m for this fascination in Kant was
t h e Berlin A u f k l r u n g . A fascination for t h i n g s English was all t h e
r a g e a m o n g t h e " p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r s " of Berlin with w h o m Kant
e n t e r e d into very lively e x c h a n g e . Moses M e n d e l s s o h n looms as
3 2

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 23

especially influential in m e d i a t i n g t h e foreign E n l i g h t e n m e n t , a n d
especially t h e British, for G e r m a n philosophy, fusing t h e n e w E n -
glish a n d F r e n c h aesthetics with t h e work of B a u m g a r t e n a n d
M e i e r . M e n d e l s s o h n h e l p e d naturalize into G e r m a n discourse
33

t h r e e crucial n o t i o n s from a b r o a d : feeling, genius, a n d the sub-

lime.
M e n d e l s s o h n enjoyed o n e signal a d v a n t a g e over K a n t : h e
could r e a d English. As F r e d e r i c Will has n o t e d , h e devoted a n en-
tire year to t h e study of E d m u n d Burke's Enquiry Into the Original of
Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. 34
H e was also conversant
with t h e F r e n c h literature, particularly J e a n D u b o s a n d C h a r l e s
B a t t e u x . His greatest utility, from Kant's v a n t a g e , was t h a t h e p u t
all t h e i r insights directly into t h e context of G e r m a n school phi-
losophy a n d particularly r e l a t e d t h e m to t h e issues raised by
B a u m g a r t e n a n d Meier with which K a n t was already wrestling.
K a n t c a m e into intellectual contact with M e n d e l s s o h n in t h e Berlin
A c a d e m y Prize C o m p e t i t i o n of 176163, which M e n d e l s s o h n won
a n d in which Kant's submission was accepted for publication by t h e
academy. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r they e n t e r e d into a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
which lasted until t h e d e a t h of M e n d e l s s o h n in 1786. T h e i r rela-
t i o n s h i p was from t h e first w a r m a n d sympathetic, despite wide dif-
ferences in their philosophical o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e y were allies o n a
m o r e g e n e r a l level: t h e p r o g r a m of i n d i g e n o u s A u f k l r u n g in Ger-
many.
Mendelssohn's effort to i n t e g r a t e foreign aesthetic theory into
t h e G e r m a n a p p r o a c h led h i m , p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t u n i n t e n t i o n -
ally, to shift t h e discourse in a psychological a n d empirical direc-
tion away from B a u m g a r t e n , or at least t h e prevailing view of
B a u m g a r t e n ' s project as a cognitive a p p r o a c h to beauty. By incor-
p o r a t i n g a m o r e psychological a p p r o a c h into his essays, especially
t h e later o n e s , M e n d e l s s o h n h e l p e d b r i n g t h e sensationalist a n d
naturalistic viewpoint of D u b o s , B a t t e u x , a n d t h e F r e n c h Enlight-
e n m e n t , a n d t h e related British school of H u m e a n d eventually
B u r k e , into fashion in G e r m a n y .
O n e of Mendelssohn's goals was to establish a h i e r a r c h y of grat-
ifications. F o r e m o s t h e placed intellectual satisfaction in p u r e ideas.
S u c h a delight h a d n o sensual c o n t e n t w h a t e v e r a n d b e l o n g e d to
t h e tradition of "intelligible b e a u t y . " I n addition, M e n d e l s s o h n
35

d i s c e r n e d a s e p a r a t e gratification in t h e cognitive perfection of a n

empirical object. T h e p l e a s u r e in b e a u t y M e n d e l s s o h n raised from
m e r e sensuality by claiming it a r o u s e d n o desire. T h i s n o t i o n of
"disinterestedness" w o u l d have a g r e a t i m p a c t o n K a n t . I n t h e 3 6

24 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

essays of the 1750s, M e n d e l s s o h n did n o t succeed, however, in
distinguishing clearly b e t w e e n t h e g o o d , the beautiful, a n d t h e
pleasant.
H a v i n g already written o n t h e p r o b l e m of t h e sublime,
M e n d e l s s o h n felt obliged to c o m e to t e r m s with Burke's major work
in t h e field. T h e result, t h e essay " b e r die M i s c h u n g d e r Schn-
h e i t e n " (1758), s u m m a r i z e d t h e a r g u m e n t s of B u r k e quite effec-
tively, m a k i n g t h e m accessible to a G e r m a n r e a d i n g a u d i e n c e long
before Lessing's translation of t h e work in 1773. B u t M e n d e l s s o h n
was n o t c o n t e n t merely to s u m m a r i z e ; h e went o n to m a k e a telling
criticism: " H e piles observation u p o n observation, all of t h e m fun-
d a m e n t a l a n d insightful; only every time it comes d o w n to explain-
i n g these observations in t e r m s of t h e n a t u r e of o u r souls, his
weakness b e c o m e s obvious. O n e realizes that h e is u n a w a r e of t h e
t h e o r y of t h e soul of G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h y . " I n a r g u i n g t h u s for a
37

m o r e spiritual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e sublime, M e n d e l s s o h n m a d e
t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t which i n f o r m e d his r e s p o n s e to t h e foreign
t h e o r y of genius.
T h e principle of t h e i n n a t e activism of t h e subject is p e r h a p s
t h e most distinctive feature of G e r m a n as o p p o s e d to British p h i -
losophy in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. Its source was L e i b n i z . B u t 38

Leibniz h a d n o t p u b l i s h e d s o m e of his most i m p o r t a n t work, a n d so

G e r m a n y ' s school p h i l o s o p h y carried forward only a partial for-
m u l a t i o n of Leibnizian metaphysics, a n d Wolff's Cartesian a n d
N e w t o n i a n modifications with respect to t h e material world h a d
served f u r t h e r to weaken or r e n d e r p e r p l e x e d these potentialities
from Leibniz. M e n d e l s s o h n a n d all t h e other, lesser figures of Ger-
m a n school-philosophy s o u g h t r e i n f o r c e m e n t from a b r o a d for
their f u n d a m e n t a l l y Leibnizian intuition that the active powers of
t h e subject lay at t h e core of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e r e w i t h
transfigured t h e world from m e r e m e c h a n i s m . It was in t h a t con-
text, i.e., before t h e "great light" which t h e publication of Leibniz's
Nouveaux essais b r o u g h t to t h e m , t h a t t h e G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r s
stood o p e n to t h e ideas of activism in t h e subject o r i g i n a t i n g in Brit-
ain a n d F r a n c e associated with " g e n i u s . "
I n his essay o n t h e sources a n d linkages of t h e fine arts a n d sci-
ences, M e n d e l s s o h n h a d a d h e r e d firmly to B a u m g a r t e n ' s t h e o r y of
ingenium as f o r m u l a t e d in 648 of t h e Metaphysica, i.e., t h a t genius
was t h e perfect h a r m o n y of the h u m a n faculties, b u t n o s e p a r a t e
faculty of its own. B u t in his reviews for Nicolai's j o u r n a l , the Briefe,
die neueste Literatur betreffend, starting in 1759, M e n d e l s s o h n b e g a n
to m o v e away from t h e strictly B a u m g a r t i a n theory. T h e first sign

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 25

of this is Mendelssohn's defense, in t h e sixtieth letter, of the " u n -
schooled" genius against those w h o insisted that genius m u s t al-
ways be t u t o r e d by taste a n d r e g i m e n , as J o h a n n Gottsched a n d
Christian Geliert h a d m a d e t h e p r e m i s e of G e r m a n c r i t i c i s m . 39

Mendelssohn's revision of his t h e o r y of genius was p a r t of a

whole series of reconsiderations taking place within the Berlin Auf-
k l r u n g . His colleague in Berlin, Friedrich Resewitz, h a d delivered
a lecture o n t h e subject of genius in 1 7 5 5 . A n d in 1757, J o h a n n
4 0

Sulzer h a d a d d r e s s e d t h e Berlin A c a d e m y with a very i m p o r t a n t

"Analyse d u genie," which h a d t h e n b e e n p u b l i s h e d in t h e a c a d e m y
y e a r b o o k . Sulzer was active in the Berlin A c a d e m y starting from
41

the 1750s, a n d his a c a d e m y lecture o n genius m a d e a very i m p o r -

tant c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e new t r e n d s , as did t h e topics h e p r o p o s e d ,
as l e a d e r of t h e section for philosophy, for t h e prize essays spon-
sored by t h e academy. It was Sulzer w h o raised the issue for t h e
f a m o u s prize c o m p e t i t i o n of 176163 o n t h e relation of m e t a -
physics a n d morals for which M e n d e l s s o h n a n d K a n t submitted im-
p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Sulzer wished to naturalize the G e r m a n
42

ideas a n d b r i n g t h e m into c o o r d i n a t i o n with the Encyclopedist tra-

d i t i o n . M e n d e l s s o h n recognized t h a t Sulzer was trying to achieve
43

the s a m e i n t e g r a t i o n his o w n essays h a d sought, between the for-

eign, naturalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of genius a n d t h e i n d i g e n o u s tradi-
tion of Leibniz. I n d e e d , t h a t was t h e most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in
Sulzer's e s s a y . 44

T h e idea of t h e " u n s c h o o l e d " as o p p o s e d to the "learned ge-

n i u s " c a m e from J o s e p h Addison's celebrated essay o n genius in t h e
Spectator in 1 7 1 1 , which h a d b e e n translated into G e r m a n in 1745.
T h e issue h a d c o m e to a h e a d in Britain in t h e revolt of t h e new
e m o t i o n a l school against A u g u s t a n taste. I n 1756, J o s e p h W a r t o n
h a d p u b l i s h e d his manifesto against A l e x a n d e r P o p e , a n d in 1758
E d w a r d Young's f a m o u s essay o n "original composition" c a m e
o u t . M e n d e l s s o h n a n d his colleagues were already quite familiar
4 5

with Young's view, a n d h a d p u b l i s h e d a n earlier essay by the p o e t in

t h e second v o l u m e of t h e i r Sammlung vermischter Schriften zur
Befrderung der schnen Wissenschaften und der freien Knste (Berlin,
1 7 5 9 ) . It is i m p o r t a n t to retrieve t h e entire controversy in British
46

aesthetics at t h a t pivotal m o m e n t , for it p r o f o u n d l y s t a m p e d t h e

last a n d most decisive sense of A u f k l r u n g for I m m a n u e l Kant: t h e
struggle of reason against t h e i m p u l s e toward irrationalism h e de-
tected in t h e e m e r g i n g Sturm und Drang m o v e m e n t .
Starting r o u g h l y a r o u n d t h e m i d c e n t u r y in Britain, a new
school identified with "sensibility" challenged neoclassicism, offer-

26 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

ing a new a p p r o a c h to taste: t h e assertion of the "sublime" against
t h e beautiful a n d of " g e n i u s " against r u l e . Sensibility was shifting
4 7

all across E u r o p e in the course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, at differ-

e n t b u t related m o m e n t s in Britain, France, a n d G e r m a n y . T h i s
manifested itself in c h a n g e s in attitudes towards g a r d e n i n g , travel,
a n d p a i n t i n g ("picturesque" landscapes), as well as in preferences
in a r c h i t e c t u r e (the revival of a p p r e c i a t i o n for Gothic) a n d litera-
t u r e (the e n t h u s i a s m for S h a k e s p e a r e a n d " O s s i a n " ) .
48

T h e fascination with t h e sublime was p e r h a p s the s y m p t o m of

this new sensibility. As David Morris a r g u e s , t h e impulses b e h i n d
the revival of interest in t h e sublime were "scientific, physico-
theological, epistemological, a n d l i t e r a r y . " T h e subjective e x p e -
49

rience of t h e g r a n d e u r of t h e u n i v e r s e i n d e e d t h e g r a n d e u r of
the very e a r t h , in all its variety a n d p o t e n c y h a d a b o u t it a r e -
ligious r e v e r e n c e a n d awe, which c a m e , via literary criticism, to be
identified with w h a t L o n g i n u s called t h e sublime. T h e h e a r t of
this n o t i o n was t h e aesthetic confrontation with infinity, or with
the vastness a n d potency of t h e u n i v e r s e . N o l o n g e r did t h e
50

world a p p e a r b o u n d e d , m a t h e m a t i c a l , simple, a n d static. It now

a p p e a r e d b o u n d l e s s , d y n a m i c , complex, c h a n g i n g . T h a t is t h e
crucial n o t i o n b e h i n d the " n a t u r a l s u b l i m e . " T h e m e d i a t i o n be-
51

tween n a t u r a l g r a n d e u r a n d t h e literary t r o p e was t h e similar sub-

jective e m o t i o n which they a r o u s e d , which was, for that e p o c h ,
religious in its f u n d a m e n t a l t e x t u r e . While t h a t religious t e x t u r e
52

may have a b a t e d in the course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, with t h e

rise of E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d Deism, the e m o t i o n a l linkage r e m a i n e d
firmly established.
T h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a p p r e c i a t i o n of n a t u r e h a d
c h a n g e d ; m e n saw n a t u r e differently, a n d t h o u g h t of themselves
differently for having d o n e so. T h e sublime was the decisive t e r m
t h r o u g h which to articulate t h e n e w a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e world of
n a t u r e as a n aspect of h u m a n consciousness. Scientists were e n t h u -
siastic a b o u t t h e complexity of n a t u r e , h e r variety a n d d y n a m i s m . 53

N o l o n g e r would t h e m e c h a n i c a l vision of Descartes suffice. New-

ton's own Opticks h a d created far vaster a n d m o r e intricate pos-
sibilities. A n e n e r g i z e d n a t u r e s e e m e d too lively for reductively
mechanistic t h i n k i n g o n the lines of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y t h o u g h t .
I n d e e d , scientists expressed e n t h u s i a s m c o n c e r n i n g possibilities of
a n e x p a n d e d physics which was n o t so mechanistically d e t e r m i n e d ,
b u t which took u p the mysterious question of "force." N o t only sci-
entists b u t also poets were swept u p in this new physics of "force"
a n d its a t t e n d a n t m e t a p h y s i c s . Consequently, after 1740, a n d in
54

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 27

t e r m s of this n e w sense for t h e complexity a n d d y n a m i s m of n a t u r e ,
t h e "sublime" c a m e to b e a p p l i e d directly to n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a . 5 5

T h e linkage of t h e s t r o n g feeling within the subject with imag-

inative responsiveness to g r a n d e u r s in the o u t e r world of n a t u r e
p r o v i d e d all t h e e l e m e n t s of a t h e o r y of h u m a n creativity. T h e fate
of t h e sublime a n d its elevated e m o t i o n s c a m e to b e linked, as a con-
s e q u e n c e , with t h e issues of spirituality, f r e e d o m , a n d creativity in
the crucial n o t i o n of " g e n i u s . " T h e Earl of Shaftesbury (A.
56

C o o p e r ) set this relation in m o t i o n by linking g e n i u s with t h e "prin-

ciple of p u r e aesthetic intuition," or "the process of p u r e cre-
a t i o n . " H e shifted t h e inquiry into beauty "from t h e world of
57

created things to t h e world of creative p r o c e s s . " 58

Shaftesbury
s o u g h t to articulate a n o t i o n of h u m a n creativity a n d spontaneity of
a sort which, while i m m a n e n t , was not material or m e c h a n i c a l . 59

T h a t n o t i o n , which h a d s t r o n g parallels with Leibnizian meta-

physics, s e e m e d all too metaphysical to t h e British of t h e eigh-
t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n s t e a d they f o u g h t it o u t in t e r m s of the conflict
60

of genius with rule, t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e relation of creative free-

d o m to conventional neoclassical s t a n d a r d s .
Addison's famous essay o n genius in t h e Spectator strove, with
a n eye to S h a k e s p e a r e , to use t h e contrast b e t w e e n H o m e r a n d
Virgil to m a k e a distinction b e t w e e n t h e n a t u r a l or " u n s c h o o l e d "
genius a n d t h e "learned g e n i u s . " While A d d i s o n celebrated t h e
61

n a t u r a l g e n i u s for t h e originality a n d p o w e r of his work, h e also

w a r n e d t h a t this was exceedingly r a r e , a n d t h a t it was highly d a n -
g e r o u s to e m u l a t e such figures. Addison implied that genius could
quite comfortably be schooled in taste, learn r u l e a n d r e a s o n , a n d
e m e r g e t h e b e t t e r for it. Virgil epitomized such genius a m o n g the
ancients, t h e A u g u s t a n s believed, b u t they also ascribed it to P o p e
among the moderns.
It was against this t h a t W a r t o n rebelled in Essay on the Genius
and Writings of Pope (1756). H e d e n i e d that P o p e was a genius at
all. G e n i u s m e a n t for h i m precisely the mysterious a n d u n -
schooled "originality" of a S h a k e s p e a r e . A n d h e insisted n o t only
t h a t Shakespeare's originality was u n s c h o o l e d , b u t also t h a t
schooling destroyed originality. T h e irrational n o t e h a d clearly
s o u n d e d . S p o n t a n e i t y h e r e took o n a n o t h e r t o n e . T h e stress o n
6 2

t h e e m o t i o n a l involved a total rejection of rules, a P r o m e t h e a n re-

b e l l i o n . T h e very n o t i o n s of craft, t e c h n i q u e , a n d taste went by
63

the b o a r d s . G e n i u s was like n a t u r e . In what was the most famous

manifesto in this vein, Conjectures on Original Composition (1758),
E d w a r d Y o u n g p u t this quite bluntly: "An Original may be said to

28 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

b e of a vegetable n a t u r e , it rises spontaneously, from t h e vital r o o t
of G e n i u s ; it grows, it is n o t m a d e . " Works of art d e v e l o p e d as a n
6 4

o r g a n i c c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e genius's s o u l . I n d e e d , the artist ex-

65

e r t e d n o conscious control at all, it s e e m e d . 6 6

F i n d i n g a r e s p o n s e to this "enthusiastic" t h e o r y of original ge-

nius p r e o c c u p i e d t h e most serious philosophical m i n d s in Britain
in t h e late 1750s. I n E d i n b u r g h , t h e prize-winning aesthetic p h i -
l o s o p h e r A l e x a n d e r G e r a r d delivered a new a n d very i m p o r t a n t se-
ries of lectures o n g e n i u s . H u m e ' s essays o n taste a n d t r a g e d y
67

from t h e late 1750s t o u c h o n this topic. H e n r y H o m e , L o r d K a m e s ,

a d d r e s s e d t h e question as well in w h a t m a n y take to be t h e
c u l m i n a t i n g work of this whole p e r i o d , Elements of Criticism (1762).
T h e y w o r k e d to d e v e l o p a carefully naturalistic t h e o r y of genius
based u p o n t h e p r e m i s e that t h e i m a g i n a t i o n was limited to w h a t
t h e senses h a d p r o v i d e d . T h e r e could be n o creation ex nihilo, n o
divine analogy in m o r t a l g e n i u s . T h e conflict which r a g e d be-
68

tween these two schools in Britain would be t a k e n u p with equal or

g r e a t e r ferocity in G e r m a n y , with t h e Strmer o n t h e side of t h e irra-
tionalists a n d t h e A u f k l r u n g o n the side of r e a s o n .
I n light of all this, while Alfred B u m l e r ' s a r g u m e n t is crucial to
t h e p r o p e r contextualization of t h e Third Critique, it is also in-
c o m p l e t e . As E r n s t Cassirer p o i n t e d o u t in a long a n d incisive n o t e
to his Philosophy of the Enlightenment, B u m l e r , p e r h a p s o u t of a mis-
g u i d e d national p r i d e , rejected a l t o g e t h e r t h e influence of British
t h o u g h t o n K a n t . T h a t is as unlikely as t h e opposite view, p r o -
6 9

fessed by E d g a r Carritt, t h a t "Kant's philosophy of beauty owes

nearly e v e r y t h i n g b u t its systematic f o r m to English w r i t e r s . " T h e
70

issue is n o t even, as a m o r e r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r has p u t it, to find

the balance of "Kant's shifting d e b t to British a e s t h e t i c s . " T h e 71

question is r a t h e r what K a n t took to be t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n the British

m a d e to B a u m g a r t e n ' s question of t h e role of sensibility in valid
k n o w l e d g e . As we will see, for a long time Kant believed that t h e
British h a d t h e finalnegativeword o n that score.
K a n t could n o t r e a d English. T h a t makes t h e question of Kant's
assimilation of t h e British E n l i g h t e n m e n t problematic o n t h e most
basic level. Accordingly, it is i m p o r t a n t to establish w h e n , what, a n d
h o w British material r e a c h e d h i m . Few m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t e r s would
d i s p u t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of British thinkers for t h e K a n t of t h e
1760s. Beck goes so far as to write t h a t "in 1763 K a n t was as m u c h a
disciple of Shaftesbury a n d H u t c h e s o n as M e n d e l s s o h n w a s
p e r h a p s m o r e s o . " B o t h Mendelssohn's a n d Kant's submissions
7 2

for t h e Berlin A c a d e m y prize show this s t r o n g British influence,

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 29

t h o u g h M e n d e l s s o h n r e m a i n e d m o r e conventionally G e r m a n a n d
h e n c e w o n t h e p r i z e . K a n t articulated t h e key influence of British
73

t h o u g h t in t h e second p a r t of his essay: " I n these times we have first

b e g u n to realize that t h e faculty of conceiving t r u t h is intellection,
while t h a t of sensing t h e g o o d is feeling, a n d t h a t they m u s t n o t be
interchanged." 74

T h e major theory of m o r a l feeling, articulated by H u t c h e s o n in

1725, b e c a m e available in a G e r m a n translation in 1762. O t h e r
works by H u t c h e s o n h a d a p p e a r e d in translation even e a r l i e r . 75

K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d H u t c h e s o n in t h e published version of his Prize

Essay as t h e f o u n d e r of t h e school of m o r a l f e e l i n g . N o t only 76

H u t c h e s o n b u t especially H u m e p r o v e d influential in this p e r i o d . 77

H u m e ' s major essays h a d b e e n translated into G e r m a n in a four

v o l u m e collection in t h e late 1750s, a n d his s u b s e q u e n t essays came
swiftly into G e r m a n . T h e consistency a n d brilliance of H u m e ' s
7 8

skeptical distinction of m a t t e r s of fact from relations of ideas, of

empirical from necessary connections, m a d e a n impression o n all
serious p h i l o s o p h e r s in E u r o p e in t h e 1750s a n d 1 7 6 0 s . T o be 79

sure, t h e full scope of H u m e ' s radicalism was n o t a p p a r e n t to many,

a n d K a n t would only realize it after 1772, w h e n h e r e a d in the
translation of J a m e s Beattie's work a sustained attack o n H u m e
which h a d t h e m i s f o r t u n e of p r e s e n t i n g t h e s u p e r i o r a r g u m e n t s of
its o p p o n e n t in sufficient detail to refute itself. 80

B u t p e r h a p s equally i m p o r t a n t for K a n t in t h e early 1760s was

the Elements of Criticism, by H e n r y H o m e , L o r d K a m e s . It a p p e a r e d
in English in 1762, a n d a year later b e c a m e available in G e r m a n .
T h e reviewers praised it, a n d it p r o v e d influential in G e r m a n aes-
thetic t h o u g h t from that p o i n t forward. T h e early essays of H e r d e r ,
which d a t e from t h e m i d 1760s, consider K a m e s equal in stature to
B a u m g a r t e n in the question of a e s t h e t i c s . T h a t parallel, t h e r e is
81

r e a s o n to s u p p o s e , h e l e a r n e d from his teacher, I m m a n u e l Kant.

K a m e s served as t h e crucial expositor of t h e principle of the British
m e t h o d in aesthetics: criticism.
For t h e K a n t of the 1760s, "science" a n d "criticism" stood j u x -
taposed as alternative m e t h o d s for aesthetics. K a n t used the two
n a m e s , B a u m g a r t e n a n d H o m e (Kames), as personifications of the
two m e t h o d s . In his lectures in Logic, for e x a m p l e , h e observed:
" T h e p h i l o s o p h e r B a u m g a r t e n in F r a n k f u r t h a d t h e plan to m a k e
an aesthetic as science. More correctly, H o m e has n a m e d aesthetics
criticism, since it gives n o rules a priori t h a t sufficiently d e t e r m i n e
t h e j u d g m e n t , as does logic, but takes its rules a posteriori a n d only
makes t h e empirical laws g e n e r a l t h r o u g h c o m p a r i s o n s , by which

30 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

we know t h e imperfect a n d t h e perfect ( b e a u t i f u l ) . " T h e distinc-
82

tion of science a n d criticism is linked, h e r e , with t h e distinction of a

priori a n d a posteriori ( H u m e ) a n d applied to t h e c o n c e p t of "per-
fection," which B a u m g a r t e n associated with t h e idea of beauty.
T h e lectures which serve as the basis for t h e p u b l i s h e d Logic
stem from t h e 1770s, t h o u g h K a n t h a d b e e n giving t h e course since
t h e late 1750s. T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of Karnes with B a u m g a r t e n dates,
as attested by Reflection 1588, from t h e mid-1760s: "Fine art allows
only critique. H o m e . T h e r e f o r e n o science of t h e b e a u t i f u l . " 83

W i t h o u t Karnes's n a m e , b u t with j u s t the same c o n t e n t , are several

o t h e r crucial Reflections of t h e 1 7 6 0 s . I n Reflection 626, Kant dis-
84

t i n g u i s h e d k n o w l e d g e according to t h r e e m e t h o d s : science, disci-

pline (instruction in doctrine), a n d critique. T h e first o p e r a t e d o n a
rational, a priori basis. T h e second worked historically, a posteriori,
toward principles which could be converted ultimately into sci-
e n c e . T h e t h i r d w o r k e d only with Beurteilung, or j u d g m e n t , a n d it
8 5

was inevitably a n d incurably subjective. Aesthetics fell u n d e r this

last category, a n d , K a n t wrote, "for this reason the school t e r m 'aes-
thetic' s h o u l d be avoided, since it p e r m i t s n o instruction in
s c h o o l s . " K a n t h a d a b a n d o n e d t h e rational a p p r o a c h to b e a u t y
86

altogether. H e wrote tellingly: "We d o a n injustice to a n o t h e r w h o

does n o t perceive the worth or t h e beauty of what moves or delights
us, if we rejoin t h a t he does not understand it. H e r e it does n o t m a t t e r
so m u c h w h a t t h e understanding c o m p r e h e n d s , b u t w h a t t h e feeling
senses." 87

K a n t a d o p t e d t h e British a r g u m e n t t h a t "knowledge of beauty

is only criticism . . . [I]ts p r o o f is a p o s t e r i o r i . " T h e British h a d
88

c o m e to t h e conclusion t h a t t h e only plausible s t a n d a r d would be a n

empirical c o n s e n s u s a m o n g g e n t l e m e n of b r e e d i n g a n d cultiva-
tion. If t h e r e could b e n o a priori proof, n o science, K a n t realized,
t h e n t h e s t a n d a r d of taste could b e n o m o r e t h a n "general a g r e e -
m e n t in a n e p o c h of rational j u d g m e n t [Beurteilung]." T a s t e , as
89

distinct from a p p e t i t e , m a t t e r e d only in society, a n d t h e r e f o r e ,

while aesthetic p l e a s u r e m i g h t b e felt in all contexts, it would only
call for the reflection a n d j u d g m e n t involved in taste in the context
of a c o m m u n i t y which valued such discrimination. T h i s n o t i o n of a
sensus communis r e m a i n e d o n e of Kant's most i m p o r t a n t borrowings
from t h e British discussion of taste even in t h e Third Critique. 90

After his Prize Essay, Kant b e g a n c h a n g i n g rapidly from t h e

" m o r a l sense" a p p r o a c h of H u t c h e s o n t o w a r d s his o w n ultimately
rationalist ethics. It would n o t be too farfetched to see his Observa-
tions on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) as a kind of

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 31

d a t a - g a t h e r i n g in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e n e w a p p r o a c h to ethical p h i -
losophy which, in his Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen
in dem Winterhalbjahre 17651766, K a n t p r o p o s e d to teach: "eval-
u a t i n g historically a n d philosophically w h a t happens [with m e n ]
b e f o r e d e m o n s t r a t i n g w h a t ought to h a p p e n . " T h e r e is, in short,
9 1

a n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a n d m o r a l p u r p o s e b e h i n d t h e little essay, far

m o r e t h a n a n aesthetic o n e . K a n t realized that feelings involved
in aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n h a d significance for his philosophy of
morals.
T h e question r e m a i n s : W h a t led Kant to c o n c e r n himself p r e -
cisely with t h e two kinds of feeling called "sublime" a n d "beautiful"?
T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n evokes, of course, n o t j u s t t h e g e n e r a l discussion
which h a d b e e n t r a n s p i r i n g in Britain since t h e t u r n of t h e century,
b u t t h e specific title of E d m u n d Burke's key work, Enquiry into the
Original of our Feelings of the Sublime and the Beautiful, which a p -
p e a r e d in English in 1757. T h e work was only translated in 1773 (by
Lessing). K a n t did eventually r e a d it, to b e sure, because h e r e f e r r e d
to B u r k e ' s work in t h e Third Critique, b u t t h e r e is a g o o d deal of con-
troversy over w h e t h e r t h e work h a d any influence on his Observa-
tions. T h e o d o r e Gracyk has most recently a r g u e d that if t h e r e was
any influence, it passed via t h e m e d i a t i o n of Mendelssohn's writings
o n B u r k e . T h a t is, I think, almost certain. K a n t knew of Burke's
9 2

work, a n d probably f o u n d t h e idea of e c h o i n g its title very a p p e a l i n g

in t e r m s of t h e p o p u l a r i t y of his o w n work. B u t h e did n o t by any
m e a n s i n t e n d to give any serious analysis of Burke's a r g u m e n t s .
Significantly, t h e sublime receives clear p r i d e of place in t h e es-
say. K a n t identifies it with Rhrung, e m o t i o n , a n d especially m o v e -
m e n t of t h e m e n t a l faculties. More importantly, K a n t associates t h e
sublime with " t r u e virtue." H e a r g u e s t h a t only "that which rests o n
principles" deserves b o t h t h e appellations of g e n u i n e virtue a n d
sublimity. "As soon as this feeling has arisen to its p r o p e r univer-
sality, it has b e c o m e sublime" because "now, from a h i g h e r stand-
point, it has b e e n placed in its t r u e relation to y o u r total d u t y . " 93

H e n c e t h e sublime for K a n t was clearly a feeling with m o r a l a n d

spiritual e l e m e n t s .
If K a n t was fascinated with t h e "sublime" in t h e 1760s, h e did
n o t show t h e s a m e interest in "genius." I n t h e 1760s, Kant f o u n d
genius n e i t h e r provocative n o r p r o b l e m a t i c . H e accepted it as a
94

t e r m a p p r o p r i a t e for t h e conception of t h e distinctive practice in

t h e fine arts which c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e t e r m " j u d g m e n t " (beur-
teilen) in t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n or "criticism" of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e .

32 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

T h e key link between t h e m , for Kant, was that they could n o t be
t a u g h t . T h e y r e q u i r e d a n a t u r a l t a l e n t . B e y o n d that, Kant
9 5 96

merely assimilated the foreign theories of genius, a l o n g t h e lines

of Mendelssohn's c o m m e n t a r i e s , to the Psychologies empirica of
B a u m g a r t e n ' s Metaphysica, which h e b e g a n to use as his text for
courses in t h e m i d 1760s. B a u m g a r t e n , in 648 of t h a t work, h a d
already defined ingenium as t h a t h a r m o n y of all t h e cognitive fac-
ulties which results in a h e i g h t e n i n g a n d enlivening of their func-
t i o n . T h i s was t h e idea from which K a n t would always start o u t in
97

his a p p r o a c h to "genius." I n d e e d , it would b e c o m e the key to his

whole t h e o r y of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e .
If t h e issue of " g e n i u s " did n o t b e c o m e philosophically signifi-
cant for K a n t until t h e 1770s, t h e related issue of "imagination"
did, a g o o d deal e a r l i e r . F r o m t h e outset, K a n t conceived of aes-
98

thetic i m a g i n a t i o n as a d a n g e r o u s capacity to project the u n r e a l

u p o n t h e a c t u a l . I n Reflection 3 1 3 , from t h e mid-1760s, Kant
99

w r o t e : " I m a g i n a t i o n [Einbildung] is actually t h e illusion [Tuschung]

in which o n e believes h e sees s o m e t h i n g in t h e object which is actu-
ally t h e creation of o u r o w n brains. T h a t is how a n enthusiast
[Schwrmer] c o m e s to believe h e can find all his p h a n t o m s
[Hirngespinsten], a n d every particular sect its d o g m a s , in the Bible.
It is n o t t h a t they learn these things in the Bible so m u c h as t h a t they
r e a d t h e m into i t . " 1 0 0
T h e s e associations of i m a g i n a t i o n with "en-
thusiasts" (Schwrmer) a n d " p h a n t o m s " (Hirngespinste) a n d with r e -
ligious sectarians r e a p p e a r across Kant's work for the n e x t several
decades, a n d they form a decisive contextual b a c k d r o p for t h e Third
Critique. 101
Shaftesbury h a d f o r m u l a t e d t h e issue for E u r o p e as a
whole w h e n h e set forth the case for E n g l a n d in his celebrated a n d
widely r e a d Letter on Enthusiasm ( 1 7 0 8 ) . 102
H e recognized in "en-
t h u s i a s m " n o t only the creative mystery of genius, b u t also t h e d a n -
gers of frenzy a n d m a d n e s s in religious fanaticism. T h a t set of
connections o v e r s h a d o w e d m a n y e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y estimations
of genius, a n d later still t h e c o n n e c t i o n of genius with m a d n e s s be-
c a m e the favorite vein of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y t h i n k e r s .1 0 3

T h e d a n g e r s of " e n t h u s i a s m " (Schwrmerei) w e r e n o t merely

abstract a n d conjectural for Kant. T h e y were concrete a n d tangi-
ble, personified in o n e of t h e most r e m a r k a b l e a n d d i s t u r b i n g of his
p e r s o n a l a c q u a i n t a n c e s : H a m a n n . H a m a n n was a n u n m i t i g a t e d
"enthusiast," whose powerful religious sensibility m e r g e d with a
poetic sensitivity a n d a p e r s o n a l h y p o c h o n d r i a to create a charis-
matic b u t difficult personality whose influence u p o n the age was

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 33

n o t s m a l l . H a m a n n was able to draw o u t of Kant's powerful orbit
1 0 4

o n e of his best s t u d e n t s , J o h a n n H e r d e r , in t h e course of the early

1760s, a n d h e c o m m u n i c a t e d m a n y impulses to H e r d e r which K a n t
f o u n d extremely d a n g e r o u s . T h a t the subversion of H e r d e r from
A u f k l r u n g to Schwrmerei by H a m a n n in t h e early 1760s may have
b e e n a c o n t r i b u t i n g factor in Kant's ironic essay, Trume eines
Geistersehers (1766), is s o m e t h i n g t h a t has n o t b e e n sufficiently con-
sidered. 1 0 5
T o b e sure, t h e essay focuses primarily o n the fascina-
tion for t h e occultism of S w e d e n b o r g , b u t t h a t was t h e very stuff
H a m a n n f o u n d worthwhile. T o b e sure, t h e b r o a d e r target was
metaphysicians without m e t h o d or self-restraint, w h o projected
i m a g e s of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r into t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t . Yet o n c e again,
H a m a n n most emphatically believed in t h e continuity of realms,
a n d t h e validity of t h e most sensual, even sexual experiences as
t e s t a m e n t s of divinity. If Kant universalized t h e a r g u m e n t , as h e
always s o u g h t to d o , that does not m e a n that t h e r e m i g h t not have
b e e n a very particular goad to m a k e it. T h e irritation H a m a n n a n d
H e r d e r caused in Kant's life a n d t h o u g h t proves to be crucial.
K a n t w a r n e d H e r d e r , in a letter of 1768, against t h e excesses of
" g e n i u s . " T h a t Kant sensed a n excess of "genius" already in t h e
1 0 6

late 1760s is significant. For K a n t it was clear e n o u g h already in t h e

writings of E d w a r d Y o u n g , in H a m a n n ' s personality a n d writings
of the 1760s, a n d in t h e "enthusiastic" poetry of Friedrich
K l o p s t o c k . For Kant, t h e "cult of g e n i u s " was already a n issue by
107

t h e late 1760s, before the Sturm und Drang h a d in fact e m e r g e d . H e

was already p r e d i s p o s e d to reject it, before it h a d even b e g u n to in-
t r u d e o n his cultural world, as it would in time.
Kant's empirical skepticism r e a c h e d its h i g h p o i n t with the
writing of Trume eines Geistersehers. H e t u r n e d to e x t r e m e skepti-
cism n o t only because of t h e offensiveness of Schwrmerei b u t also
because of t h e powerful a r g u m e n t s from H u m e which K a n t re-
ceived via t h e new work of J o h a n n B a s e d o w . 108
I n the new work,
his t o n e as m u c h as his a r g u m e n t a l a r m e d his friends in t h e Berlin
A u f k l r u n g . M e n d e l s s o h n b e g a n his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with K a n t
by e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n over this precise issue. M e n d e l s s o h n al-
ready b e g a n to fear that K a n t was e m b a r k i n g o n a kind of P y r r h o -
nism which w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all rational metaphysics. K a n t
s o u g h t to r e a s s u r e h i m t h a t this was n o t the case. While h e be-
lieved t h a t all earlier metaphysics, a n d especially the self-
i n d u l g e n t metaphysics so c o m m o n in their day, was misguided, h e
claimed to b e c o m m i t t e d to metaphysics a n d p r o p o s e d to find the
correct way to g r o u n d i t . 1 0 9

34 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment

Aufklrung vs. S t u r m u n d D r a n g

T h e ultimate sense of A u f k l r u n g for I m m a n u e l K a n t would be t h e

defense of r e a s o n against w h a t h e took to be t h e d a n g e r o u s im-
pulses of Sturm und Drang irrationalism, especially as carried for-
ward by J o h a n n H e r d e r . H e r d e r first e n t e r e d Kant's life in 1762 as
a p o o r s t u d e n t at t h e University of Knigsberg, d i s e n c h a n t e d with
m e d i c i n e a n d interested in a clerical career. K a n t allowed h i m to
a t t e n d his lecture courses for free, a n d h e took a particular interest
in H e r d e r , allowing h i m to r e a d several u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t s
of his o w n a n d o p e n i n g u p his library to t h e y o u n g m a n . T h r o u g h
Kant, H e r d e r c a m e to learn for t h e first time of such E u r o p e a n emi-
nences as H u m e , M o n t e s q u i e u , a n d Rousseau. O f all this, H e r d e r ' s
description of K a n t has given us evidence. B u t t h e y o u n g H e r d e r
was d r a w n to a n o t h e r m e n t o r at Knigsberg, the "Magus of the
N o r t h , " H a m a n n , b o t h by t h e charisma of his personality, with its
strange b l e n d of mysticism a n d poetry, a n d by t h e skill h e h a d to
offer: k n o w l e d g e of t h e English l a n g u a g e . Studying with H a m a n n ,
H e r d e r fell u n d e r his spell. H a m a n n himself r e s p o n d e d by p u t t i n g
o n p a p e r m a n y of his ideas o n t h e m e s of m u t u a l interest, in particu-
lar poetry, l a n g u a g e , genius, a n d t h e i r relations to t h e mystical-
metaphysical g r o u n d of b e i n g . T h e work Aesthetica in nuce,
H a m a n n ' s most sustained aesthetic philosophy, was c o m p o s e d
while H e r d e r was his s t u d e n t , a n d p r e s u m a b l y with the y o u n g m a n
as ideal r e a d e r .1 1 0
For Kant, this influence u p o n t h e y o u n g a n d tal-
e n t e d H e r d e r could only be baleful.
I n 1764 H e r d e r left t h e university; t h e n e x t year h e was or-
d a i n e d a n d took u p t h e ministry in Riga. B u t his intellectual inter-
ests r e m a i n e d primarily literary, n o t theological, a n d h e worked u p
a first critical effort, Uber die neuere deutsche Literatur: Fragmente,
which h e p u b l i s h e d in 1767. T h i s work, which dealt with p r o b l e m s
of l a n g u a g e a n d stylistic d e v e l o p m e n t in literature, showed clearly
the p r e d o m i n a n c e of H a m a n n over K a n t as inspiration: the t h e m e ,
the texts, a n d the m e t h o d s all suggested H a m a n n ' s a p p r o a c h a n d
interests. Kant, while h e c o n g r a t u l a t e d his f o r m e r s t u d e n t for his
first publication a n d praised his style by c o m p a r i n g it to P o p e , his
own favorite p o e t (but hardly Herder's!), nevertheless w a r n e d
against s o m e t e n d e n c i e s h e saw in t h e work towards a n excessive
i n d u l g e n c e of "genius"i.e., Schwrmerei. 111

B u t H e r d e r went his own way. I n 1769 h e left Riga, sailing to

F r a n c e to c o m e to closer grips with t h e philosophy of t h e Enlight-
e n m e n t . H e swiftly w i t h d r e w to Strassburg, w h e r e h e m e t a y o u n g

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 35

law s t u d e n t from F r a n k f u r t , J o h a n n Wolfgang von G o e t h e , in
1770. T o g e t h e r they l a u n c h e d a literary revolution in G e r m a n y ,
t h e Sturm und Drang. 112
H e r d e r c o m p o s e d t h r e e crucial essays in
literary criticism a n d aesthetics in t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h of t h e
Strassburg friendship. T h e first dealt with "Ossian" a n d t h e q u e s -
tion of folk poetry. T h e second dealt with S h a k e s p e a r e a n d his sig-
nificance for m o d e r n literature. T h e s e two, t o g e t h e r with a n essay
by G o e t h e o n t h e Strassburg c a t h e d r a l a n d Gothic architecture,
were eventually p u b l i s h e d , in 1773, in a v o l u m e entitled Von deut-
scher Art und Kunst, t h e g r e a t manifesto of t h e Sturm und Drang.
113

T h e t h i r d essay was s u b m i t t e d to t h e Berlin A c a d e m y in c o m p e t i -

tion for t h e prize for t h e best essay o n t h e origins of l a n g u a g e .
H e r d e r w o n t h e prize. T h e result of all this was that by t h e m i d
1770s H e r d e r a n d G o e t h e , w h o m e a n w h i l e published Gtz von
Berlichingen a n d t h e e n o r m o u s l y successful Leiden des jungen
Werther, h a d b e c o m e t h e n e w lions of G e r m a n letters.
T h e incongruity b e t w e e n H e r d e r ' s c a r e e r a n d his publications
c o n t i n u e d , however. I n 1771 h e was a p p o i n t e d c o u r t p r e a c h e r in
B c k e b u r g . H e h e l d this position until 1776, w h e n G o e t h e secured
h i m t h e office of Generalsuperintendent of L u t h e r a n clergy in
Weimar. T h i s " B c k e b u r g p e r i o d " was H e r d e r ' s most intensely re-
ligious, a time w h e n h e c a m e closest to t h e mystical, f u n d a m e n t a l i s t
" e n t h u s i a s m " of H a m a n n , a n d of a new a n d n o t o r i o u s friend,
J o h a n n C a s p a r Lavater, a Swiss mystic a n d s t u d e n t of physiog-
nomy. 1 1 4
Lavater h a d occasioned a n e n o r m o u s scandal in 1769 by
c h a l l e n g i n g M e n d e l s s o h n e i t h e r to refute t h e a r g u m e n t s of Charles
B o n n e t for Christianity o r to c o n v e r t . H a m a n n a n d H e r d e r d e -
1 1 5

f e n d e d Lavater in this c o n t r o v e r s y . Kant, as m i g h t be expected,

116

sided with M e n d e l s s o h n a n d L e s s i n g . 117

Religion was, from t h e first, p a r t of t h e constellation of d a n -

gers involved in Schwrmerei for Kant. All expressed themselves
clearly in t h e L a v a t e r - M e n d e l s s o h n affair. H e r d e r , for Kant, took
o n all t h e blemishes of his friends Lavater a n d H a m a n n . I n d e e d
K a n t f o u n d these blemishes in H e r d e r ' s o w n works, above all in
lteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts a n d , p e r h a p s less i m m e -
diately, in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, b o t h published in
1774. K a n t r e a d w h a t H e r d e r wrote. O f t h a t we can be quite confi-
d e n t . We k n o w that h e r e a d H e r d e r ' s first publication, because h e
wrote t o H e r d e r a b o u t it. We know for certain t h a t h e r e a d lteste
Urkunde. W e know t h a t h e r e a d Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte
der Menschheit. We m u s t a s s u m e Kant r e a d almost everything

36 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

H e r d e r w r o t e , a n d we may t h e r e f o r e connect specific Reflections
from Kant's "silent d e c a d e " with his r e a d i n g of particular essays
by H e r d e r . If we d o so, we can weave a story o u t of Kant's Reflec-
tions of t h e 1770s with decisive i m p o r t a n c e for t h e contextualiza-
tion of his Third Critique.
T h e earliest Reflection in which we can trace Kant's uneasiness
over t h e n e w t e n d e n c i e s in G e r m a n c u l t u r e which were associated
with t h e Sturm und Drang, a n d h e n c e with H e r d e r , is 767, which
dates from 177273. It is i m p o r t a n t for its d i s p a r a g e m e n t of
Rhrung (emotional agitation) a n d Reiz ( c h a r m ) : 1 1 8
"Charms and
e m o t i o n s m o v e o n e against one's will; they are always i m p u d e n t be-
cause they r o b o t h e r s of their peace. (To storm [strmen] against my
sensibilities is r u d e [unartig]. I m a y want to have my e m o t i o n s
stirred, b u t only in a way in which I k e e p these u n d e r my o w n con-
trol. W h e n that line is crossed over, t h e n others a r e playing with m e
r a t h e r t h a n letting m e into t h e i r g a m e . . . ) . " T h a t this refers to
1 1 9

the style of t h e Sturm und Drang is u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . It suggests t h a t

K a n t knew a b o u t the new t r e n d s in G e r m a n literature, b u t that, as
we would expect, h e did n o t like t h e m . 1 2 0
K a n t claimed t h a t "this
sort of d i s t u r b a n c e puts m a n y off a n d is t h e r e f o r e n o t likely to be
popular." 1 2 1
H e was w r o n g .
Sturm und Drang s u r g e d into h i g h g e a r in the years 177374.
H e r d e r p u b l i s h e d two works of e x t r e m e self-indulgence a n d i m p u -
d e n c e in which h e t r o d o n t h e toes of e m i n e n c e s a n d authorities in
m a n y fields. 122
Kant, observing this from afar, a n d himself deeply
e n m e s h e d in the most d e m a n d i n g a n d r i g o r o u s philosophical in-
vestigations, f o u n d t h e new t r e n d in his f o r m e r s t u d e n t utterly of-
fensive. T h e result was g r e a t irritation. It expressed itself in a series
of Reflections a n d in some heavily ironic c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with
H a m a n n . T h e c e n t e r of it all was H e r d e r ' s work lteste Urkunde des
Menschengeschlechts, the study of Genesis as a historical source for
t h e origins of t h e h u m a n race. I n t h e work, H e r d e r s o u g h t to apply
t h e new historical m e t h o d o l o g y which h e h a d d e v e l o p e d in his es-
says of t h e early 1770s, a n d to follow in t h e footsteps of the power-
ful work by B i s h o p Robert L o w t h of E n g l a n d o n the poetry of t h e
Hebrews. 1 2 3
B u t h e also p l u n g e d into some highly self-indulgent
tirades against o t h e r s a n d glorifications of himself a n d the mystical
insight of which h e as a self-proclaimed genius was c a p a b l e . T h i s 1 2 4

g r a t e d o n the ears n o t only of those h e attacked, b u t even of those

w h o were his f r i e n d s . 1 2 5

It was all too m u c h for Kant. I n Reflection 771 h e e x p l o d e d :

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 37

 W h o e v e r sets any sort of intuitions in t h e place of o r d i n a r y
reflection by u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n (puts that sort of
t h i n g which is a m a t t e r strictly of concepts a n d of which we
have absolutely n o intuition . . . [lined out]), raves [schwrmt].
H e has to set his feelings, his m e n t a l agitations, images, t h e
h a l f - d r e a m e d , h a l f - t h o u g h t notions which play a b o u t in his
swirling m i n d , before t h e m a t t e r at h a n d [die Sache selbst], for
these a p p e a r to h i m a u n i q u e [besonderen] p o w e r in himself.
T h e less h e can m a k e himself u n d e r s t o o d , t h e m o r e h e crit-
icizes t h e limitations of l a n g u a g e a n d of r e a s o n a n d is a n
e n e m y of all distinctness because h e is e n t e r t a i n e d not by con-
cepts, n o t even by images, b u t by m e n t a l agitation. Even
writers of feeling actualize their caprices. T h e y may o n e a n d
all have genius, be full of sensibility a n d spirit, even s o m e
taste, b u t they a r e without t h e dryness a n d laboriousness a n d
cold-bloodedness ofj u d g m e n t . E v e r y t h i n g that is distinct p r e -
sents itself o n e aspect after a n o t h e r a n d t h e n in a concept of
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; they want to b e able to intuit all aspects
at o n c e . E v e r y t h i n g mystical is welcome to t h e m ; they see
u n h e a r d - o f things in enthusiastic writings or best of all in a n -
cient texts; the n e w e r writing, j u s t because it is precise a n d sets
b o n d s u p o n t h e i r s h r i e k i n g spirits, seems to t h e m short-
sighted a n d s h a l l o w .126

I n this Reflection, K a n t clearly associates genius with Schwrmerei

a n d contrasts it with "cold-bloodedness of j u d g m e n t . " T h e f o r m e r
is self-indulgent a n d trusts in a mystical-mysterious subjective
p o w e r r a t h e r t h a n in t h e orderly discrimination of u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h e f o r m e r denies t h e p o w e r of l a n g u a g e a n d reason to give clear
expressions of t r u t h . It d i s p a r a g e s t h e rationality of t h e Aufklr-
u n g , a n d opts instead for t h e esoteric wisdom of occult writing,
m o d e r n (e.g. S w e d e n b o r g ) or especially ancient.
K a n t identifies himself, in this as in o t h e r Reflections, with "dry-
ness a n d laboriousness a n d cold-bloodedness of j u d g m e n t " a n d
with t h e logical a p p r o a c h of t h e A u f k l r u n g . I n Reflection lib, for
e x a m p l e , K a n t despairs of m a k i n g any of t h e Schwrmer ever a t t e n d
to a rational a r g u m e n t . " T h e y have to d e l u d e themselves a n d o t h -
ers in o r d e r to a p p e a r to b e fully e n d o w e d with insight which only
shallow pates may d i s e n t a n g l e . T h e y c a n n o t let their genius stiffen
a n d grow cold by tarrying. Flashes of wit are t h e gift of genius . . . I f
they w e r e to c o n d e s c e n d to j o i n the r a n k s of cold scholars, they
w o u l d play a very m e n i a l role. B u t now they can flash like m e -

38 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

teors." 1 2 7
T h e e d g e of r e s e n t m e n t o n Kant's p a r t is even clearer
h e r e t h a n in t h e Reflection we cited in full. T h e question is: can we
specify exactly w h o m K a n t is describing? We can, a n d it is H e r d e r .
H e r d e r ' s Alteste Urkunde e m p h a s i z e d the vividness a n d i m m e -
diacy of t h e poetic imagery of t h e H e b r e w s in the Old T e s t a m e n t as
a g r o u n d for t h e i r g r e a t e r validity t h a n rational a r g u m e n t s could
p r o v i d e . We can find several revealing Reflections from t h e early
1 2 8

1770s in which K a n t shows his e x t r e m e displeasure with this idea.

I n Reflection 7 6 5 , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e was a difference b e t w e e n
those w h o p r e f e r r e d the particular a n d u n i q u e a n d those w h o p r e -
ferred the principle of h a r m o n y a n d o r d e r . H e left n o question as to
his o w n allegiance in t h a t question, a n d t h e n went o n to m a k e t h e
contrast in ethnic t e r m s . N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n s , h e a r g u e d , p r e -
ferred a m o r e rational a p p r o a c h , while "Oriental p e o p l e s " t e n d e d
to b e m o r e s e n s u a l .
1 2 9
It is clear w h o these "Oriental p e o p l e " a r e
from Reflection 789:

W o u l d to G o d that we could be s p a r e d this O r i e n t a l wisdom;

n o t h i n g can b e l e a r n e d from it; t h e world has received n o in-
struction from t h e m b u t a kind of mechanical artifice, astron-
o m y a n d n u m b e r s . O n c e we h a d Occidental e d u c a t i o n from
t h e Greeks t h e n we were able to lend some rationality to the
O r i e n t a l scriptures, b u t they would never have m a d e t h e m -
selves u n d e r s t o o d o n their own. T o be sure t h e r e was once a
wise m a n , w h o was entirely different from his n a t i o n a n d
t a u g h t a healthy, practical religion, which, for the sake of t h e
times h e h a d to dress u p in images a n d old parables; b u t his
teachings fell swiftly into h a n d s which s p r e a d t h e whole O r i -
ental n o n s e n s e [den ganzen orientalischen Kram] over t h e m a n d
o n c e again set a s t u m b l i n g block for r e a s o n . 1 3 0

T h e editor of Kant's Reflections on Anthropology, Erich Adickes, cites

two passages from Kant's lectures o n a n t h r o p o l o g y from t h e early
1770s which s u p p l e m e n t this discussion. I n o n e , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t
O r i e n t a l p e o p l e were totally unfit for rational t h o u g h t , a n d t h u s in-
capable of clarifying morals or law. H e t h e r e f o r e w a r n e d against
the effort of " s o m e , w h o wish to i m p r o v e E u r o p e a n style by a rich-
ness of imagery." T h e y t h r e a t e n e d t h e c o n c e p t u a l rationalism of
E u r o p e , a n d m e a n t to think in images r a t h e r t h a n ideas. I n t h e
o t h e r passage, K a n t n o t e d that in G e r m a n y t h e r e were those w h o
wished to i n t r o d u c e O r i e n t a l rhetoric, b u t h e rejected this, because
O r i e n t a l p e o p l e s i n d u l g e d in "bombastic ideas which went b e y o n d
the b o u n d s of r e a s o n . " E u r o p e was too used to "purity" of t h o u g h t ,

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 39

too " e n l i g h t e n e d . " K a n t insisted t h a t t h e whole m a n n e r of t h e west-
e r n p e o p l e s was such t h a t they were m o r e interested in u n d e r s t a n d -
ing t h a n sensibility. Adickes a d d s : " T h e r e is n o d o u b t [that as t h e
G e r m a n advocates of this ' O r i e n t a l style' Kant] m e a n t H a m a n n a n d
Herder." 1 3 1

T h e confirmation of this connection is to be f o u n d , finally, in

t h e letters e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n K a n t a n d H a m a n n over H e r d e r ' s
lteste Urkunde in April 1774. Kant's first letter e n d e d with a very
ironic a p p e a l :

If you, d e a r friend, can find a way to i m p r o v e my g r a s p of the

m a i n i n t e n t i o n of t h e a u t h o r I ask that you give m e y o u r opin-
ion in a few lines, b u t if possible in t h e l a n g u a g e of m e n . For I,
p o o r son of t h e e a r t h t h a t I a m , find myself utterly u n c o n -
stituted for t h e godly l a n g u a g e of intuitive r e a s o n . O n the
o t h e r h a n d , w h a t o n e spells o u t for m e with c o m m o n concepts
a c c o r d i n g to logical rules I can h a n d l e perfectly well. Also, I
want m e r e l y to ascertain t h e t h e m e of t h e a u t h o r , for to com-
p r e h e n d it in its entire w o r t h according to t h e evidence is n o t a
m a t t e r I would d a r e to u n d e r t a k e . 1 3 2

H a m a n n a n s w e r e d with e q u a l irony, m o c k i n g s o m e of Kant's

p h r a s i n g in a way which m a d e H e r d e r s o u n d m o r e provocative.
H a m a n n mystified, r a t h e r t h a n clarified H e r d e r , a n d glorified h i m
j u s t for this e l e m e n t of m y s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e result was to e s t r a n g e
133

K a n t still further. I n his rejoinder, Kant m a d e a shrewd a n d telling

criticism of t h e a p p r o a c h to t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t that H e r d e r was ad-
vocating:

If o n c e a religion is placed in t h e position t h a t critical c o m p e -

tence in a n c i e n t l a n g u a g e s , philology, a n d a n t i q u a r i a n schol-
a r s h i p a r e necessary to set t h e f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n which it
m u s t build for all times a n d all peoples, t h e n t h e p e r s o n w h o
has familiarized himself best with Greek, H e b r e w , Syrian,
Arabic, etc., a n d with t h e archives of antiquity, will b e able to
m a n i p u l a t e all o r t h o d o x believers a b o u t like children, n o mat-
ter how sourly they r e a c t . 1 3 4

T h i s p o i n t of view evokes r e s o n a n c e s with Lessing's challenge to or-

t h o d o x y over the R e i m a r u s fragments, which would rip G e r m a n y
a p a r t over t h e issue of theology in the later 1770s. T h a t issue will
c o n c e r n us in detail at a later j u n c t u r e , b u t it is crucial to n o t e h e r e
t h a t for Kant, t h e religion controversy, especially as c o n d u c t e d by
these s t r a n g e m y s t a g o g u e - f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s , H a m a n n a n d Lavater

40 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

a n d i n his v i e w H e r d e r , was p a r t a n d parcel of t h e Sturm und
Drang. T h a t c o n n e c t i o n was reinforced in Kant's m i n d at just this
m o m e n t , for h e received a typically "enthusiastic" letter from t h e
n o t o r i o u s Lavater, d a t e d t h a t very same day, identifying himself as
a g o o d friend of H e r d e r . 1 3 5

Kant's irritation with Schwrmerei was s h a r e d by o t h e r s of

t h e A u f k l r u n g . Lessing, for e x a m p l e , was deeply offended by
Lavater's t r e a t m e n t of M e n d e l s s o h n a n d devoted t h e last ten years
of his life to a sly c a m p a i g n to d e b u n k t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of f u n d a -
mentalists a n d m y s t a g o g u e s a n d salvage some rational m e a n i n g
from t h e t h o u s a n d years of Christian civilization in t h e W e s t . 1 3 6

M e n d e l s s o h n , obviously, h a d to deal with t h e issue, a n d h e did in

Jerusalem, his g r e a t defense of J u d a i s m a n d E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d
plea for civil rights for J e w s . 1 3 7
T h e issue of Schwrmerei a n d its
association with genius f o u n d massive exposition in the work of a
Zrich professor, L e o n h a r d Meister, Uber die Schwrmerei (2 vols.;
1 7 7 5 - 7 7 ) . Meister c o n n e c t e d passion with i m a g i n a t i o n as t h e
source of t h e frenzy of visionaries a n d p o e t s . Back in E n g l a n d ,
1 3 8

w h e r e t h e c o n c e r n a b o u t " e n t h u s i a s m " d a t e d all the way back to

t h e m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h century, t h e "cult of g e n i u s " h a d d r a w n simi-
lar criticism, a n d a m o r e rational a p p r o a c h to genius developed.
P e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t figure in this effort was A l e x a n d e r
G e r a r d . H e s o u g h t to avoid t h e "enthusiastic" theory of genius by
offering a m o r e m u n d a n e version. I n his prize-winning Essay on
Taste h e h a d already a d d r e s s e d t h e question of genius. B u t in a
series of s u p p l e m e n t a r y lectures in 175859 h e elaborated o n his
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . B o t h works m a d e their way into G e r m a n transla-
tion, a n d it is highly p r o b a b l e t h a t Kant r e a d t h e m in t h e same
years t h a t we are e x a m i n i n g . T h e Essay on Taste was translated in
1766; t h e Essay on Genius a p p e a r e d in G e r m a n translation in 1776
a n d we k n o w with certainty t h a t K a n t r e a d it j u s t a b o u t as soon as
it arrived. H e was also r e a d i n g the new translation of Burke's En-
quiry, with its n o - n o n s e n s e sensationalist a p p r o a c h to h u m a n e m o -
tions, for Lessing's translation a p p e a r e d in 1773. A r m e d with this
level-headed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , K a n t set a b o u t devising a t h e o r y
which could explain t h e excesses of t h e Strmer, o n t h e o n e h a n d ,
a n d give a d e q u a t e recognition to t r u e genius, o n t h e other. T h e
result was a t h e o r y of genius which asserted the firm conviction
t h a t genius h a d n o place in s c i e n c e . We will take u p t h a t t h e o r y
139

in its final form, as articulated in the Third Critique, later in this

work. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t to g r a s p is that t h e exclusion of science
from genius was n o t a d i s p a r a g e m e n t of science b u t r a t h e r of

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 41

genius, a n d was g r o u n d e d in Kant's disdain for the Sturm und
Drang. T h a t b e c a m e absolute in his m i n d after a second, even
m o r e e x t r e m e b o u t of a n g e r at H e r d e r , this time from t h e very
late 1770s.
W e m u s t recall how strenuously Kant was w o r k i n g across this
"silent d e c a d e , " h o w l o n g it was taking for h i m to c o m e u p with his
n e w "critique" of metaphysics a n d morals, which h e kept p r o m i s i n g
his c o r r e s p o n d e n t s w o u l d soon be at h a n d . We m u s t recall t h e e p -
ochal n a t u r e of t h e work K a n t was accomplishing, t h e n with a Kan-
tian eye survey t h e literary scene of t h e late 1770s a n d see what
G e r m a n y f o u n d exciting. T a k e , for e x a m p l e , Lavater's Physiol-
ogische Fragmente (177578), with contributions from G o e t h e a n d
H e r d e r . Wieland's n e w j o u r n a l , Teutsche Merkur, established in
1773, actually credited such a u t h o r s as G o e t h e a n d Lenz with the
r e n o v a t i o n of t r a g e d y a n d c o m e d y in t h e G e r m a n l a n g u a g e . J u s t u s
Moser h a d t h e temerity to d e f e n d such literature against t h e crit-
icism of the king of Prussia. P e o p l e flocked to F r a n k f u r t to m e e t the
"universal g e n i u s " G o e t h e as t h o u g h h e were M o h a m m e d in
Mecca. Closer to h o m e , take t h e questions p o s e d by t h e Berlin
A c a d e m y . T h e topic for t h e prize essay in 1775 was: " W h a t is Ge-
nius, of w h a t e l e m e n t s is it c o m p o s e d , a n d d o these p e r m i t t h e m -
selves to b e distinguished within i t ? " Sulzer p o s e d it, after h a v i n g
1 4 0

given his o w n schwrmerisch answer in his Allgemeine Theorie der

schnen Knste (2 vols., 177174), a n d it was a n obvious o p p o r t u n i t y
for t h e Strmer to advertise themselves. For this prize H e r d e r com-
posed his essay, Von Erkennen und Empfinden, published in Riga in
1778. T h e winner, however, was J o h a n n E b e r h a r d , a n o r t h o d o x
Wolffian. 141
Still, t h e year before H e r d e r h a d won his second prize
from t h e a c a d e m y in t h e d e c a d e ; t h e t h e m e h a d b e e n o n t h e dec-
a d e n c e of taste in p e o p l e s . T h e Sturm und Drang was, as far as
1 4 2

K a n t could tell, c o n t i n u i n g along its m a d c o u r s e . 1 4 3

H e r d e r ' s prize essay submission, Von Erkennen und Empfinden,

a n d a s u b s e q u e n t essay, " U b e r d e n Einflu d e r s c h n e n in die
h h e r e n Wissenschaften," which a p p e a r e d in 1779, h a d to d o with
philosophy. T h e y a r g u e d against dividing h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e into
abstract faculties a n d insisted u p o n t h e wholeness which art a n d
poetry above all e v o k e d . I n these essays K a n t could n o t h e l p b u t
1 4 4

r e a d a n attack o n his concept of philosophy a n d h e n c e o n himself.

I n his Reflections, K a n t d e f e n d e d himself:

H e r d e r is very m u c h against the misuse of r e a s o n t h r o u g h a n

utterly abstract kind of thinking, in that o n e t h e r e b y neglects

42 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 t h e concrete. T h a t was t h e habit of the ancients in their n a t u r a l
philosophy. B u t t h e g e n e r a l is n o t always merely abstract;
r a t h e r , t h e r e a r e m a n y things which are i n d e p e n d e n t univer-
s a l . T h a t is t h e n a t u r e of all j u d g m e n t s which even in concreto
are n o t d e p e n d e n t o n e x p e r i e n c e , b u t w h e r e such j u d g m e n t s
of e x p e r i e n c e themselves r e q u i r e principles a priori. H e r e
t h e r e is n o place for the concrete. 145

In yet a n o t h e r Reflection, K a n t c o n t i n u e d his attack: " H e r d e r cor-

r u p t s m i n d s because h e gives t h e m e n c o u r a g e m e n t to m a k e univer-
s a l j u d g m e n t s u s i n g merely empirical r e a s o n w i t h o u t any t h o r o u g h
consideration of p r i n c i p l e s . " T h i s was t h e K a n t of t h e Critique of
146

Pure Reason writing, a n d his disdain was g r o u n d e d in a philosophi-

cal sophistication H e r d e r could n e v e r a p p r o a c h .
H a v i n g r e b u t t e d t h e criticism of his own position, K a n t u n d e r -
took a sustained d e b u n k i n g of the weakness of t h e a p p r o a c h fos-
t e r e d by H e r d e r . " T h e a d e p t s of genius, w h o m u s t lay claim to
genius a n d can only c o u n t o n t h e a p p r o v a l of p e o p l e of genius, are
those w h o c a n n o t c o m m u n i c a t e b u t m u s t c o u n t for c o m p r e h e n s i o n
only u p o n a c o m m u n a l , sympathetic inspiration . . . T h e artifice
consists of scraps [Brocken] of science a n d l e a r n i n g sewn t o g e t h e r
with t h e prestige of a n original spirit, criticism of o t h e r s , a n d a
deeply h i d d e n religious sense, to give t h e l a u n d r y [Gewsche] dig-
nity." 147
K a n t d e n i e d that o n e could have intellectual intuitions,
a n d h e d e n i e d t h a t images served better t h a n universal concepts.
" T h e r e a r e only two sources of valid insights: rational science or
critical clarity. A n d t h e n s o m e o n e comes along with a t h r o w n -
t o g e t h e r b a g of scraps from b o t h , without m e t h o d a n d science, b u t
a n i m a t e d [beseelt] with a spirit of inspiration. All such enthusiasts
talk r e l i g i o n . " Reason was t h e only vehicle for t r u e c o m m u n i c a -
148

tion, for g e n e r a l validity. It was h u m a n n a t u r e to g r a s p the particu-

lar only t h r o u g h the universals of reason. For Kant, t h e p r i d e of
A u f k l r u n g was its a d v a n c e m e n t of reason, n o t its i n d u l g e n c e in
occult s y m b o l i s m . A u t h e n t i c genius s o u g h t universality of access
149

a n d m e a n i n g . T h o s e w h o insisted u p o n mystification, w h o refused

to be e x a m i n e d in t h e clear light of reason, were n o t practicing ge-
nius b u t i l l u s i o n .150

K a n t carried this criticism forward into a series of Reflections o n

the new literary style. H e a r g u e d t h a t Klopstock, for h i m t h e first of
these schwrmerisch a u t h o r s in G e r m a n y , h a d n o t nearly t h e a u t h e n -
tic g e n i u s of a Milton, a n d could easily be i m i t a t e d . O n t h e o t h e r
151

h a n d , h e c o n c e d e d t h a t schwrmerisch a u t h o r s could b e of v a l u e

Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung 43

such a u t h o r s as Rousseau a n d Plato, for e x a m p l e . Even Lavater
could be u s e d by a critical m i n d to indicate t h e excesses which m o r e
discreet believers m i g h t conceal from scrutiny in their o r t h o d o x y .
B u t to be useful, they h a d at least to be wrestling with a n i m p o r t a n t
matter. 1 5 2
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t did not c o n t r i b u t e to e n t e r t a i n -
m e n t (fine art), invention (technology), or u n d e r s t a n d i n g (scholar-
ship) s h o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a m a t t e r of genius, b u t r a t h e r of t h e
"fantastical" [Phantasterei]. T h a t style Kant e q u a t e d with the al-
chemical a n d mystical writings of J a c o b B h m e . 1 5 3

K a n t linked this criticism with his l o n g e r - s t a n d i n g suspicion of

imaginative excessfantasyas the p h r a s e Phantasterei suggests.
I n several Reflections from t h e late 1770s, h e r e t u r n e d to the ques-
tion of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d fantasy, stressing this c o n n e c t i o n with Sch-
wrmerei. Above all, h e c a u t i o n e d against t h e loss of self-control
which i n d u l g e n c e in fantasy ("ecstasy") could entail. " O n e should
n e v e r be beside oneself, b u t r a t h e r in possession of oneself [Man mu
niemals auer sich, sondern bei sich selbst sein.]" 154
H e m a d e a set of
associations with this excessive fantasy: with h y p o c h o n d r i a c s , with
t h e superstitious, with O r i e n t a l peoples. H a m a n n h a d to figure in
that set of a s s o c i a t i o n s . For Kant, imagination h a d to b e disci-
155

plined if it w e r e to be p r o d u c t i v e . O t h e r w i s e o n e risked losing track

of t h e actual by c r e d i t i n g t h e u n r e a l . 1 5 6

T h e v o l u m e of observations o n these m a t t e r s , t h e consistency

of t h e l a n g u a g e which h e used, a n d t h e v e h e m e n c e of Kant's c o m -
m e n t a r y suggest t h e seriousness with which Kant r e s p o n d e d to
H e r d e r a n d the Sturm und Drang. A n d yet all this was in private.
Publicly h e said n o t h i n g across t h e entire d e c a d e of t h e 1770s. H e
patiently went o n b u i l d i n g his world-historical m o n u m e n t of rea-
son. B u t w h e n h e p u b l i s h e d it, n o o n e cared. H e r d e r r e m a i n e d t h e
d a r l i n g child of t h e age. A n d that was the last straw. K a n t was ready
for a public s h o w d o w n .

44 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment'

 ^ Two

KANT'S RETURN T O AESTHETICS

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
AND T H E "CRITIQUE OF TASTE"

T
o situate t h e Third Critique within t h e "critical philoso-
phy," it is necessary to establish how it relates to the First
Critique's articulation of t h e limits of philosophical reason-
i n g a n d its criteria for valid knowledge. T h e r e a r e those
w h o , as Mary G r e g o r has p u t it, suspect t h a t " K a n t sometimes
writes, in the t h i r d Critique, as if h e h a d n o t r e a d t h e Critique of Pure
Reason." I n t h e light of such observations, it is i m p o r t a n t to con-
1

sider w h e t h e r t h e Third Critique does flagrantly violate the con-

straints of t h e First Critique; i.e., are its innovations contradictory or
d e v e l o p m e n t a l ? T o be specific, was Kantjustified in conceiving of a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle a priori for noncognitive h u m a n experi-
ence? T h a t was t h e whole idea b e h i n d t h e a t t e m p t at a "Critique of
Taste." A n d , with his s t r o n g e m p h a s i s o n a subjective j u d g m e n t
a p a r t from t h e categories, was Kant's very c o n c e p t i o n of a "judg-
m e n t of taste" in u t t e r violation of his rules for t h e possibility of ex-
perience? T h e s e two questions pose the i m m a n e n t philosophical
p r o b l e m of Kant's decision to c o m p o s e t h e Third Critique.
Moreover, as h e wrote o n it, h e c a m e to conceive a philosophi-
cal viewpoint for t h e Third Critique which e x t e n d e d a n d t h e r e f o r e
m o d i f i e d t h e cognitive t h e o r y of the First Critique: the theory of
reflective j u d g m e n t . T h i s was t h e essence of t h e "cognitive t u r n "
2

t h a t r e s h a p e d t h e "Critique of T a s t e " into t h e full-fledged Critique

of Judgment. T o g r a s p the evolution of the Third Critique, accord-
ingly, it is inevitable t h a t we m u s t consider it in relation to its p r e -
decessors. T h i s c h a p t e r will consider t h e p r o b l e m of transcen-
d e n t a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e n e x t will e x p l o r e t h e p r o b l e m of t h e
p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness. Later, in p a r t 2, we
will take u p t h e "cognitive t u r n " a n d t h e theory of reflective j u d g -
ment.

45
 Kant's r e t u r n to aesthetics in 1787 h a d b o t h a contextual a n d
a n i m m a n e n t origin. T h e c o n t e x t u a l origin lay in Kant's hostility to
H e r d e r a n d t h e Sturm und Drang. Kant h a d a score to settle with
t h e m o n t h e question of art a n d genius, as we have seen. T h e i m m a -
n e n t origin lay in a crucial innovation in Kant's theory of transcen-
d e n t a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . W h e n h e took u p t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in
S e p t e m b e r 1787, K a n t r e t u r n e d to a question h e h a d j u d g e d fruit-
less in t h e Critique of Pure Reason of 1781: could taste b e g r o u n d e d
transcendentally? For some time Kant h a d n o t believed taste eli-
gible for inclusion within t h e conspectus of critical philosophy be-
cause it s e e m e d inevitably empirical. H e stated this clearly in a
footnote to the " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic":

T h e G e r m a n s a r e the only p e o p l e w h o c u r r e n t l y m a k e use of

t h e w o r d 'aesthetic' in o r d e r to signify w h a t o t h e r s call t h e cri-
tique of taste. T h i s usage originated in t h e abortive a t t e m p t
m a d e by B a u m g a r t e n , that a d m i r a b l e analytical thinker, to
b r i n g the critical t r e a t m e n t of the beautiful u n d e r rational
principles, a n d so to raise its rules to t h e r a n k of a science. B u t
such e n d e a v o r s are fruitless. T h e said rules or criteria are, as
r e g a r d s t h e i r sources, m e r e l y empirical, a n d consequently
can n e v e r serve as a priori laws by which o u r j u d g m e n t of taste
must be directed. 3

B u t by 1787 K a n t h a d c h a n g e d his m i n d . T h e discovery of a t r a n -

scendental g r o u n d i n g for aesthetics finally set Kant free from
K a m e s a n d British empiricism a n d allowed h i m to i n c o r p o r a t e taste
into his critical philosophy. T h a t is reflected in t h e changes h e in-
t r o d u c e d into this footnote in his revision of the First Critique. It is
reflected even m o r e clearly in a very f a m o u s letter.
I n D e c e m b e r of 1787, I m m a n u e l Kant wrote to the m a n w h o
h a d successfully p o p u l a r i z e d his philosophy in G e r m a n y , Karl
L e o n h a r d Reinhold, a n n o u n c i n g himself at work o n a new study, a
"Critique of Taste." T h a t letter is a crucial d o c u m e n t in t h e history
of t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique, a n d it can be used to establish
n o t only t h e n a t u r e of t h e original impulse of t h a t work, b u t also t h e
novelty of its a r g u m e n t . Even t h e context of t h e letter is of interest,
b u t first let us focus u p o n its text.

My i n n e r conviction grows, as I discover in working o n differ-

e n t topics t h a t n o t only does my system r e m a i n self-consistent
b u t also, w h e n sometimes I c a n n o t see t h e r i g h t way to investi-
gate a certain subject, I find t h a t I n e e d only look back at t h e

46 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of t h e e l e m e n t s of k n o w l e d g e , a n d of t h e
m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m , in o r d e r to discover elu-
cidations I h a d n o t expected. I a m n o w at work o n t h e critique
of taste, a n d I have discovered a kind of a priori principle dif-
ferent from those h e r e t o f o r e observed. F o r t h e r e a r e t h r e e
faculties of t h e m i n d : t h e faculty of cognition, t h e faculty of
feeling p l e a s u r e a n d displeasure, a n d t h e faculty of desire. I n
t h e Critique of Pure (theoretical) Reason, I f o u n d a priori prin-
ciples for t h e first of these, a n d in the Critique of Practical Rea-
son, a priori principles for t h e third. I tried to find t h e m for t h e
second as well, a n d t h o u g h I t h o u g h t it impossible to find such
principles, t h e systematic n a t u r e of t h e analysis of t h e p r e -
viously m e n t i o n e d faculties of t h e h u m a n m i n d allowed m e to
discover t h e m . . . so that n o w I recognize t h r e e parts of phi-
losophy, each of which h a s its own a priori principles. We can
now, t h e r e f o r e , securely d e t e r m i n e t h e compass of knowl-
e d g e , which is possible in this way, as including t h e t h r e e d e -
p a r t m e n t s of theoretical philosophy, teleology, a n d practical
philosophy, of which, it is t r u e , t h e second will b e f o u n d t h e
p o o r e s t in a priori g r o u n d s of d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I h o p e by Easter
to be r e a d y with this p a r t of philosophy, u n d e r t h e n a m e of
the Critique of Taste, which is already in writing, b u t n o t quite
p r e p a r e d for t h e p r e s s .
4

At t h e outset of t h e Third Critique, t h e n , Kant was seeking a priori

principles for t h e "faculty of feeling pleasure a n d d i s p l e a s u r e " even
t h o u g h for s o m e time h e h a d " t h o u g h t it impossible to find such
principles." K a n t claimed to have n o w f o u n d "a kind of a priori
principle different from those h e r e t o f o r e observed." A n d h e c a m e
to it, significantly, via " t h e systematic n a t u r e of t h e analysis of t h e
. . . faculties of t h e h u m a n m i n d . " Since his system was "self-
consistent," h e could trust it to aid h i m " w h e n sometimes I c a n n o t
see t h e r i g h t way to investigate a certain subject." It would p r e s e n t
h i m with "elucidations I h a d n o t expected." W h a t aided h i m , spe-
cifically, was " t h e general p i c t u r e of t h e e l e m e n t s of knowledge,
a n d of t h e m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m . " T h e idea of faculties
of m i n d a n d t h e idea t h a t t h e r e a r e different kinds of a priori prin-
ciples, of which t h e sort h e h a d n o w before h i m was u n i q u e , prove
crucial to Kant's p r o c e d u r e in late 1787, at t h e genesis of t h e "Cri-
tique of T a s t e . "
T o g r a s p h o w h e h a d c o m e to this n e w t u r n in his t h i n k i n g , we
m u s t consider w h a t Kant m e a n t in t h e First Critique by "transcen-

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 47

d e n t a l philosophy." " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t " has b e e n t h e
s t o r m c e n t e r of controversy in K a n t scholarship for t h e past thirty
y e a r s . T h e r e has n e v e r b e e n a n y t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g consensus o n
5

these issues. Dieter H e n r i c h p o i n t e d this o u t eloquently in o n e of

t h e most widely acclaimed efforts to achieve c o h e r e n c e . M a n y 6

years later, Karl A m e r i k s richly d o c u m e n t e d t h e variety of views

that still r e m a i n e d . We are n o closer t o closure today. A p a r t of this
7

p r o b l e m is, n o d o u b t , obscurity in Kant's text. A n o t h e r p a r t is t h e

i n h e r e n t difficulty of t h e task h e set himself. B u t t h e r e is a t h i r d dif-
ficulty, which is t h e disposition to treat K a n t in t e r m s of c o n t e m p o -
rary philosophical c o n c e r n s a n d s t a n d a r d s , a n d thus to lose any
h e r m e n e u t i c a l sense of w h a t K a n t himself s o u g h t to achieve. I n this
study t h e philological-historical question takes p r e c e d e n c e over t h e
epistemological o n e . Methodologically, we m u s t try to establish
w h a t sense Kant h a d of his t e r m s , his project, a n d his result before
we begin to assess t h e i r "correctness" by c o n t e m p o r a r y s t a n d a r d s . 8

Kant's Pre-Critical Notion of "Discursiveness"

K a n t b r o k e with B a u m g a r t e n by insisting u p o n a d i c h o t o m y be-

tween t h e logical a n d t h e aesthetical, b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
sense, b e t w e e n c o n c e p t a n d intuition. As sensibility a n d u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g w e r e his t e r m s for t h e "faculties" constituted in this d u -
ality, intuition a n d c o n c e p t w e r e his t e r m s for t h e specific c o n t e n t
which p e r t a i n e d to each, a n d aesthetics a n d logic were the m o d e s
or processes which o b t a i n e d in these faculties in relation to t h e i r
specific c o n t e n t s . For Kant, t h e distinction of sensibility from u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g was n o t o n e of d e g r e e , as in school philosophy, b u t
o n e of kind. Sensibility was particular, while u n d e r s t a n d i n g was
universal. Sensibility was subjective or private, while u n d e r s t a n d -
ing was objective a n d generally valid. Finally a n d crucially, sen-
sibility was passive in contrast to t h e activity of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h i s discrimination was to be t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e entire critical
philosophy, Kant's principle of "discursiveness."
B a u m g a r t e n h a d c o n t e n d e d t h a t a different criterion of objec-
tive validity could be a p p l i e d to sensibility: individual wholeness
(coordination, "extensive clarity") r a t h e r t h a n logical articulation
( s u b o r d i n a t i o n , "intensive clarity"). W h a t B a u m g a r t e n s o u g h t to
i n t e r p r e t as a n objective, if inferior manifestation, K a n t insisted
u p o n r e a d i n g merely subjectively. Aesthetics h a d to d o with intui-
tions as p r e s e n c e in sense. Objectivity (universal validity) b e l o n g e d
exclusively to t h e o t h e r side of t h e duality, the side of u n d e r s t a n d -

48 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 ing, concept, a n d logic, a n d so aesthetics by definition was a sub-
jective m o d e . At first, K a n t h a d tried to o p e r a t e with t h e l a n g u a g e
9

of B a u m g a r t e n , u s i n g "extensive" versus "intensive" c l a r i t y . Yet 10

clarity a n d distinctness did n o t express the aesthetic versus logical

distinction sharply e n o u g h . B o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensibility
1 1

could be confused. B o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensibility could be

distinct. "As to distinctness, it is perfectly compatible with intuition.
For distinctness has to d o with t h e differentiation of t h e manifold in
a whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n so far as these pieces for cognition can
be t h o u g h t t h r o u g h universal concepts, distinctness is a conse-
q u e n c e of r e a s o n ; if it occurs t h r o u g h particular [concepts], t h e n it
is a f o r m of sensibility. T h e first occurs t h r o u g h subordination, t h e
second t h r o u g h coordination." 12
B a u m g a r t e n ' s distinction between
"extensive" a n d "intensive" clarity did n o t h e l p m u c h . K a n t quickly
t h r e w off t h e whole l a n g u a g e of clarity a n d distinctness as distract-
ing, t h o u g h h e r e t a i n e d t h e contrast b e t w e e n c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d
subordination. 13

Leibniz's Nouveaux essais, which finally a p p e a r e d in p r i n t in

1765, h e l p e d K a n t sort o u t from B a u m g a r t e n ' s a p p r o a c h t h e
s o u n d e l e m e n t s in a cognitive a p p r o a c h to sensibility by stimulating
Kant's t h o u g h t t o w a r d two new distinctions. Logically a n d on-
tologically, w h a t m a t t e r e d far m o r e t h a n clarity a n d distinctness
was t h e distinction of m a t t e r from f o r m . Epistemologically, w h a t
m a t t e r e d most was the distinction b e t w e e n active u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a n d passive sensibility. Kant took t h e act of form-giving as the es-
sence of u n d e r s t a n d i n g or r e a s o n . T h i s was t h e g r e a t legacy of
Leibniz to G e r m a n school philosophy. O n c e Kant h a d a d o p t e d t h e
two discriminations of passivity/activity a n d m a t t e r / f o r m , h e was in
a position to m a k e a m u c h m o r e c o m p l e t e a n d powerful a c c o u n t of
t h e process of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
K a n t a r g u e d that all form resulted from spontaneity, from "the
soul's o w n activity." H e distinguished sharply b e t w e e n t h e m e r e
14

givenness of material in sensation a n d t h e active r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of

a n a p p e a r a n c e as a figure [Gestalt] in space a n d time by d e v e l o p i n g
the two technical t e r m s Empfindung (sensation) a n d Erscheinung (ap-
p e a r a n c e ) . His first i m p u l s e was to discriminate t h e subjectivity of
15

Empfindung from t h e objectivity of Erscheinung. 16

"Sensation" r e -
ferred strictly to a subjective state, while " a p p e a r a n c e " involved t h e
r e f e r e n c e to a n object as t h e putative source of t h e passive i m p r e s -
s i o n s . B u t this original distinction, which c a m e later a n d m o r e
17

effectively to be f o r m u l a t e d as that between Gefhl a n d Sinn,

quickly d e v e l o p e d into o n e b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d f o r m .

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 49

 Not only were sensations subjective, in that they entailed pas-
sive r e s p o n s e s of the subject, b u t they p r o v i d e d merely t h e " m a t t e r "
for, a n d w e r e n o t themselves r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of, o b j e c t s . Before
18

they could be t h o u g h t a b o u t , they h a d to b e f o r m e d , s h a p e d . 1 9

O n l y that process of f o r m i n g t h e m into representations-of-objects

resulted in Erscheinungen. A n Erscheinung differed from a n Empfin-
dung n o t only in t h a t it r e f e r r e d to a n object, b u t in t h a t it was
f o r m e d into a d e t e r m i n a t e figure [Gestalt]. Kant e q u a t e d t h a t for-
m a l d i m e n s i o n of sensibility with Anschauung, o r intuition. H e
w r o t e : "Sensibility can be c o n s i d e r e d in t e r m s of its m a t t e r or its
form. T h e m a t t e r in sensibility is sensation, a n d its faculty is sense;
t h e form of sensibility is a p p e a r a n c e , a n d its faculty is i n t u i t i o n . " 20

B u t of even g r e a t e r significance to h i m was t h e distinction of

activity from passivity in m e n t a l process. Within sensibility itself he
tried to discriminate, a l o n g with form a n d matter, passivity a n d ac-
tivity. T h i s h e did in the contrast b e t w e e n Sinn a n d Einbildung:
" O u r sensible faculties are e i t h e r senses or formative powers [Sinne
oder bildende Krfte]." 21
W h a t Kant was g r o p i n g toward was a sense
of form-giving in which b e a u t y was a "subjective principle" which
c o n f o r m e d to t h e "laws of intuitive knowledge." H e a r g u e d t h a t the
form p r o v i d e d by intuition could n o t be r e d u c e d to or derived from
the form p r o v i d e d by r e a s o n . T w o equally formal a p p r o a c h e s
could be t a k e n to t h e " m a t t e r " p r o v i d e d in a whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of a n object, i.e., a n Erscheinung. O n e could analyze it in t e r m s of its
e l e m e n t s in so far as they were universal, i.e., c o m m o n to o t h e r ob-
jects, or in t e r m s of t h e specific b o n d a m o n g t h e m in a particular
entity. T h e first o p e r a t i o n would b e a logical o n e , involving subor-
dination, t h e second a n aesthetic o n e , involving c o o r d i n a t i o n . 22

Both, however, w o u l d be impositions of "form."

T h e so-called "subjective d e d u c t i o n " in the First Critique was the
result of a p r o l o n g e d effort to discriminate t h e p r e c o n c e p t u a l syn-
thesis associated with imagination. K a n t was already trying to dif-
ferentiate t h e subjective process of individual concept formation in
Reflections d a t e d a r o u n d 1769, h e n c e prior to any influence by t h e
psychology of t h e "three-fold synthesis" of T e t e n s . K a n t identi- 2 3

fied a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n eligible for j u d g m e n t with several features.

First, it h a d to b e synthetic, t h o u g h n o t t h r o u g h reason, h e n c e it
h a d to unify a manifold of s e n s e . It c r e a t e d a s h a p e or figure
24

[Gestalt] which involved " n o t only the form of t h e object according

to the relations of space in t h e a p p e a r a n c e , b u t also t h e matter, i.e.
sensation ( c o l o r ) . " Second, it h a d to be "intuitive." K a n t did n o t
25

define this t e r m . T h i r d , it h a d to be i m m e d i a t e in t e r m s of t h e p r o -

50 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 portionality of t h e sensations. Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective
consciousness clearly recognized the p r e s e n c e to consciousness of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s [Vorstellungen] which could n o t yet be considered
cognitions [Erkenntnisse]. 26

K a n t b r o k e d o w n t h e process of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n into a series of

o p e r a t i o n s : differentiation [Abstechung] of t h e manifold; com-
p r e h e n s i o n [Begreiflichkeit]; synthesis [Zusammennehmung]; a n d dis-
crimination from o t h e r possibilities [praecisio]. 21
H e a r g u e d that
t h e synthesis h e described as Zusammennehmung was n o t yet suffi-
cient to provide " d e t e r m i n a t e f o r m " [bestimmteForm]. 28
Rather, this
r e q u i r e d w h a t h e called Zusammenordnung, that is, a "connection by
c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d n o t of s u b o r d i n a t i o n [via r e a s o n ] . " T h i s c o n n e c -
tion by c o o r d i n a t i o n h a d to take place in t e r m s of t h e form of space
in intuition. "All objects can b e k n o w n sensibly or via intuition only
in a given figure [Gestalt]. O t h e r a p p e a r a n c e s c a n n o t form a n ob-
ject, b u t a r e merely [subjective] c h a n g e s [involving succession in
t i m e ] . " B u t K a n t h a d yet a f u r t h e r level of synthesis: Zusam-
29

menstimmung. It h a d two forms: parts to a whole, or g r o u n d to con-

s e q u e n c e . T h e second, h e a r g u e d , was a m a t t e r of s u b o r d i n a t i o n .
T h e former, while clearly a m a t t e r of coordination, could very well
fall u n d e r the logical rubric of disjunctive j u d g m e n t s as well. Al-
r e a d y in t h e late 1760s, t h e n , K a n t conceived of the b u i l d i n g of a
particular representation-of-the-object in t e r m s of t h r e e stages: a
material o n e , Zusammennehmung o r t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of a manifold
of sensation; a formal o n e , Zusammenordnung or t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of this manifold as a Gestalt o r figure in space (and time); a n d a ra-
tional o n e , Zusammenstimmung, which involved conceptions of a
cognitive-evaluative n a t u r e . 3 0

K a n t wished to associate this form-giving in intuition with the

objectivity of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i.e., its reference to t h e object a n d
h e n c e its validity. H e was m o v i n g toward t h e n o t i o n that objective
validity was g r o u n d e d in t h e form which the m i n d , e i t h e r in sen-
sibility t h r o u g h intuition or in u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h concepts,
a p p l i e d to t h e merely given in sensation. I n conceiving of intuition
strictly as t h e form of sensibility, K a n t was in fact d e t a c h i n g it from
its function as t h e source of objective actuality, or reality. T h a t r e -
m a i n e d inertly given in sensation. We have c o m e u p o n o n e of t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s of Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to "discursiveness."
"Discursiveness" entailed t h r e e difficulties from the outset
which would beset K a n t t h r o u g h o u t t h e so-called "critical" p e r i o d
of his philosophy. First, K a n t h a d c o m m i t t e d himself to t h e idea
t h a t form-giving was a n active process, associated with t h e s p o n -

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 51

taneity of t h e subject, h e n c e associated with t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet
h e h a d d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of intuition as similarly form-giving a n d
s p o n t a n e o u s , b u t within sensibility. As formal a n d active, intuition
did n o t fit comfortably into t h e passive concept of sensibility. Was it
p a r t of t h e passivity of sensibility o r p a r t of the activism of u n d e r -
standing? Let us call this t h e p r o b l e m of imagination.
T h e second difficulty p r e s e n t e d by discursiveness is, if sen-
sibility a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g are different in kind, h o w can u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g d e t e r m i n e t h e particulars given in sensation with logical
a n d especially with ontological necessity? H o w a r e objective actu-
ality, t h a t m e r e , "material" givenness in sensation, a n d objective va-
lidity, t h a t formal c o n s t r u c t i o n u n d e r rule by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , to
be unified? Could r e a s o n have a "real use"? T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m of
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n . I n t h e year 1772, u n d e r the i m p a c t of
t h e full radicalism of H u m e ' s skepticism, K a n t recognized the e n o r -
mity of this p r o b l e m . It w o u l d take h i m a d e c a d e to f o r m u l a t e a
position o n it in t h e Critique of Pure Reason. 31

B u t t h e r e is a t h i r d p r o b l e m which has to d o with a certain

duplicity in Kant's n o t i o n of subjectivity: passive/active; private/
g e n e r a l ; singular/universal. K a n t h a d a very s t r o n g p e n c h a n t
to t h i n k of these t h r e e discriminations as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . B u t
they a r e not. O n c e again, his n o t i o n of intuition evidences this.
T h e r e is only o n e space, for everyone, a n d necessarily. It is sin-
gular, n o t a composite, b u t it is a n all-encompassing t o t a l i t y . It 32

resides in sensibility, t h e ostensibly subjective a n d private aspect of

h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , b u t it is n o t subjective or private. T h a t raises
the q u e s t i o n : H o w is it that e v e r y t h i n g subjective is not necessarily
private? Conversely, w h a t sort of g e n e r a l c o n c e p t can o n e develop
to discuss w h a t is utterly p a r t i c u l a r a n d private? Is t h e r e even a sub-
jective access to such m a t t e r s , i.e., can they be t h o u g h t ? Let us call
this t h e p r o b l e m of subjectivity.
T h e s e t h r e e epistemological p r o b l e m s drove K a n t to a con- ,
tinual r e w o r k i n g of his p h e n o m e n o l o g y of consciousness n o t only (

u p to the First Critique b u t o n w a r d t h r o u g h t h e Third. It would b e a n

u t t e r m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n to believe t h a t K a n t c o n s i d e r e d all t h e
epistemologicalor, m o r e broadly, cognitiveissues in his p h i -
losophy to have b e e n resolved in the first edition of t h e Critique of
Pure Reason in 1 7 8 1 . R a t h e r , h e c o n t i n u e d to reflect a n d to revise
over the e n t i r e balance of his philosophical career, a n d some of the
revisions p r o v e d major. T h e Third Critique r e p r e s e n t e d a major ef-
fort to resolve t h e s e epistemological difficulties. K a n t concen-
trated, in his "critical" b r e a k t h r o u g h , o n resolving t h e p r o b l e m of

52 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , his solution left
u n r e s o l v e d several subtle difficulties in his notions of i m a g i n a t i o n
a n d intuition a n d o t h e r s , m o r e blatant, in his n o t i o n of subjectivity.

The "Critical" Breakthrough: Transcendental Philosophy

K a n t e x p l a i n e d what h e m e a n t by " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y " in

t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e First Critique: "I entitle transcendental all
k n o w l e d g e which is occupied n o t so m u c h with objects as with t h e
m o d e of o u r k n o w l e d g e of objects insofar as this m o d e of knowl-
e d g e is to b e possible a priori."' '' A n d in t h e Prolegomena h e elabo-
1 6

r a t e d : " t h e w o r d transcendental. . . for m e n e v e r m e a n s a r e f e r e n c e

of o u r cognition to things, b u t only to o u r faculty of c o g n i t i o n . " I n 34

b o t h contexts K a n t stresses the procedural, n o t merely the objective

c h a r a c t e r of k n o w l e d g e : how, n o t j u s t what we (can) k n o w . T h e 35

question is n o t simply: " W h a t is a n object?" b u t " H o w can o u r e x p e -

rience of t h e object be valid?" T h a t , Kant insists, can only be a n -
swered by c o n s i d e r i n g the m i n d ' s active participation in know-
ledge, t h e noetic, n o t simply the n o e m a t i c d i m e n s i o n : "the mode of
o u r k n o w l e d g e . . . insofar as [it] is to be possible a priori." It is this
active, p r o c e d u r a l d i m e n s i o n that is the d o m a i n of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
philosophy." 36

T h e m i n d takes a n active role in cognition, b u t it does n o t al-

ways d o so t h r o u g h a self-conscious choice. T h i s necessity which is
prior to volition a n d yet i n h e r e n t in subjectivity is Kant's most dis-
tinctive philosophical discovery, which m i g h t b e called t h e "invol-
u n t a r y s p o n t a n e i t y " of t h e subject in e x p e r i e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to
37

Kant, t h e subject is active in cognition, as against t h e viewpoint of

empiricism, b u t n o t arbitrary, as against t h e view of skepticism. T o
the e x t e n t that a subject necessarily structures p e r c e p t i o n in a m a n -
n e r b e y o n d conscious control a n d h e n c e a n t e c e d e n t volition, t h e r e
is m o r e to subjectivity t h a n o n e is immediately aware o f . Philo- 38

sophically it is possible to a c c o u n t for t h a t involuntary spontaneity

a n d to show its necessary rationality. T h a t is precisely w h a t t r a n -
scendental a r g u m e n t s seek to d o .
T h e subject may p e r f o r m this reconstruction from t h e vantage
of a h i g h e r level of self-consciousness. However, o n e will never be
in a position voluntarily to e x e c u t e those involuntary acts of spon-
taneity at t h e g r o u n d of his consciousness, a n d t h u s t h a t aspect of
his o w n subjectivity will always r e m a i n objective to h i m , t h o u g h still
s p o n t a n e o u s vis--vis t h e object of consciousness. T h i s is what Kant
m e a n t by " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a l i s m . " In the B-version of t h e
39

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 53

 " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " h e p u t it in p e r h a p s t h e most straight-
f o r w a r d m a n n e r : " T h i s peculiarity of o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , that it
can p r o d u c e a priori unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n solely by m e a n s of t h e
categories, a n d only by such a n d so many, is as little capable of fur-
t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n as why we have j u s t these a n d n o o t h e r functions
ofj u d g m e n t , o r why space a n d time a r e the only forms of o u r possi-
ble i n t u i t i o n . " While t h e subject may c o m p r e h e n d the transcen-
40

d e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s of his o w n subjectivity, h e is n o t in a position to

c h a n g e t h e m or to p r o d u c e t h e m by a n act of will. T h i s p r i m o r d i a l
givenness is a d i m e n s i o n of reality which m a n can only recognize,
n o t c o m m a n d . It is for the p h i l o s o p h e r to speculate a n d if possible
to explain persuasively t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of such activity.
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y starts from the fact of e x p e r i e n c e ,
t h e act of empirical j u d g m e n t . Given that t h e r e is e x p e r i e n c e , i.e.,
t h a t a j u d g m e n t gets m a d e claiming objective reference, what can
be d o n e to establish its objective validity in t e r m s of the noetic p r o -
c e d u r e that it logically m u s t p r e s u p p o s e in light of t h e discursive-
ness of h u m a n n a t u r e ? K a n t w a n t e d to secure t h e c o h e r e n c e of
empirical e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h t h e idea of c o n c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a -
tion: t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i m p o s e d categorial " f o r m " t h r o u g h j u d g -
m e n t u p o n sensory " m a t t e r " a n d constituted e x p e r i e n c e as objec-
tively valid. T h e alternative to be eliminated was s o m e "stream of
consciousness" which really offered n o security against disintegra-
tion into " b l o o m i n g , b u z z i n g confusion" a n d dissolution of any
cognitive identity, i.e., c o h e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e .
K a n t h a r d l y m e a n t t h a t every empirical j u d g m e n t h a d to be
t r u e . H e merely wished to establish t h a t a j u d g m e n t could m a k e a
claim to t r u t h based u p o n criteria that w e r e validating. T h e s e crite-
ria, t h e categories, d e t e r m i n e d with necessity a n d universality the
f o r m of all possible j u d g m e n t s a b o u t a n object-in-general (Ob-
jekt).41
T h i s w a r r a n t h a d to b e s h o w n to apply to t h e only actual con-
t e n t h u m a n s e x p e r i e n c e d s e n s o r y intuition in space a n d t i m e
a n d h e n c e to actual objects (Gegenstnde). H o w categories of p u r e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g could apply with validity to sensory intuition was
the question of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e p r o b l e m lay
42

precisely in t h e s e p a r a t i o n of these two e l e m e n t s (concepts a n d in-

tuitions) in two distinct faculties. T h a t m a d e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e -
flection" indispensable.
K a n t claimed in his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " that t h e
constitution of t h e object-in-general in a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l syn-
thesis," whose spontaneity was distinctly involuntary, p r o v i d e d the
necessary f o u n d a t i o n for all voluntary acts of synthesis: empirical

54 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

j u d g m e n t s with claims to validity. A " p u r e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l syn-
43

thesis m u s t be p r e s u p p o s e d as t h e f o u n d a t i o n for any a n d every

act of empirical j u d g m e n t . T h i s "original synthesis" is n o t t h e
4 4

act o r invention of the empirical subject. It is p a r t of subjectivity,

to be sure, b u t it is involuntary subjectivity. B u t Kant is interested,
b e y o n d t h e establishment of this originary synthesis, in the con-
scious act of (empirical) j u d g m e n t . T h a t "applies" the categories,
in t h e sense of finding instantiations in a "syllogistic" r a t h e r t h a n
" j u d g m e n t a l " sense of s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r r u l e
4 5

H o w can we establish t h a t t h e p u r e concepts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d -

ing, as categories, have objective validity with reference to sen-
sibility? While this was the particular focus of the c h a p t e r entitled
" T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " t h e whole First Critique is Kant's an-
swer, a n d only the whole Critique could be a n answer, because it
alone offered scope to establish t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " o r "critical"
c o n s e q u e n c e s of discursiveness for knowledge. Nonetheless, the
kernel of t h e "critical" philosophy has always b e e n f o u n d in t h e
" d e d u c t i o n . " N o piece of m o d e r n philosophical writing has p r o -
voked so m u c h study a n d controversy. Many c o n t e m p o r a r y inter-
preters claim it impossible to find a d e d u c t i o n t h e r e . Part of t h e
4 6

difficulty, as H e n r i c h a n d o t h e r s have n o t e d , is t h a t Kant's c o n c e p t

of d e d u c t i o n is n o t o u r s ; it h a d a definite historical source that col-
o r e d its u s a g e .
4 7

C o n t e x t u a l reference also clarifies t h e question of "empirical

psychology" a n d its relation to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. T h e r e
were, for Kant, two ways of g o i n g at m e n t a l activity a n d the con-
cepts which were its e l e m e n t s . O n e , which h e d e s i g n a t e d "psycho-
logical," traced t h e historical evolution of empirical concepts in
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . For Kant, Locke was t h e p r i m a r y m o d e l of this.
48

O n e could easily a d d H u m e (and T e t e n s in G e r m a n y ) . T h e o t h e r

4 9

way s o u g h t n o t t h e origins or d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n c e p t b u t t h e
w a r r a n t or r i g h t to itits validity. T h a t was the p r o p e r l y "transcen-
dental" project. 50

We t h u s n e e d to b e clear a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of "a priori" a n d

t h e p u r p o s e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. A priori m e a n s n o t de-
rivative from e x p e r i e n c e . It does n o t m e a n completely a p a r t from
it. Consequently, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t is, as Ameriks ar-
gues, necessarily a regressive a r g u m e n t , n o t a "presuppositionless
d e d u c t i o n . " It c a n n o t be, n o r did Kant ever i n t e n d to m a k e such
51

a claim, h o w e v e r m u c h some i n t e r p r e t e r s ascribe this intention to

" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s " a n d Kant's in p a r t i c u l a r . A tran-
52

scendental a r g u m e n t sets o u tfront e x p e r i e n c e , b u t that does n o t

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 55

for K a n t i n any way r e d u c e its a priori validity to s o m e t h i n g
"empirical" o r a posteriori. T o be sure, if t h e philosophical inquiry
is to establish a n y t h i n g with necessity a n d universalitywhich is
what K a n t m e a n t by t h e t e r m "a p r i o r i " t h e n it will have to
achieve a purity of articulation which will n o t d e p e n d for its
cogency u p o n a n y t h i n g empirical. E v e r y t h i n g hinges o n exactly
what is m e a n t by " p u r i t y " a n d t h e "empirical," however. We can-
n o t even begin to discuss t h e validity of k n o w l e d g e without ac-
k n o w l e d g i n g that empirical e x p e r i e n c e occurs. Philosophy c a n n o t
sensibly question t h e o c c u r r e n c e of e x p e r i e n c e , b u t only w h e t h e r
it can b e r e c k o n e d valid k n o w l e d g e . K a n t p r o p o s e d to avoid tak-
53

i n g w h a t any specific empirical e x p e r i e n c e concretely entailed

its " m a t t e r " i n t o a c c o u n t in explaining h o w it was possible in
g e n e r a l for e x p e r i e n c e to occur. T o explain why, or how it is pos-
sible that, empirical e x p e r i e n c e can occur, we m u s t look to t h e
" f o r m " of t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , to its s t r u c t u r e . A " p u r e " analysis is
54

n o t o n e which has n o c o n n e c t i o n w h a t e v e r with empirical experi-

ence. H o w can it b e , w h e n it is s u p p o s e d to g r o u n d the validity of
t h a t experience? R a t h e r , it is o n e which is n o t d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
c o n t e n t of any particular e x p e r i e n c e for its a r g u m e n t .
T h a t this was exactly w h a t h e m e a n t by t h e crucial t e r m " p u r e , "
K a n t e x p l a i n e d in a n essay, c o m p o s e d in 1787, which h e sent u n d e r
t h e cover of t h e very letter to R e i n h o l d we b e g a n by analyzing. H e
offered his e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e t e r m as a s u p p l e m e n t to Reinhold's
widely recognized exposition of his philosophy, t h e Briefe ber die
Kantischen Philosophic I n d e e d , Kant's letter a n d t h e essay enclosed
with it were his public a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of Reinhold's c o n t r i b u t i o n
in p o p u l a r i z i n g Kant's complicated system. H e n c e t h e observation
o n " p u r i t y " in t h e essay s h o u l d be t a k e n as canonical. K a n t w r o t e :

I would like to take this o p p o r t u n i t y to devote j u s t a little at-

t e n t i o n to t h e c h a r g e that ostensible contradictions have b e e n
discovered in a work of considerable l e n g t h [the second edi-
tion of t h e First Critique], before [the discoverer] h a d a real
g r a s p of the whole . . . [This critic c h a r g e d that] in t h e first
place I said those cognitions a priori are pure, with which abso-
lutely n o t h i n g empirical is mixed [denen gar nichts Empirisches
beigemischt ist], a n d as a n e x a m p l e of t h e opposite p r e s e n t e d
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n : all t h a t c h a n g e s has a cause. By c o n t r a s t . . .
[a few pages later] I p r e s e n t this same p r o p o s i t i o n as a n e x a m -
ple of a p u r e a priori cognition, that is, o n e which is not depen-
dent o n a n y t h i n g empirical [die von nichts Empirisches a b h n g i g

56 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment

 ist]two distinct m e a n i n g s of the t e r m pure, of which, how-
ever, in t h e w h o l e work I dealt exclusively with t h e l a t t e r . 55

" P u r e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy was n o t d e p e n d e n t o n t h e e m -

pirical, b u t it was n o t utterly u n r e l a t e d to it. K a n t claimed t h a t the
m e t h o d h e p u r s u e d in t h e Second Critique was in fact identical to
t h a t of t h e First: "We c o m e t o k n o w p u r e practical laws in t h e same
way we know p u r e theoretical principles, by a t t e n d i n g to the neces-
sity with which r e a s o n prescribes t h e m to us a n d to t h e elimination
from t h e m of all empirical conditions, which r e a s o n directs. T h e
concept of a p u r e will arises from t h e former, as t h e consciousness
of a p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g from t h e l a t t e r . " T h e m a r k of rational
56

d e t e r m i n a t i o n as such is t h e modality of necessity. I n all m e n t a l

acts, the p r e s e n c e of this modality is t h e crucial indicator of a n a
priori t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r i n c i p l e . K a n t believed t h a t without this
57

p r i m o r d i a l a n d d e t e r m i n i n g modality of necessity, even what we as-

sessed cognitively could n e v e r a d v a n c e b e y o n d H u m e ' s c o n c e p t i o n
of c o n t i n g e n t - c u s t o m a r y association, i.e., it would r e m a i n merely
assertoric, n e v e r apodictic. I n t h e case of cognitive e x p e r i e n c e ,
Kant a r g u e d in t h e First Critique, without this modality in fact any
possibility of e x p e r i e n c e e v e n H u m e ' s b e c a m e i n c o h e r e n t .
T h a t was t h e only sense in which K a n t could a n d did "answer"
Hume. 5 8

H e n c e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y h a d to g r a s p t h e capacities
of " p u r e r e a s o n . " K a n t wished to i n t r o d u c e as the decisive distinc-
tion b e t w e e n his philosophy a n d all o t h e r philosophy t h e claim t h a t
his was n o t g r o u n d e d o n m e r e g e n e r a l logic b u t r a t h e r o n what h e
called " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic." G e n e r a l logic, K a n t insisted, amplify-
ing a p o i n t first m a d e by Crusius against the rationalist-essentialist
tradition in G e r m a n y , could n e v e r p r o c e e d from t h e m e r e f o r m of
the j u d g m e n t s to any assertion a b o u t t h e actuality (Wirklichkeit)
of t h e t e r m s in those j u d g m e n t s , for g e n e r a l logic was only a set of
rules a b o u t t h e forms of j u d g m e n t s , n o t a vehicle for t h e establish-
m e n t of a c t u a l i t y . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, h e asserted, dealt with
59

t h e p r o b l e m of synthetic j u d g m e n t s a priori, a n d synthetic j u d g -

m e n t s a priori h a d as their specific difference from j u d g m e n t s in
g e n e r a l logic precisely their e n t a i l m e n t of e x i s t e n c e . G e n e r a l
60

logic could not in any way yield o n t o l o g y . 61

Existence is extra-logical: owtological. T o e n t e r t h a t d o m a i n ,

philosophy h a d n o t only to r e c k o n with the forms of j u d g m e n t s (the
logical use of reason) b u t to discriminate the two kinds of matter
(concepts a n d intuitions) i n j u d g m e n t s by tracing t h e m to t h e i r dis-

Kanfs Return to Aesthetics 57

p a r a t e sourcesi.e., t h e cognitive facultiesin o r d e r to establish
t h e possibility of their synthesis in valid knowledge (the real use of
reason). K a n t conceived t r a n s c e n d e n t a l reflection to entail n o t sim-
ply t h e c o m p a r i s o n of concepts with o t h e r c o n c e p t s n o t merely
t h e logic of j u d g m e n t s b u t c o m p a r i s o n with t h e faculties which
constituted their possibility.

Reflection (reflexio) does n o t c o n c e r n itself with objects t h e m -

selves with a view to deriving concepts from t h e m directly, b u t
is t h a t state of m i n d in which we first set ourselves to discover
t h e subjective conditions u n d e r which [alone] we are able to
arrive at concepts. It is t h e consciousness of the relation of
given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r different sources of knowledge;
a n d only by way of such consciousness can t h e relation of t h e
sources of k n o w l e d g e to o n e a n o t h e r be rightly d e t e r m i n e d .
Prior to all f u r t h e r t r e a t m e n t of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , this
question m u s t first b e asked: I n which of o u r cognitive fac-
ulties a r e o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d t o g e t h e r ?
62

T h e passage deserves t h e most careful exegesis. "Reflection" is

t e r m e d a "state of m i n d " [Zustand des Gemtes]. I n t h a t state, K a n t
c o n t i n u e s , "we set ourselves to d i s c o v e r " h e n c e h e is describing
a n intentional act, or, in his o w n l a n g u a g e , a Handlung, which im-
plies conscious (and p r e s u m a b l y rational) c h o i c e " t h e subjective
conditions [subjectiven Bedingungen] u n d e r which [alone] we a r e
able to arrive at c o n c e p t s . " K a n t explains t h a t reflection provides
63

t h e "consciousness of t h e relation of given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r

different [faculties] of k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnisvermgen].'" T h a t is,
reflection seeks to know w h e n c e a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n arises, by
r e f e r e n c e to t h e faculty which is its "source." T h a t process is essen-
tial, K a n t c o n t i n u e s , because it is "only by way of such conscious-
ness" t h a t p h i l o s o p h y can t h e n correctly establish t h e essential
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l issue of "the relation of t h e [faculties] of k n o w l e d g e
to o n e a n o t h e r . "
K a n t r e f e r r e d to this process of reflection in his letter to
R e i n h o l d w h e n h e w r o t e of "the general picture of the elements of
k n o w l e d g e , a n d of t h e m e n t a l powers p e r t a i n i n g to t h e m . " For
6 4

K a n t these w e r e n o t e l e m e n t s of a "merely empirical" psychology.

T h e y were f u n d a m e n t a l structures of m e n t a l activity a p a r t from
which it was impossible even to begin to philosophize. T h a t subjec-
tive conditions a r e t h e only basis u p o n which we can arrive at philo-
sophical k n o w l e d g e is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t principles of

58 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. O n l y o n this basis is it possible to a p -
praise the validity of k n o w l e d g e , or secure a real use of r e a s o n . I
take this discussion to b e a m o n g the most straightforward a n d deci-
sive K a n t ever m a d e r e g a r d i n g the p r o c e d u r e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
philosophy, a n d t h e r e f o r e as decisive for t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n n o t
only of t h e First Critique b u t also of t h e later ones. O u r s is a determi-
nate noetic s t r u c t u r e , discursiveness; a n d t h a t d e t e r m i n a c y m u s t
figure as t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e epistemological e n t e r p r i s e . It is dis-
cursiveness t h a t m a k e s h u m a n k n o w l e d g e problematic. It is discur-
siveness, t h e n , that a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t m u s t r e c k o n with if
"objective validity" is to b e secured.
T h i s project could n o t dispense with reference to faculties of
cognition. Discursiveness c a n n o t be articulated except in t e r m s of
faculties of m i n d a n d w i t h o u t discursiveness t h e r e can be n e i t h e r a
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " p r o b l e m n o r a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l solution. If pure
concepts sufficed, t h e "Metaphysical D e d u c t i o n " would have b e e n
c o m p l e t e a n d , m o r e o v e r , t h e whole Kantian project would have
b e e n irrelevant: Leibniz, Wolff, o r B a u m g a r t e n could j u s t as well
serve. N o r could strict empirical psychology suffice, or H u m e
would have b e e n t h e finish of philosophy. T h e best expositions of
Kant's " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , " t h e r e f o r e , recognize t h a t t h e r e
are two p r o b l e m s s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n o n e a n o t h e r : first, how the
objective validity of t h e categories in cognitive j u d g m e n t s is to be
established; b u t second, h o w synthesis between t h e faculty of u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e faculty of sensibility is to be p o s s i b l e . 65

T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r o c e d u r e that makes
sense in t h e light of all t h r e e Critiques is o n e which sees Kant regress-
ing from t h e complexity of empirical e x p e r i e n c e (cognitive, m o r a l ,
or aesthetic) to a p u r e , rational principle a priori. T h i s establishes
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity. B u t h e m u s t t h e n r e t u r n to t h e c o m p l e x case
by offering a constitutive a c c o u n t of t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e p u r e prin-
ciple with r e f e r e n c e to empirical e x p e r i e n c e (application/subsump-
tion). I n t h e case of t h e First Critique, the analysis set o u t from
complex (logical a n d actual) empirical j u d g m e n t s , seeking t h e war-
r a n t for their claims to validity. Such a claim, K a n t a r g u e d , could only
be w a r r a n t e d by a priori categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e d e m -
o n s t r a t e d t h a t these p u r e categories "applied" to " p u r e " i n t u i t i o n
that they did, p r e e m i n e n t l y in 26 of the B-version of t h e " T r a n s c e n -
dental D e d u c t i o n " ; a n d how they did in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Sche-
m a t i s m " c h a p t e r . T h e "Analysis of Principles" t h e n p r o c e e d e d to
explain h o w t h e "original synthesis" could w a r r a n t applications to
an empirical object in general in a n objective cognitive j u d g m e n t .

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 59

Transcendental Method in the Later Critiques

T h e First Critique did n o t e n d with the " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic."

Kant's p o i n t was n o t simply to d e f e n d t h e c o h e r e n c e of j u d g m e n t
a n d t h e possibility of objectivity from a skeptical-solipsist dissolu-
tion into s t r e a m s of impressions. H e also wished to limit reason's
p u r s u i t s to t h e s p h e r e of actuality, i.e., to d e f e n d against "specula-
tive metaphysics." T h i s was t h e project of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Di-
alectic." T h e r e K a n t discussed, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s : (1) the ques-
tion of "rational psychology," or the substantive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
t h e self; (2) t h e question of "practical reason," o r ethics; a n d (3) t h e
q u e s t i o n of religion, since t h e Critique's p u r p o s e was to " m a k e r o o m
for faith." It was n o t t h a t K a n t d i s p u t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of such
c o n c e r n s to r e a s o n . T h e s e were p e r e n n i a l interests of r e a s o n be-
cause they w e r e c o n c e r n s h u m a n s could n o t a v o i d . Nevertheless,
66

h e d i s p u t e d reason's c o m p e t e n c e cognitively to resolve these con-

cerns.
T h e p o i n t to consider is t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles for n o n -
cognitive d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e f o u n d little s c o p e
i n d e e d , o n s o m e r e a d i n g s , w e r e d e n i e d any valid s c o p e i n t e r m s
of t h e First Critique. B u t that did n o t r e m a i n t h e case in t h e later
Critiques. T h e r e f o r e , K a n t c h a n g e d his conception of t r a n s c e n d e n -
tal p h i l o s o p h y b e t w e e n 1781 a n d 1789. However, we m u s t r e c k o n
with t h e p r o s p e c t that n o t all the c h a n g e s in his t h o u g h t over t h e
d e c a d e worked in t h e s a m e direction. T h e r e were at least two cru-
cial motives at work: first, a desire to e x t e n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l phi-
losophy into the m o r a l s p h e r e ; a n d second, a n e e d to avoid the
c h a r g e of idealism. T h e first c o n c e r n led K a n t to seek t r a n s c e n d e n -
tal principles for t h e wider h u m a n faculties. T h e second led h i m to
a n even m o r e acute suspicion of "psychologism" a n d subjective as
o p p o s e d to objective reference. T h e s e two concerns were n o t e n -
tirely h a r m o n i o u s . While scholars interested above all in t h e " T r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " of t h e B-version of the First Critique (1786)
have fastened u p o n Kant's c o n c e r n with the charges of idealism
a n d psychologism a n d accordingly stressed t h e " p r o g r e s s " from
1781 to 1786 in t e r m s of his "Refutation of Idealism" a n d his " s u p -
pression" of t h e "Subjective D e d u c t i o n " a n d with it m u c h "faculty-
talk," it is by n o m e a n s clear t h a t this was t h e p r e p o n d e r a n t shift of
t h e d e c a d e , or even t h a t it was such a p r o n o u n c e d shift as these in-
t e r p r e t e r s wish to b e l i e v e . K a n t felt a c o n c e r n t h a t even within his
67

strictly cognitive p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e r e m a i n e d a certain indeter-

minacy, a " g a p " in t h e system, which I will t e r m later the p r o b l e m of

60 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

empirical e n t a i l m e n t . Even with reference to cognition, d e p e n d -
68

ing o n one's r e a d i n g of t h e task (to say n o t h i n g of t h e success) of t h e

" T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic," a g r e a t deal m i g h t well r e m a i n to be
d o n e in t h e m a t t e r of constituting a valid empirical concept. K a n t
himself p r o m i s e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e "metaphysical" application of
his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles in t e r m s of a philosophical f o u n d a -
tion of n a t u r a l science.
F r o m t h e s e considerations it is possible to f o r m u l a t e at least
four projects t h a t would a n i m a t e t h e later critical p e r i o d :

1. ethics (practical reason)

2. aesthetics (subjective consciousness)
3. metaphysics (God, t h e soul, a n d immortality)
4. n a t u r a l science (methodology).

Most fundamentally, to k e e p c o h e r e n c e at t h e core of his transcen-

d e n t a l philosophy, K a n t h a d to p u r s u e all these c o n c e r n s u n d e r t h e
principle of t h e unity or sytematicity of reason. T h e desire to find a
legitimate e x t e n s i o n of his " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y " into n o n -
cognitive areas of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e led h i m to considerations
which complicated or i n d e e d revised his earlier positions in a m o r e
m e t a p h y s i c a l " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychological"direction.
T h e First Critique simply set aside vast reaches of philosophical
concern (because it set aside essential d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n experi-
ence) in its relentless p u r s u i t of a w a r r a n t for t h e objectivity of e m -
pirical cognition. K a n t did n o t give a full p h e n o m e n o l o g y of
subjective consciousness in t h e First Critique because h e systemat-
ically abstracted from all n o n t h e o r e t i c a l e l e m e n t s in that experi-
ence in o r d e r to establish w h a t would m a k e objective knowledge
possible. Moreover, in 1781 K a n t h a d n o plans for either of t h e
later Critiques, because their m a t t e r did n o t a p p e a r to h i m a m e n a b l e
to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t . H e only t u r n e d to this p h e n o m e n o l -
6 9

ogy in t h e later Critiques. 70

T o p u t it in t e r m s of t h e p r o b l e m s of
discursiveness, K a n t may have a d d r e s s e d t h e n a r r o w issue of t h e
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , " b u t only to some d e g r e e at the ex-
p e n s e of his resolution of t h e p r o b l e m of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e p r o b -
lem of subjectivity. T h a t did n o t escape his o w n self-criticism.
Above all, K a n t came, over the 1780s, to see t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
philosophy n o t simply as a question of epistemology b u t r a t h e r as
the system of philosophical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m a n . H e n c e t h e 7 1

impulse of his work in the later Critiques was to carry forward the
same t r a n s c e n d e n t a l quest for a priori principles which g r o u n d e d
or w a r r a n t e d c o m p l e x (rational a n d actual) h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 61

not only narrowly in t h e question of t h e cognitive faculty
(Erkenntnisvermgen) b u t m o r e widely in all t h e distinctivelyi.e.,
e s s e n t i a l l y h u m a n faculties (Gemtsvermgen). H e took such a
project to be quite distinct from "empirical psychology" or " h e t e r o -
n o m o u s (empirical) ethics." H e stressed, in what may be for us u n -
comfortably a n t i q u a r i a n t e r m s , t h e primacy of reason in h u m a n
nature.
T h e i m p o r t a n t result to retrieve from this c o m p l e x set of con-
siderations is t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy necessarily entails
r e f e r e n c e to t h e faculties of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . Consequently, in
the later Critiques K a n t would e x p a n d his " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philoso-
p h y " in t e r m s of r e f e r e n c e to the faculties of h u m a n n a t u r e . I n his
letter to Reinhold, K a n t very emphatically stated " t h e r e are t h r e e
faculties of t h e m i n d : t h e faculty of cognition, t h e faculty of feeling
pleasure a n d displeasure, a n d t h e faculty of d e s i r e . " In the later72

Critiques K a n t clarified h o w t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy a p p r o a c h e d

the p r o b l e m of t h e "psychologism" of faculties of the m i n d .
By 1787 K a n t believed o n e could p r o m o t e certain concepts
from empirical status t h r o u g h e x p l a n a t i o n s "according to tran-
scendental d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , " r e f o r m u l a t i n g t h e m in a way which
did n o t p r e s u p p o s e a n y t h i n g empirical, b u t r e f e r r e d only to the
e l e m e n t s of t h e transcendentally g r o u n d e d cognitive situation: the
subjective faculties a n d their r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a k e n in general, n o t
c o n c r e t e l y . I n a n i m p o r t a n t footnote to t h e preface of the Second
73

Critique K a n t clarified t h e n a t u r e of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l explana-

t i o n s . " A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , h e wrote, "consists only of
74

t e r m s b e l o n g i n g to the p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i.e., categories, which

contain n o t h i n g empirical." T h a t is, t h e t e r m s in his definitions
were perfectly g e n e r a l a n d logical, having n o specific material con-
tent. A n d h e insisted: "I n e e d n o m o r e t h a n this for t h e p u r p o s e s of
a critique of concepts b o r r o w e d from psychology; t h e rest is s u p -
plied by t h e Critique itself." K a n t believed these t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
75

e x p l a n a t i o n s were entirely legitimate e l e m e n t s in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

philosophy, t h a t they did n o t violate its "purity," a n d , t h e r e f o r e , did
not u n d e r m i n e its a priori claim. Moreover, if we take seriously the
a r g u m e n t in " A m p h i b o l y of C o n c e p t s of Reflection" in the First Cri-
tique, it is precisely t h e s e which e n a b l e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy to
take place at a l l . A historically g r o u n d e d characterization of
76

Kant's p r o c e d u r e m u s t take seriously his faculty f r a m e w o r k n o t

as a m e r e empirical psychology but, especially t h r o u g h the device
of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , as t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychology or,

62 The "Critique of Aesthetic fudgment"

better, p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Such a methodological p r e m i s e underlies
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which f o l l o w s .
77

T r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s m a d e possible the extension of

the critical e n t e r p r i s e b e y o n d t h e strictly theoretical, p e r m i t t i n g the
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g in reflective r e a s o n of those key aspects
of h u m a n consciousness which K a n t identified with choice a n d
with f e e l i n g . T h a t , in t u r n , considerably w i d e n e d the scope of
78

possible propositions of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic" over against what

was p e r m i t t e d u n d e r the far stricter t e r m s of the first edition of t h e
First Critique.
Kant's c o n c e r n to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t reason constitutes a n d reg-
ulates t h e wider h u m a n faculties (Gemtsvermgen) most i m m e -
diately d e t e r m i n e d his a p p r o a c h to the Third Critique, a n d most
tellingly revealed his ultimately rationalist c o m m i t m e n t s in m e t a -
physics. F o r Kant, only in t h e m e a s u r e that reason governed, even
in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, was t h e r e any validity or t r u t h in h u m a n
c o m p r e h e n s i o n , or, m o r e broadly, any vestige of dignity a n d value
in h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . T h e First Critique h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d reason's
self-legislation in t h e s p h e r e of cognition. T h e Second Critique d e m -
o n s t r a t e d reason's legislation of t h e faculty of desire. T h e I n t r o d u c -
tion to t h e Third Critique a n n o u n c e d t h a t reason, t h r o u g h t h e
faculty of j u d g m e n t , would n o w be s h o w n to provide a n a n a l o g o u s
legislation for t h e faculty of feeling. O f course, as K a n t indicated in
his letter to Reinhold, the scope of t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l legislation
was n a r r o w e s t in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, w h e r e m a n k i n d was at its
most " n a t u r a l , " b u t it was for K a n t a t r i u m p h nonetheless t h a t even
t h e r e r e a s o n d e m o n s t r a t e d its s o v e r e i g n t y . If, as I infer, t h e object
79

of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n is to t r a n s p o s e into a cognitive key all

(or as m u c h as possible) of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e n to find any r e n -
d e r i n g of p l e a s u r e f o r K a n t t h e most recalcitrantly irrational
c o m p o n e n t of t h a t e x p e r i e n c e i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l form m u s t
have b e e n a n extremely h e a d y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a n d o n e t h a t
would i n d e e d confirm K a n t in his view of the aptness of his system.
T o be in a position to u n d e r s t a n d it, however, we m u s t develop a
m o r e r i g o r o u s conception of Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective
consciousness. T h a t will r e q u i r e us to p l u n g e very deeply into
Kant's t h e o r y of m e n t a l activity a n d into a serious p r o b l e m with his
n o t i o n of "objectivity."

Kant's Return to Aesthetics 63

 ^ Three

VALIDITY AND ACTUALITY:

TOWARD KANT'S PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

K
a n t associates objectivity with actuality m a r k e d by " m a t e -
rial" sensation given involuntarily to subjective con-
sciousness. B u t at t h e s a m e time K a n t claims t h a t objec-
tivity is a question of validity, which can only be secured
by u n d e r s t a n d i n g in its constitutive determinacy. T h e result is a
p e r p l e x i n g ambiguity a b o u t t h e concept "objectivity" in Kant's
epistemology. H o w does h e relate objective validity to objective re-
ality (actuality)? I n t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c instance of a n empirical j u d g -
1

m e n t , t h e two conceptions coincide: objective validity simply is

objective reality (actuality), i.e., t h e j u d g m e n t is about t h e object.
T h e r e a r e , however, i m p o r t a n t instances in which validity a n d actu-
ality d o n o t coincide. T h u s validity without actuality would have to
be ascribed to g e n e r a l logic, to b e sure, b u t in a radically different
sense also to some propositions of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. C o n - 2

versely, a n d of m o r e i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n , actuality w i t h o u t validity

would have to b e ascribed to subjective states t h a t are n o t fully con-
ceptual (e.g. animal o r infant consciousness). T h e question of sub-
jective states p r i o r to cognition is crucial to the p r o b l e m of aesthe-
tics for K a n t .
K a n t m o v e d from his relatively u n p r o b l e m a t i c n o t i o n of objec-
tive j u d g m e n t in t h e First Critique t h r o u g h the distinction of "judg-
m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e " from " j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n " in t h e
Prolegomena (1783) to his ultimate discrimination in the Third Cri-
tique ( a r o u n d 1789) between " d e t e r m i n a n t " a n d "reflective" j u d g -
m e n t . T h e p o i n t of this evolution was to distinguish a form of
3

subjective j u d g m e n t , with its o w n references, rules, a n d validity. If,

as some specialists in First Critique issues have p e r s u a d e d t h e m -
selves, K a n t r e v e r t e d to t h e original n o t i o n ofj u d g m e n t in his revi-
sions of t h e First Critique (1786), t h e n these efforts could only have

64
 b e e n senseless. Given t h e historical fact t h a t these efforts did n o t
s e e m senseless to Kant, the only o p t i o n is to i n t e r p r e t the B-version
of t h e First Critique as consistent with these impulses. T h i s m e a n s
t h a t a consistent construal of w h a t K a n t m e a n t in 26 of the B-ver-
sion of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " w h e n h e claimed that all
sensory e x p e r i e n c e is subject to t h e categories, even if not yet in a
j u d g m e n t , is t h a t s o m e c o n t e n t s of consciousness are p r e c o n c e p -
tual. 4

Objective Judgment: Toward a Phenomenology of Empirical

Concept Formation

In his Logic, K a n t a r g u e s t h a t m a k i n g a concept distinct a n d m a k i n g

a distinct c o n c e p t a r e by n o m e a n s t h e same. While m a k i n g a con-
c e p t distinct belongs in the s p h e r e of analytic logic, m a k i n g a dis-
tinct c o n c e p t is a synthetic project, a n d o n e which r e q u i r e s t h a t
givenness of m a t t e r in intuition which is t h e focus of o u r c o n c e r n . 5

H e t h e n explains t h e process of constituting a n object. T h i s con-

stitution in K a n t i a n epistemology is a n extremely complicated
project to d e c i p h e r . For o n e t h i n g , K a n t is far m o r e c o n c e r n e d with
establishing that objective j u d g m e n t is possible in general a n d valid
in principle t h a n h e is with explicating how it is accomplished con-
cretely. Empirical j u d g m e n t s apply (schematized) categories to
actual sensible intuition to g e n e r a t e j u d g m e n t s with claims to
"objective validity." T h i s second o r empirical synthesis n e e d s to b e
transcendentally analyzed n o less t h a n t h e originary, " t r a n s c e n d e n -
tal" or p u r e synthesis. All sensible intuition is in space a n d time, a n d
space a n d time as p u r e intuition a r e s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e (sche-
matized) categories, b u t t h a t does n o t yet establish t h a t particular
regions of space a n d time s h o u l d be vested with particular material
predicates, d e s i g n a t e d accordingly as a n instance of some g e n e r a l
rule, a n d given a n a m e (empirical concept).
Empirical concepts are results, n o t f o u n d a t i o n s . T h e unity in a
concept t h a t results from a n e m p i r i c a l j u d g m e n t is made, n o t f o u n d .
B u t t h a t p r o c e d u r e of constituting a n empirical c o n c e p t does d r a w
o n t h e p r i m o r d i a l , s t r u c t u r i n g categories a n d h e n c e u p o n (sche-
matized) concepts. T h e r e is, accordingly, a crucial ambiguity t h a t
m u s t always b e b o r n e in m i n d in considering Kant's discussion of
concepts. W h e n K a n t speaks of concepts b e i n g always indispens-
able for j u d g m e n t , h e m u s t be t a k e n to m e a n t h e categories a n d
only the categories. Empirical concepts, t h e p r o d u c t s of j u d g m e n t s ,
are objects constituted, n o t p r e s u p p o s e d , in these j u d g m e n t s . 6

Validity and Actuality 65

 T h e y a r e fashioned in a c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l process Kant
calls generally "synthesis." 7

I n t h e Prolegomena a n d in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic" of the

First Critique K a n t gives a m o r e detailed a c c o u n t of it. H e writes of
a p p e a r a n c e s (Erscheinungen) involving sensation which "does not it-
self occupy any part of space or of time." I n vii of t h e Third Critique,
9.

K a n t describes "space" as a form of intuition internal to conscious-

ness; consequently, "objects" as we r e p r e s e n t t h e m by d e p l o y m e n t
in t h a t space are merely p h e n o m e n a l . Yet h e insists these spatial
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s nevertheless refer to empirically real (external) ob-
jects. K a n t t e r m s sensation a similarly subjective e l e m e n t , b u t o n e
which provides t h e " m a t t e r " for objective reference. Actuality as
givenness-in-intuition r e q u i r e s n o t merely t h e " f o r m " of space b u t
existence, or " m a t t e r " p r o v i d e d in "sensation." T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to
t h e Critique of Judgment defines sensation in vii as t h e "subjective
side of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of external things, b u t o n e which is
p r o p e r l y their m a t t e r ( t h r o u g h which we m u s t b e given s o m e t h i n g
with real e x i s t e n c e ) . "
9

" A p p e a r a n c e " we m i g h t call "figure" (Gestalt), a n d t h e m e n t a l

activity which necessarily r e s p o n d s to sense data by projecting such
figures in space a n d time, "configuration" (Gestaltung) or "delinea-
tion" (Zeichnung). 10
T o configure in space a n d in d u r a t i o n is the
first m e n t a l activity associated with the givenness of e x p e r i e n c e in
sensibility. It constitutes "extensive m a g n i t u d e " a n d is precisely
what we m e a n by t h e word " o u t e r " in its most simple sense, which
Descartes would have called "extension." B u t p e r c e p t i o n also con-
tains ("besides intuition") w h a t is "real" in a p p e a r a n c e s : sensa-
t i o n . Sensation, however, occupies n o p a r t of space a n d t i m e . It
11 1 2

is entirely a modification of t h e subject. Kant t h u s t e r m s sensation

a n "intensive m a g n i t u d e " a n d denies it as a n objective r e p r e s e n t a -
tion. Nevertheless it "refers" to the reality in a p p e a r a n c e s ; con-
sciousness ascribes this c o n t e n t or " m a t t e r " to these figures based
entirely u p o n i n t e r n a l r e s p o n s e . Assigning color, flavor, t e x t u r e , or
w a r m t h to these figures (which we necessarily associate with given
volumes for given d u r a t i o n s in a unitary field of space a n d time
based o n sense data) "fills" t h e a p p e a r a n c e s configured in space.
W h a t K a n t is offering is a n e w twist o n t h e contrast of p r i m a r y
a n d secondary q u a l i t i e s . I n Kant's version, t h e e l e m e n t of " a p -
13

p e a r a n c e , " t h e disposition of intuitions in space a n d time, is as sub-

jective as t h e qualities of taste, color, a n d so on, a n d even these
latter, t h o u g h merely modifications of the subject, nevertheless of-
fer d a t a c o n c e r n i n g , a n d h e n c e "refer" to, objects external to t h e

66 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

subject. B u t space a n d time a r e "ideal," w h e r e a s sensation is merely
"private." C o n t r a s t the necessary singularity a n d identity of space
a n d time, n o t only for o n e subject b u t for all, with t h e u t t e r plurality
of sensation, for e x a m p l e , t h e s h a d e of blue or t h e taste of honey.
T h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e t h a t all such sensations are identical inter-
subjectively. I n d e e d , t h e r e is even evidence o n the o t h e r s i d e . 14

Internality to consciousness, t h e r e f o r e , m u s t not be identified

with " m e r e " i . e . , idiosyncratic or privatesubjectivity. T h e dis-
tinction of t h e ideal from t h e private is what m a k e s space a n d time
empirically real in a way t h a t is m o r e p r i m o r d i a l (they a r e , in t h a t
sense, " p r i m a r y qualities") t h a n the simple givenness of a certain,
individually m o d u l a t e d d e g r e e of sensationcolor, w a r m t h , fla-
vor, a n d so o n (which a r e , h e n c e , secondary qualities). It is j u s t by
virtue of this distinction of the necessary universality, i.e., i n t e r s u b -
jectivity, of t h e ideal s t r u c t u r e of space a n d time, that Kant claims
h e is a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , n o t a solipsistic i d e a l i s t .
15

K a n t seems to c o n t e n d t h a t n e i t h e r a p p e a r a n c e n o r sensation
suffices for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e existence or "externality" of a n
object. It seems to lie in its i n d e p e n d e n c e of subjectivity, its public
character, o r universality, b u t t h a t is n o t sufficiently clarified yet.
T h e decisive e l e m e n t for t r u e r e f e r e n c e to t h e object is still missing.
K a n t writes:

Everything, every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n even, in so far as we are con-

scious of it, may b e entitled object. B u t it is a question for
d e e p e r e n q u i r y w h a t the w o r d "object" o u g h t to signify in re-
spect of a p p e a r a n c e s w h e n these are viewed n o t in so far as
they a r e (as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) objects, but only in so far as they
stand for a n object. T h e a p p e a r a n c e s , in so far as they a r e ob-
jects of consciousness simply in virtue of b e i n g r e p r e s e n t a -
tions, a r e n o t in any way distinct from their a p p r e h e n s i o n ,
that is, from t h e i r r e c e p t i o n in t h e synthesis of i m a g i n a t i o n . 16

What is a t t e n d e d does n o t c h a n g e ; everything hinges o n a c h a n g e in

how we a t t e n d it. "Object," in its r i g o r o u s Kantian sense, must, t h e n ,
be constituted o u t o f a n d p r o m o t e d f r o m t h i s m e r e subjectivity
of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . We m u s t c o n s t r u e as object w h a t is " n o t h i n g
b u t t h e s u m of these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . " T h a t is what it m e a n s to
17

recognize existence, Kant claims. Objective reference requires pos-

tulation of t h e existence of such " a p p e a r a n c e s a n d their relation to
o n e a n o t h e r in respect of their e x i s t e n c e . " Accordingly, h e refor-
18

m u l a t e s his n o t i o n of t h e synthesis in a c o g n i t i v e j u d g m e n t in t h r e e
levels: "of m e r e intuition (that is, of t h e form of a p p e a r a n c e ) , of

Validity and Actuality 67

 p e r c e p t i o n (that is, of t h e m a t t e r of p e r c e p t i o n ) , a n d of e x p e r i e n c e
(that is, of t h e relation of t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s ) . " N o t e t h e s e q u e n c e
19

form-matter-relation. E x p e r i e n c e is a h i g h e r o r d e r integration t h a n
a p p e a r a n c e or sensation, a n d only at that level is t h e object truly
constituted as e x t e r n a l existence.
T h i s p r o m o t i o n can only result from " r e g a r d i n g t h e formal
conditions of empirical t r u t h . " T h a t is: " a p p e a r a n c e , in con-
2 0

tradistinction to t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a p p r e h e n s i o n , can b e r e p -
r e s e n t e d as a n object distinct from t h e m only if it stands u n d e r a
rule which distinguishes i t . . . a n d necessitates s o m e o n e particular
m o d e of c o n n e c t i o n of t h e m a n i f o l d . " T h i s formulation is exactly
21

t h a t of a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , which entails s u b s u m i n g t h e m a n -
ifold u n d e r a definite c o n c e p t or r u l e . A " j u d g m e n t of experi-
2 2

e n c e , " in t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e Prolegomena, posits what Kant asserted

in t h e "Analogies of E x p e r i e n c e " of t h e First Critique: "I r e n d e r my
subjective synthesis of a p p r e h e n s i o n objective only by r e f e r e n c e to
a r u l e . " Again, K a n t privileges t h e sense of objectivity as validity
2 3

( s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r a universal rule) as against t h e sense of objec-

tivity as givenness. W h a t is given is still in t h e subject, a n d only con-
ceptualization lifts it to objectivity.
C o n s e q u e n t l y it is in o u r appraisal of t h e relation of t h e r e p r e -
sentation to t h e universal rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e deci-
sive question of objectivity is a d d r e s s e d . N o t e t h a t n o t h i n g is a d d e d
to t h e c o n t e n t of t h e concept; only t h e validity is r e a p p r a i s e d . T h a t ,
precisely, is t h e d o m a i n of t h e modality of j u d g m e n t . It is via t h e
modality of j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e distinction is first m a d e b e t w e e n
merely possible objects a n d objects to which we ascribe a c t u a l i t y . 24

I n d e e d , it is only because within this modality we have access to a n

even h i g h e r criterion, necessity, t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n has any p r o s -
pect of viability. Because t h e modality of necessity is efficacious in
t h e schematization of a n object-in-general, t h e modality of actu-
ality is efficacious in empirical j u d g m e n t s , a n d we have t h e r i g h t to
posit existence in a j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . 25

All objective j u d g m e n t s e m p l o y empirical concepts a n d g r o u n d

their claim in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t of t h e categories, b u t they
also n e e d t h a t through which t h e j u d g m e n t can relate immediately to
its object: intuition. I n t u i t i o n provides t h e requisite features of sin-
gularity ("this o n e specific") a n d immediacy ("actual" or given). B u t
w h a t exactly is a n i n t u i t i o n ? K a n t equivocates severely between a
26

receptive a n d a s p o n t a n e o u s i . e . , passive versus activeinterpre-

tation of intuition. As sensibility, intuition is associated with r e c e p -
tivity a n d passivity. As i m a g i n a t i o n , h o w e v e r a n d t h e r e is a very

68 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

i m p o r t a n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n imagination a n d intuitionit is
s p o n t a n e o u s a n d active. T h e r e is a very significant d e g r e e of over-
lap b e t w e e n t h e strictly "receptive" conception of intuition (the
discussion in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic") a n d t h e "synthetic"
sense of it in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic," n o t only in t h e so-
called "Subjective D e d u c t i o n , " b u t in the "Schematism" c h a p t e r
a n d in t h e "Analytic of Principles."
Formal andformative a r e words which K a n t invariably assigns to
t h e s p o n t a n e o u s side of his discursive dichotomy, to t h e m i n d or
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g broadly conceived. O n e can simply h o l d K a n t
guilty of a n " e r r o r " for t h i n k i n g of intuition o r imagination in this
w a y . T h e role of i m a g i n a t i o n in k n o w l e d g e has b e e n controver-
27

sial especially in t h e light of t h e analytic effort to " u p d a t e " Kant.

P e r h a p s o n e of t h e most powerful initiatives in t h a t direction c a m e
from Peter S t r a w s o n . Moreover, t h e r e is a serious difference be-
28

tween t h e two versions of t h e First Critique o n t h e question of imag-

ination. While t h e original edition of t h e First Critique assigns to
i m a g i n a t i o n n o t only t h e capacity for a synthesis of intuition b u t al-
m o s t t h e w h o l e responsibility for synthesis as such, t h e B-version
seems to w i t h d r a w most such credit from i m a g i n a t i o n a n d assigns
synthesis exclusively to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e project to liqui-
29

d a t e i m a g i n a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r from "acceptable" Kant materials was

carried forward by J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t , a n d especially by Eva
S c h a p e r . T h e i r resistance to any " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l psychology" or
30

"metaphysics" in Kant's n o t i o n of i m a g i n a t i o n is p e r h a p s the

c o u n t e r p a r t of a n excess of e n t h u s i a s m precisely for those aspects
by t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n c a m p .
3 1

Far m o r e interesting is t h e effort to see in i m a g i n a t i o n /

intuition, in this formative sense, a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m o m e n t in
the synthesis of a n empirical j u d g m e n t , a n d to b r e a k this m o m e n t
o u t for closer e x a m i n a t i o n . I n s t e a d of seeing t h e claims of synthesis
as a m a t t e r e i t h e r of narrowly conceived u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( j u d g m e n t
involving objective concepts) o r of narrowly conceived i m a g i n a t i o n
(without a n y connection with concepts), it m i g h t be wise to see
each as e l e m e n t s in Kant's g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h to t h e synthetic-
s p o n t a n e o u s participation of m i n d in k n o w l e d g e . I n d e e d , t h e r e
may well be g r o u n d s for a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e first schematizations of
t h e categories, those of quantity a n d quality, t e n d in a very substan-
tial m e a s u r e to m e r g e r a t h e r t h a n to differentiate t h e p r o p e r l y in-
tuitive a n d t h e p r o p e r l y c o n c e p t u a l projects. Might it n o t be m o r e
fruitful to recognize in these initial m o m e n t s of t h e construction of
empirical c o n c e p t s a far m o r e c o m p l e x symbiosis of imagination

Validity and Actuality 69

a n d conceptualization t h a n r e c e n t analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s find com-
fortable?
K a n t t e n d s to think t h a t o r d i n a r y consciousness simply is j u d g -
m e n t s , i.e., voluntary synthesis-acts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Accord-
ingly, t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n " is frequently taken to hold
t h a t n o t h i n g can b e in consciousness that is not t h e p r o d u c t of a
c o n c e p t u a l s y n t h e s i s . All r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s e v e n those n o t al-
32

ready in a unified intuitionmust be d e t e r m i n e d by the categories

in o r d e r to b e a m a t t e r of j u d g m e n t , i.e., to b e available for con-
sciousness at a l l . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is n o t only prima facie im-
33

plausible, it r u n s afoul of very i m p o r t a n t textual e v i d e n c e . T h e 34

scholarship o n K a n t has m o v e d very firmly t o w a r d a n alternative

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . P e r h a p s t h e most powerful influence has b e e n
G e r o l d Prauss, with his work, Erscheinung bei Kant. 35
A n o t h e r im-
p o r t a n t influence was Beck's essay, "Did t h e Sage of Knigsberg
Have N o D r e a m s ? " A wide r a n g e of scholars have, in a typically
3 6

d i s p a r a t e m a n n e r , a c k n o w l e d g e d this issue of subjective i m m e -

diacy. 37

Moltke G r a m a n d G r a h a m Bird b o t h distinguish a " s t r o n g "

from a "weak" sense of e x p e r i e n c e o r objectivity for consciousness.
G r a m notes: "if objects can a p p e a r to us without s t a n d i n g u n d e r t h e
categories, t h e n we can have e x p e r i e n c e of objects without syn-
thesizing intuition according to t h e c a t e g o r i e s . " T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c
38

result m a d e sense given two distinct notions of " e x p e r i e n c e , " only

t h e s t r o n g e r of which would m e r i t "objective validity." As Bird sees
it, we can have m o r e e x p e r i e n c e t h a n we can recognize. H e makes
m u c h of Kant's line t h a t " a p p e a r a n c e s can certainly be given in in-
tuition i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e functions of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 39

T h i s weak sense of object, however, still allows t h e subject to recog-

nize t h e object as b e i n g of a d e t e r m i n a t e sort, a n d t h u s achieve t h e
"strong" s e n s e . 40

H e n r i c h a n d Paul G u y e r p u r s u e this p r o b l e m in t e r m s of two

senses of t h e t e r m " m i n e , " d r a w i n g o n t h e obvious i m p o r t a n c e for
K a n t of t h e "unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n . " As H e n r i c h p u t s it: "Sen-
sibility is distinct from self-consciousness . . . [A]s l o n g as it is only
available to be t a k e n u p into consciousness, it is n o t at all 'mine'; b u t
only 'in relation to m e . ' " G u y e r finds H e n r i c h ' s formulation u n -
4 1

clear, b u t n o t t h e p o i n t h e is trying to articulate, a n d offers a variant

which h e thinks p u t s it better: " T h e r e m i g h t be cases in which o n e is
conscious w i t h o u t recognizing i t . . . [Gathers may recognize m e to
b e in a state which I d o n o t o r c a n n o t recognize as m i n e . " Even 4 2

Daniel Kolb, w h o is m u c h closer to t h e old i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , acknowl-

70 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

edges t h a t "it is always possible to distinguish between t h e way in
which a t h i n g seems in p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e way t h e t h i n g actually
i s . " Guyer, evaluating H e n r i c h ' s most e x t e n d e d effort to m a k e
43

sense of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l D e d u c t i o n , " m a d e w h a t m a n y take to

b e t h e most p r o m i s i n g m o v e : "Every transition in consciousness [is]
explicable by j u d g m e n t s e m p l o y i n g t h e categories b u t n o t express-
ible solely in such j u d g m e n t s . " 4 4

Ameriks, i n d e e d , c o n t e n d s t h a t " K a n t was quite aware of a n d

quite c o n c e r n e d with a c c o u n t i n g for items that initially a r e n o t
t a k e n explicitly as fully unified a n d d e t e r m i n e d by t h e catego-
r i e s . " H e goes o n to claim t h a t " K a n t was p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l
45

e n o u g h to believe in a difference between a n a p p e a r a n c e in t h e

g e n e r a l sense of any kind of idea before t h e m i n d , a n d a n a p p e a r -
a n c e in t h e specific sense of a self-manifesting given . . . [I]t is t h e
latter kind of a p p e a r a n c e t h a t is Kant's m a i n c o n c e r n in 26 . . .
[with] its d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t the categories apply 'even' for 'per-
c e p t i o n ' ( B 1 6 1 ) . " A m e r i k s a c k n o w l e d g e d "the i m p o r t a n c e of
46

Prauss' g e n e r a l i d e a for d e v e l o p i n g a sophisticated K a n t i a n ac-

c o u n t of t h e subjective side of o u r p e r c e p t u a l life . . . [A] K a n t i a n
t h e o r y c a n n o t i g n o r e this issue . . . [but] i t . . . m u s t c o n s t r u e t h e
realm as also subject, in s o m e kind of derivative way, to j u d g m e n t
and the categories." 47

For Prauss, t h e essential n a t u r e of Kant's objective j u d g m e n t

is a Deutunga process of " m e t a m o r p h o s i s " of subjective d a t a of
consciousness into objects. T h e r e is in t h a t process n o p a u s e to
48

consider t h e subjective d a t a in themselves. H e notes t h a t such

givens a r e not, as such, m a t t e r s of cognitive attention for o r d i n a r y
consciousness. T h e y a r e worked throughverwandelt (Kant) o r
gedeutet (Prauss)as t h e letters a n d i n d e e d words of a text a r e
w o r k e d t h r o u g h a n d a b a n d o n e d for t h e m e a n i n g they b e t o k e n .
Consciousness finds itself always already in t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e
j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . It can p e r f o r m a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis
49

u p o n t h a t l a n g u a g e , however, a n d t h a t will lead it retrospectively to

realize t h e necessary existence in consciousness of a p p e a r a n c e s as
such. B u t t h e p r o b l e m t h a t faces such a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis is
h o w ever to talk a b o u t a p p e a r a n c e s in their o w n right, prior to t h e
object into which they have b e e n c o n s t i t u t e d . T o focus o n t h e m is
50

a c o n s e q u e n c e e i t h e r of s o m e p r o b l e m of r e a d i n g (e.g. "decipher-
i n g " a c o r r u p t text, to stay with t h e m e t a p h o r ) , or of a n interest in
t h e process of reading (i.e., h o w is it actually that letters a n d words
make a text which can b e r e a d ? ) . 51

T h i s last q u e s t i o n is p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l . It, too, can be b r o k e n

Validity and Actuality 71

 o u t into two aspects. First, it can b e seen as a regression from fully
objective j u d g m e n t s into t h e i r constitutive m o m e n t s for t h e sake of
r e c o n s t r u c t i n g o r validating t h a t objective p r o c e d u r e . Second, it
can b e conceived as a n inventory of subjective states: a n effort to
catalog all t h e possible c o n t e n t s available to consciousness, w h e t h e r
or n o t they b e c o m e e l e m e n t s in a cognitive j u d g m e n t . I n t h e first of
these inquiries, t h e j u d g m e n t s t h a t a r e g e n e r a t e d a r e p r o p e r l y tran-
scendental, n o t subjective. I n t h e second, t h e j u d g m e n t s seem to be
merely psychological. While they a r e a b o u t t h e subject, however, it
d o e s n o t follow t h a t all such j u d g m e n t s are themselves subjective
(as c o n c e r n s validity). T h u s , to claim t h a t colors a r e subjective
qualitiesthat, e.g., " g r e e n " is a s e n s u o u s c o n t e n t of my p e r c e p -
tionsays n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e objective validity of t h e j u d g m e n t .
G r e e n is a p r o p e r t y , however subjectively registered, t h a t features
into objective j u d g m e n t s . W h a t is it, t h e n , t h a t constitutes t h e sub-
5 2

jectivity of j u d g m e n t s , a n d h o w can they still he judgments in t h e Kan-

tian sense of t h e t e r m ?
Prauss identifies t h r e e decisive features such a n analysis m u s t
explicate. First, t h e r e m u s t be a judgment, a n d j u d g m e n t s r e q u i r e
t h e categories. Yet it c a n n o t refer to t h e object since that already
bypasses t h e a p p e a r a n c e s in t h e i r o w n right. T o qualify as a
j u d g m e n t , s o m e categories m u s t obtain, yet o t h e r s , equally essen-
tially, m u s t not, for t h e full application of t h e categories neces-
sarily constitutes a n object, a n d t h e subjective a p p e a r a n c e as such
gets a n n u l l e d . Second, this j u d g m e n t m u s t b e of a particular
form: it m u s t be a first p e r s o n j u d g m e n t in t h e sense n o t only that
it is by b u t also t h a t it is a b o u t t h e subject, a n d as such it m u s t
m a k e a claim to validity (Gltigkeit), which while subjective in
scope is nevertheless compellingly a c t u a l . Finally, a n d logically
53

in light of t h e genesis of t h e p r o b l e m , a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n
m u s t c o r r e s p o n d to each a n d every j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , since
its "object" (Objekt) is precisely t h e " a p p e a r a n c e " (Erscheinung) o u t
of which t h e "object" (Gegenstand) was constituted by t h e j u d g -
m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e .
54

Prauss takes subjective j u d g m e n t s to signify acts of j u d g m e n t

a b o u t h e n c e conscious attention topre-objective d a t a of conscious-
ness (Erscheinungen as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s eligible for constitution into
objects). Prauss correctly claims that, as such, ^judgment of p e r c e p -
tion can b e possible only in light of, i n d e e d parasitically com-
p o u n d e d from, a p r i o r j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e in a kind of reversal
o r s u s p e n s i o n of p a r t of its process. T h e r e b y it borrows the (con-
ceptual) l a n g u a g e of t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., it applies t h e

72 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

c o n c e p t u a l " n a m e s " of objects to w h a t a r e only t h e i r subjective con-
comitants. M o r e importantly, it borrows t h e form of t h e j u d g m e n t
itself, r e n d e r i n g it " p r o b l e m a t i c " a n d subjective by reversing t h e
objective r e f e r e n c e t h r o u g h t h e s u s p e n s i o n of t h e categories of re-
lation which alone constituted a n objective o r d e r e x t e r n a l to t h e
subject. 55

It follows t h a t j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t literally be
t a k e n as constitutive in t h e genesis ofj u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e . It 56

is r a t h e r t h a t t h e e l e m e n t s appraised in a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n a r e
t h e e l e m e n t s m e t a m o r p h o s e d (gedeutet) into a n object by t h e j u d g -
m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e . Nevertheless, K a n t d i d u s e l a n g u a g e in t h e
57

Prolegomena t h a t suggested a sequential s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e two j u d g -

m e n t s . T h a t u s a g e fits into a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Kant's t h e o r y of e m -
pirical c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n which takes a n empirical j u d g m e n t as a
"synthetic act" in t h e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l sense t h a t it is n o t simply a
c o m p o u n d of active u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d passive sensibility, b u t
r a t h e r t h e o u t c o m e of a n initial intuitive formation (by imagination)
"taken u p " into a cognitive j u d g m e n t : i.e., a subjective synthesis
c o m p o u n d e d , o r m o r e precisely validated, by c o n c e p t u a l g e n e r a l -
ization.
Richard Aquila h a s a r g u e d for such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n vig-
orously in a series of works. Setting o u t from t h e serious ambiguity
in Kant's n o t i o n of synthesis, h e recognizes t h e i m p u l s e in t h e
scholarship to seek to resolve t h e conflict by a r e d u c t i o n of synthesis
either to u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r to imagination. N e i t h e r resolution is
plausible, however. T h e r e f o r e , Aquila opts for a constructive o r se-
q u e n t i a l a p p r o a c h to empirical c o n c e p t formation. Citing t h e
" V i e n n a Logic," Aquila suggests t h a t t h e issue is, in Kant's o w n
words, " h o w it comes a b o u t t h a t repraesentatio singularis b e c o m e s
communis." 58
I n his o w n t e r m s , "in s o m e sense o r other, empirical
conceptualization is a n o p e r a t i o n by which empirical intuitions a r e
themselves converted, if n o t literally into concepts, t h e n i n t o deter-
m i n a t e empirical c o n c e p t i o n s . " T h i s sense of " p r o m o t i o n " is t h e
59

key to his r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Kant. H e writes of "intuition's eleva-

tion, t h r o u g h t h e elevation of s o m e material in it, to a specifically
conceptualized status." T h e crucial point, however, is t h a t s o m e of
t h e synthesis m u s t already have t r a n s p i r e d at t h e level of intui-
t i o n / i m a g i n a t i o n : "at least p a r t of t h e j o b of imagination is to 'syn-
thesize' t h e m a t e r i a l . . . a n intuition m u s t contain, q u i t e in itself, t h e
manifold of all t h e material t h a t is merely 'associated' with i t . " 60

H e n c e Aquila a r g u e s t h a t we m u s t recognize " t h e n e e d t h a t K a n t

m i g h t have felt for a g e n u i n e l y p r e c o n c e p t u a l a n d precategorical

Validity and Actuality 73

f o r m of imaginative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a p p r o p r i a t e l y 'associated' with
any intuition to which concepts a r e s u p p o s e d a p p l i c a b l e . " H e n c e 61

"we m u s t t h i n k of t h e conceptualization of a n intuition in t e r m s of

s o m e sort of i n t e r n a l alteration of that very intuition . . . s o m e t h i n g
t h a t h a p p e n s to it together with w h a t e v e r intuitional expectations it
already c o n t a i n s . " H e concludes: "at least p a r t of w h a t concep-
62

tualization a d d s to t h e work of m e r e i m a g i n a t i o n involves elevating

t h e level of consciousness involved in t h e imaginative expectations in
q u e s t i o n , " h e n c e " a n objective j u d g m e n t involves a n objective re-
63

lationship among the very same representations that a purely associative

' j u d g m e n t ' connects in a merely subjective m a n n e r . " It is p r e - 6 4

cisely t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n intuitively i n t e g r a t e d 'object' to t h e fac-

ulty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a whole, t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures of
consciousness, t h a t p r o m o t e s m e r e subjective e x p e r i e n c e to objec-
tivity. 65

H e n r y Allison has m a d e a n a r g u m e n t a l o n g a similar line. H e

starts from t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t " a n intuition is itself a r e p r e s e n t a -
tion of a n individual object, quite a p a r t from any c o n c e p t u a l deter-
m i n a t i o n , " d r a w i n g s u p p o r t from t h e n o t e Kant m a d e u p o n receipt
of a letter from J a c o b S i g i s m u n d Beck in 1 7 9 1 : " T o m a k e a concept,
by m e a n s of intuition, into a cognition of a n object, is i n d e e d t h e
work of j u d g m e n t ; b u t t h e r e f e r e n c e of intuition to a n object in
g e n e r a l is n o t . " Allison c o n t i n u e s : "having a set of sensible im-
6 6

pressions t h a t are associated with o n e a n o t h e r is not the same as

h a v i n g a c o n c e p t . . . [ T h a t ] is p r o d u c e d by a series of 'logical acts'
of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t K a n t t e r m s 'comparison,' 'reflection,'
and 'abstraction.'" 67

T h i s a p p r o a c h , which will b e closely paralleled in my o w n ac-

c o u n t , can be linked to Kant's strategy in t h e Prolegomena. While
Prauss would n o t find this line of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n acceptable, h e did
offer s o m e i m p o r t a n t leads that can b e t a k e n u p into it. First, h e
n o t e d t h a t t h e so-called m a t h e m a t i c a l categories in fact a p p e a r e d
indifferent as to the question of the e x t e r n a l reference o r objec-
tivity of t h e i r " o b j e c t s . " H e n o t e d , further, t h e very close c o n n e c -
68

tion b e t w e e n t h e s e categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e p u r e
forms of i n t u i t i o n . H e t h e n c o n c l u d e d that the categories of
69

quantity a n d quality very likely h a d to b e involved in w h a t K a n t

called a " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , " b u t t h a t t h e " d y n a m i c " catego-
ries did n o t . With t h e suspension of t h e categories of relation,
7 0

however, all claims to objective validity a r e s u s p e n d e d a n d t h e j u d g -

m e n t is r e n d e r e d problematically subjective. T h a t is to say, such
j u d g m e n t s can "only b e m a d e by myself a b o u t my o w n b y any

74 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

subject only a b o u t his o w n s e n s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e [Erscheinun-
gen]." 71
A similar recognition t h a t j u d g m e n t s involving only t h e
(schematized) categories of quantity a n d quality b u t n o t carried
t h r o u g h to t h e categories of relation o r modality m i g h t be at t h e
h e a r t of Kant's n o t i o n of subjective j u d g m e n t is to be f o u n d in t h e
crucial essays of Lewis Beck, Mary G r e g o r , a n d J. Michael Y o u n g .
Beck starts from a clear stance o n t h e p r o b l e m of subjective im-
mediacy: " K a n t does n o t a n y w h e r e say t h a t t h e 'I think' m u s t ac-
c o m p a n y all of my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ; h e says merely that it m u s t be
able to a c c o m p a n y t h e m . . . A p e r c e p t i o n that could not be accom-
p a n i e d by 'I think' 'would n o t b e l o n g to any e x p e r i e n c e , conse-
q u e n t l y would b e without a n object, merely a blind play of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , less even t h a n a d r e a m . ' ( A 1 1 2 ) " Beck a r g u e s
72

that w h a t c a n n o t serve in a objective j u d g m e n t m i g h t nevertheless

b e relevant for subjective r e c k o n i n g , a n d h e asserts t h a t this is t h e
precise s p h e r e of "empirical psychology." In such reckonings, d a t a
could be "categorized without b e i n g objectified." 73
Nevertheless, for
such r e c k o n i n g s to b e " j u d g m e n t s " in the Kantian sense, certain
rules m u s t apply. Some categories prove indispensable. B u t "if all
even tacit r e f e r e n c e to objects were e x c l u d e d from t h e j u d g m e n t of
p e r c e p t i o n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories would still apply to t h e in-
tensive m a g n i t u d e . . . T h e Anticipation of Perception a p p l i e s . " 74

T h e r e f o r e , Beck concludes, "aesthetic j u d g m e n t s d o n o t e m p l o y

t h e dynamical categories a n d principles of substance, causality, a n d
existence . . . B u t t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories a n d principles cer-
tainly d o apply . . . T h e concepts which K a n t holds d o not play a
role in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of (pure) aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e a r e n o t
categorical concepts b u t e m p i r i c a l . " Beck t h e n suggests t h a t "the
75

Critique of Aesthetic Judgment seems to have g r o w n o u t of t h e doc-

trines of t h e Prolegomena which were rejected in t h e second edition
of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. " 1 a g r e e with the first point, b u t n o t
7 6

t h e second: i n d e e d , because of t h e connection between t h e Critique

of Judgment a n d t h e Prolegomena o n this issue, we may n o t take t h e
second edition of t h e First Critique as a rejection of these i d e a s . 77

G r e g o r , too, begins with t h e a p p a r e n t conflict between t h e Pro-

legomena a n d t h e Third Critique, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e ultimate
form of t h e First Critique o n t h e o t h e r : " T h e Prolegomena's t h e o r y
a b o u t j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n which d o n o t s u b s u m e sense d a t a
u n d e r t h e categories, t o g e t h e r with Kant's insistence t h a t t h e p u r e
j u d g m e n t of taste d o e s n o t s u b s u m e u n d e r a concept, m i g h t sug-
gest that t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 'this,' in 'this is beautiful,' escapes t h e
c a t e g o r i e s . " G r e g o r a r g u e s t h a t any j u d g m e n t , even the j u d g -
78

Validity and Actuality 75

m e n t of taste, m u s t , o n t h e most indisputable r e a d i n g of t h e First
Critique, involve a relation to t h e unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n possible
only via t h e categories. W h a t she t h e n does is d e v e l o p t h e a r g u m e n t
t h a t t h e " m a t h e m a t i c a l categories" feature centrally in Kant's n o -
tion of form in aesthetic j u d g m e n t s .
Y o u n g n o t e s t h a t "concepts of a highly empirical s o r t . . . to a
large e x t e n t simply m i r r o r t h e functions of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . " 79

A n d later in his essay, in c o n s i d e r i n g t h e crucial p r o b l e m of sche-

matism, h e develops t h e p o i n t even m o r e strikingly: "I take K a n t to
h o l d t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of q u a n t i t y w h e t h e r of quantity in g e n e r a l ,
o r of a specific, d e t e r m i n a t e q u a n t i t y i s t h e c o n c e p t of a feature
t h a t can be a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d only by m e a n s of i n t u i t i o n . "80

W h a t I, in t u r n , take Y o u n g to m e a n is t h a t in t h e initial schematiza-

tion of t h e categories of quantity a n d quality it is n o t at all clear t h a t
it is u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d n o t i m a g i n a t i o n (as intuition) which is t h e
p r i m a r y formative o r "synthetic" a g e n t .
T h e initiation of t h e empirical j u d g m e n t is c o n d u c t e d in
i n t u i t i o n b y imagination. T h e coordination of sensation into a sin-
g u l a r intuition c a n n o t be t h e function of concepts. T h a t work m u s t
b e d o n e t o be s u r e in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y i m a g i n a t i o n . C o n c e p t s a r e rules which apply
81

to several possible instantiations. All concepts, t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r

p u r e o r empirical, are g e n e r a l . If all j u d g m e n t s involve concepts
a n d all concepts a r e g e n e r a l rules, t h e n t h e singular individual, in
its u n i q u e d e t e r m i n a c y a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n , becomes problematic.
T h e r e f e r e n c e of any c o n c e p t to a particular ("numerically singu-
lar") instance is simply i n d e t e r m i n a t e at t h e level of t h e concept it-
self. Accordingly, K a n t calls concepts without intuitions empty. 82

E m p t y does n o t m e a n false or contradictory. I n formal t e r m s , j u d g -

m e n t s u s i n g such concepts a r e perfectly lucid. It is w h e n we move
from formal to real use of j u d g m e n t t h a t this p r o b l e m arises.
At t h e level of concepts, "this tennis ball" never m a k e s any ad-
vance over "tennis ball." T h e modifier is pointless unless it can
p o i n t b e y o n d l a n g u a g e b e y o n d concepts to existence. T o be s u r e ,
t h e l a n g u a g e can try to offer predicates t h a t differentiate this kind
of ball from o t h e r balls (e.g., hollow, elastic) or from o t h e r tennis
balls (e.g., white). B u t t h e r e a r e a lot of tennis balls t h a t fit t h e most
exhaustive description (there can b e n o lowest level of specification
of c o n c e p t s ) . O n e can only specify ultimately in intuition. M o r e -
83

over, n o t h i n g in t h e c o n c e p t can fully specify t h e similarly particu-

lar version of each of its p r e d i c a t e d p r o p e r t i e s (e.g, which white?
h o w elastic?) or, m o r e crucially, t h e coordination of these p r o p e r t i e s

76 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

into a n integral whole. A n empirical c o n c e p t names s o m e t h i n g t h a t
concepts c a n n o t fully constitute. A n d , of course, t h e concept of a
tennis ball, h o w e v e r d e t e r m i n a t e l y specified, can never be played
o n a tennis court. O n e n e e d s t h e actual ball. T h i s p r o b l e m can be
resolved only by t h e extension of concepts t h r o u g h s c h e m a t a into
t h e field of s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l intuition, w h e r e n u m e r i c a l singularity
can be constituted as a r e g i o n of extension a n d d u r a t i o n .

Subjective Judgment: States and Appraisals,

Another "Kind of Judging"

If we take it t h a t for K a n t j u d g m e n t is simply t h e form of all con-

scious a t t e n t i o n , such t h a t t h e r e can literally be n o conscious atten-
tion w i t h o u t a n explicit j u d g m e n t , t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e r e
c a n n o t b e a g r e a t deal available for conscious a t t e n t i o n t h a t does
n o t get a t t e n d e d , that d o e s n o t e n t e r into j u d g m e n t s . O n e would,
accordingly, n e e d to distinguish b e t w e e n a n awareness which e n -
c o m p a s s e d all presence-to-consciousness, a n d a conscious attention
p r o p e r , which involved w h a t achieved recognition in j u d g m e n t . T o
be even available to consciousness is to b e " m i n e , " b u t m i n e in a far
weaker sense t h a n it is w h e n it is a p p r o p r i a t e d into consciousness by
a n act ofj u d g m e n t . O n e can still acknowledge t h a t conscious atten-
tion r e q u i r e s a n act of empirical j u d g m e n t .
T h e p o i n t is, however, t h a t t h e r e can be m o r e t h a n o n e kind of
empirical j u d g m e n t : n o t simply t h e objective r e f e r e n c e of cogni-
tion, b u t t h e subjective r e f e r e n c e of aesthetics a n d reflection. Kant
clearly recognized t h r e e forms of "subjective j u d g m e n t " over t h e
course of t h e 1780s:

1. " j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n "
2. " j u d g m e n t s of taste"
3. "(logical) reflective j u d g m e n t s . "

H o w it is possible for K a n t to use t h e word " j u d g m e n t " in this

c o n t e x t a n d w h a t t h e implications may b e p r o v e s essential to
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Third Critique. I n d e e d , as a Critique of Judg-
ment, it is d e d i c a t e d to t h e e x a m i n a t i o n of this p r o b l e m .
We n e e d to distinguish "subjective objects" (subjektive Gegen-
stnde), to use Prauss's p h r a s e , from subjective judgments. One
m i g h t ask w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which can never be-
c o m e e l e m e n t s in a n objective cognition. T h e question n e e d s to be
r e p h r a s e d : w h a t about a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can never b e c o m e a n ele-
m e n t in a n objective cognition? N o t t h e matter in it, b u t t h e specific

Validity and Actuality 77

reference o f it: n o t t h e Sinn b u t t h e Gefhlhow it was for m e , i.e.,
a b o u t m e , n o t j u s t in m e . W h a t w o u l d e x a m p l e s of such a j u d g m e n t
be? T h e essential p o i n t a b o u t such j u d g m e n t s is t h a t they a r e ex-
plicitly restrictive: they assert a private situation,/or me alone. T h u s ,
Prauss's prefatory-transformational p h r a s e "It seems (to m e ) "
works to privatize t h e scope of t h e claim of t h e j u d g m e n t . Subjective
j u d g m e n t s a b o u t objects a r e j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e subjective r e -
s p o n s e to objects: valuations. Such valuations can be of quantity,
n o t j u s t quality: e.g., "that ski r u n looks s t e e p to m e . "
A b o u t c o n t e n t s of m y consciousness I a m m o r e t h a n cog-
nitively aware. I a m also affectively a n d pragmatically e m b r o i l e d in
t h e m . "Subjective objects" a r e simply c o n t e n t s of consciousness
(Vorstellungen) t a k e n asfor m e , when they a r e t a k e n t h a t way, i.e., in
j u d g m e n t s of that sort. T h e s e s a m e subjective objects r e m a i n simply
e l e m e n t s of objectsincluding myself as o n e i n j u d g m e n t s of
that sort. T h e c o n t e n t d o e s n o t c h a n g e ; all t h a t c h a n g e s is t h e refer-
e n c e of t h e j u d g m e n t . T h e issue t h a t r e m a i n s , of course, is t h e va-
lidity claim of j u d g m e n t s t h a t a r e self-referential in this sense. W h a t
t h e n d o e s subjective validity m e a n ? Late in t h e First Critique K a n t
used "subjective validity" to signify a belief which was n o t yet con-
firmed as objective k n o w l e d g e . T h a t use of "subjective validity"
84

does n o t q u i t e g e t at t h e interesting sense of t h e conception, how-

ever. It m a k e s absolutely n o sense to think of a "subjective principle
a p r i o r i " in t h a t l i g h t . N o r d o e s it really illuminate t h e t h r e e essen-
85

tial forms of subjective j u d g m e n t t h a t K a n t d e v e l o p e d over t h e

course of his critical p h i l o s o p h y .
Accordingly, it will b e necessary t o e x a m i n e in s o m e detail
Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness. K a n t took u p
this p r o b l e m in at least t h r e e salient discussions: t h e discussion of
i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e First Critique, t h e distinction of " j u d g m e n t s of
p e r c e p t i o n " from " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e " in t h e Prolegomena to
Any Future Metaphysics, a n d t h e section o n aesthetic j u d g m e n t s in
t h e Critique of Judgment.
T h e key to Kant's p h e n o m e n o l o g y lies in t h e n o t i o n of "ref-
e r e n c e " (beziehen). I n vii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Critique of
Judgment K a n t sets o u t by discriminating t h e "logical validity" of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from t h e i r "aesthetical c h a r a c t e r " by associating
t h e f o r m e r with "reference t o t h e object" a n d t h e latter with "ref-
e r e n c e to t h e subject." I m m e d i a t e l y thereafter, h e notes: " I n t h e
cognition of a n object of sense b o t h [references] a r e p r e s e n t e d
conjointly [kommen beide Beziehungen zusammen v o r ] . " W h a t does 86

it m e a n t h a t b o t h references occur t o g e t h e r ? T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n -

78 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 of-an-object is itself at o n e a n d t h e s a m e time aesthetical a n d logi-
cal, i.e., available for reference e i t h e r to t h e subject or to the ob-
j e c t . W h a t is r e f e r r e d is always j u s t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A n d as
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s presence-to-consciousnessit is always for
t h e subject. T h i s is Kant's point in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic"
of t h e First Critique: r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s "contain n o t h i n g t h a t can
b e l o n g to a n object in itself, b u t merely t h e a p p e a r a n c e of some-
t h i n g , a n d t h e m o d e in which we are affected by that some-
thing." 8 7

Kant writes in vii of a representation-of-an-object (Vorstellung

eines Objekts). T h a t is a particular kind of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , namely,
o n e which r e q u i r e s givenness-of-matter in sensation. R e p r e s e n t a -
tions are possible without such s e n s u o u s intuition, without m a t e -
riality, a n d h e n c e without objective reference. E x a m p l e s of such
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e ideas of r e a s o n (God, t h e soul, t h e world-
whole), o r abstract universals like t h e idea of virtue, o r transcen-
d e n t a l faculties. Insofar as we can t h i n k of " p u r e " intuition as a r e p -
resentation in itself, a n d n o t simply as t h e form of sense-derived
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e r e , too, we have r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i t h o u t objec-
tive ("material") reference. T h e s a m e would be t r u e of m a t h e m a t i -
cal constructions in " p u r e i n t u i t i o n . " B u t the case t h a t c o n c e r n s
88

us is precisely representation-of-an-object, both as a m a t t e r for con-

scious consideration a n d as this consideration itselfboth as a what
a n d as a how.
I n a f a m o u s passage in t h e First Critique, Kant p r e s e n t s a hier-
archy (Stufenleiter) of t e r m s relating to Vorstellung:

T h e g e n u s is representation in g e n e r a l (repraesentatio). S u b o r d i -
n a t e to it stands r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with consciousness (perceptio).
A perception which relates solely to t h e subject as a modifica-
tion of its state is sensation (sensatio), a n objective p e r c e p t i o n is
k n o w l e d g e (cognitio). T h i s is e i t h e r intuition or concept (intuitus
vel conceptus). T h e f o r m e r relates immediately to the object
a n d is single, the latter refers to it mediately by m e a n s of a fea-
t u r e which several things may have in c o m m o n . 8 9

It would a p p e a r t h e g e n u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is wider t h a n r e p r e s e n t a -
tion-with-consciousness. I n his Logic, Kant writes of " p r e s e n t i n g
s o m e t h i n g to oneself [sich etwas vorstellen]" in a way t h a t leads his
translators to n o t e t h a t "any implication of a conscious act is to be
excluded." 90

T h a t s e e m s a b s u r d , for h o w c a n t h e r e be presence-to-con-
sciousness w i t h o u t consciousness? Yet h e r e is precisely w h e r e we

Validity and Actuality 79

m u s t distinguish b e t w e e n t h a t which is p r e s e n t a n d t h a t which con-
sciousness discriminates o r a t t e n d s . In a letter to M a r c u s H e r z ,
91

d a t e d May 26, 1789, t h e very time Kant was c o m p l e t i n g t h e First

Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment a n d d e v e l o p i n g his most com-
plex c o n c e p t i o n of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t , h e w r o t e :

For if we can d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t our knowledge [Erkenntnis] of

things, even e x p e r i e n c e [Erfahrung] itself, is only possible u n -
d e r those conditions [i.e., t h e categories a n d space-time as t h e
form of i n t u i t i o n ] , it follows t h a t all o t h e r concepts of things
(which a r e n o t t h u s c o n d i t i o n e d ) are for us e m p t y a n d utterly
useless for k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnisse]. B u t n o t only that; all
sense d a t a for a possible cognition [Erkenntnis] would never,
w i t h o u t those conditions, r e p r e s e n t objects. T h e y would n o t
even r e a c h t h a t unity of consciousness t h a t is necessary for
k n o w l e d g e [Erkenntnis] of myself (as object of i n n e r sense). I
would n o t even be able to know t h a t I have sense data; conse-
q u e n t l y for m e , as a k n o w i n g b e i n g [als erkennendes Wesen],
they w o u l d b e absolutely n o t h i n g . T h e y could still (I i m a g i n e
myself to b e a n animal) carry o n their play in a n orderly fash-
ion, as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d according to empirical laws
of association, a n d t h u s even have a n influence o n my feeling
a n d desire [auf Gefhl und Begehrungsvermgen], w i t h o u t my
b e i n g aware of t h e m (assuming that I a m even conscious of
each individual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t of t h e i r relation to t h e
unity of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e i r object, by m e a n s of t h e syn-
thetic unity of t h e i r a p p e r c e p t i o n ) . T h i s m i g h t be so w i t h o u t
my k n o w i n g t h e slightest t h i n g thereby, n o t even what my
o w n condition [Zustand] i s . 92

It is critical to discern t h e strategy of this frequently cited passage. It

clearly takes u p t h e issues a d u m b r a t e d in 26 of t h e B-version of
t h e First Critique. It reasserts firmly that in a cognitive light (hence t h e
f r e q u e n t use of t h e w o r d Erkenntnis), t h e p r e s e n c e to consciousness
of data (Kant used t h e Latin word to signal strict givenness) would
be utterly m e a n i n g l e s s a p a r t from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures.
B u t it also asserts with e q u a l clarity that such d a t a would still b e or-
d e r e d ("according to t h e empirical laws of association") a n d even
m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y t h a t such d a t a could "have a n influence o n my
feeling a n d desire [auf Gefhl und Begehrungsvermgen], w i t h o u t my
b e i n g aware of t h e m , " i.e., t h a t we respond to stimuli in m o r e t h a n
cognitive ways a n d t h a t these noncognitive r e s p o n s e s would be o p -
erative even in t h e absence of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures. T h e

80 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

issue t h a t t h e passage poses, a n d which is at t h e h e a r t of any sophis-
ticated discussion of subjective immediacy, is n o t w h e t h e r such data
can have significance for cognition a p a r t from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
structures, b u t w h e t h e r they can even have significance for subjec-
tive awareness in these o t h e r d i m e n s i o n s . K a n t concludes his pas-
sage with t h e s t a t e m e n t "without my k n o w i n g t h e slightest t h i n g
thereby, n o t even w h a t my o w n condition [Zustand] is," yet it is typi-
cal of h i m in t h e Critique ofJudgment, as also in t h e Prolegomena, to
assign precisely to a n awareness of subjective condition [Zustand des
Gemts] t h e judgmental features associated with p r e s e n c e to con-
sciousness of such data. K a n t is u s i n g " k n o w i n g " in this last p h r a s e
in a sense m o r e r i g o r o u s t h a n h e would in m u c h of his consider-
ation of subjective j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e r e a s o n may well be t h a t h e
wishes to stress t h a t level of consciousness which is entirely animal,
w i t h o u t any possibility of h a r m o n y with rational-transcendental
structures.
I n t h e Stufenleiter passage we c o m e to representation-with-
consciousness with " p e r c e p t i o n " (Wahrnehmung). B u t w h a t exactly
does t h a t b e t o k e n ? K a n t places at t h e level of p e r c e p t i o n b o t h w h a t
"relates solely to t h e subject as t h e modification of its state"which
h e calls sensation (Empfindung)and "objective p e r c e p t i o n "
which h e calls cognition (Erkenntnis). H o w is the a t t e n t i o n involved
with sensation distinguished from cognition? Does w h a t is a t t e n d e d
c h a n g e , o r only h o w we a t t e n d it? K a n t does n o t h e r e provide a n
account of h o w o n e moves from Empfindung to Erkenntnis. 93
The
issue is precisely to articulate t h e difference b e t w e e n what is given
to consciousness in r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d how we c o m e to n o t e it, i.e.,
develop a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e different m o m e n t s in conscious
attention.
I n his Logic, K a n t suggests t h a t Wahrnehmen, p e r c e p t i o n as t h e
m e r e consciousness of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is s e p a r a t e d by at least
several m e d i a t i o n s from the k i n d of consciousness we normally u n -
d e r s t a n d h i m to m e a n by "objective knowledge." T h e Stufenleiter
does n o t b r e a k t h e m a t t e r o u t in e n o u g h detail. T h e Logic offers
m o r e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . A new step, kennen, is i n t r o d u c e d , which
94

entails a capacity of c o m p a r i s o n , d i s c e r n m e n t of identity a n d dif-

ference, yet clearly w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to concepts. I n d e e d , Kant
holds animals to be cognizant in this s e n s e . H e j u x t a p o s e s to this
95

t h e idea erkennen"to be cognizant with consciousness" as dis-

tinctly h u m a n a n d rational, a n d yet h e reserves to a h i g h e r level
still, verstehen, c o n c e p t i o n t h r o u g h c o n c e p t s . W h a t are kennen a n d
96

erkennen in this account, as distinct from wahrnehmen o n t h e o n e

Validity and Actuality 81

 h a n d , a n d verstehen o n t h e o t h e r ? Is Kant i n d u l g i n g in idle discrimi-
nations? O r is it not, r a t h e r , t h a t b o t h in what we s h a r e with animals
(kennen) a n d in what we exceed t h e m by (erkennen), Kant seems to
e n d o w h u m a n consciousness with t h e capacity for ajudgment ofper-
ception?
I n t h e Prolegomena K a n t writes: "All o u r j u d g m e n t s are at first
merely j u d g m e n t s of p e r c e p t i o n ; they h o l d only for us (i.e. for o u r
subject), a n d we d o n o t till afterwards give t h e m a new reference (to
an object)." This subsequent j u d g m e n t o f "experience"has
97

claim to objectivity. I n o n e sense, this is because it "expresses n o t

merely a r e f e r e n c e of t h e p e r c e p t i o n to a subject, b u t a quality of
t h e object." O n e m i g h t take this "quality" to be existence or given-
ness. B u t K a n t privileges a second sense of objectivity: validity
g r o u n d e d in t h e logical universality of t h e concepts of u n d e r s t a n d -
ing. K a n t m e a n s to secure "objective r e f e r e n c e " t h r o u g h "logical
validity." O n l y this p r o m o t e s j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e to objec-
tivity.
Nevertheless h e conceives of too j u d g m e n t s in a s e q u e n c e (note
t h e "at first" a n d t h e "afterwards" in t h e passage). I n d e e d , h e
speaks of two different "kinds ofj u d g i n g " : "first, I may merely com-
p a r e p e r c e p t i o n s a n d c o n n e c t t h e m in a consciousness of my state;
o r secondly, I may c o n n e c t t h e m in consciousness in general. T h e
f o r m e r j u d g m e n t is merely a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n a n d is of sub-
jective validity only; it is merely a c o n n e c t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n s in my
m e n t a l state, without r e f e r e n c e to t h e o b j e c t . " Kant seems to link
98

t h e m o r e primitive kind of j u d g i n g with t h e sorts of processes h e

t e r m e d kennen a n d erkennen in t h e Logic. T h a t k i n d of j u d g i n g has
t h e p o w e r to unify r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e to "a con-
sciousness in o n e subject o n l y . " T h i s unification is by m e a n s of
99

c o m p a r i s o n , d i s c e r n i n g likeness a n d difference.
T h i s "kind of j u d g i n g " is u n d e r t a k e n by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
b u t it is hardly Kant's s t a n d a r d idea of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g (e.g., his
" d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique). It is r a t h e r a
100

m o d e of j u d g i n g which, like t h e notion " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n "

itself, would n o t s e e m to have b e e n d e v e l o p e d yet in Kant's First
Critiqueexcept, p e r h a p s , in Kant's notion of "imagination." In
t h e Stufenleiter passage of t h e First Critique, Kant characterizes "in-
tuition" as a n objective p e r c e p t i o n , a cognition, t h o u g h it "refers
immediately to t h e object a n d is single." T h a t is extremely p r o b l e m -
atic, n o t only vis--vis B a u m g a r t e n b u t vis--vis m o d e r n skeptics of
his n o t i o n of intuition. Intuition of singular objects, n o t according
to universal rules, as a n i m m e d i a t e a n d u n i q u e reference to t h e ob-

82 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

ject, fails to satisfy t h e decisive criterion of a j u d g m e n t of experi-
e n c e . H o w is intuition [Anschauung] as "objective" p e r c e p t i o n to be
distinguished from sensation [Empfindung] as merely "subjective"?
It is n o t s u b s u m e d u n d e r any universal c o n c e p t . T h e relation be-
tween sensation a n d intuition as "objects" of a t t e n t i o n raises all t h e
issues entailed in t h e incongruity of validity a n d actuality in Kant's
n o t i o n of objectivity. We could, as m a n y r e c e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s have
c o n t e n d e d , simply h o l d K a n t to have e r r e d in claiming objective
status for this sense of i n t u i t i o n . 101
Yet t h e r e is a crucial sense of
e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e involved with i n t u i t i o n .102
We n e e d a clearer
p h e n o m e n o l o g y of this p e r c e p t i o n . I m a g i n a t i o n is t h e decisive link
in this whole inquiry.
Kant's characterization of i m a g i n a t i o n in empirical cognition
in the First Critique proves very i m p o r t a n t in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g his p h e -
n o m e n o l o g y . Different p e r c e p t i o n s "occur in t h e m i n d separately
a n d singly" a n d they c a n n o t be c o m b i n e d by sense. Kant character-
izes sense as " t h e p o w e r of intuiting w h e n t h e object is p r e s e n t , "
w h e r e a s i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t so restricted. Sense is m o m e n t a r y o r im-
m e d i a t e ; t h e p r e s e n c e has n o d u r a t i o n . Only imagination has t h e
p o w e r to h o l d past a n d p r e s e n t p e r c e p t i o n s t o g e t h e r a n d by t h a t
synthesis " p r o d u c e a n intuition." T h a t is t h e sense of r e p r o d u c t i o n
or " p r e s e n t a t i o n " (Darstellung; exhibitio). T h a t is what i m a g i n a t i o n
m u s t d o : " b r i n g t h e manifold of intuition into t h e form of a n im-
age." 1 0 3
While i m a g i n a t i o n is a n act of consciousness, a n d clearly
p a r t of its spontaneity, it acts by rules a n d p r o c e e d i n g s "of which we
a r e scarcely ever c o n s c i o u s . " I m a g i n a t i o n is generally t a k e n by
104

K a n t to be p a r t of t h e spontaneity of consciousness, a n d h e n c e , of
" u n d e r s t a n d i n g " as conscious activity o n a m u c h wider r a n g e t h a n
his First Critique u s a g e . 1 0 5

I n his Anthropology, K a n t distinguishes between " a t t e n d i n g "

a n d "abstracting" as powers of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g (in t h e most g e n e r a l
sense of t h e t e r m ) . " H e identifies with attentio " t h e p o w e r of a p -
p r e h e n d i n g given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to p r o d u c e a n intuition," a n d
with abstractio "the p o w e r of abstracting what is c o m m o n to several
of these to p r o d u c e a concept." 106
N o t e that b o t h a r e productive ac-
tivities. K a n t elaborates o n t h e p o w e r of imagination in 31 of t h e
Anthropology. H e discriminates t h r e e powers: "forming intuitions in
space (imaginatio plastica), associating intuitions in time (imaginatio
associans), a n d c o n n e c t i n g o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s because of their af-
finity for o n e a n o t h e r , in so far as they have a c o m m o n g r o u n d (af-
finitas)." 107

T h e last of t h e s e powers holds o u r attention. K a n t elaborates

Validity and Actuality 83

 his m e a n i n g : "By affinity I m e a n t h e c o n n e c t i o n of t h e manifold by
virtue of its origin from o n e g r o u n d . " W h a t does that signify? H e
a t t e m p t s to elucidate by contrast with "a succession of r e p r e s e n t a -
tions h a v i n g n o objective c o n n e c t i o n " so b e m u s i n g t h a t we " w o n d e r
w h e t h e r we have b e e n d r e a m i n g . " T h a t cannot be, t h o u g h we can
1 0 8

only clarify why t h a t c a n n o t be, only find t h e necessary transcen-

d e n t a l law for it, w h e n we leave this stage of consciousness a n d rise
to t h e h i g h e r p o w e r of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet w h a t is crucial to
n o t e is t h a t "the play of i m a g i n a t i o n still follows t h e laws of sen-
sibility, which provides t h e material, a n d this is associated without
consciousness of t h e r u l e b u t still in k e e p i n g with it. So t h e associa-
tion is carried o u t in conformity with u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h it is n o t
derived from u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 1 0 9

I m a g i n a t i o n " p r o d u c e s " such a n intuition i n d e p e n d e n t of con-

c e p t u a l universals, K a n t suggests in t h e Anthropology. H e character-
izes t h e k i n d of unification of which i m a g i n a t i o n is capable as
constituting a discernible individual by c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e h e t e r o -
g e n e o u s p r o p e r t i e s t h a t b e l o n g in it. O n e m u s t discriminate from
m e r e particulars of sense p e r c e p t i o n , which a r e t h e truly simple
things for Kant, t h e object in its singularity, which is a composite,
i.e., contains a manifold, b u t is n o n e t h e l e s s individual, i.e., d e t e r m i -
n a t e e n o u g h to b e distinguished. T h a t d e t e r m i n a c y is constituted
n o t by t h e application of universals in a c o n c e p t u a l construction,
b u t r a t h e r by contrast (oppositio) which "arouses o u r attention by
j u x t a p o s i n g c o n t r a r y sense r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s u n d e r o n e a n d t h e
same c o n c e p t . " 1 1 0

Obviously, m o r e t h a n m e r e contrast is discriminable. T h e

i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t also be able to find similarity. K a n t characterizes
these two capacities as " j u d g m e n t " (indicium) a n d "wit" (ingenium).
" J u d g m e n t ' s task is to n o t e t h e differences in a manifold t h a t is
identical in p a r t ; t h a t of wit is to n o t e t h e identity of a manifold t h a t
is different in p a r t . " J u d g m e n t a n d wit a r e t a l e n t s n a t u r a l gifts.
1 1 1

T h e y b e l o n g to u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the b r o a d sense, to be s u r e , b u t
they " d e p e n d o n t h e subject's n a t u r a l predisposition" a n d in t h a t
measure cannot be taught or l e a r n e d . 1 1 2
K a n t a d d s a very i m p o r -
t a n t characterization of wit: " W h e n wit draws c o m p a r i s o n s , its be-
havior is like p l a y . " 113
I m a g i n a t i o n , with its percipience of affini-
ties, seems very close to t h e kennen a n d erkennen of t h e j u d g m e n t of
perception.
Y o u n g a r g u e s t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t b e rescued from a simple
association with i m a g i n g a n d seen r a t h e r as involving reconfigura-
tion (umbilden, umgestalten), a t a k i n g as o t h e r or as m o r e t h a n is

84 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

given. 1 1 4
In this sense, i m a g i n a t i o n is i n h e r e n t l y interpretative, n o t
r e c e p t i v e . I n d e e d , Y o u n g goes very far toward identifying imag-
115

ination with functions t h a t K a n t is conventionally held to assign to

the u n d e r s t a n d i n g via concepts. T h e r e is n o question, for Y o u n g ,
t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n belongs to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s functions of t h e m i n d
in K a n t . H e sees it functioning in t e r m s of d i s c e r n i n g in t h e sen-
1 1 6

sibly given configurations which " m i g h t also a p p e a r in o t h e r ways

a n d o n o t h e r occasions," which seems to c o m e close to t h e concep-
tual sense of "falling u n d e r a r u l e . " Y o u n g p u s h e s so h a r d in this
direction t h a t h e seems close to Schaper's project of dissolving
i m a g i n a t i o n entirely into u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e d u c i n g Kant's epis-
temology to two faculties, with n o m e d i a t i n g t h i r d . B u t Y o u n g is
1 1 7

not ultimately disposed to follow S c h a p e r t h a t far.

H e m a k e s a crucial distinction: "to c o n s t r u e or i n t e r p r e t some-
t h i n g sensibly p r e s e n t as a n F a n d to discriminate it from things of
o t h e r types . . . is a function of imagination," b u t "to have t h e dis-
cursive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h i n g of kind F, t h e concept of such a
t h i n g , a n d to be able tojudge t h a t w h a t is sensibly p r e s e n t is a n F . . .
are functions of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h e first function has to d o
1 1 8

with t h a t recognition or n a m i n g associated with kennen a n d erken-

nen as in a c q u a i n t a n c e , n o t k n o w l e d g e [wissen], while t h e second is
involved with w h a t K a n t called verstehen ( u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , o r m o r e
generally objective j u d g m e n t . Y o u n g points o u t that s o m e of t h e
things i m a g i n a t i o n discerns as F's find n o c o n c e p t u a l correlate,
while s o m e of t h e things u n d e r s t a n d i n g conceives as F's find n o
sensible c o r r e l a t e . 1 1 9

Y o u n g m e a n s to d r a w i m a g i n a t i o n very close to t h e faculty of

j u d g m e n t (Urteilskraft). 120
B o t h entail " s u b s u m i n g particulars u n -
d e r rules." However, j u d g m e n t is c o n c e r n e d with validity in a cru-
cial way t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n is not. While i m a g i n a t i o n functions as
s u b s u m p t i o n in accordance with a r u l e , j u d g m e n t functions as sub-
s u m p t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e conception of a rule, i.e., with ex-
plicit r e f e r e n c e to t h e validity of t h e claimed s u b s u m p t i o n . T h i s
distinction is decisive. K a n t writes of imagination acting in accor-
d a n c e with t h e rules of u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t n o t for t h e sake of these
rules in a crucial passage of the Anthropology which will p r o v e essen-
tial to t h e whole idea of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s . T h a t it is possible for
i m a g i n a t i o n to act in a c c o r d a n c e with the rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d -
ing b u t w i t h o u t explicit a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of t h e m makes t h e free-
d o m of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n conceivable a n d p e r m i t s of Kant's crucial
c o n c e p t of " h a r m o n y " in t h e Third Critique, w h e r e a s in constitutive
judgment, i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t free, b u t is precisely determined. 121

Validity and Actuality 85

Y o u n g concludes t h a t t h e key is to "distinguish b e t w e e n a merely
subjective linking of a p p e a r a n c e s a n d a linking of t h e a p p e a r a n c e s
in t r u t h . . . b e t w e e n a merely subjective unity a n d a n objective
u n i t y . " W i t h this l a n g u a g e h e comes amazingly close to t h e dis-
1 2 2

tinction b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of
p e r c e p t i o n , b u t h e m e n t i o n s n e i t h e r t h e Prolegomena itself n o r
Prauss's f a m o u s exegesis of it. Nevertheless, his analysis of imagina-
tion shows h o w p r o f o u n d l y close imagination a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of
p e r c e p t i o n a r e , a n d how close b o t h are to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t .
It is that c o h e r e n c e that I wish to p u s h to its ultimate conclusion.
K a n t recognizes that existence is a m a t t e r a b o u t which n o t h i n g
can b e "anticipated" a priori. If t h e r e a r e rules for p r o m o t i n g actu-
ality via concepts to validity, they m u s t start from a n d r e i n t e r p r e t
what m u s t already be given. T h a t raises o n c e again t h e question of
t h e r e f e r e n c e involved in intuitive synthesis. Is the " c o m m o n
g r o u n d " o r "origin" p r o d u c e d by i m a g i n a t i o n K a n t at o n e p o i n t
calls it "intuition" a n d at a n o t h e r " i m a g e " n o t a p p r o a c h i n g t h e
sense of a n object? K a n t seems driven to c o n c e d e at least a restric-
tive sense of this: " t h e p o w e r of intuition ( p u r e or empirical) is lim-
ited to objects in t h e i r singularity, w h e r e a s t h e p o w e r of concepts
contains t h e universal e l e m e n t of [ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ] . " 123

If we exploit fully t h e sense we have b e e n g a r n e r i n g b o t h of t h e

core ambiguity in Kant's n o t i o n of objectivity a n d of the peculiar
"kind of j u d g i n g " we have discriminated, we can suggest t h a t K a n t
could m e a n t h a t objective reference only has a claim to validity
w h e n conceptually constituted, b u t t h a t some p r o s p e c t of plausible,
m e r e l y subjectively valid, r e f e r e n c e to t h e object m i g h t b e associ-
a t e d with t h e j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n : p e r h a p s a descriptive r a t h e r
t h a n a scientific reference. I n t h e imaginative synthesis, t h e n , we
could discern (kennen) a unity of the manifold (image) as r e f e r r i n g
to s o m e t h i n g existing e x t e r n a l to the subject in the most p r i m o r d i a l
sense of givenness: a n i n v o l u n t a r y modification of t h e subjective
state, to be s u r e f o u n d in t h e subject, b u t n o t m a d e by it.
Let us s u m u p t h e capacities we ascribe to this o t h e r "kind of
j u d g i n g . " Insofar as it has all those powers of a t t e n d i n g involved in
i m a g i n a t i o n , it can form intuitions in space, a n d associate t h e m in
t i m e . It can c o m p a r e a n d contrast, a n d t h e r e b y discern identity a n d
difference, a g r e e m e n t a n d opposition. T h a t is to say, it can find
w h e t h e r a n d which sensations are given as c o n n e c t e d with, or a r e
a b o u t , distinct forms as their p r o p e r m a t t e r . A n d it can find t h e af-
finities of m e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d ascribe t h e m to a unified
g r o u n d . It can constitute a n i m a g e of a n o b j e c t . B u t w h a t imag-
124

86 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

ination c a n n o t d o , n o r this form of j u d g i n g either, insofar as they
are identical, is " b r i n g forth a sense r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t was never
given to t h e p o w e r of s e n s e . " Insofar as t h e subject can recognize
1 2 5

this involuntary givenness of sensation a n d ascribe it to a n intuition

as e x t e r n a l to itself, this kind of j u d g i n g can discriminate " i n n e r "
a n d " o u t e r " e v e n if all t h a t it c o n t e m p l a t e s is p r e s e n t as i n n e r
sense. It d o e s this, it m u s t b e stressed, ultimately in accordance
with, b u t w i t h o u t explicit r e c o u r s e to, t h e rules of t h e u n d e r -
standing.
It is j u s t h e r e t h a t t h e Third Critique takes u p a n d decisively
advances t h e a r g u m e n t . I n w h a t is very likely t h e oldest section of
the work, 10, K a n t m a k e s t h e following crucial observation:
"Again, we a r e n o t always forced to r e g a r d w h a t we observe (in
respect of its possibility) from t h e p o i n t of view of r e a s o n . T h u s we
can at least observe a p u r p o s i v e n e s s according to form, w i t h o u t
basing it o n a p u r p o s e (as t h e material of t h e nexus finalis), a n d r e -
m a r k it in objects, a l t h o u g h only by r e f l e c t i o n . " 126
" T h e point of
view of r e a s o n " in t h e text s h o u l d b e taken to refer to theoretical
o r cognitive o p e r a t i o n in t h e technical sense of s u b s u m i n g r e p r e -
sentations u n d e r universal c o n c e p t s : " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e "
or " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t s , " in o t h e r words. T h u s we a r e con-
c e r n e d in this passage with t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g . " Twice in
t h e passage K a n t calls that activity "observation" (beobachten). I n
addition, h e uses " r e m a r k " o r "recognize" (bemerken). B o t h a r e
words t h a t a p p e a r in s o m e sense cognitive. T o observe (beobachten)
a n d to recognize (bemerken) a r e very likely t h e senses of kennen a n d
erkennen in t h e Logic passage. K a n t claims n o w t h a t they a r e pos-
sible only "by reflection." W h a t , t h e n , is reflection?
I n t h e " A m p h i b o l y of C o n c e p t s of Reflection" of t h e First Cri-
tique, K a n t defines reflection as " t h a t state of m i n d [Zustand des
Gemtes] in which we first set ourselves to discover t h e subjective
conditions u n d e r which (alone) we a r e able to arrive at concepts."
H e n c e it "does n o t c o n c e r n itself with objects themselves with a
view of d e r i v i n g concepts from t h e m directly," b u t r a t h e r considers
"the relation of given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o u r different sources of
knowledge." 127
K a n t goes o n to a r g u e t h a t all j u d g m e n t s r e q u i r e
this reflection. H e intimates t h a t it is a c o m m o n p l a c e in all acts of
consciousness, n o t merely j u d g m e n t s b u t "all c o m p a r i s o n s " (alle
Vergleichungen). 128
Every interpretative e n c o u n t e r with e x p e r i e n c e
involves reflection, a n d h e characterizes its o p e r a t i o n s in j u s t t h e
t e r m s which we have c o n n e c t e d with that o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g :
"Now t h e relations in which concepts in a state of m i n d can stand to

Validity and Actuality 87

o n e a n o t h e r are those of identity a n d difference, of agreement a n d op-
position, of t h e inner a n d t h e outer, a n d finally of t h e determinable a n d
t h e determination (matter a n d f o r m ) . " 1 2 9

I n discussing reflection u n d e r these "four h e a d i n g s of all com-

parision a n d distinction," K a n t provides t h e seal to t h e a r g u m e n t I
have b e e n trying to e l a b o r a t e : " T h e y a r e distinguished from
categories by t h e fact t h a t they d o n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e object accord-
ing to w h a t constitutes its c o n c e p t (quantity, reality), b u t only serve
to describe in all its manifoldness t h e c o m p a r i s o n of t h e r e p r e s e n t a -
tions which is p r i o r to t h e c o n c e p t of t h i n g s . " Reference to t h e
1 3 0

object in this " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " I m a i n t a i n , is t h e essential

s t r u c t u r e of t h e "reflective j u d g m e n t " u p o n which t h e entire Third
Critique is g r o u n d e d .
Kant's association of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " with this e m e r g e n t n o -
tion of reflective j u d g m e n t is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of his a t t u n e m e n t to
t h e cognitive potential in this o t h e r k i n d of j u d g i n g , a n d it is in p u r -
s u i n g this cognitive extension of his l a n g u a g e of purposiveness t h a t
K a n t would c o m e to m a k e his b r e a k t h r o u g h to t h e t h e o r y of re-
flective j u d g m e n t as such, with its a t t e n d a n t discrimination from
d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t a n d modification of t h e faculty s c h e m e of
rationality. B u t b e f o r e h e could follow o u t that potential, K a n t h a d
still to use w h a t h e already g r a s p e d a b o u t purposiveness to solve his
p r o b l e m in aesthetics.

88 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 Four

T H E TRANSCENDENTAL
GROUNDING OF TASTE:
PURPOSE AND PLEASURE

s h e t u r n e d to t h e composition of his "Critique of T a s t e "

in late 1787, K a n t believed that some form of transcen-
d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g was possible. H e believed h e h a d
f o u n d t h a t elusive a n d u n i q u e a priori principle in which
h e could g r o u n d t h e faculty of feeling transcendentally in a critique
of taste. B u t how did h e c o m e to t h a t principle? H o w was it distinc-
tive? A n d why, above all, did h e t e r m that d e p a r t m e n t of philoso-
p h y which w o u l d explicate it "teleology?" With those questions we
get to t h e h e a r t of t h e specific genesis of t h e "Critique of T a s t e . "
Kant f o u n d his key j u s t as h e i n t i m a t e d in t h e letter to Reinhold,
namely, by reflecting o n his previous success a l o n g t h e line of a sys-
temic extension of t h e critical philosophy in t e r m s of t h e faculties of
m i n d , i.e., t h e Second Critique. T h e genesis of the "Critique of T a s t e "
lies in t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e m o d e l of t h e Second Critique for t h e reso-
lution of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r o b l e m of the Third. K a n t b e g a n t h e
"Critique of T a s t e " o n t h e p r e m i s e that t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e j u d g -
m e n t of taste was a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice. B o t h
h a d s e n s u o u s o u t c o m e s , b u t b o t h w e r e d e t e r m i n e d entirely by
form, a n d t h u s by a universal rational principle, a n d they could
b o t h t h e r e f o r e be taken to be a u t o n o m o u s a n d a priori. T o work
o u t t h e analogy it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d what form m e a n t in
t h e context of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, h e n c e what the s t r u c t u r e of
the j u d g m e n t of taste h a d to be, a n d w h a t purity of such a j u d g m e n t
would entail. K a n t n e e d e d to follow the p r o c e d u r e h e outlined for
t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of p u r e principles: first, to a t t e n d to
t h e modality of necessity t h a t r e a s o n itself i n t r o d u c e d into these
propositions, a n d second to eliminate all the particular, empirical
c o n t e n t a n d isolate t h e p u r e form of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s .
1

K a n t was interested exclusively in t h e idea of finding "a kind of

89
a priori principle different from those h e r e t o f o r e observed" which
would g r o u n d feeling in r e a s o n , a n d this g u i d e d t h e whole flow of
his a r g u m e n t a t i o n . His p r o c e d u r e p r o v e d very intricate, a n d I p r o -
pose to r e c o n s t r u c t it exegeticlly t h r o u g h t h e sections which, o n
the basis of Tonelli a n d t h e o t h e r scholars, we can d a t e earliest, a n d
h e n c e as t h e original "Critique of T a s t e " of fall 1787: 1 - 2 2 , 3 1 -
4 0 . We m u s t n o t a s s u m e , however, t h a t they were c o m p o s e d
m u c h less conceivedas they now stand. H e r e M e r e d i t h steps
forth as a n extremely i n g e n i o u s g u i d e . H e suggests t h a t t h e m a r -
2

velous piece of architectonic, w h e r e b y t h e "Analytic of t h e Beauti-

ful" was ultimately s t r u c t u r e d in t e r m s of t h e g e n e r a l character-
istics of all l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t s , c a m e s o m e w h a t late a n d was i m p o s e d
o n a text that h a d d e v e l o p e d in a n a l t o g e t h e r different m a n n e r . H e
f u r t h e r suggests t h a t t h e earliest s e g m e n t s of t h e work were, ac-
cordingly, 1 Off. a n d 3Iff. H e includes 1 as i n t r o d u c t o r y a n d
9 as, in Kant's o w n words, " t h e key to t h e Critique of T a s t e . " It is 3

in t h e s e sections t h a t we m u s t locate t h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h which m a d e

possible t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e "Critique of Taste."
K a n t b e g a n 10 of t h e Critique ofJudgment, "Of Purposiveness
in G e n e r a l , " with n o less t h a n five t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s .
P u r p o s e , p u r p o s i v e n e s s , pleasure, pain, a n d will all received t r a n -
scendental e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h a t these e x p l a n a t i o n s are in large
m e a s u r e a s s u m e d in t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n of t h e rest of t h e analytic,
i n c l u d i n g sections which p r e c e d e it, s u p p o r t s Meredith's conjec-
t u r e t h a t this may have b e e n t h e starting point of t h e original
"Critique of T a s t e . " C o n n e c t i n g the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c h i e v e m e n t
r e p r e s e n t e d by 10 with t h e a c c o u n t K a n t gave in his letter to
R e i n h o l d in D e c e m b e r 1787 e n h a n c e s t h e plausibility of
Meredith's suggestion.
P u r p o s i v e n e s s " t e l e o l o g y " s e r v e d as the vehicle for t h e de-
v e l o p m e n t of a "Critique of T a s t e . " K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d in his let-
ter to R e i n h o l d t h a t teleology h a d little to offer, t h a t it was the
"poorest in a priori g r o u n d s of d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " B u t t h a t t h e r e
4

could be any a priori principles g r o u n d i n g feeling was already a

revolutionary insight. T h e link between p l e a s u r e a n d p u r p o s i v e -
ness is t h e g r o u n d i n g insight of t h e "Critique of Taste." I n 10
Kant takes p l e a s u r e , transcendentally described, to b e t h e causal-
ity of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in "maintaining t h e subject in t h e same
s t a t e . " K a n t characterizes p u r p o s e a n d purposiveness with crisp
5

e c o n o m y : " P u r p o s e is t h e object of a concept in so far as t h e con-

cept is r e g a r d e d as t h e cause of t h e object (the real g r o u n d of its
possibility); a n d t h e causality of a concept in respect of its object is its

90 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 p u r p o s i v e n e s s (forma finalis)." P u r p o s e is t h e relation b e t w e e n a
6

c o n c e p t a n d a n object w h e r e b y t h e c o n c e p t acts as cause of the ac-

tuality (existence) of t h e object.
W h a t is caused is "not merely t h e cognition of a n object b u t t h e
object itself (its form a n d existence)." B u t even m o r e i m p o r t a n t is
7

t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y distinctive k i n d of cause: causality t h r o u g h a

concept. I n t h e K a n t i a n framework, the relation of p u r p o s e in-
volves intelligent agency, o r "will." T h a t is why K a n t p r e s e n t s a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n of will in 10. H e describes it as " t h e
faculty of desire, so far as it is d e t e r m i n a b l e to act only t h r o u g h con-
cepts, i.e. in conformity with t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p u r p o s e . " 8

Causality t h r o u g h intelligent will is " n o u m e n a l causality"; it con-

stitutes a n event which c a n n o t b e a c c o u n t e d for within t h e strict
categorical system of t h e world of p h e n o m e n a . T h e essential idea
9

of this m o d e of causality arises in t h e h u m a n consciousness of

m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d responsibility. I n reflecting o n t h e idea of will in
t h e context of t h e Second Critique K a n t f o u n d t h e clue to a transcen-
d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e Third. 10

It r e m a i n s to see exactly h o w K a n t t h o u g h t h e h a d achieved his

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of taste. K a n t first analyzed (to "analyze"
or " e x p o u n d " is t h e first step in "Critique") t h e essential e l e m e n t s in
t h e j u d g m e n t of taste as a type of p r o p o s i t i o n . H e d i s c e r n e d t h a t
11

it was a singular, n o t a universal l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t , i.e., it r e f e r r e d to

a single i n s t a n c e . T h e j u d g m e n t " T h i s tulip is beautiful" was a
12

j u d g m e n t of taste, while t h e j u d g m e n t "Tulips a r e beautiful" was a

cognitive j u d g m e n t . A j u d g m e n t of taste h a d always to be a n im-
1 3

m e d i a t e , first-hand r e s p o n s e to a n unanticipatably u n i q u e stim-

ulus.
Second, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was g r o u n d e d n o t in any c o n c e p -
tualization b u t r a t h e r in t h e m e r e feeling elicited by t h e p r e s e n c e of
t h e representation-of-an-object. H e r e K a n t f o u n d it necessary to
discriminate r e p e a t e d l y b e t w e e n "sensation" (Sinn) a n d "feeling"
(Gefhl), t h a t is, objective a n d subjective r e f e r e n c e . More specifi-
14

cally, h e discriminated b e t w e e n cognitive use involving conceptual-

ization, a n d m e r e aesthetic c o n t e m p l a t i o n . H e associated t h e
15

f o r m e r with objectivity a n d t h e latter with subjectivity. T h u s t h e

j u d g m e n t of taste was subjective, h a d to d o with feeling, a n d osten-
sibly h a d n o cognitive use w h a t s o e v e r . 16

B u t despite these two features, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste claimed

o n t h e o n e h a n d universal c o n s e n t a n d o n t h e other, necessity. It
claimed, in s h o r t , features which K a n t associated with a priori j u d g -
m e n t s . K a n t was careful to discriminate t h e sort of universality a n d

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 91

the sort of necessity claimed in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste from those
claimed in cognitive j u d g m e n t s . T h e universality of consent
claimed in a j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t observed, h a d to d o n o t with
t h e t r u e universality which could reside only in logical validity, b u t
r a t h e r with t h e intersubjective validity of t h e j u d g m e n t , namely, its
claim o n all o b s e r v e r s . Similarly, t h e kind of necessity claimed in
17

t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was n o t t h e necessity of a universal logical

category b u t r a t h e r t h e " e x e m p l a r y " necessity of a singular in-
s t a n c e . Yet, for all that, in t h e m e a s u r e t h a t the j u d g m e n t of taste
18

m a d e these claims, it s e e m e d to suggest a rational a priori principle

at its f o u n d a t i o n .
T h e key p o i n t is t h a t in t h e sorts of propositions involved in aes-
thetic j u d g m e n t s s o m e modality of necessity s e e m e d involved.
T h u s , K a n t w r o t e : " I n this modality of a e s t h e t i c j u d g m e n t s , n a m e l y
their a s s u m e d necessity, lies w h a t is for t h e Critique of Judgment a
m o m e n t of capital i m p o r t a n c e . For this is what makes a n a priori
principle a p p a r e n t in t h e i r case, a n d lifts t h e m o u t of t h e s p h e r e of
empirical p s y c h o l o g y . " T h e s e lines c o m e from o n e of t h e transi-
19

tional sections a d d e d to t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e " to a c c o m m o -

d a t e it into t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " a n d t h e use of the
p h r a s e "Critique of J u d g m e n t " confirms that it c a n n o t have b e e n
written before t h e s p r i n g of 1789. B u t t h e idea h a d to be p r e s e n t to
Kant's m i n d before h e could e m b a r k at all o n any t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
g r o u n d i n g of a "Critique of T a s t e . "
T h u s K a n t felt t h a t establishing t h e g r o u n d w h e r e b y t h e sin-
gular j u d g m e n t could be recognized as universal a n d necessary, a
priori, in this sense constituted t h e philosophical challenge a n d
t h e r e w a r d of a consideration of taste as a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l issue. I n
8, h e n o t e d t h a t while t h e formal category was n o t particularly
p r o b l e m a t i c for g e n e r a l logic, it was quite a n o t h e r m a t t e r for
t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r : "It brings to light a p r o p e r t y of
o u r cognitive faculty which, w i t h o u t this analysis, would have r e -
m a i n e d u n k n o w n . " It was this discovery which e n a b l e d K a n t to
2 0

write his "Critique of T a s t e , " a n d this which h e identified as t h e a

priori principle of a kind unlike any o t h e r discovered.
I n t h e case of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, the p u r p o s e of t h e action
could n o t b e its material o u t c o m e , b u t only t h e internal d y n a m i c of
rationality in t h e subject. Similarly, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste h a d to be
p u r e of such c o n n e c t i o n . Purity in t h e case of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste
m e a n t t h a t p l e a s u r e could n o t b e c o n n e c t e d with t h e materiality of
t h e object r e p r e s e n t e d to consciousness. H e n c e K a n t a r g u e d t h a t
"every interest vitiates t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d robs it of its

92 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 impartiality . . . w h e r e instead of, like t h e interest of reason,
m a k i n g p u r p o s i v e n e s s take t h e lead in t h e feeling of pleasure, it
g r o u n d s it u p o n this f e e l i n g . . . " T o be s u r e , in b o t h m o r a l choice
21

a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, a material p l e a s u r e m i g h t a c c o m p a n y
t h e m e n t a l process. " H a p p i n e s s " in t h e case of a p u r e m o r a l choice
was n o t e x c l u d e d as a result, only as a cause. Similarly " c h a r m " in
the case of a j u d g m e n t of taste was not excluded as a t t e n d i n g t h e
e x p e r i e n c e , b u t only as the d e t e r m i n i n g basis.
K a n t distinguished, in strict analogy to t h e m o r a l p r o b l e m ,
b e t w e e n empirical ( h e t e r o n o m o u s ) a n d p u r e ( a u t o n o m o u s ) j u d g -
m e n t s : "A j u d g m e n t of taste . . . is only p u r e so far as its deter-
m i n i n g g r o u n d is tainted with n o merely empirical delight. B u t
such a taint is always p r e s e n t w h e r e c h a r m [Reiz] or e m o t i o n
[Rhrung] have a s h a r e in t h e j u d g m e n t by which s o m e t h i n g is to b e
described as b e a u t i f u l . " Rather, a " p u r e " form of delight was asso-
22

ciated with t h e i m m a n e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e m e n t a l process

e x p r e s s e d in t h e propositions: in t h e case of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice,
"respect," a n d in t h e case of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, beauty. T h e s e
two feelings, in their purity, i.e., their abstraction from any deter-
m i n i n g interest in t h e material gratification t h a t m i g h t empirically
b e b o u n d u p with t h e m , b e t o k e n e d or " m a r k e d " t h e intrinsic a n d
rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e m e n t a l activity which occasioned
them.
T h u s , as from t h e feeling of respect we can necessarily infer
t h e p u r e m o r a l choice as its only possible cause, so from t h e feeling
of beauty we s h o u l d be able necessarily to infer a p u r e rational p r o -
cess as its only possible cause: "an a u t o n o m y of t h e subject passing
j u d g m e n t o n t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e (in the given r e p r e s e n t a -
t i o n ) . " A u t o n o m y is the decisive idea. Again, in striking analogy
23

to t h e a r g u m e n t of t h e Second Critique, Kant insists t h a t "taste

lays claim simply to a u t o n o m y . " It is a free choice. I n d e e d , Kant
24

a r g u e s , it is t h e freest choice possible for m a n , a n d a kind of free-

d o m which m a n alone enjoys, j u s t by virtue of his complex na-
ture. 2 5

I n analyzing t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, j u s t as in analyzing t h e p u r e

m o r a l choice, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y is " c o n c e r n e d with t h e a
priori principles of p u r e j u d g m e n t . . . those in which it is itself,
subjectively, object as well as l a w . " T h e way in which we ascertain
26

w h e t h e r such purity or a u t o n o m y is attained in t h e j u d g m e n t of

taste is strikingly parallel to t h e m a n n e r in which any given m a x i m
of choice is a p p r a i s e d for its conformity to t h e categorical i m p e r a -
tive:

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 93

 w e i g h i n g t h e j u d g m e n t , n o t so m u c h with actual, as r a t h e r
with t h e merely possible, j u d g m e n t s of o t h e r s . . . by p u t t i n g
ourselves in t h e position of every o n e e l s e , . . . letting go t h e
e l e m e n t of m a t t e r , i.e. sensation, in o u r g e n e r a l state of r e p r e -
sentative activity, a n d confining attention to t h e formal pecu-
liarities of o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r g e n e r a l state of r e p r e s e n -
tative activity. 27

It is only insofar as t h e subject has n o r e a s o n to suspect t h a t his

j u d g m e n t can be merely private t h a t h e is e m b o l d e n e d to speak
with a "universal voice" a n d express w h a t h e takes to b e a " c o m m o n
sense" (sensus communis). 28
T h i s is t h e basis for his claim to univer-
sality a n d necessity.
Previous p h i l o s o p h e r s of aesthetics h a d s o u g h t t h e basis for t h e
j u d g m e n t of taste in a p r o p e r t y of the object, b u t their search h a d
b e e n v a i n . I n s t e a d , K a n t p r o p o s e d that it b e s o u g h t in t h e confor-
29

mity of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object to o u r j u d g m e n t , i.e., we

m u s t find in t h e rules given by t h e j u d g m e n t t h e g r o u n d of t h e
b e a u t y ascribed to t h e object. T h i s was, as it were, Kant's " C o p e r n i -
can revolution" in aesthetics, which m a d e possible a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
philosophy of taste. K a n t a r g u e d , in view of all t h e essential fea-
t u r e s of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, t h a t t h e rational a priori principle
which g r o u n d e d it could only lie in a relation of t h e faculties t h e m -
selves. I n 9, which h e called t h e "key to t h e Critique of Taste," h e
articulated this as t h e idea of " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties."
A "Critique of T a s t e , " u n d e r t a k e n transcendentally, h a d to b e
"an investigation of t h e faculties of cognition a n d t h e i r function in
these j u d g m e n t s , a n d t h e illustration, by t h e analysis of e x a m p l e s ,
of t h e i r m u t u a l subjective purposiveness, t h e form of which in a
given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . c o n s t i t u t e ^ ] t h e beauty of their o b j e c t . "
30

H e r e , finally, " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " [Zweckmigkeit] or "teleology" e n -

ters into Kant's account, a n d justifies his c o n t e n t i o n a b o u t t h e
g r o u n d i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle of this faculty of m i n d .
T h e strategy of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " a p p e a r s to have b e e n to
s u p e r i m p o s e t h e l a n g u a g e of reflection, as a kind of j u d g i n g indis-
pensable for cognition in g e n e r a l , u p o n h u m a n capacity for feel-
ing, as a "real" aspect of finite-rational subjectivity in g e n e r a l . T h e
"Critique of T a s t e " can be c o n s t r u e d as a project of g r o u n d i n g at
least some feeling in a rational principle a priori. T h e core a r g u -
m e n t , w o r k i n g from p l e a s u r e a n d purposiveness to the intersubjec-
tive validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, f o u n d articulation ultimately
in t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique, espe-

94 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

daily in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" a n d in t h e " D e d u c t i o n of
Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " K a n t f o r m u l a t e d t h e view t h a t t h e r e was a n
intrinsic a p t i t u d e peculiar to h u m a n beings for g r o u n d i n g feeling
in r e a s o n t h r o u g h b e a u t y . H e called this a " c o m m o n sense"
31

(sensus communis). W i t h t h a t h e tried to i n c o r p o r a t e n o t only t h e

G e r m a n rationalist tradition, b u t also t h e British "critical" a p -
p r o a c h to aesthetics.
N o t objectivity b u t subjective responsespecifically " m u t u a l
subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " i s t h e key to the n a t u r e of b e a u t y a n d
of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, "a t h i n g b e i n g called beautiful solely in
respect o f t h a t quality in which it a d a p t s itself to o u r m o d e of taking
it i n . " T h e crucial locus of Kant's analysis of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e
3 2

is within consciousness, in its o w n o p e r a t i o n s , a n d for h i m t h e cru-

cial c o n d i t i o n is t h a t "the m e n t a l state in this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m u s t
be o n e of a feeling of t h e free play of t h e powers of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
in a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n for a cognition in g e n e r a l . " K a n t goes
33

o n to e l a b o r a t e t h e m e a n i n g of this "free play." H e writes: " T h e

q u i c k e n i n g of b o t h faculties (imagination a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) to a n
indefinite, b u t yet, t h a n k s to t h e given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , h a r m o n i o u s
activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is t h e sensation
whose universal communicability is postulated by t h e j u d g m e n t of
t a s t e . " W h y did K a n t call this " m u t u a l subjective purposiveness?"
34

I n 12, K a n t w r o t e t h a t "this p l e a s u r e is in n o way practical." Yet h e

claimed t h a t it "still involves a n i n h e r e n t causality." T h i s h e charac-
terized as "preserving the continuance of t h e state of the r e p r e s e n t a -
tion itself a n d t h e active e n g a g e m e n t of t h e cognitive powers
without ulterior a i m . " T h u s K a n t conjoined his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
3 5

e x p l a n a t i o n s of p l e a s u r e a n d p u r p o s e to g e n e r a t e this n o t i o n .
36

The Language of Purposiveness

P u r p o s e has its c o h e r e n t a n d literal sense in t h e willed act. K a n t im-

mediately asserts, however, t h a t we may discriminate t h e form of
p u r p o s e from its reality. T h e form of p u r p o s e is design, i.e., t h e r e -
lation of a n idea as cause of t h e actuality of a n object. T h a t is t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " offered in 1 0 . B u t if we abstract
3 7

from this relation a n d t h i n k only of t h e form, t h e n we a t t e n d to t h e

appearance of design, which does n o t necessarily entail its actuality.
A n d t h u s we derive t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of purposiveness given in iv
a n d anticipate t h e p h r a s e K a n t i n t r o d u c e s in so m a n y words in 10:
" p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t p u r p o s e . " T h e notion of "formal" p u r -
3 8

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 95

posiveness invokes similarity o r analogy to p u r p o s e . It is a figura-
tive use of t h e l a n g u a g e .
W h y does K a n t t r a n s p o s e t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s from
literal to figurative use? T h e answer lies in t h e peculiar o p p o r t u n i t y
it provides for a c c o u n t i n g for events. T h e form of p u r p o s e is a pos-
sible cognitive o r d e r . T h i s e m e r g e s clearly in 10: " B u t a n object, o r
a state of m i n d , o r even a n action is called purposive, a l t h o u g h its
possibility d o e s n o t necessarily p r e s u p p o s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a
p u r p o s e , merely because its possibility can b e explained a n d con-
ceived by us only in so far as we a s s u m e for its g r o u n d a causality
a c c o r d i n g to p u r p o s e s . " S u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is patently figura-
39

tive, a subjective r e c o u r s e to m a k e t h e m a t t e r "intelligible to o u r -

selves." B u t t h e occasion for this account is n o n e t h e l e s s t h e
perplexity of empirical cognition. We a r e struggling to "explain"
a n d to "conceive." Purposiveness is a cognitive l a n g u a g e to which
we r e s o r t in t h e extremity of empirical anomaly.
If we have cognitive r e c o u r s e to this l a n g u a g e , w h a t validity can
it claim? P u r p o s e , K a n t emphatically assures us, is n o t a category. It
is n o t p a r t of t h e constitutive f r a m e w o r k w h e r e b y t h e u n d e r s t a n d -
i n g d e t e r m i n e s objective k n o w l e d g e . Heuristic " m a x i m s " in gen-
40

eral a r e certainly "useful" {zweckmig has t h a t sense in G e r m a n ) in

investigations, b u t they a r e , a c c o r d i n g to Kant, strictly subjective.
T h i s subjective usefulness, t h o u g h cognitive, m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d in
t e r m s of h u m a n practical p u r p o s i v e n e s s i n its "technical" r a t h e r
t h a n its " m o r a l " s e n s e r e a d i n g cognition as a m o d e of h u m a n
technical practical purposiveness. T h i s idea c o m e s to articulation in
Kant's First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, especially in i. All
of this n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , n o t h i n g a b o u t this sort of usefulness r e n -
d e r s its cognitive results "objective." T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n discrimi-
nates logical from aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t s , yet K a n t never
ascribes objectivity to logical reflective j u d g m e n t . H e restricts his
entire discussion to subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s .
K a n t wished to e q u a t e subjective with formal, a n d objective
with material p u r p o s i v e n e s s , b u t t h e exigencies of his exposition
did n o t p e r m i t t h i s . H a d h e h e l d to a tighter line, K a n t could n o t
41

have conceived of a p u r p o s i v e n e s s which was at o n c e objective a n d

formal o r of o n e which was at o n c e subjective a n d material. B u t in
fact h e did. I n 62 K a n t gave a n a c c o u n t of the purposiveness of
geometrical constructions as objective a n d formal. A n d K a n t ac-
c o u n t e d for t h e a g r e e a b l e or pleasant (das Angenehme) in his First
Introduction as subjective b u t material purposiveness. Only by vir-

96 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

t u e of o u r a c c o u n t of t h e d i s j u n c t u r e of Kant's n o t i o n s of validity
a n d actuality can we m a k e any sense of this. Objective formal p u r -
posiveness proves to b e a form of validity without actuality, while
subjective material p u r p o s i v e n e s s involves actuality w i t h o u t valid-
ity, especially in Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e "animality" of m a n . It r e -
m a i n s t h a t t h e o t h e r two types of purposivess prove far m o r e
significant for Kant: objective material purposiveness a n d , above
all, subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s .
I n c o n t r a s t i n g t h e formal " p u r p o s i v e n e s s in g e n e r a l " of geo-
metrical figures with "real" o r "material" purposiveness in 62 of
the Third Critique, K a n t stressed t h a t t h e latter was to be f o u n d in
"things, e x t e r n a l to myself," whose " o r d e r a n d regularity [as] exist-
ing things m u s t b e given empirically in o r d e r to b e k n o w n . " H e 4 2

used as his e x a m p l e a g a r d e n laid o u t in geometric regularity. En-

c o u n t e r i n g this empirical g a r d e n , o n e discovered purposiveness. It
was given, t h e result of a n empirical cognition, as s o m e t h i n g a b o u t
the object. Yet purposiveness could only be given problematically,
for it was a n interpretative inference from, n o t a p r o p e r t y i m m e -
diately in, t h e given. T h u s K a n t w r o t e : " T h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s of a
thing, so far as it is r e p r e s e n t e d in p e r c e p t i o n , is n o characteristic of
the object itself (for such c a n n o t be perceived) a l t h o u g h it may be
inferred from a cognition of t h i n g s . " First the t h i n g h a d to be rec-
43

ognized. T h a t s e e m e d to r e q u i r e a n empirical cognitive j u d g -

m e n t . T h a t j u d g m e n t , m o r e o v e r , led to t h e conjecture t h a t t h e
4 4

t h i n g as recognized could not plausibly be taken as a m e r e n a t u r a l

h a p p e n s t a n c e ; it stood o u t as a n o m a l o u s in n a t u r e . It a p p e a r e d as
a n artifact, as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of s o m e d e s i g n . 45

Recognizing t h e purposiveness of things does n o t a p p e a r p r o b -

lematic if they result from o u r o w n particular practical activity. It 46

is alien p u r p o s e t h a t poses interpretative difficulty. E n c o u n t e r i n g

such a t h i n g , we have to m a k e a n inference a b o u t its genesis, having
r e c o u r s e to o u r o w n practical purposiveness as a m o d e l . We are in
t h e r e a l m of empirical j u d g m e n t s . T o take t h e e x a m p l e K a n t sug-
gests in 62, we m i g h t find ourselves in yet a n o t h e r kind of g a r d e n ,
n o t o n e o n t h e m o d e l of Versailles a n d geometry, b u t o n e m o d e l e d
in t h e O r i e n t a l fashion to imitate t h e spontaneity of n a t u r e , a n d fail
to recognize t h e artifact for o n e . O r we m i g h t recognize it as p u r -
4 7

posive a n d yet still take it to s e e m n a t u r a l , a n d enjoy it as a work of

art: a " d e p e n d e n t " beauty, because we shall have h a d to recognize,
h e n c e conceptualize, it as a g a r d e n before we can j u d g e it as a r t . 4 8

B u t t h e converse is also possible: we may take a n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 97

as a n artifact because it seems so d e s i g n e d . T h e point is, discern-
49

m e n t , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n a word, j u d g m e n t i s requisite h e r e . It is
a cognitive situation in which o n e may easily err.
A n d more t h a n cognition is involved. T h e r e is also usefulness,
a n d t h e c o n n e c t i o n of usefulness with existence. "Material p u r -
posiveness" has a s t r o n g sense of a n object available for use. I n 10,
in defining p u r p o s e K a n t m a d e a g r e a t deal of distinguishing t h e
object itself from its m e r e cognition. H e characterized t h e object it-
self as "form a n d e x i s t e n c e . " T h e existence of t h e object in this
50

sense seems to go b e y o n d t h e cognition of it. Its form a n d existence

m u s t have s o m e additional m e a n i n g . T h e m e a n i n g of t h e actual ex-
istence of a n object in t e r m s of its availability for use is e n c o m p a s s e d
in Kant's t e r m "[material] i n t e r e s t . " It e x t e n d s t h e relation of t h e
51

subject to t h e object from a cognitive to a practical o n e , a n d entails

not only t h e material existence of t h e object, b u t also t h e material
existence of t h e subject (as Willkr). A p u r p o s e always entails inter-
est, a c o n c e r n for t h e existence o r actualization of t h e object. T h a t is
exactly w h a t "material p u r p o s i v e n e s s " signifies.
I n 15 K a n t i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n of "objective purposive-
n e s s . " T h e c o n n e c t i o n of "objective" with "material purposive-
52

ness" is twofold. It involves, in t h e first r e g a r d , a d e t e r m i n a t e object

of cognition to b e a p p r e c i a t e d by t h e subject as a n occasion for
m e r e gratification. "Material p u r p o s i v e n e s s " is p r o m o t e d to "objec-
tive p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in r e f e r e n c e to a n object constituted by con-
cepts a n d elected by a rational process of will (not m o r a l , in this
case, b u t simply p r u d e n t i a l , i.e., pleasure-seeking). As such it would
b e useful or, in Kant's words, a "relative" p u r p o s e (or relative good).
Objects b e c o m e "relative" p u r p o s e s only via t h e i r utility for a n in-
trinsic p u r p o s e , a n a g e n t o r " e n d . " T h e y a r e , precisely, " m e a n s . "
C o n s e q u e n t l y , p u r p o s i v e n e s s r e m a i n s merely "external," n o t in t h e
object itself b u t in its utility to a separate " e n d " o r intrinsic p u r p o s e .
H e n c e t h e essential contrast b e t w e e n "material" a n d "objec-
tive" p u r p o s i v e n e s s only c o m e s to full articulation in t e r m s of this
n o t i o n of intrinsic (self-determining) p u r p o s e . A n intrinsic purpose
is a n a g e n t capable of m e a n s - e n d s choice, or at least a n actual entity
whose empirically observed b e h a v i o r c a n n o t be a c c o u n t e d for by
h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g otherwise t h a n by analogy with such a n
a g e n t . T h u s " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s " have i m p u t e d to t h e m a form of
action a n a l o g o u s to that of a t r u e a g e n t . Yet Kant is unequivocal
that the effective m e c h a n i s m in t h e case of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s is n o t
m e a n s - e n d s choice, n o t rational will, b u t merely instinct. H e n c e
" n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s , " or o r g a n i c forms, have only a n i m p u t e d "in-

98 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

trinsic purposiveness." As a c o n s e q u e n c e they d o n o t m e r i t t h e full
status of a n "end-in-itself." 53

K a n t identified t h e n o t i o n of "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " with t h e

c o n c e p t of "perfection." B a u m g a r t e n h a d used t h e n o t i o n to refer
to t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s of a t h i n g in t e r m s of its distinguishing m a r k s .
T o b e perfect in t h a t sense was to d e m o n s t r a t e all t h e requisite
m a r k s of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of t h i n g . T h i s sense of completeness
after its kind K a n t t e r m e d "quantitative perfection." H e a r g u e d
against B a u m g a r t e n t h a t it was only possible to use perfection in its
"quantitative" sense if o n e already could posit w h a t "kind" a t h i n g
was s u p p o s e d to be. B u t t h e idea t h a t a n entity ought to be any kind
was n o t a simple j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , not a cognitive j u d g m e n t
p r e s i d e d over by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t a j u d g m e n t of (practical)
r e a s o n . It p r e s u m e d a c o n c e p t of t h e t h i n g , a n d m o r e specifically,
a n idea of w h a t t h e p u r p o s e of t h e t h i n g s h o u l d be. T h i s was the
e x p l a n a t i o n of his o w n n o t i o n of "qualitative perfection" which
K a n t offered in 15 of t h e Third Critique. W h e r e m o r a l j u d g m e n t s
are c o n c e r n e d , t h e faculty at w o r k is r e a s o n , a n d r e a s o n functions
not in t h e r e a l m of t h e actual, b u t in t h e realm of "intelligible form."
T h e j u d g m e n t of "qualitative perfection," insofar as it is a m o r a l a p -
praisal, t h a t is, insofar as t h e t e r m s "good" a n d "perfect" c o r r e -
s p o n d , translates t h e object of such a j u d g m e n t from t h e world of
t h e senses into t h e n o u m e n a l o r d e r . Perfection as h e uses it, qualita-
tive perfection, entails i m m a n e n t purposiveness o r e n t e l e c h y . 54

T h e most essential link b e t w e e n Kant's philosophy a n d t h a t of

B a u m g a r t e n is t h e p r o b l e m a t i c consideration of this idea of Voll-
kommenheit, o r perfection. Perfection, in this context, refers to t h e
objective quality of a t h i n g . T h e n o t i o n of intrinsic perfection has,
for Kant, n o t merely a cognitive b u t a n evaluative aspect. K a n t d e -
veloped this n o t i o n in t h e 1750s a n d 1760s. "All perfection a p p e a r s
to consist in t h e a c c o r d a n c e [Zusammenstimmung] of a t h i n g with
freedom, h e n c e in its p u r p o s i v e n e s s , g e n e r a l utility, e t c . " For
5 5

K a n t t h e objective perfection of a t h i n g h a d to d o with its p u r p o s e .

Kant initially, u n d e r t h e influence of B a u m g a r t e n , s o u g h t to
use b e a u t y as a n access to this objective perfection. I n a Reflection
from t h e 1750s, K a n t m a d e this clear in e x p l a i n i n g t h e m e a n i n g of
judicium. "If o n e n o t e s n o t only t h e similarities a n d differences of
things, b u t also h o w a manifold m e r g e s into a unity a n d forms its
g r o u n d , t h e n o n e recognizes perfection. T h i s is called j u d g i n g
[beurteilen] . . . Such j u d g m e n t is quite certainly possible t h r o u g h
t h e lower faculties of k n o w l e d g e . " W h a t K a n t wished to resolve,
56

vis--vis B a u m g a r t e n , is " w h e t h e r b e a u t y a n d perfection, including

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 99

t h e i r causes as well as t h e rules for j u d g i n g t h e m , stand in secret
c o n n e c t i o n . " K a n t wished to believe t h a t t h e recognition of t h e
57

objective quality of a t h i n g a cognitive-evaluative j u d g m e n t

h a d a n aesthetic c o n c o m i t a n t . " T h e i n n e r perfection of a t h i n g has
a n a t u r a l relation to beauty. For t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n of a manifold to
a p u r p o s e r e q u i r e s its c o o r d i n a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to c o m m o n laws.
T h e r e f o r e t h e same p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h which a b u i l d i n g is beautiful
c o n t r i b u t e s as well to its perfection [bonitt]." B u t sometimes, with
58

certain sorts of p h e n o m e n a , K a n t believed it possible t h a t this aes-

thetic aspect could arise even w h e n t h e r e were difficulties with t h e
cognitive-evaluative j u d g m e n t . " I n all p r o d u c t s of n a t u r e a n d of art
t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g which relates exclusively to t h e p u r p o s e , a n d
s o m e t h i n g t h a t merely has to d o with t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e a p p e a r -
a n c e with t h e state of m i n d , i.e. t h e m a n n e r [Manier], t h e w r a p p i n g .
T h e latter, even w h e n o n e c a n n o t g r a s p t h e p u r p o s e , is often quite
sufficient [for b e a u t y ] , e.g. t h e s h a p e a n d color of flowers." T h e 59

m e r e m a n n e r in which such things affect o u r sensibility suffices for

t h e e x p e r i e n c e of aesthetic p l e a s u r e . "We recognize of m a n y
60

things in n a t u r e that they a r e beautiful, b u t we d o n o t know their

p u r p o s e ; o n e s h o u l d believe n o t t h a t it was n a t u r e ' s i n t e n t i o n to
please u s , b u t t h a t we a r e pleased n a t u r e seems to have inten-
tion." 61

Yet, while t h e feeling of b e a u t y m i g h t b e a r o u s e d merely by t h e

Manier, K a n t believed it was tied to t h e objective p u r p o s e . K a n t
went q u i t e far a l o n g this line:

O n e n o t e s t h a t almost e v e r y t h i n g in n a t u r e which has t h e p r o p -

erty of s h a p i n g itself distinctly from t h e g e n e r a l c l u m p of mat-
ter is beautiful in t h e eyes of m a n . F r o m this o n e can see t h a t
beauty m u s t involve a c o n s e q u e n c e [Folge] of perfection, while
perfection itself m u s t b e a m a t t e r of concepts. P e r h a p s t h e rec-
ognition of perfection comes first in m a n ; recognized sensibly,
it is beauty; as a m e r e m a t t e r of sensation, t h e p l e a s a n t . 62

I n s o m e obscure r e m a r k s that follow, K a n t insisted that s o m e t h i n g

m u s t b e given in sensation which p e r t a i n e d to t h e "absolute a n d
real" in t h e object, even if u n d e r s t a n d i n g could n o t g r a s p this abso-
lute quality perfectly [in der Vollkommenheit]. Kant t h u s i n t r o d u c e d a
distinction b e t w e e n a perfection in t h e t h i n g itself, which was inti-
m a t e d only obscurely in sensation, a n d a perfection in com-
p r e h e n d i n g t h e t h i n g , which was a m a t t e r of cognitive process in
which t h e obscurity of sensation i n t e r v e n e d .

/ 00 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 I n all sensibility t h e r e is a perfection which h u m a n u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g does n o t possess, namely, intuition, a n d a n i m p e r -
fection: sensation a n d t h e f o r m of a p p e a r a n c e . Reason
r e p r e s e n t s only relational concepts [Verhltnis Begriffe]; in in-
tuition, however, what is absolute a n d internal in a n object is
t h o u g h t . E x c e p t t h e imperfection is t h a t o u r intuitions con-
cern only t h e relation of things to o u r s e n s e s . 63

In t h e Reflection K a n t a r g u e d that it was in intuition that the "abso-

lute a n d i n t e r n a l " t h e realityof a n object was t h o u g h t . T h a t
clearly suggested a cognitive-evaluative level of d i s c o u r s e . O v e r 64

against that, K a n t claimed t h a t "the synthesis of a manifold for a

d e t e r m i n a t e p u r p o s e is relative perfection."
I n Kant's t h i n k i n g of t h e 1760s, "perfection" p o i n t e d in too
m a n y directions. H e tried to i n t e g r a t e u n d e r it cognitive, ethical,
a n d aesthetic c o m p o n e n t s of j u d g m e n t . T h e load was simply too
heavy, a n d t h e e n t e r p r i s e collapsed u n d e r t h e i m p a c t of British e m -
piricism. K a n t gave u p his n o t i o n of beauty c o n n e c t e d to objective
perfection in Reflection 6 7 6 , in which h e recognized two distinct
sorts of perfection. O n e involved t h e n a t u r e of t h e object, a n d was
cognitive a n d e v a l u a t i v e . T h e o t h e r involved t h e n a t u r e of t h e
65

subject, a n d perfection in this sense was what t h e aesthetic, what

beauty, was all a b o u t . It involved "liveliness," i.e., e x p a n d i n g t h e
consciousness of l i f e . " T h a t t h e form of a n object facilitates t h e
66

activity of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is what makes s o m e t h i n g beautiful

pleasurable a n d this is subjective; what is objective, however, is t h a t
this f o r m is universally v a l i d . " K a n t described aesthetic experi-
67

e n c e as a sort of play, a use of t h e m i n d without specific p u r p o s e

merely for t h e sake of e n t e r t a i n m e n t , in which "all t h e powers of
t h e m i n d a r e set into h a r m o n i o u s p l a y . " T h i s n o t i o n of h a r m o n y
68

of t h e faculties was directly d r a w n from t h e school-philosophy tra-

dition.
While K a n t believed that beauty was a m a t t e r of subjective per-
fection a n d involved t h e h e i g h t e n i n g of t h e m i n d , h e h a d to deter-
m i n e w h e t h e r h e could explain b e a u t y entirely by this e n h a n c i n g
function or w h e t h e r it r e q u i r e d a s u p p l e m e n t a r y a c c o u n t in t e r m s
of merely s e n s u o u s p l e a s u r e . In Reflection 6 3 8 , K a n t f o r m u l a t e d t h e
issue in t h e following way: " T h e question is w h e t h e r t h e play of
sensations o r t h e form a n d s h a p e of intuition is immediately plea-
surable o r only pleases because it provides u n d e r s t a n d i n g with
comprehensibility a n d facility in g a t h e r i n g into a whole t h e m a n -

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 101

ifold a n d giving distinctness to t h e whole r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " I n t h e 69

first case, K a n t believed, b e a u t y would be indistinguishable from

sensual " c h a r m " [Reiz]. Since K a n t c a m e to reject this identification,
his t h e o r y of b e a u t y as subjective perfection h a d to b e o r i e n t e d to-
w a r d a h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, a n d beauty g r o u n d e d in this utility
for u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h a t was t h e m e a n i n g of his most fruitful
n o t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s : "subjective formal"i.e., aestheticpur-
posiveness.

"Aesthetic" Purposiveness

I n vii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n K a n t w r o t e : "If p l e a s u r e is b o u n d u p
with t h e m e r e a p p r e h e n s i o n (apprehensio) of t h e f o r m of a n object
of intuition, w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to a c o n c e p t for a definite cognition,
t h e n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is t h e r e b y n o t r e f e r r e d to t h e object, b u t
simply to t h e subject . . . a n d h e n c e can only express a subjective
formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e o b j e c t . " We have, t h e n , to c o n s t r u e
70

"subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . "

T h e subjective (element) in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , which cannot be

an ingredient in cognition, is t h e pleasure or pain b o u n d u p with it
. . . T h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s , t h e r e f o r e , which p r e c e d e s t h e cogni-
tion of a n object a n d which, e v e n without o u r wishing to use
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of it for cognition, is at t h e same time im-
mediately b o u n d u p with it, is t h a t subjective (element) which
c a n n o t b e a n i n g r e d i e n t in cognition. H e n c e t h e object is only
called p u r p o s i v e w h e n its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a n aesthetical r e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s .
71

T h e r e are few m o r e essential o r m o r e difficult passages t h a n this

o n e in t h e Third Critique. C o n s i d e r t h e peculiarities of t h e exposi-
tion. It is t h e object which is "called" p u r p o s i v e . T h a t suggests a
j u d g m e n t very akin to t h e o n e involved in t h e figurative extension
of t h e t e r m in empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . B u t in this new context
72

this signifies only t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object is " i m m e -

diately c o m b i n e d " with a feeling of pleasure. Does this m e a n they
are t h e s a m e o r different? Is t h e " r e f e r e n c e " in (i.e., a n aspect of) o r
about (i.e., a n assessment of) t h e representation-of-the-object? T h e
issue only gets m u d d i e r w h e n K a n t redefines this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
which as such h a d to have available in it m a t t e r for reference to t h e
object, into a n "aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of purposiveness." Is t h e
materiality a n d distinctiveness of t h e object utterly a n n u l l e d ? I n ad-

102 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

dition, is a n aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s t h e same as
or different from p u r p o s i v e n e s s itself?
K a n t d o e s well to ask, at this j u n c t u r e , " w h e t h e r t h e r e is, in gen-
eral, such a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . " At t h e outset of
73

vii, in d e a l i n g with logical validity as r e f e r e n c e to t h e object, K a n t

discriminated b e t w e e n t h e " f o r m " of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d its
" m a t t e r " : space a n d sensation respectively. Now it would a p p e a r
t h a t form a n d m a t t e r a r e relevant as well in t e r m s of r e f e r e n c e to
t h e subject. If we may be p e r m i t t e d t h e p h r a s e s , we m u s t distin-
guish a n "aesthetic f o r m " a n d a n "aesthetic m a t t e r " as p r o p e r t i e s of
t h e representation-of-the-object. T h e s e may n o t simply b e con-
flated with space a n d sensation. T h e s e aesthetic e l e m e n t s in or
" b o u n d u p with" t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n could have no objective refer-
ence, K a n t i n s i s t e d .74

H o w d o e s t h e "aesthetic f o r m " of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n connect

with formal purposiveness? Earlier we o p e r a t e d with a fairly secure
n o t i o n of w h a t formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s signified in its figurative
sense: likeness to p u r p o s e , t h e a p p e a r a n c e of design. Now K a n t
seems c o n f o u n d i n g l y close to identifying t h e formality of p u r -
posiveness with t h e form of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as it refers to t h e
subject"aesthetic f o r m . " B u t t h a t is ostensibly onlyfeeling. T h e
75

e l e m e n t of objective r e f e r e n c e t h a t m a d e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ser-
viceable for empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seems n o w to have e v a p o r a t e d
utterly. I n t h e empirical cognitive use, t h e whole empirical exis-
tence of a t h i n g was occasion for t h e r e c o u r s e to p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n
this new, "aesthetical" instance, w h a t m a t t e r s is t h e m e r e form of
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, b u t t h a t in only its subjective refer-
e n c e . It is h e l d to b e n o t merely for t h e subject b u t a b o u t t h e sub-
ject.
K a n t suggests a very i m p o r t a n t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l distinction
in t h e Anthropology: "We s h o u l d distinguish between i n n e r sense,
which is a m e r e p o w e r of p e r c e p t i o n (of empirical intuition), a n d
the feeling of p l e a s u r e a n d d i s p l e a s u r e t h a t is o u r susceptibility to
b e d e t e r m i n e d , by certain r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , either to hold o n t o
t h e m or to drive t h e m awaywhich could b e called interior sense
(sensus interior)." 76
Sensation provokes n o t merely attention (con-
sciousness) b u t subjective r e f e r e n c e , "attention to o u r o w n state" o r
self-consciousness. Every sensation is in i n n e r sense, or for t h e sub-
j e c t , a n d yet almost all can be i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of o u t e r sense,
objective r e f e r e n c e . F r o m t h e latter, j u d g m e n t s b o t h of p e r c e p t i o n
a n d of e x p e r i e n c e can b e c o n s t r u e d . B u t t h e r e r e m a i n s that which

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 103

 is n o t merely for t h e subject b u t also a b o u t o r of t h e subject: t h e
"state of m i n d " which K a n t associates with t h e feeling {Gefhl) of
p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n . Sensation r e m a i n s t h e occasion, however, even
of this reference. Kant gives a fitting illustration in 3, w h e r e t h e
g r e e n of a m e a d o w is c o n s i d e r e d b o t h in t e r m s of its objective refer-
e n c e a n d in t e r m s of t h e pleasantness o r satisfaction it occasions in
t h e s u b j e c t . T h i s latter is t h e s p h e r e of t h e "aesthetic."
77

K a n t is a d d r e s s i n g himself to t h e subjective r e s p o n s e to e m p i r i -
cal sensation a n d focusing his a t t e n t i o n exclusively u p o n that refer-
e n c e to t h e subject. T h e r e f o r e h e abstracts from t h e cognitive
aspect of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, its objective reference, to
clarify t h e aesthetic side, subjective reference. H e recognizes that
p l e a s u r e or p a i n can b e involved in empirical cognition, yet h e in-
sists t h a t this p l e a s u r e o r pain has n o cognitive r e l e v a n c e . 78

W h e n h e writes of a " p u r p o s i v e n e s s . . . which p r e c e d e s the

cognition of a n object," t h e only sense in which t h a t "cannot be an
ingredient of cognition," as h e also insists, is if cognition is taken in t h e
r i g o r o u s sense of a " j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , " of a " d e t e r m i n a n t
j u d g m e n t . " B u t w h a t a b o u t a reflective j u d g m e n t ? Is the characteriz-
ation of t h e subjective purposiveness of a "logical reflective j u d g -
m e n t " (a teleological j u d g m e n t ) at all different from that of a n
"aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t ? " T h a t is, can t h e r e b e any differ-
e n c e in w h a t is p r e s e n t to consciousness? Is it not really a m a t t e r of
h o w we a t t e n d t h a t p r e s e n c e t h e use, t h e intellectual interest
t a k e n in w h a t is given? I n short, does n o t subjective formal p u r p o -
siveness, as K a n t articulates it in this crucial passage, implicitly con-
tain a r e f e r e n c e to t h e objectnot, to be sure, in the sense of t h e
j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e a n d its "valid" claim, b u t in t e r m s of t h e
j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " a n d its " r e -
flective" claim?
B u t in light of this parallelism b e t w e e n t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of
p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d the subjective reference of feeling, t h e full
significance of "subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in its formal sense, i.e.,
" p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t p u r p o s e , " e m e r g e s . T h a t t h e same sub-
jective r e f e r e n c e can serve as t h e essential d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
e x p e r i e n c e of b e a u t y a n d as t h e basis for a cognitive use of p u r -
posiveness (teleology) suggests t h e p o w e r in Kant's n o t i o n . H e r e we
have a n indication of o u r capacity to " e x p e r i e n c e " prior to a n d sep-
arately from cognition. We see t h a t the kind of " j u d g i n g " which we
have b e t o k e n e d by kennen a n d erkennen, b y j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n ,
by t h e synthesis of a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d imagination, by beobachten
a n d bemerken, a n d finally by reflection, is identified with the aes-

104 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

thetic sense of purposiveness. It is what Kant would later call " r e -
flective j u d g m e n t . "
B u t at this stage of his a r g u m e n t K a n t was exclusively con-
c e r n e d with u s i n g his l a n g u a g e of purposiveness to articulate the
possibility of a subjective r e s p o n s e which was n o t for the p u r p o s e s
of cognition a n d h e n c e n o t explicitly d e t e r m i n e d by t h e rules of t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t which was nevertheless g r o u n d e d in t h e ra-
tional s t r u c t u r e s of t h e m i n d a n d consequently eligible for a n a pri-
ori d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n short, K a n t h a d only a partial interest in t h e
s t r u c t u r e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . H e was c o n c e r n e d with o n e p u r e case
within it, j u s t as, in his consideration of t h e p u r e m o r a l choice, h e
isolated o n e p u r e case within t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of purposive-
ness as willed action in g e n e r a l . T h e r e were two linked strategies to
p u r s u e in g e n e r a t i n g t h e p u r e case, in p e r f o r m i n g t h e transcen-
d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of taste. T h e first was to discriminate between a
merely passive affect, material p l e a s u r e , a n d the p l e a s u r e which at-
t e n d e d m e n t a l activity itself. T h e second was to discriminate be-
tween two j u d g m e n t s a b o u t p l e a s u r e , o n e claiming t h e object was
"pleasant" a n d t h e o t h e r t h a t it was "beautiful." As I will show, b o t h
strategies t u r n o n t h e c o m p l e x subjective p h e n o m e n o l o g y we have
labored so h a r d to b r i n g into clarity.

The Transcendental Grounding of Taste 105

 Five

T H E BEAUTIFUL AND
T H E PLEASANT: KANT'S
TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTION OF TASTE

T
h e p l e a s u r e in beauty is a singular event. It c a n n o t be gen-
eralized. It is n o t a p r o p e r t y of the object, b u t a subjective
r e s p o n s e w i t h o u t c o n c e p t . Taste is always a subjective
j u d g m e n t in t h e essential sense that it m u s t b e m a d e in t h e
first p e r s o n , of a specific instance, o n t h e basis of t h a t person's indi-
vidual r e s p o n s e . K a n t assures us t h a t it c a n n o t b e a prescriptive
1

r u l e , g r o u n d e d in discursive concepts. W h a t is consciousness aware

of in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of b e a u t y t h a t it should m a k e t h e j u d g m e n t of
taste? A r e we cognizant "aesthetically by sensation a n d o u r m e r e
i n t e r n a l sense? O r . . . intellectually by consciousness of o u r inten-
tional activity in b r i n g i n g these p o w e r s into p l a y ? " Kant's answer is
2

unequivocal: " T h e r e is . . . n o way for t h e subjective unity of t h e

relation in q u e s t i o n to m a k e itself k n o w n [other] t h a n by sensa-
t i o n . " Since "it is absolutely o u t of t h e question to r e q u i r e that
3

p l e a s u r e in [material] objects s h o u l d be acknowleded by every

o n e , " it can only b e the form of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, b u t
even this n o t so m u c h in itself as in what it elicits in t h e subject,
which is t h e basis of t h e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . T h u s 9 crucially con-
4

t e n d s : "If t h e p l e a s u r e in t h e given object p r e c e d e s . . . t h e j u d g -

m e n t of taste a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object, . . . such
p l e a s u r e w o u l d b e n o t h i n g different from t h e m e r e pleasantness in
sensation, a n d so . . . could have only private validity." T h e t r u e 5

source of t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste c a n n o t rest o n t h e

m e r e sensation, b u t can only derive from its d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e
m e n t a l function which a t t e n d s it. S o m e t h i n g distinctive a b o u t
t h e subjective feeling involved in taste differentiates it from m e r e
s e n s u o u s p l e a s u r e . K a n t discriminated m e r e passive affect from
t h e delight in m e n t a l activity itself. T h i s led to a distinction of form
a n d m a t t e r in t h e aesthetic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n object, t h e discrim-

106
ination of t h e beautiful from t h e pleasant in t e r m s of t h e p h e -
n o m e n o l o g y of t h e i r respective e x p e r i e n c e s .

The Phenomenology of the Pleasant

O n l y in t e r m s of this discrimination d o e s Kant's n o t i o n of aesthetic

judgment b e c o m e clear. "Beautiful" a n d " a g r e e a b l e " occur only as
predicates in j u d g m e n t s . T h a t is to say, these t e r m s arise in con-
sciousness only in t h e context of t h e observations "X is beautiful" or
"X is pleasant." T h e s e observations are inept, because t h e p r e d i -
cates refer n o t to X b u t to t h e state of t h e subject in t h e p r e s e n c e of
X. Insofar, however, as j u d g m e n t s can b e m a d e at all, t h e state of
t h e subject m u s t in s o m e sense b e a m e n a b l e to conscious a t t e n t i o n .
K a n t is acutely aware of t h e incongruity of t h e p h r a s e "aesthetic
j u d g m e n t . " T o take it in any sense cognitively, h e concedes, would
be "blatantly c o n t r a d i c t o r y . " If K a n t will n o t have us call it cogni-
6

tion, it r e m a i n s to ask w h a t " r e f e r e n c e " a n d "reflection" t h e n m e a n ,

a n d why h e s t u b b o r n l y clings to t h e word " j u d g m e n t " in charac-
terizing t h e s e events. K a n t wishes to h o l d o u t for t h e possibility t h a t
a n "aesthetic j u d g m e n t of reflection" s h o u l d retain s o m e status as a
j u d g m e n t , b u t why s h o u l d h e k e e p t h e t e r m for t h e merely sensual
e x p e r i e n c e of t h e agreeable? C a n it have b e e n because j u d g m e n t
(Urteil) was a traditional t e r m in G e r m a n t r e a t m e n t of aesthetic
e x p e r i e n c e e v e n t h e "merely s e n s u o u s " i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen-
t u r y ? Was K a n t merely following convention? Possibly, b u t we
7

would n o t b e wise to take t h a t as a c o m p l e t e account of a philo-

sophical p r o c e d u r e so self-consciously u n d e r t a k e n by so subtle a
m i n d . C a n it have b e e n , t h e n , Kant's n o t o r i o u s h a n k e r i n g after
"architectonic"a violence to t h e sense of t h e l a n g u a g e for t h e
sake of system? S o m e have b e e n t e m p t e d to r e a d it s o . Yet t h e r e is
8

a n alternative t h a t would r e n d e r m a t t e r s m o r e c o h e r e n t a n d plau-

sible: to have r e c o u r s e to t h a t o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , Kant's com-
plex sense of "subjective r e f e r e n c e " in t e r m s of the state of m i n d of
t h e subject. T h i s is why we labored so long over t h e m e a n i n g of
"subjective j u d g m e n t " in Kant.
K a n t characterizes t h e a g r e e a b l e o r pleasant (das Angenehme) in
2ff. of t h e Third Critique by t h e following essential features: (1)
it pleases in sensation, t h a t is, it "rests entirely o n sensation" o r
" r e p r e s e n t s t h e object simply in relation to sensation"; (2) in t h e
a g r e e a b l e "it is n o t merely t h e object t h a t pleases, b u t also its exis-
tence"; a n d , consequently, (3) it is merely " p r i v a t e . " I n the First In-
9

troduction to the Critique ofJudgment, K a n t characterizes observations

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 107

 a b o u t t h e a g r e e a b l e as "aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense" a n d explains
t h a t such j u d g m e n t s are "completely i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e faculty of
k n o w l e d g e , b e i n g directly related via sense to t h e feeling of plea-
s u r e . " By contrast, K a n t ascribes to t h e beautiful t h e following
1 0

features: (1) it pleases in reflection; (2) it is disinterested; a n d conse-

quently, (3) it is universal. I n t h e First Introduction Kant describes
observations a b o u t t h e beautiful ("judgments of taste") as "aes-
thetic j u d g m e n t s of reflection," a n d claims t h a t they a r e g r o u n d e d
in t h e "specific [eigentmlichen] principles of t h e faculty of
j u d g m e n t . " T h e r e u p o n K a n t m a k e s t h e following discrimina-
1 1

tion: "Aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense express material purposive-

ness; aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of reflection, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , formal
purposiveness." 12

Clearly, t h e significance of e i t h e r t e r m hinges o n t h e j u x t a p o s i -

tion with its a l t e r n a t e . T h e question t h a t immediately arises is why
K a n t uses t h e t e r m j u d g m e n t at all for t h e e x p e r i e n c e of the a g r e e -
able. It would seem m o r e a m a t t e r of physiological r e s p o n s e to
stimulus t h a n a " j u d g m e n t . " Nevertheless, t h e t e r m gets articulated
in a n observation that has the form of a j u d g m e n t . It is, however
remotely, a n aspect of conscious articulation, of cognitive process,
even if only of a physiological o r subjective event.
T h a t q u a s i - j u d g m e n t a l feature also helps explain h o w t h e
a g r e e a b l e can, as K a n t insists, b e b o u n d u p with "interest," i.e., how
it can be " n o t merely t h e object t h a t pleases, b u t also its existence."
We are back with o u r familiar t h e m e of usefulness. Yet o u r earlier
a c c o u n t of it p r e s u m e d t h e cognition of t h e object p r i o r to its eval-
u a t i o n as available for use. Now, K a n t implies t h a t such subjective
materia] p u r p o s i v e n e s s arises without any c o g n i t i o n . It is neces-
13

sary to reconsider t h e n o t i o n of interest in t e r m s of w h a t K a n t

claims a b o u t the agreeable r e s t i n g entirely o n sensation. T h a t calls
for a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of this e x p e r i e n c e .
K a n t holds t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e a g r e e a b l e to be impossible to
p r e d i c t a priori. Before t h e first e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e can be n o antic-
ipation a n d t h e r e f o r e n o interest, because the connection of plea-
s u r e with t h e e x p e r i e n c e can c o m e only a posteriori. At t h e outset
of this pristine initial e n c o u n t e r , t h e n , t h e r e is t h e p r e s e n c e to con-
sciousness of X, for e x a m p l e , one's first taste of kiwi. Let us a s s u m e
t h a t u p o n tasting kiwi for t h e first time t h e r e is a feeling of pleasure
"immediately b o u n d u p with it." T h a t e x p e r i e n c e is n o t yet a j u d g -
m e n t . It is merely "physiological" o r at best "psychological." B u t the
e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t t e r m i n a t e t h e r e . Instead, a n inference is

108 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 d r a w n . T h e r e is reflection of s o m e sort after a n d o n account of
t h e p l e a s u r e . T h e first p a r t of this inference is t h e j u d g m e n t "X (in
o u r case, t h e kiwi) is agreeable." It m i g h t be h e l d t h a t this initial
j u d g m e n t s h o u l d have the m o r e primitive form of "This is a g r e e -
able." Yet for t h e balance of t h e reflection precisely w h a t is r e q u i r e d
is t h a t s o m e h o w w h a t occasioned t h e p l e a s u r e b e "recognized"
(erkannt), i.e., n a m e d , tagged, a n d m a r k e d sufficiently for f u r t h e r
consideration c u l m i n a t i n g in a n interest. O n o u r first consideration
this r e q u i r e d cognition in t h e full sense of r e c o u r s e to concepts.
H e r e is w h e r e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e capacities associated with
that o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g n o w offers a n alternative. W h a t it per-
mits is precisely t h e kind of recognition (erkennen) r e q u i r e d . I n con-
s e q u e n c e , however, two senses of "materiality" we e n c o u n t e r e d
e a r l i e r t h e givenness of m a t t e r in sensation ("actuality") a n d t h e
availability for use a t t a c h e d to t h e existence of a n object ("interest")
d r a w substantially closer to o n e a n o t h e r , a n d with t h a t t h e plau-
sibility of a n "actuality w i t h o u t validity" as a sense of Kant's t e r m
"objectivity" increases.
H o w d o e s t h e j u d g m e n t of sense lead to interest? By t h e time I
m a k e t h e observation a b o u t t h e agreeable, a n a p p e t i t e has b e e n
a r o u s e d . I c a n n o t say I find s o m e t h i n g pleasant without simultane-
ously confessing a desire for m o r e . I n Kant's o w n words: "Now t h a t
a j u d g m e n t a b o u t a n object by which I describe it as pleasant ex-
presses a n interest in it, is plain from t h e fact that by sensation it
excites a desire for objects of t h a t kind [dergleichen Gegenstnden];
consequently t h e satisfaction p r e s u p p o s e s n o t t h e m e r e j u d g m e n t
a b o u t it, b u t t h e relation of its existence to my state, so far as this is
affected by such a n object [ein solches Objekt]." 14
N o t e t h a t t h e lan-
g u a g e implies a very i m p o r t a n t generalization. T h e j u d g m e n t , "X
is a g r e e a b l e , " c h a n g e s into "X's a r e agreeable." B u t this p r o m o t i o n
f r o m singularity to generality d o e s not occur, according t o Kant,
with t h e b e a u t i f u l . T h e initial j u d g m e n t of sense is "aesthetical
15

a n d singular" in a m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s to t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, b u t
t h e s u b s e q u e n t generalization is n o t . K a n t characterizes this g e n e r -
alization as a "logical" o r "cognitive" j u d g m e n t . 1 6

T w o things succeed u p o n t h e original physiological e x p e r i e n c e

of p l e a s u r e in t h e p r e s e n c e of X: a cognitive generalization a n d a n
a w a k e n i n g desire. T h e cognitive generalization is hasty. ( O n e may
t u r n o u t to b e allergic to kiwi.) Yet it is essential to t h e genesis of t h e
desire. T h e j u d g m e n t takes t h e practical form: "I w a n t things like
X." T h a t , precisely, is what interest m e a n s . I n t e r e s t occasions a n

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 109

"inclination" (Neigung) in t h e faculty of desire; it "pathologically
conditions" it. T h i s motivates t h e will. Willkr takes a n interest in,
c o n c e r n s itself with t h e availability of, things like X, for t h e p u r p o s e
of m a i n t a i n i n g its pleasurable state.
As this a c c o u n t indicates, insofar as K a n t wishes to associate t h e
a g r e e a b l e with interest h e m u s t a b a n d o n his claim t h a t it has n o t h -
i n g w h a t e v e r to d o with t h e faculty of k n o w l e d g e . Kant's m o d e l of
will completely obviates this, since it involves r e a s o n choosing t h e
g o o d w h e t h e r absolute o r merely relative. I n t e r e s t is c o n n e c t e d
strongly to t h e n o t i o n of t h e relative g o o d , t h e useful. " T h e pleas-
a n t , which, as such, r e p r e s e n t s t h e object simply in relation to sense,
m u s t first be b r o u g h t by t h e concept of a p u r p o s e u n d e r principles
of r e a s o n , in o r d e r to call it good, as a n object of t h e w i l l . " T h e 17

j u d g m e n t of sense m u s t be "elevated," t h o u g h what is b e i n g j u d g e d

has c h a n g e d n o m o r e t h a n t h a t which is t h e "object" of a j u d g m e n t
of e x p e r i e n c e has c h a n g e d from what was t h e "object" of a j u d g -
m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n .
K a n t claims b o t h t h e j u d g m e n t of sense a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t in-
terest associated with it a r e "private." T h e y d o n o t a d m i t of any nec-
essary generality, e i t h e r for o t h e r subjects o r even across instances
for t h e s a m e subject. ( O n e can grow tired of kiwi.) T h e privacy of
t h e j u d g m e n t s has to d o n o t merely with t h e materiality of t h e
object, b u t above all with t h a t of t h e subject. O n e ' s empirical sin-
gularity, one's particular sensory a p p a r a t u s , one's particular dis-
positions, create t h e possibility t h a t o n e " d e p e n d s o r can d e p e n d o n
t h e existence of t h e t h i n g , " i.e., becomes existentially e n t a n g l e d
with i t . O n e develops a craving t h a t colors every s u b s e q u e n t e n -
18

c o u n t e r ; p r e f e r e n c e s i n t r u d e t h r o u g h o u t e x p e r i e n c e a n d r u i n im-
partiality.
N o w we can u n d e r s t a n d subjective material purposiveness. It is
subjective n o t m e r e l y in r e f e r e n c e to "interior sense," the subject's
r e s p o n s e , b u t also in t h e sense of partialitylimited generality.
T h a t , however, is b o u n d u p in t u r n with t h e subject's materiality,
a n d h e l p s explain why this p u r p o s i v e n e s s is material. A n o t h e r
sense of this materiality lies in t h e fact t h a t t h e agreeable is occa-
sioned n o t by t h e "aesthetic f o r m " (as in t h e beautiful) b u t by t h e
"aesthetic m a t t e r " in sensation. T h i s is t h e significance of t h e Kan-
tian t e r m Reiz ( c h a r m ) . In addition, this e x p e r i e n c e creates a n
19

"interest," i.e., a c o n c e r n for t h e availability or material existence of

t h e object o r objects of t h a t kind for the use of t h e subject.

110 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

The Transcendental Deduction of the Judgment of Taste

T h e adventitiousness of t h e delight associated with t h e agreeable

led K a n t to try to distinguish t h e beautiful from it. T h e j u d g m e n t of
taste s e e m e d too i m p e r i o u s , t h e claim of beauty too g r a n d , to derive
from t h e s a m e experiential process t h a t a c c o u n t e d for t h e a g r e e -
able. T h e j u d g m e n t of taste could n o t b e merely private. T h e j u d g -
m e n t of taste could n o t b e colored by any interest. T h e j u d g m e n t of
taste h a d to claim a universal validity. It could n o t if it were merely
s e n s u o u s . T h e project, t h e n , was to find a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d in
t h e h i g h e r faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Kant wished to raise t h e j u d g -
m e n t of taste to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity. T h u s h e d r e w a parallel be-
tween t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d t h e empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t ,
the j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e : "like all empirical j u d g m e n t s , it can
declare n o objective necessity a n d lay claim to n o a priori validity.
B u t t h e j u d g m e n t of taste also claims, as every o t h e r e m p i r i c a l j u d g -
m e n t does, to b e valid for all m e n . " N e i t h e r aesthetic j u d g m e n t s
2 0

n o r empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t s a r e in themselves a priori neces-

sary in a logical-universal s e n s e . B u t t h e empirical cognitive j u d g -
21

m e n t may claim intersubjective validity a n d objective t r u t h because

it is g r o u n d e d in universal rules which a r e themselves a priori valid.
Similarly, K a n t wishes to g r o u n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste in a univer-
sal a priori s t r u c t u r e of consciousness. Only, with t h e beautiful, h e
is in t h e s p h e r e of feeling, n o t concept, a n d t h e logical rules as such
c a n n o t serve h i m .
Before i n q u i r i n g into Kant's r e c o u r s e u n d e r these circum-
stances, a s e c o n d parallel b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a n d t h e
j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e deserves to b e e x p l o r e d . As we have n o t e d ,
t h e j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e results from a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , at a
h i g h e r level, of a p r i o r j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n . T h e question now
to consider is w h e t h e r t h e r e m i g h t b e a similar s e q u e n c e of j u d g -
m e n t s involved in t h e genesis of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. C a n t h e r e be
a p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c e of p l e a s u r e a n a l o g o u s (or identical) to t h a t
of t h e j u d g m e n t of sense in t h e a g r e e a b l e , o u t of which, at a h i g h e r
level of authority, t h e final j u d g m e n t of taste is f o r m u l a t e d ? Is it a
simple or a c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l event?
K a n t seems to d e n y emphatically t h a t such a possibility of se-
quential j u d g m e n t s could arise in this case: "If t h e p l e a s u r e in t h e
given object p r e c e d e s . . . t h e j u d g m e n t of taste a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n -
tation of t h e o b j e c t . . . such p l e a s u r e would b e n o t h i n g different

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 111

from t h e m e r e pleasantness [Annehmlichkeit] in s e n s a t i o n . " Kant 22

devotes a very l o n g section, which h e calls t h e "key to t h e critique,"

to t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e reflection m u s t p r e c e d e a n d occasion t h e
p l e a s u r e . O t h e r w i s e , K a n t fears, t h e j u d g m e n t of taste would sink
23

to t h e level of t h e m e r e l y private. Yet is h e wise to conflate t h e m a n -

ifestly empirical c h a r a c t e r of t h e e x p e r i e n c e with merely private va-
lidity? T h e beautiful, n o less t h a n t h e agreeable, is inextricably a
posteriori: it c a n n o t be anticipated. I n d e e d , given Kant's insistence
u p o n its singularity, t h e beautiful is even less predictable t h a n t h e
agreeable. It would s e e m t h a t if t h e beautiful is to have a m o r e au-
gust claim, it c a n n o t be by d e n y i n g all this, b u t r a t h e r by t r a n s c e n d -
i n g it.
Still, we m u s t a t t e n d carefully to Kant's claims in 9. H e wishes
to suggest t h a t his m o d e l of p l e a s u r e as "immediately b o u n d u p
with" t h e representation-of-the-object as its "aesthetical c h a r a c t e r "
s h o u l d be revised to include t h e possibility t h a t p l e a s u r e n o t i m m e -
diately a c c o m p a n y t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r may result from
a n i n t e r v e n i n g reflective j u d g m e n t . O n the face of it, t h e r e is n o
r e a s o n to believe t h a t p l e a s u r e c a n n o t be occasioned by t h e m i n d ' s
o w n activities. J u s t t h a t seems to b e o n e sense of Kant's use of t h e
24

t e r m "spirit" (Geist) in 4 9 . B u t t h e p r o b l e m is to see h o w this ac-

2 5

tivity is occasioned by specific r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a n d to account for

t h e i r eliciting it. I n addition, it is necessary to describe t h e activity
itself a n d explain why it s h o u l d occasion p l e a s u r e . All this calls for a
m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e e x p e r i e n c e .
Kant's p o s t u r e in 9 s h o u l d be j u x t a p o s e d to that which h e
a d o p t s in t h e " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " a n d especially in
37 of t h a t p a r t of t h e Third Critique. T h e r e it would a p p e a r t h a t
K a n t favors t h e n o t i o n of a s e q u e n c e of j u d g m e n t s . In 36, Kant
begins to b r e a k o u t w h a t in 9 h e tried to r e a d as a single j u d g m e n t .
H e writes: " A l t h o u g h t h e p r e d i c a t e (of t h e personal pleasure b o u n d
u p with t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) is empirical, nevertheless, as c o n c e r n s
t h e r e q u i r e d assent of everyone t h e j u d g m e n t s a r e a priori. " He
2 6

c o n t i n u e s a l o n g this line in 37, a c k n o w l e d g i n g that it is a "merely

empirical j u d g m e n t " t h a t a " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n object is i m m e -
diately b o u n d u p with p l e a s u r e . " Yet this n o l o n g e r keeps h i m from
ascribing g r e a t e r validity to t h e e n s u i n g j u d g m e n t of taste:

A n d so it is n o t t h e p l e a s u r e , b u t t h e universal validity of this

pleasure, perceived as mentally b o u n d u p with t h e m e r e j u d g -
m e n t u p o n a n object, which is r e p r e s e n t e d a priori in a j u d g -
m e n t of taste as a universal r u l e for t h e j u d g m e n t a n d valid for

112 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment'

 e v e r y o n e . It is a n empirical j u d g m e n t (to say) t h a t I perceive
a n d j u d g e a n object with p l e a s u r e . B u t it is a n a priori^judg-
m e n t (to say) t h a t I find it beautiful, i.e. I attribute this satisfac-
tion necessarily to e v e r y o n e . 27

K a n t takes t h e s a m e line in t h e crucial exposition of vii of t h e In-

t r o d u c t i o n , t h e most meticulous a c c o u n t of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of
this e x p e r i e n c e . 28

O f t h e two stances, that of 37 a n d vii seems t h e m o r e a p t . 2 9

T o claim j u d g m e n t s of taste have a priori validity would n o t only b e

inconsistent with his s t a t e m e n t in vii, b u t would result in t h e in-
congruity t h a t aesthetic j u d g m e n t s would enjoy h i g h e r validity
t h a n j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e , a result that K a n t can hardly have
c o u n t e n a n c e d . Rather, as vii m o r e soundly holds, they r e m a i n
empirical, but, sanctioned by t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d s , have claim
nevertheless to "intersubjective" validity. Kant e x p o u n d s t h e dif-
ference b e t w e e n objective a n d intersubjective validity in 8 . 3 0

O t h e r p r o b l e m s r e m a i n . O n e is that a sequential t h e o r y of t h e
genesis of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m u s t still give a n account of t h e
initial e x p e r i e n c e which i n c o r p o r a t e s Kant's distinctive m a r k s of
t h e beautiful, i.e., its singularity, a n d its basis in t h e aesthetic form,
n o t t h e m a t t e r , of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n so far as t h e a g r e e a b l e d e -
rives from t h e "aesthetic m a t t e r , " we c a n n o t use it as t h e basis for
o u r characterization of t h a t initial e x p e r i e n c e . Moreover, t h e r e is
s o m e t h i n g telling in Kant's p r o p o s i t i o n that in t h e case of t h e b e a u -
tiful t h e r e is a m e d i a t i o n of reflection. T h i s d o e s n o t refute t h e
s e q u e n c e theory; it only complicates t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e
question, a p p r o p r i a t e l y e n o u g h for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, is:
H o w passive is t h e subject in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful?
While K a n t stresses t h e d e g r e e to which t h e subject is affected
(afficiert) in t h e e x p e r i e n c e , nevertheless it is striking h o w n o t
merely t h e object b u t even t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e object shifts far
into t h e b a c k g r o u n d . Its form serves as t h e occasion, b e c o m e s at
most a catalyst, for a c o m p l e x subjective r e s p o n s e . K a n t stresses r e -
peatedly t h e "act" of reflection, t h e "act" of j u d g i n g , a n d above all,
the f r e e d o m of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n : "the imagination m u s t be con-
sidered in its f r e e d o m . . . as p r o d u c t i v e a n d s p o n t a n e o u s (as t h e
a u t h o r of arbitrary [willkrlichen] forms of possible i n t u i t i o n ) . " 31

O n t h e o n e side, t h e i m a g i n a t i o n seems c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e given-

ness of t h e object. O n t h e o t h e r , it a p p e a r s c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e laws
of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t we recall t h a t t h e givenness of r e p r e s e n -
tations is primarily in t h e i r " m a t t e r , " n o t their f o r m . A n d we recall

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 113

 t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n as t h a t " o t h e r k i n d ofj u d g i n g " has t h e capacity to
"befree a n d yet of itself conformed to law." K a n t acknowledges t h a t this
seems "contradictory" in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 22, yet h e insists it
is nevertheless t h e c a s e . I n t h e Anthropology h e shows clearly h o w
32

this is not a contradiction, b u t merely a difference in t h e level of

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l self-consciousness. T h e i m a g i n a t i o n is o p e r -
33

ating in a c c o r d a n c e with law w i t h o u t yet b e i n g aware of it a n d ex-

pressly observing it.
It r e m a i n s to explain w h a t this free act of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n can
m e a n . K a n t offers a very useful characterization in 67 of t h e An-
thropology: " I n taste (taste t h a t c h o o s e s ) t h a t is, in aesthetic
j u d g m e n t w h a t p r o d u c e s o u r p l e a s u r e in t h e object is n o t t h e sen-
sation i m m e d i a t e l y (the material e l e m e n t in o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
t h e object). It is r a t h e r t h e way in which free (productive) imagina-
tion a r r a n g e s this m a t t e r inventivelythat is, t h e form; for only
form can lay claim to a universal r u l e for t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " 34

If t h e h i g h e r faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g manifests its spontaneity

a n d its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a u t h o r i t y in r e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e merely given
after its o w n rules, h e r e too K a n t seems to indicate a r e i n t e r p r e t a -
tion, a reconfiguration (Umgestaltung) of t h e merely a p p r e h e n d e d ,
b e t o k e n i n g o n c e again s p o n t a n e i t y a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l authority.
It is precisely t h e refusal to stay with t h e m e r e givenness, t h e willful
(willkrlichen) play u p o n it in t h e activity of t h e imagination, which
elevates taste above a p p e t i t e . I n 12 of t h e Anthropology, K a n t writes
of "Artificial Play with Sensory S e m b l a n c e [Sinnenschein]" a n d con-
t e n d s t h a t we k n o w it for illusion, a n d yet we linger over it w i t h o u t
rectifying it (objectifying it) t h r o u g h conceptualization. " T h i s play
with sensory s e m b l a n c e is very pleasant a n d e n t e r t a i n i n g for t h e
m i n d . " I m a g i n a t i o n takes t h e merely given a n d reconfigures it,
3 5

t a k i n g j o y i n j u s t this reconfigurative play. Obviously i m a g i n a t i o n is

in n o position to s u p p l y the m a t t e r in sensation, for that is simply
given. W h a t it can a n d d o e s reconfigure is t h e f o r m .
T h e m o s t impressive a c c o u n t of this was offered by Rudolf
O d e b r e c h t in a work rarely cited, Form und Geist, which a p p e a r e d in
1930. O d e b r e c h t a r g u e s t h a t aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n is a n i n t e r r u p -
tion of t h e n o r m a l cognitive e x p e r i e n c e . B u t m o r e , h e c o n t e n d s
t h a t it is a g e s t u r e of subjective liberation: a "Zurckgewinnung der
Gestaltung an sich"a retrieval of t h e (power of) configuration by
t h e subject. O d e b r e c h t elaborates:

T h e r e takes place, in t h e context of intense activity of my con-

sciousness, a liberation [Loslsung] from t h e first stage of

114 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n , a s h a t t e r i n g of t h e f o r m of a p p e a r a n c e
[Scheinform] a n d a spirited [stimmungshaftes] r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of
t h e in-itself m e a n i n g l e s s r h y t h m of configuration in t h e m a t e -
rial. I n this configuration t h e r e awakens for m e symbolically a
n e w object [Gegenstndlichkeit] which is entirely r e f e r r e d to t h e
feeling of self of my ego [Selbstgefhl meines Ich] a n d consti-
tutes i t . 36

T h i s is t h e " e x p e r i e n c e of p u r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " as a n act of conscious-

ness. We r e d e s i g n t h e given in aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , a n d this,
O d e b r e c h t c o n t e n d s , is what K a n t m e a n t by t h e cryptic t e r m
Zeichnung (delineation) in 14 of t h e Third Critique w h e n h e w r o t e :
"the delineation is t h e essential t h i n g ; a n d h e r e it is n o t w h a t grati-
fies in sensation b u t w h a t pleases by m e a n s of its form t h a t is f u n d a -
m e n t a l for t a s t e . "
37

W h a t O d e b r e c h t saw is t h a t Zeichnung m u s t b e r e a d as act, n o t

object, a n d f o r m , consequently, n o t as f o u n d b u t m a d e , a n d finally
t h a t otherwise difficult p h r a s e "how it is possible t h a t a t h i n g c a n
please in t h e m e r e act of j u d g i n g it (without sensation o r c o n c e p t ) "
as Kant's indication t h a t act is the crucial t h i n g . J u d g i n g is act in
3 8

t h a t crucially " o t h e r k i n d " of significance b e l o n g i n g to imaginative

configuration. It is w i t h o u t sensation in t h e sense t h a t it liberates
itself from t h e merely given, t h e c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n t h a t a t t e n d t h e
"in-itself m e a n i n g l e s s r h y t h m of configuration in t h e material." It is
without c o n c e p t because it d o e s n o t p r o p o s e to know t h e material,
b u t only to play with it, to enjoy playing with it, for t h e sake of t h e
feeling of self t h a t play, a n d n o t simply matter, offers. Obviously we
a r e n o w in a position to characterize w h a t h a p p e n s in t h e contrast-
i n g e x p e r i e n c e of t h e pleasant o r a g r e e a b l e . We d o n o t liberate our-
selves. We d o n o t reconfigure. We d o n o t play. We simply take u p
t h e given c h a r m a n d e m o t i o n a n d enjoy that. We e x p e n d n o m e n t a l
effort, cognitive o r imaginative.
N o w t h a t we g r a s p t h e first p h a s e of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e b e a u -
tiful, we m u s t r e t u r n to t h e issue of t h e validity of t h e ultimate j u d g -
m e n t of taste p r o n o u n c e d u p o n it. T h a t is to seek its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
g r o u n d , a n d K a n t insists " n o t h i n g can b e universally c o m m u n i -
cated e x c e p t cognition a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , so far as it belongs to
c o g n i t i o n . " T h e task of finding a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d , t h e n , is
39

t o find t h e basis in t h e cognitive faculties for what has a p p e a r e d a

m a t t e r of m e r e feeling. B u t in discovering that this p l e a s u r e in-
volves t h e s p o n t a n e o u s play of t h e imagination a n d t h e relish of its
f r e e d o m , a n d in recognizing f u r t h e r t h a t this f r e e d o m nevertheless

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 115

 anticipates a n d accords with t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t a fully self-
conscious u n d e r s t a n d i n g would i m p o s e , we have t h e i n g r e d i e n t s
for t h e K a n t i a n solution: " h a r m o n y of t h e faculties."
T h e p h r a s e s " h a r m o n y " o r "free play" of t h e faculties are m e t a -
phorical a n d accordingly mysterious in themselves. K a n t falls short
of offering a clear discursive r e d e m p t i o n of these p h r a s e s in t h e
Third Critique. H e n e v e r sorts o u t clearly t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l from
t h e empirical in his f o r m u l a t i o n . H e does n o t carefully e n o u g h dis-
tinguish w h a t o r d i n a r y consciousness can t h i n k a n d assert in justi-
fying a claim like "X is beautiful" from what t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
p h i l o s o p h e r c a n a d d u c e to e x p l a i n t h e ultimate basis for such j u d g -
m e n t s . It is necessary to retrieve Kant's scattered accounts of what
o r d i n a r y consciousness m a k e s of its e x p e r i e n c e a n d thinks of its
claims in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, a n d see h o w far that goes t o w a r d
t h e ultimate t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g . If h a r m o n y of t h e faculties
lies at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l basis of t h e validity ofj u d g m e n t s of taste,
surely K a n t c a n n o t have m e a n t o r d i n a r y consciousness to m a k e t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n before u t t e r i n g t h e claim. I n d e e d , h e ex-
plicitly asserts t h a t o r d i n a r y consciousess is aware of this h a r m o n y
only as a sensation of p l e a s u r e . 40

H o w d o e s o r d i n a r y consciousness c o m e to m a k e a n d justify t h e
j u d g m e n t of taste? Q u i t e simply, it starts from t h e recognition t h a t
a p a r t i c u l a r p l e a s u r e is different from t h e merely pleasant. T h e
subject investigates t h e source of his o w n p l e a s u r e . It is n o t t h a t
n o t h i n g a g r e e a b l e m a y have b e e n p r e s e n t . Reiz can, a n d usually
does, a c c o m p a n y p l e a s u r e in t h e beautiful. B u t t h e subject recog-
nizes t h a t m o r e t h a n Reiz affects h i m . H e did n o t start from a p -
petite. H e was n o t swayed by p r e f e r e n c e . H e h a d n o stake, n o
interest in t h e case. H e did n o t n e e d to know w h a t the t h i n g was for.
H e did n o t n e e d to know w h e t h e r it was right or w r o n g . H e did n o t
even n e e d to k n o w w h a t it was. J u s t e n c o u n t e r i n g it set h i m off,
"since t h e p e r s o n w h o j u d g e s feels himself q u i t efree as r e g a r d s t h e
satisfaction which h e attaches to t h e object [since it does n o t rest o n
any inclination of t h e subject, n o r u p o n any o t h e r p r e m e d i t a t e d in-
terest], h e c a n n o t find t h e g r o u n d of this satisfaction in any private
conditions c o n n e c t e d with his o w n subject, a n d h e n c e it m u s t be r e -
g a r d e d as g r o u n d e d o n w h a t h e can p r e s u p p o s e in every o t h e r per-
s o n . " I n o t h e r words, t h e subject believes t h e way h e r e s p o n d e d is
41

t h e way a n y o n e else could, would, a n d should. If pressed to justify

this last belief, t h e subject would have r e c o u r s e to the n o t i o n of a
" c o m m o n s e n s e " (sensus communis), t h a t is, t h a t h e is only e x p r e s s i n g
w h a t all h u m a n s feel a n d j u d g e , given only t h a t they abstract from

116 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . B e y o n d this conviction of s p e a k i n g with a "uni-
42

versal voice," of claiming only what "we r e g a r d as t h e least to b e

e x p e c t e d f r o m a n y o n e claiming t h e n a m e of m a n , " o r d i n a r y con-
sciousness cannot g o . 4 3

T h e balance of t h e a r g u m e n t falls to t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i -
losopher. T h e situation is a n a l o g o u s to t h e case of j u d g m e n t s of
e x p e r i e n c e . T h e r e , too, o r d i n a r y consciousness can carry t h e a r g u -
m e n t for p a r t i c u l a r claims only to such generalities as cause or sub-
stance. It r e m a i n s for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy to d e m o n s t r a t e
t h e i r b i n d i n g universality. So h e r e it is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy's
task to d e m o n s t r a t e definitively t h a t t h e claim of taste is g r o u n d e d .
O n l y t h e p h i l o s o p h e r can f o r m u l a t e such propositions as: "Now a
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by which a n object is given t h a t is to b e c o m e a cogni-
tion in g e n e r a l r e q u i r e s imagination for t h e g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e
manifold of intuition, a n d understanding for t h e unity of t h e con-
cept u n i t i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . " T h e interaction of these two
44

faculties is t h e key to Kant's account of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty.

W h a t is necessary for k n o w l e d g e in g e n e r a l occurs in t h e case
of b e a u t y w i t h o u t i n t e n t . As vii p u t s it,

that a p p r e h e n s i o n of forms in t h e imagination can n e v e r take

place w i t h o u t t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , t h o u g h u n d e s i g n e d l y
[unabsichtlich], at least c o m p a r i n g t h e m with its faculty of r e -
ferring intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this c o m p a r i s o n t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n (as t h e faculty of a priori intuitions) is placed by
m e a n s of a given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u n d e s i g n e d l y [unabsichtlich]
in a g r e e m e n t with t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as t h e faculty of con-
cepts, a n d t h u s a feeling of p l e a s u r e is a r o u s e d , t h e object
m u s t t h e n b e r e g a r d e d as p u r p o s i v e for t h e reflective j u d g -
ment. 4 5

T h e conformity to law without i n t e n t is related to t h e process of

"cognition in g e n e r a l , " a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d is shifted
from t h e a u t h o r i t y of universal rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which
in t h e cognitive case p r o m o t e d t h e m e r e a p p r e h e n s i o n of imagina-
tion to objective validity, to t h e necessity of these faculties t h e m -
selves for t h e possibility of any cognition at all: "the subjective
formal conditions of a j u d g m e n t in g e n e r a l . " T h e universality
46

a n d necessity of t h e s e faculties themselves g r o u n d t h e validity of

t h e j u d g m e n t of taste.
T h a t i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g work t o g e t h e r c a n
work t o g e t h e r i s t h e f o u n d a t i o n of t h e validity of t h e j u d g m e n t .
" T h e p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n these cognitive faculties requisite for

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 117

taste is also requisite for t h a t o r d i n a r y s o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g which
we have to p r e s u p p o s e in e v e r y o n e . " T h e p r o p o r t i o n , the "har-
47

m o n y , " t h a t "state of m i n d , which is to be m e t with in the relation of

o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e powers to each other, so far as they refer a given
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to cognition in general," is j u s t as necessary to t h e pos-
sibility of e x p e r i e n c e as a n y of t h e categories taken in i s o l a t i o n . 48

"For w i t h o u t this as t h e subjective condition of cognition, cognition

as a n effect c o u l d n o t a r i s e . " T h e r e f o r e , "if cognitions are to ad-
49

mit of communicability, so m u s t also the state of m i n d i . e . t h e

a c c o r d a n c e of t h e cognitive p o w e r s . " T h a t is t h e gist of t h e t r a n -
50

scendental d e d u c t i o n . 51
What the transcendental philosopher
t h u s discursively establishes, t h e subject experiences as pleasure, o r
m o r e precisely: "the m o r e lively play of b o t h m e n t a l powers (the
i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) w h e n a n i m a t e d by m u t u a l
a g r e e m e n t . " T h e play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is in itself pleasurable:
5 2

"We linger over t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n of t h e beautiful because this con-

t e m p l a t i o n s t r e n g t h e n s a n d r e p r o d u c e s itself." T h a t is subjective
53

formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s .
T h e r e is a paradoxical aspect even in Kant's p u r e solution of
t h e p r o b l e m of taste, namely, why only certain r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s -
of-the-object s h o u l d occasion t h e e x p e r i e n c e . N o t every object of
54

sense occasions t h e feeling of b e a u t y . Even if "beauty" refers to

55

subjective r e s p o n s e , it is only the catalytic p r e s e n c e of s o m e given

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which m a k e s its possible, a n d it is at least plausible
to ask w h e t h e r t h e trait which m a k e s certain objects catalytic can b e
identified. If subjective p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of faculties is constant for
all h u m a n s , a n d if, t h e r e f o r e , they o u g h t all to recognize t h e s a m e
empirical intuitions as beautiful, t h e n t h e r e should, in principle, be
s o m e e v e n if only empiricaltraits which such intuitions m u s t
s h a r e , a n d s o m e r e a s o n why those occasion beauty. H e n c e , in that
m e a s u r e , t h e n a t u r e of t h e object seems objectively involved. It may
be difficult to establish the traits. T h e y m a y only b e empirical, b u t it
would s e e m to b e logically possible to find t h e m .
While it is t h e case t h a t some representations-of-objects occa-
sion beauty, K a n t a r g u e s it is n o t possible of anticipation, i.e., n o
r u l e can b e m a d e prescriptive for it, a n d a n y generalization descrip-
tive of it, if possible at all, would be empirical, i.e., a n empirical
c a n o n in t h a t g e n r e of beauty. Such c a n o n s of b e a u t y a r e n o t to b e
f o u n d in discursive generalizations b u t exclusively in e x e m p l a r y in-
stances. T h e p o i n t is j u s t t h a t n o discursive generalization can catch
w h a t m a k e s t h e instances e x e m p l a r y . If t h e r e a r e instances to which
"all times a n d all p e o p l e s " ascribe beauty, they r e p r e s e n t at m o s t

118 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

empirical examples in which t h e r e m a y lie a n implicit c a n o n ("deep-
lying g e n e r a l g r o u n d s " ) , b u t n o t o n e which can b e f o r m u l a t e d in
w o r d s . K a n t usually stressed t h a t references to such a "classical"
5 6

s t a n d a r d for taste was a n empirical r e c o u r s e , worthy a n d essential,

b u t still merely empirical.

Backsliding: The Confusion of Aesthetic with Cognitive Reference

F o r t h e K a n t i a n t h e o r y of b e a u t y t o work, it m u s t b e possible for

aesthetic form to arise even from t h e m e r e m a t t e r in sensation.
T h e characterization of color a n d t o n e cognitively as "secondary
qualities," i.e., m e r e sensation o r "intrinsic m a g n i t u d e , " m u s t n o t
d e n y t h e m t h e possibility of occasioning a feeling of b e a u t y a n d a
j u d g m e n t of taste, for t h e n , i n d e e d , Bach could n o t b e beautiful,
n o r Delacroix. T h e s a m e holds, of course, for color a n d t o n e in
n a t u r e t h e s o n g of a bird, t h e color of a flower. Yet K a n t allowed
his c o n c e r n for " p u r i t y " to mislead h i m . Purity for K a n t is exclu-
sively a m a t t e r of form. H e was t r o u b l e d by t h e s e e m i n g i n c o n g r u -
ity t h a t several artistic m e d i a , especially music a n d p a i n t i n g , evoked
beauty via sense e x p e r i e n c e which, o n his theory of objective refer-
ence, could only b e c o n s i d e r e d " m e r e s e n s a t i o n " " m a t t e r , " n o t
"form." H o w could m e r e m a t t e r have aesthetic form? "A m e r e
color, such as t h e g r e e n of a plot of grass, or a m e r e t o n e (as distin-
guished from s o u n d o r noise), like t h a t of a violin, is described by
most p e o p l e as in itself beautiful, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e fact t h a t b o t h
seem to d e p e n d merely o n t h e m a t t e r of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n
o t h e r words, simply o n sensation, which only entitles t h e m to b e
called a g r e e a b l e . " F o r m was for K a n t almost s y n o n y m o u s with
57

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l potential. H e h a d already exploited fully t h e tran-

scendental potential of sensible form (Sinn) as the s t r u c t u r e of a pri-
ori intuition in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Aesthetic" of t h e First Critique.
Such form in representations-of-objects was eligible for cognitive
use, for r e f e r e n c e to t h e o b j e c t . I n o r d e r to give a clear a n d com-
58

pelling a c c o u n t of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, Kant h a d differentiated

from t h a t a n o t i o n of "aesthetic form," which r e f e r r e d exclusively
to t h e subject, a n d which consequently was not to b e confused with
t h e other. It was n o t t h e form of t h e representation-of-the-object in
its objective r e f e r e n c e which occasioned beauty, b u t r a t h e r t h e aes-
thetic formality of t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , its r e f e r e n c e to t h e subject,
t h e h a r m o n y of t h e faculties it o c c a s i o n e d . If, as K a n t p e r s u a d e d
59

himself in 14, only form as objective reference in a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n -

of-an-object could elicit a feeling of beauty, t h e n musical t o n e s a n d

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 119

the colors in p a i n t i n g a n d t h e r e w i t h two of the greatest realms of
a r t w o u l d fall o u t of t h e conspectus of his aesthetic theory: a fatal
flaw.
In his effort to p r o m o t e t h e m to objective formality, h e h a d r e -
course to t h e theories of L e o n h a r d Euler, w h o tried to established
m a t h e m a t i c a l regularities in t h e s e p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of wave
frequencies. T h i s , as m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d formal, struck K a n t as a
plausible solution. Color a n d t o n e would b e r e s c u e d from t h e i r
m e r e materiality. " T h e m i n d n o t alone perceives by sense t h e i r
effect . . . b u t also, by reflection, t h e r e g u l a r play of the i m p r e s -
sions, ( a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e form in which different r e p r e s e n t a -
tions a r e united,) . . . T h e y would b e n o t h i n g short of formal
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of t h e unity of t h e manifold of sensations, a n d in
that case could even be c o u n t e d beauties in t h e m s e l v e s . " W h a t 60

K a n t believed h e h a d d o n e was to establish the "purity" of these

sensations as a kind of form. "[SJensations of color as well as of t o n e
a r e only entitled to be immediately r e g a r d e d as beautiful w h e r e , in
e i t h e r case, they a r e pure." H a v i n g f o u n d " p u r i t y " in this m a t h e -
matical s t r u c t u r e b e h i n d color a n d t o n e , h e t h e n c o m p o u n d e d his
e r r o r by asserting: "all simple colors are r e g a r d e d as beautiful so far
as p u r e . . . C o m p o s i t e colors have n o t this a d v a n t a g e . " T h a t vio-
lates Kant's principle t h a t j u d g m e n t s of taste may never b e univer-
sal j u d g m e n t s . It is also d u b i o u s experientially, with r e f e r e n c e to
p a i n t i n g or, for t h a t m a t t e r , n a t u r a l c o l o r .
61

K a n t was t e m p t e d to identify aesthetic f o r m a n d objective f o r m

for two r e a s o n s . First, h e believed t h a t f o r m always carried with it
t h e potential for objective validity, a n d h e certainly wished to be-
lieve that t h e j u d g m e n t of taste entailed s o m e form of validity. B u t
h e also h a d a second motive for this e n t e r p r i s e : his s t r o n g interest
in discriminating "aesthetic f o r m " from "aesthetic m a t t e r , " t h e
beautiful from t h e pleasant. " C h a r m " [Reiz], o r aesthetic matter,
could have n o relevance to beauty, aesthetic form, which fell ex-
clusively to t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. T h e p r e s e n c e of Reiz could only
r u i n t h e " p u r i t y " of a j u d g m e n t of taste. All of this is perfectly con-
sistent with t h e t h e o r y of beauty we have already e n c o u n t e r e d . T h e
p r o b l e m arises w h e n K a n t p r o c e e d s to confuse "aesthetic m a t t e r "
with "cognitive m a t t e r " in t h e representation-of-the-object, a n d as-
serts t h a t "cognitive m a t t e r " is ineligible for a j u d g m e n t of taste.
If K a n t strove to extract objective form from t h e m e r e m a t t e r of
sensation in color a n d s o u n d , h e also tried to identify aesthetic f o r m
in g e n e r a l with objective form. Kant's identification of Gestalt (fig-
u r e ) with "regularity" exposes t h e ambiguity of t h e whole p r o c e e d -

120 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

ing: "Every form of objects of sense (both of e x t e r n a l a n d also,
mediately, of i n t e r n a l sense) is e i t h e r / j g w e o r play [entweder Gestalt
oder Spiel]. I n the latter case it is e i t h e r play of figures (in space:
mimic a n d d a n c e ) , o r m e r e play of sensations (in t i m e ) . " T h e 62

words Gestalt a n d Spiel have e n o r m o u s potential for a theory of

beauty a l o n g K a n t i a n linesif only K a n t would leave t h e m w h e r e
they b e l o n g , in t h e realm of aesthetic form, namely, the playful rec-
onfiguration [Umgestaltung] of sense i n p u t according to t h e fancy of
the imagination, exclusively for its subjective gratification. T h a t is,
we m u s t n e v e r forget, t h e t r u e K a n t i a n theory. W h a t is a n aesthetic
whole may b e a f r a g m e n t of s o m e cognitive object, o r s o m e cong-
eries of such distinguishable objects, a n d j u s t in that m e a s u r e aes-
thetic form a n d its essential Gestalt m u s t n o t b e confused with
objective form a n d its d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t o u r . B o u n d e d n e s s c a n n o t
be a sufficient criterion for beauty, because all objects are b o u n d e d ,
b u t n o t all a r e beautiful.
K a n t himself recognizes t h e limitations of his sense of the
b o u n d e d n e s s , t h e regularity a n d symmetry, of t h e beautiful
"thing." I n a crucial p a r a g r a p h in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 22, h e
states t h e issue a n d d e f e n d s his a u t h e n t i c position against this "ob-
jective s u b r e p t i o n " of symmetrical, logical form:

N o w geometrically r e g u l a r figures, a circle, a s q u a r e , a cube,

a n d t h e like, are c o m m o n l y b r o u g h t forward by critics of taste
as t h e most simple a n d u n q u e s t i o n a b l e e x a m p l e s of beauty.
A n d yet t h e very r e a s o n why they are called regular, is because
t h e only way of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m is by looking o n t h e m
as m e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of a d e t e r m i n a t e concept by which the
figure has its r u l e (according to which alone it is possible)
prescribed for it. O n e or o t h e r of these two views m u s t , t h e r e -
fore, b e w r o n g : either t h e verdict of t h e critics t h a t attributes
beauty to such figures, or else o u r own, which m a k e s p u r -
posiveness a p a r t from any c o n c e p t necessary for b e a u t y . 63

I n the G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 22 Kant rescues himself from his o w n

confusion o n t h e score of taking objective f o r m m e r e disposition
in space (and t i m e ) f o r beauty (aesthetic form).

The Scope of the "Critique of Taste"

Let us review o u r reconstruction of t h e "Critique of T a s t e " of 1787.

It h a d a clear a n d careful "Analytic," in t h e exposition of t h e pecu-
liarities of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste. It obviously h a d a very precise

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 121

" D e d u c t i o n , " in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t a b o u t t h e " h a r m o n y
of the faculties" a n d "subjective formal purposiveness." B u t what is
a " C r i t i q u e " w i t h o u t a "Dialectic"? If we look to t h e "Dialectic of
Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " as it stands in t h e finished Critique of Judgment,
however, we find ourselves virtually in a different universe from t h e
o n e we have b e e n considering. It is very h a r d to believe t h a t this was
t h e "Dialectic" that K a n t h a d in m i n d in his original version.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it offers us a clue as to w h a t t h e m o r e pri-
m o r d i a l "Dialectic" m a y have b e e n . C o n s i d e r 56, t h e " R e p r e s e n t a -
tion of t h e A n t i n o m y of T a s t e . " It p r e s e n t s two positions which
w e r e b o t h widely articulated in t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y literature
a b o u t taste a n d which s e e m e d m u t u a l l y inconsistent. O n t h e o n e
h a n d t h e r e was t h e p r o v e r b , old as t h e R o m a n s , t h a t t h e r e is n o dis-
p u t i n g a b o u t taste, t h a t is, t h a t t h e g r o u n d of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e
o r taste is subjective, i n d e e d private. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e very
n a t u r e of any j u d g m e n t of taste was t h a t one's claim as to beauty
o u g h t to b e a c k n o w l e d g e d as valid, that t h e r e s h o u l d b e univer-
sality of c o n c u r r e n c e . B u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of this claim is obviously
controversy, because t h a t c o n c u r r e n c e d o e s n o t arise. Controversy,
however, implies t h e possibility of discourse a n d resolution, b u t
such discourse, if it were c o n d u c t e d rationally, would b e d i s p u t e .
H e n c e t h e r e would a p p e a r to b e a necessary contradiction between
two positions, each of which has a rational f o u n d a t i o n . T h a t is the
stuff of dialectic. It is also c o m p o s e d entirely of t h e ingredients in-
trinsic to t h e original "Critique of T a s t e . " A n d t h e p r o o f t h a t such
64

a s t r u c t u r e was p r e s e n t in t h e original "Critique of T a s t e " is to b e

f o u n d in 7.
T h e o d d t h i n g is, 7 also solves t h e "Dialectic," for t h e key to the
a n t i n o m y is t h a t t h e thesis is t r u e of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of sense,
while t h e antithesis is t r u e of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s of taste. Yet we
s h o u l d n o t b e p u t off by t h e simplicity. K a n t originally believed t h a t
b o t h t h e " D e d u c t i o n , " which h e expressly acknowledged was
"easy," a n d t h e "Dialectic" were simple, because this " d e p a r t m e n t
of philosophy," as h e called it in his letter to Reinhold, was so
" p o o r " in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , a n d h e n c e in their p o t e n -
tial c o n f l i c t s . It was only later, w h e n h e b e c a m e aware of g r e a t p o -
65

tential latent in t h e material h e h a d worked u p to g r o u n d t h e

faculty of feeling in a n a priori principle, t h a t h e c a m e u p o n a whole
n e w idea for t h e "Dialectic."
O n t h e conjecture t h a t 56 a n d 7 may have b e e n all t h e "Di-
alectic" t h e r e was in t h e original "Critique of T a s t e , " let us c o m p a r e
t h a t archaeological r e c o n s t r u c t i o n with t h e ultimate "Critique of

122 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 Aesthetic J u d g m e n t " for t h e major differences. First, as we have
j u s t c o n t e n d e d , t h e actual "Dialectic" of t h e final version was a later
addition. Also, as we observed in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n , t h e "Analytic of
t h e S u b l i m e " was n o t a p a r t of t h e original "Critique of Taste." B u t
n o t e also t h a t t h e material o n art, 4 3 - 5 4 , played n o p a r t what-
ever in o u r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Tonelli dates this material to t h e year
1788, i.e., h e considers t h e t r e a t m e n t of art a n extension of t h e
project which h a d b e e n u n d e r t a k e n in t h e "Critique of T a s t e " of
1787. 6 6

Finally, t h e r e a r e certain sections in t h e "Analytic of t h e Beauti-

ful" which did n o t have a place in o u r reconstruction of t h e original
"Critique of T a s t e , " in particular 1 5 - 1 7 a n d p o r t i o n s of t h e G e n -
eral R e m a r k to 22. M e r e d i t h , in assessing 1517, observes t h a t
they d o n o t seem to fit naturally into t h e flow of t h e exposition be-
fore a n d after t h e m . I n d e e d , they r e p r e s e n t a far m o r e c o m p l e x
6 7

consideration of t h e p r o b l e m of beauty. N o t all t h e s e consider-

ations were n e w to Kant, b u t all were a d d e d to his text later.

The Beautiful and the Pleasant 123

 Six

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

IN T H E YEAR 1788

K
ant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l m e t h o d was to distill from a com-
plex m e n t a l process a p u r e a priori principle, a n d m a k e
t h a t principle t h e w a r r a n t for t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e
m o r e c o m p l e x p r o b l e m from which h e initially r e -
gressed. I n t h e Third Critique, K a n t h a d to establish t h e implications
of t h e solution for his " p u r e " j u d g m e n t for the full complexity of
aesthetic m a t t e r s . K a n t u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e were great c o m p l e x -
ities in the critique of taste which r e m a i n e d , despite his t r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e p u r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . Any "critique of
1

taste" which could a c c o u n t for t h e beauty only of foliage b u t n o t of

d a Vinci, of sea shells b u t n o t of S h a k e s p e a r e , would n o t have h a d
g r e a t s t a n d i n g in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c u l t u r e . T o prove t h e p o w e r
of his new insight, K a n t h a d to be able to clarify t h e questions of
criticism t h a t arose in t h e c o n t e x t of works of a r t . 2

"Dependent" and "Ideal" Beauty

K a n t h a d to acknowledge t h a t t h e " p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste h e h a d

s t r u g g l e d so h a r d to isolate was so restrictive t h a t t h e only p h e n o m -
e n a which s e e m e d to fall within it w e r e relatively trivialsea shells
a n d flowers, a r a b e s q u e s a n d foliagethings perceived as g r a t u -
itously e l e g a n t without the least intrinsic m e a n i n g . Most of the
things of any substantive i m p o r t a n c e to m a n h u m a n beauty, t h e
b e a u t y of o r g a n i s m s , t h e b e a u t y of artificedo n o t seem to fall u n -
d e r t h e rubric of Kant's " p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste." T h e y a r e n o t so
simple t h a t t h e i r c o n c e p t n e e d n o t b e involved in their recognition,
m a k i n g p r o b l e m a t i c t h e " p u r i t y " of t h e i r aesthetic r e c e p t i o n . A
t h e o r y of b e a u t y which could find it in t h e b l o o m of narcissus o r t h e

124
swirl of a nautilus, b u t n o t in t h e Sistine ceiling or a s o n n e t of
S h a k e s p e a r e , could hardly have satisfied Kant.
T h i s explains his distinction of "free" f r o m " d e p e n d e n t "
beauty (16). H e r e q u i r e d a transition from his " p u r e " case to t h e
3

c o m p l e x issues involved in t h e appraisal of beauty in c o m p l e x

forms of n a t u r e a n d above all in works of art. In d e v e l o p i n g his
" p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste," K a n t d e n i e d t h e idea of "objective p u r -
posiveness" (intrinsic perfection) any place in his aesthetic theory.
" W h a t is formal in t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h i n g , i.e. t h e a g r e e m e n t
of its manifold with a unity (i.e. irrespective of w h a t it is to be) does
not, of itself, afford us any cognition whatsoever of objective p u r -
posiveness. For since [in a j u d g m e n t of taste] abstraction is m a d e
from this unity as purpose (what t h e t h i n g is to be) n o t h i n g is left b u t
the subjective purposiveness of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e m i n d . "
B u t that is entirely a subjective r e f e r e n c e , namely, to a state of m i n d
"in which t h e subject feels itself quite at h o m e . " 4

"Free b e a u t y " is t h e e x t r e m e case, from which t h e u n d e r l y i n g

principle can m o s t obviously b e d e d u c e d . K a n t explains t h a t " d e -
p e n d e n t b e a u t y " is called such because it "does p r e s u p p o s e a con-
cept a n d the perfection of t h e object in a c c o r d a n c e therewith." It is
t h e r e f o r e a " c o n d i t i o n e d b e a u t y " [bedingte Schnheit], which relies
u p o n t h e "concept of a particular p u r p o s e " in its aesthetic assess-
m e n t . "If now t h e j u d g m e n t of taste in respect of t h e beauty of a
t h i n g is m a d e d e p e n d e n t o n t h e p u r p o s e in its manifold, like
a j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n , a n d t h u s limited, it is n o l o n g e r a free a n d
p u r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . " Kant is most explicit a b o u t " d e p e n d e n t
5

beauty," or t h e connection of b e a u t y with perfection, in 48, w h e r e

h e writes: "It is t r u e t h a t in f o r m i n g a n estimate, especially of ani-
m a t e objects of n a t u r e , e.g. of a m a n or a h o r s e , objective p u r -
posiveness is also c o m m o n l y t a k e n into account with a view to
j u d g m e n t u p o n t h e i r beauty; b u t t h e n t h e j u d g m e n t also ceases to
b e purely aesthetic, i.e. a m e r e j u d g m e n t of t a s t e . " I n pulchritudo
6

adhaerens, t h e aesthetic j u d g m e n t is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the idea of per-

fection: it is "a logically c o n d i t i o n e d aesthetic j u d g m e n t [ein logisch-
bedingtes sthetisches Urtheil]." A n o t h e r kind of "interest" t h r e a t e n s
to c o m p r o m i s e t h e disinterestedness of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste: t h e
ethical interest in t h e good o r t h e perfect. 7

T h e idea of perfection, that is, "a c o n c e p t of t h e p u r p o s e which

d e t e r m i n e s w h a t t h e t h i n g is to b e , " asserts itself in t h e c o n c e p t of
" d e p e n d e n t beauty." B u t it involves a n ethical j u d g m e n t , n o t a n
aesthetical o n e . If a n entity is recognized as intrinsically purposive,

Kant's Philosphy of Art 125

this can occasion d e l i g h t . B u t t h a t delight is in t h e good, n o t in t h e
8

beautiful. B e a u t y can n e v e r b e a necessary, h e n c e prescriptive a n d

predictable, delight. It is singular a n d it is unanticipatable. It is, of
course, possible that a feeling of b e a u t y m i g h t b e a r o u s e d ; such a n
o c c u r r e n c e , however, would of necessity have to free itself from t h e
sense of t h e objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e entity.
T h e p r o b l e m is, in w h a t sense is " d e p e n d e n t beauty" (pulchri-
tudo adhaerens) still beauty? T h e j u d g m e n t involved is unequivocally
i m p u r e . W h a t m e a s u r e of aesthetic value d o e s it retain? "A j u d g -
m e n t of taste, t h e n , in respect of a n object with a definite internal
p u r p o s e , can only b e p u r e if e i t h e r t h e p e r s o n j u d g i n g has n o con-
c e p t of this p u r p o s e o r else abstracts from it in his j u d g m e n t . "
Kant's solution is t h a t two s e p a r a t e " j u d g m e n t s " can b e discerned.
" [ W l h e n we c o m p a r e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by which a n object is given
to us with t h e object (as r e g a r d s what it o u g h t to be) by m e a n s of a
concept, we c a n n o t avoid c o n s i d e r i n g a l o n g with it t h e sensation in
t h e subject [es [kann] nicht vermieden werden, wenn wir die Vorstellung,
wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, mit dem Objecte (in Ansehung
dessen, was es sein soll) durch einen Begriff vergleichen, sie zugleich
mit der Empfindung im Subjecte zusammen zu halten]." T h a t is, t h e 9

representation-of-the-object, i.e., t h e empirical intuition, has in

itself b o t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e object a n d r e f e r e n c e to t h e subject.
K a n t h e r e considerably widens t h e possibilities of his t h e o r y of
taste. It is possible b o t h to m i s u n d e r s t a n d intrinsic p u r p o s e as in-
a d v e r t e n t p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d , even m o r e interestingly, to abstract
from it a n d j u d g e solely aesthetically. T h i s latter p o w e r to abstract
from a cognitive or ethical appraisal in o r d e r to u n d e r t a k e a n
aesthetical o n e is a very significant addition to t h e Kantian arsenal.
T h e capacity to abstract would s e e m to fit very nicely with a t h e o r y
of aesthetic a p p r a i s a l as reflective, a n d especially with t h e r e n d e r -
i n g of this n o t i o n as o n e which inserts r e f e r e n c e to t h e subjective
processes of m i n d p r i o r to t h e appraisal of delight. B u t in t h a t case,
t h e pulchritudo in p u r p o s i v e objects is in fact n o different from t h e
pulchritudo in r a n d o m p h e n o m e n a , a n d t h e distinction of vaga from
adhaerens h a s n o t h i n g to d o with aesthetics at all. W h a t K a n t illus-
t r a t e d with r e f e r e n c e to foliage s h o u l d h o l d w i t h o u t a m e n d m e n t
for a Bach sonata. T h e n why did K a n t u n d e r t a k e t h e whole distinc-
tion? A n d can we b e satisfied with t h e result?
I n m y view, 17 is a n effort to reconsider t h e issues a n d per-
plexities of 15 16 in a n e w light, in t e r m s of t h e "ideal of beauty."
K a n t distinguishes two e l e m e n t s in his "ideal of beauty," a n aesthetic
normal idea a n d a rational idea. T h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea," a n "in-

126 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

dividual intuition (of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ) , " would a p p e a r to be t h e
aesthetic side of t h e complex, while t h e "rational idea" would en-
c o m p a s s t h e "perfection" involved in a c o m p l e x ( " d e p e n d e n t " ) case
of b e a u t y .10

K a n t explains t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in t h e following

terms:

T h e n o r m a l idea m u s t d r a w from e x p e r i e n c e t h e constituents

which it r e q u i r e s for t h e f o r m of a n animal of a particular
kind. B u t t h e greatest p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e construction of
this f o r m t h a t which would serve as a universal n o r m for
f o r m i n g a n estimate of each individual of t h e species in
q u e s t i o n t h e i m a g e that, as it were, forms a n intentional
basis u n d e r l y i n g t h e technic of n a t u r e , to which n o s e p a r a t e
individual, b u t only t h e race as a whole, is a d e q u a t e , has its
seat merely in t h e idea of t h e j u d g i n g subject. Yet it is, with all
its p r o p o r t i o n s , a n aesthetic idea, a n d , as such, capable of
b e i n g fully p r e s e n t e d in concreto in a m o d e l i m a g e . 1 1

T h e n o r m is p r i o r to t h e instances, a n d c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t e l y
f o r m u l a t e d from t h e m . R a t h e r it is by virtue of t h e n o r m t h a t they
can be recognized as instances: " T h i s normal idea is n o t derived
from p r o p o r t i o n s t a k e n from e x p e r i e n c e as definite rules: r a t h e r
is it a c c o r d i n g to this idea t h a t rules for f o r m i n g estimates first be-
c o m e p o s s i b l e . " K a n t spells o u t t h e idea: "It is a n i n t e r m e d i a t e be-
12

tween all singular intuitions of individuals, with their manifold

variationsa floating i m a g e for t h e whole g e n u s . " T h a t is p r e -
1 3

cisely w h a t a s c h e m a is. T h i s p r i m o r d i a l "idea" in the j u d g i n g sub-

ject, a s c h e m a of beauty, seems a n a l o g o u s to t h e i m p u t e d p u r p o s e
in n a t u r e w h e r e b y she designs individuals according to a principle
of t h e species as a whole, so t h a t they each instantiate it, while re-
m a i n i n g nevertheless distinguishable individuals. T h e difference
b e t w e e n this s c h e m a a n d o n e which serves d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t
is t h a t t h e latter is constituted a n d fixed by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
w h e r e a s t h e o n e which serves t h e reflective aesthetic j u d g m e n t is
indefinite. 14

B e a u t y has to d o with t h a t which p r e c e e d s conceptualization,

i.e., t h a t singular instance which incites i m a g i n a t i o n to playful re-
configuration. I n t h a t sense, b e a u t y resides only in "what c a n n o t be
r e p r e s e n t e d by concepts b u t only in a n individual p r e s e n t a t i o n [in
einzelner Darstellung]." T h e "faculty of p r e s e n t a t i o n " is imagination.
H e n c e b e a u t y can only b e a n ideal of t h e imagination. I m a g i n a t i o n ,
K a n t suggests, has t h e empirical capacity to g e n e r a t e w h a t o n e

Kant's Philosphy of Art 127

 m i g h t t e r m a n "ideal t y p e . " T h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" distills
1 5

from a series of e x p e r i e n c e s a s t a n d a r d for any particular instantia-

tion (note t h a t t h e issue has shifted to p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n rec-
ognition) of a species. K a n t offers a "psychological e x p l a n a t i o n " of
this process which in fact t u r n s o u t to b e a m o r e e x t e n d e d descrip-
tion. " T h e i m a g i n a t i o n , in a m a n n e r q u i t e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e to
us," is able to form a n i m a g e , "a m e a n c o n t o u r which serves as a
c o m m o n s t a n d a r d for all [ein Mittleres [Bild] . . . , welches allen zum
gemeinschaftlichen Mae dient]." 16
T h i s " m e a n c o n t o u r " is like a sta-
tistical average of all t h e empirical instances, which we m i g h t con-
struct mechanically, b u t t h a t is n o t h o w i m a g i n a t i o n does it. It "does
all this by m e a n s of a dynamical effect u p o n t h e o r g a n of internal
sense, arising from t h e f r e q u e n t a p p r e h e n s i o n of such forms [durch
einen dynamischen Effect, der aus der vielfltigen Auffassung solcher Ge-
stalten auf das Organ des innern Sinnes entspringt]."
17

T h i s is very s t r a n g e l a n g u a g e from Kant. Is t h e " o r g a n of inter-

nal sense" t h e intuition of time as form for "objective r e f e r e n c e " or
t h e receptivity of aesthetic form, namely, the "state of m i n d " o r
feeling of t h e subject? W h a t exactly is a " d y n a m i c effect?" T h e
m o r e K a n t develops t h e ideas, t h e m o r e questions arise, a n d t h e
less clarity r e m a i n s . Insofar as any ideal of b e a u t y as latent criterion
for j u d g m e n t s of taste can b e ascribed to t h e j u d g i n g subject, it can
only b e t h e schematic a n a l o g o f t h a t condition of h a r m o n y b e t w e e n
t h e free play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e lawfulness of t h e u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g as they relate to any empirical intuition, or, in Kant's
words, to "cognition in g e n e r a l . " T h u s t h e "ideal of b e a u t y " as t h e
"highest m o d e l " would b e t h e implicit schema to which j u d g m e n t
c o m p a r e s a n y singular instance to discern w h e t h e r it is beautiful o r
not. Phenomenologically t h a t c o m p a r i s o n is via pleasure, t r a n s c e n -
dentally it is via h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, empirically it is t h e im-
plicit unity in all t h e previous instances in which b e a u t y has b e e n
discerned. B u t finding a tulip beautiful s h o u l d b e j u s t as relevant to
t h a t implicit unity of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, a n d h e n c e of any
"ideal of beauty," as finding Beethoven's Pastoral S y m p h o n y b e a u -
tiful.
T h e idea of a n aesthetic n o r m a l idea, while interesting, only of-
fers a different l a n g u a g e to f o r m u l a t e w h a t K a n t h a d explicated
m o r e clearly in relating t h e j u d g m e n t of taste to t h e h a r m o n y of t h e
faculties. It does n o t at all a d v a n c e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w t h e
j u d g m e n t of taste m a y b e e x t e n d e d to m o r e c o m p l e x objects, p a r -
ticularly those which s e e m to entail intrinsic p u r p o s e , a n d t h e r e -
fore it d o e s n o t a d v a n c e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of pulchritudo adhaerens

128 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

as a n aesthetic matter. I n fact K a n t could n o t resolve t h e issue at this
p o i n t of his t h i n k i n g . It would take what I call t h e "ethical t u r n " to
lead h i m to a t h e o r y of symbolism which would clarify t h e issues.
Kant's f u r t h e r observations o n t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in
17 try to offer a m o r e fruitful sense of t h e t e r m as related to art. H e
suggests t h a t this n o t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e m i n i m u m aptness of a p r e -
sentation: " t h e form that constitutes t h e indispensable condition of
all beauty, a n d , consequently, only correctness in t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
t h e g e n u s . " T h u s h e illustrates with two classical s t a n d a r d s t h e
1 8

Doryphorus of Polycletus a n d Myron's Cow. H e n c e t h e aesthetic nor-

mal idea, instead of b e i n g a g r o u n d for beauty, is only a limiting
condition, g u a r a n t e e i n g "the p r e s e n t a t i o n is merely academically
correct." E v e r y t h i n g u n i q u e a n d distinctive, which characterizes a
t r u e singular instance, r e m a i n s u n d e t e r m i n e d by this aesthetic nor-
mal i d e a . K a n t has d e m o t e d t h e whole notion to the "mechanical"
1 9

c h a r a c t e r of art.
I n t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h of 17, Kant's discourse implicitly
shifts from t h e q u e s t i o n of finding beautiful things in n a t u r e to
m a k i n g beautiful objects (art). I n discussing t h e "exemplary," Kant
writes of " p r o d u c t s of taste," a n d t h e n proceeds to a very i m p o r t a n t
assertion: " H e w h o imitates [nachahmt] a m o d e l [Muster] shows, n o
d o u b t , in so far as h e attains to it, skill [Geschicklichkeit]; b u t only
shows taste in so far as h e can j u d g e of this m o d e l himself [sofern
als er dieses Muster selbst beurtheilen kann]." 20
Taste h e r e for t h e first
time involves t h a t which p r o d u c e s , n o t merely appreciates, beauty.
H e n c e , art for t h e first time e n t e r s consideration in a serious m a n -
ner. I n d e e d , t h e notions of imitation (Nachahmung), of m o d e l
(Muster), a n d of skill (Geschicklichkeit) all play a crucial role in Kant's
t h e o r y of art. T h u s , 17 r e p r e s e n t s t h e transition to t h e consider-
ation of art.

The Philosophy of Art

W h a t is art? K a n t p r e s e n t e d a very orderly, precise, even brilliant

exposition of it in t h e Third Critique. T h e r e is n o t the least hint of
casualness o r indifference in t h e analysis. Yet o n e c a n n o t h e l p b u t
recognize h o w structurally negligent h e was in t h e p l a c e m e n t of his
whole exposition of t h e topic within the work. T h e t r e a t m e n t of art
(4354) is r u n into the " D e d u c t i o n of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t s " via
two transitional sections ( 4 1 - 4 2 ) , t h o u g h t h e r e is n o a p p a r e n t
reason why it belongs t h e r e . T o m a k e m a t t e r s even worse, t h e
whole of t h e " D e d u c t i o n " is left u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of "Book T w o "

Kant's Philosphy of Art 129

of the "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " which is called the "Ana-
lytic of t h e S u b l i m e . " J o h a n n Gottfried Kiesewetter, Kant's proof-
r e a d e r , suggested t h a t K a n t i n t r o d u c e a new division of t h e b o o k at
t h a t p o i n t to give d u e weight to t h e shift in a t t e n t i o n . H e suggested
a " B o o k T h r e e " to i n c l u d e t h e " D e d u c t i o n " a n d t h e t r e a t m e n t of
a r t . B u t even t h a t d o e s n o t really a d d r e s s t h e discontinuity be-
2 1

tween t h e actual " D e d u c t i o n " (3140) a n d t h e exposition of art.

T h e structural neglect is puzzling, especially in a p h i l o s o p h e r
so architectonic. It raises t h e question: W h a t function was t h e ex-
position of art to serve? C o u l d it in s o m e sense b e p a r t of t h e d e d u c -
tion of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s ? W o u l d it p e r h a p s m a k e sense to say
t h a t t h e p o i n t of this exposition was to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e d e d u c -
tion which w o r k e d for t h e " p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste also h e l d in t h e
case of works of art? Possibly. C o u l d o n e t h e n m a k e a n even m o r e
e x t r a v a g a n t leap a n d s u p p o s e t h a t t h e whole m a t t e r b e l o n g e d to
t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e " in some sense? T h e r e is a very
strained sense in which t h e whole t h e o r y of symbolism, which is t h e
c u l m i n a t i o n of t h e exposition of art a n d t h e basis for t h e final form
of t h e "Dialectic," can b e considered in t e r m s of t h e most p r o f o u n d
m e a n i n g of t h e sublime, namely, t h e aesthetic consciousness of
subjective m o r a l w o r t h . Yet all of this is so t e n u o u s t h a t it seems
m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e to find K a n t unjustifiably lax in the organization
of his book.
S u s p e n d i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of its p o o r p l a c e m e n t , let us consider
t h e exposition of art starting in 43. W h a t is immediately obvious is
t h a t this exposition has every aspect of a fresh b e g i n n i n g . It p r e -
s u m e s n o t h i n g of t h e previous analysis. It defines each of its con-
cepts as it p r o c e e d s , a n d it develops rigorously a l o n g t h e lines it
itself sets u p . While it is clearly related to t h e p r i o r "Analytic of t h e
Beautiful," especially to 1517, it stands a u t o n o m o u s l y . T h e
elegance a n d conciseness of this exposition is very noteworthy, es-
pecially in view of t h e m o n u m e n t a l i t y of t h e issues u n d e r consider-
ation a n d t h e vast literature which Kant h a d to digest in m a k i n g his
discriminations. T h i s last p o i n t n e e d s to b e u n d e r s c o r e d : t h e ex-
position of art is a n analysis which takes for g r a n t e d a massive b o d y
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a "conventional wisdom," a n d is offered as a
clarification a n d elevation o f t h a t discourse.
K a n t sets a b o u t clarifying t h e c o n c e p t of art in t e r m s of t h r e e
discriminations. H e distinguishes b e t w e e n artifice a n d n a t u r e . H e
distinguishes b e t w e e n art a n d artifice. A n d h e distinguishes b e -
tween art a n d science. T h e p o w e r a n d implication of these discrimi-
n a t i o n s a r e impressive. At t h e h e a r t of t h e exposition of t h e first

130 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 discrimination is what I will call t h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art: its
o d d parallelism with n a t u r e . T h e r e has l o n g b e e n controversy over
Kant's a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e relative beauty in n a t u r e a n d in art.
S o m e c o n t e n d t h a t K a n t substantially u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e i m p o r -
t a n c e of artistic beauty, a n d that his t r e a t m e n t of it in t h e Critique of
Judgment was s u b o r d i n a t e d to considerations deriving from his a p -
preciation for n a t u r a l beauty, a n d from his ulterior philosophical
interests in n a t u r a l beauty, i.e., its cognitive a n d ethical implica-
t i o n s . Kant's t h e o r y of aesthetics in g e n e r a l set o u t from t h e
22

s t a n d p o i n t of t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o r r e c e p t i o n of beauty, a n d n o t its
creation. Even w h e n h e assessed t h e creative d i m e n s i o n of aes-
thetics, as h e h a d to in c o n s i d e r i n g art, h e did so, as it were, from
outside, d i s e n g a g e d from t h e i m m a n e n t artistic process, a n d as-
sessing it with "cold-blooded" d e t a c h m e n t . 2 3

All this may well b e t r u e , b u t before we a d o p t it as o u r her-

m e n e u t i c v a n t a g e , it behooves us to consider a n o t h e r alternative,
namely, t h a t K a n t may have c o m e to treat art, as a c o m p l e x issue in
aesthetics, after h e c o n s i d e r e d n a t u r a l beauty, merely because in
t h e latter h e could m o r e easily isolate t h e essential e l e m e n t s of a
" p u r e " j u d g m e n t of taste, a n d consequently t h a t h e always in-
t e n d e d to b r i n g his findings to b e a r u p o n t h e c o m p l e x p r o b l e m of
art. T h a t is, in m y view, a very worthwhile consideration. B u t t h e r e
is a n o t h e r , m o r e subtle a n d m o r e r e w a r d i n g . While t h e r e is u n -
d o u b t e d l y s o m e g r o u n d for suspicion of Kant's a t t i t u d e toward art,
o n e can e n t e r a n i m m e d i a t e corrective whose implications m i g h t in
fact be capable of reversing t h e whole line of criticism against Kant.
T h e corrective is simply t h a t n a t u r a l beauty a p p e a r s to b e arti-
fice, or, t h e idea of art is implicit in t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of n a t u r a l
beauty. Kant's aesthetic e m p h a s i z e s t h e active role of t h e m i n d in
every aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , n o t simply those of creation b u t those of
r e c e p t i o n as well. I n d e e d , o n e could go so far as to say t h a t t h e r e can
be n o aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e at all which is n o t creative, in t h a t every
o n e involves h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, a n d h a r m o n y of t h e fac-
ulties, in its t u r n , t h e free play of t h e imagination which is, simply,
creativity.

P e r h a p s o n e of t h e most f a m o u s lines in t h e Third Critique, a n d

deservedly so, is from 45: " N a t u r e p r o v e d beautiful w h e n it wore
t h e a p p e a r a n c e of art; a n d art can only b e t e r m e d beautiful, w h e n
we a r e conscious of its b e i n g art, while yet it has t h e a p p e a r a n c e of
n a t u r e . " T h i s p r o f o u n d p a r a d o x is p r e g n a n t with t h e whole
2 4

Idealist-Romantic vision. It is from this p a r a d o x t h a t we m u s t gen-

e r a t e t h e e n t i r e t h e o r y of a r t which K a n t p r e s e n t s in t h e Third Cri-

Kant's Philosphy of Art 131

tique. B u t first, let u s dwell a m o m e n t o n t h e n a t u r a l side of this
p a r a d o x . N a t u r e is c o n s i d e r e d beautiful w h e n it looks like art, b u t
we know it is not. It is i n a d v e r t e n t artifice: what seems to b e de-
signed, yet c a n n o t b e ascribed to any worldly artist. H e n c e K a n t
treats n a t u r a l beauty "as if" it w e r e art, a n d h e calls this, frequently,
t h e "technic of n a t u r e . "
T h e r e is n o question t h a t this is a m e t a p h o r , yet it raises two
m a t t e r s for theoretical reflection. First, is w h a t we a p p r e c i a t e as d e -
sign in t h e object o r only in o u r response? T h e whole question of
"objective s u b r e p t i o n " comes back into consideration, with this
s u b r e p t i o n n o w f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of t h e problematic c o n c e p t i o n
"intrinsic objective purposiveness." B u t second, r e g a r d i n g n a t u r e
as t h e s p h e r e of relentless mechanical laws a n d efficient causality,
h o w can any p h e n o m e n o n in n a t u r e , n o m a t t e r how a p p a r e n t l y d e -
signed, possess intrinsic p u r p o s e ("perfection")? Must n o t these
works of n a t u r e which a p p r o x i m a t e art be ascribed literally to a n
A r t i f i c e r ? I n short, t h e i m p u t a t i o n of beauty to objects in n a t u r e
25

raises questions which a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y ontological a n d theologi-

cal a n d find t h e i r expression precisely in a n investigation of teleol-
ogy. T h u s , o n e side of Kant's aesthetic p a r a d o x p u s h e s his t h o u g h t
decisively in t h e direction of t h e "cognitive t u r n . "
B u t w h a t of t h e o t h e r side? W h a t d o e s it m e a n t h a t art m u s t
have t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n a t u r e while still b e i n g recognized as art?
K a n t takes Kunst to signify, like t h e a n c i e n t G r e e k techne, all h u m a n
i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , all artifice. H e distinguishes be-
tween t h e verb tun, which h e associates with t h e Latinfacere, a n d t h e
verbs wirken a n d ( m o r e problematically) handeln, which h e associ-
ates with t h e Latin agere. Tun m e a n s to d o , a n d it invariably refers to
intentional action, to a " d e e d . " Facere, in addition, has t h e sense of
" m a k i n g . " Wirken, which M e r e d i t h translates lamely as " o p e r a t i n g "
a n d B e r n a r d as "working," involves, in t h e G e r m a n , t h e sense of
causing o r effecting, a n d it is this sense t h a t K a n t wishes to evoke.
K a n t calls t h e result of art (Kunst, tun) a "work" (Werke; opus), a n d
t h e result of n a t u r e a n "effect" (Wirkung; effectus). T h e sense of t h e
whole is n o w clear. N a t u r e refers to t h a t construction of m a t t e r s
which involves cause a n d effect (in t h e efficient, mechanistic-
deterministic sense) a n d art refers to t h a t construction of m a t t e r s
which involves t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of p u r p o s e .
I n t h a t sense, Kunst is only a p p r o x i m a t e l y r e n d e r e d by "art" a n d
w o u l d b e best conceived as "artifice," as in t h e adjectival contrast
"artificial/natural." Artifice stands for t h e whole r e a l m of h u m a n
action in g e n e r a l , i.e., techne. It is t h e whole of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e

132 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of m a n ' s active stance in t h e world, w h a t H e i d e g g e r
called a t t e n d i n g to t h e " r e a d y - t o - h a n d , " as c o n t r a s t e d with t h e
p u r e l y c o n t e m p l a t i v e o r cognitive stance toward t h e " p r e s e n t - t o -
h a n d . " Moreover, it is i m p o r t a n t to recognize t h a t in 43 K a n t still
considers t h e "technical" as p a r t of t h e "practical" s p h e r e , i.e., to b e
u n d e r s t o o d within t h e f r a m e w o r k of rational will. After h e takes t h e
"cognitive t u r n , " h e will correct himself a n d assign all "technical
practical p u r p o s i v e n e s s " to t h e theoretical o r cognitive d o m a i n , as a
m a t t e r , to b e s u r e , of rationality, b u t of merely efficient rationality
w h a t M a x W e b e r would call Zweckrationalittas c o n t r a s t e d with
authentically practical action, which h a d to be g r o u n d e d in value,
i.e., m o r a l c h o i c e w h i c h , b o r r o w i n g from Weber, we m i g h t t e r m
Wertrationalitt. 26
T h a t r e a s s i g n m e n t of Technik, with f u n d a m e n t a l
r e p e r c u s s i o n s for t h e n o t i o n "Technik der Natur," belongs to t h e
p e r i o d of t h e composition of t h e First Introduction to the Critique of
Judgment.
Insofar as all h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n is Kunst, o r artifice, t h e con-
trast of this with n a t u r e , o r t h e a u t o n o m o u s flow of n a t u r a l events,
is clear. I n d e e d , K a n t m a d e a g r e a t deal of t h e distinction between
a n action (Handlung) a n d a n e v e n t (Wirkung) in his Second Critique.
While it was always possible, h e wrote, for t h e subject to p r e s e n t a
cognitive a c c o u n t of his actions retrospectively as t h e result of a
causal c h a i n , a n d h e n c e as a n event, this belied t h e prospective
c h a r a c t e r of each a n d every act u n d e r t a k e n by that subject as a free
agent, i n c l u d i n g t h e decision to view p r i o r acts as d e t e r m i n e d . As
artifice o r Technik, Kunst implied p u r p o s e , i.e., t h e causality of a
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e actual existence of a n object o r state of af-
fairs. B u t m o r e , it entailed a consideration o f t h a t causality as effec-
tive, i.e., actually in t h e world of sense, h e n c e a m a t t e r n o t only of
i n t e n t i o n (Absicht o r Zweckvorstellung) b u t of actualization, a n d
h e n c e entailed t h e whole m a t t e r of skill a n d efficiency (Geschick-
lichkeit) which w e r e irrelevant in t h e case of p u r e m o r a l choice.
Artifice is simply too wide a category to h e l p us with a n aes-
thetic clarification of art. H e n c e K a n t h a d to p r o c e e d to a distinc-
tion of a r t as such from artifice in g e n e r a l . T h a t was his second
distinction. It will c o m e as n o s u r p r i s e that w h a t K a n t u n d e r t o o k
was a n o t h e r search for "purity," a n d that t h e key to such a search
would b e t h e isolation of "form." T h u s K a n t m a d e t h r e e discrimi-
nations in isolating t h e " p u r e " case of a r t within t h e c o m p l e x field
of artifice in g e n e r a l . T h e first is t h e discrimination of a r t from
labor. T h e key to this distinction is t h a t t h e motive of t h e latter is t h e
r e t u r n to b e derived from t h e action, t h e p a y m e n t . H e n c e , like a

Kant's Philosphy of Art 133

practical choice based o n a material principle, o r like a simple j u d g -
m e n t of sense, t h e interest in t h e satisfaction ultimately to be ex-
p e c t e d is t h e basis for t h e action. T h e implication, further, is t h a t
t h e m e a n s a n d labor is clearly for K a n t merely a m e a n s i s u n -
pleasant d r u d g e r y , a n d consequently t h e only r e a s o n o n e w o u l d
subject oneself to it is for t h e p a y m e n t . T h a t c a n n o t b e t h e case for
art. It can only b e " p u r p o s i v e as play, i.e., as o c c u p a t i o n t h a t is
pleasant in itself [nur als Spiel, d. i. Beschftigung, diefr sich selbst an-
genehm ist, zweckmig ausfallen (gelingen)]." 27
T h e word "pleasant" is
a bit disconcerting in this s e n t e n c e , b u t t h e idea of "play" is t h e
m a i n harvest: K a n t identifies art with a n activity which is t h e source
of delight in itself, which n e e d s n o e x t e r n a l r e c o m p e n s e . H e sal-
vages t h e distinction of t h e beautiful from t h e pleasant in his n e x t
discrimination, which is between "fine [schne] a r t " a n d "agreeable
art." K a n t develops t h a t distinction in 44. T h e pleasant is, as we
w o u l d expect, eliminated from t h e " p u r e " consideration of beauty.
T h a t leaves o n e final distinction in t h e "purification" of art as
such f r o m artifice in g e n e r a l . It is t h e most p r o b l e m a t i c a n d t h e
most i m p o r t a n t : t h e distinction b e t w e e n "aesthetical a r t " a n d " m e -
chanical art." T h e idea of t h e mechanical first arose in consider-
ation of t h e role of t h e "aesthetic n o r m a l idea" in t h e "ideal of
beauty." T h e r e , K a n t associated t h e mechanical with "academic
correctness," t h o u g h h e implied t h a t t r u e art h a d s o m e t h i n g m o r e
a b o u t it. H e explains this idea in 4 3 - 4 4 . I n 43 h e m a k e s t h e fol-
lowing observation: " I n all free arts, s o m e t h i n g of a c o m p u l s o r y
c h a r a c t e r is still r e q u i r e d , or, as it is called, a mechanism."
28
I n 44,
K a n t explains t h a t "mechanical arts" a r e those which are based o n a
clear a n d d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t of what is to be p r o d u c e d , i.e., they
follow a r u l e . T h u s "mechanical a r t s " signfies, precisely, artifice in
g e n e r a l , as p u r p o s i v e action. B u t with respect to fine art it has a fur-
t h e r implication, namely, t h a t a r u l e m u s t b e followed. B u t we know
t h a t n o prescriptive r u l e can be claimed for t h e appreciation of
beauty. C a n it b e t h a t o n e could apply in its creation? K a n t clearly
recognizes this c a n n o t be. O n c e again, we m u s t b e attentive to his
n o t i o n of "play" in this context: t h e action is u n d e r t a k e n for t h e in-
trinsic satisfactioni.e., t h e d e l i g h t i t provides. S o m e h o w , t h e
recognition that a r t falls within artifice, i.e., p u r p o s e f u l action,
seems n o w to t h r e a t e n its f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e , namely, f r e e d o m .
Rules a r e rational, cognitive, a n d d e t e r m i n a n t . Artifice in g e n e r a l
falls u n d e r rules. Fine a r t falls u n d e r artifice in general, yet it m u s t
not s u b o r d i n a t e itself to a prescriptive r u l e . K a n t has l a n d e d h i m -
self squarely in a p a r a d o x . It is, i n d e e d , t h e second half of his

134 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art: t h a t art m u s t a p p e a r like n a t u r e (that
which suffers n o h u m a n intervention), a n d yet m u s t b e recognized
as art (namely, a h u m a n act).
T h e r e a r e two sides t o this issue. First, w h a t can it m e a n t h a t
fine art a p p e a r like n a t u r e ? A n d second, what sort of h u m a n act is
fine art? Let us take each of t h e m u p in t u r n . W h e n K a n t writes t h a t
art m u s t look like n a t u r e , w h a t h e m e a n s is t h a t it s h o u l d a p p e a r "as
free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a p r o d u c t of
m e r e n a t u r e [von allem Zwange willkrlicher Regeln sofrei scheinen, ah
ob es ein Product der bloen Natur sei]." 29
B u t since w h e n is n a t u r e
"free"? Kant's definition of n a t u r e is precisely t h e e n s e m b l e of laws,
o r t h e existence of p h e n o m e n a u n d e r t h e constraint of those laws.
Even in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , w h e n we t h i n k of n a t u r e as " u n c o n -
strained," w h a t sorts of events d o we have in m i n d ? Certainly n o t
t h e "starry h e a v e n s . " Even a " m e a n d e r i n g b r o o k " o r a " v a g r a n t
b r e e z e " follow, in fact, utterly fixed physical laws. If we r e s p o n d to a
spontaneity, a d y n a m i s m in n a t u r e , a n effortlessness of o r d e r , we
also know t h a t t h a t o r d e r is real, b i n d i n g , a n d fixed. P e r h a p s it is in
t h e p h e n o m e n a of life in n a t u r e t h a t we a r e most struck by its "free-
d o m , " in t h e l u x u r i a n t creativity which m a k e s each leaf of a n oak
tree distinct, each instance of a species u n i q u e . P e r h a p s it is t h e
lushness, this s p e n d t h r i f t vitality of n a t u r e , that we m e a n by t h a t
sense of " f r e e d o m " from t h e c o n s t r a i n t of arbitrary rules. Certainly
if m a n w e r e to m a k e a n oak tree, each leaf would b e p r o d u c e d to
identical specifications of t h e most mechanical sort. Individuality is
s o m e t h i n g o u r rational constructions seem to consider t h o r o u g h l y
dispensable.
T h e r e is a f u r t h e r point, however. I n the sense t h a t rules a r e
arbitrary (willkrlich), they a r e artificial. T h e y are p r o d u c t s of p u r -
pose or rational will. Reason is t h e only source of r u l e in t h e world.
T o b e r u l e - b o u n d e d is to b e subject to r e a s o n . B u t K a n t locates t h e
e n t i r e aesthetic s p h e r e n o t in s u b o r d i n a t i o n to r e a s o n b u t in t h e
free play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , in sensibility, t h e r e a l m of t h e merely
given, t h e d o m a i n of objective actuality, n o t validity. H e n c e what
art m u s t entail is a p u r p o s i v e n e s s without a p u r p o s e : as h u m a n act
it falls u n d e r t h e r u b r i c of artifice, of p u r p o s e , a n d h e n c e of rule,
b u t as free act it falls u n d e r t h e dispensation of t h e m e r e formality
of p u r p o s e , Zweckmigkeit ohne Zweck. Yet the formality of p u r p o s e
is still a n a l o g o u s to r u l e , to design. S o m e e l e m e n t of r u l e m u s t re-
main.
If, t h e n , t h e r e is a sense t o t h e idea t h a t art s h o u l d b e like n a t u r e
in its f r e e d o m from t h e c o n s t r a i n t of arbitrary rules, t h e stress m u s t

Kant's Philosphy of Art 135

b e o n t h e two words "constraint" a n d "arbitrary," a n d not o n t h e
w o r d "rules." T h i s is t h e way in which K a n t elaborates his p o i n t
in 45:

B u t t h e way in which a p r o d u c t of art seems like n a t u r e , is by

t h e p r e s e n c e of perfect exactness [Piincktlichkeit] in t h e a g r e e -
m e n t with rules prescribing h o w alone t h e p r o d u c t can b e
w h a t it is i n t e n d e d to be, b u t with a n absence of labored effect
[Peinlichkeit], (without academic form betraying itself,) i.e.
w i t h o u t a trace a p p e a r i n g of t h e artist having always h a d t h e
r u l e p r e s e n t to h i m a n d of its h a v i n g fettered his m e n t a l
powers. 3 0

T h e r e a r e two key points to b e extracted. First, t h e r e is a necessary

place for r u l e in free or fine art, h e n c e Kant's insistence o n t h e m e -
chanical as "academic f o r m " or correctness. B u t t h e d e e p e r p o i n t is
t h a t this "correctness" m u s t b e of a h i g h e r sort. T h e "exactness"
K a n t prescribes for art is n o t that of its conformity to mechanical
c a n o n s of correctness, b u t r a t h e r t h e parallel it shows to t h e inev-
itability a n d ease of n a t u r a l o r d e r , its a p t n e s s in a m u c h g r a n d e r
sense. T h a t is t h e o t h e r side of t h e analogy of art a n d n a t u r e : it is
n o t j u s t in its lack of constraint b u t in its precision, i n d e e d , effortless
precision, t h a t art m u s t s e e m n a t u r a l . T h e distinction h e r e is be-
tween ease a n d clumsiness, b u t even m o r e is at stake, s o m e p r i m o r -
dial sense of Tightness which is n o t only aesthetic b u t cognitive a n d
ethical. A n d t h e r e is o n e final, R o m a n t i c fillip to t h e a r g u m e n t ,
which K a n t deftly a n d ironically takes u p : m a n is after all also a
c r e a t u r e of n a t u r e . N a t u r e , in its effortless creativity, can t h e n be
t a k e n to act through m a n to g e n e r a t e works of fine art. A n d t h a t is
exactly w h a t K a n t takes " g e n i u s " to m e a n .
W i t h " g e n i u s " all t h e c o n t e x t u a l issues c o m e to a h e a d . T h e
conflict b e t w e e n r u l e a n d genius was t h e essential issue between
Neoclassicism a n d Romanticism. It was also t h e self-professed mis-
sion of t h e Sturm und Drang in G e r m a n y to free its c u l t u r e from t h e
constraint of arbitrary classical rules (Latin a n d F r e n c h in deriva-
tion) by t h e articulation, t h e celebration, a n d t h e u n t r a m m e l e d
p u r s u i t of " g e n i u s . " A n d all this was r e p u g n a n t to I m m a n u e l K a n t .
T h a t explains t h e t h i r d key discrimination K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in his
exposition of t h e c o n c e p t of art: t h e distinction of art from science.
L o o k i n g at t h e p r o b l e m of genius in this light first will h e l p contex-
tualize t h e whole issue a n d serve us mightily at a later j u n c t u r e .

136 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

Art versus Science: The Ironic Approach to Genius

Kant's hostility to t h e Sturm und Drang is t h e decisive context in

which o n e m u s t r e a d n o t only his distinction of art from science in
43, b u t also his whole t r e a t m e n t of g e n i u s in 4 6 - 4 7 . K a n t has a
very definite t a r g e t in m i n d , even within t h e Sturm und Drang:
J o h a n n H e r d e r . His j u x t a p o s i t i o n of science a n d art can be r e a d
s h o u l d be r e a d a s a j u x t a p o s i t i o n , as well, of his o w n method with
H e r d e r ' s manner.31
Let us first e x a m i n e Kant's exposition, t h e n
t u r n o u r sights to t h e context to which it u n q u e s t i o n a b l y refers.
T h e c a m p a i g n begins in 43. K a n t insists t h a t t h e r e is a n e l e m e n t of
rule, of a c a d e m i c r e g i m e n , i.e., of m e c h a n i s m , even in "free art." It
is a p p r o p r i a t e to m a k e this point, h e asseverates, because " n o t a few
leaders of a n e w e r school believe t h a t t h e best way to p r o m o t e a free
art is to sweep away all restraint, a n d convert it from labor into m e r e
play [manche neuere Erzieher eine freie Kunst am besten zu befrdern
glauben, wenn sie allen Zwang von ihr wegnehmen und sie aus Arbeit in
bloes Spiel verwandeln]." 32
T h e result of such a p o s t u r e , however, is
t h a t t h o u g h t h e "spirit" [Geist], which "alone gives life to t h e work
[allein das Werk belebt]," would be free, it would be all-too-free,
namely, " b e c o m e bodyless a n d evanescent [gar keinen Krper haben
und gnzlich verdunsten wrde]."
T h e r e is n o question t h a t t h e reference h e r e is to t h e Sturm und
Drang t h e o r y of genius a n d its rebellion against Neoclassical c a n o n s
of taste. T h e question is r a t h e r w h e t h e r we can be m o r e precise in
d e t e r m i n i n g w h o t h e target of Kant's criticism m i g h t have b e e n .
W i t h o u t question, in t h e 1780s, a n d certainly by 1788, t h e l e a d e r of
t h e Sturm und Drang a n d t h e most i m p o r t a n t theorist of aesthetic
genius in G e r m a n y was H e r d e r . A l t h o u g h K a n t h a d h a d r u n - i n s
also with t h e i r m u t u a l associate, H a m a n n , the latter d i e d in 1788,
a n d while it is highly likely t h a t h e was to b e t a r r e d with t h e s a m e
b r u s h , h e could hardly pose a f u r t h e r t h r e a t to t h e direction of Ger-
m a n c u l t u r e . O n t h e s t r e n g t h of this alone, H e r d e r seems t h e most
obvious c a n d i d a t e . T h a t conjecture receives great r e i n f o r c e m e n t in
Kant's n e x t section.
K a n t a r g u e s at t h e outset of 44 t h a t t h e r e can be n o such t h i n g
as a "beautiful science," any m o r e t h a n t h e r e can be a "science of
t h e beautiful." It is clear t h a t by t h e latter h e m e a n t a logically p r e -
scriptive r u l e which d e t e r m i n e d t h e concept of the beautiful. W h a t
is interesting is t h e m e a n i n g of t h e o t h e r notion, a "beautiful sci-
e n c e . " "As for a beautiful sciencea science which, as such, is to be

Kant's Philosphy of Art 137

beautiful, is a n o n e n t i t y . F o r if, t r e a t i n g it as a science, we were to
ask for r e a s o n s a n d proofs, we would be p u t off with e l e g a n t
p h r a s e s (bons mots). " K a n t is saying t h a t in such a n instance, s o m e -
3 3

t h i n g p u r p o r t i n g to b e science, h e n c e a m a t t e r of logical discourse,

would, w h e n c h a l l e n g e d , reply t h a t it was justified in its p r o p o s i -
tions n o t by proofs b u t by elegance o r beauty. Beauty was a n i n e p t
g r o u n d for t r u t h , for Kant, a n d n o t h i n g irked h i m m o r e t h a n to
raise a rational q u e r y of s o m e o n e ' s ostensible science a n d b e re-
p r o a c h e d for insensitivity to his target's lyrical sensibility. H e h a d
g o n e t h r o u g h j u s t such a n e p i s o d e i n his review of H e r d e r ' s Ideen.
T h e a r g u m e n t t h r u s t s m o r e deeply t h a n this personal d i m e n -
sion, for K a n t is q u e s t i o n i n g t h e justice in u s i n g t h e w o r d "science"
in t h e w h o l e r e a l m of t h e h u m a n i t i e s as such. I n o t h e r words, K a n t
is l a u n c h i n g t h e c a m p a i g n for t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e so-called "two
c u l t u r e s " by t h e d e m o t i o n of t h e h u m a n i t i e s from t h e r a n k of
Wissenschaft. H e writes that these "elegant sciences" [schnen Wissen-
schaften] constitute merely t h e p r e p a r a t i o n in scholarship requisite
for t h e cultivation of taste:

for fine art, in t h e fulness of its perfection, a large store of sci-

e n c e [Wissenschaftthough it would b e better, a n d catch t h e
n a t u r e of Kant's distinction, w e r e it translated as "scholar-
ship"] is r e q u i r e d , as, for e x a m p l e , knowledge of ancient
l a n g u a g e s , a c q u a i n t a n c e with classical a u t h o r s , history, anti-
q u a r i a n l e a r n i n g , etc. H e n c e these historical sciences [histo-
rischen Wissenschaften], o w i n g to t h e fact that they form t h e
necessary p r e p a r a t i o n a n d g r o u n d w o r k for fine art, a n d
partly also o w i n g to t h e fact t h a t they a r e t a k e n to c o m p r i s e
even t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e p r o d u c t s of fine art (rhetoric a n d
poetry), have by a confusion of words, actually got t h e n a m e
of e l e g a n t s c i e n c e s .
34

T h e studia humanitatis a r e all h e r e carefully a d u m b r a t e d , a n d all

l u m p e d t o g e t h e r as failing of t h e full s t a t u r e of science. While they
are, to b e s u r e , worthy studies, they d o n o t have t h e same theoreti-
cal status, t h e s a m e objective validity.
T h i s stance m u s t b e placed in context. Romanticism is often
t a k e n , in g e n e r a l , as t h e rebellion against t h e primacy of theoretical
r e a s o n a n d of science in t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of t h e essential m e a n i n g s
of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . It was t h e effort to replace t h e n a t u r a l scien-
tist o r n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h e r t h e t e r m s a n d often t h e figures were,
in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , s y n o n y m o u s w i t h t h e artist as t h e t r u e
seer, t h e vates. T h e suggestion of r i c h e r potentials of m e a n i n g to

138 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

which aesthetic sensibility o p e n e d t h e artist u p , a n d of t h e actual
inspiration of artists by these u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g s , is w h a t lent such
p o w e r to t h e idea of genius in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d sur-
r o u n d e d it with a n i m b u s of mystery a n d even mysticism. As a good
son of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t , K a n t f o u n d such n o t i o n s revolting. Sci-
e n c e s h o u l d n o t e n d u r e such indignity. " G e n i u s " h a d to be p u t in its
place. A n d t h a t was exactly w h a t K a n t p r o c e e d e d to d o . 3 5

T h e only possible reconciliation of t h e p a r a d o x of art as at o n c e

"free" a n d limited by " m e c h a n i s m , " as at o n c e " n a t u r a l " a n d as
"purposive/artificial," was to r e a d t h e actual a g e n t in artistic cre-
ativity n o t as t h e subject in his self-possession, b u t r a t h e r as n a t u r e
w o r k i n g t h r o u g h t h e subject. H e n c e , all "free," all "beautiful" o r
"fine" art h a d to b e t h e p r o d u c t of g e n i u s . B u t g e n i u s a n d this is
t h e ironic p o i n t h a d to b e conceived as s o m e t h i n g which t h e artist
n e i t h e r controlled n o r u n d e r s t o o d .
Kant's exposition of g e n i u s takes its t e r m s from t h e "conven-
tional w i s d o m . " K a n t started with the n o t i o n of " g e n i u s " as "the
36

talent (natural e n d o w m e n t ) which gives t h e rule to art." B u t that

only m e a n t , K a n t elaborated, t h a t g e n i u s was "the i n n a t e m e n t a l
a p t i t u d e (ingenium) through which n a t u r e gives t h e rule to art." T h i s
was n o t yet his analysis, merely his r e a d i n g of w h a t o t h e r s h a d said,
b u t it gave h i m a very useful v a n t a g e o n t h e whole issue. T h e point
was that "fine art c a n n o t of its o w n self excogitate t h e r u l e accord-
ing to which it is to effectuate its p r o d u c t [Also kann die schne Kunst
sich selbst nicht die Regel ausdenken, nach der sie ihr Product zu Stande
bringen soll]." 37
With this construction Kant could n o w explicate,
from t h e v a n t a g e of his o w n aesthetic theory, why g e n i u s h a d to be
t a k e n to b e "original," as t h e conventional wisdom h a d it, a n d why it
also could p r o d u c e only " e x e m p l a r y " instantiations which could
n e i t h e r b e p r e s r i b e d in logical rules n o r described in discursive e m -
pirical c a n o n s , b u t which stood in themselves as t h e o n e source n o t
only for t h e cultivation of taste as a p p r e c i a t i o n b u t for f u r t h e r ex-
emplification of b e a u t y t h r o u g h art. B u t t h e ironic p o i n t is reserved
for last:

It c a n n o t indicate scientifically h o w it brings a b o u t its p r o d -

uct, b u t r a t h e r gives the r u l e as nature. H e n c e , w h e r e a n au-
t h o r owes a p r o d u c t to his genius, h e does n o t himself know
how t h e ideas for it have e n t e r e d into his h e a d , n o r has h e it in
his p o w e r to invent t h e like at p l e a s u r e , or methodically, a n d
c o m m u n i c a t e t h e s a m e to o t h e r s in such p r e c e p t s as would
p u t t h e m in a position to p r o d u c e similar p r o d u c t s . 38

Kant's Philosphy of Art 139

T h e artistic g e n i u s c a n n o t explain his o w n achievement, c a n n o t r e -
p r o d u c e it at will, a n d c a n n o t teach it to o t h e r s . F r o m t h e vantage
p o i n t of rationality, h e is i m p o t e n t . H o w ironic t h e n is t h e p h r a s e
"leaders of a n e w e r school" [neuere Erzieher] in r e f e r e n c e to t h e
Strmer, for in t h e m e a s u r e t h a t they were i n d e e d geniuses, they
could n o t teach their g e n i u s . T h e y were merely t h e vehicles of a nat-
u r a l revelation. T h e r e has rarely b e e n so ironic a r e a d i n g of poetic
inspiration as this, a n d K a n t i n t e n d s to use it for all it is w o r t h . If this
is w h a t genius m e a n s , t h e n obviously the word genius has n o t h i n g
to d o with science. AH of Kant's t h r e a d s c o m e t o g e t h e r in a tight
knot, i n d e e d , a noose, a n d in it h e has H e r d e r . I n 47, K a n t ex-
plicitly e x e m p t s science from t h e s p h e r e of genius.

It all lies in t h e n a t u r a l p a t h of investigation a n d reflection ac-

c o r d i n g to rules, a n d so is n o t specifically distinguishable from
w h a t m a y be a c q u i r e d as t h e result of industry backed u p by
imitation. So all that Newton has set forth in his i m m o r t a l work
. . . m a y well b e l e a r n e d , h o w e v e r g r e a t a m i n d it took to find it
all o u t . . . [because] all t h e steps t h a t N e w t o n h a d to take from
t h e first e l e m e n t s of g e o m e t r y to his greatest a n d most p r o -
f o u n d discoveries were such as h e could m a k e intuitively evi-
d e n t a n d plain to follow [ganz anschaulich und zur Nachfolge
bestimmt vormachen knnte], n o t only for himself b u t for every-
one else. 39

Science, K a n t asseverates, is merely prosaic, unlike t h e inimitable

flights of poetic fancy of a H o m e r . " I n m a t t e r s of science, t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e greatest i n v e n t o r differs only in d e g r e e from t h e most laborious
imitator a n d a p p r e n t i c e . " N o t only is science prosaic, it is egalitar-
ian. Art, however, is a l t o g e t h e r different: "we c a n n o t learn to write
in a poetic vein." Poeta nascitur nonfit. Poets are b o r n , n o t m a d e .
T h e h i g h e s t distinction to which the genius lays claim, t h e in-
spiration of his g u a r d i a n " d a i m o n , " Kant, by acknowledging, d e -
m e a n s . T o be s u r e they a r e "the elect of n a t u r e [die Gnstlinge der
Natur]," b u t w h e n K a n t writes " N o d i s p a r a g e m e n t . . . of those
g r e a t m e n , to w h o m t h e h u m a n race is so deeply i n d e b t e d , [i.e., t h e
m e n of science] is involved in this c o m p a r i s o n " with n a t u r e ' s dar-
lings, w h o e n t e r t a i n s any serious d o u b t w h e r e his loyalties lie?
Science p r o m i s e s " c o n t i n u e d a d v a n c e s of g r e a t e r perfection in
k n o w l e d g e , with all its d e p e n d e n t practical a d v a n t a g e s . " It is
progressive a n d it can also b e t a u g h t . It is t h e very stuff of e d u c a -
tion. T h e r e f o r e , K a n t bluntly states, it possesses a " g r o u n d of con-
siderable s u p e r i o r i t y " over art. I n d e e d a n d h e r e K a n t m a k e s a

140 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

s t a g g e r i n g p o i n t which anticipates t h e H e g e l i a n t h e o r y of a r t " a r t
m u s t m a k e a halt [at s o m e p o i n t ] , as t h e r e is a limit i m p o s e d u p o n it
which it c a n n o t t r a n s c e n d . T h i s limit has in all probability b e e n
l o n g since a t t a i n e d . "
40

H o w is a r t t h e n carried forward? H o w is taste cultivated? T h e

a n s w e r is: t h r o u g h t h e e x e m p l a r y instantiation of p r i o r works of
g e n i u s , o n which s u b s e q u e n t artists m u s t practice t h e i r taste, a n d
from which they m u s t derive n o t a r u l e to imitate, b u t a n e x a m p l e
to follow: n o t t h e result b u t t h e activity which p r o d u c e d it is w h a t
t h e artistic g e n i u s m u s t g a t h e r from a n o t h e r ' s m a s t e r p i e c e . It is to
retrieve t h e Zweckmigkeit ohne Zweck whose o u t c o m e was a n artis-
tic m a s t e r p i e c e t h a t o n e artist studies a n o t h e r ' s work. A n d to dis-
c e r n it, while vital to t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n , is n o t h i n g if it does n o t elicit
in t h e artist a latent capacity in himself to e m u l a t e that process, to
m a k e a work of art of his own. T h e r e f o r e , t h e only way t h e potential
g e n i u s can be cultivated is to subject h i m o r h e r to t h a t r i g o r o u s ex-
p o s u r e to e x e m p l a r y instances of artistic g e n i u s which is j u s t w h a t is
m e a n t by " a c a d e m i c t r a i n i n g . " A n d h e n c e t h a t very " m e c h a n i c a l "
e l e m e n t c a n n o t b e e v a d e d in t h e cultivation of t h e artist. B u t K a n t
wishes to assert e v e n m o r e : t h e mechanical is n o t only indispens-
able in t h e cultivation of t h e artist, it is also indispensable in t h e art-
ist's creation of a work.
T h a t is why t h e Sturm und Drang version of g e n i u s is inco-
h e r e n t , K a n t a r g u e s . "Originality" is n o t e n o u g h . Realization of a
work r e q u i r e s t e c h n i q u e , skill, discipline: rule.

[S]hallow m i n d s fancy t h a t t h e best evidence they can give of

their b e i n g full-blown geniuses is by e m a n c i p a t i n g themselves
from all academic constraint of rules, in t h e belief t h a t o n e
cuts a finer figure o n t h e back of a n ill-tempered t h a n of a
t r a i n e d h o r s e . G e n i u s can d o n o m o r e t h a n furnish rich mate-
rial for p r o d u c t s of fine art; its elaboration a n d itsform r e q u i r e
a talent academically t r a i n e d , so t h a t it may be e m p l o y e d in
such a way as to s t a n d t h e test of j u d g m e n t . 4 1

H e n c e K a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a work of a r t is a c o m p l e x
process, in which g e n i u s supplies t h e " m a t t e r " b u t j u d g m e n t (taste)
provides t h e "form." K n o w i n g Kant, m u c h of w h a t follows is p r e -
dictable. W h a t is n o t predictable is t h e interjection t h a t K a n t places
at j u s t this p o i n t :

B u t , for a p e r s o n to hold forth a n d pass sentence like a g e n i u s

in m a t t e r s t h a t fall to t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e most p a t i e n t rational

Kant's Philosphy of Art 141

 investigations, is ridiculous in the e x t r e m e . O n e is at a loss to
k n o w w h e t h e r to l a u g h m o r e at t h e i m p o s t o r w h o envelops
himself in such a c l o u d i n which we a r e given fuller scope to
o u r i m a g i n a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e of all use of o u r critical
faculty,or at t h e s i m p l e - m i n d e d public which imagines t h a t
its inability clearly to cognize a n d c o m p r e h e n d this master-
piece of p e n e t r a t i o n is d u e to its b e i n g i n v a d e d by new t r u t h s
en masse, in c o m p a r i s o n with which, detail, d u e to carefully
w e i g h e d exposition a n d a n academic e x a m i n a t i o n of root-
principles, seems to it only t h e work of a t y r o . 4 2

K a n t is in fact back in his polemic of 44, r e g a r d i n g "beautiful sci-

e n c e . " It was a r g u e d in c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t section t h a t Kant was refer-
r i n g to H e r d e r . Now, with this passage, t h e evidence is over-
w h e l m i n g . T h e l a n g u a g e of this passage has only to b e c o m p a r e d to
t h a t in which t h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e is to H e r d e r ,
Kant's letter to Friedrich Jacobi of A u g u s t 30, 1 7 8 9 . A n d t h a t 43

m e a n s t h a t H e r d e r is t h e t a r g e t n o t only of t h e d i s p a r a g e m e n t of
"beautiful science" b u t of t h e u n t r a m m e l e d t h e o r y of genius as
well. I n d e e d , t h e whole ironic t r e a t m e n t of genius is a result of
Kant's hostility to H e r d e r .
It is in this sense t h a t we m u s t see t h a t K a n t n e v e r e n t e r s into
t h e perspective of t h e artist in creation, b u t always j u d g e s h i m from
outside, from t h e s t a n d p o i n t ofscience. T h e result is often very
p e n e t r a t i n g , as we will see, b u t the d e t a t c h m e n t also has a n ironic,
i n d e e d , p a t r o n i z i n g e l e m e n t which we m u s t n o t m i s s . T h e artistic
44

genius d o e s n o t know w h a t h e is d o i n g . T h e r e is s u d d e n l y a n o d d
a p t n e s s to o u r i m p u t a t i o n of a work of art to t h e bees, t h o u g h they
accomplish it only by i n s t i n c t . Is t h e m a t t e r so different with a n
45

artistic genius? As genius, t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e "material" t h a t is

b r o u g h t into t h e synthesis, n o . It is taste, it is j u d g m e n t t h a t p r o -
vides "form," t h a t provides "rule," t h a t brings with it t h e dignity of
reason.

Kant's Architectonic Redemption of Art

K a n t h a d a n ironic i n t e n t i o n in his t r e a t m e n t of genius: h e in-

t e n d e d to rebuff t h e Sturm und Drang a n d in particular J o h a n n
H e r d e r for t h e o u t l a n d i s h p r e t e n s e s they h a d i n t r o d u c e d into t h e
G e r m a n cultural scene, n o t only within t h e n a r r o w b o u n d s of p o -
etry, b u t also in aesthetic criticism, in history, a n d even, most out-
rageously, in science a n d philosophy. T h a t i m p u l s e is very s t r o n g in

142 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

 t h e exposition of art a n d genius in t h e Third Critique, a n d if it is n o t
a t t e n d e d , t h e complexity of t h e intentions of t h e work seems to sug-
gest a very h i g h level of confusion. T h e r e was n o confusion at all,
j u s t a variety of scores to settle. W h e n Kant felt satisfied t h a t his
l o n g - s t a n d i n g g r u d g e against t h e Sturm und Drang h a d b e e n a d e -
quately articulated, h e could r e t u r n to his systematic task of analyz-
ing t h e p r o b l e m s of aesthetics. Accordingly, his architectonic
i n t e n t i o n rescued his theory of art from serving a merely polemical
function in t h e work.
T h e architectonic i n t e n t i o n was to r e a d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of
beauty in art as structurally h o m o l o g o u s with t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of
beauty. B e a u t y always involved Zweckmigkeit ohne Zweck, i.e., sub-
jective formal purposiveness, which, transcendentally analyzed,
m e a n t h a r m o n y of t h e faculties. N o t only was this h a r m o n y of t h e
faculties to be d i s c e r n e d transcendentally as t h e basis of t h e a p p r e -
ciation of b e a u t y in t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, it was n o w to b e s h o w n as
t h e basis for t h e p r o d u c t i o n of b e a u t y in the work of art. C o n s e -
quently, w h a t K a n t n o w t u r n e d to accomplish was t h e elucidation
of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e work of art in t e r m s of t h e relations of t h e
faculties of t h e m i n d . H e already set forth t h e major c o n t e n t i o n of
t h a t analysis w h e n h e a r g u e d t h a t " g e n i u s " could only p r o v i d e t h e
"material" for beautiful art, b u t t h a t it was taste, mechanically
achieved t h r o u g h discipline a n d academic training, which s u p p l i e d
the "form." It is t h e relation of genius to taste t h a t b e c o m e s t h e
c e n t e r of Kant's a t t e n t i o n now t h a t his polemical e n e r g i e s have dis-
sipated.
Kant's claim t h a t g e n i u s only supplies the "material" in a work
of art would suggest t h a t genius c a n n o t stand in very h i g h stead in
his t h e o r y of t h e b e a u t y of art, since for K a n t beauty, like r e a s o n , is
always exclusively linked with "form." T h a t would, however, r e p r e -
sent such a radical b r e a k with t h e conventional wisdom a n d such a
r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e new sensibility as to leave K a n t utterly isolated
from his c u l t u r e . Certainly K a n t was a brave thinker, b u t h e did n o t
e x p o s e himself needlessly to such e s t r a n g e m e n t , a n d h e felt t h a t h e
h a d f o u n d a way b o t h to p u t g e n i u s in its place a n d , to mix t h e m e t a -
p h o r , to give t h e devil his d u e . Let us begin with t h e tension be-
4 6

tween g e n i u s a n d taste.
K a n t r e t u r n s to t h e issue of t h e title at t h e close of 48. H e con-
t e n d s t h a t t h e b e a u t y in a work of art is t h e result of taste, since taste
alone gives it form. K a n t d e f e n d s this claim with a very p e n e t r a t i n g
analysis of t h e labor of artistic p r o d u c t i o n , relevant n o t only for his
o w n a p p r o a c h , b u t also as evidence of a m o r e a p t a p p r e c i a t i o n of

Kant's Philosphy of Art 143

creative activity t h a n t h e rival Sturm und Drang notion of effortless
genius:

T o give this form . . . to t h e p r o d u c t of fine art, taste merely is

r e q u i r e d . By this t h e artist, h a v i n g practised a n d corrected his
taste by a variety of e x a m p l e s from n a t u r e or art, controls his
work a n d , after m a n y , a n d often laborious, a t t e m p t s to satisfy
taste, finds t h e form which c o m m e n d s itself to h i m . H e n c e
this f o r m is not, as it were, a m a t t e r of inspiration, o r of a free
swing of t h e m e n t a l powers, but r a t h e r of a slow a n d even
painful process of i m p r o v e m e n t , directed to m a k i n g t h e form
a d e q u a t e to his t h o u g h t w i t h o u t prejudice to t h e f r e e d o m in
t h e play of those p o w e r s . 47

In this passage K a n t goes very far toward r e i n t e g r a t i n g art within

t h e g e n e r a l s p h e r e of artifice, a n d raises t h e self-conscious p u r s u i t
of technique to p r o m i n e n c e in t h e t h e o r y of a r t . H e clearly articu-
4 8

lates s o m e of t h e g r o u n d i n g principles u p o n which aesthetic m o d -

e r n i s m w o u l d b r e a k radically with t h e Romantic, a n d i n d e e d even
t h e classical t r a d i t i o n . B u t n o t only does Kant, by e m p h a s i z i n g
49

t e c h n i q u e , b l u r t h e distinction b e t w e e n art a n d artifice a n d h e n c e

d r a w it closer to "mechanical art," h e also, by e m p h a s i z i n g t h e la-
boriousness a n d p a i n of t h e process, draws it m u c h closer to labor,
to "industrial art." Yet, to b e s u r e , t h e labor is i n t e n d e d a n d experi-
e n c e d as play.
I n p u t t i n g so m u c h e m p h a s i s o n taste, however, Kant begins to
fear t h a t h e t h r e a t e n s his whole a p p r o a c h to genius, a n d t h a t leads
h i m to take back in t h e very n e x t p a r a g r a p h almost everything h e
j u s t ascribed to taste. "Taste is, however, m e r e l y a critical, n o t a p r o -
ductive faculty; a n d w h a t c o n f o r m s to it is not, merely o n that ac-
c o u n t , a work of fine art." K a n t t h e n reasserts in all t h e i r rigor t h e
distinctions between "fine" a n d "mechanical" art. Mere l e a r n i n g ,
academicism, does n o t suffice for beauty. It may be correct, K a n t
a r g u e s , b u t it is "spiritless [ohne Geist]." 50
Let us look back to t h e
closing p a r a g r a p h of 43, w h e r e t h e tension between " m e c h a n i s m "
a n d "spirit" [Geist] was first i n t r o d u c e d , a n d t h e f o r m e r associated
with "body" a n d the latter with "life" o r liveliness. T h e polarities 51

a r e skewed. Spirit a n d life, in t h e n o r m a l Kantian o r d e r of things,

s h o u l d b e l o n g with form. M e c h a n i s m a n d "body" should, in t h e
n o r m a l K a n t i a n o r d e r of t h i n g s , b e l o n g with "matter." B u t m e c h a -
nism h a s b e e n associated with taste, a n d taste with "form," while
g e n i u s has b e e n associated with "matter." Yet "spirit" a n d "life"

144 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"

clearly fall to t h e side of genius. H o w are we to m a k e sense of all
this?
T h a t K a n t can view taste as " p r o d u c t i v e " is evidenced in 1 7 . 5 2

T h a t h e views it as n o t p r o d u c t i v e is clear from 48. T h a t genius

provides only t h e "material" is stated bluntly in 47. T h a t it nev-
ertheless supplies t h e "spirit" a n d t h e "life," t h a t it is t h e productive
e l e m e n t in t h e work of art, is t h e stress of t h e e n t i r e exposition of
art. T h e r e is obviously a p r o b l e m with consistency h e r e . Kant's con-
sidered view, as expressed in 50, is t h a t it is only t h e synthesis of
t h e two which can p r o d u c e fine art. T h e r e f o r e , taking taste in isola-
tion, it can only p r o d u c e a "mechanical," academically correct b u t
"lifeless" p r o d u c t . Conversely, by taking genius in isolationand
h e r e we get at t h e essential p o i n t w h a t is p r o d u c e d r u n s t h e risk of
being "nonsense." 53

It is in t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of "spiritless academic correctness" o n

the o n e h a n d a n d "original n o n s e n s e " o n the o t h e r t h a t we g r a s p
what K a n t is trying to articulate in 48. A r t c a n n o t b e achieved
w i t h o u t t h e discipline of a r u l e , even if only in t h e very indefinite
form of e x e m p l a r y instances critically a t t e n d e d t h r o u g h academic
training. B u t it derives its impulse from n a t u r e , from a g r a t u i t o u s
givenness in t h e subject, a n "actuality without validity," which ex-
presses itself in t h e play of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n as freely productive. Ge-
nius is g r o u n d e d in this. Since t h e s p h e r e in which all this takes
place is sensibility in t h e sense in which it is most r e m o t e from cog-
nitive legitimacy, o r "objective validity" in t h e K a n t i a n sense, K a n t
assigns it to " n a t u r e . " G e n i u s is c o n s t r u e d as a n a t u r a l kind of free-
d o m . Yet h e r e a g a i n all t h e p r o b l e m s of what " n a t u r e " m e a n s in
such a context, all t h e force of t h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x , i n t e r v e n e .
C a n n a t u r e b e t h e strict mechanical realm of p h e n o m e n a l law in
this context?
We m u s t ask w h a t sort of f r e e d o m t h e aesthetic s p h e r e pos-
sesses, a n d w h a t d a n g e r s l u r k in t h a t sort of f r e e d o m . W h y does it
have this d a n g e r o u s p r o p e n s i t y to n o n s e n s e , to m e r e caprice, in t h e
e x t r e m e to s h e e r lunacy? T h a t is t h e question. Aesthetic f r e e d o m is
the "free play of t h e imagination," b u t what t h a t m e a n s is t h a t it is
not necessarily subject to any rule. W h e n successful it behaves in a
way which is consistent with r u l e . B u t what if it is unsuccessful?
T h e n w h a t we have is that " b l o o m i n g , buzzing confusion" which
K a n t discussed in t h e cognitive context of t h e First Critique a n d in
t h e decisive exposition of i m a g i n a t i o n in t h e Anthropology. 54
In-
d e e d , t h a t is m a d n e s s in the precise sense of t h e loss of r e a s o n . Ge-

Kant's Philosphy of Art 145

nius, in its liberty, in its caprice, in its play, flirts with m a d n e s s . If in
aesthetic f r e e d o m m a n is at his most free, free even from obligation
to r e a s o n , j u s t in this m e a s u r e h e is most in peril for his ultimate
dignity, which for K a n t is exclusively g r o u n d e d in r e a s o n . 55

I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 29, with which K a n t surveys his e n -

tire exposition of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s , h e m a k e s a very telling anal-
ysis of t h e f r e e d o m involved in morality a n d the f r e e d o m involved
in aesthetics.

[ T j h o u g h . . . t h e i m m e d i a t e pleasure in t h e beautiful in na-

t u r e p r e s u p p o s e s a n d cultivates a certain liberality [Liberalitt]
of t h o u g h t , i.e. m a k e s o u r delight i n d e p e n d e n t of any m e r e
e n j o y m e n t of sense, still it r e p r e s e n t s f r e e d o m r a t h e r as inplay
t h a n as exercising a law-ordained function, which is t h e gen-
u i n e characteristic of h u m a n morality, w h e r e reason has to
i m p o s e its d o m i n i o n u p o n sensibility. 56

Accordingly, Kant's description of b e a u t y in 5 m u s t b e r e a d with a

n e w skepticism. W h e n K a n t writes that "taste in t h e b e a u t i f u l . . .
[is] t h e o n e a n d only disinterested a n d free delight," t h a t "favor
[Gunst] is t h e only free liking," h e is r e c k o n i n g in m a n a sort of free-
d o m which is d a n g e r o u s l y a u t o n o m o u s , close to caprice, a n d can
only b e rescued, ultimately, by t h e s u p e r v e n t i o n of t h e m o r e a u -
thentic sort of h u m a n f r e e d o m , which is ethical. H e n c e t h e drive
within K a n t i a n aesthetics to establish a b o n d with t h e ethical, via
" d e p e n d e n t beauty," "perfection," a n d t h e "ideal of beauty."
T h e t h e o r y of art has b r o u g h t us to t h e b r i n k of metaphysics.
T h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art o p e n s o u t o n m a n y metaphysical
possibilities. A m i d this wealth, Kant's t h o u g h t first hits u p o n
o n e : t h e idea of "perfection." It was, as we have n o t e d , a n idea
with a history in aesthetics d a t i n g at least from B a u m g a r t e n . B u t
B a u m g a r t e n h a d wished to use t h e idea in a cognitive vein. Kant's
n o t i o n of perfection, by contrast, was practical. O r so it s e e m e d .
I n 48, K a n t r e t u r n e d to his idea of " d e p e n d e n t beauty" a n d
his t h i n k i n g t h e r e carried h i m back still f u r t h e r t o w a r d "objective
s u b r e p t i o n " a n d t h e question, involved in t h e n a t u r e side of t h e
g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art, w h e t h e r n a t u r a l b e a u t y was real, r a t h e r
t h a n i m p u t e d . H e set off t h e issue with a n excruciatingly contradic-
tory assertion: "A b e a u t y of n a t u r e is a beautiful thing; beauty of art
is a beautiful representation of a t h i n g . " First of all, to call t h e beauty
57

of n a t u r e a beautiful thing is to c o m m i t objective s u b r e p t i o n . B u t

second, to call t h e b e a u t y of art a beautiful r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstel-
lung) is to use t h e latter t e r m in a n extraordinarily awkward s e n s e . 58

146 The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment

It usually refers to t h a t which is merely p r e s e n t to consciousness,
i.e., i n t e r n a l to consciousness. B u t t h a t is precisely w h a t art c a n n o t
be. A r t m u s t be a realization, a n objectification. It m u s t have a sen-
suous givenness s e p a r a t e from t h e particular subjective conscious-
ness of its creator. It m u s t exist. It m u s t b e a thing. H o w can Kant
have so t h o r o u g h l y m u d d l e d things?
While, clearly, t h e r e is a difference between t h e b e a u t y of art
a n d t h e b e a u t y of n a t u r e , it is n o t simple, as the g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x
of art clearly d e m o n s t r a t e s . Let us a t t e m p t first to salvage Kant's
n o t i o n of art. Clearly h e is using " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " in a drastically
different sense from t h a t typical of his t h o u g h t . I n what sense,
t h e n ? We can rescue t h e sense of his a r g u m e n t if we r e a d Vorstellung
as Darstellung, o r p r e s e n t a t i o n . At t h e e n d of his discussion of t h e
m u d d l i n g p h r a s e , K a n t writes: "So m u c h for t h e beautiful r e p r e -
sentation of a n object, which is p r o p e r l y only t h e form of t h e p r e -
sentation [Darstellung] of a c o n c e p t . " " R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " in this o n e
59

instance merely signifies t h a t which is artificially m a d e to serve as a

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a physical sign, of s o m e t h i n g . By his association
6 0

of t h e t e r m Vorstellung with Darstellung, I believe K a n t saves himself

from hopeless obscurity or folly in his construction of art.
It r e m a i n s to be seen w h a t K a n t i n t e n d e d by t h e c o n t e n t i o n
that a n a t u r a l b e a u t y was a beautiful t h i n g . Kant immediately went
o n to claim t h a t t h e r e was n o n e e d in a p u r e aesthetic j u d g m e n t to
have r e c o u r s e to t h e idea of a n i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e , or to the idea of
perfection. Insofar as this was t h e case, t h e n a n a t u r a l b e a u t y was,
aesthetically c o n s i d e r e d , merely a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d a n utterly
subjective o n e at that, of t h e p l e a s u r e e x p e r i e n c e d t h r o u g h har-
m o n y of t h e faculties, a n d K a n t h a d n o business calling it a " t h i n g . "
Yet b o t h art a n d " d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y " in n a t u r e , a c c o r d i n g to
Kant, r e q u i r e s o m e n o t i o n of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e , of perfection. At
his clearest, K a n t insists t h a t beauty, i.e., t h e authentically aesthetic
e x p e r i e n c e , is n o t a m a t t e r of t h e p r o p e r t i e s of a n object, b u t r a t h e r
of t h e m e n t a l activity of t h e subject, a n d h e n c e , for beauty, n o "ob-
jective p u r p o s i v e n e s s " is requisite. I n his idea of " d e p e n d e n t
b e a u t y " a n d in his discrimination of t h e beauty of n a t u r e from t h e
b e a u t y of art, however, Kant discovered a very i m p o r t a n t "intellec-
tual interest in n a t u r a l beauty," a n d its first i m p u l s e was toward a
"cognitive t u r n " in his whole a p p r o a c h to reflection: t h e idea of a
teleological j u d g m e n t .

Kant's Philosphy of Art 147

 Part Two

T H E GENESIS O F T H E " C R I T I Q U E
OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT"
 SSffc Seven

T H E COGNITIVE TURN:
T H E DISCOVERY OF
REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

T
h a t K a n t s h o u l d p r o d u c e a Critique of biological a n d cos-
mological speculation makes sense in view of t h e salience
of these issues in t h e e p o c h , especially in G e r m a n y . B u t
why a n d h o w did this project insinuate itself into Kant's
o n g o i n g project in aesthetics? W h a t was it a b o u t his w o r k o n t h e
"Critique of T a s t e " which s u d d e n l y led K a n t to consider it a p p r o -
priate to take u p all those o t h e r questions which h e clearly h a d in
m i n d , b u t which o n e would t h i n k deserved separate articulation? 1

T h e most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for t h e unity of the Third Critique is to

show h o w t h e p r o b l e m of teleological j u d g m e n t arises i m m a n e n t l y
o u t of t h e p r o b l e m of aesthetic j u d g m e n t , i.e., o u t of the "objective
s u b r e p t i o n " which particularly a t t e n d s t h e d i s c e r n m e n t of b e a u t y
in n a t u r e .
"Objective s u b r e p t i o n " is t h e t e n d e n c y to ascribe to t h e object
itself t h e p r o p e r t y which entailed beauty, even t h o u g h according to
K a n t b e a u t y resides in t h e r e s p o n s e of the subject, i.e., in subjective
formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s . T h e t e n d e n c y to "objective s u b r e p t i o n " is a
n a t u r a l e r r o r of j u d g m e n t , yet K a n t believed it m i g h t n o t within
t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e as such, b u t subsequently, as a m a t t e r for
reflectionbe t h e source of " p r o f o u n d i n q u i r i e s . " T h e " p u r -
2

posiveness of n a t u r e " a r o u s e d a n "intellectual interest" after, a n d

o n a c c o u n t of, a purely aesthetic d i s c e r n m e n t of beauty in n a t u r e . 3

I n 29, K a n t wrote t h a t t h e r e w e r e " n u m b e r l e s s beautiful things

in n a t u r e , " whose beauty m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g specific to t h e m , p a r t
of t h e givenness of their r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . N a t u r a l beauty was "inde-
p e n d e n t , " Kant claimed in several places, e.g. 23, w h e r e h e ex-
pressed t h e view t h a t "we m u s t seek a g r o u n d external to ourselves
for t h e beautiful of n a t u r e . " I n 30, Kant wrote t h a t "purposiveness
has its g r o u n d in t h e object a n d in its figure [Gestalt]" a n d h e n c e was

151
a "speciesfinalis data, non accepta." While clearly falling into "objec-
tive s u b r e p t i o n , " this line of t h o u g h t b r o u g h t K a n t to a key t u r n i n g
point. H a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e d it, o n e was d r a w n to w o n d e r why it
s h o u l d have h a p p e n e d , K a n t w r o t e in 30: "With r e g a r d to t h e
beautiful in n a t u r e . . . we may start a n u m b e r of questions t o u c h -
i n g t h e cause of this p u r p o s i v e n e s s of t h e i r forms: e.g. H o w a r e we
to e x p l a i n why n a t u r e has scattered b e a u t y a b r o a d with so lavish a
h a n d , even in t h e d e p t h s of t h e o c e a n w h e r e it can b u t seldom be
r e a c h e d by t h e eye of m a n f o r which alone it is p u r p o s i v e . " In 4

23 h e w r o t e :

Self-subsisting n a t u r a l b e a u t y reveals to us a technic of n a t u r e

which shows it in t h e light of a system o r d e r e d in a c c o r d a n c e
with laws t h e principle of which is n o t to b e f o u n d within t h e
r a n g e of o u r e n t i r e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s principle is
t h a t of a p u r p o s i v e n e s s relative to the e m p l o y m e n t of j u d g -
m e n t in respect of p h e n o m e n a which have t h u s to be as-
signed, n o t merely to n a t u r e r e g a r d e d as aimless m e c h a n i s m ,
b u t also to n a t u r e r e g a r d e d after t h e analogy of art. H e n c e it
gives a veritable extension, not, of course, to o u r k n o w l e d g e of
objects of n a t u r e , b u t to o u r c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r e itself
n a t u r e as m e r e m e c h a n i s m b e i n g e n l a r g e d to t h e c o n c e p t i o n
of n a t u r e as a r t a n e x t e n s i o n inviting p r o f o u n d inquiries as
to t h e possibility of such a f o r m . 5

T h i s passage makes the crucial transition between t h e aesthetics

a n d t h e teleology by suggesting that, insofar as we reflect u p o n t h e
b e a u t y in n a t u r e as given ("objective"), we i m p u t e to n a t u r e a form
of o r d e r i n g utterly distinct from t h a t of mechanistic causality.
W h e n n a t u r e m a n i f e s t e d orderliness in t h e empirical s p h e r e , as it
were, gratuitously, it a p p e a r e d as if it were a n artist. T h a t is, its re-
sult a p p e a r e d p u r p o s i v e . K a n t suggested in t h e aesthetics t h a t
w h e n we c a m e u p o n a n object of n a t u r a l beauty, we were p r o n e to
m a k e this inference. B u t it was simply a subjective fancy, n o t valid
j u d g m e n t . Yet t h e very subjective formal purposiveness with which
t h e j u d g m e n t of taste was c o n c e r n e d " p r o v o k e d inquiries."
I n g a r n e r i n g t h e full significance of this "technic of n a t u r e , "
w h e r e b y n a t u r e is i n t e r p r e t e d "after t h e analogy of art," Kant be-
g a n t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment a n d m a d e his
"cognitive t u r n . " His key was precisely t h e n o t i o n of reflection, t h a t
" o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g " which we have b e e n at such g r e a t pains to
disclose in Kant's t h i n k i n g . I n his "cognitive t u r n , " K a n t c o n s i d e r e d
t h e possibility of revising t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t h e o r y of cognition a n d

152 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

of metaphysics which h e h a d c o n s t r u c t e d in t h e First Critique. T h e
locus classicus of t h a t r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n was the First Introduction to the
Critique of Judgment. T h e ultimate o u t c o m e was the "Critique of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " as we n o w have it.

The "Technic of Nature"

T h e p h r a s e "Technik der Natur" d e v e l o p e d in Kant's aesthetics,

in t h e c o n t e x t of objects of n a t u r a l beauty. I n t h e First Introduction to
the Critique ofJudgment, this n o t i o n u n d e r w e n t closer cognitive scru-
tiny. A c c o r d i n g to Kant, consciousness d i s c e r n e d in n a t u r e gra-
tuitous d e s i g n , t h a t is, works of n a t u r e [Wirkungen] which a p p e a r e d
like works of artifice [Werke]. N a t u r e could hardly be t a k e n for a n
6

artist, a n d w h a t was really at play in t h e n o t i o n of a Technik der Natur

was simply analogy. It was not n a t u r e t o which, in fact, "technic"
7

b e l o n g e d , b u t t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . T h e First Introduction

8

stressed t h e parallel b e t w e e n "reflection" as a cognitive e n t e r p r i s e

a n d "art." K a n t w r o t e : " T h e reflective j u d g m e n t t h u s w o r k s . . . n o t
schematically, b u t technically, n o t j u s t mechanically, like a tool con-
trolled by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e senses, b u t artistically, accord-
ing to t h e universal b u t at t h e same time u n d e f i n e d principle of a
p u r p o s i v e , systematic o r d e r i n g of n a t u r e . " It is j u d g m e n t which
"posits a priori t h e technic of nature as t h e principle of its reflection." 9

"We will in t h e future also use t h e t e r m 'technic' w h e r e n a t u r a l o b -

jects a r e only judged [beurtheilt] as if t h e i r possibility rested o n a r t . . .
[ N ] a t u r e is j u d g e d [beurtheilt] . . . only by analogy with a n art a n d ,
m o r e particularly, only in a subjective relation t o o u r faculty of
k n o w l e d g e a n d n o t in a n objective relation to t h e o b j e c t s . " T h a t ,
10

to be s u r e , is only a m a t t e r of " t h i n k i n g , " n o t "knowing," after t h e

r i g o r o u s K a n t i a n distinction, b u t t h e "Critique of Teleological
J u d g m e n t " sets o u t from j u s t this t h o u g h t that n a t u r a l b e a u t y acted
as a stimulus to scientific i n q u i r y . J u s t by virtue of t h a t gratifying
11

d i s c e r n m e n t of g r a t u i t o u s o r d e r , reflective j u d g m e n t was in a posi-

tion to generalize a principle for n a t u r e as a whole: the p u r p o s i v e -
ness of n a t u r e in its empirical variety for h u m a n c o m p r e h e n s i o n in
empirical concepts. T h i s was t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle of re-
flective j u d g m e n t .
T h e key cognitive strategy of reflective j u d g m e n t was t h e idea
of artifice projected from t h e subject o n t o empirical n a t u r e : n a t u r e
as art. Since it could find instances of a Technik der Natur it felt e n -
titled to generalize to t h e idea t h a t n a t u r e in all its empirical m a n -
ifestations w o u l d so c o n f o r m to t h e logical r e q u i r e m e n t s of h u m a n

The Cognitive Turn 153

awareness. It a t t r i b u t e d to n a t u r e t h e same design it e m p l o y e d in its
own functioning. T h e g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art e m e r g e s as crucial
yet again, b u t in t h e obverse direction: it is not art's conformity to
n a t u r e , b u t n a t u r e ' s to art which n o w c o n c e r n s us. We a r e n o l o n g e r
d e a l i n g with t h e exclusively formal a n d h e n c e completely s p o n -
t a n e o u s j u d g m e n t of beauty. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t it was n o t h u m a n
"favor" that n a t u r e a p p e a r e d so o r d e r e d . M a n h a d to p r e s u m e
u p o n n a t u r e ' s favor. N a t u r e could n o t be objectively compelled to
show such o r d e r . While it was t r u e t h a t in g e n e r a l n a t u r a l law was
i m p o s e d by t h e necessary s t r u c t u r e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l conscious-
ness, it was j u s t as t r u e t h a t empirically what law t h e r e m i g h t b e h a d
to b e f o u n d , n o t m a d e , by m a n . It was, indeed, n a t u r e ' s favor to
m a n w h e n a n d if such o r d e r showed itself. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t it was
impossible for m a n to deal with his empirical e x p e r i e n c e except on
t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t n a t u r e did so favor h i m , t h a t it did o p e r a t e in
conformity with t h e processes which alone g u a r a n t e e d efficacy to
his logical o p e r a t i o n s . W h a t t h a t m e a n t , in practice, was that h u -
m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e empirical world could only find unifor-
mities o r h o m o g e n e i t y i . e . , it could only classifyif n a t u r e h a d
already actually specified in a logical o r d e r , i.e., in hierarchical struc-
ture.
T h e issue at h a n d is t h e cognitive status of t h e analogy of na-
t u r e a n d art, t h e Technik der Natur or t h e "purposiveness of n a t u r e
in its empirical variety." We m u s t ascertain the limitations of its cog-
nitive validity. W h a t did K a n t m e a n it to signify? Why s h o u l d t h e -
oretical r e a s o n tolerate it? I n d e e d , is such a n "objective s u b r e p t i o n "
any m o r e consistent with p u r e theoretical reason t h a n with p u r e
aesthetic j u d g m e n t ? H a s Kant's c o m p l e x case of beauty not sim-
1 2

ply r e n d e r e d t h e viability of his p u r e forms of b o t h cognition a n d

aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n i n c o h e r e n t ? Unless t h e gravity of this a n o m -
aly is recognized as essential to Kant's philosophizing in the Third
Critique, t h e i n t e r n a l d y n a m i s m of its evolution a n d t h e ultimately
revolutionary implications of t h e work will n e v e r be g r a s p e d .
As K a n t e l a b o r a t e d his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "subjective formal p u r -
posiveness" specifically with r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l beauty, h e c a m e to
realize at last t h e latent cognitive significance of Zweckmigkeit a n d
of t h e process associated with it, reflection. Not only did "subjective
formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s " have a n aesthetical d i m e n s i o n b e a u t y
b u t it also h a d a cognitive d i m e n s i o n , that "figurative u s e " in t h e
" o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g . " N o t only did t h e idea of purposiveness offer
cognitive possibilities, b u t so did t h e process of reflection; they were
m u t u a l l y constitutive. T h i s is hardly p a r t of the constitutive o p e r a -

154 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

 tion of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . "Since this kind of classification is not
o r d i n a r y experiential k n o w l e d g e , b u t is r a t h e r a n artistic knowl-
e d g e , insofar as n a t u r e is t h o u g h t in such a way that it can be r e n -
d e r e d specific by this kind of principle, it [ n a t u r e ] is r e g a r d e d as
art." A n d Kant reiterates t h e point in 7: " T h u s it is t h e faculty of
13

judgment t h a t is essentially technical; n a t u r e is r e p r e s e n t e d as techni-

cal only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it agrees with this p r o c e d u r e a n d m a k e s it
n e c e s s a r y . " T h u s a "teleological j u d g m e n t " has a very peculiar
14

cognitive status, a n d so, too, does t h e idea of t h e "purposiveness of

n a t u r e " u p o n which it is f o u n d e d . " E x p e r i e n c e d o e s exhibit e n d s
[Zwecke], b u t n o t h i n g can prove t h a t these are also intents [Ab-
sichten]."15
T o take t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e literally as p u r p o s e
was to i m p u t e to it such (rational) intents, a n d this could only b e
"sophistic."

[W]e have n o empirical k n o w l e d g e of such a relationship. For

only in works of art can we b e c o m e conscious of reason as t h e
cause of objects, which a r e t h e r e f o r e called p u r p o s i v e or e n d s ,
a n d in t h a t case calling r e a s o n 'technical' conforms to o u r ex-
p e r i e n c e of t h e causality of o u r o w n powers. But n a t u r e r e p -
r e s e n t e d as technical analogously with reason (thus i m p u t i n g
p u r p o s i v e n e s s a n d m o r e o v e r p u r p o s e to nature) is a special
c o n c e p t which is never m e t with in e x p e r i e n c e , a n d which is
only posited by t h e j u d g m e n t in reflecting o n things in o r d e r
to organize e x p e r i e n c e . 16

T h e first sense to be d r a w n from this, of course, is t h a t the usage

involved in t h e n o t i o n of n a t u r e - a s - a r t is merely heuristic or "reg-
ulative" in Kant's l a n g u a g e . B u t t h e r e is a d e e p e r point, which be-
comes very significant later, namely, that o u r discursive form of
t h o u g h t can only function with t h e sort of e x p e r i e n c e r e p r e s e n t e d
by n a t u r a l art or "technic," i.e., g r a t u i t o u s o r d e r , by i m p u t i n g to it
a n intentional artifice m o d e l e d after o u r o w n p u r p o s i v e action. It is
only by this projection of o u r purposive activity, o u r art, u p o n such
instances t h a t they b e c o m e in any way accessible to o u r c o m p r e h e n -
sion, yet even so they r e m a i n outside the d e t e r m i n a t e b o u n d a r i e s
of empirical k n o w l e d g e . T h i s suggests that t h e r e is a n ultimate in-
c o n g r u i t y b e t w e e n t h e cognitive system Kant d e v e l o p e d in t h e First
Critique a n d t h e intractable fact of t h e existence of "objective p u r -
posiveness." H e would only draw t h e full implications of this di-
l e m m a w h e n h e h a d fully w o r k e d t h r o u g h his "cognitive t u r n " in
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . "

The Cognitive Turn 155

The Cognitive Turn: Kant's Discovery of Reflective Judgment

It is historically useful to consider t h e whole issue of Kant's later

cognitive p h i l o s o p h y in t e r m s of his revision of the Critique of Pure
Reason. K a n t u n d e r t o o k t h a t revision starting in April 1786, w h e n
h e received w o r d from his publisher, H a r t k n o c h , that t h e first
p r i n t i n g of t h e Critique of Pure Reason h a d b e e n sold out. I n view
b o t h of t h e g e n e r a l neglect a n d of t h e specific m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
which h a d p l a g u e d t h a t first version, K a n t was intent u p o n revising
his g r e a t work to m a k e m o r e obvious j u s t w h a t h e h a d b e e n trying
to say. N o t t h a t t h e substance would c h a n g e : K a n t felt certain t h a t h e
h a d achieved t h e correct solution in 1781 a n d n e e d never v a r y . 17

B u t t h e r h e t o r i c of p r e s e n t a t i o n certainly could stand i m p r o v e -

m e n t , as his critics h a d n o t hesitated to advise h i m , a n d as h e
himself recognized, with r e s e r v a t i o n s . T h u s , the revisions h e u n -
18

d e r t o o k in t h e s e c o n d edition of t h e Critique of Pure Reason can, very

roughly, b e linked with two intentions: first, to answer specific mis-
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , especially t h e c h a r g e of "idealism," a n d second, to
i m p r o v e t h e r h e t o r i c of exposition a n d r e n d e r as accessible as pos-
sible a work which K a n t knew well e n o u g h could never b e " p o p -
ular." 19

Kant's revisions w e r e h a m p e r e d by t h e responsibilities of u n i -

versity r e c t o r s h i p in 1786, a n d h e only c o m p l e t e d t h e m in April
1787, w h e n h e c o m p o s e d t h e preface to t h e second edition. Actu-
ally, it would be m o r e accurate to say t h a t Kant s t o p p e d revising,
r a t h e r t h a n c o m p l e t e d his revisions, for h e m a d e n o c h a n g e s in t h e
work after t h e first c h a p t e r of book 2 of t h e "Dialectic." In t h e pref-
ace h e gave two g r o u n d s for leaving t h e bulk of t h e "Dialectic" u n -
c h a n g e d . First, h e a r g u e d t h a t his critics h a d not h a d any serious
2 0

p r o b l e m s in g r a s p i n g w h a t h e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e . T h a t a r g u m e n t is
specious, for t h e r e w e r e few m a t t e r s which d r e w such u n i f o r m
question as Kant's resolution of t h e T h i r d A n t i n o m y a n d his whole
distinction of p h e n o m e n a a n d n o u m e n a u p o n which it rested. Sec-
o n d , K a n t a r g u e d , m o r e realistically, t h a t t h e t i m e was too short,
i.e., t h a t h e could delay n o l o n g e r t h e issuance of t h e second edi-
tion.
T h e r e is a t h i r d possibility, a d v a n c e d h e r e merely as a w o r k i n g
hypothesis, b u t o n e which h a s intrinsic interest a n d would b e very
significant if confirmed, namely, t h a t K a n t b r o k e off his revisions of
t h e First Critique at t h a t p o i n t because crucial issues in t h e balance of
t h e "Dialectic" r e q u i r e d such substantial revisions that h e could not
carry t h e m off yet. If we reflect t h a t t h e balance of t h e "Dialectic"

156 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

considers, first, t h e p r o b l e m s of cosmology a n d specifically the
transition from t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles to a n empirical physical
science; second, t h e p r o b l e m s of practical philosophy a n d theol-
ogy; a n d , third, t h e p r o b l e m s of i m m a n e n t rational process in
inductive synthesis, leading, in t h e section o n m e t h o d , to a consid-
eration of t h e unity of p u r e r e a s o n as a system, we can take most of
t h e w o r k K a n t p u b l i s h e d after 1787 to have b e e n , almost literally, a
sustained revision of t h e balance of t h e First Critique.
N o c o n c e p t played a b i g g e r role in all these revisions t h a n
Zweckmigkeit. It was a n idea which only a p p e a r e d in t h e First Cri-
tique in t h e u n r e v i s e d s e g m e n t , which fits o u r h y p o t h e s i s .
21
It
p r o v e d crucial in t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of Kant's ethical philosophy, b o t h
in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals a n d in t h e Critique of
Practical Reason. Purposiveness (Zweckmigkeit) f e a t u r e d in all of
Kant's r u m i n a t i o n s not only a b o u t ethics, but also a b o u t aesthetics
a n d e v e n a b o u t systematic theoretical r e a s o n . It is a n idea which
would m u s h r o o m in Kant's m i n d over t h e years 1 7 8 1 - 9 0 until it
b e c a m e t h e most i m p o r t a n t symbol a n d concept for t h e unity of
r e a s o n . It b e c a m e , as we have seen, t h e central idea in the Third Cri-
tique.22
B u t t h e issue goes far d e e p e r t h a n we have yet h a d o p p o r -
tunity to p u r s u e it, for Zweckmigkeit has h i t h e r t o only received
consideration in its practical a n d in its aesthetic significances. T h e
key p o i n t is that, h a v i n g e m p l o y e d t h e c o n c e p t extensively in these
areas, K a n t c a m e at last to c o n s i d e r its cognitive implications.
Zweckmigkeit in its cognitive sense K a n t calls " t e l e o l o g y . " 23

T h e a d v a n c e K a n t m a d e between t h e First Critique of 1781 a n d

the First Introduction of 1789 lay precisely in his discovery a n d elab-
o r a t i o n of t h e subjective f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e m i n d which only the
aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e h a d m a d e accessible to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l phi-
losophy. T h r o u g h t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t was b r o u g h t finally
to recognize t h e m a n y impulses within his t h o u g h t t o w a r d a t h e o r y
of "reflection" as in s o m e m e a s u r e cognitive. T h e result was t h e fu-
sion of t h r e e distinct notions, each with powerful r a n g e s of implica-
tion: j u d g m e n t , reflection, a n d purposiveness. O n c e K a n t p u t
these t h r e e ideas t o g e t h e r , w h a t o p e n e d u p was t h e t r e m e n d o u s
role which this faculty of j u d g m e n t could play in the cognitive
sphere.
T h e key to reflective j u d g m e n t is its connection with beauty,
both in its subjective g r o u n d p u r p o s i v e n e s s without p u r p o s e
a n d in its "application" to objects of n a t u r e . K a n t c o n t e n d e d
that, subjectively, it was t h e state of m i n d in which imagination a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g freely h a r m o n i z e d , a n d t h e attentiveness to t h a t

The Cognitive Turn 157

h a r m o n y , "reflection." B u t as "application," it was a n active p r i n -
ciple. As reflection, t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t h a d t h e whole arsenal
of t h e idea of p u r p o s i v e n e s s to work with: purposiveness n o t only
in its literal sense of h u m a n action (artifice), b u t also its figurative
sense of recognition of design a n d its aesthetic sense of p l e a s u r e in
t h e m e r e l y formal a c c o m m o d a t i o n of n a t u r a l forms with t h e struc-
t u r e of m e n t a l action. It could find in n a t u r e objects which gratified
it because they a p p e a r e d , by virtue of t h e i r form, as if they w e r e
d e s i g n e d to accord with h u m a n consciousness. Purposiveness in
n a t u r e , like t h e very b e a u t y which raised it to Kant's a t t e n t i o n ,
could only b e subjective a n d formal, yet it offered a r e m a r k a b l e
cognitive potential which K a n t could well utilize to resolve t h e n a g -
g i n g difficulty in his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y c o n c e r n i n g e m p i r i -
cal e n t a i l m e n t .

The Problem of Empirical Entailment

Kant's First Critique did n o t completely constitute a n d validate e m -

pirical science or, i n d e e d , any p a r t i c u l a r empirical cognition in its
particularity, b u t only t h e possibility of a cognition in general, ac-
c o r d i n g to his First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment. W h a t h a d
b e e n accomplished in t h e First Critique was to g u a r a n t e e t h e unity of
e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l by g r o u n d i n g it in t h e necessary unity of con-
sciousness itself, i.e., in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n .
Kant w o r k e d strictly with t h e idea of a n object in general, a n d with
" p u r e i n t u i t i o n " s p a c e a n d time w i t h o u t any particular c o n t e n t .
H e n c e what h e p r o v e d was that t h e categories could apply to all ob-
jects of possible e x p e r i e n c e .
B u t j u s t in t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h a t p r o o f t h e p r o b l e m manifests
itself: what can h o l d for all objects c a n n o t completely d e t e r m i n e
any o n e in particular. T h u s in a very i m p o r t a n t footnote to 2 of t h e
First Introduction, K a n t distinguished "analytic unity" from "syn-
thetic unity" o n precisely this line: what all objects of possible e x p e -
rience possessed in c o m m o n could n o t serve in t h e specification of
any p a r t i c u l a r object, i.e., could n o t c o m p l e t e t h e synthetic con-
struction of its empirical concept, since it only p r o v i d e d t h e w h e r e -
withal for a n y empirical c o n c e p t . Since cognition is n o t a d e -
24

quately served by a blanket g u a r a n t e e , b u t m u s t b e able to p r o c e e d

to specifics, t h e p r o b l e m of t h e e n t a i l m e n t of t h e empirical, which
r e m a i n e d o p e n in t h e First Critique, l o o m e d as a major p r o b l e m for
t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y . Kant's cognitive p h i l o s o p h y stands o r falls
25

158 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

u p o n t h e principle of discursiveness a n d t h e clear articulation of
t h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e aesthetical a n d t h e logical, b e t w e e n in-
tuition a n d concept, i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Yet even as
K a n t insisted u p o n discursiveness, h e recognized t h a t t h e only
g r o u n d for a possible p h i l o s o p h y as, i n d e e d , for a possible experi-
e n c e , lay in t h e synthesis which b r i d g e d t h e g a p between intuition
a n d concept, i m a g i n a t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . N o t only was t h a t
t h e crucial issue of t h e First Critique, b u t it also b e c a m e t h e crucial
cognitive issue of t h e Third Critique.
While K a n t a r g u e d against H u m e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of causality
was necessary at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level, h e acknowledged at t h e
s a m e t i m e t h a t H u m e h a d every r i g h t to consider any empirical a p -
plication of t h a t principle to b e c o n t i n g e n t . T h e p r o b l e m , t h e n , was
how to m a k e t h e transition from t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l certainty to t h e
empirical application. F r o m t h e outset, K a n t felt confident t h a t
such a transition was possible. H e frequently observed, in t h e First
Critique, that c o n s e q u e n c e s could b e d r a w n analytically from t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles h e was u n e a r t h i n g . T h u s , in t h e discus-
sion of t h e categories, Kant declined to offer definitions o r follow
o u t all their implications, reserving t h a t for t h e "systematic" artic-
ulation of d o c t r i n e which could follow, in his view quite easily, from
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f o u n d a t i o n s . H e p r o m i s e d his r e a d e r s a speedy ex-
e c u t i o n of his Metaphysics of Nature a n d his Metaphysics of Morals,
which would p e r f o r m this l a b o r . I n d e e d , t h a t is t h e essential posi-
26

tive m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m "metaphysics" for Kant after 1 7 8 1 : t h e

analytic ( h e n c e a priori) derivation of principles from t r a n s c e n d e n -
tal t r u t h s , t o w a r d t h e specification of empirical k n o w l e d g e b o t h
cognitive a n d practical. Kant's definition of a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ex-
position" was precisely t h e elaboration of a principle which could
serve as t h e basis for f u r t h e r a priori k n o w l e d g e . T h i s project of a
27

metaphysical f o u n d a t i o n for t h e d o m a i n s of n a t u r e a n d morals

based o n his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principles absorbed t h e bulk of Kant's
philosophical e n e r g y from 1781 t o his d e a t h .
I n t h e p r e s e n t instance, it is n o t with t h e metaphysics of n a t u r e
t h a t we m u s t c o n c e r n ourselves, b u t with s o m e t h i n g still m o r e pri-
m o r d i a l , i n d e e d , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . I n t h e First Critique t h e possibility
of a metaphysical f o u n d a t i o n of empirical science h a d n o t in fact
b e e n s e c u r e d . I n his work entitled Metaphysical Foundations of Natu-
ral Science (written in the s u m m e r of 1785), Kant set a b o u t t h e tran-
sition to empirical science via " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s " of
m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n in o r d e r to g r o u n d a N e w t o n i a n , m a t h e m a t i c a l

The Cognitive Turn 159

p h y s i c s . Yet that was in a very i m p o r t a n t sense p r e m a t u r e , for t h e
28

whole question of t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of empirical n a t u r e with ra-

tional concepts of l a w e v e n in m a t h e m a t i c a l p h y s i c s h a d n o t
b e e n g u a r a n t e e d . It was this realization which m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g
led K a n t to r e c o n s i d e r his cognitive t h e o r y a n d i n t r o d u c e major r e -
visions.
K a n t m a d e t h e situation quite plain in his First Introduction.
While, a c c o r d i n g to t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of t h e First Cri-
tique, "we a r e to r e g a r d e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l as a system u n d e r
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l laws of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d n o t as a m e r e a g g r e -
g a t e , " K a n t wrote, "it d o e s n o t follow from this t h a t n a t u r e is a sys-
t e m comprehensible by h u m a n cognition t h r o u g h empirical laws also
. . . For t h e variety a n d diversity of t h e empirical laws m i g h t b e so
g r e a t that, while it w o u l d b e in p a r t possible to unify p e r c e p t i o n s
into a n e x p e r i e n c e by particular l a w s , . . . it would never be possible
to unify these laws themselves u n d e r a c o m m o n principle." I n d e e d ,
e a c h e x p e r i e n c e could be such t h a t it showed n o similarity to a n y
other, so t h a t each would s t a n d in total isolation a n d consciousness
w o u l d b e " c o n f r o n t e d by a c r u d e , chaotic a g g r e g a t e totally devoid
of system . . . " U n d e r such conditions, consciousness, t h o u g h a
2 9

formal unity, would b e faced with a n i g h t m a r e of particulars, of in-

dividual intuitions for which n o classificatory empirical concepts
could b e f o u n d .
T h e r e a r e t h r e e levels to this empirical e m b a r r a s s m e n t . First,
t h e r e is t h e p r o b l e m of t h e individual entity. T h i s is t h e p r o b l e m of
t h e "synthesis of r e c o g n i t i o n " t h r o u g h empirical concepts. So far as
empirical concepts r e m a i n , as concepts, universal, they c a n n o t en-
tail t h e full individuality of the i n t u i t i o n . T h a t is a very i m p o r t a n t
30

sense of t h e n o t i o n "contingency" [Zuflligkeit] in t h e Third Cri-

tique. It is precisely in this a r e a that o u r a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g "ac-
31

tuality without validity" a n d t h e " o t h e r kind ofj u d g i n g " b o u n d u p

in "aesthetic" reflection proves so i m p o r t a n t . Kant's t h e o r y of e m -
pirical cognition involves a p r o b l e m of individual intuition from
which h e abstracted in his p u r e case of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a priori
k n o w l e d g e . O n c e again, t h e c o m p l e x case is far t h o r n i e r t h a n t h e
p u r e case, as t h e Third Critique m a i n t a i n e d .
T h e level at which K a n t is most comfortable f o r m u l a t i n g t h e
issue is n o t at t h e level of t h e individual intuition. O n t h e o n e h a n d ,
h e chooses at times to believe that t h e p a r t i c u l a r object is s e c u r e d by
his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n , while, o n t h e o t h e r , h e recognizes
t h a t even s e c u r i n g t h e c o h e r e n c e of any particular intuition as a n

/ 60 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

object of consciousness will n o t avail if s o m e h i g h e r o r d e r classifica-
tions a r e n o t possible. H e n c e t h e idea of g e n e r a l empirical concepts
is m o r e crucial to h u m a n k n o w l e d g e t h a n g r a s p i n g a n individual
intuition. O n l y in so far as we can classify similarities a n d differ-
ences a m o n g e x p e r i e n c e s is t h e r e any h o p e for o r d e r in o u r con-
sciousness, h o w e v e r full each of o u r intuitions m i g h t be. T h u s t h e
second level of c o n c e r n is with t h e possibility of laws, i.e., concepts
which e x p r e s s uniformities a m o n g e x p e r i e n c e s a n d t h e r e b y orga-
nize empirical k n o w l e d g e .
Yet these laws themselves would be capricious a n d unavailing if
t h e r e w e r e n o t s o m e p r o s p e c t of c o h e r e n c e a m o n g t h e m , s o m e
g u a r a n t e e of "system" a n a l o g o u s to t h a t p r o v i d e d transcendentally
by t h e unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e categories. T h a t , in its t u r n ,
m e a n t that n a t u r e as a n empirical whole h a d to b e a unity, i n d e e d ,
a system of laws in strict conformity with t h e systematic s t r u c t u r e of
h u m a n r e a s o n , such t h a t t h e unity was accessible t o h u m a n con-
sciousness. T h e only way that t h e r e could be a h o p e for system in
empirical laws was if it were possible for consciousness to p r e s u m e
in empirical n a t u r e a p r o p e n s i t y to organize itself a c c o r d i n g to t h e
principles of logical articulation to which h u m a n beings were nec-
essitated by discursive consciousness.
T h e claim t h a t categorial u n d e r s t a n d i n g did n o t d e t e r m i n e
empirical j u d g m e n t s , t h e view t h a t only the g e n e r a l concept of n a -
t u r e h a d b e e n secured for certainty a n d t h a t t h e empirical h a d n o a
priori c o h e r e n c e , resulted in a substantial circumscription of what
h a d s e e m e d t h e established r e a l m of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d
cleared a very large space for t h e e x p a n d e d notion of j u d g m e n t as a
theoretical o r cognitive i n s t r u m e n t of h u m a n r e a s o n . W h e r e the
32

First Critique h a d recognized p r o b l e m s of empirical e n t a i l m e n t ,

K a n t h a d resorted to t h e regulative faculty of reason a n d its " h y p o -
thetical" uses. Now, it s e e m e d , t h e First Introduction t r a n s f e r r e d this
function of r e a s o n to j u d g m e n t (or at least m a d e the two virtually
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ) . T h u s j u d g m e n t ' s d o m a i n was e n l a r g e d at t h e
33

e x p e n s e of b o t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n . If we a r e to u n d e r s t a n d
how K a n t c a m e to resolve t h e p r o b l e m of empirical e n t a i l m e n t
t h r o u g h t h e idea of a faculty of j u d g m e n t , we m u s t go back to t h e
First Critique a n d a p p r e c i a t e his theory of t h e logical process of
t h o u g h t a n d t h e specific role played in it by "regulative ideas of rea-
son," o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e "faculty ofj u d g m e n t , " o n the o t h e r ,
a n d trace h o w these ideas evolved, a n d i n d e e d m e r g e d , into t h e
idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t . "

The Cognitive Turn 161

The Regulative Use of Reason and the Faculty of Judgment

In 2 of t h e First Introduction, K a n t reviewed briefly his n o t i o n of t h e

faculties of cognition as articulated in t h e First Critique 34
H e identi-
fied t h r e e such " f a c u l t i e s " u n d e r s t a n d i n g , r e a s o n , a n d j u d g m e n t .
U n d e r s t a n d i n g , as h e h a d it t h e r e , r e p r e s e n t e d " k n o w l e d g e of t h e
universal (of rules)," a n d reason "the capacity for t h e determination
of t h e particular t h r o u g h t h e universal (deduction f r o m p r i n -
c i p l e s ) . " J u d g m e n t , in this s c h e m e , served as t h e m e d i a t i o n .
35

W h e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o v i d e d t h e major p r e m i s e , or r u l e , j u d g -
m e n t s u p p l i e d t h e p a r t i c u l a r case to b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r it, or t h e
m i n o r p r e m i s e , a n d reason was t h e capacity to draw t h e conclusion
with logical necessity.
T h e s e definitions derive from t h e formal logical t h e o r y of t h e
syllogism as it was t a u g h t in t h e late e i g h t e e n t h century, by Kant
a m o n g o t h e r s . T h i s formal definition of t h e "logical u s e " of t h e
3 6

various faculties is a very i m p o r t a n t starting point, a n d n o t to b e

dismissed as " t h o r o u g h l y architectonic a n d riddled with faculty-
t a l k . " It m u s t r a t h e r be g r a s p e d as Kant's effort to p r e s e n t a clear
37

a n d d e t e r m i n a t e a c c o u n t of t h e process of m i n d . A c c o r d i n g to t h e
t h e o r y of logical syllogisms, r e a s o n i n g functioned i m m a n e n t l y by
recognizing concepts of g r e a t e r generality (scope) as hierarchically
" h i g h e r " a n d placing concepts of g r e a t e r specificity (content)
" u n d e r " these. T h u s r e a s o n i n g p r o c e e d e d e i t h e r u p t h e c h a i n of
concepts (abstraction) t o w a r d m o r e a n d m o r e universal concepts
( g e n e r a ) , each e m b r a c i n g wider classes of s u b o r d i n a t e concepts b u t
itself with less a n d less c o n t e n t , o r d o w n t h e chain of concepts (con-
cretion) t o w a r d m o r e a n d m o r e particular concepts (species), each
richer in c o n t e n t but n a r r o w e r in scope. T h i s m o v e m e n t of reason
h a d to b e c o n t i n u o u s : t h e r e could b e n o gaps in t h e r e a s o n i n g o r
t h e whole s t r u c t u r e would fail of its essential unity.
T h e s e i m m a n e n t principles of rational process were articu-
lated in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of the First Critique in a very
i m p o r t a n t methodological a p p e n d i x entitled " T h e Regulative E m -
p l o y m e n t of t h e Ideas of P u r e R e a s o n . " K a n t called t h e m hom-
38

ogeneity, specification, a n d continuity. In the First Introduction, h e

r e t u r n e d to this idea, claiming that it was absolutely necessary for
m a n ' s empirical k n o w l e d g e t h a t these logical processes be accom-
m o d a t e d by n a t u r e in its empirical v a r i e t y . As formal logic this
39

system of a s c e n d i n g (regressive) r e a s o n i n g a n d d e s c e n d i n g (spec-

ifying) r e a s o n i n g h a d l o n g since b e e n established by logicians.
W h a t K a n t wished to a r g u e was that this whole p a t t e r n of t h i n k i n g

162 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

could, a n d h a d to, apply to empirical e x p e r i e n c e . H e n c e it h a d to
b e l o n g to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, a n d have a "real" use. B u t t h a t re-
q u i r e d a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle. Kant equivocated a b o u t a t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n of such a principle for t h e faculty of reason in
t h e First Critique. Eventually, t h e First Introduction assigned that
principle to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t . In t h e First Critique Kant con-
sidered t h e o p e r a t i o n u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u b r i c of the "regulative
use of t h e ideas of r e a s o n , " a n d w h e n t h e p r o b l e m involved syn-
thetic i n d u c t i o n , t h e "hypothetical u s e " of r e a s o n . W h a t we m u s t
n o w establish is h o w a n d why K a n t c a m e to transfer this o p e r a t i o n
from t h e faculty of r e a s o n to t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t in t h e Third
Critique.
T h e faculty of reason has a peculiar status in t h e First Critique.
O n t h e o n e h a n d , it would a p p e a r to be t h e most i m p o r t a n t p a r t of
cognition, a n d yet o n t h e o t h e r , K a n t seems to view it as t h e s p h e r e
primarily of "dialectical illusion." Certainly t h e faculty of u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g enjoys a h i g h e r e s t e e m in t h e bulk of t h e work t h a n does
r e a s o n . Yet K a n t e n d e a v o r s to find a positive as well as a critical
place for r e a s o n in h u m a n consciousness. It is this problematic
struggle which i n f o r m s t h e bulk of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic."
T h e issue of r e a s o n has two sides, t h e methodological a n d t h e
ontological. T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l aspect c o n c e r n s t h e " u s e " of rea-
son. T h e ontological aspect c o n c e r n s t h e objectivity of reason, a n d
in that c o n n e c t i o n we m u s t always b e a r in m i n d t h e ambiguity of
t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t of objectivity, its conflicting senses of validity
a n d of actuality. I n t h e First Critique K a n t is primarily c o n c e r n e d to
d e b u n k t h e ontological idea of r e a s o n . It is only in a n " A p p e n d i x "
that h e directly addresses its methodological role. Yet a n attentive
r e a d i n g of t h e entire " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" shows that Kant
has a n extraordinarily h i g h estimation of t h e p o w e r of r e a s o n in its
reflexivity. n o issue within it can r e m a i n obscure. Reason is t h e
c o m p l e t e j u d g e of its o w n power. It is reason which submits itself to
critique. It is reason which recognizes its o w n limits. Reason: n o t
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Only r e a s o n can supply t h e rules for its o w n i m m a -
n e n t process.
H e n c e t h e r e are two methodological d i m e n s i o n s to r e a s o n :
first, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o n e , g o v e r n i n g t h e i m m a n e n t o p e r a t i o n of
r e a s o n i n g itself, a n d second, a n empirical o n e , g o v e r n i n g t h e spe-
cific application of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g to empirical s c i e n c e . T h e 40

f o r m e r u n d e r t a k e s t h e laborious task n o t only of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n -

tal d e d u c t i o n to g r o u n d t h e possibility of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s g r a s p of
sensible intuition within its r u l e , b u t also of t h e a n t i n o m i e s , testing

The Cognitive Turn 163

 its o w n limits by t h e e m p l o y m e n t of t h e principle of contradiction
against its o w n i m m a n e n t process.
K a n t a r g u e s that r e a s o n is always m o v e m e n t , process, act, r a t h e r
t h a n fixity, c o n c e p t , o r object. Reason creates, r a t h e r , i d e a s . Ideas41

a r e m e t a c o n c e p t s , in t h e sense of p r o v i d i n g rules for t h e organiza-

tion of concepts into systems of t h o u g h t . U n d e r s t a n d i n g h o l d s
4 2

exclusive sway within any given j u d g m e n t . It is precisely t h e set of

rules w h e r e b y any given assertion (categorical proposition) can b e
formulatedespecially any empirical j u d g m e n t via t h e s c h e m a -
tism, i.e., o n e which has a n object of sensible intuition as its possible
subject a n d t h e categories as predicate. S u c h synthetic j u d g m e n t s
have t h e i r w a r r a n t exclusively in t h e principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d -
ing. B u t t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of these categorical propositions into sys-
t e m s of t h o u g h t , t h e b u i l d i n g of syllogisms, falls u n d e r the purview
of r e a s o n .
At t h e s a m e time, two of t h e j u d g m e n t s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
involve t h e relation of propositions (hypothetical a n d disjunctive
j u d g m e n t s ) , a n d all t h e m o d a l j u d g m e n t s refer to a h i g h e r o r d e r
criterion of validity over a n d above t h e specific proposition. H e n c e
certain of t h e categories have a n a m b i v a l e n t status: they fall b o t h
u n d e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d u n d e r r e a s o n . T h e s e categories a r e
t h e categories of relation a n d t h e categories of modality. K a n t calls
t h e m "dynamical" as o p p o s e d to " m a t h e m a t i c a l , " a n d h e also t e r m s
t h e m "regulative." T h o s e two t e r m s , dynamical a n d regulative, lie
at t h e h e a r t of t h e n o t i o n of reason in Kant, a n d create ambiguities
in his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. K a n t explains why h e distinguishes be-
tween dynamical a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l categories in t h e " T r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l Analytic." T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l categories a r e purely constitu-
tive, in that they c o n c e r n t h e a p p e a r a n c e itself; "alike as r e g a r d s
t h e i r intuition a n d t h e real in t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n , they can b e g e n e r -
a t e d a c c o r d i n g to rules of m a t h e m a t i c a l s y n t h e s i s . " T h e d y n a m i -
43

cal categories, however, "are n o t c o n c e r n e d with a p p e a r a n c e s a n d

t h e synthesis of t h e i r empirical intuition, b u t only with t h e existence
of such a p p e a r a n c e s a n d t h e i r relation to o n e a n o t h e r in respect of
t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . " B u t "since existence c a n n o t b e constructed, t h e
44

principles can apply only t o t h e relations of existence, a n d can yield

only regulative p r i n c i p l e s . " H e n c e , t h e "analogies of e x p e r i e n c e "
45

a r e n o t "constitutive of t h e objects, t h a t is, of t h e a p p e a r a n c e s , b u t

only regulative. T h e s a m e can b e asserted of the postulates of e m -
pirical t h o u g h t in g e n e r a l . " T h e distinction b e t w e e n t h e m a t h e -
46

matical a n d t h e dynamical categories has to d o n o t with t h e i r

" c e r t a i n t y b o t h have certainty a priori"but r a t h e r "as r e g a r d s

164 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e intuitive ( a n d consequently of t h e d e m o n s t r a -
tive) f a c t o r s . "
47

K a n t related this distinction of "constitutive" a n d "regulative"

to t h e m o r e familiar o n e w h e r e b y h e distinguished t h e empirical
role of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n as e n t i r e faculties in t h e " T r a n -
scendental D i a l e c t i c . " H e writes t h e r e :
48

T h e principle of r e a s o n i s . . . p r o p e r l y only a rule, prescribing

a regress in t h e series of t h e conditions of given a p p e a r a n c e s
. . . It is n o t a principle of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e . . .
[i.e.] a principle of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . N o r is it a constitutive
principle of r e a s o n , e n a b l i n g us to e x t e n d o u r c o n c e p t of t h e
sensible world b e y o n d all possible e x p e r i e n c e . . . Accordingly
I entitle it a regulative principle of r e a s o n . . .
I n o r d e r p r o p e r l y to d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g of this r u l e
of p u r e reason, we m u s t observe . . . t h a t it c a n n o t tell us what
the object is, b u t only how the empirical regress is to be carried out so
as to arrive at t h e c o m p l e t e c o n c e p t of t h e o b j e c t . 49

R e a s o n functions to o r d e r concepts (in a series o r a s y s t e m ) . T o 50

create or constitute concepts is t h e function of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,

b u t r e a s o n does have a use in relation to empirical p r o b l e m s . It is
t h e r u l e for t h e "empirical r e g r e s s " m e n t i o n e d in t h e citation
above. K a n t calls this t h e "regulative e m p l o y m e n t [Gebrauch, u s e ] "
of r e a s o n , a n d defines it as "directing t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o w a r d s a
certain goal u p o n which t h e r o u t e s m a r k e d o u t by all its rules con-
v e r g e . . . t o give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity com-
b i n e d with t h e greatest [possible] e x t e n s i o n . " 51

K a n t addresses himself directly to t h e relation between t h e

"regulative" principles of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the "regulative"
function of reason later in t h e s a m e section. T h e principles of t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , K a n t claims, a r e "constitutive in respect of experi-
ence, since they r e n d e r t h e concepts, without which t h e r e can be n o
e x p e r i e n c e , possible apriori." T h a t is, these principles a r e necessary
in t h e process of p r o m o t i o n of m e r e p e r c e p t i o n into e x p e r i e n c e , in
t h e m o v e m e n t from a j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n to a j u d g m e n t of ex-
p e r i e n c e , so that they a r e i n s t r u m e n t a l in t h e c o n c e p t u a l definition
of sensible intuition, a n d have a "schematic" function. T h e "regula-
tive" principles of p u r e reason c a n n o t , because " n o s c h e m a of sen-
sibility c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e m can ever b e given, [and] they can
n e v e r have a n object in concreto. " Accordingly, t h e principles of
5 2

t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g can have "objective validity" in t h e sense of "ob-

jective r e f e r e n c e , " w h e r e a s t h e principles of p u r e r e a s o n (in its cog-

The Cognitive Turn 165

nitive sense) c a n n o t . O n c e again, it is n o t t h e "certainty" b u t t h e
relation to intuition, to "actuality," t h a t distinguishes "constitutive"
from "regulative."
Yet this a r g u m e n t leaves s o m e questions u n a n s w e r e d . For o n e
t h i n g , o n c e we have a d v a n c e d b e y o n d t h e " m a t h e m a t i c a l " constitu-
tive categories, t h e e n t i r e process of t h i n k i n g has to d o with ration-
ally i m m a n e n t rules, a n d these, surely, b e l o n g to reason as s u c h . 5 3

T o d e n y t h e m "validity" is a b s u r d ; to d e n y t h e m "reality" is typical

of t h e K a n t i a n ambiguity c o n c e r n i n g "objectivity." Kant's suspicion
of reason's dialectical p r o p e n s i t y comes to t h e forefront. O n l y what
c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e can sanction does K a n t feel secure in t e r m i n g
"real." B u t t h e whole q u e s t i o n of t h e validity a n d even t h e reality of
r e a s o n as such c a n n o t be left at that.
I n any event, it is n o t merely t h e g e n e r a l "regulative" function
of p u r e r e a s o n which is h e r e in question, b u t m o r e specifically its
" h y p o t h e t i c a l " e m p l o y m e n t . I n m a k i n g t h e distinction between t h e
"apodictic" a n d t h e "hypothetical" use of r e a s o n in j u d g m e n t s ,
K a n t c a m e closest to anticipating t h e key distinction of reflective
from d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t which h e e n u n c i a t e d in t h e First Intro-
duction. K a n t w r o t e :

If r e a s o n is a faculty of d e d u c i n g t h e particular from t h e u n i -

versal, a n d if t h e universal is already certain of itself a n d given,
only judgment is r e q u i r e d to e x e c u t e t h e process of s u b s u m p -
tion, a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r is t h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d in a necessary
m a n n e r . T h i s I shall entitle t h e apodeictic use of r e a s o n . If,
however, t h e universal is a d m i t t e d as problematic only, a n d is a
m e r e idea, t h e particular is certain, b u t t h e universality of t h e
rule of which it is a c o n s e q u e n c e is still a p r o b l e m . Several par-
ticular instances, which are o n e a n d all certain, are scrutinized
in view of t h e r u l e , to see w h e t h e r they follow from it. If it t h e n
a p p e a r s that all particular instances which can be cited follow
from t h e r u l e , we a r g u e to its universality, a n d from this again
to all p a r t i c u l a r instances, even to those which are n o t t h e m -
selves given. T h i s I shall entitle t h e hypothetical e m p l o y m e n t
of r e a s o n .5 4

T h i s is Kant's most explicit consideration of t h e p r o b l e m of i n d u c -

tion in t h e whole First Critique.
W h a t n e e d s to b e recognized in this g e r m of a theory, which is
e l a b o r a t e d u p o n in t h e First Introduction a n d t h e n t r e a t e d defini-
tively in t h e Third Critique, is t h e relation between t h e inductive p r o -
cess a n d t h e ultimate basis of validity. Proof is always deductive. I n

166 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

Kant's l a n g u a g e , we can have k n o w l e d g e only t h r o u g h " d e t e r m i -
n a n t " j u d g m e n t s . T h e r e is a radical incongruity between t h e rea-
soning involved in discovery (or invention) a n d t h e r e a s o n i n g
involved in proof. O n c e we have m a d e t h e i n d u c t i o n successfully,
we t h e n t u r n a r o u n d a n d p r e s e n t t h e p r o o f deductively. K a n t did
n o t work o u t t h e principles of i n d u c t i o n ; h e a s s u m e d t h e m . H e did
not explain the incongruity; h e simply asserted i t . 55

B u t m i g h t this n o t h e l p explain his r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e whole

issue of i n d u c t i o n in t e r m s of " j u d g m e n t , " n o t reason? J u d g m e n t as
a faculty has n o n e of t h e prestige a n d dignity which Kant c a n n o t
h e l p b u t invest in r e a s o n . I n d e e d , h e finds t h e occasion to lay t h e
b l a m e for all e r r o r squarely at t h e d o o r of the faculty of j u d g m e n t :
"All e r r o r s of s u b r e p t i o n a r e to b e ascribed to a defect of j u d g m e n t
[Urtheilskrafl], never to u n d e r s t a n d i n g or to r e a s o n . " H o w did56

K a n t conceive of the "faculty of j u d g m e n t " in t h e First Critique, a n d

how did t h a t conception c h a n g e over t h e 1780s?
T h e full-fledged l a n g u a g e of j u d g m e n t was a late innovation in
Kant's critical philosophy. I n particular, t h e notion of "reflective
j u d g m e n t " was n o t worked o u t in t h e First Critique of 1 7 8 1 , or even
i n t e g r a t e d into t h e revised version of 1 7 8 7 . It was only in t h e
57

mid-1780s that K a n t b e g a n to write a g r e a t deal m o r e a b o u t t h e

"faculty of j u d g m e n t . " Crucially, o n e of t h e first explicit articula-
tions of t h e n e w l a n g u a g e c a m e in his r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g t h e so-
called " P a n t h e i s m Controversy" in 1786, in his essay "Was heit:
sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " B u t even t h a t essay, since it h a d
58

o t h e r tasks, failed to d e v e l o p t h e idea sufficiently. T h a t develop-

m e n t fell to t h e Third Critique, a n d especially to its First Introduction.
While in its "logical use," K a n t assigned the "faculty of j u d g -
m e n t " merely a m e d i a t i n g role between u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n
in t h e First Critique, w h e n h e c a m e to treat of its t r a n s c e n d e n t a l or
"real" use, h e spoke of t h e faculty ofj u d g m e n t as t h e faculty of cog-
nition in g e n e r a l , i.e., as t h e process of r e a s o n i n g or m a k i n g j u d g -
m e n t s , of which t h e m o r e elaborate syllogistic s t r u c t u r e of reason
a n d also t h e specific categorical p r o c e d u r e of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
were simply i n s t a n c e s . T h i s g r a n d n o t i o n ofj u d g m e n t in the First
59

Critique was, at t h e s a m e time, c o m p l e m e n t e d by two n a r r o w e r

ones. T h e first characterized j u d g m e n t as a virtually mechanical
s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e second
60

took j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r n o t of universal a n d necessary reason

b u t r a t h e r of n a t u r a l skill, a n e n d o w m e n t o r talent for discrimi-
n a t i n g w h e n t h e rule could h o l d in a given instance a n d w h e n it
could n o t . 6 1

The Cognitive Turn 167

 K a n t claimed t h a t j u d g m e n t as a faculty was distinct from t h e
o t h e r faculties of cognition in t h a t it was strictly a m a t t e r of (subjec-
tive) m e n t a l process. W h i l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g h a d objectivity b o t h in
t h e sense of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity of its universal categories
a n d in t h e sense of application t o "objects of e x p e r i e n c e " in t h e full
Kantian sense of t h e " j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , " a n d reason sim-
ilarly h a d objectivity b o t h in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l purity of t h e m o r a l
law a n d in t h e application of its imperative c o m m a n d s to acts of t h e
will, j u d g m e n t h a d n o objectivity of application. T h e r e was n o o b -
jective r e f e r e n c e , in t h e r i g o r o u s Kantian sense, which b e l o n g e d to
j u d g m e n t ( t h o u g h , as we have a r g u e d , t h e r e is a quasi-objective ref-
e r e n c e in "reflection"). H e n c e j u d g m e n t could p r o d u c e n o " m e t a -
physical principles" a n d g r o u n d n o "science" or " d o c t r i n e . " 62

I n d e e d , t h e r e is question w h e t h e r in t h e First Critique t h e faculty of

j u d g m e n t h a d any specific t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d . Only u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g possessed this g r o u n d , i.e., a legitimate t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e -
d u c t i o n . It could b e ascribed, in t h e First Critique, n e i t h e r to
6 3

r e a s o n , because it t r a n s c e n d e d e x p e r i e n c e a n d could n o t have o b -

jects in sensible intuition, n o r t o j u d g m e n t , because, o n t h e basis of
t h e " n a r r o w " definition j u s t given, j u d g m e n t was invariably e i t h e r
a n i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ("schematism") o r it was a nat-
u r a l , h e n c e empirical, e n d o w m e n t . While K a n t f o u n d t h e t r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l w a r r a n t for r e a s o n in t h e Second Critique, t h e question of t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t r e m a i n e d o p e n . It
was t h e Third Critique which settled t h e issue.

A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle did g u a r a n t e e t h e validity of j u d g -

m e n t (and h e n c e its "subjective" universality a n d necessity), since
w i t h o u t o n e , it could not stand as a faculty of cognition at all. T h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t for t h e whole faculty of j u d g m e n t lay in t h e
h a r m o n y of t h e faculties, o r m o r e precisely, in t h e efficacious func-
t i o n i n g of rationality in its empirical extension, i.e., in t h e confor-
mity of t h e intuition p r o d u c e d by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n with t h e rules
legislated by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Kant h a d worked o u t t h e t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d a l r e a d y i n his d e d u c t i o n o f t h e j u d g m e n t of
taste. W h e n h e s e c u r e d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity of subjective
formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s as aesthetic, h e simultaneously did so for t h e
cognitive faculty of j u d g m e n t , because they a r e o n e a n d t h e s a m e .
I n o t h e r words, t h e c o m p l e x notion of a faculty of j u d g m e n t
c a m e to be i n t e g r a t e d with t h e equally c o m p l e x sense of "reflec-
tion" which we u n e a r t h e d in o u r earlier a n a l y s i s . T o g e t h e r they
64

constituted t h e r e m a r k a b l e idea of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " t h e m o s t

synthetic c o n c e p t K a n t ever achieved c o n c e r n i n g t h e process of

168 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

h u m a n m e n t a l activity, especially in its creativei.e., inductive o r
s y n t h e t i c m o d e . Reflective j u d g m e n t was t h e m e n t a l p r o c e d u r e
of i n d u c t i o n , of finding s o m e c o n c e p t which unified particulars ac-
c o r d i n g to a n empirical principle of o r d e r o r design.

System, Organic Form, and the Unity of Reason

T h e discovery of "reflective j u d g m e n t , " as Giorgio Tonelli a n d

o t h e r s have a r g u e d , was t h e decisive t u r n which e n g e n d e r e d t h e
Critique of Judgment as t h e whole we k n o w . K a n t f o u n d t h a t his
6 5

c o n c e r n h a d b e c o m e m o r e g e n e r a l t h a n h e initially believed. H e
was n o t simply investigating taste, b u t a whole a n d very compli-
cated "faculty" of m i n d : j u d g m e n t . F r o m t h e aesthetic j u d g m e n t of
beauty in n a t u r e , via "objective s u b r e p t i o n , " K a n t c a m e to t h e p r o s -
pect of a teleological j u d g m e n t , a n d in t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e two h e
discovered a new m e n t a l process, "reflective j u d g m e n t , " which
t r a n s f o r m e d his cognitive theory. T h a t b r e a k t h r o u g h c a m e s o m e
t i m e before May 1789, w h e n h e sent a letter to R e i n h o l d a n n o u n c -
ing his involvement in a larger project t h a n h e h a d h i t h e r t o ac-
k n o w l e d g e d : a "Critique of the Faculty of J u d g m e n t " of which t h e
"Critique of T a s t e " constituted only a p a r t . K a n t worked o u t t h e
6 6

new idea of a "faculty of j u d g m e n t " in t h e First Introduction to

the Critique of Judgment.
It was only t h r o u g h t h e articulation of t h e "system" w h e r e i n
j u d g m e n t was constituted as a faculty t h a t it could be raised to full
critical e x a m i n a t i o n , K a n t wrote in iii of t h e final version of t h e
I n t r o d u c t i o n . T h a t entailed t h e discrimination of o t h e r faculties
67

(cognitive a n d h u m a n ) a n d t h e delimitation of their function such

that t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t was left with a possible a n d a necessary
function of its o w n within the system. As h e labored over his new-
f o u n d faculty of j u d g m e n t , h e c a m e to express a bolder n o t i o n of
systematicity t h a n h e generally felt possible, a n d t h a n h e would
eventually p e r m i t to b e p r e s e n t e d to t h e public u n d e r t h e pres-
tigious r u b r i c of "critique." T h i s is why t h e First Introduction is such
a r e m a r k a b l e d o c u m e n t . It offers a tantalizing glimpse into t h e pos-
sibilities K a n t allowed himself speculatively at o n e time, only later
to r e p r e s s .
6 8

T h e idea of "system" played a major role in Kant's initial break-

t h r o u g h to t h e Third Critique a n d again at t h e crucial "cognitive
t u r n " in early 1789. T h e "Critique of T a s t e " originated from Kant's
belief t h a t h e h a d d e t e r m i n e d t h e entire scope of t h e system of
h u m a n faculties, b o t h at t h e level of p u r e cognition a n d at t h e level

The Cognitive Turn 169

of g e n e r a l h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s led h i m to believe that t h e
p r o b l e m which inevitably a t t e n d e d such discriminations, namely,
t h e q u e s t i o n of a n u n d e r l y i n g systematic unity of r e a s o n , was also
a m e n a b l e to solution. T h e conviction of a p p r o a c h i n g a solution to
t h a t p r o b l e m h a d b e e n g r o w i n g in K a n t in t h e course of his ethical
writings, a n d it carried t h r o u g h t h e p h a s e of t h e "Critique of
T a s t e , " as attested in t h e letter to R e i n h o l d of D e c e m b e r 1787. It
p e a k e d in t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. T h a t work
a t t e m p t e d a unified a n d systematic articulation of Kant's whole
p h i l o s o p h y ; t h a t is, it s o u g h t to express t h e "unity of r e a s o n . " H e
69

took t h e e l e m e n t s b o t h of t h e cognitive faculties a n d of the g e n e r a l

h u m a n capacities which h e articulated t h e r e to be definitive. His
project was to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r systematicity in t h e two senses of
completeness and interdependency.
T h a t K a n t i n t e n d e d this e m e r g e s from a passage late in t h e
First Introduction which distinguished a n "encyclopedic" i n t r o d u c -
tion from o r d i n a r y " p r o p a e d e u t i c " o n e s . Encyclopedic i n t r o d u c -
tions set t h e work t h a t followed within a systematic o r d e r , a n d
b r o u g h t t h a t systematic o r d e r t h e r e w i t h to a close. A n "encyclo-
pedic" i n t r o d u c t i o n is

possible only w h e n o n e is in a position to p r e s e n t exhaustively,

t h r o u g h t h e formal c o n c e p t of a whole which at t h e same t i m e
contains in itself a priori t h e principle of a c o m p l e t e articula-
tion into parts, t h e subjective a n d objective sources of a cer-
tain k i n d of c o g n i t i o n s .
70

K a n t claimed his First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment was a n

instance of a n "encyclopedic" i n t r o d u c t i o n . 71

T h e t e r m "system" a p p e a r e d e v e r y w h e r e in t h e First Introduc-

tion; its first four sections h a d "system" in t h e i r t i t l e s . I n d e e d , K a n t
72

described a p l e t h o r a of "systems," m a n y of which r e m a i n e d , t h o u g h

less obtrusively, in t h e final version. T h e r e was t h e "system" of
cognitive-logical p o w e r s t h e Erkenntniskrfte. T h e r e was t h e "sys-
t e m " of h u m a n capacities in g e n e r a l t h e Gemtsvermgen. T h e r e
was t h e "system" of k n o w l e d g e from a priori principlesphilos-
o p h y . T h e r e was t h e "system" of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l possibilities of
knowledgeKritik. S o m e scholars find t h e First Introduction suspect
j u s t for this i m p u l s e in t h e work, dismissing it as " t h o r o u g h l y archi-
tectonic a n d r i d d l e d with faculty-talk." Conversely, t h e r e a r e those
73

w h o find this a v a n t a g e from which to i n t e g r a t e t h e entire Kantian

p h i l o s o p h y . My objective will b e to link t h e idea of "system" with
74

t h e idea of t h e "unity of r e a s o n . "

170 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

 Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of systematic r e a s o n , as h e d e v e l o p e d it even
in t h e First Critique, suggested that h e recognized, however hesi-
tantly, a kind of causal d e t e r m i n a t i o n which was n o t serial, not
t r a n s e u n t , b u t s i m u l t a n e o u s a n d i m m a n e n t , a n d t h a t h e recog-
nized this "entelechy" n o t only in t h e r e g i m e n of r e a s o n itself b u t in
o r g a n i s m s as well. Such a m o d e escaped his categorical d e t e r m i n a -
tion of e x p e r i e n c e in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic of t h e First Critique,
b u t it p r o v e d ineluctable b o t h in any t r a n s c e n d e n t a l account of t h e
i m m a n e n t functioning of r e a s o n a n d in any empirical-scientific ac-
c o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . K a n t i m p u t e d to r e a s o n an i m m a n e n t d y n a -
mism, t h e capacity to set its o w n goals a n d to p u r s u e t h e m . H e 7 5

also i m p u t e d to r e a s o n a c o n c e r n with its o w n self-realization. 76

K a n t m e a n t by r e a s o n a process of systematization. " T h e unity of

r e a s o n is t h e unity of s y s t e m . " 77

T h i s unity of r e a s o n always p r e s u p p o s e s an idea, n a m e l y t h a t

of t h e form of a whole of k n o w l e d g e a whole which is p r i o r
to t h e d e t e r m i n a t e k n o w l e d g e of t h e parts a n d which contains
t h e conditions that d e t e r m i n e a priori for every p a r t its posi-
tion a n d relation to the o t h e r parts. T h i s idea accordingly pos-
tulates a c o m p l e t e unity . . . n o t a m e r e c o n t i n g e n t a g g r e g a t e ,
b u t a system c o n n e c t e d a c c o r d i n g to necessary l a w s . 78

In t h e A p p e n d i x to t h e "Regulative Use of t h e Ideas of P u r e Rea-

son," K a n t disclaimed a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n a formal-logical sense
for his t h e o r y of t h e systematicity of r e a s o n . " T h e systematic unity
(as a m e r e idea) is, however, only a projected unity, to be r e g a r d e d
not as given in itself, b u t as a p r o b l e m o n l y . " T h i s e n d r e m a i n e d a
79

m e r e "postulation," K a n t claimed. While it could serve as "the crite-

rion of the truth" of its o p e r a t i o n s , it could n o t be taken as actual. It
was, K a n t a r g u e d , "a logical p r i n c i p l e . " 80

Yet t h e r e is a g o o d deal to t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e idea of sys-

tematicity a n d unity of r e a s o n which seems to go b e y o n d such diffi-
d e n c e . I n d r a w i n g t h e whole discussion of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
Dialectic" to a conclusion, Kant r e t u r n e d to t h e question of p u r e
reason a n d its unity.

[S]ince t h e systematic c o n n e c t i o n which r e a s o n can give to t h e

empirical e m p l o y m e n t of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t only fur-
t h e r s its extension, b u t also g u a r a n t e e s its correctness, t h e
principle of such systematic unity is so far also objective, b u t in
a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e m a n n e r (principium vagum) . . .
B u t r e a s o n c a n n o t t h i n k this systematic unity otherwise

The Cognitive Turn 171

 t h a n by giving to t h e idea of this u n i t y a n object; a n d since
e x p e r i e n c e can n e v e r give a n e x a m p l e of c o m p l e t e systematic
unity, t h e object which we have to assign t o t h e idea is n o t such
as e x p e r i e n c e c a n ever supply. T h i s object, as t h u s e n t e r t a i n e d
by r e a s o n (ens rationis ratiocinatae), is a m e r e idea; it is n o t as-
s u m e d as a s o m e t h i n g t h a t is real absolutely a n d in itself, b u t is
p o s t u l a t e d only p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y .
81

T o u p h o l d t h e principle of system in r e a s o n as "objective" even if

i n d e t e r m i n a t e was already to m a k e a very i m p o r t a n t assertion
a b o u t objective validity w i t h o u t actuality. Moreover, in u p h o l d i n g
t h e n o t i o n of a n ens rationis ratiocinatae, K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t
s o m e sort of g r o u n d i n g entity was r e q u i r e d by reason in its self-
c o n c e p t i o n , even if only "problematically." H e could still claim t h a t
any d o g m a t i c assertion of its "existence" was a " s u b r e p t i o n . " Yet t h e
issue is really w h a t ontological status to ascribe to "objective validity
w i t h o u t actuality." T h e q u e s t i o n m i g h t be p u t otherwise: Is t h e e m -
pirical subject a n a d e q u a t e "substance" to g r o u n d t h e sort of r e a s o n
t h a t K a n t is describing?
K a n t frequently writes of t h e logical a n d t h e real " u s e " of rea-
son. T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t arises, of course, is: U s e by w h o m ? C o m m o n
sense answers: t h e empirical subject. However, Kant, in his most
precise articulation, c a n ascribe " u s e " n e i t h e r to t h e empirical sub-
j e c t n o r to a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e n o u m e n a l subject, a n d h e n c e resorts
simply to ascribing it to r e a s o n itself. Reason as s u b j e c t n o t simply
as f o r m i s what is h e r e at stake. If we a s s u m e , for t h e sake of
a r g u m e n t , t h a t r e a s o n "uses" itself logically b u t also in a real m a n -
ner, what this use r e q u i r e s is that r e a s o n itself possess a n intrinsic
d y n a m i s m , a self-determination which is at o n c e s p o n t a n e o u s a n d
autonomous. 8 2

K a n t distinguished system from a g g r e g a t e in t e r m s of t h e idea

of "totality," which p r o v i d e d an "exact classification" of e l e m e n t s
a n d explicated " t h e i r interconnection in a system." K a n t t h e n went o n
to give a very i m p o r t a n t characterization of system as "a unity self-
subsistent, self-sufficient, a n d n o t to be increased by a n y additions
from w i t h o u t . . . c o m p r e h e n d e d a n d d e t e r m i n e d by o n e idea. T h e
c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d articulation of this system can at t h e s a m e time
yield a criterion of t h e correctness a n d g e n u i n e n e s s of all its c o m p o -
n e n t s . " T h e e l e m e n t s of this definition, strictly logical in formula-
8 3

tion, a r e illuminating b o t h as r e g a r d s Kant's idea of t h e d y n a m i s m

of r e a s o n , a n d as r e g a r d s t h e self-legislation of science. Kant's idea
of systematicity entails t h e n o t i o n s of articulation (architectonic)

172 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

a n d closure ( u n i t y ) . T h e principle of t h e priority of t h e whole
84

over t h e p a r t s (totality) is clear in all his versions, a n d t h e r e is m o r e -

over the implication t h a t this whole is a ground, n o t j u s t a b o n d . 8 5

Finally, system entails a d y n a m i c p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d b o t h t h e com-

plete d e t e r m i n a t i o n of its p a r t s a n d t h e equally exhaustive exposi-
tion of t h e i r interrelation.
K a n t r e t u r n e d to his c o n c e p t of system n e a r t h e very e n d of t h e
First Critique in t h e section of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Doctrine of
M e t h o d " entitled t h e "Architectonic of P u r e Reason." T h e r e h e d e -
fined system (cognitively) as " t h e unity of t h e manifold m o d e s of
k n o w l e d g e u n d e r o n e idea." H e went o n to identify this o n e i d e a
totality,

t h e form of a w h o l e i n so far as t h e c o n c e p t d e t e r m i n e s a
priori n o t only t h e scope of its manifold c o n t e n t , b u t also the
positions which t h e p a r t s occupy relatively to o n e a n o t h e r . . .
T h e unity of t h e e n d to which all t h e parts relate a n d in t h e
idea of which they all s t a n d in relation to o n e a n o t h e r , m a k e s
it possible for us to d e t e r m i n e from o u r k n o w l e d g e of t h e
o t h e r p a r t s w h e t h e r any p a r t b e missing, a n d to p r e v e n t any
arbitrary addition . . . T h e whole is t h u s a n organised unity
(articulatio), a n d n o t a n a g g r e g a t e (coacervatio). It may grow
from within (per intussusceptionem), b u t n o t by external a d d i -
tion (per appositionem). It is t h u s like a n animal b o d y . 8 6

In d e v e l o p i n g his most e x t e n d e d characterization of t h e system of

reason, K a n t e n d e d u p d r a w i n g a n analogy to o r g a n i c f o r m .
T h e key e l e m e n t in Kant's c o n c e p t of r e a s o n is system, b u t his
most fruitful insight is t h a t t h e systematicity of reason d e m o n -
strates a p r o f o u n d a n d persistent analogy with t h e idea of o r g a n i c
form. Kant's parallelism between t h e s t r u c t u r e of o r g a n i s m s a n d
t h e n a t u r e of r e a s o n is widely recognized. McFarland, for e x a m p l e ,
observes t h a t K a n t h a d a n "evident conviction t h a t t h e h i g h e s t form
of systematic unity to which k n o w l e d g e can b e b r o u g h t is organic in
type. I n fact his c o n c e p t i o n of a system of k n o w l e d g e is such t h a t
it can be i n t e r p r e t e d in e i t h e r logical o r o r g a n i c t e r m s . " A n d
8 7

T h o m a s W e l d o n a r g u e d t h a t "what [Kant] really u n d e r s t a n d s by

'idea' is t h e c o n c e p t of any kind of o r g a n i c whole as contrasted with
a m e r e a g g r e g a t e o r m e c h a n i s m . " D s i n g also points o u t t h e sig-
88

nificant i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between o r g a n i s m a n d system, a n d be-

tween r e a s o n a n d o r g a n i s m by virtue of their systematicity. 89

K a n t m o s t definitively articulated this analogy of r e a s o n to or-

g a n i s m via "system" in t h e revised version of t h e First Critique. I n

The Cognitive Tum 173

t h e preface to t h e B-version K a n t w r o t e : "[P]ure reason, so far as
t h e principles of its k n o w l e d g e a r e c o n c e r n e d , is a quite s e p a r a t e
self-subsistent unity, in which, as in a n o r g a n i z e d body, every m e m -
b e r exists for every o t h e r , a n d all for t h e sake of each, so t h a t n o
principle can safely b e t a k e n in any one relation, unless it has b e e n
investigated in t h e entirety of its relations to t h e whole e m p l o y m e n t
of p u r e r e a s o n . " I n d e e d , K a n t pressed t h e analogy m u c h further,
90

d r a w i n g u p o n t h e c o m p e t i n g biological theories of the day to il-

lustrate t h e alternative possibilities of a t h e o r y of m i n d , a n d desig-
n a t i n g his o w n as t h e "epigenesis of p u r e r e a s o n . " I n t h a t 91

c o n n e c t i o n , Kant w r o t e : " p u r e speculative r e a s o n has a s t r u c t u r e

w h e r e i n e v e r y t h i n g is a n organ, t h e whole b e i n g for t h e sake of
every p a r t , a n d every p a r t for t h e sake of all t h e o t h e r s . " W h a t is
92

so significant a b o u t this c o n n e c t i o n with o r g a n i c f o r m is t h e n a t u r e

of causality that applies in such forms: i m m a n e n t , holistic, a n d si-
m u l t a n e o u s . Kant called such d e t e r m i n a t i o n "intrinsic purposive-
ness" in t h e Third Critique. It is this critical n o t i o n t h a t is, I wish to
establish, t h e key to t h e idea of t h e "unity of r e a s o n . "
Kant's crucial c o n c e r n in the later Critiques was with t h e "unity
of r e a s o n . " System a n d architectonic a r e t h e talismans of t h a t
93

unity. F r o m t h e inception of his "critical p e r i o d " at t h e very latest,

K a n t clearly laid stress u p o n t h e systematicity a n d t h e architectonic
of r e a s o n . I n t h e First Critique, w h e n K a n t first articulated his idea
of a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic," h e p u t forward a startlingly Idealist for-
mulation:

W h e n a science is a n a g g r e g a t e b r o u g h t into existence in a

m e r e l y e x p e r i m e n t a l m a n n e r , such c o m p l e t e n e s s can n e v e r
b e g u a r a n t e e d by any kind of m e r e estimate. It is possible only
by m e a n s of an idea of the totality of t h e a priori k n o w l e d g e
yielded by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; such a n idea can furnish a n ex-
act classification of t h e concepts which c o m p o s e t h a t totality,
exhibiting t h e i r interconnection in a system. 94

T h e issue of system b e c a m e particularly a c u t e w h e n Kant realized

t h a t t h e critical project of t h e First Critique, which h e h a d initially
s u p p o s e d to have g r o u n d e d all t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy, only
covered theoretical o r "speculative" r e a s o n a n d in fact left o u t im-
p o r t a n t issues involved in practical r e a s o n . T h i s sense, as it grew
9 5

o n h i m after 1 7 8 1 , can b e t a k e n to b e t h e decisive stimulus to his

f u r t h e r s p e c u l a t i o n s . B u t n o t only did Kant n e e d to distinguish
96

t h e a r g u m e n t s , a n d with t h e m t h e c o n c e p t of t h e a priori principles

g r o u n d i n g practical r e a s o n , h e was also left with t h e inevitable sys-

174 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

tematic task of reconciling t h e two aspects u n d e r t h e o n e c o n c e p t
of r e a s o n . H e n c e system entailed t h e c o n c e r n for t h e "unity of
reason."
T h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, c o m p o s e d b e t w e e n
1783 a n d 1785 a n d published in t h e latter year, a r g u e d that any ex-
tension of t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y t o w a r d t h e inclusion of a p u r e a
priori principle for practical r e a s o n would necessarily entail t h e es-
tablishment of a p r o o f of t h e unity of reason. "[I]f a critical e x a m -
ination of p u r e practical reason is to be c o m p l e t e , t h e n t h e r e m u s t ,
in my view, be t h e possibility at t h e same t i m e of s h o w i n g t h e unity
of practical a n d speculative r e a s o n in a c o m m o n principle; for in
the final analysis t h e r e can b e only o n e a n d t h e s a m e reason, which
is to b e differentiated solely in its a p p l i c a t i o n . " I n the Second Cri-
97

tique, Kant's c o n c e r n for t h e unity of r e a s o n h a d b e c o m e t h e linch-

pin in his philosophical e n t e r p r i s e :

W h o e v e r has b e e n able to convince himself of t h e t r u t h of t h e

p r o p o s i t i o n s in t h e Analytic will get a certain e n j o y m e n t . . .
for they correctly occasion t h e expectation of b r i n g i n g s o m e
day into o n e view the unity of t h e entire p u r e rational faculty
(both theoretical a n d practical) a n d of b e i n g able to derive
e v e r y t h i n g from o n e principle. T h e latter is an unavoidable
n e e d of h u m a n r e a s o n , as it finds c o m p l e t e satisfaction only in
a perfectly systematic unity of its c o g n i t i o n s . 98

N o t e , first, Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e idea of a unity of r e a s o n ; sec-

o n d , his conviction that it was philosophically attainable; a n d fi-
nally, his a c k n o w l e d g m e n t t h a t t h e Second Critique h a d n o t yet
accomplished this task of establishing it incontrovertibly, t h o u g h it
s u p p l i e d t h e material for such a g r o u n d i n g . H e r e was t h e g r e a t
stimulus to Fichte a n d all t h e o t h e r Idealists, a n d h e r e , too, the ac-
k n o w l e d g e m e n t of i n c o m p l e t e n e s s which Kant would later d e n y in
his r e p u d i a t i o n of Fichte's a p p r o a c h .
T h e possibility r e m a i n s that precisely in t h e Third Critique Kant
did c o m p l e t e t h a t system of t h e unity of r e a s o n . His letter to
R e i n h o l d in D e c e m b e r 1787 describing his new project of a t h i r d
critique has a t o n e of confidence in t h e definitive totality of his sys-
t e m . T h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Third Critique, a n d especially the
9 9

first version of t h a t I n t r o d u c t i o n , t h o u g h c o m p o s e d s o m e w h a t
later t h a n t h e letter, r e p r e s e n t s p e r h a p s the high p o i n t in Kant's
confidence in t h e closure of his system.
T h i s closure is n o t merely epistemological. It is unequivocally
metaphysical. T h e r e is a discernible if g r a d u a l propensity in Kant's

The Cognitive Turn 175

writings over t h e 1780s t o w a r d t h e articulation of d e t e r m i n a t e be-
liefs a b o u t t h e reality a n d n a t u r e of n o u m e n a G o d , soul, a n d
world. T h e architectonic of his critical p h i l o s o p h y c a m e m o r e a n d
m o r e to rest o n its t a n g e n c y with a "supersensible substrate" until,
in t h e Third Critique, t h a t n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t g r o u n d f e a t u r e d
decisively in r o u n d i n g his system to a close. K a n t r e s c u e d all this
from "dialectical" d o g m a t i s m only by r e p e a t e d a d m o n i t i o n s t h a t
such speculations h a d strictly "practical" validity, a n d , t a k e n in a
strict, cognitive-epistemological light, r e p r e s e n t e d " m e r e think-
i n g . " Yet t h e r e can b e n o real d o u b t a b o u t t h e seriousness of his
convictions o n t h e score of theism o r o n t h e related issue of h u m a n
moral freedom.
H o w e v e r s c r u p u l o u s K a n t may have b e e n a b o u t t h e i n a d e -
quacy of speculative proofs, h e was a "theist" in t h e precise sense of
his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. 100
A
large p a r t of his "critical" p h i l o s o p h y can b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a n effort
to b a l a n c e his recognition of t h e limitations of speculative rational-
ism o r " d o g m a t i c metaphysics" with his recognition of t h e essential
h u m a n interest in metaphysics. I n t h e Prolegomena to any Future
Metaphysics h e w r o t e t h a t t h e d e m a n d for metaphysics would n e v e r
d i s a p p e a r , "since t h e interests of h u m a n r e a s o n in g e n e r a l a r e inti-
mately interwoven with i t . " 1 0 1
I n his I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e First Cri-
tique h e w e n t even f u r t h e r : " I n d e e d , we p r e f e r to r u n every risk of
e r r o r r a t h e r t h a n desist from such u r g e n t inquiries, o n t h e g r o u n d
of t h e i r d u b i o u s character, or from disdain a n d indifference. T h e s e
u n a v o i d a b l e p r o b l e m s set by p u r e r e a s o n itself a r e G o d , f r e e d o m
a n d i m m o r t a l i t y . " T h e decisive ideas of r e a s o n h a d their g r o u n d
102

in its immanent interests, w h a t K a n t t e r m e d t h e "requirements (Bedrf-

nisse) of r e a s o n " in t h e essay "Was heit: sich im D e n k e n ori-
entieren?" 1 0 3
I n t h a t essay, as well, K a n t recognized a n a t u r a l
p r o p e n s i t y to ontology ("physico-theology") as b o t h t h e "dialecti-
cal" d a n g e r a n d t h e metaphysical c h a r m of teleology. I n t h e Third
Critique K a n t m a d e explicit w h a t h e h a d i n t i m a t e d in t h e essay of
1786: " T h e r e is, t h e n , i n d e e d a certain p r e s e n t i m e n t of o u r r e a s o n
o r a h i n t , as it w e r e , given us by n a t u r e , t h a t , by m e a n s of this con-
c e p t of final cause, we g o b e y o n d n a t u r e a n d could u n i t e it to t h e
h i g h e s t p o i n t in a series of c a u s e s . " 1 0 4
A n d again: " t h e n a t u r a l
things t h a t we find possible only as p u r p o s e s supply t h e best p r o o f
of t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e world-whole." I n d e e d , Kant's p e r s o n a l
metaphysical p r e f e r e n c e s c o m e to clear expression immediately af-
ter this s t a t e m e n t : "to t h e c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to t h e p h i -
l o s o p h e r alike they a r e t h e only valid g r o u n d of p r o o f for its

/ 76 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

d e p e n d e n c e o n a n d origin from a B e i n g existing outside t h e
w o r l d a B e i n g w h o m u s t also b e intelligent o n a c c o u n t of its p u r -
posive f o r m . Teleology, t h e n , finds t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n of its inves-
tigations only in t h e o l o g y . " 105
It was this "physico-theology," a n d
n o t t h e scientific issue, which m a d e o r g a n i c f o r m s as " n a t u r a l p u r -
poses" so philosophically i m p o r t a n t for Kant.

The Cognitive Turn 177

 ^ Eight

T H E CONTEXTUAL ORIGINS
OF KANT'S CRITIQUE
OF CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

W
h e n we a t t e m p t e d to r e c o n s t r u c t t h e c o n c e r n s which
b r o u g h t K a n t to t h e specific cognitive t u r n leading to
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " it p r o v e d
useful to c o n s t r u e t h e m heuristically as revisions of
t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. We
can best g r a s p the i n t e n t i o n s b e h i n d Kant's cognitive revisions of
t h e late 1780s if we clearly a p p r e c i a t e his p u r p o s e s in t h e original
a n d t h e revised versions of that First Critique, as h e articulated t h e m
especially in t h e second preface to t h a t work (April 1787). First, we
can establish q u i t e clearly t h a t K a n t s o u g h t to secure the validity of
science n o t only against t h e skepticism of H u m e , b u t also against
t h e speculation of t h e "aesthetic" sorts of scientists. Second, we can 1

establish t h a t K a n t s o u g h t to set severe limits o n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t

o r "metaphysical" flights of school rationalism, b u t also o n t h e
"mystical" d r e a m s of t h e Schwrmer, t h e religious a n d poetic "ge-
niuses" of t h e Sturm und Drang.
T h e r e were m a n y critics of K a n t in t h e s e years, b o t h empiricists
a n d rationalists. While they irritated Kant, h e did n o t feel t h e n e e d
to r e s p o n d to t h e m . B u t K a n t h a d o t h e r foes, the "aestheticists" of
2

science a n d t h e "mystics" of metaphysics. T h e y h a d b e e n active to a

fault, from Kant's v a n t a g e . I n d e e d , t h e i r c a m p a i g n s were u p p e r -
most in Kant's m i n d in his epistemological a n d methodological
considerations of t h e m i d to late 1780s. N o t t h a t t h e Schwrmer di-
rectly challenged K a n t . T h e y carried o n in blissful oblivion of t h e
stern Knigsberger, a n d it was this i m p e r t i n e n c e which p r o v o k e d
h i m to assert t h e rights a n d rigors of t r u e science a n d p h i l o s o p h y
against t h e i r sophistries.
T h e w a r b e g a n in e a r n e s t with Kant's flurry of " p o p u l a r essays"
in t h e m i d - 1 7 8 0 s , o n c o n t e m p o r a r y topics in history a n d especially

178
science, all of which a i m e d at t h e p r e t e n s i o n s of t h e "aestheticists"
of science a n d H e r d e r in p a r t i c u l a r . T h e first s h o w d o w n c a m e in
3

Kant's reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen in 1785. T h e n m a t t e r s b e c a m e

even m o r e controversial with t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e " P a n t h e i s m C o n -
troversy." It h a d two provocative o u t c o m e s from Kant's point of
view: first, t h e intimation (by Jacobi) t h a t Kant's Critique lent s u p -
p o r t to t h e materialist d e t e r m i n i s m of Spinoza; a n d , second, t h e
overt claim by M e n d e l s s o h n , in Morgenstunden, t h a t Kant's Critique
h a d destroyed e v e r y t h i n g in metaphysics, b u t most particularly, all
rational g r o u n d s for c r e d e n c e in G o d .
T h e s e w e r e p r o f o u n d l y d a n g e r o u s c h a r g e s which could easily
b r i n g t h e authorities d o w n u p o n Kant. H e n c e K a n t b e c a m e m o r e
belligerent in t h e late 1780s, t h o u g h t h a t polemical e d g e rarely rose
directly to t h e surface in his philosophical works. T h e prefaces to
each of his major works give indication of t h e c a m p a i g n h e saw h i m -
self waging, n o t only for t h e t r i u m p h of his o w n philosophy, b u t
m o r e broadly for t h e t r i u m p h of A u f k l r u n g against t h e forces of
r e p r e s s i o n a n d of irrationalism. All these impulses fueled Kant's r e -
considerations of epistemology a n d science at t h e close of t h e dec-
ade, a n d gave s h a p e to t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . "
Kant's decision in 1784 to review H e r d e r ' s Ideen only m a k e s
sense within a contextual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Kant's v e n t u r e into p o p u -
lar essay writing o n t h e subject of history starting in late 1784
s h o u l d occasion s o m e w o n d e r , for h e otherwise steadfastly refused
to be distracted from t h e p r e s s i n g urgency of his systematic project.
T o be s u r e , K a n t h a d p r o f o u n d observations to m a k e in such fields
as history, a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d g e o g r a p h y , a b o u t which h e h a d b e e n
teaching courses for m a n y years. T o b e s u r e , such m a t t e r s were n o t
u n r e l a t e d to his critical system. Nevertheless, t h e t i m i n g is striking.
H o w m a n y reviews did K a n t ever write? H o w m a n y after 1781?
Why of t h e Ideen, a n d why at t h a t particular m o m e n t ? N o t only t h e
reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, b u t also t h e essays in t h e Berlinische Mon-
atsschrift, starting with " I d e a for a Universal History" in N o v e m b e r
1784 a n d c u l m i n a t i n g with " M u t h m a l i c h e r A n f a n g d e r Men-
s c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " in J a n u a r y 1786, r e p r e s e n t e d a n o p e n attack
u p o n H e r d e r . H e r d e r ' s success was a n offense to Kant in t h e 1780s.
T h e p o p u l a r e n t h u s i a s m for H e r d e r ' s Ideen s e e m e d a n implicit in-
sult in view of t h e neglect of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. 4

W h e n we e x a m i n e t h e circumstances s u r r o u n d i n g Kant's r e -
views of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, we find a n intimate c o n n e c t i o n with Kant's
c o n c e r n s over t h e p o p u l a r r e c e p t i o n of his philosophy. T h e key fig-
u r e in this case is Christian Gottfried Schtz, professor of Rhetoric

Kant's Critique of Science 179

at t h e University of J e n a , t h e p r i m e locus for t h e future of G e r m a n
Idealism. As m a n a g i n g e d i t o r of a new intellectual j o u r n a l , t h e All-
gemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Schtz was seeking t h e collaboration of as
m a n y distinguished G e r m a n a u t h o r s as h e could find. Naturally, h e
t h o u g h t of Kant, whose w o r k h e r e s p e c t e d p r o f o u n d l y a n d w h o
h a d n o t yet received t h e recognition t h a t h e rightfully deserved.
W h o b e t t e r t h a n Kant, Schtz t h o u g h t , to review t h a t o t h e r most
p r o m i n e n t figure in t h e " p h i l o s o p h y " of t h e day, H e r d e r ? With that
p r o p o s a l , Schtz o p e n e d his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with Kant in J u l y
1784. 5

I n his lost reply, K a n t a p p a r e n t l y w a x e d e l o q u e n t over Schtz's

kindness in taking such a n active interest in his work a n d com-
p l a i n e d of t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t s e e m e d to h a u n t it. Schtz's
r e s p o n s e of A u g u s t 2 3 , 1784, set o u t with sympathetic r e m a r k s
which b e t o k e n e d such a c o n t e n t : "It s a d d e n e d m e t h a t t h e coldness
with which y o u r sublime efforts have b e e n m e t from several sides
a n d t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s o m e of y o u r most i m p o r t a n t p r i n -
ciples s h o u l d really have c a u s e d you to d o u b t w h e t h e r o u r e p o c h is
w o r t h y of you a n d t h e o u t s t a n d i n g work of y o u r spirit." T h e n c e -
6

forth Schtz saw to it t h a t his letters to K a n t carried news of t h e

p r o g r e s s in t h e r e c e p t i o n of K a n t i a n philosophy, a n d , i n d e e d , h e
was strategically placed to tell a vital p a r t of t h a t tale.
T h e letter of A u g u s t also revealed t h a t K a n t h a d accepted
Schtz's invitation to review H e r d e r . K a n t suggested t h a t his review
b e c o n s i d e r e d a n e x p e r i m e n t a l participation in t h e n e w j o u r n a l ,
a n d h e d e c l a r e d himself p r e p a r e d to r e n o u c e his h o n o r a r i u m , es-
pecially s h o u l d t h e editorial b o a r d b e displeased with his com-
m e n t s . T h a t suggests a certain bellicosity t o w a r d t h e subject of t h e
envisioned review. I n a c c e p t i n g t h e a s s i g n m e n t to review H e r d e r ' s
Ideen, K a n t l a u n c h e d his o p e n c a m p a i g n of rivalry against H e r d e r .
T h e issue is: W h a t led K a n t to this o p e n attack? T h e answer is "aes-
theticism in s c i e n c e " p a n t h e i s t Naturphilosophie. T o u n d e r s t a n d
this, we m u s t e x a m i n e H e r d e r ' s work a n d t h e a p p r o a c h b e h i n d it.

Herder's I d e e n z u r Philosophie d e r Geschichte d e r M e n s c h h e i t

As a historian as well as a p h i l o s o p h e r of history, H e r d e r wished to

i n t e g r a t e into his Ideen as m u c h empirical evidence as was t h e n
available r e g a r d i n g n o t merely r e c o r d e d history b u t also w h a t we
w o u l d call t h e ecology a n d t h e physical a n t h r o p o l o g y of t h e h u m a n
s p e c i e s . H e n c e t h e first v o l u m e of t h e Ideen was a n effort to harvest
7

180 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

from t h e n a t u r a l sciences of t h e day all t h e insight they could p r o -
vide into t h e f o r m a t i o n of m a n k i n d . T o b e s u r e , science was in its
u t t e r infancy in those fields, a n d H e r d e r s o u g h t p r e m a t u r e l y to
speculate, j u s t as Descartes, at t h e a n a l o g o u s infancy of t h e m a t h e -
matical science of physics, h a d speculated a p r e m a t u r e a n d disas-
t r o u s synthesis. A n d , certainly, H e r d e r did i n d u l g e in a lyrical b e n t
in his l a n g u a g e . Yet h e also s t e e p e d himself in t h e best scientific
t h o u g h t available to h i m , a n d these scientists r e a d his work with
n o t e w o r t h y a p p r o v a l . Kant's c o n t e m p t a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t devel-
8

o p m e n t s in t h e n a t u r a l sciences m u s t n o t mislead us r e g a r d i n g t h e
historical integrity of H e r d e r ' s project.
H e r d e r ' s g r a n d project in t h e Ideen was to find h o w m a n as a
c r e a t u r e of n a t u r e figured in m a n as a n artifice of c u l t u r e , to r e a d
these two d i m e n s i o n s of m a n in continuity. Kant, by contrast,
wished to dissociate t h e m to t h e highest d e g r e e possible w i t h o u t
contradiction. Accordingly, H a m a n n was correct w h e n h e p o i n t e d
o u t to H e r d e r , irate at Kant's u n p r o v o k e d attack, t h a t "in y o u r Ideen
t h e r e a r e m a n y places which a p p e a r to b e like arrows a i m e d at h i m
a n d his system, even if you may n o t have b e e n t h i n k i n g of h i m . " It 9

seems, t o o , t h a t H a m a n n was correct in his sense t h a t H e r d e r ' s

provocation of K a n t was u n i n t e n d e d , or at least n o t self-conscious.
H e r d e r ' s alienation from K a n t i a n philosophy by 1783 is well d o c u -
m e n t e d . B u t so is his belief that h e h a d n o t publicly u t t e r e d his o p -
position. T h a t h e sincerely believed this to b e the case is indicated
1 0

by t h e e x t e n t of his shock a n d sense of betrayal over Kant's reviews

of his w o r k . 11

H e r d e r ' s c o n c r e t e p r o c e d u r e in v o l u m e 1 of the Ideen was to sit-

u a t e m a n , i.e., to c o n s t r u e his e m e r g e n c e in t e r m s of his geophysi-
cal p l a c e m e n t . H e n c e , famously, H e r d e r b e g a n his g r a n d work with
t h e line, " O u r e a r t h is a star a m o n g s t a r s . " H e r d e r built from this
12

astronomical situation a characterization of t h e geographical a n d

climatic conditions of h u m a n e m e r g e n c e . D r a w i n g extensively
from t h e e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e analogy of botanical a n d zoological
forms with those of h u m a n i t y , H e r d e r w o r k e d t o w a r d t h e c o n c e p -
tion of m a n as a " m i d d l i n g c r e a t u r e a m o n g animals," t h a t is, as t h e
instance in which all t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s f o u n d t h e c o n s u m m a t e inte-
g r a t i o n a n d e x p r e s s i o n . F r o m this physical c h a r a c t e r of m a n as
13

t h e "concrete universal" (to b o r r o w a Hegelianism) of t h e a n i m a l

world, H e r d e r t h e n m o v e d o n to m a n ' s decisive physiological dif-
ference from t h e rest: erect p o s t u r e . I n w h a t was t h e most
i m a g i n a t i v e a n d for K a n t m o s t suspect as lyrical-speculative

Kant's Critique of Science 181

s e g m e n t of t h e work, H e r d e r s o u g h t to correlate all m a n ' s distinc-
tive cultural attributes with this essential physical attribute of erect
posture. 1 4

T u r n i n g at last to those aspects of h u m a n i t y which w e r e most

authentically spiritual, H e r d e r s o u g h t a c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e of
transition. H e s o u g h t a m o d e l of t h e f o r m a t i o n of this s p h e r e in
m a n which went b e y o n d what h e h a d articulated in his earlier t h e -
ory of t h e origin of l a n g u a g e , o n e which, in accordance with his
larger c o n c e p t , d e v e l o p e d a continuity between t h e forces of n a t u r e
a n d t h e forces of s p i r i t . H e f o u n d it precisely in that n o t i o n of
15

"forces" (Krfte) which they b o t h s h a r e d . I n this H e r d e r d r e w ex-

1 6

plicitly u p o n Leibniz a n d R u g g e r o G u i s e p p e Boscovich, a n d t h e r e

a r e indications t h a t h e was aware, as well, of t h e i m p o r t a n t m e t a -
physical conclusions which J o s e p h Priestley h a d d r a w n from these
scientific n o t i o n s .
T h e result was a t h e o r y of t h e world as c o m p o s e d primarily of
forces o r g a n i z e d hierarchically. T h i s n o t i o n , especially tied to a
sense of t h e conservation of force in t h e world ( t h o u g h hardly in its
m o d e r n acceptance), led to a c o n n e c t i o n l o n g since d e a r to H e r d e r :
m e t e m p s y c h o s i s as t h e only c o h e r e n t d o c t r i n e of t h e immortality of
the soul. H e r e t h e influence of Lessing's Education of the Human
Race figured p r o m i n e n t l y . H e r d e r ' s theological d e v e l o p m e n t in
17

t h e 1770s, which m o v e d away from t h e pietistic fideism of his

B c k e b u r g years a n d his association with Lavater a n d H a m a n n
t o w a r d a clear r e p u d i a t i o n of essential tenets of o r t h o d o x Chris-
tianity, o c c u r r e d u n d e r t h e aegis of L e s s i n g . I n articulating such
18

ideas, H e r d e r was i n d u l g i n g in those "metaphysical" speculations

in n a t u r a l science which t h e G e r m a n s called Naturphilosophie.
H e r d e r ' s works of t h e 1780s r e p r e s e n t t h e central effort to
t r a n s f o r m t h e m o o d of t h e Sturm und Drang into a position, to take a
raw intuition a n d raise it into a conscious a r g u m e n t . H e r m a n n
Korff's magisterial Geist der Goethezeit identifies this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
in t h e work of H e r d e r (and G o e t h e ) in t h e 1780s as t h e essence of
w h a t t h e G e r m a n s call die Klassik, namely, t h e m a t u r e artistic p e r i o d
of t h e Goethezeit w h e n o r d e r , balance, a n d c o h e r e n c e displace t h e
wild o u t b u r s t s of t h e early formative y e a r s . Korff a r g u e s t h a t it
19

was n o t t h e c o n t e n t of t h e Sturm und Drang mentality b u t r a t h e r its

articulation which u n d e r w e n t t h e major t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . H e writes
elegantly of t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e g r o u n d i n g intuition of t h e Sturm
und Drang:

T h e quintessential spirit of t h e Sturm und Drang m o v e m e n t

was t h a t feeling for n a t u r e in the light of which t h e world a p -

182 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

 p e a r e d as a living unity a n d a n o r g a n i c b e i n g , which realized
itself in a n e t e r n a l b e c o m i n g a n d passing away, in ceaseless
creation a n d m e t a m o r p h o s i s . Living N a t u r e ! T h a t was t h e
g r a n d idea which divided [their] new h u m a n i t y as m u c h from
t h e soulless materialism of t h e F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t as from
t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l i s m of C h r i s t i a n i t y .
20

T h e a u t h o r s of t h e Sturm und Drang r e a d n a t u r e in t h e figure of

their o w n creativity a n d restless freedom, i.e., in analogy to ge-
nius. T h e y felt in n a t u r e a n irrepressible d y n a m i s m , process,
d e v e l o p m e n t l i f e . A n d they gave themselves over to a celebration
of this Dionysian vitality as they gave themselves over to t h e u n -
t r a m m e l e d articulation of t h e i r own.
W i t h i n a n d e m e r g e n t from t h e Sturm und Drang e n t h u s i a s m for
n a t u r e was a sense for c o h e r e n c e , for a m o r e d y n a m i c vision of
o r d e r . I n a beautiful piece from 1782, his " F r a g m e n t o n N a t u r e , "
G o e t h e articulated this e m e r g e n t s e n s e . T h e t o n e was still r h a p -
21

sodic a n d t h e intuition of s t r u c t u r e r e m a i n e d inchoate, as G o e t h e

felt n o hesitancy to proclaim from a later, m o r e m a t u r e v a n t a g e . 22

Yet within the e x t r e m e variety of n a t u r e ' s " p l a y " a n d n a t u r e was

for G o e t h e a Spielerin, i n d e e d , a Schauspielerin (actress) w h o p u t o n
r o l e s G o e t h e sensed t h e m a r v e l o u s simplicity of l a w . 23

T o c a p t u r e clearly this e m e r g e n t sense of law: this was t h e

project of G o e t h e a n d of H e r d e r in t h e years of their most intimate
a n d p r o d u c t i v e association, t h e 1780s. T h e y strove to find for t h e i r
sense of n a t u r e a philosophical-conceptual s t r u c t u r e . H a r d l y p h i -
losophers, they n o n e t h e l e s s t u r n e d to philosophy for inspiration.
T h u s H e r d e r , w h o in this t u r n to philosophy vastly o u t p a c e d his
m o r e diffident friend, f o u n d by t h e late 1770s t h e triad from w h o m
to forge his o w n vision: Spinoza, Shaftesbury a n d L e i b n i z . While 24

we will have occasion to dwell o n Spinoza at l e n g t h later in this

work, a n d Leibniz m u s t r e m a i n a n o m n i p r e s e n t b a c k d r o p too vast
ever to b r i n g into t h e f o r e g r o u n d , Shaftesbury m u s t be b r o u g h t im-
mediately into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I n his i m p o r t a n t article o n t h e Ger-
25

m a n r e c e p t i o n of Shaftesbury, O s k a r Walzel m a d e t h e crucial

a r g u m e n t : Shaftesbury saw n a t u r e " n o t as a d e a d mass of a t o m s b u t
a unified, spiritualized w h o l e . . . [an] organic unity [which was] a n -
i m a t e d by o n e unifying [spiritual] p r i n c i p l e . " In this new n o t i o n
26

of n a t u r e , Shaftesbury p r o v e d t h e decisive stimulus to t h e later

p a n t h e i s m of G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r . T h a t c o n n e c t i o n has b e e n
2 7

n o t e d , as well, by E r n e s t T u v e s o n . Shaftesbury welded a crucial

2 8

a r g u m e n t linking this sense for n a t u r e as a living whole with a view

of h u m a n n a t u r e as possessing i n n a t e a t t u n e m e n t or "sensibility"

Kant's Critique of Science 183

which was n o t simply cognitive b u t simultaneously ethical, e m o -
tional, a n d a e s t h e t i c . Walzel e m p h a s i z e s t h e concept of " i n n e r
29

h a r m o n y " as t h e key to Shaftesbury's Weltanschauung. H e notes t h a t

" i n n e r h a r m o n y is for [Shaftesbury] t h e c o u n t e r p a r t of t h e univer-
sal c o h e r e n c e o f n a t u r e ; i n n e r h a r m o n y is also t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n
for t h e recognition of this c o h e r e n c e in n a t u r e . " J e r o m e Stolnitz
3 0

has d i s c e r n e d a very similar configuration in Shaftesbury's c o n c e p -

tion of t h e " P r o m e t h e a n " virtuoso: " [ T ] h e i n n e r h a r m o n y of his life
[is] a n 'imitation of n a t u r e . ' " As T u v e s o n p u t it, Shaftesbury a d -
31

vanced t h e "proposition that m a n ' s n a t u r e is a n integral p a r t of t h e

h a r m o n y of t h e u n i v e r s e . " His great idea was that t h e r e existed
32

a " u n i q u e h u m a n sense of value as resulting from t h e uniquely

h u m a n ability to a p p r e c i a t e t h e aesthetic wholeness of t h e u n i -
verse." 33

Shaftesbury's u n i t a r y responsiveness h a d t h e capacity to dis-

c e r n beauty, b u t this beauty was a form of Tightness a b o u t the world
which h a d its cognitive a n d ethical c o n c o m m i t a n t s . His f a m o u s34

declaration t h a t b e a u t y a n d t r u t h a r e o n e m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d in
this light. " H e does n o t m e a n by t r u t h a s u m total of theoretical
k n o w l e d g e , of p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s . . . T o h i m ' t r u t h ' sig-
nifies r a t h e r t h e i n n e r intellectual s t r u c t u r e of t h e universe . . .
which can only b e immediately e x p e r i e n c e d a n d intuitively u n d e r -
s t o o d . " Shaftesbury believed we h a d such a capacity. Ernst Cassirer
35

t e r m e d it " a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g (intellectus archetypus)" a n d as-

sociated it with Plotinus's d o c t r i n e of intelligible b e a u t y . Shaftes- 36

b u r y h a d a p r o f o u n d i m p a c t u p o n i m p o r t a n t poetic m i n d s of
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n y , a m o n g t h e m C h r i s t o p h Wieland,
G o e t h e , a n d especially H e r d e r . T h e s e w e r e the ideas which ani-
3 7

m a t e d t h e Sturm und Drang a n d which H e r d e r i n t r o d u c e d into his

Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. But t h e r e was o n e
G e r m a n whose taste p r o v e d distinctly m o r e British t h a n G e r m a n
o n t h e score of " p a n t h e i s m , " a n d w h o was quick to blast it as Schwr-
merei: I m m a n u e l K a n t .

Kant's Disparagement of Herder from the Reviews of I d e e n

to the T h i r d Critique

Kant's review of volume 1 of H e r d e r ' s Ideen a p p e a r e d in the Allege-

meine Literatur-Zeitung in February 1785anonymously. It was 38

an o p e n secret, however, as Schtz reported to him in a letter dated

F e b r u a r y 18, 1785. Schtz was d e l i g h t e d with t h e stir t h e review
h a d c r e a t e d , a n d felt it did w o n d e r s for t h e new j o u r n a l . H e also

184 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

t h o u g h t t h e review a "masterpiece of precision" a n d felt any a u t h o r
s h o u l d b e h a p p i e r to have Kant's criticisms t h a n t h e praise of t h e
m u l t i t u d e . Alas, h e r e p o r t e d , H e r r H e r d e r d i d n o t s h a r e his view.
H e r d e r h a d p r o v e n very sensitive a b o u t it, a n d o n e of his s u p p o r t -
ers p l a n n e d a r e b u t t a l of t h e review, to a p p e a r in t h e Teutsche
Merkur. 39

It is n o t h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d H e r d e r ' s reaction. While e m p h a -

sizing H e r d e r ' s literary grace a n d imaginative boldness, K a n t con-
stantly f o u n d fault with his philosophical clarity a n d c o n c e p t u a l
p e n e t r a t i o n . H e r d e r claimed in his m e t h o d o l o g y to have set all met-
aphysics aside a n d to have d e v o t e d himself to physiology a n d e x p e -
rience. Obviously, h e h a d n o t followed t h a t principle, a n d it was
h e r e t h a t K a n t d r o v e t h e first a n d most telling t h r u s t of his review:

[H]ow s h o u l d we r e g a r d t h e design which aims to explain that

which o n e d o e s not c o m p r e h e n d by that which o n e com-
p r e h e n d s even less? . . . W h a t can t h e p h i l o s o p h e r n o w in-
voke h e r e to justify his allegations except simple despair of
finding clarification in s o m e kind of k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e a n d
t h e a t t e n d e n t necessity to seek it in t h e fertile field of t h e p o -
etic i m a g i n a t i o n ? B u t this is still metaphysics, a n d w h a t is
m o r e , very d o g m a t i c metaphysics, even t h o u g h o u r a u t h o r
r e n o u n c e s it, as fashion d e m a n d s . 4 0

Certainly K a n t lavished praise o n H e r d e r ' s lyrical inventiveness,

b u t m u c h in t h e way A n t o n y lavished praise o n Caesar's assassins.
Kant's review begins: "His is n o t a logical precision in t h e definition
of concepts o r careful a d h e r e n c e to principles, b u t r a t h e r a fleeting,
sweeping view, a n adroitness in u n e a r t h i n g analogies in the wield-
i n g of which h e shows bold imagination. T h i s is c o m b i n e d with
cleverness in soliciting s y m p a t h y for his subjectkept in increas-
ingly hazy r e m o t e n e s s b y m e a n s of s e n t i m e n t a n d s e n s a t i o n . " 41

U n d e r t h e guise of c o m p l i m e n t , Kant's review i n d u l g e d in d e n i g r a -

tion. It is h a r d to credit t h e view t h a t this was u n i n t e n d e d . O f 4 2

c o u r s e , K a n t was "correct," b u t in t h a t punctilious sense which by

u p h o l d i n g t h e letter d o o m s a g r e a t deal of t h e spirit to d e a t h . 4 3

T h a t spirit, t h o u g h w o u n d e d in H e r d e r , would s p r i n g alive again

a n d t r i u m p h over K a n t in t h e works of his o w n finest disciples, t h e
Idealists.
K a n t was t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h his o w n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g
of n a t u r a l science even as h e was r e a d i n g a n d critically dissecting
t h e early volumes of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t
sources of later G e r m a n Naturphilosophie. 44
Kant's criticism of

Kant's Critique of Science 185

H e r d e r forcefully articulated his discrimination of r i g o r o u s science
(philosophy) from speculative empiricism, however imaginative o r
lyrical. Even as h e p u r s u e d his project of c u t t i n g H e r d e r d o w n to
size, K a n t worked b r e a k n e c k at his o w n systematic writings. T h a t
project initially f o u n d expression in his Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science (written 1785, published 1786), b u t it c o n t i n u e d in
several essays o n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of science in t h e late 1780s
which c u l m i n a t e d in t h e Third Critique.
T h e r e is a direct connection between Kant's critical reviews of
H e r d e r ' s Naturphilosophie in 1785 a n d t h e a r g u m e n t in t h e " A n a -
lytic" a n d "Dialectic" of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " of
t h e Third Critique. H e r d e r ' s views o n t h e p h i l o s o p h y of n a t u r e , as
they f o u n d expression n o t only in v o l u m e 1 of his Ideen zur Phi-
losophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784) b u t above all in his Gott:
einige Gesprche (1787), served as t h e decisive formulation of t h a t
"hylozoism" a n d " p a n t h e i s m " which K a n t d i s p a r a g e d t h r o u g h o u t
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h a t constitutes t h e ce-
m e n t t h a t b i n d s Kant's so-called p o p u l a r excursions to his critical
a n d systematic c o n c e r n s .
H e r d e r h a d t h e temerity to r e s p o n d to Kant's criticism in subse-
q u e n t volumes of t h e Ideen with s h a r p a n d ad h o m i n e m attacks o n
Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history a n d o n Kant's critical rigor. T h e i r hos-
tility was n o w public, a c c e n t u a t i n g t h e polarization within G e r m a n
intellectual c u l t u r e between t h e Sturm und Drang a n d t h e Aufkl-
r u n g a n d occasioning in y o u n g e r intellectuals a major p r o b l e m in
r e i n t e g r a t i n g t h e i r cultural heritage. T h a t Kant's hostility t o w a r d
H e r d e r persisted even after his two reviews of H e r d e r ' s g r e a t work
is clear from belligerent if veiled references K a n t i n t r o d u c e d into
each of his major works of the late 1780s. I n 1785, Kant p u b l i s h e d
his Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, o n a topic s o m e w h a t r e -
m o v e d from those over which h e h a d publicly d i s p u t e d with
H e r d e r , b u t h e gave almost i m m e d i a t e vent to his p i q u e with
Herder:

W h e t h e r o r n o t p u r e philosophy in all its parts requires its

o w n special m a n m i g h t well be in itself a subject worthy of
consideration. W o u l d n o t the whole of this l e a r n e d industry
b e b e t t e r off if those w h o a r e a c c u s t o m e d , as t h e public taste
d e m a n d s , to p u r v e y a m i x t u r e of t h e empirical with t h e ra-
tional in all sorts of p r o p o r t i o n s u n k n o w n even to themselves
a n d w h o style themselves i n d e p e n d e n t thinkers, while giving
t h e n a m e of hair-splitters to those w h o apply themselves to

/ 86 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

 t h e purely rational p a r t , w e r e to b e given w a r n i n g a b o u t p u r -
s u i n g simultaneously two j o b s which a r e q u i t e different in
t h e i r t e c h n i q u e , a n d each of which p e r h a p s r e q u i r e s a special
talent that w h e n c o m b i n e d with t h e o t h e r talent p r o d u c e s
nothing but bungling? 4 5

K a n t saw himself as t h e b e l e a g u e r e d d e f e n d e r of rigor a n d m e t h o d .

T h i s was stated in all clarity in a Reflection from t h e late 1780s:

T o h a n d l e p r o f o u n d l y complicated questions of philosophy

in t h e m a n n e r of a g e n i u s : I decline t h e h o n o r altogether. 1 try
only to c o n d u c t my inquiry in a n academic m a n n e r . W h e n t h e
labor, t h e consistent application a n d caution which this re-
quires has succeeded, t h e r e r e m a i n s for t h e t r u e genius (not
t h e sort w h o try to m a k e e v e r y t h i n g o u t of n o t h i n g ) to provide
it with a sublime t u r n of spirit a n d so to set in m o t i o n t h e use
of t h e dry p r i n c i p l e s .
46

T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of driness a n d t h o r o u g h n e s s to " g e n i u s " a n d

c h a r l a t a n r y f o u n d reiteration in the preface to the B-version of t h e
First Critique, c o m p o s e d in April 1787. H e celebrated the "spirit of
t h o r o u g h n e s s " of Wolff a n d t h e school philosophy as t h e only p r o s -
pect of a "secure progress of t h e science [of metaphysics, because it]
is to b e a t t a i n e d only t h r o u g h orderly establishment of principles,
clear d e t e r m i n a t i o n of concepts, insistence u p o n strictness of
proof, a n d avoidance of v e n t u r e s o m e , non-consecutive steps in o u r
i n f e r e n c e s . " T h i s "spirit of t h o r o u g h n e s s , " K a n t went o n slightly
47

later in t h e preface, "is n o t extinct in G e r m a n y , b u t has only b e e n

t e m p o r a r i l y o v e r s h a d o w e d by the prevalence of a pretentiously
free m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g . " T h e pretentiously free m a n n e r of
48

t h i n k i n g , with its v e n t u r e s o m e speculations, raised t h e d a n g e r of

"materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, a n d su-
perstition," from whose universal injuriousness only criticism
could p r o t e c t c u l t u r e . T h e context, by 1787, of Spinozism a n d p a n -
theism, with H e r d e r as their p r i m e e x p o n e n t , raised p r o f o u n d d a n -
gers for t h e A u f k l r u n g , in Kant's view. T h a t c o n c e r n would s t a m p
all his o t h e r projects.
I n t h e Second Critique, K a n t r e t u r n e d to t h e attack against
H e r d e r . "Consistency," h e wrote, "is t h e highest obligation of a p h i -
losopher." B u t it was hardly to be f o u n d "in o u r syncretistic age,
w h e n a certain shallow a n d dishonest system of coalition b e t w e e n
contradictory principles is devised because it is m o r e acceptable to a
public which is satisfied to know a little a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g a n d at bot-

Kant's Critique of Science 187

torn n o t h i n g , t h u s playing t h e j a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s . " T h e discussion
49

shortly t h e r e a f t e r of "syncretism" a n d "Spinozism" betrays t h e tar-

get of Kant's disdain: o n c e a g a i n it is H e r d e r .
H e r d e r , t o o , m u s t b e t h e t a r g e t of d i s p a r a g e m e n t in Kant's im-
p o r t a n t essay from late 1787, " b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer
Principien in d e r P h i l o s o p h i c " T h e r e K a n t attacked "hasty so-
phists" (rasche Vernnftler) w h o "are so lacking in foresight as to
carry t h e i r o w n ideas over into t h e i r observations." T h e y were par-
ticularly to be f o u n d a m o n g those i n t e r e s t e d in the "origins of
plants a n d animals," which, however, K a n t claimed was a "science
for gods, . . . n o t for m e n . " Such " h y p e r m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , " h e
5 0

wrote, "are i g n o r a n t of e l e m e n t a r y concepts a n d also profess to dis-

d a i n t h e m , a n d nevertheless v e n t u r e forth heroically to m a k e new
c o n q u e s t s . " T h e essay c u l m i n a t e d in a n attack o n t h e idea of a
51

single f u n d a m e n t a l force i n t e g r a t i n g n a t u r e a n d m a n , t h e very idea

which H e r d e r h a d speculatively e m b r a c e d in his Ideen a n d reiter-
a t e d in Gott, a n d which J o s e p h Priestley h a d also articulated, m u c h
to Kant's d i s p l e a s u r e . 52

T h u s t h e r e is a c o n t i n u o u s trail of hostile r e m a r k s a b o u t
H e r d e r u p to t h e b e g i n n i n g of Kant's c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Cri-
tique. W i t h i n each p h a s e of its composition, as well, K a n t w a g e d a
direct a n d i m p o r t a n t polemic against H e r d e r . I n t h e "Critique of
T a s t e , " h e attacked H e r d e r ' s theory of genius a n d m a d e a very
h a r s h distinction b e t w e e n t h e " m a n n e r " of H e r d e r ' s lyrical specula-
tion a n d t h e " m e t h o d " of science. In t h e "Critique of Teleological
J u d g m e n t , " h e attacked H e r d e r ' s theories of biological force a n d
d e v e l o p m e n t as a n "aestheticism of science" i n c o n g r u o u s with its
t r u e rigor. A n d in t h e final f o r m of t h e Critique ofJudgment, h e at-
tacked t h e "Spinozism" a n d "syncretism" of H e r d e r ' s m o r a l -
religious views. T h e rivalry with H e r d e r is t h e most i m p o r t a n t con-
textual b a c k g r o u n d to Kant's Critique of Judgment.

188 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

 Nine

KANT AGAINST
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
HYLOZOISM

D
e v e l o p m e n t s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y n a t u r a l science p r o -
vide t h e essential b a c k d r o p b o t h for Kant's i n t e n t i o n s in
t h e 1780s, c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e Third Critique, a n d for t h e
r e c e p t i o n of t h a t work by t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e 1790s
w h o c r e a t e d G e r m a n Idealism a r o u n d a p h i l o s o p h y of n a t u r e . T h e
strategy of o u r investigation will b e first to set t h e context of late
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientific t h o u g h t , t h e n to trace Kant's o w n r e -
flections o n biology u p to t h e decisive consideration of t h e p r o b l e m
of o r g a n i c f o r m in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " O n
t h a t basis we can p r o c e e d to t h e metaphysical issues t h a t lay b e h i n d
Kant's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l conflict with "hylozoism."
I n a d d i t i o n to N e w t o n i a n physics, K a n t took a significant inter-
est in biology. I n d e e d , G e r m a n s of t h e late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early
twentieth c e n t u r y c o n s i d e r e d h i m o n e of t h e f o r e r u n n e r s of
Darwina dubious idea. T h o u g h hardly a proto-Darwinian, Kant
1

did c o n c e r n himself with issues in t h e Darwinian purview: geology,

paleontology, ecology, a n d " n a t u r a l history." Most of his w o r k o n
biology investigated t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of " n a t u r a l history" in t e r m s
of two o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e r n s . First, h e wished to secure t h e dis-
tinction of life from t h e i n o r g a n i c , affirming t h e u n i q u e n e s s a n d
mystery of o r g a n i s m s as p h e n o m e n a of empirical n a t u r e , a n d u p -
h o l d i n g t h e u t t e r inexplicability of t h e origins of life. Second, K a n t
2

insisted u p o n a distinction of m a n from t h e rest of o r g a n i c life.

T h e r e w e r e few ideas K a n t struggled to k e e p divided m o r e
t h a n life a n d matter. H e r e p e a t e d l y claimed t h a t t h e r e could n e v e r
be a N e w t o n of t h e blade of g r a s s . T h e radical r e m o v a l of life from
3

m a t t e r defined it into impossibility. O r g a n i s m s , as empirically

4

given forms of n a t u r e , b e c a m e simply i m p e n e t r a b l e o n c e t h e con-

cept of life was r e m o v e d . K a n t d e f e n d e d a n idea which Descartes

189
first p r o p o s e d for physics a n d which N e w t o n ostensibly m a i n -
tained in his g r e a t works, namely, inert m a t t e r . I n fact, however,
5

e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science, i n s p i r e d by N e w t o n , h a d a d v a n c e d far
b e y o n d this n o t i o n , as m a n y o t h e r intellectuals in G e r m a n y knew
well, certainly by 1786.
Kant's attitudes i m p e d e d his recognition of these r e c e n t devel-
o p m e n t s in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science a n d left h i m sharply es-
t r a n g e d from its most creative a n d effective c u r r e n t s . His refusal 6

to consider these possibilities c a n n o t be ascribed to a lack of intellec-

tual capacity, o r to a lack of study. It m u s t b e associated squarely
with his views a b o u t method a n d a b o u t metaphysics. Kant's " p a r a -
d i g m " for science h a d b e e n set by t h e Leibniz-Clarke controversy. 7

T h e issues with which h e was comfortable, a n d t o w a r d which h e a p -

plied himself assiduously, w e r e those which arose between the
N e w t o n i a n s a n d t h e Leibnizians of t h e early e i g h t e e n t h century.
T h u s K a n t r e p e a t e d l y investigated t h e objective status of space, dis-
p u t i n g b o t h t h e N e w t o n i a n view of "absolute" space a n d t h e Leib-
nizian view of a n interstitial o r "relative" space, to d e v e l o p his o w n
d o c t r i n e ultimately in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c . " Similarly,
8

K a n t attacked t h e atomist theory, a r g u i n g for t h e infinite di-

visibility of m a t t e r a n d t h e completely n o m i n a l concept of a funda-
m e n t a l p a r t i c l e . H e u p h e l d t h e Leibnizian a r g u m e n t that action at
9

a distance involved a n "occult quality" r e p u g n a n t to science, a n d h e

tried to work o u t a t h e o r y of empirical physics which would incor-
p o r a t e Leibniz's t h e o r y of d y n a m i s m a n d f o r c e . O n t h e o t h e r
10

h a n d , h e u p h e l d Newton's t h e o r y of causality as mechanical, New-

ton's rules for t h e scientific m e t h o d , above all t h e r e p u d i a t i o n of
" h y p o t h e s e s , " a n d Newton's m a t h e m a t i c a l a p p r o a c h to science. In-
d e e d , K a n t m a d e m a t h e m a t i c a l formulation t h e criterion of the
efficacy of a s c i e n c e . 11

T h e s e w e r e all worthy a n d f u n d a m e n t a l issues, b u t they were

t h e issues of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e first half of t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen-
tury. T h e history of science has recognized a very i m p o r t a n t gener-
ational b r e a k in this p e r i o d which substantially c h a n g e d t h e
o r i e n t a t i o n of science a r o u n d t h e m i d d l e of t h e c e n t u r y . It started
12

in Britain in t h e 1740s a n d r e a c h e d F r a n c e in t h e 1750s, w h e r e it

s p u r r e d b o t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of F r e n c h materialism in J u l i e n d e
La Mettrie a n d E t i e n n e d e Condillac, a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e
m o r e eclectic a p p r o a c h of t h e Encyclopedists, J e a n D ' A l e m b e r t
a n d Denis Diderot. D'Alembert's Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclo-
pedia is a particularly useful source for this, since it shows a n a c u t e
a w a r e n e s s of t h e g e n e r a t i o n a l shift a n d its scientific a n d p h i l o s o p h -

190 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

ical i s s u e s . Diderot, w h o figured p r o m i n e n t l y in b o t h t h e m a t e -
13

rialist a n d t h e Encyclopedist a p p r o a c h e s (they were by n o m e a n s

mutually exclusive), gave literary expression to t h e impact of these
ideas in his D'Alembert's Dream. 14
B u t p e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t
figures in this scientific f e r m e n t in F r a n c e at m i d - c e n t u r y were
t h e b i o l o g i s t s m e n like Pierre M a u p e r t u i s , G e o r g e s Buffon,
Theophile Bordeu, and Charles B o n n e t . 1 5

T h a t s a m e g e n e r a t i o n a l shift in science c a m e to G e r m a n y a bit

later in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. It simply arrived too late for Kant.
His m i n d was set in t h e t h o u g h t p a t t e r n s , t h e p a r a d i g m , of t h e ear-
lier p e r i o d , a n d h e n e v e r achieved any s y m p a t h y for t h e p r o b l e m s
or t h e insights of t h e n e w a p p r o a c h . I n d e e d , his c o n c e r n to cor-
1 6

rect t h e i r deviations from t h e a u t h e n t i c scientific a p p r o a c h led h i m

to take u p t h e question of m e t h o d o l o g y in t h e nascent biological
sciences, first in a series of p o p u l a r essays, t h e n m o r e formally in his
o w n systematic version of N e w t o n i a n physical science, Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science, a n d finally in t h e "Critique of Tele-
ological J u d g m e n t . " Even as h e in fact redefined Newton's atomic
t h e o r y in t e r m s of t h e decisive n o t i o n of "force," K a n t wished to u p -
h o l d t h e letter of t h e N e w t o n i a n law, to k e e p t h e m a x i m against
"feigning h y p o t h e s e s " at t h e h e a r t of all t r u e s c i e n c e . K a n t chose
17

to a d h e r e to a relentless sense of mechanical causality in t h e expli-

cation of physical p h e n o m e n a , even t h o u g h h e realized it would
not work in t h e case of o r g a n i c l i f e . 18

B u t this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t c a n n o t account alone, or

even primarily, for Kant's p o s t u r e . K a n t h a d not only scientific b u t
also metaphysical positions to d e f e n d : t h e traditional n o t i o n of a
t r a n s c e n d e n t , intelligent Deity w h o c r e a t e d t h e world, a n d t h e
notion of individual m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d responsibility. As h e saw
it, t h e t r e n d s in science a n d cosmology, "materialist" a n d " p a n t h e -
ist," t h r e a t e n e d these positions. Above all, t h e renaissance of t h e
p h i l o s o p h y of Spinoza in G e r m a n y s e e m e d to K a n t to p o r t e n d
atheism in t h e form of materialistic d e t e r m i n i s m . H e n c e h e ven-
t u r e d into t h e field of biology in the 1780s in a c a m p a i g n against
what h e could only see as metaphysical sophistry within t h e new sci-
ence.
T h i s d r e a d of a t h e i s m a n d d e t e r m i n i s m a c c o u n t e d for Kant's
second g u i d i n g principle in a p p r o a c h i n g t h e biological sciences: to
u p h o l d t h e distinction of m a n from t h e balance of organic life. His
insistence u p o n t h e u n i q u e n e s s of r e a s o n a n d f r e e d o m necessitated
t h e categorial separation of m a n from o t h e r animals. K a n t h a d
c o m e to biology because of its role in t h e empirical a n t h r o p o l o g y

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 191

evolving o u t of travelers' narratives of faraway places a n d " p r i m i -
tive" races. K a n t d e t e r m i n e d to deliver lectures o n this subject,
which h e associated with "Physical G e o g r a p h y , " starting in 1 7 5 7 . 1 9

F r o m t h e outset h e s h o w e d his resolute opposition to any effort to

d e v e l o p a physiological a c c o u n t of h u m a n evolution, since it would
in fact b e a n a r g u m e n t for m a n ' s continuity with o t h e r o r g a n i s m s .
T h e mid-1780s a p p e a r to b e t h e p e r i o d of Kant's m o s t i n t e n s e
c o n c e r n with biology. Since t h e issue of t h e differentiation of life
from m a t t e r is central to Kant's biological considerations, t h e Meta-
physical Foundations of Natural Science figures as p a r t of this project.
I n d e e d , t h e r e is evidence t h a t Kant's biological p r e o c c u p a t i o n s
e v e n i n t r u d e d into t h e celebrated revisions of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
D e d u c t i o n " of t h e Critique of Pure Reason in 1 7 8 6 . 20

Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century: Some Soundings

N e w e l e m e n t s in metaphysics w e r e astir in t h e scientific discoveries

a n d theories of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, especially in t h e nascent sci-
ences of "electricity," chemistry, a n d biology. W i t h o u t p r e t e n d i n g
to offer original r e s e a r c h b u t only to synthesize from t h e c u r r e n t
literature, this section will suggest, first, t h a t t h e " N e w t o n i a n i s m "
which prevailed in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y did n o t carry t h e scien-
tific revolution forward a c c o r d i n g to t h e conventional m o d e l of t h e
" m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e . " R a t h e r , it p u r s u e d t h e
21

m o s t speculative h y p o t h e s e s N e w t o n felt p r e p a r e d to interject into

later editions of his g r e a t w o r k s . Second, it will articulate t h e "hy-
22

p o t h e s e s " of t h e n e w N e w t o n i a n i s m of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in
t e r m s of its n e w l a n g u a g e of "force," s h o w i n g t h a t this e x p a n d e d
physical l a n g u a g e h a d clear a n d crucial metaphysical c o n c o m m i -
t a n t s . Finally, a n d crucially, it will a r g u e t h a t t h e shift in t h e sense
2 3

of n a t u r e which took place in t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century, in which

m a t t e r a n d spirit collapsed t o w a r d unity, could be, a n d was, r e a d in
two radically different ways: as t h e materialization of spirit, a n d as
t h e spiritualization of m a t t e r . A retrieval a n d historical vindication
of t h e latter possibility ("hylozoism") is essential to a p r o p e r histor-
ical a p p r e c i a t i o n of G e r m a n Naturphilosophie.
T h e n o t i o n of a " m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e " is a p p r o -
p r i a t e for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s in physical a s t r o n o m y a n d in ter-
restrial m e c h a n i c s over t h e c o u r s e of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 24

Descartes a n d N e w t o n , d e s p i t e their serious differences, s h a r e d a

theoretical c o m m i t m e n t to m e c h a n i c a l cause a n d a n o t i o n of t h e
i n e r t n e s s of m a t t e r . Newton's n o t i o n of t h a t inertnessi.e., his

/ 92 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

principle of inertiawas m o r e subtle t h a n Descartes's a n d , as a r e -
sult, e v a d e d t h e p r o b l e m of e x p l a i n i n g t h e sources of u n i f o r m rec-
tilinear m o t i o n . Nevertheless, while N e w t o n c o n s i d e r e d inertial
velocity a n i n h e r e n t p r o p e r t y of bodies, h e did n o t feel p r e p a r e d to
recognize a n y o t h e r forces, like attraction o r r e p u l s i o n , as i n h e r e n t .
H e n c e his sense of m a t t e r r e t a i n e d a g o o d p a r t of t h e Cartesian n o -
tion of i n e r t mass.
N e w t o n did displace t h e p l e n u m t h e o r y of m a t t e r of Descartes
with a t o m i s m ; consequently, space (extension) a n d m a t t e r h a d to
be distinguished, a n d e v e n seemingly solid bodies h a d to b e con-
s t r u e d as p o r o u s . All bodies could b e analyzed into a series of fun-
d a m e n t a l particles u n i f o r m in t h e i r essential p r o p e r t i e s . T h e o n e
difficulty in t h e t r i u m p h of Newton's atomist t h e o r y over t h e C a r t e -
sian p l e n u m was t h e n o t o r i o u s p r o b l e m of "action at a distance."
Mechanical cause in terrestrial mechanics worked o n t h e n o t i o n of
t h e direct transmission of force t h r o u g h impact. It r e q u i r e d con-
tiguity, as in t h e instance of billiard balls colliding. Terrestrial m e -
chanics p o s e d few difficulties for t h e atomists. B u t t h e r e were o t h e r
actions in t h e physical universe, as N e w t o n was all too aware, which
failed to establish t h e transmission of force t h r o u g h impact. T h e
most i m p o r t a n t of these was gravity itself. T h e plausibility of t h e
p l e n u m t h e o r y of m a t t e r lay n o t insignificantly in its ability to ac-
c o u n t for t h e transmission of such forces t h r o u g h t h e material m e -
d i u m it claimed filled t h e space b e t w e e n ostensibly s e p a r a t e objects.
It was o n this very p o i n t t h a t Leibniz m a d e s o m e of his most telling
physical objections to N e w t o n i a n physics, a n d such objections k e p t
Cartesian physics alive o n t h e c o n t i n e n t until t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h
century. 25

Action at a distance a n d t h e distinction of space from m a t t e r

were n o t simply physical theories, b u t expressed metaphysical com-
m i t m e n t s in N e w t o n i a n n a t u r a l philosophy. N e w t o n was a m a n o b -
sessed with theological a n d metaphysical c o n c e r n s . H e could n o t
26

have b e e n otherwise, living in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century. T h e p o i n t is

n o t simply to n o t e t h e " q u a i n t " ideas h e cultivated "alongside" his
"valid" physical theories, b u t to recognize t h a t metaphysics a n d
physics i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d utterly in that a g e , a n d that t h e o n e in-
spired a n d i n f o r m e d t h e o t h e r . Newton's theory of action at a dis-
t a n c e h a d starkly theological e l e m e n t s .
N e w t o n e x p l a i n e d action at a distance by conceiving of G o d as
t h e requisite "etherial m e d i u m " for t h e transmission of f o r c e . In- 27

d e e d , N e w t o n believed space was divine, a n o t i o n which h e inher-

ited from decidedly metaphysical speculations d e v e l o p e d by t h e

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 193

C a m b r i d g e Piatonist H e n r y M o r e a n d c o n t i n u e d by t h a t Christian
virtuoso R o b e r t B o y l e . T h a t such metaphysical notions w e r e n o t
28

lost o n his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s is evidenced in t h e decidedly theological

cast of t h e Leibniz-Clarke c o n t r o v e r s y . At stake already in t h a t d e -
29

bate was t h e suggestion t h a t G o d a n d t h e world m i g h t b e one, a n

idea r e p u g n a n t to o r t h o d o x Christianity, a n d associated with " d a n -
g e r o u s " a n d "atheistic" i d e a s t h o s e of H o b b e s a n d Spinoza. T h e
possibilities for a "materialist" r e a d i n g w e r e obviously t h e r e , as cer-
tain t r e n d s in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d later d e m o n s t r a t e d . B u t
t h e r e w e r e alternative possibilities for w h a t we m i g h t call a "spir-
itual" r e a d i n g , which m u s t n o t b e lost from s i g h t . 30

" N e w t o n i a n i s m " n o t only involved t h e large notion of G o d as

space o r as etherial force m a i n t a i n i n g t h e world a n d i m p a r t i n g
its accelerations, b u t also t h e m o r e concrete physical n o t i o n of a
f u n d a m e n t a l a n d u n i f o r m a t o m of particulate matter. Newton's
a t o m i s m led to e x t r e m e l y fruitful speculations ("queries" or, in fact,
hypotheses) a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e physical world which u n d e r -
cut t h e n o t i o n of inert matter. T h e series of speculations N e w t o n
inserted into later editions of his widely studied Opticks c e n t e r e d
a r o u n d t h e p r o p e r t i e s which could legitimately be c o n s i d e r e d in-
h e r e n t in particulate matter. N e w t o n recognized t h e existence of
forces, a n d t h e i r vital i m p o r t a n c e to physical science, b u t h e f o u n d
it impossible to recognize t h e m as i m m a n e n t p r o p e r t i e s of partic-
ulate matter. I n s t e a d h e simply t e r m e d t h e m "etherial" o r "im-
p o n d e r a b l e principles" of physical action. Obviously, t h e t e r m
" p r i n c i p l e " is extremely v a g u e as to t h e exact n a t u r e of these p h e -
n o m e n a , i.e., as to t h e i r substantive reality a n d metaphysical im-
plications. His successors w o u l d wrestle with this question intensely
in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century.
Newton's speculations a b o u t t h e ultimate n a t u r e of t h e particu-
late m a t t e r in t h e universe also raised t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t t h e actual
mass of t h e universe m i g h t , in t e r m s of its physical extension, con-
stitute a vanishingly small v o l u m e as c o m p a r e d to t h e vast inter-
stices of " i m p o n d e r a b l e " o r "etherial" s p a c e . I n t h a t m e a s u r e t h e
31

b r u t e massiveness of t h e world could b e theoretically transfigured

into t h e play of e n e r g i e s u p o n a n airy immaterial field, a n d t h e
g a p which t h e Cartesian a n d t h e Christian models set between
n a t u r e a n d spirit (as " a n i m a t i n g " o r "energizing" principle) closed.
N e w t o n i n t r o d u c e d a n e w a n d powerful i m p e t u s into b o t h m e t a -
physics a n d t h e physical sciences with t h e s e notions.
T h e N e w t o n i a n scientists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y p u r s u e d
t h e leads N e w t o n h a d offered in his queries in t h e Opticks by study-

194 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

ing t h e n u m e r o u s physical p h e n o m e n a which did n o t fit neatly into
a n i m p a c t m o d e l of force. T h e y dwelled u p o n attraction a n d r e p u l -
sion, u p o n chemical a n d electrical p h e n o m e n a , a n d as they did so,
they b e g a n to redefine t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e physical world in such a
way t h a t t h e Cartesian n o t i o n of inert matter, a n d with it t h e C a r t e -
sian n o t i o n of mechanical cause as t h e i m p a c t m o d e l of force, c a m e
to s e e m entirely i n a d e q u a t e . I n central E u r o p e , Leibniz, a n d , fol-
lowing h i m , Boscovich p u r s u e d these lines aggressively, b o t h in t h e
metaphysical a n d in t h e physical vein, articulating a theory of phys-
ical " d y n a m i s m " which, in Boscovich, completely eliminated t h e
idea of particulate m a t t e r ( e x t e n d e d mass) a n d replaced it with a
p o i n t c e n t e r of force.
Such d e v e l o p m e n t s in particle theory p r o v e d central to t h e d e -
v e l o p m e n t of t h e e m e r g e n t science of chemistry, a n d of t h e related
physics of electricity a n d m a g n e t i s m . T h e result was a recognition
of t h e necessity of t h e physical postulation of such forces as real ele-
m e n t s in t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a , a n d t h e conse-
q u e n t a b a n d o n m e n t of any e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e world exclusively in
t e r m s of i n e r t m a t t e r a n d t h e i m p a c t m o d e l of force, which to-
g e t h e r c o m p r i s e d t h e " m e c h a n i z a t i o n of t h e world p i c t u r e . " T h i s
was particularly t h e case in t h e even less d e v e l o p e d field of biolog-
ical science, w h e r e t h e mechanical theory of science h a d b o t h given
a fruitful i m p e t u s to revisions of scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d also
r u n u p against its clearest limitations in c o n s t r u i n g t h e empirical
data.
Let u s consider these d e v e l o p m e n t s in science as R o b e r t
Schofield chronicled t h e m in his widely cited work, Mechanism and
Materialism. While Schofield's g e n e r a l categories a p p e a r confusing,
h e nevertheless recognized a definite shift in scientific o r i e n t a t i o n
a r o u n d m i d - c e n t u r y in B r i t a i n . T h e n e w a n d for Schofield o b -
32

viously problematic"speculative influence of N e w t o n i a n m a t t e r

theory was felt in chemistry a n d p h y s i o l o g y . " W h a t t r a n s p i r e d
33

was a substantialization of t h e problematic forces which experi-

m e n t h a d u n e a r t h e d as operative in the physical world: light, heat,
electricity, a n d m a g n e t i s m . Schofield characterized these new
forces in t h e following t e r m s : " T h e materialized, substantial causes
are almost all i m p o n d e r a b l e , highly t e n u o u s fluids, a n d most of
these a r e partially characterized by their possession of varying
forces of attraction a n d r e p u l s i o n . " Schofield f o u n d in his scien-
34

tists a shift from logical, m a t h e m a t i c a l , abstract rationalism t o w a r d

a m o r e c o m p l e x qualitative a n d metaphysical orientation. H e
claimed t h e s e new scientists s h a r e d Bacon's c r u d e empiricism

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 195

a l o n g with L i n n a e u s ' s "Aristotelian c o n t e n t m e n t with t h e creation
a n d categorizing of different q u a l i t i e s . " Schofield b l a m e d this
35

m o r e naturalistic a n d metaphysical a p p r o a c h o n continental influ-

ences a n d "religious m y s t i c i s m . " I n t e r m s of scientific influence,
36

h e e m p h a s i z e d L i n n a e u s in particular, b u t o n e m i g h t also include

Leibniz a n d Boscovich. Schofield associated t h e m o r e abstract a n d
mechanistic a p p r o a c h of t h e earlier g e n e r a t i o n with " A u g u s t a n ra-
tionality" a n d with d e i s m . H e l a m e n t e d t h a t in t h e new g e n e r a -
3 7

tion "that peculiar c o m b i n a t i o n of classics, logic a n d m a t h e m a t i c s

which h a d t e m p e r e d t h e m i n d to abstract studies was missing."
While Schofield chose to see metaphysics inspiring this shift in
o r i e n t a t i o n , h e did a d m i t t h a t t h e r e w e r e s o m e difficulties in carry-
i n g o n scientifically in t h e mechanistic m o d e o n c e t h e physical im-
p o r t a n c e of forces h a d to b e a c k n o w l e d g e d . T h e mechanists
38

could n o t "assign m a g n i t u d e o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of form to any of

t h e various forces of attraction a n d repulsion which they u s e d with
such i n g e n u i t y in t h e i r s p e c u l a t i o n s . " It h a d b e c o m e impossible,
39

scientifically o r philosophically, to enforce a categorial distinction

b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d force, between "inert m a s s " a n d "active p r i n -
ciples." A n d n o satisfactory mechanistic a c c o u n t could b e given for
t h e origins o r t h e n a t u r e of "force" as such.
It is n o t because I s h a r e Schofield's o p i n i o n s a b o u t t h e relative
w o r t h of t h e s e two orientations, b u t r a t h e r precisely because I d o
n o t t h a t I find his testimony so fruitful. T h e distinction b e t w e e n
m a t t e r a n d spirit which h a d b e e n t h e key to Cartesian t h o u g h t a n d
t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e w r a n g l e of p h i l o s o p h y in his wake (the so-called
" m i n d - b o d y " p r o b l e m ) c a m e in t h e light of t h e new science to col-
lapse t o w a r d a unity. Yet it was a collapse to unity which could b e
r e a d in two lights. It could b e r e a d , as t h e deists a n d pantheists of
t h e Radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t r e a d it, as t h e confirmation of material-
ism, t e n d i n g in its e x t r e m e to a t h e i s m (as in H u m e , Voltaire, a n d
t h e F r e n c h Materialists). B u t it could also b e r e a d , as t h e p o e t s of
sensibility in m i d - e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y Britain; t h e i r G e r m a n c o u n -
t e r p a r t s , t h e Empfindsamkeit a n d later t h e Sturm und Drang; a n d ,
most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scientists of chemistry
a n d biology across E u r o p e w o u l d r e a d it, asaspiritualization of mat-
ter. T h e N e w t o n i a n i s m of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y h a d a rich m e t a -
physical c o n t e n t . I n d e e d , theology r e m a i n e d very close t o t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t s in n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y in t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d
while a t t h e e x t r e m e s t h e n o t e of a t h e i s m a n d materialism c a m e to
b e h e a r d clearly, for t h e bulk of t h e century's scientific t h i n k e r s ,
such radicalism s e e m e d clearly unattractive, a n d i n d e e d even in-

196 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

consistent with t h e i r o w n physical results. C o n s e q u e n t l y , they
s o u g h t to suggest s o m e t h i n g quite different. T h e y b e g a n to r e c o n -
ceive n a t u r e as a living whole.
Let u s p u r s u e this q u e s t i o n a bit m o r e concretely in t e r m s of t h e
biological sciences, in o r d e r to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e peculiar complexity
b u t also c o h e r e n c e of t h e n e w mentality a n d its g r o u n d i n g n o t in
"mystical excess" b u t in p r o b l e m s of c o n c r e t e empirical science.
T h e crisis of the so-called "iatromechanical" a p p r o a c h in t h e
biological sciences, i.e., t h e a p p r o a c h which s o u g h t to explain all
biological p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of t h e inert-matter, impact-theory-
of-force a p p r o a c h of m e c h a n i c a l cause, is crucial n o t only for its in-
trinsic i m p o r t a n c e in e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y science b u t because it is
t h e field directly a d d r e s s e d in Kant's "Critique of Teleological
J u d g m e n t " a n d , n o t coincidentally, in H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie
der Geschichte der Menshheit. T h e n e w scientific rationalism, with its
e p o c h - m a k i n g success in m a t h e m a t i c a l physics, h a d p r o f o u n d l y in-
fluenced t h e sciences of m e d i c i n e a n d biology in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h
century. T h e effort to revise these sciences to accord with t h e new
m e t h o d o l o g y of scientific rationalism led to a systematic p u r s u i t of
" i a t r o m e c h a n i c a l " e x p l a n a t i o n s for biological p h e n o m e n a . T h a t
e n t h u s i a s m led m a n y medical scientists, most p r o m i n e n t l y figures
like H e r m a n n B o e r h a a v e , to b e c o m e p i o n e e r i n g advocates of New-
t o n i a n i s m . B u t while such a p o s t u r e was all t h e r a g e at t h e close
of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century, its i m p u l s e h a d e x h a u s t e d itself by
t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h century, a n d a n e w orientation b e c a m e in-
creasingly i m p o r t a n t o n e which, forced by t h e materials u n d e r
e x a m i n a t i o n , r e a c h e d o u t for m o r e c o m p l e x causal-explanatory
theories.
I n this search for n e w theories, a n t i q u a t e d t e r m s frequently
served to describe t h e most novel e x p e r i m e n t s , a n d scientists, e m -
barrassed at the metaphysical b a g g a g e their b o r r o w e d t e r m s car-
ried with t h e m , s o u g h t to find a clearer a n d m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e
l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t sacrificing t h e richness a n d d e t e r m i n a c y of t h e i r
e x p e r i m e n t a l a n d theoretical results. W h e n K a n t wrote in t h e Third
Critique t h a t t h e r e could n e v e r b e a N e w t o n of t h e blade of grass, h e
m e a n t a n u m b e r of t h i n g s , n o t all of which t h e biologists of t h e
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y would have a g r e e d with. B u t o n e t h i n g they
most assuredly did: namely, t h a t n o m o d e l of i n e r t m a t t e r a n d m e -
chanical cause would serve to a c c o u n t for t h e p r o b l e m s of biology.
K a n t wished to t u r n this result to a theological point, n o u m e n a l
causality by a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . T h e scientists, o n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , w a n t e d to complicate t h e i r physical m o d e l of n a t u r e to

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 197

i n c o r p o r a t e those c o m p l e x forces which they hypothesized to ac-
c o u n t for physical p h e n o m e n a . W h e r e K a n t wished to build a wall
b e t w e e n spirit a n d m a t t e r , the scientists were finding "vitalism" a
necessary e l e m e n t in t h e i r physical theorizing. K a n t segregated
"life" from o r g a n i s m s . A biologist could not, at t h e peril of losing
his field of inquiry.
T w o central E u r o p e a n scientists figured p r o m i n e n t l y in the bi-
ologists' d e v e l o p m e n t of a n alternative stance: G e o r g Ernst Stahl
a n d Albert von Haller. It was Stahl w h o p r o p o s e d t h e a n t i q u a t e d
l a n g u a g e of " a n i m i s m " to h e l p characterize t h e e l e m e n t s in experi-
m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a for which the "iatromechanical" a p p r o a c h h a d
n o lexicon. U n q u e s t i o n a b l y Stahl w a n t e d with this l a n g u a g e to re-
i n t r o d u c e into n a t u r a l science a considerable a m o u n t of traditional
metaphysics, which few of his y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s in t h e bio-
logical sciences felt enthusiastic a b o u t . Yet they took u p his lan-
4 0

g u a g e , faute de mieux. Similarly, t h e new g e n e r a t i o n of biologists

l e a r n e d a g r e a t deal from t h e p i o n e e r i n g work in c o m p a r a t i v e
physiology d o n e by von Haller, a n d in particular his characteriza-
tion of "irritability." A g r e a t deal of controversy arose over t h e dis-
tinction of this p r o p e r t y of organic life from "sensitivity." B u t t h e
41

whole m o v e m e n t was t o w a r d "vitalism." I n t h e medical school of

Montpellier these issues c a m e to a theoretical crisis, a n d in t h e
t h o u g h t of B o r d e u achieved as m u c h clarification as t h e prelimi-
n a r y state of t h e science a l l o w e d . I n a brilliant essay, Sergio
42

Moravia has d o c u m e n t e d t h e shift from t h e "iatromechanical" to

t h e "vitalist" orientation. By focusing o n B o r d e u , Moravia d e m o n -
strated t h e perplexity a n d t h e resolution t h r o u g h which t h e school
of Montpellier, a n d with it m o d e r n biology, passed d u r i n g t h e
course of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
43

M o r e generally, Moravia s t r u c t u r e d his conceptualization

a r o u n d a very f e c u n d pair of t e r m s : I'homme machine, d r a w n , of
course, from La Mettrie's provocative work o f t h a t title, a n d I'homme
sensible, which, alas, has n o such singular text to which to trace its
p a r e n t a g e , b u t is by far t h e m o r e interesting of t h e two. L'homme
sensible gestures as a p h r a s e to all those issues of spirituality t h a t
m e c h a n i s m would d e n y . By placing man at t h e c e n t e r of his treat-
m e n t , Moravia stressed t h e direct a n d crucial sense in which t h e
implications of biology b o r e u p o n t h e possibilities for a n t h r o p o l -
ogy. M a n was at stake in all t h e e x p e r i m e n t s with r e g e n e r a t i n g
h y d r a . M a n was at issue in all t h e theories of animal a n d vegetable
"spirits." W i t h o u t t h a t sense, t h e whole d r a m a of e i g h t e e n t h -

198 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

c e n t u r y science is lost. A n d so, too, t h e motives b e h i n d I m m a n u e l
Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of science of t h e 1780s.

Kant's Writings on Biology

Kant's publications in biology b e g a n with his review, in 1 7 7 1 , of

Peter Moscati's a r g u m e n t claiming t h a t erect p o s t u r e was n o t p h y s -
iologically a d v a n t a g e o u s to m a n , b u t instead caused t h e species dif-
ficulties, h e n c e , it could n o t b e seen as a strictly biological
a d a p t a t i o n . Moscati's claim that "the erect p o s t u r e of m a n was
forced a n d u n n a t u r a l " sustained Kant's own conviction of a deci-
sive difference between m a n a n d the a n i m a l k i n g d o m : t h e inter-
vention of r e a s o n . Kant c o n c l u d e d t h a t m a n " h a d b e e n led by
r e a s o n a n d imitation to diverge from t h e original, a n i m a l a r r a n g e -
m e n t . " Since h e could walk erect, r e a s o n enforced this shift in pos-
t u r e , despite all physiological h a r d s h i p , for reasons of its o w n : "[In
m a n ] a g e r m of reason also lay, t h r o u g h which, if it was to develop,
h e was d e t e r m i n e d for society. Accordingly h e a s s u m e d p e r m a n e n t l y
t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e p o s t u r e [for such society], n a m e l y t h a t of a
b i p e d . O n t h e o n e h a n d , h e gained infinitely m u c h over t h e ani-
mals, b u t h e also h a d to accept t h e c o n s e q u e n t adversities of so
p r o u d l y h o l d i n g his h e a d h i g h e r t h a n his old c o m r a d e s . " T h e is-
44

sue of erect p o s t u r e , a n d of a physiological transition from o t h e r

animal forms to m a n , would arise again, in Kant's controversy with
H e r d e r in t h e 1780s. For K a n t , any effort to t h i n k m a n in con-
tinuity with t h e rest of t h e animal k i n g d o m t h r e a t e n e d t h e dignity
of t h e species, which rested in reason a n d freedom, e l e m e n t s which
could have n o physical g r o u n d .
Kant's n e x t essay in t h e field of biology c a m e f o u r years later,
a p p e a r i n g initially as a n a d v e r t i s e m e n t for his lectures in physical
g e o g r a p h y d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r t e r m of 1775, t h e n in a slightly r e -
vised form in a p o p u l a r science j o u r n a l in 1777. Many of t h e ideas
45

K a n t would u p h o l d t h r o u g h t h e 1780s h e first articulated in this

essay, a n d it t h e r e f o r e merits close e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e t h e m e , t h e va-
riety of h u m a n races, was central to t h e e m e r g e n t field of physical
a n d cultural a n t h r o p o l o g y in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d h a d m o -
m e n t o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for social a n d political r e l a t i o n s . K a n t
46

wished to clarify some methodological principles a n d offer s o m e

substantive h y p o t h e s e s r e g a r d i n g race. Moreover, t h e topic d r e w
K a n t to larger questions in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of science.
First, h e took sides with Buffon against L i n n a e u s in a r g u i n g

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 199

t h a t t h e principle of n a t u r a l science h a d to d o n o t with n o m i n a l
classes b u t with real relations. " T h e divisions of t h e schools have to
d o with classes based o n similarities, t h e divisions of n a t u r e , however,
c o n c e r n lineages [Stmme] which discriminate animals in t e r m s of
consanguinity [Verwandtschaften] in t e r m s of t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n . " 47

T h i s distinction of " n o m i n a l " a n d "real" types would have n o t only

a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b u t also a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l significance for K a n t in
t h e 1780s a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w o u l d play a major role in his d i s p u t a -
tions.
S e c o n d , K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e distinction between Schulgat-
tungen a n d Naturgattungen could only b e sustained if it were pos-
sible to establish t h e latter. T h a t could only be d o n e if o n e could
discover, b e y o n d t h e artificial typologies (Linnaeus), n a t u r a l laws
(Buffon). T o find such laws r e q u i r e d a new sense of t h e p h r a s e
" n a t u r a l history," which in practice h a d only b e e n a " n a t u r a l d e -
scription," a n d even t h e n only in t h e sense of n o m i n a l typologies.
K a n t a r g u e d t h a t a science h a d to take t h e idea of history seriously,
i.e., recognize t h a t even t h e best description of h o w t h e forms of
n a t u r e stood at p r e s e n t did n o t explain h o w they got t h a t way.
H e n c e K a n t p r o p o s e d a new c o n c e p t i o n of " n a t u r a l history" which

would teach us a b o u t t h e c h a n g e s in t h e form of t h e e a r t h a n d

at t h e s a m e time a b o u t t h e [changes which] the c r e a t u r e s of
t h e e a r t h (plants a n d animals) suffered in t h e course of their
n a t u r a l w a n d e r i n g s , a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t variations [Abar-
tungen] from t h e original f o r m of t h e i r ancestral line [Stamm-
gattung]. It would in all likelihood r e i n t e r p r e t a large n u m b e r
of a p p a r e n t l y distinct types [Arten] into races of the same spe-
cies [Gattung] a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e c u r r e n t l y so diffuse system of
a c a d e m i c n a t u r a l description into a physical system for the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g [i.e, a s c i e n c e ] .
48

Given Buffon's definition of species as t h a t real consanguinity

s h o w n by o r g a n i s m s which w h e n crossed p r o d u c e d offspring ca-
pable of r e p r o d u c t i o n , K a n t asked h o w from any original form of
t h e species o n e could derive " t h r o u g h a chain of alterations" t h e
varieties o r races e n c o u n t e r e d in p r e s e n t n a t u r a l descriptions.
K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e potential for variation was built into t h e
o r g a n i s m as p a r t of its species-heritage. " T h e g r o u n d s of a particu-
lar d e v e l o p m e n t [Auswickelung] which lie in t h e n a t u r e of a n
o r g a n i c b o d y (of a p l a n t o r a n animal) a r e called germs [Keime] if
t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s affect p a r t i c u l a r parts, b u t if they affect only
t h e size o r t h e interrelation of t h e p a r t s , t h e n I t e r m t h e m natural

200 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

endowments [natrliche Anlagen]." 49
Variation was p a r t of t h e origi-
nal g e r m - p l a s m , a n d it manifested itself w h e n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t
placed t h e species u n d e r specific ecological constraints for a sus-
t a i n e d p e r i o d of t i m e . H e n c e K a n t m a i n t a i n e d simultaneously t h e
doctrines of t h e fixity of species a n d of t h e a d a p t a t i o n of varieties
within species to ecological constraints.
K a n t h e l d to these d o c t r i n e s because t h e alternative would be to
allow t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t a l factors could cause t h e strictly genetic n a -
t u r e of t h e species to alter, a n d K a n t disbelieved utterly in such a
possibility. " C h a n c e o r g e n e r a l mechanical laws can n e v e r b r i n g
a b o u t such a d a p t a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e we m u s t see such d e v e l o p m e n t s ,
which a p p e a r accidental according to t h e m , as predetermined
[vorgebildet]." E x t e r n a l factors could b e occasions, b u t n o t direct
causes of c h a n g e s which could b e i n h e r i t e d t h r o u g h g e n e r a t i o n .
"As little as c h a n c e o r physical-mechanical causes can g e n e r a t e [her-
vorbringen] a n organic body, so little will they be able to effect in
t h e m a modification of their r e p r o d u c t i v e powers which can be in-
herited." 50

H e r e K a n t i n t r o d u c e d t h e p h r a s e Zweckmigkeit. T h e r e h a d to
b e p u r p o s i v e g r o u n d s for t h e modification or variation of o r g a n -
isms, a n d t h e r e f o r e it h a d to b e possible to establish a n a c c o u n t of
their variation, a " n a t u r a l history," which would indicate t h e origi-
nal n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t of t h e species a n d explain its actualization
in variety over t i m e in different e n v i r o n m e n t s . H e n c e t h e m e t h o d
of " n a t u r a l history" would b e "to b r i n g forward p u r p o s i v e causes
[zweckmige Ursachen] w h e r e n a t u r a l o n e s a r e n o t easily discerned,
a n d n a t u r a l o n e s w h e r e we c a n n o t observe p u r p o s e s . " 51
Hence
teleology a n d m e c h a n i s m w e r e c o m p l e m e n t a r y m o d e s of i n t e r p r e -
tation. T h i s n o t i o n would receive m i n u t e a t t e n t i o n in t h e Third Cri-
tique. K a n t a t t e m p t e d to follow this m e t h o d o l o g y in a c c o u n t i n g for
t h e divergences of races within t h e single h u m a n species in t e r m s of
a d a p t a t i o n to different e n v i r o n m e n t s over long stretches of t i m e .
A r t h u r Lovejoy has offered s o m e useful historical indications
of t h e sources of Kant's ideas in this essay. F r o m t h e text itself it was
obvious t h a t K a n t was familiar with t h e works of L i n n a e u s , Buffon,
a n d M a u p e r t u i s , a n d Lovejoy a r g u e s t h a t " K a n t derived n o t only
most of his zoological facts, b u t also s o m e of his ideas of scientific
m e t h o d , from B u f f o n . " B u t m o r e , Lovejoy p o i n t e d to t h e influ-
52

e n c e of a c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n a u t h o r w h o m K a n t m e n t i o n e d by
n a m e in t h e Third Critique a n d later praised publicly: J o h a n n
Friedrich B l u m e n b a c h . I n 1775, t h e s a m e year as Kant's essay,
B l u m e n b a c h p u b l i s h e d a m a j o r study o n similar t h e m e s : De generis

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 201

humani variatione nativa. 53
B l u m e n b a c h derived his data from
Buffon b u t his c o n c e p t s from Leibniz. His two objectives in t h e
work w e r e to differentiate b e t w e e n m a n a n d animals a n d to ex-
plain t h e different races of m a n . A n o t h e r key conception which
d r e w B l u m e n b a c h a n d K a n t t o g e t h e r was t h e Leibnizian n o t i o n
of " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " Clearly, K a n t got t h e material for his reflec-
tions from this c o m p a n y L i n n a e u s a n d Leibniz, Buffon a n d
B l u m e n b a c h , a n d h e knew, in addition, of Maupertuis's ideas of
selective b r e e d i n g . 54

T h e r e was very little in t h e Critique of Pure Reason in its first ver-

sion which related directly to biology. T h e r e a r e , however, a few
points which deserve a t t e n t i o n a l l of t h e m , incidentally, in t h e
"Dialectic." K a n t m a d e r e f e r e n c e to t h e u n i q u e n e s s of o r g a n i c
f o r m at several j u n c t u r e s . H e also m a d e a very i m p o r t a n t distinc-
5 5

tion b e t w e e n t h e r a t i o n a l - m a t h e m a t i c a l principle of continuity a n d

t h e fact t h a t a n object in n a t u r e was empirically always a quantum
discretum. 56
I n t h a t context h e a d d r e s s e d himself directly to "the
widely discussed law of the continuous gradation of c r e a t e d beings,
which was p r o p o u n d e d by Leibniz, a n d admirably s u p p o r t e d by
B o n n e t . " K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e m a x i m of continuity could n o t be
5 7

t a k e n as a n objective principle of empirical n a t u r e :

For observation a n d insight into t h e constitution of n a t u r e

could n e v e r justify us in t h e objective assertion of t h e law. T h e
steps of this ladder, as they a r e p r e s e n t e d to us in e x p e r i e n c e ,
stand m u c h too far a p a r t ; a n d w h a t may seem to us small dif-
ferences a r e usually in n a t u r e itself such wide gaps, that from
any such observations we can c o m e to n o decision in r e g a r d to
n a t u r e ' s ultimate designespecially if we b e a r in m i n d t h a t in
so g r e a t a multiplicity of things t h e r e can n e v e r b e m u c h diffi-
culty in finding similarities a n d a p p r o x i m a t i o n s . 58

T h i s a r g u m e n t , which a i m e d directly against any t h e o r y of conti-

nuity ( a n d m u t a t i o n ) across species, figured p r o m i n e n t l y in Kant's
later writings, a n d was f u n d a m e n t a l to his resistance to "transfor-
m a t i o n i s m " a n d "hylozoism."
K a n t felt t h a t his First Critique h a d established t h e necessary p a -
r a m e t e r s for t h e p u r s u i t n o t only of p h i l o s o p h y b u t also of science.
While, to b e s u r e , t h e exposition of his "metaphysics of n a t u r e " was
n o t c o m p l e t e , it could be derived virtually by analysis of t h e t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l principles h e h a d established in the Critique. H e h a d n o t
only clarified certain perplexities of r e a s o n b u t established t h e a p -
p r o p r i a t e principles of scientific investigation into n a t u r e . Above

202 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

all h e believed h e h a d p r o n o u n c e d a n interdict against "specula-
tion" in science, a n d especially against two particular e r r o r s
"materialism" a n d "spiritualism" in c o s m o l o g y . B u t in G e r m a n y ,
59

t h e 1780s p r o v e d to b e n o t a d e c a d e of "critical" restraint, b u t

r a t h e r t h e s e e d t i m e of Naturphilosophie, t h a t highly speculative a n d
distinctive " R o m a n t i c i s m " in science. Its source was the Sturm und
Drang, a n d its p r o p h e t was H e r d e r .
H e n c e , w h e n H e r d e r p r o c e e d e d in his Ideen to overstep all t h e
limits t h a t K a n t h a d so laboriously p o s t u l a t e d for philosophy a n d
n a t u r a l science, K a n t felt called u p o n to set his f o r m e r pupil
straight. While we have already c o n s i d e r e d t h e t o n e of t h e reviews
of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, h e r e we will e x a m i n e t h e concrete issues in sci-
ence which w e r e raised t h e r e . K a n t took t h e thesis of t h e first vol-
u m e of H e r d e r ' s work to b e as follows: " T h e spiritual n a t u r e of t h e
h u m a n soul, its persistence a n d p r o g r e s s to perfection, w e r e to b e
p r o v e n t h r o u g h analogy with t h e n a t u r a l formations of m a t t e r pri-
marily in its o r g a n i c f o r m , avoiding all metaphysical investiga-
t i o n s . " K a n t cited two e x t e n d e d passages from H e r d e r which
60

expressed this thesis. T h e first deserves citation h e r e , since it would

e c h o r e p e a t e d l y in later writings:

Before it was possible for o u r air, o u r water, o u r e a r t h to b e

b r o u g h t forth, m a n y m u t u a l l y displacing a n d d e s t r o y i n g lin-
eages [Stamina] w e r e necessary; a n d t h e manifold species
[Gattungen] of e a r t h , of minerals, of crystalizations, even of
t h e organization of mollusks, plants, animals, finally in m a n
how m a n y dissolutions a n d revolutions of t h e o n e into t h e
o t h e r w e r e n o t p r e s u p p o s e d ? H e , t h e son of all t h e e l e m e n t s
a n d beings, their choicest totalization [auserlesenster Inbegriff]
a n d at t h e s a m e time t h e flower of earthly creation, could be
n o t h i n g b u t t h e ultimate child of n a t u r e ' s w o m b [letze Schoo-
kind der Natur], t o w a r d whose cultivation a n d r e c e p t i o n m a n y
d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revolutions m u s t have served as p r e c e -
dents. 61

H e r d e r t h u s s e e m e d p r e p a r e d to see n o t only m a n in continuity

with o r g a n i c form, b u t o r g a n i c form itself in continuity with t h e in-
organic, i.e., in his o w n words, " p e r h a p s even in so-called dead
things o n e a n d t h e same e n d o w m e n t [Anlage] for organization,
only infinitely c r u d e r a n d m o r e m u d d l e d , m i g h t preside."
I n d e e d , this idea of o n e all-pervasive force [Kraft] was t h e es-
sential idea which H e r d e r e n t e r t a i n e d in his work, according to
Kant. H e cited yet a n o t h e r passage from H e r d e r which a d v a n c e d

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 203

this speculation: " F r o m rock to crystal, from these to metals, from
these to plantlife, from t h e r e to a n i m a l , ultimately to m a n we have
seen t h e form of organization ascend [steigen], a n d with it also t h e
powers a n d drives of t h e c r e a t u r e s g r o w n m o r e various, until ulti-
mately e v e r y t h i n g c a m e to unity in t h e figure of m a n , so far as this
could e n c o m p a s s t h e m . " I n t h e c o u r s e of this speculation, H e r d e r
d e n i e d t h e theory of p r e f o r m a t i o n a n d epigenesis, advocated t h e
thesis of erect p o s t u r e as t h e physiological distinction of m a n , a n d
tried to derive from it t h e rational a n d volitional aspects of his be-
havior, i.e., h e claimed t h a t t h e h u m a n soul e m e r g e d gradually out
of t h e all-pervasive force of n a t u r e itself. H e r d e r wrote: " T h e -
oretically a n d practically reason is n o t h i n g b u t a derivative [Vernom-
menes], a p r o p o r t i o n a n d direction of ideas a n d p o w e r s [Krfte]
which is l e a r n e d a n d for which m a n was cultivated by his o r g a n i c
form a n d way of living." Moreover, H e r d e r tried to use t h e d o c t r i n e
of t h e "conservation of force" as t h e g r o u n d for a belief in t h e im-
mortality of t h e soul, since t h e latter was simply t h e all-pervasive
force of t h e world in its h u m a n instance. All of these n o t i o n s were
a n a t h e m a to Kant.
H e p r o c e e d e d to reject each o n e . First, as to t h e continuity of
species, h e raised t h e issue of quanta discreta.

As r e g a r d s t h e h i e r a r c h y of o r g a n i s m s , . . . its use with refer-

e n c e to the r e a l m of n a t u r e h e r e o n e a r t h leads n o w h e r e . . .
T h e m i n u t e n e s s of differences w h e n o n e c o m p a r e s species
a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r similarity is, in view of such a g r e a t multi-
plicity [of species], a necessary c o n s e q u e n c e of that multi-
plicity. B u t a consanguinity [Verwandtschaft] a m o n g t h e m ,
a c c o r d i n g to which e i t h e r o n e species springs from a n o t h e r
a n d all of t h e m o u t of o n e original species o r as it were they
originate from o n e single generative m o t h e r - w o m b , would
lead to ideas which a r e so m o n s t r o u s that reason shrinks
back. 62

Even m o r e emphatically did Kant reject t h e idea of a single all-

pervasive form of force as t h e principle of t h e organization of na-
t u r e . " T h e unity of o r g a n i c f o r c e . . . is a n idea which is entirely out-
side t h e field of empirical n a t u r a l science a n d belongs to merely
speculative p h i l o s o p h y . " Moreover, in ascribing this as t h e basis
63

of h u m a n r e a s o n a n d f r e e d o m , as a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h u m a n
soul, Kant i n t i m a t e d , H e r d e r "took t h e spiritual powers of m a n in a
q u i t e different sense from that of t h e h u m a n soul, a n d did n o t con-
sider it a p a r t i c u l a r substance b u t merely a n effect of g e n e r a l n a t u r e

204 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

w o r k i n g u p o n m a t t e r in a n invisible a n d a n i m a t i n g m a n n e r " i . e . ,
H e r d e r was very close to a d o c t r i n e of p a n t h e i s m o r " h y l o z o i s m . " 64

K a n t also reviewed t h e second v o l u m e of H e r d e r ' s Ideen, in

which H e r d e r discussed t h e issues of physical g e o g r a p h y a n d t h e
different races of m a n , issues which, as we have n o t e d , were t h e
subject of Kant's r e g u l a r lectures at Knigsberg a n d also of o n e of
his essays. I n o t h e r words, H e r d e r was writing o n m a t t e r s a b o u t
which K a n t c o n s i d e r e d himself s o m e w h a t e x p e r t . Moreover,
H e r d e r took t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of this second volume to r e s p o n d to
Kant's hostile criticism with s o m e hostile criticism of his o w n , spe-
cifically of Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history in " I d e a for a Universal His-
tory with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t . " T h o s e historical issues b e l o n g in a
s e p a r a t e context, b u t t h e issue of race figures directly in o u r c u r r e n t
considerations. After setting t h e context of t h e dispersal of t h e h u -
m a n race across t h e physical g e o g r a p h y of t h e planet in book 6,
H e r d e r d e v o t e d himself to the specific issue of race a n d t h e expla-
nation of its variations in b o o k 7. H e r d e r d e n i e d t h e t h e o r y of indi-
vidual p r e f o r m a t i o n [das Evolutionssystem"transformationism"]
a n d t h e t h e o r y of merely m e c h a n i c a l , external factors as sufficient
e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e h a d to be a n i m m a n e n t force
b e h i n d such variation. H e r d e r called it a "genetic force" which
modified itself a c c o r d i n g to e n v i r o n m e n t a l constraints. K a n t h a d
n o q u a r r e l with that, b u t insisted t h a t this "genetic force" was not
unlimited, a n d could n o t lead to a m u t a t i o n of species, a n d t h a t t h e
p r o p e r t e r m s for it s h o u l d b e " g e r m s " [Keime] o r "original e n d o w -
m e n t s . " Such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Kant a d d e d , s h o u l d n o t resort to
the speculative t h e o r y of m e c h a n i s m s a n d a r c h e t y p e s [Knospen]
which w e r e p r e f o r m e d a n d succeeded o n e a n o t h e r u n d e r certain
circumstances, as in t h e "transformationist" system, b u t s h o u l d
simply accept this capacity for variation as a given incapable of fur-
ther determinate elucidation. 65

Kant's review of t h e second v o l u m e of H e r d e r ' s Ideen a p p e a r e d

in t h e N o v e m b e r 15, 1785 issue of Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. In
that s a m e m o n t h , in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, a p p e a r e d a n o t h e r
c o n t r i b u t i o n by K a n t to this very topic of t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y of race.
T h a t can hardly b e a coincidence. I n t h e new essay o n race, K a n t
r e i t e r a t e d his f u n d a m e n t a l principles, m a k i n g even m o r e explicit
his c o m m i t m e n t to t h e fixity of species. " T h r o u g h o u t o r g a n i c na-
t u r e , a m i d all c h a n g e s of individual creatures, the species m a i n t a i n
themselves u n a l t e r e d [die Species derselben sich unverndert erhalten]."
Kant w e n t o n to a r g u e that this was a n essential principle of scien-
tific investigation, without which every c o n c e p t would dissolve:

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 205

 [I]f s o m e magical p o w e r of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . . . were capable
of m o d i f y i n g . . . t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e faculty itself, of t r a n s f o r m -
i n g N a t u r e ' s original m o d e l o r of m a k i n g additions to it, . . .
we s h o u l d n o l o n g e r know from what original N a t u r e h a d
b e g u n , n o r how far t h e alteration of t h a t original may p r o -
ceed, n o r . . . into what g r o t e s q u e r i e s of form species m i g h t
eventually b e transmogrified [in welche Fratzengestalt die Gat-
tungen und Arten zuletzt noch verwildern drften] . . . I for my
p a r t a d o p t it as a f u n d a m e n t a l principle to recognize n o
p o w e r . . . to m e d d l e with t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e work of N a t u r e
. . . [to] effect c h a n g e s in t h e ancient original of a species in
a n y such way as to i m p l a n t those c h a n g e s in t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e
process a n d m a k e t h e m h e r e d i t a r y . 66

T h e reiteration of t h e principles of t h e essay of 1775 a d e c a d e later

can only be g r a s p e d as a direct c o m m e n t u p o n t h e d i s r e g a r d for
t h e s e ideas by H e r d e r in t h e Ideen.
W h y s h o u l d Kant have f o u n d t h e idea of t h e m u t a t i o n of
species so u n b e a r a b l e ? T h a t empirical science did not d r a w back
from it is clear from t h e work of t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y biologists
we have c o n s i d e r e d . Why, t h e n , did Kant balk? T h e answer lies in
his philosophical c o m m i t m e n t s , not his scientific i n s i g h t . Kant 67

f e a r e d for t h e dissolution of the two essential b o u n d a r i e s u p o n

which his p h i l o s o p h y rested: that between m a t t e r a n d life, a n d that
b e t w e e n o r g a n i s m s a n d m a n . T h a t n a t u r a l science s h o u l d v e n t u r e
into such h y p o t h e s e s was horrifying to Kant, a n d h e felt driven to
confirm t h e legal limits of scientific investigation a c c o r d i n g to t h e
s o u n d principles of " N e w t o n i a n i s m . " T h e s u m m e r of 1785 was t h e
t i m e of t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, a n d two of its essential objectives were to prove b e y o n d
d o u b t t h e distinction of life from m a t t e r a n d to give a m o r e rational
a n d critical theory of force [Kraft], as against t h e wildly speculative
notions which, taking off from Leibniz a n d Boscovich, were in-
u n d a t i n g t h e n e w sciences of chemistry a n d biology.
T h e Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is a work which
has n o t received a g r e a t deal of attention in t h e Kant literature.
T h i s is s t r a n g e in view of Kant's p r o m i s e s in t h e First Critique. It is
also u n f o r t u n a t e , because it leaves t h e i m p o r t a n t question of t h e
metaphysical elaboration of Kant's system in that m e a s u r e o u t of
consideration. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t point a b o u t t h e work, from o u r
c u r r e n t v a n t a g e , is Kant's insistence u p o n g r o u n d i n g physical sci-
e n c e u p o n m a t t e r a n d m o t i o n , i.e., o n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

206 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

principles of physics, even as he revised t h a t theory in crucial Leib-
nizian ways t o w a r d a theory of m a t t e r as force. T h i s , c o m b i n e d with
his unequivocal s t a t e m e n t t h a t "in every special doctrine of n a t u r e
only so m u c h science p r o p e r can b e f o u n d as t h e r e is m a t h e m a t i c s
in it," t e n d e d to b e extremely hostile to all of t h e recent work in
chemistry a n d b i o l o g y . I n d e e d , in accordance with this criterion,
68

Kant claimed t h a t chemistry failed to qualify as a science a n d

s h o u l d b e r e g a r d e d merely as a "systematic art of analysis." T h a t
notion of a "systematic a r t " can b e related r a t h e r directly to t h e
"technic" of reflective j u d g m e n t , especially as t h e latter w o u l d
apply to biology in t h e Third Critique. It follows t h a t biology could
p r e t e n d even less t h a n chemistry to science in Kant's sense of t h e
word. Still worse was t h e situation for any "science" of empirical
psychology, which could not even be a "systematic a r t . " T h e point 69

is, Kant m a d e his criterion for science so restrictive that almost all
the new sciences were ineligible. T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g p r o f o u n d l y
reactionary a b o u t such a s t a n c e . But it was p a r t a n d parcel of t h e
70

c o m m i t m e n t s to which Kant felt b o u n d by the mid-1780s.

Kant's biological p r e o c c u p a t i o n s manifested themselves in t h e
revisions of t h e First Critique in 1786, t h r o u g h his use of biological
illustrations a n d m e t a p h o r s for his cognitive t h e o r y . B u t t h e next
71

significant piece of writing really devoted to t h e questions of biol-

ogy was a n essay c o m p o s e d in t h e fall of 1 7 8 7 t h e essay entitled
" b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien in d e r Philoso-
p h i e . " It is widely recognized to have b e e n of crucial relevance to
7 2

the genesis of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " T h e occa-

7 3

sion for t h e composition of this essay is o n the surface quite

straightforward, b u t the implications t u r n o u t to be m o r e intricate.
Kant not only published his reviews of H e r d e r a n d his second essay
o n race in 1785, but h e also published a n essay entitled " M u t h -
malicher A n f a n g d e r M e n s c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " in t h e Berlinische
Monatsschrift in J a n u a r y , 1786. It, too, was c o m p o s e d in t h a t busy
year of 1785 in which Kant's central p r e o c c u p a t i o n a p p e a r s to have
b e e n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of science. In O c t o b e r a n d N o v e m b e r of
1786, in t h e Teutsche Merkur, the j o u r n a l which h a d carried
Reinhold's spirited defense of H e r d e r ' s Ideen against Kant's review
a n d which R e i n h o l d coedited with his distinguished father-in-law,
Wieland, t h e r e a p p e a r e d a two-part critique of Kant's writings o n
t h e a n t h r o p o l o g y of race a n d of h u m a n origins by a n i m p o r t a n t
G e r m a n scientist, G e o r g Forster, later to b e c o m e famous for his in-
volvement in t h e F r e n c h Revolution. Kant, ever sensitive to crit-
icism a n d viewing this particular criticism as yet a f u r t h e r rejoinder

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 207

from t h e c a m p of H e r d e r a n d t h e "aestheticists" of science, felt a
n e e d to r e p l y .
74

T h e m a t t e r c a m e even m o r e forcefully to a h e a d w h e n H e r d e r
himself reasserted all those ideas which K a n t f o u n d so i r r e s p o n -
sible in a n even m o r e o u t r a g e o u s form, t h e unequivocally pantheist
tract Gott: einige Gesprche in early s u m m e r 1787. Kant was furious
a b o u t t h e "syncretist" a n d " p a n t h e i s t " sophistries e m a n a t i n g from
t h a t q u a r t e r a n d a n x i o u s to d e b u n k t h e m . At t h e same time,
R e i n h o l d , a n d with h i m t h e j o u r n a l Teutsche Merkur, h a d converted
to K a n t i a n i s m , a n d since A u g u s t of 1786 Reinhold h a d b e e n p u b -
lishing serially his crucial Briefe ber die Kantische Philosophie, which
did so m u c h to p o p u l a r i z e Kantian t h o u g h t in G e r m a n y . I n Octo-
b e r 1787, R e i n h o l d w r o t e to Kant asking for a public acknowledg-
m e n t of t h e accuracy of his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e latter's work, a n d
K a n t saw t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to use t h e very Teutsche Merkur to r e b u t t
his critics. T h e result was t h e essay o n teleology.
Forster h a d p u b l i s h e d o n t h e question of race theory himself,
a n d his o w n views differed from Kant's, b u t they were respectably
scientific for t h e most part, a n d Kant wished not so m u c h to d i s p u t e
Forster's scientific s t a n d i n g as to d e f e n d his own. Forster h a d im-
p u g n e d Kant's scientific objectivity a n d his m e t h o d o l o g y , n o t
merely his h y p o t h e s e s , a n d so Kant h a d a n u m b e r of points to ad-
dress in his essay. It is, i n d e e d , a most c o m p l e x a n d i m p o r t a n t piece
of writing. T h e title has often b e e n t e r m e d a bit misleading, for
m u c h of t h e essay c o n c e r n s t h e same old issues of race with which
we have b e c o m e familiar. B u t that is to m i s a p p r e h e n d t h e i m p o r -
t a n c e of t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y a n d c o n c l u d i n g sections of t h e essay,
which o p e r a t e o n a m u c h h i g h e r level of generality a n d in fact r e p -
resent s o m e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t writing K a n t ever did o n t h e
m e t h o d o l o g y of science a n d also o n questions of his o w n philoso-
phy. T h e r e f o r e it behooves us to a d d r e s s t h e issues of t h e essay in
t e r m s of their increasing scope, starting with t h e most concrete a n d
familiar, t h e p r o b l e m of race, a n d p r o c e e d i n g to t h e larger consid-
e r a t i o n s in t h a t context.
Forster h a d c h a r g e d , with a n eye as m u c h to Kant's " M u t h m a -
licher A n f a n g d e r M e n s c h e n g e s c h i c h t e " as to his essays o n the a n -
t h r o p o l o g y of race, that K a n t i n t r o d u c e d theological considera-
tions into m a t t e r s of empirical science. Not only did Kant s e e m to
ascribe to Providence a role in n a t u r e (teleology), b u t his a c c o u n t of
t h e origins of t h e h u m a n species derived m u c h from t h e scriptural
a c c o u n t . A particular instance of this, Forster claimed, was Kant's
75

d o g m a t i c assertion t h a t t h e e n t i r e h u m a n race s p r a n g from o n e set

208 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

of p a r e n t s , which Forster believed Kant took literally from Scrip-
t u r e . K a n t d e n i e d t h e c h a r g e , a n d a r g u e d t h a t it was not biblical
7 6

literalism b u t r a t h e r t h e facts of t h e case which led h i m to believe

that t h e only way to a d v a n c e t h e science of race was to work from a
t h e o r y of consanguinity r a t h e r t h a n m e r e similarity, a n d consan-
guinity simply m e a n t c o m m o n p a r e n t a g e . W h e t h e r t h e r e was
7 7

only o n e p a i r at the outset, o r m a n y pairs with identical genetic e n -

d o w m e n t s , did n o t really matter, for it was t h e principle alone
which K a n t was trying t o establish.
Forster q u e s t i o n e d t h e whole distinction between n a t u r a l
description a n d n a t u r a l history, a r g u i n g that Kant's a p p r o a c h to
science was too metaphysical in t h a t h e b e g a n with principles, defi-
nitions, etc., instead of w o r k i n g empirically. H e r e K a n t r e s p o n d e d
that science could n o t p r o c e e d without any o r i e n t i n g h y p o t h e s e s . 78

Kant's c o n c e p t s were n o t metaphysical, but simply hypothetical,

d e s i g n e d to clarify t h e p r o b l e m . Forster accused h i m f u r t h e r of ad-
vocating teleological e x p l a n a t i o n , w h e r e a s science o u g h t to work
only with n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n . K a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t of course sci-
e n c e always p r e f e r r e d efficient causes, w h e n it could find t h e m , b u t
h e insisted t h a t in their absence, science was fully entitled to resort
to t e l e o l o g y . T h i s was n o t capricious, it was necessary for t h e in-
79

vestigation itself.
K a n t a r g u e d that it was simply impossible to conceive of o r g a n -
isms a n d above all of t h e process of g e n e r a t i o n a n d variation in
heredity except in t e r m s of purposiveness. Mechanical accounts
simply w e r e n o t a d e q u a t e . In his preliminary draft for t h e essay,
Kant wrote very clearly o n this line: " T h e principle of p u r p o s i v e -
ness in t h e construction of o r g a n i c a n d especially living c r e a t u r e s is
as m u c h b o u n d u p with reason as t h e principle of efficient causes in
r e g a r d to all c h a n g e s in t h e world. T o take any p a r t of a c r e a t u r e for
useless [zwecklos] which is a p e r m a n e n t fixture of its species is t h e
s a m e t h i n g as to take a n o c c u r r e n c e in the world to have arisen with-
o u t a c a u s e . " Blind n a t u r a l m e c h a n i s m simply could n o t explain
80

the complexity of t h e reciprocal relations of a n o r g a n i s m .

Kant m a d e t h e s a m e point at t h e conclusion of t h e essay, in his
most exacting definition of " o r g a n i s m " p r i o r to t h e Third Critique.
H e wrote:

Because t h e concept of a n o r g a n i z e d b e i n g already implies

t h a t it is a material t h i n g in which e v e r y t h i n g stands in rela-
tion to e v e r y t h i n g else reciprocally as e n d a n d m e a n s [Zweck
und Mittel], a n d this can only b e conceived as a system of final

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 209

 causes, a n d h e n c e human reason at least is left certainly not
with a physical-mechanical, b u t only with a teleological way to
explain its possibility: for this r e a s o n o n e c a n n o t ask of physics
w h e n c e all such organization originally springs. T h e answer
to this question would, if it were accessible at all, obviously lie
outside n a t u r a l science in metaphysics. 81

A n d this was t h e p o i n t Kant wished most to stress to Forster: that

the real dividing line was not between t h e two of t h e m as scientists,
b u t r a t h e r between a u t h e n t i c scientists a n d a r r a n t speculators.
K a n t struck out at such a r r a n t speculators several times in t h e
essay. T h e first such blast c a m e early o n , w h e n h e w a r n e d against
overhasty inferences from empirical observations to general p r i n -
ciples. H e claimed t h a t L i n n a e u s h a d fallen prey to e r r o r by taking
t h e similarity of certain instances for a p r o o f of the similarity of
their f u n d a m e n t a l principles. Such hasty generalization was not
s o m e t h i n g a careful scientist p e r m i t t e d himself, but t h e r e were
those "so indiscriminate as to r e a d t h e i r ideas into their observa-
tions." K a n t called such individuals "rash sophists [rasche Vernnft-
ler]."82
H e went o n a few pages later to castigate "the c o m m o n ,
shallow way of t h i n k i n g which takes all the differences in o u r spe-
cies o n t h e s a m e footing, namely, that of m e r e c h a n c e , a n d sees
t h e m e m e r g i n g a n d fading as e x t e r n a l circumstances direct, a n d
h e n c e which considers all [scientific] inquiries superfluous a n d
even t h e preservation of species in t h e s a m e purposive form point-
less." 83

T o w h o m Kant was r e f e r r i n g m i g h t b e unclear, o u t of context,

b u t t h e r e can b e little d o u b t after all we have considered, a n d t h e r e
is m o r e evidence to be b r o u g h t to bear. K a n t r e n e w e d his impreca-
tion against sophistical science at t h e close of the essay, before his
crucial definition of o r g a n i s m s , a n d t h e r e h e explicitly attacked the
t h e o r y of force which h a d b e e n so widely b a n d i e d a b o u t . Such a
theory, Kant c h a r g e d , could n e v e r be p r o v e n by e x p e r i e n c e . But
" w h e r e t h e latter stops a n d o n e m u s t carry o n with self-invented
forces of m a t t e r [selbst erdachten Krften der Materie] in a c c o r d a n c e
with u n h e a r d - o f laws incapable of proof, o n e has passed b e y o n d
n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . " T h a t was w h a t H e r d e r h a d d o n e .
84

Forster h a d u s e d Kant's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e u t t e r fluidity of

species from t h e review of H e r d e r as a n instance of Kant's m e t a -
physical a p p r o a c h to science, b u t K a n t insisted t h a t h e was hardly
u p h o l d i n g such a p r e p o s t e r o u s notion as the "relatedness [Ver-
wandtschaft] of e v e r y t h i n g in a n imperceptible g r a d i e n t from m a n

210 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

to t h e whale a n d o n d o w n w a r d (conjecturally even to t h e lichens
a n d m o s s e s ) a n d not simply in a system of c o m p a r i s o n s b u t in
t e r m s of a system of g e n e r a t i o n from c o m m o n lineages [Stmme] in
a n a t u r a l chain of o r g a n i c beings." It was n o t h e w h o held that all
life " s p r a n g from t h e m o t h e r w o m b of e a r t h fertilized by the sea-
s l i m e " t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e plenty w h o did, a n d K a n t gave t h e ex-
a m p l e of B o n n e t . Kant withdrew his o w n c h a r g e t h a t such ideas
8 5

were m o n s t r o u s a n d that reason was horrified by t h e m ( t h o u g h h e

only did so as if these were F r s t e r s p h r a s e s , not his own). Rather,
h e said, any s o u n d scholar would r e p u d i a t e t h e m because they
a b a n d o n e d " t h e fruitful soil of n a t u r a l science" for t h e "wastelands
of metaphysics." H e a c k n o w l e d g e d a "not u n m a n l y fear" of what-
ever "led r e a s o n away from its first principles a n d m a d e it p e r m i s -
sible to rove a b o u t in b o u n d l e s s imaginations." Not Forster, b u t
Herder was t h e target of all this.
At t h e core of H e r d e r ' s sophistries, in Kant's view, was his u n -
justifiable n o t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l forces [Grundkrfte]. H e n c e Kant
b r o u g h t his essay to a close with a n exposition of t h e p r o b l e m of any
conception of f u n d a m e n t a l forces from the vantage of transcen-
d e n t a l philosophy. Such a f u n d a m e n t a l force by definition could
not b e d i s c e r n e d in any empirical e x p e r i e n c e . H e n c e it could only
b e a m a t t e r of k n o w l e d g e if o n e could offer a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ac-
c o u n t for it. But, Kant was a d a m a n t , h u m a n reason "absolutely
c a n n o t conceive such fundamental forces a p r i o r i . " 86

W h a t were the implications for t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy of

such a stark assertion? We m u s t reflect t h a t " p o w e r s " [Krfte] was a
t e r m which Kant h a d used to characterize t h e faculties of m i n d .
W h a t was t h e status of such concepts in light of Kant's claim? H e
a d d r e s s e d himself explicitly to this question in t h e same p a r a g r a p h .
It was not, n e a r g u e d , as t h o u g h reason should n o t deal with the
p r o b l e m posed by the question of f u n d a m e n t a l forces. But t h e r e
was a p r o p e r m e t h o d which a l o n e offered any prospect of results.
First, in t h e bewildering variety of such forces, reason should, as
always, aim to r e d u c e t h e m to the least possible n u m b e r , t h o u g h it
was implausible to believe they could ever b e r e d u c e d to unity. T h e
only evidence of the existence of such forces was t h r o u g h t h e rela-
tion of cause a n d effect, a n d the only k n o w l e d g e we h a d of t h e m
was in t h e effect, so that o u r conception could only draw from that
evidence, a n d only express this causal relation. In a footnote, K a n t
gave as his e x a m p l e t h e faculty of imagination [Einbildungskraft].
H e a r g u e d that we recognized it by its effects, a n d that we were in
n o position to explain it by s o m e o t h e r force.

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 211

 T h i s led h i m to a m u c h m o r e g e n e r a l p o i n t , still in t h e footnote,
with r e g a r d to t h e relation of substance t o force. H e r e Kant ad-
dressed himself to o n e of t h e core doctrines of Wolffian philoso-
phy, t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e soul was a substance with a single
f u n d a m e n t a l power, t h e p o w e r of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Wolff's e r r o r lay
in t h e confusion of a nominal universal for a real o n e , Kant a r g u e d ,
d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e philosophical potential implicit in all his think-
i n g a b o u t t h e p r o b l e m of r a c e . K a n t illustrated his p o i n t with a
8 7

r e f e r e n c e to t h e t h e o r y of physical science. T o say all t h e forces of

material n a t u r e were forces of m o v e m e n t was t r u e b u t useless, be-
cause from this we could not derive t h e specific forces of attraction
a n d r e p u l s i o n which were alone constitutive of material dynamics.
T h e m o r e abstract c o n c e p t was certainly higher, b u t it did n o t con-
tain t h e lower concepts, since the latter were richer in c o n t e n t a n d
h a d m a n y e l e m e n t s which fell outside of what was s h a r e d u n d e r t h e
higher concept.
B u t K a n t h a d a n even m o r e r e m a r k a b l e point to m a k e . T h e
t h r u s t of t h e new ontologies of science was to try to identify t h e con-
cept of s u b s t a n c e with t h e concept of f u n d a m e n t a l force, i.e., to dis-
solve m a t t e r into force. B u t that was a m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n of t h e
m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m s , Kant claimed. Force did n o t constitute t h e
g r o u n d of t h e reality of p r o p e r t i e s . T h a t was what substance sig-
nified. Force was merely the relation of substance to its p r o p e r t i e s
insofar as it (substance) g r o u n d e d their actuality. A n d substance
could have as m a n y relations as it has p r o p e r t i e s . T h e r e f o r e t h e r e
could be n o h o m o l o g y of substance with f u n d a m e n t a l force. T h e
relevance of this a r g u m e n t will only e m e r g e fully w h e n we a r e deal-
ing with t h e u l t i m a t e issues of ontology b e t w e e n Kant a n d t h e new
metaphysics.
K a n t b r o u g h t t h e s e notions of s u b s t a n c e a n d force at last to
b e a r o n t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r g a n i s m , a n d c a m e directly to t h e
t h r e s h o l d of t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " H e w r o t e :

Now, t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r g a n i z e d b e i n g is this: that it is a ma-

terial t h i n g which is only possible t h r o u g h t h e interrelation of
all t h a t it contains reciprocally as e n d a n d m e a n s (in fact every
anatomist a n d physiologist has p r e s u m e d such a concept). A
f u n d a m e n t a l force t h r o u g h which o r g a n i c form is achieved
m u s t consequently be t h o u g h t as a causality working accord-
i n g to p u r p o s e s , a n d i n d e e d in such a m a n n e r that these p u r -
poses m u s t b e a s s u m e d as the basis for t h e very possibilty of its
efficacy. We, however, a r e a c q u a i n t e d with such forces, in

212 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment'

 t e r m s of t h e i r basis of determination, only in ourselves, i.e. in o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d will, as cause of t h e possibility of certain
p r o d u c t s which a r e totally c o n s t r u c t e d according to p u r p o s e s ,
t h a t is, works of a r t .
8 8

T o try to conceive of a f o r m of causality which, without intellect a n d

will, could nevertheless o r g a n i z e itself, was s o m e t h i n g for which we
h a d n o m o d e l in ourselves a n d n o basis in e x p e r i e n c e . It was, K a n t
c o n c l u d e d , "completely fanciful [erdichtet] a n d e m p t y , " a n d t h e r e
was n o t t h e slightest r e a s o n to believe that any evidence could b e
f o u n d for it. T h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d o r g a n i c form exist in the world,
s o m e intelligent cause for it would have to be conceived, e i t h e r in
t h e world o r outside it. Kant's writings o n biology t h r o u g h " U b e r
d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer Principien in d e r Philosophie" have
b r o u g h t us to t h e p r o b l e m of o r g a n i s m s . Kant's manifold consider-
ations of t h e d e c a d e fuse into this o n e crucial consideration.

Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism 213

 31* Ten

T H E PROBLEM OF ORGANIC
FORM IN T H E CRITIQUE
OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

hile t h e First Introduction e x a m i n e d the purposive-

ness of n a t u r e as a whole, t h e "Critique of Teleologi-
cal J u d g m e n t , " which Kant worked o n in t h e s p r i n g
a n d s u m m e r of 1789, c o n c e r n e d itself with t h e issue
of m o r e specific o r g a n i c f o r m s . I n d e e d , t h e "Critique" s h o u l d b e
1

r e a d as t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of Kant's biological reflections. Yet all t h a t

we h a v e d e t e r m i n e d c o n c e r n i n g the whole Third Critiqueits p r o b -
lem f o r m u l a t i o n , its d e v e l o p m e n t , its languagesraises the dis-
c o u r s e to a different p l a n e , a n d t h u s , while t h e familiar issues arise
in t h e "Critique," they take o n a whole new significance a n d figure
in a m u c h g r a n d e r philosophical project. T h e strategy of i n t e r p r e -
tation will begin with p r o b l e m s of biological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n familiar
from Kant's earlier writings, p r o c e e d to his formulation of a theory
of o r g a n i c form, a n d c u l m i n a t e in the "Dialectic of Teleological
J u d g m e n t , " w h e r e Kant addressed t h e metaphysical p r o b l e m s his
a p p r o a c h entailed.
C e r t a i n sections of the "Critique" directly restate t h e m e s in t h e
teleology essay. T h u s , 68 seems to be a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the m e t h -
odological self-defense Kant offered against the criticisms of G e o r g
Forster. A n d 80 can b e seen as Kant's reiteration of his q u a r r e l
with t h e theorists of t h e mutability of species a n d t h e unity of force.
Similarly, 81 can be seen as Kant's clearest position s t a t e m e n t o n
late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y biological theories of r e p r o d u c t i o n a n d
"evolution," a n d h e n c e his definitive stance o n issues in biological
science. Similarly, 6 4 - 6 6 r e p r e s e n t a m o r e deliberate a n d sus-
tained effort to f o r m u l a t e a definition of organic form, but d e p a r t
in n o significant m a n n e r from t h e c o n c e p t i o n offered at t h e close of
t h e teleology essay. Let us take u p these familiar issues briefly in
turn.

214
 T h e gist of Forster's criticism was that Kant h a d n o t c o n d u c t e d
himself p r o p e r l y as a scientist, i.e., t h a t Kant betrayed the m e t h o d o l -
ogy of science. I n 68, Kant again d e f e n d e d his m e t h o d o l o g y . H e
e m p h a s i z e d its "systematic" c h a r a c t e r a n d also its use of c o n c e p t u a l
h y p o t h e s e s , t h o u g h only heuristically, as guides for investigation.
H e a r g u e d t h a t t h e very m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of his l a n g u a g e
s h o u l d have signaled the metaphysical diffidence of t h e a p p r o a c h .
"Design is ascribed to n a t u r e , i.e. to m a t t e r . . . [But] n o design in
the p r o p e r m e a n i n g of the w o r d can possibly be ascribed to inani-
m a t e m a t t e r . . . H e n c e we speak quite correctly in teleology . . .
w i t h o u t e i t h e r m a k i n g a n intelligent b e i n g of [ n a t u r e ] , for that
would be p r e p o s t e r o u s , o r even without p r e s u m i n g to place a n -
o t h e r intelligent B e i n g above it as its Architect." Kant was n o t 2

advocating a theological a p p r o a c h to n a t u r a l science. Physico-

teleology simply p o i n t e d to t h e inescapable logical p r o b l e m of
s o m e o r i g i n a t i n g rational cause. Still, from that to a full-fledged
n o t i o n of G o d was a considerable distance, a n d in any event, t h e
o r i g i n a t i n g cause was a regulative, i.e., heuristic notion, n o t a n o b -
jective p r i n c i p l e .
3

K a n t insisted that mechanical accounts failed to m a k e sense of

o r g a n i c f o r m , a n d t h a t consequently, at some p o i n t in t h e most m e -
chanical e x p l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c life some originating a n d n o n -
m e c h a n i c a l cause would n e e d to be invoked. Kant wished to b r i n g
this to b e a r even o n t h e most e x t r a v a g a n t h y p o t h e s e s of g e n e r a t i o n
offered in t h e biological sciences of his day, in 80. T h i s was t h e sec-
tion in which Kant a p p e a r e d , especially to late n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
G e r m a n s t u d e n t s of his work, whose h e a d s were full of Darwinism,
to have anticipated m u c h of t h e teaching of evolution. A careful
consideration of t h e text shows that n o t h i n g could be f u r t h e r from
the t r u t h . Kant was n o t e m b r a c i n g t h e d o c t r i n e h e articulated in
80 b u t r a t h e r h o l d i n g it forward as t h e most e x t r e m e sort of
h y p o t h e s i s o n e which, o n any s o u n d r e a d i n g e i t h e r of the clarify-
ing footnote to t h a t section or of 8 1 , h e t h e n expressly r e p u d i -
ated. 4

"If t h e naturalist would not waste his labor, h e must, in j u d g i n g

of things t h e c o n c e p t of any of which is indubitably established as a
n a t u r a l p u r p o s e (organized beings), always lay d o w n as basis a n
original o r g a n i z a t i o n . " T h i s is t h e starting point for t h e celebrated
5

discussion of t h e fluidity of species in which Kant takes u p t h e re-

sults of c o m p a r a t i v e a n a t o m y as a possibility for a mechanical ex-
p l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c modification: " T h e a g r e e m e n t of so m a n y
g e n e r a of a n i m a l s in a certain c o m m o n schema, which a p p e a r s to

The Problem of Organic Form 215

be f u n d a m e n t a l not only in t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r bones b u t also in
t h e disposition of t h e i r r e m a i n i n g p a r t s . . . allows a ray of h o p e ,
h o w e v e r f a i n t , . . . t h a t h e r e s o m e t h i n g m a y b e accomplished by t h e
aid of the principle of t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e (without which
t h e r e can b e n o n a t u r a l science in g e n e r a l ) . " Note that for Kant
6

such a theory would b e a t h e o r y of mechanism. A n y i m m a n e n t ac-

c o u n t of biological variation would b e mechanistic in his view, a n d
t h a t is why for h i m t h e r e is n o real difference b e t w e e n a strict m e c h -
anistic materialist a n d a hylozoist. T h e y only differ in t h e p r o p e r -
ties they ascribe to matter, yet wish m a t t e r to suffice for t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n of o r g a n i c p h e n o m e n a .
K a n t struck immediately against t h e n o t i o n that any such in-
sights yet qualified as objective k n o w l e d g e . T h e y were hints a n d
h o p e s , n o t established facts, in his v i e w t h o u g h n o t in that of t h e
scientists of his day! At best, what they h a d was a fruitful analogy,
K a n t went o n . " T h i s analogy of forms, which with all t h e i r differ-
ences seem to have b e e n p r o d u c e d according to a c o m m o n original
type, s t r e n g t h e n s o u r suspicions of a n actual relationship between
t h e m in their p r o d u c t i o n from a c o m m o n p a r e n t , t h r o u g h t h e
g r a d u a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n of o n e animal g e n u s to a n o t h e r . " T h e rela-
7

t i o n s h i p biologists h a d u n c o v e r e d was only analogy, only n o m i n a l .

T h e y h a d raised t h e question of a n actual relationship, based o n
Verwandtschaft, b u t hardly confirmed it by t h e i r results, K a n t in-
sisted. T h e r e was, to be s u r e , a " g r a d u a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n " of g e n u s
to g e n u s , b u t they r e m a i n e d quanta discreta. H e n c e it was a n extrav-
a g a n t hypothesis i n d e e d to try to link t h e m all in a n actual relation-
ship which would e x t e n d "from m a n , d o w n to t h e polyp, a n d again
from this d o w n to mosses a n d lichens, a n d finally to t h e lowest stage
of n a t u r e noticeable by us, viz. to c r u d e matter." Such a bold ar-
chaeologist of n a t u r e , reflecting o n t h e "surviving traces of its
oldest revolutions," m i g h t conjecture o n e "great family of crea-
tures."

H e can s u p p o s e t h e b o s o m of m o t h e r e a r t h , as she passed o u t

of h e r chaotic state (like a g r e a t animal), to have given birth in
t h e b e g i n n i n g to c r e a t u r e s of less p u r p o s i v e form, t h a t these
again gave birth to o t h e r s which f o r m e d themselves with
g r e a t e r a d a p t a t i o n to t h e i r place of birth a n d their relations to
each o t h e r , until this w o m b b e c o m i n g t o r p i d a n d ossified, lim-
ited its births to definite species not f u r t h e r modifiable. 8

Yet Kant's point a b o u t this " d a r i n g v e n t u r e of r e a s o n " which " t h e

m o s t a c u t e naturalists" m i g h t p e r m i t themselves was t h a t such a n

216 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

 archaeologist " m u s t still in the e n d ascribe to this universal m o t h e r
a n o r g a n i z a t i o n p u r p o s i v e in respect of all these c r e a t u r e s . " T h a t is,
at t h e origin, t h e r e m u s t be s o m e form of causality which is not ma-
terial a n d which t h e n persists a n d governs t h e whole process of r e -
p r o d u c t i o n a n d variation across time. "It would always r e m a i n
generatio univoca in t h e most universal sense of t h e word, for it only
considers o n e o r g a n i c b e i n g as derived from a n o t h e r organic
being, a l t h o u g h from o n e which is specifically different." 9

Moreover, K a n t w e n t o n in t h e footnote, while such a h y p o t h -

esis was n o t c o n t r a r y to r e a s o n , a n d this distinguished it from t h e
n o t i o n of s p o n t a n e o u s g e n e r a t i o n (generatio aequivoca), it was nev-
ertheless n o t to be f o u n d in e x p e r i e n c e that such fluidity between
species (generatio heteronyma) h a d ever taken place. " E x p e r i e n c e
gives n o e x a m p l e of it; a c c o r d i n g to e x p e r i e n c e , all g e n e r a t i o n t h a t
we k n o w is generatio homonyma. T h i s is n o t merely univoca in con-
trast to t h e g e n e r a t i o n o u t of u n o r g a n i z e d material, b u t in t h e or-
ganization of the p r o d u c t s is of like kind to t h a t which p r o d u c e d
i t . " H e n c e K a n t clearly d e n i e d t h e empirical plausibility of t h e
10

" d a r i n g v e n t u r e " of m u t a t i o n of species. I n 81 h e took his o w n

stand based o n t h e necessity of a teleological principle in organic
forms at s o m e point. E i t h e r such rational ( n o u m e n a l ) causality in-
t r u d e d at every instance of such organic form, which was t h e m e t a -
physical d o c t r i n e of "occasionalism," o r it i n t r u d e d only at t h e
origin, which was t h e metaphysical doctrine of "preestablished har-
mony," or " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " T h e f o r m e r was t h e u t t e r a b a n d o n m e n t
of science, for it f o u n d miracle at every t u r n . "If we a s s u m e t h e oc-
casionalism of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of organized beings, all n a t u r e is
quite l o s t . " T h a t left " p r e f o r m a t i o n . " Kant distinguished two ver-
11

sions of t h e latter doctrine. O n e , "individual p r e f o r m a t i o n , " which

K a n t associated with t h e t h e o r y of emboitement o r "transformation-
ism," c o m m o n l y called the "evolution" theory in the e i g h t e e n t h
century, h a d serious drawbacks. First, in r e q u i r i n g a special provi-
d e n c e in t h e creation of each specific o r g a n i s m , it m a d e n o great
a d v a n c e over "occasionalism," especially since p l a c e m e n t at the ori-
gin (in time) was really n o t a significant difference w h e n r e f e r r i n g
to n o u m e n a l (timeless) causality. B u t t h e r e were even empirical
p r o b l e m s with the theory. It h a d great difficulty dealing with such
p r o b l e m s as a b o r t i o n a n d hybridization.
T h a t left only the t h e o r y of "generic p r e f o r m a t i o n " o r "epi-
genesis." A c c o r d i n g to this theory, "the productive faculty of t h e
g e n e r a t o r , a n d consequently t h e specific form, would be virtually
p r e f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i n n e r purposive capacities [Anlagen]

The Problem of Organic Form 217

k
which a r e p a r t of its lineage [Stamm]." While the species were f o r m e d
at t h e origin, t h e individuals within t h e m varied, within t h e limits of
t h e i r original e n d o w m e n t s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e pressures of their e n -
v i r o n m e n t . T h i s was j u s t t h e t h e o r y which Kant h a d advocated in
his t r e a t m e n t of race. T h e a d v a n t a g e of such a theory was t h a t it
" r e g a r d s n a t u r e as self-producing, n o t merely as self-evolving, a n d
so with t h e least e x p e n d i t u r e of the s u p e r n a t u r a l leaves to n a t u r e all
t h a t follows after t h e first b e g i n n i n g . " T h e m a i n advocate of such a
t h e o r y of epigenesis, K a n t wrote, was B l u m e n b a c h . It was h e w h o
d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e validity a n d t h e limitations of t h e hypothesis by
refuting t h e excesses of its materialist a n d hylozoist rivals.

I n all physical e x p l a n a t i o n s of these formations h e starts from

o r g a n i s e d m a t t e r . T h a t c r u d e m a t t e r s h o u l d have originally
f o r m e d itself a c c o r d i n g to mechanical laws, that life s h o u l d
have s p r u n g from t h e n a t u r e of what is lifeless, that m a t t e r
s h o u l d have b e e n able to dispose itself into t h e form of a self-
m a i n t a i n i n g p u r p o s i v e n e s s t h i s h e rightly declares to be
contradictory to r e a s o n . 12

T h e u l t i m a t e e n e m i e s in t h e whole controversy over t h e b o u n d a r y

b e t w e e n t h e a n i m a t e a n d t h e i n a n i m a t e stand revealed: those w h o
advocated a n i m m a n e n t a c c o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . Kant n a m e d t h e m
in t h e last s e g m e n t of 80: H u m e , t h e pantheists, a n d t h e Spinoz-
i s t s . T h e y w e r e n o t scientific rivals; they were rivals in metaphysics.
13

Before we t u r n to t h a t metaphysical rivalry, a n d t h e "Dialectic

of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in which it was f o u g h t o u t , let us review
briefly Kant's definition of organic form as h e developed it in 64
6 6 . T h e essential definition Kant offered of such o r g a n i c form, as
we have seen from t h e essay " b e r d e n G e b r a u c h teleologischer
Principien i n d e r Philosophie," was that of t h e reciprocal interrela-
tion of p a r t s as m e a n s a n d e n d s , a n d consequently, of t h e priority of
t h e w h o l e over t h e p a r t s in t h e constitution of t h e entity. Struc-
turally, t h a t is, o r g a n i s m s a p p e a r e d to be b o t h cause a n d effect of
themselves. T h e i r p a r t s were possible only t h r o u g h their r e f e r e n c e
to t h e whole. T h e y w e r e self-organizing beings. Kant m a d e a m u c h
m o r e p a i n s t a k i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n of these same points in t h e "Ana-
lytic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " I n 64 Kant a r g u e d t h a t such
o r g a n i c forms a p p e a r e d " c o n t i n g e n t " relative to all empirical laws,
i.e., they could n o t be a c c o u n t e d for in j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e
based o n mechanical causality. A n o r g a n i s m was "cause a n d effect
of itself." K a n t p o i n t e d to t h r e e distinct processes which showed
this trait: r e p r o d u c t i o n , internal g r o w t h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d r e -

218 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

ciprocal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of parts. H e n c e , in 65 h e associated with
o r g a n i s m s a "formative p o w e r of a self-propagating k i n d . " In 66 14

h e went o n to characterize this reciprocal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as that

of e n d s a n d m e a n s a n d to a r g u e that it was as inconceivable t h a t
t h e r e s h o u l d be parts in a n o r g a n i s m which h a d n o p u r p o s e as
t h a t t h e r e could be events in n a t u r e without a c a u s e . B u t t h e
15

really interesting question was not how Kant described o r g a n i c

forms. T h e question was how h e reconciled their empirical actu-
ality with his system of cognition a n d his philosophy as a whole. It is
t h e metaphysical question which d e m a n d s a h e a r i n g .

The Epistemological Problem of Empirical Organisms

Reflective j u d g m e n t i m p u t e d purposiveness to n a t u r e as a whole

merely heuristically, as a methodological recourse necessary for sci-
entific insight into the empirical diversity of n a t u r e . Its objective
was to create a system of empirical science. O n e of the marks of a
system is closure, i.e., t h e resolution of all t h e events that fall within
its scope. T h e N e w t o n i a n physics in whose system K a n t wished to
set empirical science involved efficient mechanical cause. B u t
within t h e empirical diversity it s o u g h t to organize, s o m e objects
p r e s e n t e d anomalies which t h e mechanical framework could n o t
explicate.
O n e m i g h t ask h o w it was even possible, according to Kant's
m o d e l , to e x p e r i e n c e such entities, since e x p e r i e n c e was necessarily
s t r u c t u r e d in t e r m s of the categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d
h e n c e in a m o d e l which was already mechanical. Kant a d d r e s s e d
himself to this question in t h e First Introduction in 7. As h e p u t it,
"the first q u e s t i o n at this p o i n t is, how is t h e technic of n a t u r e per-
ceived in its p r o d u c t s ? " T o explain h o w o r g a n i s m s could b e rec-
16

ognized, K a n t h a d to deploy his " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , " that

involving "reflection" a n d "purposiveness," because t h e d e t e r m i -
n a n t form of j u d g m e n t simply did n o t suffice. T h e j u d g m e n t of ex-
p e r i e n c e p r e s e n t e d consciousness with d a t a which simply did n o t
accord with t h e premises of t h a t v e r y j u d g m e n t i t was a n o m a l o u s ,
or, in his t e r m s , " c o n t i n g e n t " a n d some crucial s u p p l e m e n t be-
c a m e necessary to r e n d e r t h e e x p e r i e n c e c o h e r e n t . Purposiveness
is n e v e r s o m e t h i n g we perceive directly in a n e x p e r i e n c e . It is,
r a t h e r , a n inference, a n i m p u t a t i o n , which we m a k e . K a n t p u t it
1 7

well in a m a r g i n a l n o t e to his o w n copy of the First Introduction: "we

r e a d final causes into things a n d d o not, so to speak, abstract t h e m
from p e r c e p t i o n s . "
18

The Problem of Organic Form 219

 Yet we d o so for g o o d reasons. K a n t m a d e a very i m p o r t a n t o b -
servation in the Second Critique which is g e r m a n e h e r e : "all events in
time a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r a l law can be called t h e ' m e c h a n i s m of na-
t u r e , ' even t h o u g h it is n o t s u p p o s e d that things which a r e subject
to it m u s t really b e material m a c h i n e s . " T h i s is t h e converse of t h e
19

p o i n t h e m a d e so strenuously at t h e level of n a t u r e as a whole: j u s t

because n a t u r e a p p e a r e d d e s i g n e d , that did n o t m e a n it could n o t
have achieved this mechanically. H e r e t h e proposition is: j u s t be-
cause n a t u r e a p p e a r s u n d e r t h e categorical rules of mechanical law,
t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h e real g r o u n d of its p h e n o m e n a l a p p e a r a n c e s
m i g h t n o t follow s o m e o t h e r principle.
We can perceive, i.e., f o r m a " j u d g m e n t of p e r c e p t i o n " of, such
entities. B u t how can we conceive of t h e m ? Is it possible to ac-
c o m m o d a t e this a n o m a l y w i t h o u t destroying the causal s t r u c t u r e of
the First Critique? H o w is it possible to explain d e t e r m i n a t e l y objects
of e x p e r i e n c e which fall outside the s t r u c t u r e of c a t e g o r i e s ? It 20

m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t while t h e reflective j u d g m e n t served

a l t o g e t h e r well for t h e i n d u c t i o n of new principles of scientific or-
d e r in t h e empirical world, these principles could only be estab-
lished as valid science t h r o u g h a p r o o f s t r u c t u r e which would work
deductively in t e r m s of t h e causal categories of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
T h u s , to illustrate, it was a n act of imagination, of reflective j u d g -
m e n t , which led Kepler to conceive of t h e orbits of the planets as
elipses, b u t h e only p e r s u a d e d t h e scientific c o m m u n i t y of his in-
sight w h e n h e was able to p r o v e his claim mathematically a n d have
it c o n f i r m e d by empirical m e a s u r e m e n t s . T h a t is, h e h a d to take his
insight, his i n d u c t i o n , a n d r e f o r m u l a t e it as a " d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g -
m e n t , " in Kant's terminology. Only " j u d g m e n t s of e x p e r i e n c e , "
sanctioned by t h e rules of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , constituted valid
k n o w l e d g e in his view.
T h e d i l e m m a which organic forms p r e s e n t e d was t h a t such a
m e c h a n i c a l m o d e of e x p l a n a t i o n did not, a n d as far as could b e d e -
t e r m i n e d w o u l d n o t ever b e able to, account for t h e p h e n o m e n a to
be c o n s t r u e d , K a n t a r g u e d . W h a t were t h e characteristics of these
empirical a n o m a l i e s which r e n d e r e d t h e m so difficult to explicate
mechanically? F r o m t h e vantage of scientific explanation, t h e real
p r o b l e m with o r g a n i s m s was t h a t their behavior was inconsistent
with t h e h u m a n m o d e of causal e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e intrinsic o r d e r
21

of a n o r g a n i s m was such t h a t it was, in t h e full sense, systematic.

H e n c e it was impossible to apply a serial m o d e l of causal construc-
tion to it. It fell n o t u n d e r t h e serial form of j u d g m e n t ( g r o u n d to

220 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

c o n s e q u e n c e , cause to effect) b u t r a t h e r u n d e r t h e disjunctive form
of j u d g m e n t (whole to p a r t ) .2 2

At t h e level of p e r c e p t i o n itself, however, it intractably r e -

m a i n e d t h a t we e n c o u n t e r e d p h e n o m e n a of which it was h u m a n l y
impossible to m a k e any sense a p a r t from t h e ascription to t h e se-
q u e n c e of t h e i r behavior of a principle which was n o t mechanical.
A n o r g a n i s m was a self-constituting whole which t r a n s f o r m e d itself
within its o w n systemic c o n t o u r s literally before o u r eyes in a m a n -
n e r which defied all o u r constitutive e x p l a n a t o r y m o d e l s . T h e only
alternative principle we h a d at o u r rational disposal was t h e con-
cept of p u r p o s e which we ourselves used to s u p e r i m p o s e o u r will
u p o n m e c h a n i c a l process, a n d so we h a d r e c o u r s e to this in o u r con-
ception of these empirical anomalies.
W h a t was t h e usefulness of t h e analogy of p u r p o s e in t h e con-
text of o r g a n i c forms? P u r p o s e signified that a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in
the m i n d served as t h e original cause of t h e existence of a n entity or
a state of affairs. M a n could m a k e sense of his o w n purposive ac-
tivity as rational (even if n o u m e n a l ) causality in t e r m s of t h e tem-
poral a n d logical p r e c e d e n c e of a n idea a n d willed act to t h e
actuality h e p r o d u c e d as a n objective p u r p o s e , b u t h o w could such a
self-determination be projected u p o n noncognitive entities? T h e r e
was n o g r o u n d to ascribe a m i n d capable of such willed action to t h e
o r g a n i c forms m a n observed in n a t u r e , Kant insisted. T h e y a p -
p e a r e d to be intrinsically self-regulating, b u t according to K a n t it
r e m a i n e d i m p r o p e r to ascribe to t h e m , as p h e n o m e n a l objects, a n
intelligent will. T o view m e r e material p h e n o m e n a in t h a t m a n n e r
was to fall into t h e contradiction of h y l o z o i s m . 23

T o ascribe to the p h e n o m e n a of organic form the principle of

p u r p o s i v e n e s s was n o t even very fruitful as analogy, because these
objects e x c e e d e d utterly t h e m o s t elaborate form of intrinsic p u r -
posiveness h u m a n beings could design, t h a t is, works of art. K a n t
realized t h a t t h e analogy h a d a g a p i n g flaw. W h a t a n o r g a n i s m
could d o was "infinitely b e y o n d t h e reach of art," h e wrote in 64.
A n d h e d e v e l o p e d this realization m o r e extensively in 65. "We say
of n a t u r e a n d its faculty in o r g a n i z e d p r o d u c t s far too little if we
describe it as a n analogon of art, for this suggests a n artificer (a ra-
tional being) e x t e r n a l to it." K a n t recognized t h a t o r g a n i s m s orga-
nized themselves. S u c h "internal natural perfection . . . is not even
thinkable o r explicable by m e a n s of any exactly fitting analogy to
h u m a n art." K a n t c o n c l u d e d : " T o speak strictly, t h e n , t h e organiza-
tion of n a t u r e has in it n o t h i n g analogous to any causality we know."

The Problem of Organic Form 221

 H e r e K a n t b o t h a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e limitation of his a p p r o a c h
a n d set forth t h e intense philosophical difficulty of a n alternative. It
was t h e search for a n alternative which led to the speculative re-
c o u r s e of hylozoism. O n this score, K a n t w r o t e :

We p e r h a p s a p p r o a c h n e a r e r to this inscrutable p r o p e r t y if
we describe it as a n analogem of life, b u t t h e n we m u s t either
e n d o w m a t t e r , as m e r e matter, with a p r o p e r t y which con-
tradicts its very b e i n g (hylozoism) o r associate therewith a n
alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul). B u t in the
latter case we m u s t , if such a p r o d u c t is to be a n a t u r a l p r o d -
uct, e i t h e r p r e s u p p o s e o r g a n i z e d m a t t e r as t h e i n s t r u m e n t of
t h a t soul, which d o e s not m a k e the soul a whit m o r e com-
p r e h e n s i b l e , o r r e g a r d t h e soul as artificer of this s t r u c t u r e ,
a n d so r e m o v e t h e p r o d u c t from (corporeal) n a t u r e . 2 4

K a n t did n o t believe e i t h e r of t h e two versions of hylozoism could

s t a n d u p to r i g o r o u s analysis. H e subjected t h e m to it in t h e "Dialec-
tic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " B u t if all these alternatives failed,
was t h e r e any resolution of t h e d i l e m m a ? K a n t believed t h e r e was
o n e last o u t : " T h e c o n c e p t of a t h i n g as in itself a n a t u r a l p u r p o s e is
. . . n o constitutive c o n c e p t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g or of reason, b u t it
can serve as a regulative c o n c e p t for t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , to
g u i d e o u r investigation a b o u t objects of this kind by a distant anal-
ogy with o u r o w n c a u s a l i t y . " Driven to a d m i t that it was impossi-
25

ble for m a n to see o r g a n i s m s o t h e r t h a n as n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s , K a n t

h e l d t h a t this necessity lay in our projection, n o t their n a t u r e . 2 6

The "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment": The Methodological Portion

T h e "Dialectic" t u r n s o n two distinctions, t h a t between a subjective

m a x i m a n d a n objective principle, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h a t be-
tween a reflective a n d a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , o n t h e other. A r e -
flective j u d g m e n t is only a subjective r e c o u r s e , a n d its w a r r a n t is
c o n s e q u e n t l y only a subjective m a x i m . A d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , a
" j u d g m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e " in Kant's earlier l a n g u a g e , has t h e full
w a r r a n t of a n objective principle. K a n t a r g u e d t h a t r e a s o n fell into
dialectical e r r o r w h e n it took a subjective m a x i m as a n objective
principle, o r a reflective j u d g m e n t for a d e t e r m i n a n t o n e . B u t t h e 2 7

m a t t e r is n o t so simple.
T h e resolution of Kant's "Dialectic" h i n g e d o n conceiving of
t h e mechanistic e x p l a n a t i o n of empirical events as j u s t as m u c h a

222 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

subjective m a x i m as t h e teleological e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d this is a very
p r o b l e m a t i c idea in light of t h e "Second Analogy" of t h e First Cri-
tique. H o w a r e we to u n d e r s t a n d this move? I n his study of Kant's
c o n c e p t of teleology, M c F a r l a n d offers a n i n g e n i o u s h y p o t h e s i s . 28

H e suggests t h a t while m e c h a n i s m has t h e full w a r r a n t of validity in

its transcendental e m p l o y m e n t , constituting t h e object of possible
e x p e r i e n c e o r n a t u r e in g e n e r a l , its status alters w h e n it is b r o u g h t
to b e a r u p o n p r o b l e m s in empirical n a t u r e , a n d it t h e n stands
merely as o n e possible m a x i m of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a m o n g o t h e r s .
While it is constitutive at t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level, it is only regula-
tive at t h e empirical level.
Yet this i n g e n i o u s t h e o r y r u n s into difficulty as to t h e m e a n i n g
of a determinant j u d g m e n t at t h e empirical level. E i t h e r McFarland
m u s t d e n y it occurs at this level, which goes against Kant's text, as
M c F a r l a n d realizes, o r h e faces t h e prospect t h a t such a d e t e r m i -
n a n t j u d g m e n t c a n n o t in fact be discriminated from a reflective
j u d g m e n t in t e r m s e i t h e r of i n d u c t i o n versus specification o r of ob-
jective cognitive validity. K a n t could n o t have m e a n t this. H e never
s u r r e n d e r e d t h e belief that even in t h e empirical, a mechanistic ex-
p l a n a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e categories resulted in valid knowl-
e d g e , a n d h e n c e it was n o t merely a subjective m a x i m . It h a d a claim
to objectivity which was n e v e r accorded to reflection. It p r o d u c e d
"real," n o t " n o m i n a l " concepts, t h o u g h assertorically not apodic-
tically.
At several j u n c t u r e s in t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t "
K a n t insisted that, in t e r m s of empirical knowledge, only t h e j u d g -
m e n t of e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., only t h e e x p l a n a t i o n according to m e -
chanical causality, could p r o d u c e valid science. T h u s in 70, K a n t
w r o t e : "unless this lies at t h e basis of investigation, t h e r e can b e n o
p r o p e r k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e at a l l . " In 78, h e m a d e t h e same
29

point: "It is infinitely i m p o r t a n t for r e a s o n n o t to let slip t h e m e c h a -

nism of n a t u r e in its p r o d u c t s , a n d in t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n n o t to pass it
by, because w i t h o u t it n o insight into t h e n a t u r e of things can b e
a t t a i n e d . " A n d in 80, Kant, almost as a n aside, observed t h a t
30

w i t h o u t t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e " t h e r e can b e n o n a t u r a l science

in g e n e r a l . " H e c o n c l u d e d t h e e n t i r e "Dialectic" o n this n o t e : "We
31

s h o u l d explain all p r o d u c t s a n d occurrences in n a t u r e , even t h e

most p u r p o s i v e , by m e c h a n i s m as far as is in o u r p o w e r (the limits
of which we c a n n o t give a n account of in this kind of investiga-
t i o n ) . " T h i s was t h e "privilege" which t h e principle of m e c h a n i s m
32

enjoyed in t h e study of n a t u r e .

The Problem of Organic Form 223

 N o t only did Kant t h u s privilege empirical d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g -
m e n t s as truly scientific, b u t h e also consistently d e n i e d to empirical
reflective j u d g m e n t s any such title. T h i s is most explicit in 79. I n
that section, K a n t asked a b o u t t h e cognitive status of teleology:
"Does it b e l o n g to n a t u r a l science (properly so c a l l e d ) . . , ?" H e re-
plied: " n a t u r a l science . . . n e e d s d e t e r m i n a n t a n d not merely re-
flective principles in o r d e r to supply objective g r o u n d s for n a t u r a l
effects. I n fact, n o t h i n g is g a i n e d for the t h e o r y of n a t u r e or t h e
m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of its p h e n o m e n a by m e a n s of its effective
causes by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m as c o n n e c t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e relation
of p u r p o s e s . . . Teleology, t h e r e f o r e , as science, belongs to n o d o c -
t r i n e b u t only to c r i t i q u e . " T h a t is, it is purely subjective. Since it
33

was impossible to t h i n k of o r g a n i s m s in any m a n n e r b u t as n a t u r a l

p u r p o s e s , K a n t claimed, "the question . . . can only be w h e t h e r this
f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n is m e r e l y subjectively valid, i.e. is a m e r e
m a x i m of o u r j u d g m e n t , or w h e t h e r it is a n objective principle of
n a t u r e . " K a n t clearly believed that to h o l d t h e latter was to "con-
3 4

fuse a f u n d a m e n t a l proposition of the reflective with o n e of t h e d e -

terminant judgment." 3 5

Kant's "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " considered m e t h -

odologically, e n d s in precisely t h e same p o s t u r e for n a t u r e as a
whole as h e e n d e d t h e "Analytic" in t h e consideration of particular
o r g a n i c forms: with a "regulative" or "subjective" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
reflective j u d g m e n t in its cognitive application (teleology). T h e
question t h a t m u s t b e raised seriously is w h e t h e r this suffices. C a n
Kant's cognitive system e n d u r e t h e actuality of t h e a n o m a l y of
o r g a n i c forms within a p r e s u m a b l y systematic empirical "science"
a n d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y within a p r e s u m a b l y systematic "tran-
s c e n d e n t a l logic"? Kant's p r e s e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t resolve t h e di-
l e m m a it uncovers, b u t only offers t h e u n p l e a s a n t b u t ostensibly
ineluctable e x p e d i e n t of " t h i n k i n g " a b o u t actual p r o b l e m s of na-
t u r e in t e r m s which violate f u n d a m e n t a l l y t h e principle of his o w n
science a n d epistemology. If, as h e c o n t e n d e d , t h e analogy with
p u r p o s e was a weak projection, c o n t i n g e n t u p o n o u r discursive-
ness, a n d o n e , m o r e o v e r , which did n o t fully fit t h e case, a n d if, fur-
ther, h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e with reason suggested a capacity for
intrinsic self-determination as a n actual force in the world, however
" n o u m e n a l " its origins, t h e force of Kant's o w n a r g u m e n t t h r u s t s
us, willy-nilly, into considerations which m u s t revise his notions of
science a n d of epistemology toward a m o r e inclusive frame of ref-
erence.

224 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

The Intrusion of Metaphysics

K a n t wished to k e e p o p e n t h e possibility of teleological j u d g m e n t s

a b o u t n a t u r e in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " n o t
merely because t h e p r o b l e m of o r g a n i c form could find n o o t h e r
c o h e r e n t r e s o l u t i o n s i n c e in fact even his o w n p r o p o s a l offered
only a l a m e resolution which e x p o s e d all t h e weaknesses of discur-
sive r e a s o n i n g b u t because it offered, over a n d above its empirical
assistance, a very i m p o r t a n t set of metaphysical c o n c o m m i t a n t s .
"[I]t is at least possible to consider t h e material world as m e r e p h e -
n o m e n o n a n d to think as its substrate s o m e t h i n g like a t h i n g in
itself (which is n o t p h e n o m e n o n ) , a n d to attach to this a corre-
s p o n d i n g intellectual intuition (even t h o u g h it is not ours). T h u s
t h e r e would b e , a l t h o u g h incognizable by us, a supersensible real
g r o u n d for n a t u r e , to which we ourselves b e l o n g . " T h a t was t h e
36

real p o i n t of t h e "Dialectic." K a n t a i m e d not at the "conflict" of e m -

pirical research m a x i m s b u t r a t h e r at t h e issue of plausible m e t a -
physics of n a t u r e as a whole.
T h e issue of o r g a n i c form r e n e w e d in a n even m o r e intense
form t h e question of t h e objectivity of purposiveness in n a t u r e
which reflective j u d g m e n t h a d e n c o u n t e r e d in the idea of the tech-
nic of n a t u r e as a whole. T h e m e r e existence of one n a t u r a l p u r -
p o s e , K a n t a r g u e d , r e q u i r e d a reconsideration of the entirety of
n a t u r e as a system of laws: "if we o n c e refer action of this sort on the
whole to a n y supersensible g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t i o n b e y o n d t h e
blind m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e , we m u s t j u d g e it a l t o g e t h e r according
to this principle," Kant w r o t e . " B u t this concept leads necessarily
3 7

to the idea of collective n a t u r e as a system in accordance with t h e

r u l e of p u r p o s e s , to which idea all t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e m u s t b e
s u b o r d i n a t e d . " Such a system would have its g r o u n d b e y o n d na-
38

t u r e , for only this would p e r m i t b o t h a mechanical a n d a teleologi-

cal principle of j u d g m e n t to be viable in the conception of n a t u r a l
objects: " T h e principle which should r e n d e r possible t h e com-
patibility of b o t h in j u d g i n g of n a t u r e m u s t be placed in that which
lies outside b o t h (and consequently outside t h e possible empirical
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of n a t u r e ) , b u t yet contains their g r o u n d , i.e. in the
supersensible." 39

W i t h these a r g u m e n t s a b o u t t h e supersensible, t h e ultimate

consideration b e h i n d Kant's interest in biological science a n d in
teleology at last comes to t h e forefront: his c o n c e r n with theology,
with t h e c o n c e p t i o n of a n intelligent creator. " T h e n a t u r a l things

The Problem of Organic Form 225

t h a t we find possible only as p u r p o s e s supply t h e best p r o o f of the
c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e w o r l d - w h o l e . " H e r e is t h e g r a n d t e m p t a t i o n to
40

metaphysics. " T h e r e is, t h e n , i n d e e d a certain p r e s e n t i m e n t of o u r

r e a s o n o r a hint, as it were, given u s by n a t u r e , that, by m e a n s of this
c o n c e p t of final causes, we g o b e y o n d n a t u r e a n d could u n i t e it to
t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t in t h e series of c a u s e s . " I n a word, "teleology. . .
41

finds t h e c o n s u m m a t i o n of its investigations only in t h e o l o g y . " O f 42

course this is "dialectical"a n a t u r a l e r r o r of r e a s o n which carries

it b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s of its legitimate authority. A n d yet, as t h e "Di-
alectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " reveals, it is for K a n t a n inescap-
able speculative u r g e w h o s e very frustration should serve as a
useful p r o p a e d e u t i c to m a n ' s reflection o n his own being-in-the-
w o r l d m o r a l considerations t h a t lead o n c e again, but, in Kant's
view, with legitimacy, b e y o n d t h e p h e n o m e n a l world (i.e., "eth-
icotheology"). 43

K a n t d e n i e d t h e n o t i o n of n a t u r e as living, as an active subject

"in-and-for-itself," a d a m a n t l y . First, h e refused to believe we could
know n a t u r e as a whole. Second, h e a r g u e d we could barely "think"
of n a t u r e as a whole as a p u r p o s e . If we did so, we could not t h i n k it
an intrinsic o r real p u r p o s e , i.e., h e d e n i e d that we could even t h i n k
of n a t u r e as alive: "the possibility of living m a t t e r c a n n o t even be
t h o u g h t ; its c o n c e p t involves a contradiction, because lifelessness,
inertia, constitutes t h e essential c h a r a c t e r of m a t t e r . " K a n t in- 44

sisted that "life m e a n s t h e capacity of a substance to d e t e r m i n e itself

to act from a n i n t e r n a l principle, of a finite substance to d e t e r m i n e
itself to c h a n g e , a n d of a material substance to d e t e r m i n e itself to
m o t i o n o r rest as c h a n g e of its s t a t e . " T h e only p o w e r capable of
45

such self-determination, K a n t went on, was intelligent will. Intel-

ligent will could n e v e r b e f o u n d in p h e n o m e n a ; it did n o t exist in
n a t u r e . It b e l o n g e d to n o u m e n a . Even m a n , a being of t h e n a t u r a l
o r d e r , only h a d "life" by virtue of his o t h e r , n o u m e n a l a s p e c t . 46

T h e philosophical p r o b l e m of this "purposiveness of n a t u r e , "

K a n t insisted, allowed only o n e solution: a t r a n s c e n d e n t creator.
T h e r e w e r e only two alternatives. Either consciousness h a d to a d -
mit t h a t n a t u r e was capable of intrinsic purposiveness, o r o n e h a d
to a s s u m e a s u p e r n a t u r a l creator. Consequently, K a n t believed
m a n could only c o m p r e h e n d t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e t h r o u g h
a projection of actual p u r p o s e b e y o n d n a t u r e o n t o a t r a n s c e n d e n t
a n d considerably s u p e r i o r intelligence. I n iv of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n
to t h e Third Critique, h e w r o t e : "particular empirical laws, in respect
of w h a t is in t h e m left u n d e t e r m i n e d by these universal laws, m u s t
b e c o n s i d e r e d in a c c o r d a n c e with such a unity as they would have if

226 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( a l t h o u g h not o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) h a d fur-
n i s h e d t h e m to o u r cognitive faculties, so as to m a k e possible a sys-
t e m of e x p e r i e n c e a c c o r d i n g to particular laws of n a t u r e . " T o4 7

deal with the p a r a d o x e s which organic form posed for conscious-

ness, K a n t f o u n d p r o f o u n d l y attractive, even if merely conjectural,
a notion we m i g h t t e r m "nature-for-God." I n Kant's words, "Na-
t u r e is n o l o n g e r estimated as it a p p e a r s like art, b u t r a t h e r in so far
as it actually is art, t h o u g h s u p e r h u m a n a r t . " Such "physico-
4 8

theology" was inevitable for m a n ' s discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Kant

claimed. T h i s conjecture of a Nature-for-God c a m e to formulation
via t h e analogy of purposiveness. " O u r reason has in its p o w e r for
t h e j u d g m e n t n o o t h e r principle of t h e possibility of t h e object,
which it inevitably j u d g e s teleologically, t h a n t h a t of s u b o r d i n a t i n g
t h e m e c h a n i s m of n a t u r e to t h e architectonic of a n intelligent A u -
t h o r of t h e w o r l d . "
49

Kant's willingness to articulate these speculative notions can-

n o t b e e x p l a i n e d entirely in t e r m s of t h e scientific o r epistemologi-
cal q u a n d a r y into which the p r o b l e m of o r g a n i c form p l u n g e d
discursive r e a s o n . Rather, it is crucial to b r i n g into consideration
s o m e powerful c o n t e x t u a l forces which were driving h i m toward
t h e articulation a n d defense of a series of theological a n d m o r a l
c o m m i t m e n t s of a definitely metaphysical n a t u r e . T h e key to
Kant's metaphysical a d v e n t u r e in t h e Critique of Judgment is t h e
n e e d to r e s p o n d to a powerful new metaphysical vision which was
catching the i m a g i n a t i o n of G e r m a n y in t h e second half of t h e
1780s: Spinozist p a n t h e i s m . T h e issue t h a t m u s t b e carried forward
into t h a t context is w h e t h e r K a n t h a d compellingly refuted hylozo-
ism a n d w h e t h e r his o w n position was c o h e r e n t , either e p i s t e m o -
logically o r scientifically, i.e., in t e r m s of t h e exhaustiveness of his
concept of causality in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic, o r in t e r m s of t h e possi-
bility of empirical-scientific accounts of organisms.

The Problem of Organic Form 227

 ISF 3
Eleven

T H E PANTHEISM CONTROVERSY
AND T H E THIRD CRITIQUE

T
h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy arose in A u g u s t 1785, w h e n
Friedrich Jacobi published a slender volume i n t e n d e d to
create a scandal over Lessing's alleged Spinozism a n d
a t h e i s m . At t h e e n d of S e p t e m b e r , Mendelssohn p u b -
1

lished Morgenstunden, with c h a p t e r s d e v o t e d to t h e question of

Lessing's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d S p i n o z a . T h e resulting controversy
2

p r o v e d to b e o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t events in G e r m a n intellec-

tual life. It is only n o w b e g i n n i n g to receive t h e recognition it d e -
3

serves. Frederick Beiser's r e c e n t history of G e r m a n philosophy in

t h e d e c a d e after t h e First Critique is a notable effort to d o justice to
t h e c o n t r o v e r s y . Beiser conceives it as h a v i n g t h r e e levels of signifi-
4

c a n c e . T h e surface issue concerns Lessing's religious loyalties in

5

t h e context of t h e rationalism of the A u f k l r u n g . B e n e a t h t h a t is

t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p r o p e r exegesis of Spinoza's philosophy. B u t
Beiser a r g u e s correctly t h a t t h e " i n n e r c o r e " of t h e controversy is
t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e "authority of reason," i.e., w h e t h e r philosophy
was capable of salvaging a m e a n i n g f u l c o s m o s . 6

As a major m o m e n t in t h e struggle of A u f k l r u n g against

Sturm und Drang, the P a n t h e i s m Controversy inevitably affected
I m m a n u e l Kant. "Spinozism" was a symbol for two crucial issues
of t h e a g e : " m o d e r n scientific n a t u r a l i s m " as " u n c o m p r o m i s i n g
m e c h a n i s m , " a n d criticism of traditional authority, b o t h religious
a n d civil, t h r o u g h " e n l i g h t e n e d " e x a m i n a t i o n of its bases. Spinoz-
ism a p p e a l e d to e l e m e n t s in G e r m a n y i n s u r g e n t against o r t h o d o x y
in religion a n d also against t h e ancien r e g i m e in politics. T h a t n o t 7

only Spinoza's biblical a n d political criticism but also the " o r t h o -

d o x " r e a d i n g of his metaphysics certainly h a d this "radical" p o t e n -
tial has b e e n established in a wider e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n
c o n t e x t by M a r g a r e t J a c o b . Lessing's Spinozism a p p e a r e d to e m -
8

228
brace b o t h of these aspects, a n d t h a t was why it p r o v o k e d so m a n y :
"Spinozism" was so radical t h a t it t h r e a t e n e d to isolate t h e Aufkl-
r u n g from t h e s u p p o r t of t h e establishment a n d b r i n g d o w n u p o n
it t h e reprisals of o r t h o d o x religion. For Mendelssohn, Spinozism
was a d a n g e r o u s a n d e x t r e m e philosophical e n t e r p r i s e which com-
p r o m i s e d t h e security of t h e Aufklrung's progress, b u t for Jacobi
A u f k l r u n g progress itself was t h e d a n g e r , a n d Mendelssohn's ver-
sion in p a r t i c u l a r n e e d e d to b e o v e r t h r o w n .
J a c o b i insisted that it was not merely t h e "radical" form of Spin-
ozism b u t t h e entire e n t e r p r i s e of A u f k l r u n g itself which h a d to b e
r e p u d i a t e d to rescue t h e Christian c u l t u r e of G e r m a n y . In his chal-
lenge to t h e a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n a n d his a r g u m e n t for a "leap of
faith" (salto mortale), J a c o b i used Spinozism as t h e e x e m p l a r of all
consistent philosophy, which, in his view, h a d to drive its practi-
tioners to a t h o r o u g h g o i n g n i h i l i s m . T h a t such nihilism dis-
9

credited t h e a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n b o t h Jacobi a n d M e n d e l s s o h n ,
bitter rivals t h o u g h they were, a g r e e d . T h e public d i s p u t e s e e m e d
o n all sides deeply antipathetic to "Spinozism." M e n d e l s s o h n , a n d
later Kant, accepted Jacobi's claim a b o u t Spinoza a n d a r g u e d only
t h a t while Spinozism did m e r i t t h e criticism, o t h e r rational philoso-
p h y did not. M e n d e l s s o h n equivocated even a b o u t t h i s . Only 10

K a n t clearly d e f e n d e d t h e "authority of reason," b u t o n the basis of

his o w n peculiar system.
While J a c o b i a n d M e n d e l s s o h n a n d t h e r e f o r e K a n t s a w
Spinozism as a force (symbolic o r actual) driving philosophy toward
nihilism, H e r d e r , G o e t h e a n d the g e n e r a t i o n of Idealism saw Spin-
ozism as a decisive r e s o u r c e , o n c e properly r e f o r m u l a t e d , for t h e
rescue of p h i l o s o p h y from that debacle. W h a t was it in Spinoza t h a t
t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e Goethezeit f o u n d so promising? Certainly n o t
" u n c o m p r o m i s i n g m e c h a n i s m " or "atheism a n d fatalism." Instead,
they saw in his idea of "intrinsic infinity" a kind of holism which
p r o v i d e d a resolution to t h e c o n u n d r u m of m o d e r n epistemology
(in b o t h its m i n d - b o d y as well as its o n e - m a n y f o r m s ) . T h e most
11

spectacular o u t c o m e of t h e controversy was this formulation of a

heterodox i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S p i n o z a a p a n t h e i s m of a n entirely dif-
ferent sort. W h a t set it off was Lessing's notion of hen kaipan. 12
The
idea c a u g h t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n of such figures as G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r
a n d was passed o n as t h e decisive metaphysical impulse in t h e Ide-
alist g e n e r a t i o n . O f course, they believed Spinozism could only
13

work w h e n enlivened with t h e new ideas a b o u t n a t u r e which t h e

p o e t r y a n d also t h e science of t h e later e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y h a d cre-
ated.

The Pantheism Controversy 229

 U p o n first l e a r n i n g of Jacobi's disclosures a b o u t Lessing,
H e r d e r h a d w a x e d ecstatic over t h e slogan hen kai pan. H e wrote
to J a c o b i t h a t h e felt n o o n e h a d yet d e v e l o p e d t h a t e l e m e n t in
Spinoza's philosophy, a n d l a m e n t e d t h a t Lessing h a d n o t lived long
e n o u g h to d o s o . I n t h a t s a m e letter, H e r d e r disclosed a long-
1 4

s t a n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t to d r a w o u t t h e parallels a m o n g Spinoza,
Shaftesbury, a n d L e i b n i z a project which, provoked by this very
controversy, resulted in his Gott: einige Gesprche of 1787. T h e n h e
p u t forth his m a i n d i s a g r e e m e n t with Jacobi's view of Spinoza.
T h e y differed deeply, h e wrote, over t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e original
B e i n g , t h e ens entium. While J a c o b i r e a d it as e m p t y , a propertyless
g r o u n d , H e r d e r r e a d it as full, a positive infinity. Next, H e r d e r
q u e s t i o n e d t h e sense of claiming t h e u t t e r t r a n s c e n d e n c e of G o d .
G o d h a d to act in a n d t h r o u g h things to g r a n t t h e m force (Kraft)
a n d o r d e r . While h e h a d difficulties with t h e idea of a "world soul"
as Jacobi ascribed it to Lessing, because it s e e m e d to imply t h a t the
world was God's body, h e claimed that seen properly, i.e., sub specie
aeternitatis, t h e material world t u r n e d simply into the realized rea-
son of G o d .
W h a t is of interest for t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique (and also
for t h e genesis of G e r m a n Idealism) is h o w Kant followed o u t
Jacobi's r e a d i n g of Spinoza, a n d t h e r e f o r e struggled to d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t while Spinoza did lead philosophy into t h e abyss of atheism
a n d fatalism, his o w n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l idealism would not. H e m a d e
t h a t effort n o t only in his i m m e d i a t e c o m m e n t o n t h e P a n t h e i s m
C o n t r o v e r s y " W a s heit: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " b u t also
in t h e Second a n d p r e e m i n e n t l y in t h e Third Critique. For t h e same
r e a s o n s , it is j u s t as i m p o r t a n t to see h o w H e r d e r followed o u t
Lessing's r e a d i n g of Spinoza a n d struggled to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t
Spinoza did n o t lead to a t h e i s m a n d fatalism, but r a t h e r to a new
metaphysics of i m m a n e n t reason, p a n t h e i s m . H e r d e r m a d e this
case in Gott: einige Gesprche. Kant, l e a r n i n g of this d e v e l o p m e n t ,
a p p l i e d himself in t h e Third Critique v e h e m e n t l y to t h e rejection of
H e r d e r ' s vitalist p a n t h e i s m as well as to t h e refutation of Spinozist
"fatalism." T h a t was the ontological d i s p u t e which Kant u n d e r t o o k
in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . "

Kant's Involvement in the Pantheism Controversy

E m b a r k e d o n a major controversy, Jacobi t u r n e d to his wider circle

of intellectual contacts for confirmation a n d s u p p o r t . Jacobi,
H e r d e r , a n d G o e t h e m e t for a c o n f e r e n c e o n Spinoza in W e i m a r in

230 The "Critique of TeleologicalJudgment"

S e p t e m b e r 1784, b u t they failed to c o m e to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 15

C o n f r o n t e d with this refusal to see things his way, Jacobi t u r n e d

elsewhere. I n W e i m a r h e , G o e t h e , a n d H e r d e r h a d r e a d with d e -
light H a m a n n ' s Golgotha und Scheblimini, a polemic directed against
Mendelssohn's Jerusalem a n d , m o r e generally, against t h e seculariz-
i n g c u l t u r e of Berlin (and Berlin J e w s ) . Jacobi h a d already m a d e
1 6

contact with H a m a n n , with w h o m h e s h a r e d a passionate, fideistic

Christian p i e t i s m . I n N o v e m b e r 1784 h e sent t h e materials of t h e
17

controversy to H a m a n n , a n d t h e Knigsberger p r o v e d to b e t h e
stout s u p p o r t h e h a d s o u g h t in vain in G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r . I n d e e d ,
H a m a n n h a d l o n g since b e e n w a g i n g a private war with t h e
Berliners. I n J a c o b i h e saw a welcome ally for his o w n c a u s e . 18

H a m a n n a n d K a n t e n c o u n t e r e d o n e a n o t h e r in Knigsberg
society from time to time a n d e x c h a n g e d o p i n i o n s o n the c o n t e m -
p o r a r y cultural s c e n e . H a m a n n saw to it t h a t a copy of Jacobi's
19

b o o k passed t h r o u g h Kant's h a n d s . K a n t held t h e Bchlein very

briefly, b u t did r e a d i t . W h e n Jacobi pressed H a m a n n for details
20

o n Kant's r e s p o n s e to t h e work, H a m a n n replied: " K a n t was very

pleased with y o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e whole edi-
tion. H e h a d never b e e n able to m a k e sense of Spinoza's system,
a n d h e h a d a l o n g a n d w i d e - r a n g i n g conversation a b o u t it with
[Christian] K r a u s [a f u t u r e ally in t h e controversy], w h o h a d n o t yet
r e a d y o u r piece, h o w e v e r . "21

If K a n t f o u n d t h e little book of interest, o n e suspects it was be-

cause it dealt with Lessing. Certainly t h e r e is n o indication, a p a r t
from this a d h o c conversation r e p o r t e d by H a m a n n , t h a t K a n t
f o u n d it i m p o r t a n t o r that h e felt called u p o n to take u p a careful
philosophical study of S p i n o z a . Jacobi's revelations p r o v o k e d
22

radically different r e s p o n s e s from o t h e r major G e r m a n intellec-

tuals of t h e period. H a m a n n himself t u r n e d to a t h o r o u g h e x a m -
ination of Spinoza's philosophy in the winter of 178485. A few 23

m o n t h s earlier, G o e t h e a n d H e r d e r did as well. All of these figures,

a n d with t h e m M e n d e l s s o h n a n d Jacobi themselves, gave w a r r a n t
of a r d u o u s effort at the study of Spinoza's work. We find t h e s a m e
a r d o r a m o n g t h e Idealists later. We d o n o t find it in Kant. T h e r e is
n o evidence of any effort o n Kant's p a r t to study S p i n o z a . 24

T h e specific circumstance t h a t d r a g g e d K a n t into t h e bitter dis-

p u t e lies, most plausibly, in a line of a r g u m e n t which M e n d e l s s o h n
first a d v a n c e d against Jacobi, only to have h i m take it u p in his t u r n :
t h a t Spinoza's metaphysics could be formulated in Kantian t e r m s .
M e n d e l s s o h n suggested t h a t Jacobi's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was "directly
o p p o s e d to t h e system of Spinoza" as h e u n d e r s t o o d it. " W h e n you

The Pantheism Controversy 231

say t h e infinite u n i q u e substance of Spinoza h a s for itself alone a n d
o u t s i d e t h e p a r t i c u l a r things n o d e t e r m i n a t e c o m p l e t e existence,
you o v e r t h r o w for m e a l t o g e t h e r t h e c o n c e p t I h a d of Spinoz-
i s m . " H e went o n :
25

If I u n d e r s t a n d you correctly, only t h e determinately particu-

lar entities a r e actually existent things [so sind blo die bestimm-
ten einzelnen Wesen wirklich existierende Dinge]; t h e infinite, o n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , as t h e principle of actuality, arises only in t h e
aggregate, in t h e totality of all these particulars [in dem Zusam-
m e n , indem Inbegriffe aller dieser Einzelheiten]. I t i s t h u s a m e r e
collective entity which has n o o t h e r substantiality t h a n that of
t h e p a r t s of which it is c o m p o s e d . 2 6

T h a t view was i n c o h e r e n t , h e c h a r g e d . W h e r e was the unity of the

manifold? It could n o t be in t h e particular p a r t s , which existed only
in themselves. H e n c e it could n o t arise by their m e r e s u m m a t i o n .
T h e r e h a d to be a prior whole, "a truly t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity." T h e
n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l whole as a p r i o r unity has a clearly Kan-
tian ring. By this point, M e n d e l s s o h n h a d e n c o u n t e r e d ( t h o u g h , by
his o w n admission, n o t m a s t e r e d ) Kant's First Critique. T a k i n g u p
Mendelssohn's hint, J a c o b i linked Kant with Spinoza. For h i m all
p h i l o s o p h y r e q u i r e d t a r r i n g with the s a m e b r u s h . Jacobi's Bchlein
claimed in a footnote t h a t passages in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
" a r e completely in t h e spirit of S p i n o z a . " Such a claim d r e w d o w n
27

o n J a c o b i a bee s w a r m of protest from t h e K a n t i a n s . Eventually it

28

even forced K a n t to take u p t h e whole matter.

O n O c t o b e r 16, 1785, M e n d e l s s o h n sent K a n t a copy of
Morgenstunden with a cover letter explaining his position in t h e con-
troversy. M e n d e l s s o h n a p p e a l e d to Kant as a s u p p o r t e r of the Auf-
k l r u n g : "I fear t h a t philosophy has its fanatics [Schwrmer] w h o
p e r s e c u t e j u s t as v e h e m e n t l y a n d seem even m o r e intent u p o n
proselytizing t h a n the fanatics of positive r e l i g i o n . " While-
29

Mendelssohn's letter m a d e a n impression o n Kant, t h e book with

which it arrived m a d e a n even s t r o n g e r o n e . Morgenstunden, as a
major philosophical effort to restate the rationalist a r g u m e n t s in
theology which Kant h a d refuted in t h e First Critique, did concern
K a n t directly in a way t h a t Jacobi's Spinoza-Bchlein did n o t yet seem
to d o . H e f o u n d t h e work, especially with its n o t o r i o u s prefatory
r e m a r k s labeling h i m alles-zermalmende"all-destroying"a direct
challenge, a n d for a time h e e n t e r t a i n e d the notion of writing a re-
s p o n s e . Kant's new disciples, including the energetic Christian
Schtz, p r o t e s t e d that s o m e p e o p l e c o n s i d e r e d Morgenstunden a re-

232 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

buttal to Kant's First Critique, a n d asked Kant to take M e n d e l s s o h n
to task for his failure to c o m p r e h e n d t h e critical p h i l o s o p h y . I n 30

t h e a u t u m n of 1785 it a p p e a r e d that K a n t would d o j u s t that.

H a m a n n was delighted with this prospect a n d s p r e a d t h e news vig-
o r o u s l y . H e felt it could only h e l p Jacobi's cause. B u t instead, at
31

t h e e n d of N o v e m b e r , K a n t wrote a letter back to Schtz in which

h e p r e s e n t e d a very gracious r e a d i n g of Mendelssohn's work, u r g -
i n g t h e disciples of t h e critical philosophy to apply constructive crit-
icism to it as "the last t e s t a m e n t of d o g m a t i c metaphysics a n d at t h e
s a m e time its most perfect p r o d u c t . " Schtz published Kant's let-
32

ter a l o n g with his o w n review of Morgenstunden a l o n g the lines Kant

h a d indicated.
J a c o b i was d i s a p p o i n t e d to h e a r this, b u t his p r i m a r y c o n c e r n
was still to ascertain Kant's r e s p o n s e to his o w n work, to his inter-
p r e t a t i o n of Spinoza. Writing to H a m a n n o n N o v e m b e r 18, Jacobi
n o t e d t h a t t h e latter h a d n e v e r elaborated o n Kant's impressions of
t h e Spinoza-Bchlein. Jacobi w a n t e d to know m o r e a b o u t Kant's
p o s i t i o n . H a m a n n a n s w e r e d o n N o v e m b e r 30: "Kant has admit-
33

ted to m e t h a t h e has n e v e r studied Spinoza a n d , b e i n g so t a k e n u p

with his own system, that h e has n e i t h e r desire n o r time to get in-
volved with a n y o n e e l s e ' s . " H a m a n n r e a s s u r e d Jacobi t h a t K a n t
34

liked his work, a n d left it at that. Kant simply h a d n o t h i n g m o r e to

say a b o u t it in 1785.
T h i n g s b e g a n to c h a n g e in J a n u a r y 1786, w h e n word of
Mendelssohn's s u d d e n d e a t h r e a c h e d Knigsberg. Simultaneously,
t h e latter's last literary endeavor, To the Friends of Lessing, a brief b u t
passionate r e p u d i a t i o n of Jacobi's book, was published by his liter-
ary e x e c u t o r s . T h e controversy took o n a far m o r e p e r s o n a l
35

a n d bitter t o n e as c h a r g e s were aired that Jacobi's e x p o s e h a d

h a s t e n e d t h e d e a t h of M e n d e l s s o h n . T h e Berlin circle took u p
Mendelssohn's cause with v e h e m e n c e : Nicolai at the Allgemeine
Deutsche Bibliothek, J o h a n n Erich Biester at t h e Berlinische Mon-
atsschrift, a n d t h e literary executors of the late philosopher, a m o n g
t h e m M a r c u s H e r z , Kant's f o r m e r s t u d e n t a n d g o o d friend. Bies-
ter, too, was a close friend a n d the publisher of most of Kant's p o p -
u l a r e s s a y s . B o t h Biester a n d H e r z t u r n e d to K a n t asking h i m , as
36

a n ally of t h e Berlin A u f k l r u n g , to take u p Mendelssohn's cause

against J a c o b i . I n r e p o n s e to Herz's plea for his intervention,
3 7

K a n t gave vent to his maximal p i q u e with Jacobi o n April 7, 1785:

" T h e J a c o b i a n farce is n o serious matter, b u t only affected genius-
cultism [Genieschwrmerei], d e s i g n e d to m a k e a n a m e for himself
a n d t h e r e f o r e hardly worthy of a n e a r n e s t refutation. Maybe I

The Pantheism Controversy 233

m i g h t d o s o m e t h i n g for t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift to expose this
h o c u s - p o c u s [Gaukelwerk]." 38
S t r o n g l a n g u a g e : the Berliners
s e e m e d a b o u t to win h i m to t h e i r side. H a m a n n a n d Jacobi recog-
nized t h e shift in t h e wind, a n d Jacobi b e g a n to press H a m a n n for
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Kant's attitude, fearing t h a t h e would now be-
c o m e t h e target of Kant's i r e . 3 9

O n F e b r u a r y 11, t h e J e n a Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung had

carried a n a n n o u n c e m e n t of Jacobi's work, probably by Schtz,
furious over Jacobi's cavalier association of K a n t with Spin-
ozism. Schtz directed a letter to K a n t to t h e same effect in t h a t
month. 4 0
J a c o b i realized h e h a d e r r e d badly, e x p l a i n i n g to
H a m a n n in a letter d a t e d M a r c h 24 that h e h a d referred to Kant in
t h e Bchlein w i t h o u t sufficient discretion. B u t his anxiety took o n
t o n e s of belligerence as well: "I would b e very sorry if Kant j o i n e d
t h e p a r t y of t h e Berlin m o n g r e l - d o g s [Lumpenhunde], a n d h e would
r e g r e t it p r e t t y m u c h in t h e e n d , for s u r e . " Jacobi worried a b o u t
4 1

Kant's a t t i t u d e n o t only to t h e work already published b u t also to

t h e work h e was a b o u t to publish: Wider Mendelssohns Beschul-
digungen (April 1786). " I n any case," J a c o b i wrote, "this time h e
s h o u l d n o t have any cause to c o m p l a i n a b o u t m e . " 4 2

I n d e e d , n o l o n g e r did Jacobi associate K a n t with Spinozism o r

a t h e i s m ; his new book invoked Kant's philosophy for its d e m o n -
stration of t h e p r o p e r limits of speculative p h i l o s o p h y a n d its rec-
o g n i t i o n of t h e rightful s p h e r e of belief. H e sent H a m a n n a copy
43

for K a n t "if you think it good." O n May 5, J a c o b i a d d e d : "If K a n t is

n o t entirely h a p p y with o n e o r two places, p o i n t o u t to him t h a t h e
s h o u l d k e e p his disciples in J e n a a n d G o t h a in line. T h e s e epigoni
really d o n o t d o h i m m u c h c r e d i t . " Jacobi h a d a s h a r p eye for
44

Kant's o n g o i n g efforts to build u p a following, c o m p l a i n i n g in a n

earlier letter, "his relations with t h e Berliners a n d t h e J e n a p e o p l e
a p p e a r to m e to betray s o m e t h i n g (wanting) petty in his char-
acter." 45

H a m a n n passed o n Jacobi's second p a m p h l e t to Kant as h e h a d

b e e n asked, a n d , o n May 2 8 , r e p o r t e d to Jacobi a conversation h e
h a d h a d with K a n t a b o u t t h e book. H a m a n n h a d asked K a n t if h e
was irked at Jacobi's references to h i m in t h e new work. " H e assured
m e t h e o p p o s i t e was t h e case a n d a p p e a r e d to b e perfectly content
with y o u r b o o k . " H a m a n n c o n c l u d e d t h a t Jacobi h a d n o t h i n g to
46

fear; K a n t would r e m a i n n e u t r a l . Certainly H a m a n n ' s assessment

of K a n t was correct. H e did n o t want to e n t e r into polemics o n ei-
t h e r side. H e did n o t w a n t to be involved at all. T h e question t h e n

234 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

arises: Why, in view of this, did Kant feel c o m p e l l e d to write "Was
heit: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " T h e answer is, simply, to d e -
fend his o w n philosophy. Letters from his closest s u p p o r t e r s a n d
friends convinced h i m over t h e late s p r i n g a n d s u m m e r of 1786
t h a t n o t only J a c o b i b u t also M e n d e l s s o h n w e r e misleading t h e
public a b o u t t h e critical philosophy. Christian Schtz b e c a m e agi-
tated at t h e liberties t a k e n with Kantianism by Jacobi's latest d e -
fender, t h e still-anonymous a u t h o r of Resultate der Jacobischen und
Mendelssohnschen Philosophie, T h o m a s W i z e n m a n n . Schtz wrote a
h a r s h review of t h e w o r k . At t h e same time, L u d w i g H e i n r i c h
47

J a k o b a l a r m e d K a n t over t h e impact of Mendelssohn's work: "in

s o m e reviews t h e impression is quite clearly c r e a t e d t h a t t h r o u g h
this text [i.e., Morgenstunden] t h e K a n t i a n Critique has received n o
slight blow, which in my o p i n i o n proves clearly t h a t t h e Critique is
still only b e i n g s k i m m e d over, n o t studied t h o r o u g h l y . "48

B u t n e i t h e r Schtz n o r J a k o b knew h o w to trigger Kant's fears

t h e way his l o n g t i m e associate a n d editor Biester did. It is Biester's
letter of J u n e 11, 1786 which p r o v e d the precipitating cause of
Kant's i n t e r v e n t i o n . F r o m Biester's letter it is clear that h e h a d
49

studied Kant's reply to M a r c u s H e r z of April 1786. It is also fairly

clear t h a t Biester gave considerable t h o u g h t to t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
his case. H e knew what would seem vital to Kant, a n d w h e r e his ulti-
m a t e solidarity with t h e Berlin point of view lay. T h u s Biester dis-
t i n g u i s h e d two issues in t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy: t h e first con-
c e r n e d Lessing's alleged atheism a n d Mendelssohn's culpability in
covering it u p ; t h e second c o n c e r n e d the relation of reason to r e -
ligion (i.e., w h a t Beiser has t e r m e d t h e "authority of reason").
O n t h e first issue Biester was p r e p a r e d to m a k e wholesale con-
cessions. "I m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e , " h e wrote, "that after what H e r r
J a c o b i has p r e s e n t e d in his latest piece o n Lessing, it seems to m e
very p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e latter did incline t o w a r d a t h e i s m . " As
50

for M e n d e l s s o h n , to j u d g e his intentions was m o r e complex, a n d

Biester claimed t h a t Jacobi very likely withheld information a b o u t
t h e precise u n f o l d i n g of their discussions. B u t Biester was even
willing to a d m i t t h a t M e n d e l s s o h n m i g h t have s h o w n some per-
sonal weakness. M e n d e l s s o h n was not above flaws. O n e of t h e most
o u t r a g e o u s claims of Jacobi a n d his ilk was that Berliners h a d
t u r n e d M e n d e l s s o h n into a n "idol." T h i s was u n t r u e ; t h e very m e n
w h o rose to his defense against the slurs of J a c o b i h a d a r g u e d vig-
orously with h i m over his philosophy. Berlin was a context of free
d i s a g r e e m e n t a n d d e b a t e , a n d all the talk of a "Berlin way of think-

The Pantheism Controversy 235

i n g " which implied t h e c o n t r a r y was slander. Yet even this Biester,
t h o u g h n o w personally involved, declared himself p r e p a r e d to set
aside.
W h a t h e could n o t set aside, what led h i m to t u r n to Kant to
fulfill w h a t t h e latter h a d p r o m i s e d , was a c o n c e r n for t h e p r o p e r
e s t e e m of philosophy a n d t r u t h . F o r Biester, Jacobi a n d his clique
r e p r e s e n t e d at o n e a n d t h e s a m e t i m e t h e two g r e a t delusions of the
e p o c h : religious fanaticism a n d atheism. It was, Biester claimed,
"a miraculously s t r a n g e o c c u r r e n c e t h a t b o t h confusions of t h e
h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g s h o u l d b e so unified in these new sophists
[Schwindelkpfen]." 51
Biester h e l p s m a k e clear t h e confusion Jacobi
c r e a t e d by his s i m u l t a n e o u s e n t h u s i a s m for Spinoza as philosophy
a n d c o n d e m n a t i o n of that philosophy for t h e sake of religious
faith. W h a t Jacobi r e p r e s e n t e d , a c c o r d i n g to Biester, was "the u n -
d e r m i n i n g a n d m o c k e r y of every rational theory of G o d , t h e
celebration a n d virtual idolatry of Spinoza's i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e
c h i m e r a s , a n d t h e i n t o l e r a n t directive to take u p a positive religion
as t h e only necessary a n d at t h e same t i m e t h e only available way
o u t for any rational m a n . " For Biester, this a m o u n t e d to "affected
5 2

genius-cultism." J a c o b i was o u t "to m a k e himself i m p o r t a n t . "

T h e p h r a s e s a r e K a n t ' s f r o m t h e H e r z l e t t e r . W i t h those
53

p h r a s e s e c h o i n g a b o u t , Biester b e c a m e effusive a b o u t t h e salutary

result of Kant's prospective intervention: "I wish that m e n w h o
have h i t h e r t o held t h e h e l m in philosophy a n d to w h o m t h e entire
public t u r n s in grateful recognition as d e p e n d a b l e a n d experi-
e n c e d leaders w o u l d publicly declare themselves against all this, so
that r e a d e r s will not b e led astray by ungifted a n d unqualified navi-
gators a n d d a s h e d u p o n t h e reefs." T h a t m i g h t have sufficed, but
Biester h a d m o r e . Now h e t u r n e d to t h e scandalous use Jacobi h a d
m a d e of Kantian philosophy, which m a d e it imperative "on prin-
ciple a n d for t h e r e a s s u r a n c e of y o u r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s " for Kant to
disassociate himself from Jacobi.

W h e n r e a d e r s find t h a t a writer in every s p h e r e defiant of

t r u t h a n d i n n o c e n c e has taken you as a s u p p o r t i n g witness,
they d o n ' t know what to think, a n d in the e n d c o m e to believe
his claims. I can assure you t h a t this is already the case with
m a n y very respectable p e o p l e , w h o have b e e n misled in this
m a n n e r . T h e r e is n o m o r e odious accusation that a n e n -
l i g h t e n e d p h i l o s o p h e r can e n d u r e t h a n t h a t his principles fos-
ter overt dogmatic atheism, a n d t h e r e b y [religious] fanaticism
[Schwrmerei]. Fanaticism via atheism! T h a t is Jacobi's doctrine,

236 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment

 a n d h e is n o t d a u n t e d from trying to d e l u d e t h e world into
t h i n k i n g J>OM a g r e e with h i m .5 4

Biester called u p o n his old friend a n d e s t e e m e d colleague to follow

t h r o u g h o n his p l e d g e to a d d r e s s the matter, above all for t h e sake
of t h e public, a n d to state firmly that h e "has never b e e n a m e m b e r
of t h e Christian society for t h e a d v a n c e m e n t of atheism a n d fanati-
cism." H e recognized t h a t K a n t h a t e d polemics, b u t insisted t h a t
this m a t t e r h a d to override such scruples. T h e last t h i n g K a n t
would want, h e a d d e d as a final t o u c h , well aware of t h e c h a n g e in
t o n e t o w a r d K a n t in Jacobi's latest work, was for t h e public to
surmise t h a t h e withheld criticism because J a c o b i h a d publicly
praised h i m .
As a g o a d to Kant, that letter h a d to b e a m i n o r masterpiece.
Kant felt himself c o n s t r a i n e d to address the issue. B u t in fact, h e
had b e e n s o m e w h a t mollified by Jacobi's praise. A n d h e did h a t e p o -
lemics. A n d M e n d e l s s o h n , too, s e e m e d to be confusing the public
a b o u t t h e t r u e merits of t h e critical philosophy. W h e n , in J u l y 1786,
K a n t sat d o w n to write "Was heit: sich im D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " all
these considerations i n t e r v e n e d . Above all, Kant saw his p u r p o s e
as t h e clarification of his o w n philosophy in contrast to b o t h of t h e
d i s p u t a n t s . I n t h a t p u r p o s e t h e r e lay virtually n o interest in t h e
substantive issues of Spinoza's philosophy itself o r of Lessing's re-
ligious stance. H e was exclusively interested in t h e question of t h e
" a u t h o r i t y of r e a s o n . "
55

Kant's "Was heit: sich im Denken orientieren?"

K a n t set o u t in "Was heit" from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e discursive

c h a r a c t e r of h u m a n consciousness, in which concepts w i t h o u t sense
intuition could g e n e r a t e n o objective validity. T o be s u r e , even
56

abstracted from sense intuition, they could still have formal useful-
ness, K a n t a r g u e d . H e p o i n t e d n o t only to logic, whose p r e e m i n e n t
d o m a i n this was, b u t also to m a x i m s of m e t h o d o l o g y in i n t e r p r e t a -
tive science (i.e., "regulative" ideas of reason). At issue, h e went
on, was w h e t h e r b e y o n d these formal a n d heuristic uses, concepts
abstracted from e x p e r i e n c e could yield valid insight. T r a d i t i o n a l
d o g m a t i c metaphysics h a d u p h e l d t h e view that they could, a n d
Moses M e n d e l s s o h n h a d long aligned himself with this stance. In-
d e e d , his o w n rational theology d e p e n d e d o n it. B u t in his con-
troversy with Jacobi, Kant n o t e d , Mendelssohn h a d c o m e to believe
that this speculative r e a s o n n e e d e d t h e g u i d a n c e of c o m m o n sense

The Pantheism Controversy 237

to h e l p "orient" i t . Alas, t h a t move n o t only u n d e r c u t t h e a u t h o r -
57

ity of speculative r e a s o n , b u t it also o p e n e d t h e way to "enthusiasm

a n d t h e total d e t h r o n i n g of reason." T o b e sure, t h a t was not
M e n d e l s s o h n ' s i n t e n t , a n d K a n t a g r e e d with him in resisting t h e
claim t h a t r e a s o n s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d in favor of i m m e d i a t e belief
g r o u n d e d in tradition o r revelation. Reason r e m a i n e d the only r e -
c o u r s e in j u d g m e n t . Yet K a n t a d d e d t h a t r e a s o n h a d to be cog-
nizant of its o w n limits. T h a t was t h e sense of "orientation" t h a t h e
himself wished to advocate.
T h i s rational p r o b l e m of o r i e n t a t i o n in t h e utterly obscure
r e a l m of t h e supersensible, w h e r e concepts h a d n o e x p e r i e n c e to
rely u p o n to establish objective validity, could only be resolved by a
subjective r e c o u r s e . B u t far from implying a salto mortale in this,
K a n t c o n n e c t e d it r a t h e r to t h e "feeling of reason's own r e q u i r e -
m e n t [das Gefhl des der Vernunft eigenen Bedrfnisses]." 58
H e charac-
terized this process as o n e in which r e a s o n b r o u g h t its j u d g m e n t s
u n d e r d e t e r m i n a t e m a x i m s "solely a c c o r d i n g to a subjective g r o u n d
of discrimination of its own faculty ofj u d g m e n t [lediglich nach einem
subjektiven Unterscheidungsgrunde in der Bestimmung ihres eigenen
Urteilsvermgens]." 59
T h e s e two passages a r e of decisive i m p o r -
t a n c e in d i s c e r n i n g t h e distance K a n t h a d c o m e in his stance o n
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l faculties a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n s since t h e
First Critique. In describing this d o m a i n , which in the First Critique
f o u n d articulation in t h e l a n g u a g e of r e a s o n a n d its "regulative"
function, K a n t n o w w r o t e of " j u d g m e n t " a n d a "faculty of j u d g -
m e n t , " anticipating t h e v a n t a g e a d o p t e d in t h e Third Critique. T h e
anticipatory relation looms even m o r e strongly w h e n we e x a m i n e
t h e two crucial t e r m s "feeling" (Gefhl) a n d " r e q u i r e m e n t " (Bed-
rfnis) which K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in the article.
K a n t clarified his formulation in a footnote s o m e w h a t later in
t h e essay in t h e following t e r m s : "Reason does not feel; it recog-
nizes its s h o r t c o m i n g [Mangel] a n d incites [wirkt] via t h e drive for
knowledge [Erkenntnistrieb] t h e feeling of a n e e d [Bedrfnisbetter
r e n d e r e d as requirement]." 60
Kant went o n in t h e footnote to com-
p a r e this to his n o t i o n of the " m o r a l feeling" in the crucial sense
that the feeling is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e , not t h e instigator, of r e a s o n . 61

We find ourselves in t h e i n n e r m o s t r e a c h e s of Kantian p h e -

n o m e n o l o g y of subjective consciousness: t h e relation a m o n g t h e
subjective faculties. Reason e n g e n d e r s a feeling, b u t it does so for
r e a s o n s of its o w n : that is why Bedrfnis m u s t n o t be r e a d too liter-
ally as itself a feeling o r n e e d . Reason has a n i m m a n e n t , transcen-
dentally p r i o r p r o p e n s i t y to systematicity, to totality, to logical

238 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

closure. T h i s i m m a n e n t principle regulates t h e e n t i r e function of
t h e m i n d f e e l i n g , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d r e a s o n itself. It is this
which m a k e s k n o w l e d g e a "drive." It is this which s p u r s imagina-
tion to visions of c o h e r e n c e in t h e world a n d in t h e self. T h e con-
nection of this relentless law of r e a s o n with t h e p r o c e e d i n g s of t h e
o t h e r faculties, I submit, forms t h e systematic f o u n d a t i o n for
Kant's Third Critique.
62

I n t h e absence of any objective reference, r e a s o n tries to find

t h e next closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n . If it c a n n o t form a d e t e r m i n a t e in-
sight into its supersensible object, it tries to reason a b o u t the relation
of this object to t h e objects of e x p e r i e n c e , a n d to b r i n g this relation
u n d e r logical rules. H e n c e analogy is t h e rational form of orienta-
tion in t h e r e a l m of t h e supersensible. Analogy c a n n o t establish ex-
istence; only sense intuition can provide this. Nevertheless, t h e r e
a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e m i n d to which n o sense intuition c o r r e -
s p o n d s . O n e such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n without c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in sense
intuition m u s t d r a w o u r a t t e n t i o n : "the c o n c e p t of a n original
b e i n g , as t h e highest intelligence a n d at t h e s a m e time t h e highest
g o o d . " T h i s n o t i o n of a n ens realissimum o r ens perfectissimum, K a n t
6 3

a r g u e s , is a necessary idea for o u r rational process. We can only

g r a s p particulars in t h e i r concreteness within t h e conspectus of
s o m e t h i n g all-encompassing. B u t w h a t Kant insists is that this idea
is "regulative," i.e., heuristic, n o t ontological. T h e e r r o r of all d o g -
matic metaphysics lay in m o v i n g from logical necessity to ontologi-
cal necessity. Kant's p o i n t is j u s t t h a t t h e r e can be n o analytic
d e d u c t i o n of existence. N e i t h e r Descartes n o r Mendelssohn could
m a k e t h e ontological p r o o f of t h e existence of G o d work. More-
over, to believe reason capable of such feats was to t h r o w o p e n t h e
gates to u n r e s t r i c t e d speculation, the source of all kinds of schwr-
merisch c h i m e r a s .
W h a t sort of status does such a n idea t h e n have? It is cognitively
indispensable a n d objectively i n d e t e r m i n a t e . For such a notion
K a n t offered t h e a p t t e r m Vernunftglaube, rational belief. K a n t 64

a r g u e d t h a t we h a d , for reason's sake, to believe in a n original,

rational creator. O n l y this a s s u m p t i o n m a d e sense of t h e p u r -
posiveness of n a t u r e . "Even if we c a n n o t prove t h e impossibility of
such p u r p o s i v e n e s s w i t h o u t a n intelligent first cause," t h e p r o b l e m s
of m a k i n g sense of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e world were so pressing t h a t
we would b e justified in p r e s u m i n g i t . T h i s is a n anticipation of
65

t h e a r g u m e n t of physico-theology as a p r o p a e d e u t i c to theism
which played such a central role in t h e "Methodology" section of
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e Third Critique. More-

The Pantheism Controversy 239

over, h a v i n g established t h e theoretical plausibility of such a n as-
s u m p t i o n , Kant went o n to t h e question of its practical necessity in
a n anticipation of t h e ethico-theological a r g u m e n t for t h e exis-
t e n c e of G o d which w o u l d find expression in t h e Second Critique
(1788) a n d , again, feature i m p o r t a n t l y in t h e c o n c l u d i n g sections of
t h e Third Critique.
K a n t d e v o t e d t h e balance of his essay to discriminating his n o -
tion of "rational belief" from Mendelssohn's n o t i o n that specula-
tive r e a s o n could achieve real insight o r objective knowledge, o n
t h e o n e h a n d , a n d from Jacobi's n o t i o n t h a t r e a s o n s h o u l d be
t h r o w n over entirely, o n t h e o t h e r . Against t h e latter p o s t u r e Kant
d e v o t e d t h e c o n c l u d i n g a r g u m e n t s of his text. T h e concept of G o d ,
h e insisted, was a rational idea. It could b e f o u n d in n o intuition
first. I n d e e d , all evidence of G o d h a d to b e c o m p a r e d to this p r i o r
idea of G o d n o t , to be s u r e , for adequacy, which would b e i m p o s -
sible in view of t h e infinity of G o d a n d t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e fini-
t u d e of all possible e x p e r i e n c e , b u t for contradiction. T o s u s p e n d
this rational criterion in considerations of t h e divine, Kant a r g u e d ,
was t h e essence of Schwrmerei, a n d its c o n s e q u e n c e s were supersti-
tion a n d atheism.
At t h a t j u n c t u r e , Kant a p o s t r o p h i z e d t h e fideists directly, call-
i n g u p o n t h e m to recognize t h e d a n g e r i n h e r e n t in their cult of ge-
nius, in t h e i r e x t r e m e claims for f r e e d o m . T h e y d e m a n d e d t h e
f r e e d o m to believe w h a t e v e r they wanted, f r e e d o m even from t h e
constraints of r e a s o n . T h u s t h e genius claimed to have richer in-
sight t h a n logic could p r o v i d e . " T h e c o n s e q u e n t a s s u m p t i o n of t h e
m a x i m t h a t r e a s o n is n o t valid as the s u p r e m e arbiter we o r d i n a r y
m e n call Schwrmerei, b u t those darlings of benevolent n a t u r e call it
illumination." 66
H o w e v e r prepossessed by this "illumination" t h e
g e n i u s m i g h t b e personally, K a n t p o i n t e d out, h e still h a d to con-
vince o t h e r s , a n d for this h e h a d to have r e c o u r s e to m e r e historical
facts, to tradition, l e g e n d f o u n d a t i o n s which could never b e a r t h e
weight a n d which, in t h e e n d , boiled d o w n to superstition, since
r e a s o n could n o t i n t e r p o s e its criteria.
W h e n geniuses took this recourse, they discredited themselves
in t h e eyes of o r d i n a r y m e n , b u t worse, they provoked a m o r e gen-
eral skepticism a b o u t any k i n d of faith, even "rational belief," a n d
e n c o u r a g e d a n equally one-sided insistence t h a t reason h a d n o r e -
q u i r e m e n t s for belief. T h a t was "unbelief," t h e view t h a t all faith
was s u p e r s t i t i o n t h e stance of the radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t , of
H u m e a n d of Voltaire. T h a t "atheism" in its t u r n , Kant went on,
h a d d e l e t e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s b e y o n d its intentions as well, for with

240 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

t h e dissolution of t h e belief in G o d , t h e claims of morality u p o n t h e
h u m a n h e a r t were loosened a n d a "libertinism" (Freigeisterei) of con-
duct followed a free-thinking in m a t t e r s t h e o l o g i c a l . T h a t in its
67

t u r n could only p r o v o k e t h e state to intervene to secure o r d e r in

society. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e ultimate o u t c o m e of such radical claims
of f r e e d o m against the legislation of reason could only be t h e ironic
t h r o t t l i n g of any f r e e d o m w h a t e v e r u n d e r t h e tutelage of t h e state.
T h a t was why K a n t a r g u e d so strenuously for r e a s o n as m a n ' s ulti-
m a t e r e c o u r s e in j u d g m e n t . Reason as arbiter left m a n to his o w n
self-determination; such rational f r e e d o m was the essence of "en-
l i g h t e n m e n t . " T o forsake it was to r u n t h e risk of a repression which
would affect n o t merely t h e extremists b u t everyone.

The Theological-Political Context of the Pantheism Controversy

O n e c a n n o t stress too strongly Kant's attentiveness to t h e political

context of religious disputes as it was expressed in this closing a r g u -
m e n t . I n it o n e can find t h e key to Kant's frame of m i n d for t h e n e x t
n i n e years, u p t h r o u g h the controversy s u r r o u n d i n g his Religion
Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Moreover, o n e can hardly find a
clearer c o n n e c t i o n between this very lively contextual sensitivity
a n d Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of " e n l i g h t e n m e n t " as b o t h t h e principle
a n d t h e project of his e p o c h . K a n t m a d e perfectly clear in these
6 8

lines t h e decisive c o n n e c t i o n between security a n d liberty offered

by his n o t i o n of rational belief or e n l i g h t e n m e n t . 69

After t h e publication of Karl L e o n h a r d Reinhold's Briefe ber

die Kantische Philosophie starting in 1786, Kantianism h a d b e c o m e all
t h e r a g e in G e r m a n y . I n April of that year, t h e original p r i n t i n g
7 0

of t h e First Critique h a d sold o u t . T h i s allowed K a n t to m a k e i m p o r -

t a n t clarifying revisions a n d issue a second edition of t h e Critique of
Pure Reason in 1787. It a p p e a r e d that h e h a d succeeded at last in
t a k i n g c o m m a n d of the G e r m a n philosophical scene, a n d h e could
afford n o w to devote himself entirely to t h e c o m p l e t i o n of his
m o n u m e n t a l systematic edifice. H a m a n n characterized Kant aptly
in May 1787: h e "carried o n his work o n his own system w i t h o u t
c a r i n g m u c h a b o u t a n y t h i n g else in the world, caring n e i t h e r w h a t
takes place t h e r e n o r what it thinks of h i m . " Kant n o l o n g e r
7 1

w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e victory of his system. I n d e e d , h e r e a d Jacobi's

p r e o c c u p a t i o n with his First Critique as yet a n o t h e r sign of t h e per-
vasive p e n e t r a t i o n of his critical philosophy. O f course h e claimed
t h a t J a c o b i h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d h i m , b u t h e claimed that a b o u t
everyone. 72

The Pantheism Controversy 241

 T h e r e were still political p r o b l e m s , however. T h e authorities
h a d d e v e l o p e d suspicions as to Kant's religious o r t h o d o x y starting
with t h e First Critique. Since it systematically d e m o l i s h e d all rational
a r g u m e n t s in theology, it was received by m a n y in the theological
c o m m u n i t y with dismay. Kant's Grounding of the Metaphysics of Mor-
als (1785) did little to ease this suspicion in o r t h o d o x circles, a n d
i n d e e d c o n t a i n e d material which m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d as even m o r e
d a m a g i n g to religious o r t h o d o x y . W h e n Moses Mendelssohn
73

called K a n t t h e "all-destroyer" in his widely r e a d preface to Morgen-

stunden (1785), h e was r e f e r r i n g to this theological impact. W h a t
M e n d e l s s o h n , Kant's friend, l a m e n t e d w i t h o u t ire, o t h e r s , less
kindly disposed, w e r e c o n d e m n i n g in t h e halls of power.
At M a r b u r g , a cabinet o r d e r h a d b e e n issued b a n n i n g t h e
t e a c h i n g of Kantian philosophy starting in t h e winter t e r m of
1 7 8 6 . T h e g r o u n d s were t h a t Kant's t h o u g h t led to total skepti-
7 4

cism a n d j e o p a r d i z e d public morals! T h e source of such n o n s e n s e

was Kant's old a n t a g o n i s t F e d e r at G t t i n g e n . B u t o t h e r s , like
Christoff Meiners, in t h e preface to his Psychology, p r o p a g a t e d
t h e s e d i s t o r t i o n s . I n d e e d , as Kantianism b e c a m e m o r e p o p u l a r ,
75

official scrutiny increased. T h e d e a t h of Frederick II in 1787 a n d

t h e succession of t h e far m o r e conservative Frederick William II
b o d e d f u r t h e r state interventions in m a t t e r s of faith a n d morals,
a n d K a n t , as t h e sequel showed, was far from e x e m p t from suspi-
cion.
W h e t h e r K a n t himself wished to b e so t h r e a t e n i n g to o r t h o d o x
religion m a y b e seriously q u e s t i o n e d , b u t t h a t his t h o u g h t did in-
spire in o t h e r s a radicalism in m a t t e r s religious which could only
occasion c o n s t e r n a t i o n a m o n g o r t h o d o x authorities can be p r o v e n
easily. W i t h Schadenfreude H a m a n n r e p o r t e d o n e particularly juicy
instance of this to H e r d e r as early as 1785. S o m e fifty theology stu-
d e n t s w h o d e c l a r e d themselves Kantians a n d disdainers of religion
(Religionsspttern) h a d risen u p , a r g u i n g , in H a m a n n ' s words, t h a t
" t h e r e could b e n o m o r a l philosophy [Sittenlehre] n o r s o u n d r e a s o n ,
n o r public h a p p i n e s s u n d e r Christianity. W h e t h e r Kant has b e e n
i n f o r m e d a b o u t this equally o u t r a g e o u s a n d pathetic o c c u r r e n c e I
don't know." 76

W h a t e v e r K a n t may have m e a n t , t h e r e were Kantians w h o

viewed his a c h i e v e m e n t as radically hostile to o r t h o d o x y . Official
77

d i s p l e a s u r e over K a n t i a n e x t r e m i s m at T b i n g e n was c o m m u n i -
cated from S t u t t g a r t to Berlin in t h e late 1780s, a n d t h e incident at
M a r b u r g was still fresh in Kant's m e m o r y . U n d e r t h e circum-
7 8

stances it is n o t h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why h e s h o u l d have felt it neces-

242 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

sary to stress t h e compatibility of his "theism" with religious
o r t h o d o x y a n d to distance it as m u c h as possible from any form of
"deism," in particular t h e S p i n o z a n - H e r d e r i a n sort.
I n t o this c h a r g e d context in m i d - 1 7 8 7 , H e r d e r threw his new
work, Gott: einige Gesprche, raising o n c e again all t h e issues of Spin-
ozism a n d p a n t h e i s m . T h i s time things were even m o r e a p p a l l i n g
from Kant's vantage, for H e r d e r was a n unequivocal advocate of
these n e w notions, celebrating Lessing, glorifying Spinoza, a n d
p e r p e t r a t i n g a n u n a b a s h e d p a n t h e i s m with all t h e considerable
p o w e r of his literary style a n d intellectual r e p u t a t i o n . B u t t h e r e was
also a p e r s o n a l e l e m e n t . H e r d e r a n d Kant h a d b e c o m e public a n -
tagonists over Kant's reviews of H e r d e r ' s Ideen zur Philosophie der
Geschichte der Menschheit (vol. 1, 1784), a n d Kantians could n o t h e l p
b u t see in H e r d e r ' s new publication evidence of his bitterness to-
w a r d t h e i r m a s t e r . I n t o his serenity K a n t f o u n d o n c e again t h a t
79

his rival h a d i n t r u d e d .

Herder's Gott: einige G e s p r c h e

W h a t exactly did H e r d e r a r g u e in Gott: einige Gesprche? Q u i t e sim-

ply, h e e l a b o r a t e d o n t h a t c o h e r e n c e of t h e positions of Spinoza,
Shaftesbury, a n d Leibniz which h a d already i n f o r m e d the Ideen a n d
his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with J a c o b i of 178485. T h e publication of
Gott in 1787 n o t only fulfilled H e r d e r ' s p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t to
write a n essay o n that t h e m e , b u t it h a d t h r e e m o r e i m m e d i a t e "in-
d u c e m e n t s which t h e times themselves o f f e r e d . " First, h e wished
80

to d e f e n d Spinoza from Jacobi's m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H e n c e it was a

work i n t e n d e d as p a r t of t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy. Second, h e
wished to revise Spinoza in t h e light of t h e new science, o n t h e o n e
h a n d , a n d of his o w n theological notions, o n t h e other. I n this light,
it was p a r t of those stirrings t o w a r d metaphysics that originated in
the Sturm und Drang intuition of n a t u r e . B u t finally, h e wished t o
attack K a n t i a n philosophy a n d its i n r o a d s into theology. T h a t this
was a p e r s o n a l a n d bitter motive goes without saying. T h e complex-
ity of these intentions resulted in a m e a s u r e of obscurity in t h e
work.
T h e first of t h e five dialogues of Gott: einige Gesprche s o u g h t to
refute all t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Spinoza p r o p a g a t e d by Pierre
Bayle. T h i s d i a l o g u e was the most effective in its a r g u m e n t . No less
a critic t h a n Schiller a p p r e c i a t e d it, t h o u g h the balance of t h e work
left h i m c o l d . T h e second dialogue located t h e core of Spinoza's
81

p h i l o s o p h y in t h e notion of intrinsic infinity, in contrast to t h e

The Pantheism Controversy 243

merely indefinite extensiveness of a s u m of finites. H e r d e r rec- 82

ognized "that few will u n d e r s t a n d this distinction between t h e

infinite-in-itself a n d t h e endless conceived in t h e imagination in
t e r m s of t i m e a n d space, a distinction which is yet t r u e a n d neces-
s a r y . " A correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this n o t i o n would dismiss t h e
83

c h a r g e "of enclosing G o d within the world a n d identifying H i m

with it." H e r d e r insisted t h a t t h e n o t i o n of intrinsic infinity re-
q u i r e d a greatness of t h e whole b e y o n d any m e r e s u m of its parts,
even as it r e q u i r e d its logical priority. H e n c e , H e r d e r i n t e r p r e t e d
Spinoza as p a n m t h e i s m , n o t p a n t h e i s m , t h o u g h h e lacked t h e ter-
minology. 84

T h e d i l e m m a in Spinoza, H e r d e r went o n , lay n o t in this n o t i o n ,

b u t r a t h e r in his all-too-Cartesian identification of extension with
matter. Spinoza identified G o d with e x t e n d e d matter. H e r d e r ac-
c o u n t e d for this n o t simply by "pernicious Cartesian e x p l a n a t i o n s "
b u t also by "the c h i l d h o o d of n a t u r a l science" in Spinoza's times,
c o n t e n d i n g that m o r e recent science offered t h e resolution of Spin-
oza's d i l e m m a of finding a t r u e unity b e t w e e n t h e disparate at-
tributes of t h o u g h t a n d m a t t e r in original B e i n g . T h e solution
85

lay in t h e idea of "substantial forces," a t h e o r y of the d y n a m i s m of

n a t u r e which h a d b e e n articulated by Leibniz a n d e x t e n d e d by
Boscovich. I n t h a t l a n g u a g e it was possible to restate Spinoza's doc-
trine of t h e o n e substance as "absolutely infinitethat is, a substance
consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal a n d
infinite essentiality" in a m o r e plausible form: "That the Deity reveals
Himself in an infinite number offorces in an infinite number of ways." m

H e r d e r believed t h e innovations in the theory of the physical

sciences h a d a direct b e a r i n g o n the thorniest of metaphysical is-
sues, claiming t h a t his r e w o r k i n g of Spinozism a l o n g these lines
p r o v i d e d a c o h e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which would b r i n g

a n e n d to all t h e objectionable expressions of how God, ac-

c o r d i n g to this o r that system, may work o n a n d t h r o u g h d e a d
m a t t e r . It is n o t d e a d b u t lives. For in it a n d c o n f o r m i n g to its
o u t e r a n d i n n e r o r g a n s , a t h o u s a n d living, manifold forces
a r e at work. T h e m o r e we learn a b o u t matter, the m o r e forces
we discover in it, so t h a t t h e e m p t y conception of a d e a d ex-
tension completely d i s a p p e a r s . J u s t in r e c e n t times, w h a t n u -
m e r o u s a n d different forces have b e e n discovered in the
a t m o s p h e r e ! H o w m a n y different forces of attraction, u n i o n ,
dissolution a n d r e p u l s i o n , has n o t m o d e r n chemistry already
f o u n d in b o d i e s ?
87

244 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

H e r d e r ' s " d y n a m i c p a n t h e i s m " t h u s invoked t h e most i m p o r t a n t
r e c e n t i n n o v a t i o n s in t h e theories of t h e n a t u r a l sciences, especially
in t h e fields of electricity, chemistry, a n d b i o l o g y . 88

H e r d e r used t h e f o u r t h d i a l o g u e to express his distance from

J a c o b i in t h e strongest form: " I . . . took u p Mendelssohn's Morgen-
stunden, a n d saw t h a t we w e r e m o r e o r less in a g r e e m e n t o n t h e his-
torical fact of what Spinoza's system really w a s . " H e r d e r publicly 89

sided with M e n d e l s s o h n , a n d e v e n m o r e with Lessing, against

J a c o b i . All t h e m o r e a s t o u n d i n g , t h e n , t h e t u r n which H e r d e r took
w h e n h e c a m e to Jacobi's d o c t r i n e of belief, t o w a r d which h e h a d
always b e e n so cool. In Gott H e r d e r picked u p t h e idea a n d t u r n e d it
against K a n t . A c c o r d i n g to H e r d e r , t h e t r u t h of Jacobi's d o c t r i n e of
belief lay in its insistence o n t h e existential situatedness of t h o u g h t .

W i t h o u t existence, a n d a series of existences, m a n would not

t h i n k as h e does. T h e r e f o r e , t h e p u r p o s e of his t h o u g h t can-
n o t b e to d r e a m fantasies a n d to play with illusory ideas a n d
words as if with a self-made reality, b u t r a t h e r , as h e says, "to
disclose Existence" . . . Such k n o w l e d g e , in u n i o n with the
i n n e r feeling for t r u t h , is alone t r u e . It alone illumines the
spirit, n u r t u r e s t h e heart, brings o r d e r a n d regularity into all
t h e s p h e r e s of o u r l i f e .
90

Against this holistic m o d e of c o m i n g to grips with reality, H e r d e r

f o u n d w a n t i n g all "over-subtle r e a s o n i n g , " all "metaphysical
hairsplitting." G r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , h e went on, d r a w i n g u p a list
c o n s p i c u o u s for t h e absence of Kant, "loved precise ideas" b u t as
"philosophers] d e s e r v i n g of t h e n a m e , " did n o t i n d u l g e " e m p t y
p h a n t o m s of a n idly speculating i m a g i n a t i o n . " 91

H e r d e r a s s e r t e d h a r d l y arguedthe validity of rational t h e -

ology a l o n g t h e lines of Spinoza's ontological a r g u m e n t against
" t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r , that is, o n e w h o overreaches h i m -
self." Irony, alas, h e r e showed its i m p o t e n c e against discursive
92

logic. H e r d e r w e n t o n as if a t u r n of p h r a s e h a d settled the ac-

c o u n t s . His character, T h e o p h r o n , protested: " I , at least,. . . f e e l s o
e n e r v a t e d by every p h i l o s o p h y which plays with that type of sym-
bolical words w i t h o u t ideas a n d without objects, t h a t I c a n n o t soon
e n o u g h r e t u r n to n a t u r e , to existence, j u s t to b e c o m e aware again
t h a t I a m a l i v e . " T h e n h e went o n far too long a n d far too o b -
93

scurely to articulate a metaphysics of his own, trying to identify

Spinoza's a u s t e r e Divinity with Christian Providence a n d o f
c o u r s e m e t e m p s y c h o s i s . While H e r d e r recognized t h a t Spinoza
h a d a n a u t h e n t i c n o t i o n of G o d as t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e " I com-

The Pantheism Controversy 245

pletely d e n y t h a t Spinoza t u r n e d G o d into a n u n t h i n k i n g b e i n g "
h e could n o t articulate t h a t recognition without falling back toward
s o m e of t h e a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c projections which Spinoza strove to
eliminate, a n d which H e r d e r knew s h o u l d n o t be c o u n t e n a n c e d , as
h e indicated in his critical r e m a r k s a b o u t L e i b n i z . Persisting
94

n o n e t h e l e s s , H e r d e r laid himself wide o p e n to t h e attack for "syn-

cretism" which J a c o b i a n d K a n t immediately a n d effectively
launched. 9 5

The Kantians' Response

H e r d e r ' s work stirred a g r e a t deal of concern a m o n g the new Kan-

tians at J e n a by its o p e n hostility t o w a r d Kant. Friedrich Schiller, a
r e c e n t convert, wrote to his friend, Krner, a m o r e a d e p t Kantian,
of his impressions of t h e new work, a n d K r n e r supplied h i m with a
detailed critique from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of o r t h o d o x K a n t i a n i s m . I n
96

a d d i t i o n it is very likely t h a t Schiller discussed t h e work with t h e two

most p r o m i n e n t K a n t i a n s in J e n a , Schtz a n d Reinhold.
W i t h all that, it is impossible t h a t K a n t would n o t have h e a r d of
H e r d e r ' s work very shortly after its publication, a n d indeed, if we
c o n s i d e r t h e text of t h e Second Critique, c o m p o s e d over that s u m -
m e r , we can find clear evidence of Kant's irritation with H e r d e r a n d
his p r e o c c u p a t i o n with Spinozism. Certainly we know that K a n t
h a d r e a d t h e work by A u g u s t of 1789, for h e wrote a letter to Jacobi
which indicated his r e a d i n g . B u t we can establish that the circle
a r o u n d K a n t was already very h o t a b o u t H e r d e r ' s Gott in 1787,
from t h e letter of o n e of Kant's Knigsberg cronies, Christian
K r a u s , to Christian Schtz, d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1787. K r a u s w r o t e :
"It is a p p r o p r i a t e to e x p o s e t h e pantheistic Schwrmerei which
d o m i n a t e s so many, particularly y o u n g m i n d s , a n d t h e aesthetic-
metaphysical b o m b a s t with which H e r d e r as a clever r o g u e calcu-
latedly n u r t u r e s his p u b l i c . " T h e most a l a r m i n g t h i n g was that
97

m a n y of these y o u n g enthusiasts for p a n t h e i s m were at the s a m e

t i m e e n t h u s i a s t s for Kantianism! T h a t , Kant's circle believed, could
only result in political mischief. T h u s , K r a u s b e g a n working u p o n a
refutation of p a n t h e i s m . 98

Mindful of Kant's hostility to H e r d e r , J a c o b i sent h i m a copy of

t h e n e w edition of his work o n Spinoza, full of criticisms of H e r d e r
a n d praise for Kant. Kant's r e s p o n s e was e v e r y t h i n g h e could have
desired. I n his letter to J a c o b i of A u g u s t 30, 1789, acknowledging
t h e gift, K a n t praised t h e work for its " d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e diffi-
culties t h a t beset t h e teleological p a t h to t h e o l o g y . " It h a d b e e n
99

246 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

this, K a n t suggested, that h a d set Spinoza o n his m i s g u i d e d c o u r s e
of d e n y i n g teleology altogether. Kant went o n to claim that it was
merely a s e c o n d a r y m a t t e r (Nebensache) w h e t h e r o n e c a m e to a c o m -
m i t m e n t to theism from r e a s o n or from revelation, for t h e point
was to d e f e n d it, a n d f r e e d o m with it, against t h e "syncretism of
S p i n o z a " a n d the "deism of H e r d e r ' s Gott." 100

W h a t characterizes all forms of syncretism generally is t h e i r

f o u n d a t i o n in a lack, of u p r i g h t n e s s [Mangel an Aufrichtigkeit]:
a trait of m i n d which is particularly typical of this great artist
in illusions (which, as t h r o u g h a magic l a n t e r n , m a k e mirac-
u l o u s t h i n g s m o m e n t a r i l y manifest, only thereafter swiftly to
vanish, leaving b e h i n d still a m o n g t h e naive a sense of won-
d e r m e n t a n d t h e impression that s o m e t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y
m u s t b e b e h i n d it all, which t h e y j u s t d i d n ' t c a t c h ) .
101

W i t h this e x t r e m e l y caustic characterization of H e r d e r , Kant d e -

clared J a c o b i his ally, a n d e x p l a i n e d that h e m e a n t h i m n o h a r m in
t h e essay "Was heit," which h e h a d written only u n d e r e x t r e m e
p r e s s u r e to dissociate himself from Spinozism. It behooves us to
step back a n d j u x t a p o s e for a m o m e n t this letter of A u g u s t 1789 to
J a c o b i with t h e letter of April 1786 about Jacobi. H o w things have
c h a n g e d ! I n 1786 Jacobi was t h e Schwrmer, b u t in 1789 h e is
s h o u l d e r to s h o u l d e r with K a n t against t h e Schwrmer. I n 1786
J a c o b i was p a r t of the genius-cult, r a n g e d alongside H e r d e r . In
1789, all this is forgotten. Herder is Kant's o v e r w e e n i n g c o n c e r n .
I n d e e d , K a n t a n d his circle h a d b e e n agitated over H e r d e r a n d
p a n t h e i s m from t h e m o m e n t of his publication of Gott in m i d - 1 7 8 7 .
Kant's worries a b o u t political backlash h a d c o m e too t r u e with
Wllner's Edict of 1788. W i t h s o m e of his o w n followers lured to-
w a r d p a n t h e i s m , K a n t decided to d e b u n k it himself in t h e Third Cri-
tique. Kant's attacks o n t h e " a n a l o g o n of life" a n d o n "hylozoism" in
t h e Third Critique r e s o n a t e in t h e i r very l a n g u a g e with the attacks o n
H e r d e r of five years e a r l i e r .102
W h a t p r o v o k e d their reassertion
was H e r d e r ' s Gott. Kant's project in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological
J u d g m e n t " was to refute such d a n g e r o u s "syncretism."

The Pantheism Controversy 247

 Twelve

KANT'S ATTACK ON SPINOZA

IN T H E "DIALECTIC OF
TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT''

H
aving e x p l o r e d t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy in detail
from t h e Kantian vantage, it has b e c o m e clear why t h e
issue of Spinozism s h o u l d have b e c o m e so central to the
"Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " Kant's struggle
with Spinoza, as Allison has n o t e d , was "central, n o t p e r i p h e r a l , to
t h e overall a r g u m e n t of t h e Critique ofJudgment.Indeed, I wish to
a r g u e t h a t it is precisely as h e c o m p o s e d these sections in late s u m -
m e r 1789 t h a t K a n t m a d e his "ethical t u r n . " T h e r e f o r e , 7 2 - 7 7 of
t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " r e p r e s e n t t h e h e a r t of t h e
whole work. T h e i r c o n c e r n is explicitly with (dogmatic) systems of
ontology a n d t h e i r plausibility in a c c o u n t i n g for t h e complexities of
objective p u r p o s i v e n e s s within a lawfully c o h e r e n t n a t u r e .
I n 72 of the Third Critique Kant laid o u t a typology of "dogmatic
metaphysical" ontologies. At t h e outset of 73 K a n t asked: " W h a t d o
all t h e s e systems desire? T h e y desire to explain o u r teleological
j u d g m e n t s a b o u t n a t u r e . " K a n t f o r m u l a t e d all the ontologies in
2

t e r m s of his c o n c e p t of "objective purposiveness." H e discriminated

b e t w e e n "realism" a n d "idealism" of this purposiveness a n d between
"physical" a n d "hyperphysical" accounts of causality. T h i s occa-
sioned a fourfold schema, which h e set o u t in 72:

1. idealist-physical: "lifeless matter," t h e mechanistic m a t e -

rialism of causality, which K a n t associated with E p i c u r u s a n d
D e m o c r i t u s a m o n g t h e ancients;
2. idealist-hyperphysical: a "lifeless G o d , " o r fatality, which
K a n t associated with Spinoza a m o n g t h e m o d e r n s ;
3. realist-physical: "living matter," the d o c t r i n e of hylozo-
ism, which K a n t did n o t explicitly link to any t h i n k e r or school;
and

248
 4. realist-hyper physical: a "living G o d , " t h e d o c t r i n e of the-
ism, which "certainly is s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r g r o u n d s of expla-
n a t i o n " because it ascribed intelligent will to a t r a n s c e n d e n t
C r e a t o r a n d t h e r e b y "rescues in t h e best way t h e purposive-
ness of n a t u r e . "3

By t h e realism a n d idealism of objective purposiveness Kant m e a n t

t h e validity a n d illusion of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e . H e n c e all "idealist" o n -
tologies rejected teleology. Kant's setting of all metaphysics in a
teleological f r a m e w o r k seems for t h a t r e a s o n forced. T h e s e m e t a -
physics a d d r e s s themselves with equal plausibility to the ancient
q u e s t i o n of t h e O n e a n d t h e Many, or, in a m o r e r e c e n t b u t apposite
f o r m u l a t i o n , of t h e relation of B e i n g (Sein) to entities (Seienden), in
t e r m s of t h e classical l a n g u a g e of s u b s t a n c e . By t h r u s t i n g dis-
4

course o n ontology which rejected teleology into that alien lan-

g u a g e , K a n t did it f u n d a m e n t a l violence. By setting t h e p r o b l e m of
entities in t e r m s of t h e l a n g u a g e of purposiveness, h e g e n e r a t e d a n
absurdity: "If all things m u s t b e t h o u g h t of as p u r p o s e s , t h e n to be a
t h i n g is t h e s a m e as to b e a p u r p o s e . " T h a t was, as h e claimed, p r e -
5

p o s t e r o u s . B u t h e was w r o n g to castigate Spinoza or t h e "school-

m e n " for this folly: it was his o w n shift of l a n g u a g e which h a d
precipitated i t . 6

T h e s e s c h o o l m e n h a d s o m e t h i n g else in m i n d : what K a n t
t e r m e d t h e i r d o c t r i n e of t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l perfection of things
(in r e f e r e n c e to their p r o p e r being), according to which e v e r y t h i n g
has in itself t h a t which is requisite to m a k e it o n e t h i n g a n d n o t a n -
o t h e r . " T h i s was simply w h a t t h e s c h o o l m e n m e a n t by the c o n c e p t
7

substance. I n t h e i r l a n g u a g e system, substance signified entity, i.e.,

a d e t e r m i n a t e grammatical-logical subject which was eligible for
predications. A substance was simply t h a t a b o u t which s o m e t h i n g
could b e said. Discourse could illuminate sufficient of its p r o p -
ertiesachieve a d e g r e e of completeness ("perfection") in their
listingthat its individuality b e c a m e clear a n d distinct. B u t t h e
question of entities as substances b e c a m e c l o u d e d w h e n t h e con-
cept of "perfection" was lifted o u t of its scholastic sense of quantita-
tive c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d t r a n s p o s e d into Kant's l a n g u a g e system as
qualitative perfection o r p u r p o s e . Such a n o t i o n of perfection
8

entailed intrinsic self-determination, K a n t a r g u e d . While this

m a d e sense of s o m e entitiesorganic forms a n d intelligent lifeit
a d d e d to t h e o r d i n a r y sense of entity a complexity too heavy for it to
sustain. N o t all things were p u r p o s e s . Kant's tactic makes sense only
in t h e context of a n e w u r g e n c y a b o u t the p r o s p e c t of a metaphysic

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 249

g r o u n d e d in teleology which could claim validity. T h a t was exactly
what t h e p a n t h e i s t r e a d i n g of Spinozism s e e m e d to e n t a i l .
9

Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l criticism entitled h i m , o n t h e most favor-

able r e a d i n g , to reject all metaphysics, n o t to privilege s o m e . T h e 1 0

m o m e n t h e moved from t h e level of epistemological scruple to a

d i s p u t a t i o n of particular conceptions, h e b e c a m e b u t o n e m e t a -
physician m o r e . T h a t K a n t p r e f e r r e d t h e f o u r t h of the d o g m a t i c
o p t i o n s h e described is perfectly clear, even t h o u g h h e acknowl-
e d g e d t h a t it could n o t b e p r o v e n theoretically. H e criticized the
o t h e r s n o t merely for t h e i r d o g m a t i s m b u t for their d o g m a . A n d
the two which d r e w t h e most sustained criticism were "fatality" a n d
"hylozoism," or in o t h e r t e r m s , Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m .
I n 73 K a n t offered m o r e extensive criticism of each of the
metaphysical views h e h a d schematized in 72. Conspicuously, his
a r g u m e n t against Spinozism was by far t h e most p r o t r a c t e d . In that
section, K a n t gave his m o s t elaborate characterization of Spinoza's
d o c t r i n e of original B e i n g :

to this B e i n g , as substrate of those n a t u r a l things, h e ascribes

in r e g a r d to t h e m , n o t causality, b u t m e r e subsistence. O n ac-
c o u n t of its u n c o n d i t i o n e d necessity, a n d also that of all n a t u -
ral things as accidents i n h e r i n g in it, h e secures, it is t r u e , to
t h e forms of n a t u r e t h a t unity of g r o u n d which is requisite for
all p u r p o s i v e n e s s , b u t at t h e same time h e tears away their
c o n t i n g e n c e , w i t h o u t which n o unity ofpurpose can be t h o u g h t ,
a n d with it all design, i n a s m u c h as h e takes away all intelli-
g e n c e from the original g r o u n d of n a t u r a l t h i n g s . 11

K a n t distinguished "causality" from "subsistence," a n d t h o u g h h e

c o n c e d e d that Spinoza established t h e "unity of g r o u n d " (Einheit des
Grundes) which was necessary for a c o m p r e h e n s i o n of t h e "forms
of n a t u r e " (Naturformen), h e a r g u e d t h a t Spinoza's view r o b b e d
t h e m of " c o n t i n g e n c e " (Zuflligkeit), a n d h e n c e of "unity of p u r -
pose." Spinoza's original B e i n g (Urwesen), in which "accidents in-
h e r e , " constituted a m e r e "substrate of things in n a t u r e . " T h i s in
t u r n m e a n t that Spinoza d e n i e d all design (alles Absichtliche) a n d
even u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstand) to the "original g r o u n d . "
Kant's whole sense of Spinoza c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e doctrine of
a "lifeless G o d . " "So m u c h is clear," h e wrote, "that o n this theory
t h e p u r p o s i v e c o m b i n a t i o n in t h e world m u s t be taken as u n -
d e s i g n e d ; for a l t h o u g h derived from a n original Being, it is not d e -
rived from His u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r from any design of His, b u t r a t h e r
from t h e necessity of His n a t u r e a n d of t h e world unity which e m a -

250 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

nates from H i m . " Kant elaborated o n t h e m e a n i n g of "fatality" in
1 2

73 by offering t h e following characterization of Spinozism: "as it

a p p e a l s to s o m e t h i n g supersensible to which o u r insight d o e s n o t
e x t e n d , [it] is n o t so easy to controvert, b u t that is because its con-
cept of t h e original B e i n g is n o t possible to u n d e r s t a n d . " 13

K a n t was n o t merely claiming "dialectical excess" in Spinoza's

n o t i o n of G o d ; h e was claiming it was d e t e r m i n a t e l y wrong. W h e n
h e a r g u e d t h a t it was n o t possible to u n d e r s t a n d Spinoza's c o n c e p t
of t h e original B e i n g h e m e a n t that t h e notion was logically in-
c o h e r e n t . T h a t was a m u c h m o r e radical claim, a n d o n e that K a n t
could n o t sustain. In essence, what Kant, following Jacobi, claimed
was t h a t Spinoza d e n i e d intellect or t h o u g h t to t h e original
B e i n g . Yet this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Spinoza's original B e i n g as "life-
1 4

less" is m o r e t h a n a little p r o b l e m a t i c .
15

T o s u m m a r i z e Kant's key charges against Spinoza's notion of

original B e i n g (Sem), K a n t believed Spinoza's G o d was lifeless since:

1. Spinoza denied G o d intelligence;

2. Spinoza denied G o d purposiveness;
3. Spinoza denied G o dfreedom; a n d
4. Spinoza denied G o d causality.

C o n s e q u e n t l y , Spinoza m a d e G o d over into a m e r e Urstoff

p r i m o r d i a l m a t t e r , "blind necessity"i.e., his c o n c e p t of G o d as
substance was "lifeless." As I will show, however, Kant's own conjec-
tures a b o u t t h e intellectus archetypus in 7677 of t h e Third Critique
d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n t e r n a l c o h e r e n c e of a m o d e l of intellect very
close to what Spinoza ascribed to his original B e i n g . 1 6

1. The Question of God's Intelligence. Kant claimed t h a t Spinoza

"takes away all intelligence from t h e original g r o u n d of n a t u r a l
t h i n g s " for t h e things of t h e world a r e "not derived from His u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o r from any design of His . . ." B u t t h a t is widely at vari-
a n c e with w h a t Spinoza actually claimed in t h e Ethics. T h e r e is a
profuse a n d p r o f o u n d ascription of intelligence to G o d in t h a t
w o r k . O n e is at a loss to see h o w K a n t can have m a d e his assertion.
1 7

C a n it b e t h a t Spinoza s h o u l d have used t h e t e r m s " t h o u g h t " a n d

"intellect" b u t n o t u n d e r s t o o d t h e m , o r n o t m e a n t t h e m ? Is it that
1 8

e l s e w h e r e Spinoza m a d e a r g u m e n t s o r assertions which con-

tradicted theseconsciously o r unwittingly? T h a t seems a m o r e
likely alternative. Yet we m u s t at t h e very least recognize t h a t Spin-
oza affirmed t h e consciousness, t h e self-consciousness a n d i n d e e d
t h e infinite consciousness of G o d , for which all possibility is actual.
H o w e v e r contradictory his p h i l o s o p h y m i g h t ultimately be p r o v e n

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 251

to b e , Spinoza c a n n o t b e c h a r g e d with having altogether d e n i e d
these t h i n g s , a n d in this m e a s u r e K a n t was j u s t plain w r o n g . B u t t h e
point n e e d s to b e s h a r p e n e d . Was Spinoza contradictory?
T h e r e is a n o t o r i o u s passage, t h e " N o t e to Proposition 17" of
book 1 of t h e Ethics, in which Spinoza p r o p o s e d to show "that nei-
t h e r intellect n o r will a p p e r t a i n to God's n a t u r e . " T h e r e stands
1 9

o u r contradiction, a p p a r e n t l y . It is shocking, b u t it was m e a n t to be.

A serious i n t e r p r e t e r , b e a r i n g all t h e o t h e r passages in m i n d , would
seek to reconcile t h e a p p a r e n t discord. A hostile reader, seeking to
be scandalized by offense to his religious sensibilities, would latch
o n t o t h e s e words with a v e n g e a n c e . K a n t was certainly not that kind
of a r e a d e r , b u t Jacobi was.
W h a t did Spinoza m e a n by his shocking line? For Spinoza t h e
t e r m s "intellect" a n d "will" were distinctly h u m a n attributes a n d h e
envisioned those of m o r e conventional piety saying "they know of
n o t h i n g m o r e perfect, which they can attribute to God, t h a n t h a t
which is t h e highest perfection in o u r s e l v e s . " T h e h u b r i s of that
20

projection p r o v o k e d Spinoza's assertion, as h e m a d e vividly clear in

a r e m a r k a b l e a n d conclusive passage:

if intellect a n d will a p p e r t a i n to t h e e t e r n a l essence of G o d , we

m u s t take these words in s o m e signification quite different
from those they usually bear. For intellect a n d will, which
s h o u l d constitute t h e essence of God, would perforce be as far
a p a r t as t h e poles from the h u m a n intellect a n d will, in fact,
would have n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with t h e m b u t the n a m e ;
t h e r e would b e a b o u t as m u c h c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h e
two as t h e r e is b e t w e e n t h e Dog, the heavenly constellation,
and a dog, an animal that b a r k s . 21

Spinoza h a r d l y d e n i e d intellect to G o d ; h e wished to alert his

r e a d e r to t h e idea that divine intellect was not simply s o m e multiple
a n a l o g u e of o u r s . Let Spinoza m a k e his o w n point: "Now the intel-
lect of G o d is the cause of b o t h t h e essence a n d t h e existence of o u r
intellect; t h e r e f o r e , t h e intellect of G o d so far as it is conceived to
constitute t h e divine essence, differs from o u r intellect b o t h in re-
spect to essence a n d in respect to existence, n o r can it in anywise
a g r e e t h e r e w i t h save in n a m e , as we have said b e f o r e . " T o believe
22

t h a t b e c a u s e Spinoza d e n i e d God's intellect c o r r e s p o n d e d to o u r s ,

Spinoza d e n i e d h i m intellect altogether is to believe t h e r e can only
be o n e kind of intellect, with differences of d e g r e e . J a c o b i m i g h t
h o l d such a view. K a n t could not. O n e of his crucial philosoph-
ical strategies was to distinguish o u r discursive intellect from a

252 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

conjectural alternative form: t h e intuitive intellect. T h i s intellectus
archetypus, I c o n t e n d , tallies a l t o g e t h e r well with t h e intellect of
Spinoza's G o d .
2. The Question of God's Purposiveness. K a n t c o n t e n d e d that
Spinoza's original B e i n g d i d n o t act by design, intention, o r p u r -
pose; t h e r e was in it n o causality t h r o u g h ideas. T o evaluate t h e sig-
nificance of this claim, we m u s t recall t h a t Kant m e a n t by p u r p o s e
t h e relation w h e r e b y a n "idea" (technically, a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , or
Vorstellung) served as t h e g r o u n d o r cause of t h e "existence" of a n
o b j e c t . Now, in m a n , merely t h i n k i n g , even k n o w i n g t h e r e p r e -
23

sentation does not g e n e r a t e t h e t h i n g . W h a t is r e q u i r e d is a n in-

2 4

t e r v e n i n g praxis, actualization. M e n labor to b r i n g forth, a n d they

have projected this back u p o n their "creator." I n religious lan-
g u a g e , G o d " l a b o r e d " seven days to create the world. Kant's m o d e l ,
too, r e a d divine causality o n t h e m o d e l of h u m a n practical p u r -
posiveness. T h i s a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m was pervasive a n d basic to t h e
e n t i r e K a n t i a n system. T h e kind of G o d K a n t r e q u i r e d in his
ethico-theology was the "living" G o d of the Christian tradition,
with a providential a n d p e r s o n a l character, w h o "created" t h e
world.
Yet this whole distinction of m e n t a l from material, i n t e n d e d
from actual, only m a k e s sense in the context of h u m a n discursive
n a t u r e . T o project these q u a n d a r i e s of m o r t a l m a n back u p o n t h e
original B e i n g is problematic. Spinoza could n o t accept this: "this
d o c t r i n e d o e s away with t h e perfection of God: for, if G o d acts for
a n object, h e necessarily desires s o m e t h i n g which h e lacks." T h e
n o t i o n of final cause, t h e l a n g u a g e of purposiveness, w h e n applied
to G o d , " m a k e s that which is by n a t u r e first to b e last, a n d t h a t
which is h i g h e s t a n d most perfect to be most i m p e r f e c t . " T h e n o -
25

tion of G o d as a p u r p o s i v e creator, a c r e a t o r from i n t e n t i o n a n d d e -

sign w h o h a d to realize t h e world in a n act, was p r o f o u n d l y foreign
to Spinoza.
H e n c e K a n t was correct in his claim t h a t Spinoza d e n i e d p u r -
posiveness to his original Being. W h a t is incorrect is the implication
K a n t drew, namely, that G o d could n o t any l o n g e r b e r e g a r d e d as a
cause. Spinoza still felt entitled to view the intellect of G o d as t h e
cause of all entities. T h a t causality was not t r a n s e u n t a n d s e q u e n -
tial, however, b u t i m m a n e n t a n d eternal. Nevertheless, as cause, it
r e m a i n e d logically prior.

If intellect belongs to t h e Divine n a t u r e , it c a n n o t be in na-

t u r e , as o u r s is generally t h o u g h t to be, posterior to, or simul-

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 253

 t a n e o u s with t h e things u n d e r s t o o d , i n a s m u c h as G o d is prior
to all things by r e a s o n of his causality. O n t h e contrary, t h e
t r u t h a n d formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as such in t h e intellect of G o d . W h e r e f o r e t h e
intellect of G o d , in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's
essence, is, in reality, t h e cause of t h i n g s , b o t h of their essence
a n d of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e .
26

T h i s n o t i o n of causation, a n d especially of divine causation, will

c o n c e r n us f u r t h e r below.
3. The Question of God's Freedom. W i t h t h e rubric of "fatality" a n d
with his f r e q u e n t suggestion t h a t it was " m e r e necessity" a n d "blind
necessity" t h a t was operative in t h e relation b e t w e e n Spinoza's orig-
inal B e i n g a n d t h e world, K a n t m a d e t h e claim t h a t Spinoza's G o d
h a d n o f r e e d o m . Spinoza h a d a very clear n o t i o n of what freedom
signified within his system: " T h a t t h i n g is called free, which exists
solely by t h e necessity of its o w n n a t u r e , a n d of which t h e action is
d e t e r m i n e d by itself a l o n e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , that t h i n g is neces-
sary, o r r a t h e r c o n s t r a i n e d , which is d e t e r m i n e d by s o m e t h i n g ex-
t e r n a l to itself to a fixed a n d definite m e t h o d of existence o r
a c t i o n . " T h e implications for G o d were d r a w n quite clearly: " G o d
27

acts solely by t h e laws of his o w n n a t u r e , a n d is n o t constrained by

a n y o n e . " H e n c e , " G o d is t h e sole free cause. F o r G o d alone exists by
t h e sole necessity of his n a t u r e , a n d acts by t h e sole necessity of his
n a t u r e . " Spinoza's d o c t r i n e q u i t e unequivocally asserted t h e free-
2 8

d o m of G o d a n d equally d e n i e d it to every o t h e r entity. It was p r e -

cisely Spinoza's d o c t r i n e of a substance t h a t its existence s h o u l d b e
d e t e r m i n e d solely by its own essence. By t h a t very definition h e
could conceive of only a single substance, G o d , as existent. G o d as
this o n e substance possessed a n intrinsic, self-determining neces-
sity which was f r e e d o m . Entities, which owed b o t h their essence
a n d t h e i r existence to t h e original substance, necessarily could n o t
enjoy such f r e e d o m .
W h a t d i d f r e e d o m m e a n to Kant, t h e n , t h a t h e s h o u l d have
f o u n d it d e n i e d in Spinoza? Manifestly h e d i d n o t m e a n caprice.
F r e e d o m for K a n t was precisely t h e capacity to c o n f o r m to a self-
legislated principle. Rationality was t h e g r o u n d of freedom. Only
because t h a t rationality was t h e intrinsic essence of m a n as n o u -
m e n o n d i d h e have f r e e d o m . So m u c h m o r e , t h e n , should this rea-
s o n i n g a p p l y to Kant's n o t i o n of G o d . B u t t h e n it would a p p e a r
difficult, a p a r t from t h e imagistic w r a p p i n g s , to see what was so dif-
f e r e n t a b o u t t h e two stances. I n d e e d , I s u b m i t Kant's d o c t r i n e of

254 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

"life" a n d of f r e e d o m at t h e level of a n original B e i n g d o not signifi-
cantly differ from Spinoza, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e real locus of
conflict b e t w e e n K a n t a n d Spinoza o n t h e question of f r e e d o m lay
n o t at t h e level of t h e original B e i n g o r G o d , b u t r a t h e r at t h e level
of t h e individual existent h u m a n being. K a n t insisted u p o n , a n d
Spinoza rejected utterly, t h e f r e e d o m of existent m a n . T h i s situa-
tion is at t h e h e a r t of t h e conflict between t h e two g r e a t philoso-
p h e r s . Kant's e n t i r e philosophical e n e r g y radiates from his c o n c e r n
for t h e efficacious practical f r e e d o m of m a n , i.e., his m o r a l d u t y in
t h e world of things. T h a t was t h e origin of his l a n g u a g e of p u r -
posiveness. It was t h e h e a r t of Kantianism. B u t Spinoza utterly d e -
nied i t . 2 9

4. The Question of God's Causality. Kant a r g u e d t h a t Spinoza con-

fused causality with i n h e r e n c e o r s u b s i s t e n c e . K a n t a g r e e d with
30

his c o n t e m p o r a r y , Crusius, in m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e logical relation

of g r o u n d to c o n s e q u e n c e was n o t t h e same as, a n d could n o t serve
as t h e basis for, t h e actual relation of cause to effect. Logical rela-
tions w e r e "analytic"; actual relations were " s y n t h e t i c . " Precisely 31

w h a t t h e latter entailed was t h e separateness of t h e relata. T h a t sep-

a r a t e n e s s , for Kant, was only conceivable in t e r m s of existential
i.e., m a t e r i a l s e p a r a t e n e s s . All causality, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e d
materiality a n d was t r a n s e u n t . Such a p o s t u r e creates e n o r m o u s
difficulties for purposiveness as a m o d e of causality, for purposive-
ness posits a n immaterial ( n o u m e n a l ) cause as materially ( p h e n o m -
enally) efficacious. T h i s K a n t a d m i t t e d to b e flagrantly i n c o n g r u e n t
with categorial u n d e r s t a n d i n g of causality, b u t h e h e l d o u t that it
was n o t in itself c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
32

T h e essential issue lies elsewhere, however. Kant has f o r m u -

lated t h e e n t i r e p r o b l e m in t e r m s of a discursive rational being, b u t
Spinoza was conceiving of s o m e t h i n g quite other. W h a t may b e
t r u e of t h e cognitive p r o b l e m of m a n in view of his discursive situa-
tion, a n d of t h e practical p r o b l e m of m a n , in view of t h e difference
b e t w e e n a n i n t e n t i o n a n d a n object, between o u g h t a n d is, simply
may n o t b e projected back u p o n t h e original Being. As a conse-
q u e n c e , Kant's distinction of g r o u n d a n d c o n s e q u e n c e from cause
a n d effect, of logical from actual, simply does n o t apply. T o d e m o n -
strate this we have only to consider Kant's o w n brilliant j u x t a p o s i -
tion of discursive a n d intuitive intelligence in 7677 of t h e Third
Critique.
I n those sections, Kant's p u r p o s e was to explain the p r o b l e m of
h u m a n consciousness in t e r m s of t h e conflict b e t w e e n reason's aspi-
ration to totality a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s r e q u i r e m e n t s for validity

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 255

in short, t h e discursive d i l e m m a t h a t objective knowledge r e q u i r e d ,
in h u m a n s , sensible intuition in addition to p u r e reason. T o m a k e
clear t h e implications of discursiveness in m a n , Kant a r g u e d , " t h e
idea of a possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g different from t h e h u m a n m u s t be
f u n d a m e n t a l . " T h a t idea was t h e n o t i o n of a n "intuitive" u n d e r -
33

s t a n d i n g . K a n t u s e d this t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t t h r o u g h o u t his crit-

ical p e r i o d , a n d in the Third Critique h e spelled o u t the essential
e l e m e n t s of the j u x t a p o s i t i o n .
For t h e discursive intellect, t h e distinction of t h e possible from
t h e actual was decisive. H u m a n beings w e r e c a u g h t in t h e disjunc-
tion of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) a n d object, of intention a n d re-
alization, of o u g h t a n d is. Cognitively this expressed itself in t h e
e m p t y liberty of t h o u g h t , which could t h i n k possible all that was
n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , b u t could not entail its actuality. But "if o u r u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g w e r e intuitive, it would have n o objects b u t those which
a r e actual. C o n c e p t s (which merely e x t e n d to t h e possibility of a n
object) a n d sensible intuitions (which give us s o m e t h i n g without al-
lowing us to cognize it t h u s as a n object) would b o t h d i s a p p e a r . " 34

C o n c e p t s , as designations of t h e merely possible, would d i s a p p e a r

because all possibility in a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g would entail ac-
tuality. Similarly t h e d i l e m m a of t h e discursive intellect over o u g h t
a n d is w o u l d fall away "were r e a s o n considered as in its causality
i n d e p e n d e n t of sensibility . . . a n d so as cause in a n intelligible
world entirely in a g r e e m e n t with the m o r a l law . . . [I]n such a
world t h e r e would be n o distinction b e t w e e n ' o u g h t to d o ' a n d
'does,' b e t w e e n a practical law o f t h a t which is possible t h r o u g h us
a n d t h e theoretical law of that which is actual t h r o u g h u s . " 3 5

Most p e r t i n e n t to t h e question of theism versus deism a n d of

t h e place of teleology in t h e i r conflict, K a n t wrote t h a t for t h e dis-
cursive intellect t h e whole could only b e achieved by t h e m e c h a n i -
cal s u m m a t i o n of its parts. Discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g h a d to
p r o c e e d from analytic-universals to particulars in t h e construction
of any c o n c e p t of a n object. B u t Kant claimed we could " t h i n k a n
intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which d o e s not p r o c e e d from t h e universal
to the particular, a n d so to the individual ( t h r o u g h concepts)" but
would instead p r o c e e d "from t h e synthetic-universal (the intuition of
a w h o l e as such), to t h e particular, i.e. from t h e whole to t h e
parts." 3 6

T h e closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g could

m a k e to t h e notion of a systemic whole, a n organic entity, was via
t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n t h a t l a n g u a g e , a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of t h e whole stood p r i o r to t h e existence o f t h a t whole, a n d f o r m e d ,

256 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

as it w e r e , t h e causal security t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e d t h e parts p e n d i n g
its c o n s t i t u t i o n . Manifestly this l a n g u a g e did not really c a p t u r e
37

t h e relation of whole to parts which Kant characterized as accessible

to t h e hypothetical intuitive intellect a n d as a l o n e a d e q u a t e to the
n o t i o n of a t r u e whole p r i o r to a n d h i g h e r t h a n its p a r t s . H e n c e
3 8

p u r p o s i v e n e s s as a m o d e l was a discursive a p p r o x i m a t i o n , a n d a
weak o n e . It was hardly consistent with a n intuitive intellect. For
t h a t intellect, to think was to actualize. F u r t h e r m o r e , the whole n o -
tion of t h e contingency of particulars, as in the p r o b l e m of e m p i r i -
cal n a t u r e ' s lawfulness for a discursive u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b e c o m e s
irrelevant for t h e intuitive intellect. Kant's strictures against
Spinoza's characterization of t h e causal relation of his original
B e i n g to n a t u r a l things are palpably out of place. O n e final point:
K a n t explicitly stated that t h e idea of such a n intellectus archetypus
"contains n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " With that h e destroyed his o w n
39

claim t h a t t h e r e was a logical i n c o h e r e n c e in Spinoza's n o t i o n of t h e

original Being. I n s u m , Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Spinoza's original
B e i n g as a "lifeless G o d " fails utterly.
Still, if t e r m i n g Spinoza's God "lifeless" in Kant's technical
sense of t h e t e r m has b e e n shown i n a p p r o p r i a t e , that does not sig-
nify t h a t it was a n y t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g t h e o r t h o d o x theistic version
of a personal G o d . H a v i n g devoted so m u c h e n e r g y to revindicating
G o d in his a t t r i b u t e of " t h i n k i n g t h i n g " o r t h o u g h t in Spinoza, we
r u n t h e risk of u n d e r s t a t i n g t h e inevitably scandalous c o n c o m m i -
tant position of t h a t philosophy, namely, that G o d was also a n "ex-
t e n d e d t h i n g " o r matter. W h a t e v e r may have b e e n the merits of t h e
first position, t h e m e r e claim t h a t G o d was m a t t e r r e m a i n e d out-
r a g e o u s b e y o n d r e d e m p t i o n to o r t h o d o x religious sensibility. G o d
as s u b s t a n c e in Spinoza's sense b l u r r e d with G o d as substance in t h e
vulgar sense, a n d t h e result s e e m e d indiscernible from atheistic
materialism. J u s t by that m e a s u r e h a d t h e doctrine of p a n t h e i s m
served t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y against
o r t h o d o x religion, a n d it was n o coincidence t h a t Spinoza was d e a r
to t h e h e a r t s of these deist f r e e - t h i n k e r s . T h i s association with
40

m a t t e r was t h e source of t h a t suspicion of t h e inertness of Spinoza's

original B e i n g which so possessed Jacobi a n d p r o v o k e d Kant. It
would lead t h e Idealists to believe t h a t they h a d to show t h a t B e i n g
as Spinoza conceived it n e e d e d to be reconceived in a m o r e spir-
itualized f o r m . Yet, if my reconstruction has any merit, t h e r e was
4 1

already a lot of this in Spinoza himself, awaiting Idealist discovery.

First a n d most importantly, as a g o o d essentialist, Spinoza in-
sisted u p o n t h e reality of intellectual intuition a n d o n its episte-

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 257

mological p r e e m i n e n c e . A n o t h e r powerful implication of his
4 2

t h o u g h t was t h a t "the t r u e is t h e w h o l e " t h a t o n e h a d to start from

the idea of t h e intrinsic infinite a n d t h i n k in t e r m s of perfection sub
specie aeternitatis. A n o t h e r essential principle h e e n d o w e d t h e m with
was t h a t all n e g a t i o n was limitation. T h i s c r e a t e d the logical p r o s -
pect t h a t within t h e infinite whole t h e r e m i g h t b e a n i m m a n e n t ar-
ticulation to particularity. T h e e l e m e n t s of dialectics as a logical
process of differentiation a n d limitation compatible with ontologi-
cal u n i t y g l i m m e r e d in his formulations.
I n o n e way, K a n t w o r k e d sharply to divide Spinoza from t h e
" p a n t h e i s t " s t a n d p o i n t of t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t . H e insisted
u p o n r e a d i n g Spinoza's original B e i n g as "hyperphysical," as su-
persensible o r t r a n s c e n d e n t . T h i s , too, was a n i n a d e q u a t e g r a s p of
Spinoza's stance; j u s t as Spinoza's idea of the original B e i n g did n o t
fit comfortably with t h e o r t h o d o x notion of a p e r s o n a l divinity, it
did n o t fit t h e o r t h o d o x n o t i o n of a t r a n s c e n d e n t o n e either. O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , t h e radical E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s materialist r e a d i n g did n o t
really g r a s p his position either, for Spinoza's affirmation of i m m a -
n e n c e , as against conventional t r a n s c e n d e n c e , signified t h e im-
m a n e n c e of entities in Being, of t h e world in God, a n d not t h e
converse. Spinoza offered a t h i r d possibility, which would be t a k e n
u p a n d d e v e l o p e d brilliantly in G e r m a n Idealism. Spinoza created
t h e possibility of a " p a n e n t h e i s m , " t h o u g h only t h e full develop-
m e n t of G e r m a n Idealist t h o u g h t would b r i n g sufficient clarity to
these issues t h a t t h e t e r m itself would b e i n v e n t e d . 43

Lessing h a d built his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Spinoza o n a p a n e n t h e -

ist r e a d i n g . H e r d e r d e v e l o p e d t h e same line of t h o u g h t in his
4 4

Gott: einige Gesprche. T h e y o u n g Idealists would take u p a n d trans-

figure t h e s e b e g i n n i n g s by b r i n g i n g Spinoza's idea of t h e original
B e i n g into a m u c h m o r e intimate p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e world of en-
tities, fusing a far from "lifeless" Absolute with a n equally animated
N a t u r e . T h e y s o u g h t a way to r e n e w Spinoza's metaphysical syn-
thesis via w h a t Lessing d u b b e d t h e hen kaipan.
Lessing's p h r a s e c a p t u r e d t h e essential magic of Spinozism for
t h e Idealists. W h a t it b e t o k e n e d was synthesis, totality, h o l i s m
t h a t closure lusted after by r e a s o n a n d by feeling: t h e bridge of sub-
j e c t to object, sign to signified, o u g h t to is, desire to fulfillment, m a n
to n a t u r e . It is in those most famous p h r a s e s from SpinozaDeus
sive Natura a n d Natura naturansthat we pick u p a n additional a n d
crucial e l e m e n t in t h e a p p e a l of Spinozism, in t h e affinity between
w h a t K a n t d i s p a r a g e d as "fatalism" a n d "hylozoism." Spinoza's idea
allowed t h e G e r m a n Idealists to give way to t h e i r o v e r w e e n i n g intu-

258 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

ition of n a t u r e as d y n a m i c , active, creativealive. T h a t s e e m e d to
resolve t h e i m m a n e n c e - t r a n s c e n d e n c e p r o b l e m . N a t u r e as a living
force was b o t h in t h e world a n d its h i g h e r principle. It was immanent
Reason.
N a t u r e was more t h a n matter, a n d it was Nature that lived. T h e
very p r o t e s t K a n t m a d e o n behalf of G o d , his objection to "lifeless-
ness," t h e Idealists would m a k e o n behalf of t h e world. A n d , p a r a -
doxically in t h e spirit of Kant, for t h e sake of t h e f r e e d o m of t h a t
most inextricably worldly spirit, m a n himself. With his a r g u m e n t s
in t h e Third Critique, K a n t set t h e issues of the metaphysical vision
which would i n f o r m G e r m a n Idealism. K a n t failed in his mission to
reverse t h e tide of Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m in G e r m a n y . T h e
t r e a t m e n t h e gave these topics in t h e Third Critique served to rally
j u s t those w h o w e r e most a d e p t a n d interested in his philosophy to
t h e defense of Spinoza a n d p a n t h e i s m , a n d t h u s p r o v o k e d t h e new
metaphysics of G e r m a n Idealism. T h e latter could n o m o r e abide
t h e denial of life to t h e Absolute t h a n it could to t h e existent, a n d as
a result m a d e Life, p r o p e r l y c o n s t r u e d , o u t to b e t h e hen kaipan. If
o n e a c c e p t e d b o t h Spinoza's claim t h a t utterly disparate substances
could n o t interact a n d Kant's claim that empirical m a n m u s t be
seen as free, t h e only possible recourse was to r e a d w h a t Kant
t e r m e d t h e n o u m e n a l , t r a n s c e n d e n t , o r intelligible o r d e r as in fact
t h e i m m a n e n t principle of t h e real, n a t u r a l , existential o r d e r .
Spinoza's B e i n g , indwelling in N a t u r e a n d in m a n , b e c a m e Reason
a n d F r e e d o m in o n e : t h e distinctive metaphysical principle of Ger-
m a n Idealism, Geist.

From the "Cognitive" to the "Ethical" Turn

We have c o m e a vast distance in o u r consideration of Kant's "cogni-

tive t u r n , " a n d it may be well to s u m u p , provisionally, t h e key
points of o u r itinerary. T h e cognitive t u r n took place in t h e s p r i n g
of 1789, as a result of Kant's discovery of t h e cognitive potential in
"subjective formal p u r p o s i v e n e s s " or t h e "technic of n a t u r e . " I n t h e
wake of this, h e c a m e to f o r m u l a t e his t h e o r y of "reflective j u d g -
m e n t " a n d to reconceive his n o t i o n of t h e "faculty of j u d g m e n t . "
Accordingly, h e envisioned his work t h e n c e f o r t h n o l o n g e r as a
"Critique of T a s t e " b u t as t h e Critique of Judgment.
Kant's works of 178790 may plausibly be r e a d as a sustained
revision of t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e First Critique of
1 7 8 1 . F r o m at least 1785 forward, K a n t h a d felt obliged to offer a
t h e o r y of t h e "unity of r e a s o n " which went b e y o n d his restrictive

Kant's Attack on Spinoza 259

considerations in t h e First Critique's " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic." As
h e m a d e t h e "cognitive t u r n " in 1789, h e c a m e as close to offering
t h a t unified vision of h u m a n consciousness as h e was ever to c o m e ,
a n d w h a t h e a t t e m p t e d , despite his reservations, inspired his fol-
lowers to even g r a n d e r a d v e n t u r e s in synthesis. If that p e r h a p s
e x c e e d e d Kant's avowed project, it was certainly t h e case that ele-
m e n t s e m e r g e d in t h e Third Critique which s e e m e d to offer s u p p o r t
for such a systematic revision, especially o n t h e vexed questions of
t h e "unity of r e a s o n " a n d t h e possibility of valid self-awareness. His
confidence in t h e closure of his cognitive system with t h e discovery
of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle g r o u n d i n g taste, a n d t h e n with his
discovery of t h e cognitive p o w e r of this s a m e principle, r e a c h e d a
m a x i m u m , p e r h a p s for his whole philosophical career. I n particu-
lar, h e believed h e could now resolve t h e n a g g i n g p r o b l e m of his
epistemology, the failure in t h e First Critique to entail t h e objective
validity of empirical j u d g m e n t s . T o flesh o u t these notions, h e
p l u n g e d into t h e First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.
B u t K a n t also h a d a n eye toward t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y context, es-
pecially in n a t u r a l science. T h e r e were those w h o wished to p u s h
s o m e of t h e ideas with which Kant was working too far, w h o fell into
"dialectical" excess a n d p e r p e t r a t e d "aestheticism of science."
Against t h e m h e h a d already b e e n c o n d u c t i n g a n e x t e n d e d cam-
paign d u r i n g t h e late 1780s, a n d h e saw t h a t it would n e e d to be
b u t t r e s s e d in t h e new Critique ofJudgment. H e directed himself to
t h a t task in t h e "Analytic of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in the late
s p r i n g a n d early s u m m e r of 1789. In t h e process, h e saw that t h e
"aestheticists of science" could all too frequently be identified with
t h e p a n t h e i s t s a n d materialists w h o t h r e a t e n e d the o r t h o d o x theis-
tic p e a c e of G e r m a n religious c u l t u r e . T h e receipt of Jacobi's second
edition of t h e Spinoza-Bchlein in late s u m m e r of 1789 t r i g g e r e d a
far m o r e polemical t u r n in his a r g u m e n t against hylozoism b o t h in
t h e "Analytic" a n d above all in the "Dialectic." His c a m p a i g n s o u g h t
n o t only to rectify t h e methodological excess of "speculation" in t h e
new science of biology, b u t at t h e same time to demolish t h e m e t a -
physical excess of Spinozism a n d hylozoism. T h e result was t h e
climactic a r g u m e n t with Spinoza in t h e "Dialectic of Teleological
J u d g m e n t " over t h e question of plausible o n t o l o g i e s n o t only of
n a t u r e b u t of self. Kant m a d e his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t against
metaphysical speculation, b u t h e went o n to insinuate clearly his
o w n metaphysical position, identified with theism a n d the free will
of individual h u m a n actors. T h a t is what I call t h e "ethical t u r n . "

260 The "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

 BPW* Part Three

T H E F I N A L FORM O F T H E
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
 SP* Thirteen

T H E ETHICAL TURN IN KANT'S

CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

I
n 12 of t h e First Introduction K a n t p r e s e n t e d a plan for t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n of his newly conceived Critique ofJudgment which
s h e d s a g r e a t deal of light u p o n t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e ultimate
work. I n k e e p i n g with his n o t i o n of a n "encyclopedic i n t r o -
d u c t i o n , " K a n t p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e b o d y of his b o o k provide a sys-
tematic articulation of t h e faculty of j u d g m e n t , i.e., o n e which
would b e c o m p l e t e a n d internally consistent. H e p r o c e e d e d to lay
1

d o w n a f r a m e w o r k for this t h r o u g h t h r e e distinctions. First h e dis-

t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n d e t e r m i n a n t a n d reflective j u d g m e n t s . Deter-
m i n a n t j u d g m e n t n e e d e d n o consideration within t h e faculty of
j u d g m e n t itself since it was completely g o v e r n e d by the faculty of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e systematic articulation of t h e faculty
of j u d g m e n t in t e r m s of its o w n intrinsic principle would focus ex-
clusively u p o n reflective j u d g m e n t . Kant p r o c e e d e d t h e n to a sec-
o n d discrimination, b e t w e e n aesthetic a n d logical reflective j u d g -
m e n t s . T h i s r e q u i r e d t h a t a critique of j u d g m e n t s h o u l d have two
parts, o n e c o n s i d e r i n g aesthetic j u d g m e n t s ( j u d g m e n t s of taste),
a n d o n e c o n s i d e r i n g l o g i c a l j u d g m e n t s (teleology).
At first glance, these w o u l d s e e m to be sufficient divisions. B u t
in fact K a n t w e n t o n to a third, decisive distinction, between intrin-
sic a n d relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s . Accordingly, t h e simple twofold di-
2

vision t u r n e d into a fourfold division. I n t h e s p h e r e of t h e aesthetic

reflective j u d g m e n t , K a n t identified the consideration of intrinsic
p u r p o s i v e n e s s with beauty, a n d t h e n h e linked t h e consideration of
relative p u r p o s i v e n e s s with the sublime. I n t h e s p h e r e of t h e logical
r e f l e c t i v e j u d g m e n t , h e discriminated t h e consideration of intrinsic
p u r p o s i v e n e s s , i.e., n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s or o r g a n i c forms, from con-
sideration of relative purposiveness, i.e., the p u r p o s e of n a t u r e (as
a whole) in its relation to m a n . 3

263
 T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , while n o t acknowledged in t h e final struc-
t u r e of t h e work, nevertheless i n f o r m e d its ultimate design. T h e
whole "ethical t u r n " would b e a n elaboration of t h e p r o b l e m s en-
tailed by t h e t h i r d discrimination. It is t h e basis for the consider-
ation of t h e sublime in t h e Third Critique, a n d it helps clarify t h e
i m p o r t a n c e of t h e e l a b o r a t e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g -
m e n t , " which is really t h e consideration of t h e final p r o b l e m .
S t a r t i n g in late s u m m e r of 1789, Kant's Critique of Judgment
went t h r o u g h a third, major m e t a m o r p h o s i s c e n t e r e d above all in
t h r e e places in t h e Third Critique: t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g -
m e n t , " t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime," a n d 49 (the analysis of ge-
n i u s ) . H e c o n t i n u e d a l o n g this line in early 1790, elaborating his
4

" M e t h o d o l o g y of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d t h e n revising sub-

stantially t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e whole work in t h e last m o n t h s be-
fore delivering his m a n u s c r i p t to the publisher. It is this final t u r n
in t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of his w o r k that I will call Kant's "ethical t u r n . "
H e m a d e it for c o n t e x t u a l as well as for i m m a n e n t reasons. T h e
n e w "practical-metaphysical" e m p h a s i s of t h e final version can be
e x p l a i n e d contextually in t e r m s of Kant's struggle against Spinoz-
ism a n d p a n t h e i s m . Kant's "ethical t u r n " m u s t be seen as p a r t of
a strategy to d e f e n d his crucial metaphysical c o m m i t m e n t s : to the
free will a n d m o r a l d u t y of individual h u m a n beings, a n d to
t h e idea of a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l Divinity o n Christian lines.
T h e i m m a n e n t r e a s o n h a d to d o with his desire to reconcile his
p h e n o m e n a - n o u m e n a t h e o r y of f r e e d o m with t h e p r o b l e m of actu-
alizing t h e m o r a l good. H e n e e d e d , or felt h e n e e d e d , to r e f o r m u -
late a n d s t r e n g t h e n t h e a n a l o g u e to schematism which h e h a d
d e v e l o p e d in t h e Second Critique.
T h a t was t h e t h r u s t of t h e crucial ii of the I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e
Critique ofJudgment, entitled "Of t h e Realm of Philosophy in G e n -
eral." K a n t a r g u e d t h e r e t h a t

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n exercise . . . two distinct legisla-

tions o n o n e a n d t h e same territory of e x p e r i e n c e , without
prejudice to each o t h e r . . . T h a t they d o n o t constitute one
r e a l m arises from this that the n a t u r a l c o n c e p t r e p r e s e n t s its
objects in intuition, n o t as things in themselves, b u t as m e r e
p h e n o m e n a ; t h e c o n c e p t of freedom, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p -
r e s e n t s in its object a t h i n g in itself, b u t n o t in i n t u i t i o n .
5

I n t e r m s of his p h e n o m e n a - n o u m e n a distinction, this s e e m e d per-

fectly a d e q u a t e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h o u g h these two different realms

264 The Critique of Judgment

 " d o n o t limit each o t h e r in t h e i r legislation . . . they perpetually d o
so in t h e world of sense." T h i s is because even if philosophy may b e
divided into theoretical a n d practical, "the territory to which its
r e a l m e x t e n d s a n d in which its legislation is exercised is always only
t h e c o m p l e x of objects of all possible e x p e r i e n c e , so long as they a r e
t a k e n for n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n m e r e p h e n o m e n a . " Reason in its
6

m o r a l legislation m u s t legislate to p h e n o m e n a as t h o u g h they w e r e

n o u m e n a . B u t t h a t m e a n t t h a t b o t h laws m u s t obtain simultane-
ously. T h e r e f o r e , practical laws did a n d h a d to infringe u p o n n a t u -
ral o r d e r . T h e q u e s t i o n was how they could d o so without violating
t h e legislation of cognitive laws. T h e answer, for Kant, was of
c o u r s e t h e resort to teleology. B u t the force b e h i n d the whole strat-
egy was his c o m m i t t e d belief in t h e reality of n o u m e n a .
T h e best way to illuminate t h e n a t u r e of t h e "ethical t u r n " is to
contrast t h e final version of the I n t r o d u c t i o n , c o m p o s e d in March
1790, with t h e First Introduction, c o m p o s e d by May 1789. Kant's in-
terest in t h e heuristic utility of teleological j u d g m e n t s for cognition
a p p e a r s to have fallen off substantially between t h e composition of
t h e two versions. It is n o t so m u c h t h a t Kant a b a n d o n e d t h e posi-
tion of t h e First Introduction as that it simply did n o t seem so i m p o r -
t a n t to h i m . R a t h e r , h e felt a s t r o n g n e e d to u n d e r s c o r e t h e merely
subjective c h a r a c t e r of teleological t h i n k i n g a b o u t objects of na-
t u r e . His d i s p a r a g e m e n t of " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e " c e n t e r e d o n his r e -
j e c t i o n of any possible i m m a n e n c e in n a t u r e in connection with his
struggle against Spinozism a n d p a n t h e i s m .
By far t h e most i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n t h e two versions
c o m e s at t h e i r very outset: t h e m e n t i o n of will as a " n a t u r a l cause"
in 1 of t h e final version is new. T h a t novelty b e c o m e s salient in ii
of t h e final version, a section which h a d n o p r e c e d e n t in t h e First
Introduction a n d which e x p l o r e d in detail the p r o b l e m of will as a
n a t u r a l cause raised at t h e conclusion of i. K a n t stated t h e defini-
tive c o n c e r n of t h e Third Critique in t h e final p a r a g r a p h of the sec-
tion. It may well b e o n e of t h e clearest s t a t e m e n t s Kant ever m a d e
r e g a r d i n g t h e p o i n t of his e n t i r e philosophical e n t e r p r i s e . K a n t
s o u g h t to reconcile n a t u r e a n d freedom, t h e laws of causality with
t h e law of morality, within his system. H e w r o t e :

N o w even if a n i m m e a s u r a b l e gulf is fixed between t h e sen-

sible realm of the concept of n a t u r e a n d t h e supersensible
r e a l m of t h e concept of f r e e d o m , so that n o transition is pos-
sible from t h e first to t h e second (by m e a n s of t h e theoretical
use of reason), j u s t as if they were two different worlds of

The Ethical Turn 265

 which t h e first could have n o influence u p o n t h e second, yet
t h e s e c o n d is meant to h a v e a n influence u p o n t h e first. 7

Man's free will h a d to try to actualize its p u r p o s e s in the world of

sense, h e n c e this h a d to be at least possible. Kant's m o r a l philoso-
p h y r e q u i r e d n o t success, b u t a n a t t e m p t to actualize the individ-
ual's m o r a l will in t h e world. T h a t r e q u i r e d t h e translation of a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will into a n actual,
efficacious act: free will as a " n a t u r a l cause."
K a n t chose to resolve t h e d i l e m m a in t h e following m a n n e r :
" n a t u r e m u s t b e so t h o u g h t t h a t t h e conformity to law of its form at
least h a r m o n i z e s with t h e possibility of t h e p u r p o s e s to b e effected
in it a c c o r d i n g to laws of f r e e d o m . " Kant went o n to explicate this
s e n t e n c e with o n e even m o r e problematic: " T h e r e m u s t , t h e r e f o r e ,
be a g r o u n d of t h e unity of t h e supersensible, which lies at the basis
of n a t u r e , with t h a t which t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m practically con-
t a i n s . " K a n t recognized t h a t " t h e concept of this g r o u n d " could
8

yield n o k n o w l e d g e ; t h e "supersensible" was obviously b e y o n d

sense, a n d h e n c e ineligible for categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Nev- 9

ertheless K a n t m a i n t a i n e d it m a d e possible t h e "transition" from

t h e principles of f r e e d o m to t h e principles of n a t u r e . W h a t Kant
a p p e a r s to have m e a n t is t h a t t h e reconciliation of t h e laws of na-
t u r e a n d t h e law of f r e e d o m could be t h o u g h t only in t e r m s of t h e
idea of a "supersensible g r o u n d , " t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t unity of n a t u r e
a n d m a n : a metaphysical idea if ever t h e r e was o n e !
T h e w h o l e t e n o r of t h e consideration was metaphysical in t h a t
Kant a d d r e s s e d himself to t h e intervention of t h e supersensible in
t h e world of sense. K a n t u p h e l d his distinction of p h e n o m e n a a n d
n o u m e n a b u t h e validated t h e latter not only as indispensable to
h u m a n thought (theoretical r e a s o n as "regulative"), b u t m u c h m o r e
i m p o r t a n t l y as essential to h u m a n action (practical reason as a u t o n -
omous freedom).
Since Kant's critical p h i l o s o p h y did n o t p e r m i t any cognitive as-
cription of objective reality to n o u m e n a , h e h a d to d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of a unifying supersensible " g r o u n d " was a t r a n -
scendentally necessary s t r u c t u r e for consciousness in general. T h e
c o n c e p t h e r e q u i r e d h a d to recognize t h e lawfulness of n a t u r e in
t e r m s a n a l o g o u s to t h e lawfulness of will. It could be n e i t h e r t h e -
oretical, i.e., constitutive of t h e objects of cognition, n o r practical,
i.e., legislative of m o r a l imperatives, b u t only a m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g :
subjective, b u t nevertheless indispensable. W h a t fit t h e bill was t h e
c o n c e p t of " p u r p o s i v e n e s s " (Zweckmigkeit). K a n t h a d seen in tele-

266 The Critique of Judgment

 ology t h e key to his a priori principle d e t e r m i n i n g t h e faculty of
feeling in his original b r e a k t h r o u g h to t h e "Critique of T a s t e " in
late 1787. Purposiveness p r o v i d e d t h e link in aesthetics between
j u d g m e n t a n d feeling, t h o u g h only in its formal, n o t actual signifi-
cance. Similarly, purposiveness f o u n d its way into Kant's cognitive
p h i l o s o p h y as a way to resolve t h e p r o b l e m of i n d u c t i o n a n d to se-
c u r e t h e possibility of empirical science. At t h e final stage of his
c o m p o s i t i o n , this vastly e x p a n d e d n o t i o n p r o v e d decisive for his
metaphysical a d v e n t u r e with t h e "supersensible substrate." Pur-
posiveness, by virtue of its multiple linguistic links, p r o v i d e d the in-
t e g u m e n t b i n d i n g t h e supersensible substrate of n a t u r e with t h e
supersensible f r e e d o m of t h e m o r a l subject. T h e l a n g u a g e of p u r -
posiveness set t h e t o n e o n which all t h e h a r m o n i c s of t h e Third Cri-
tique w e r e built.
It h a d its original a n d literal place, however, in t h e t h e o r y of
h u m a n action, especially practical o r m o r a l action. T h i s m o r a l di-
m e n s i o n of teleology reasserted itself as K a n t worked o u t his posi-
tion in t h e Third Critique. T h i s new c o n c e r n i n t r u d e d powerfully
into t h e "Critique of Teleological J u d g m e n t " a n d t h e revised I n t r o -
d u c t i o n . J u s t as teleology h a d f o u n d its way into t h e p r o b l e m of
cognition in t e r m s of empirical investigations, so now teleology
f o u n d its way into p r o b l e m s of morality in t e r m s of the n a t u r a l , m a -
terial aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e . It was essential for m a n to find a
solution w h e r e b y h e could b o t h recognize t h e o r d e r (lawfulness) of
n a t u r e a n d yet confirm his o w n freedom not merely n o u m e n a l l y
b u t practically. As t h e " T h i r d A n t i n o m y " of t h e First Critique h a d it,
f r e e d o m a n d necessity w e r e compatible, b u t only so long as each
r e m a i n e d in its o w n realm. Nevertheless, Kant was quite aware t h a t
h u m a n m o r a l obligation entailed t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of m o r a l choices
into t h e world of things. B u t was t h e r e any place for t h e m t h e r e ?
While m a n took himself for a real p u r p o s e , h e was a n a t u r a l p h e -
n o m e n o n nevertheless. M a n f o u n d himself a m e r e object of na-
ture's processes: " n a t u r e has n o t in the least e x c e p t e d h i m from its
destructive o r its productive powers, but has subjected everything
to a m e c h a n i s m of its o w n without any p u r p o s e . " 1 0

M a n as p u r p o s i v e h a d b e e n at stake all a l o n g in t h e Third Cri-

tique. F o r K a n t t h e o n e ultimate a n d persistent p r o b l e m for m a n
was h o w to reconcile his self-conception as n o u m e n a l l y free with
his k n o w l e d g e of his own n a t u r a l materiality. T h e cognitive con-
c e p t i o n of n a t u r e o p e r a t e d within a framework of relentless causal
necessity. As p h e n o m e n o n , m a n was "always only a link in t h e chain
of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e s . " K a n t h a m m e r e d away at this point. A n d
11

The Ethical Turn 267

yet, h e insisted, only in m a n himself could a final p u r p o s e be f o u n d
in n a t u r e . " H e is t h e ultimate p u r p o s e of creation h e r e o n e a r t h ,
because h e is t h e only b e i n g u p o n it w h o can form a concept of p u r -
poses a n d w h o can, by his r e a s o n , m a k e o u t of a n a g g r e g a t e of p u r -
posively f o r m e d things a system of p u r p o s e s . " H e was u n i q u e in
12

t h e world for having n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m "to d e t e r m i n e p u r p o s e s

. . . as u n c o n d i t i o n e d a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s . "
13

Man's task, a c c o r d i n g to Kant, was to realize his stature as a free

a g e n t . " T h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m is m e a n t to actualize in t h e world
of sense t h e p u r p o s e p r o p o s e d by its laws, a n d consequently n a t u r e
m u s t b e so t h o u g h t t h a t t h e conformity to law of its form at least
h a r m o n i z e s with t h e possibility of the p u r p o s e s to be effected in it
a c c o r d i n g to laws of f r e e d o m . " M a n h a d to evaluate his own p u r -
14

p o s e u n d e r t h e d o u b l e tension between his material d e t e r m i n a c y

a n d t h e ultimate t r a n s c e n d e n c e of his freedom (the p r o b l e m of t h e
unity of man as a finite-rational subject), a n d b e t w e e n his individual
subjectivity a n d the u l t i m a t e destiny of his kind (the p r o b l e m of t h e
unity of mankind as a spiritual force transfiguring n a t u r e into his-
tory). It is this metaphysical question of h u m a n p u r p o s e that the
Critique ofJudgment ultimately takes u p : t h e crucial relation b e t w e e n
m a n ' s d u t y a n d his destiny in t h e world.
T h e ethical t u r n entailed the effort to c o m e to grips with m a n ' s
being-in-the-world. It h a d b o t h a n aesthetic a n d a practical d i m e n -
sion. I n t h e aesthetic s p h e r e , t h e ethical t u r n invoked beauty as t h e
symbol of morality. I n t h e practical s p h e r e , it h a d to d o with d u t y
a n d destiny, i.e., history, religion a n d t h e c o n c e p t of the "highest
g o o d . " T h e t h e o r y of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic only clarified
t h e aesthetic d i m e n s i o n of t h e relation of t h e sensible to t h e s u p e r -
sensible, a n d K a n t t u r n e d to t h e final question of its practical di-
m e n s i o n , t h e p r o b l e m of t h e "highest g o o d , " in t h e very last stages
of t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e text. I n d e e d , h e elaborated it substan-
tially in t h e first m o n t h s of 1790 after h e h a d already i n f o r m e d his
p u b l i s h e r t h a t the work was finished. T h e "Methodology of Tele-
ological J u d g m e n t , " as we now have it, m u s t b e d a t e d to this last
period. 1 5
It i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e metaphysical progress Kant h a d
m a d e via his t h e o r y of t h e sublime a n d t h e symbolic a n d e x t e n d e d it
i n t o a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of m a n ' s being-in-the-world.

268 The Critique of Judgment

 Fourteen

T H E SUBLIME, T H E SYMBOLIC,
AND MAN'S "SUPERSENSIBLE
DESTINATION"

I
n t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t , " t h e "Analytic of t h e
S u b l i m e , " a n d 49 (the analysis of genius) K a n t developed a
new t h e o r y of symbolism. A l o n g with a r e n e w e d interest in t h e
sublime, two o t h e r t e r m s a s s u m e d salience in his work: t h e
" s u p e r s e n s i b l e " a n d " i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts." T h e intimate rela-
tion of these t h r e e notions constitutes t h e t h e o r y of symbolism.
T h i s n e w interest in symbolism originated in Kant's elaboration of
his t h e o r y of n o u m e n a l h u m a n f r e e d o m in t h e c o m p l e x case of
h u m a n being-in-the-world. T h e key to t h e t h e o r y of symbolism lies
in Kant's revision of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic
Judgment."
I n revising a n d d e e p e n i n g t h e "simple" a n t i n o m y of his "Cri-
tique of T a s t e , " K a n t m o v e d from a negative to a positive n o t i o n of
the a n t i n o m y : from "discipline" (critique) to speculation (meta-
physics). T h e positive sense u r g e s us to "think" t h e unity of r e a s o n
1

t h e g r o u n d of o u r o w n subjectivity. T o b e s u r e , as in t h e First Cri-

2

tique, K a n t c o n t i n u e d to d e n y strict "objective reality" (i.e., cognitive

validity) to such t h o u g h t . B u t h e also, a n d m u c h m o r e emphatically
t h a n in t h e First Critique, e m p h a s i z e d t h e m e a n i n g f ulness of t h e a n -
t i n o m y in g r o u n d i n g n o u m e n a for reason. Such a g r o u n d i n g was
of course n o t theoretically objective. It was only "practical." B u t in
R e m a r k II to 57, K a n t a r g u e d t h a t t h e p o i n t of all t h e a n t i n o m i e s
was to "force" u s to recognize "an intelligible substrate ( s o m e t h i n g
supersensible of which t h e c o n c e p t is only a n idea a n d supplies n o
p r o p e r k n o w l e d g e ) . " T h i s h e articulated with even m o r e elo-
3

q u e n c e a n d i m p o r t a n c e in 57 itself: " A n d t h u s h e r e , as also in t h e

Critique of Practical Reason, t h e a n t i n o m i e s force us against o u r will
to look b e y o n d t h e sensible a n d to seek in t h e supersensible t h e

269
p o i n t of u n i o n for all o u r a priori faculties, because n o o t h e r e x p e -
d i e n t is left to m a k e o u r r e a s o n h a r m o n i o u s with itself." T h a t K a n t
4

used t h e w o r d "force" in b o t h contexts is striking. H e suggested

with it t h a t t h e m i n d resisted t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e is a supersensible
r e a l m over a n d above t h e sensible o n e . Such resistance derived
from two q u a r t e r s : t h e n a t u r a l dialectical i m p e t u s to s u b r e p t i o n ,
r e g a r d i n g t h e sensible world as t h e only world ( c o m m o n sense),
a n d t h e sophisticated philosophical suspicion of such a transcen-
d e n t world (skepticism). K a n t claimed t h a t t h e first resistance could
b e o v e r c o m e o n c e it was d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t n o t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l
to t h e actual n e e d s of o r d i n a r y m e n was lost by such a distinction,
b u t r a t h e r a g r e a t deal g a i n e d for their ultimate m e a n i n g . Against 5

t h e s e c o n d resistance, K a n t a r g u e d that r e a s o n , u p o n which skep-

tics rely for critical efficacy, could n o t itself r e m a i n c o h e r e n t with-
o u t resort to such a distinction.
If a n a n t i n o m y exists, t h e r e m u s t be a conflict at the level of
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle, i.e., some question of necessary validity
m u s t be at stake, a n d this inevitably implies that p u r e reason
(the faculty of cognition in general) m u s t exercise its critical func-
tion. T h e faculty of r e a s o n (in general) o p e r a t e s exclusively with
t h o u g h t s , i.e., via t h e function of concepts. H e n c e any a n t i n o m y
m u s t involve concepts. T h e p r o b l e m in t h e specific case of the fac-
ulty of j u d g m e n t is t h a t a p p a r e n t l y reflective j u d g m e n t , at least in
its aesthetic e m p l o y m e n t , d o e s n o t involve concepts. K a n t t h e r e -
fore a r g u e s t h a t e i t h e r j u d g m e n t has n o claim to necessary validity,
which destroys t h e legitimacy of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, or else j u d g -
m e n t m u s t have s o m e c o n n e c t i o n with concepts after all. 6

T h i s was t h e n e w f o r m of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aes-

thetic J u d g m e n t " which K a n t i n t r o d u c e d in t h e late s u m m e r o r fall
of 1789. I n this a n t i n o m y , only t h e second possibility was accept-
able for Kant. His solution was to associate t h e sorts of concepts ex-
c l u d e d from j u d g m e n t s of taste with " d e t e r m i n a t e " concepts (of t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , a n d to conceive of a n o t h e r sort of " c o n c e p t "
namely, o n e which did n o t b e l o n g to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d which
was c o n s e q u e n t l y n o t d e t e r m i n a t e : ideas of reason now described
as " i n d e t e r m i n a t e " or " u n d e t e r m i n a b l e " c o n c e p t s . C o n c e p t s of
7

t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e r e d e t e r m i n a t e because they could b e applied

concretely, via t h e schematism, to objects of sensible intuition.
Ideas of r e a s o n were i n d e t e r m i n a t e because they could never b e
p r e s e n t e d completely by a n object of sensible intuition. H e n c e ,
K a n t n o w a r g u e d t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t of taste possessed a n a priori

270 The Critique of Judgment

w a r r a n t for its claim to universal c o n s e n t by virtue of its r e f e r e n c e
n o t to any d e t e r m i n a t e concept, b u t r a t h e r to i n d e t e r m i n a t e ideas
of r e a s o n .
K a n t w e n t o n to articulate in g e n e r a l w h a t such rational con-
cepts c o n t a i n e d . H e a r g u e d t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e concept of rea-
son r e f e r r e d to t h e supersensible "which lies at t h e basis of all
sensible intuition." In a reflective j u d g m e n t , " t h e m e r e p u r e ra-
tional c o n c e p t of t h e supersensible which u n d e r l i e s t h e object (and
also t h e subject j u d g i n g it) [is] r e g a r d e d as a n object of sense a n d
t h u s p h e n o m e n a l . " K a n t suggested, t h e n , t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t of
8

taste ultimately entailed the assertion of t h e reality of "the c o n c e p t

of t h e g e n e r a l g r o u n d of t h e subjective purposiveness of n a t u r e for
t h e j u d g m e n t " as a " d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d " a n d as t h e " s u p e r s e n s -
ible substrate of h u m a n i t y . " T h a t is clearly "dialectical" s u b r e p t i o n
in t e r m s of t h e First Critique. As d e t e r m i n i n g , r a t h e r t h a n deter-
m i n e d , t h e "supersensible" could n e v e r b e a t r u e object of cogni-
t i o n . K a n t n o w stressed, however, that it could be t h o u g h t , a n d it
9

could also be a t t e n d e d via reflection, i.e., aesthetically. W h a t u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g could n o t p r o v e , r e a s o n could think, reflection could feel.
W h a t they b o t h p o i n t e d to was t h e supersensible, conceived of n o t
only as t h e "substrate of p h e n o m e n a " b u t also as a "subjective p r i n -
ciple," i.e., "the indefinite idea of t h e supersensible in u s . "
K a n t articulated t h r e e aspects of this idea in his R e m a r k II
to 57. T h e r e was t h e idea of t h e supersensible in general, as t h e
substrate of n a t u r e , which c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e idea of t h e t h i n g -
in-itself o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object in t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Analytic,"
a n d also, p e r h a p s , to the idea of n a t u r e as a whole in t h e " T r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l Dialectic" of t h e First Critique. T h e r e was t h e principle of
subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of n a t u r e for o u r cognition, or t h e im-
p u t e d "technic of n a t u r e " involved in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l principle
of logical reflectivejudgment. A n d finally t h e r e was t h e principle of
t h e p u r p o s e s of f r e e d o m a n d its conformity to m o r a l law, o r t h e
idea of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l or n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m as d e v e l o p e d in t h e
Second Critique. H e n c e each of t h e t h r e e Critiques e x p l o r e d a n idea
of t h e supersensible. T h e question implied by this articulation was
w h e t h e r t h e r e was s o m e unity to t h e idea of t h e supersensible which
was m o r e t h a n n o m i n a l , a n d which could t h e n stand as a universal
g r o u n d for b o t h n a t u r e a n d f r e e d o m . K a n t asserted in the First Cri-
tique t h a t unity was methodologically indispensable for t h e func-
tion of r e a s o n , b u t r e m a i n e d merely a formal o r heuristic principle,
h e n c e objectively n o m i n a l . T h e new a n t i n o m y s e e m e d to raise

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 271

a g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e w e r e g r o u n d s for considering
t h e supersensible objectively real.
Unless reflective j u d g m e n t could refer to this i n d e t e r m i n a t e
c o n c e p t of t h e supersensible, K a n t decided, it could not lay claim to
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g a n d would fall o u t of t h e realm of t h e
faculty of cognition into t h a t of m e r e s e n s e . B u t if it did m a k e
10

such a r e f e r e n c e , a n d d r e w u p o n it as its ultimate g r o u n d , t h e n

w h a t a p p e a r e d to be a m e r e l y aesthetic j u d g m e n t from the vantage
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g could be c o n s t r u e d as a "disguised j u d g m e n t
of r e a s o n . " T h i s "disguised j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n " would c o n c e r n
11

" t h e perfection discovered in a t h i n g a n d t h e reference of the m a n -

ifold in it to a p u r p o s e . " Accordingly, it w o u l d b e a "confusion" to
c o n s i d e r it a n aesthetic reflection, since "it is at b o t t o m teleological."
K a n t h a d systematically rejected such a n a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m
of b e a u t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e "Critique of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " H e
sustained t h a t rejection in t h e R e m a r k to 57. Yet h e formulated it
as t h e possibility t h a t would obtain were we e n d o w e d with intellec-
tual intuition of n o u m e n a , i.e., were it possible to "know," n o t
m e r e l y "think" t h e supersensible. While such overt metaphysics r e -
m a i n e d proscribed in t h e "critical philosophy," Kant was now work-
i n g t o w a r d a new access to these crucial ideas. T h e n a t u r a l
c o n t i n u a t i o n of the a r g u m e n t c a m e in 59.
It is i m p o r t a n t to d r a w a t t e n t i o n first, however, to a strange pas-
sage in 22, at the conclusion of the exposition of the "Analytic of
t h e Beautiful," w h e r e K a n t discussed his n o t i o n of a sensus com-
munis. H e w r o t e :

T h i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e n o r m of a c o m m o n sense is actually p r e -
s u p p o s e d by us, as is shown by o u r claim to lay d o w n j u d g -
m e n t s of taste. W h e t h e r t h e r e is in fact such a c o m m o n sense,
as a constitutive principle of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e , o r
w h e t h e r a yet h i g h e r principle of reason makes it only into a
regulative principle for p r o d u c i n g in us a c o m m o n sense for
h i g h e r p u r p o s e s ; w h e t h e r , therefore, taste is an original a n d
n a t u r a l faculty o r only t h e idea of a n artificial o n e yet to b e
a c q u i r e d , so that a j u d g m e n t of taste with its a s s u m p t i o n of a
universal assent in fact is only a r e q u i r e m e n t of reason for
p r o d u c i n g such h a r m o n y of s e n t i m e n t ; w h e t h e r the o u g h t ,
i.e. the objective necessity of the confluence of the feeling of
any o n e m a n with t h a t of every other, only signifies t h e possi-
bility of arriving at this accord, a n d t h e j u d g m e n t of taste only

272 The Critique of Judgment

 affords a n e x a m p l e of t h e application of this p r i n c i p l e t h e s e
questions we have n e i t h e r t h e wish n o r t h e p o w e r to investi-
gate as y e t . 12

T h e p l a c e m e n t of this passage is extremely awkward in t h e context

of t h e a r g u m e n t which was b e i n g developed at t h a t point in t h e
"Analytic of t h e Beautiful." T h e reference to a n " i n d e t e r m i n a t e "
n o r m is evidence of this, for t h e distinction is n o t at all e m p l o y e d in
t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful" u p to that point. Since the passage
involves considerations to which n o t h i n g in the p r e c e d i n g sections
would point, it a p p e a r s to be a later addition. T h e n o t i o n that t h e
j u d g m e n t of taste m i g h t be a "disguised j u d g m e n t of reason,"
which was clearly i n t i m a t e d as a possibility in t h e passage, h a d b e e n
rejected o u t of h a n d in t e r m s of t h e idea of perfection in 15, a n d
would h a r d l y m e r i t reassertion. Yet Kant h e r e i n t r u d e d s o m e inti-
m a t i o n s t h a t t h e n o t i o n of " c o m m o n sense" a n d t h e claim to univer-
sality a n d necessity in the j u d g m e n t of taste b e t o k e n e d s o m e far
vaster a n d m o r e metaphysical possibilities t h a n his straightforward
articulation w o u l d s e e m to r e q u i r e . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , we s h o u l d
n o t b e too hasty to c o n c l u d e in R e m a r k II of 57 t h a t Kant wished
a l t o g e t h e r to dismiss t h e p r o s p e c t that t h e j u d g m e n t of taste m i g h t
be a disguised j u d g m e n t of reason. I n d e e d , if we t u r n to 59, we
discover h e asserted r a t h e r t h a n d e n i e d this prospect, t h o u g h in a
new a n d r e m a r k a b l e form: the theory of symbolism.
P e r h a p s t h e most striking p h r a s e in t h e Third Critique occurs in
t h e title of 59: "Of B e a u t y as t h e Symbol of Morality." E i g h t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y aesthetics f u n d a m e n t a l l y s o u g h t to liberate the realm of
aesthetics from its submission to ethics, or, in a n o t h e r formulation,
to distinguish a kind of feeling in which n o desire was implicated,
b u t with this p h r a s e K a n t dramatically r e i n t r o d u c e d t h e b o n d be-
tween the aesthetic a n d the ethical. Yet h e wished to restore t h e
linkage n o t discursively, not cognitively, b u t only symbolically.
59 b e g i n s n o t with a n exposition of its d r a m a t i c title b u t r a t h e r
with t h e clearest articulation of Kant's n o t i o n of " p r e s e n t a t i o n "
[Darstellung] of concepts in general, hypotyposis. Presentation m e a n s
simply "sensible illustration." Empirically, it is a n e x a m p l e . It is
w h a t a m a t h e m a t i c i a n or a scientist m e a n s by a " d e m o n s t r a t i o n . "13

S o m e concepts can be d e m o n s t r a t e d determinately, either t h r o u g h

c o n s t r u c t i o n in p u r e intuition (as in geometry, a n d m a t h e m a t i c s
generally), o r t h r o u g h schematism. Schematism is that p r o c e d u r e
of p r e s e n t a t i o n in which for a p u r e concept of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 273

a n intuitive d e t e r m i n a t i o n is constituted directly a n d adequately.
Schematism is d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e r e are concepts avail-
able to c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n d e t e r m i n a t e ideas of r e a s o n " t o which
n o sensible intuition can b e a d e q u a t e . "
K a n t d e v e l o p e d his t h e o r y of symbolism with reference to
these i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts. K a n t described t h e p r o c e d u r e of
symbolism as follows: "an intuition is s u p p l i e d with which accords a
p r o c e d u r e of t h e j u d g m e n t a n a l o g o u s to w h a t it observes in sche-
m a t i s m , i.e. merely a n a l o g o u s to t h e r u l e of this p r o c e d u r e , n o t to
t h e intuition itself, c o n s e q u e n t l y to t h e form of reflection merely
a n d n o t to its c o n t e n t . " First, it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that s o m e in-
14

tuitive c o r r e l a t i v e h o w e v e r i n a d e q u a t e i s s o u g h t or supplied by
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . We will have to ask why. Second, t h e principle of
t h e p r o c e d u r e is analogy.
Symbolism works by analogy to t h e p r o c e d u r e of schematism in
d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , t h e constitution of sensible intuition by t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s principle of analogy K a n t m a d e t h e basis for
" o r i e n t a t i o n of t h i n k i n g " in r e f e r e n c e to t h e supersensible in his
crucial article o n t h e P a n t h e i s m Controversy, "Was heit: sich im
D e n k e n o r i e n t i e r e n ? " Let us retrieve two points from that discus-
15

sion: w h a t t h e principle of analogy can achieve, a n d why it is in-

voked. T h e latter idea deserves first consideration, for t h a t article
linked it unequivocally with t h e " r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e a s o n . " Rea- 16

son must t h i n k a b o u t t h e supersensible. Given this, t h e only q u e s -

tion it will consider is h o w most contructively to d o so. T h e answer
is: by analogy. K a n t e x p l a i n e d what philosophical analogy could
achieve in t h e First Critique in discussing his "Analogies of Experi-
e n c e . " T h a t n o t i o n of analogy was r e i t e r a t e d in t h e article "Was
1 7

h e i t " a n d again in t h e Third Critique. 18

T h e principle of analogy
allows t h e rational confirmation of a relation, b u t n o t of its d e t e r m i -
n a t e c o n t e n t . T h e analogy of symbol to s c h e m a allows t h e rational
validity of a relation b e t w e e n an i n d e t e r m i n a t e idea of reason a n d a
sensible intuition, even t h o u g h t h a t relation c a n n o t establish t h e
identity of t h e c o n t e n t . T h u s , while schematism achieves a direct
p r e s e n t a t i o n of concepts, symbolism achieves a n indirect p r e s e n t a -
tion.
T h a t b r i n g s us to t h e t h i r d key p o i n t to take from the cited pas-
sage, namely, t h a t in symbolism the m i n d is set in m o t i o n in a p r o -
c e d u r e which is strictly a n a l o g o u s to that of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in its
d e t e r m i n a n t o r constitutive p r o c e d u r e . T h a t is, a t h o u g h t seeks
p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e form of intuition. T h e m o v e m e n t of the m i n d is
from t h o u g h t to sensibility. T h e source of t h e i m p u l s e lies in rea-

274 The Critique of Judgment

son, n o t sense. It is "expressionist," n o t "impressionist." T h a t is to
say, t h e p r o b l e m is n o t o n e of recognition b u t of creation. T h e sym-
bol is i n v e n t e d , not discovered, t h o u g h , of course, o n c e t h e p r o -
c e d u r e has b e e n established, it is easy to see how it becomes possible
t h a t a n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e m i g h t be taken for a symbol: we are in the
familiar g r i p of the g r o u n d i n g p a r a d o x of art o n c e m o r e .
Let u s s u m u p w h a t we have established. First, symbolism is a n
e n t e r p r i s e a i m e d at finding intuitive expression for a n i n d e t e r m i -
n a t e , i.e., supersensible idea of reason. It involves a p r o c e d u r e of
analogy, which is able only to secure t h e relation between the super-
sensible a n d t h e intuitive object, but not t h e identity of their con-
tents. H e n c e t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n is with this relation, with t h e
sense of affinity, with t h e evocation of t h e supersensible in r e a s o n
by t h e sensible object. A n d precisely what the symbol is to evoke is
t h a t supersensible subjectivity which for Kant is distinctly m o r a l .
All of t h e s e e l e m e n t s c o n v e r g e in a single concept: Geistesgefhl.
Geistesgefhl was w h a t K a n t "provisionally t e r m f e d ] the faculty of
r e p r e s e n t i n g a sublimity in o b j e c t s . " H e n c e o u r e x a m i n a t i o n of
19

Kant's t h e o r y of symbolism leads us directly to t h e sublime. It is

only by c o n s i d e r i n g the idea of t h e sublime t h a t we can m a k e sense
of t h e relation of "aesthetic ideas" to "rational ideas" in such a way
as to d o full justice to Kant's claim t h a t "beauty is t h e symbol of t h e
morally g o o d . "

The Analytic of the Sublime

T h e p l a c e m e n t of the "Analytic of t h e Sublime" ( 2 3 - 3 0 ) in t h e

c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique is problematic. M e r e d i t h , at o n e
e x t r e m e , c o n s i d e r e d t h e material o n t h e sublime to b e a m o n g the
oldest writing in t h e Third Critique, a n d h e n c e "almost certainly
i n c l u d e d " in t h e original version of t h e "Critique of T a s t e . " 2 0

S o u r i a u , at t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e , claimed t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e
sublime was " t h e very latest exposition of Kant's aesthetic t h o u g h t , "
a n d d a t e d it to t h e very last days p r i o r to publication of the book in
s p r i n g 1 7 9 0 . Tonelli a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e sublime, as
21

it stands in t h e Third Critique, is i n f o r m e d by t h e full conception of

reflective j u d g m e n t , h e n c e h a d to follow t h e "cognitive t u r n " of
s p r i n g 1 7 8 9 . His case is persuasive. B u t Meredith's observation is
22

n o t w i t h o u t point, nor, despite its obvious chronological i m p o s -

sibility, can we dismiss Souriau's claim, for it contains a very i m p o r -
t a n t , t h o u g h still unclarified insight.
W h e n K a n t t u r n e d to t h e sublime, h e h a d before h i m a con-

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 2 75

siderable body of material, l o n g since dissected a n d formulated, in-
c l u d i n g n o t merely t h e view published in his Observations of 1 7 6 4
of which at least o n e significant idea, the m o r a l relevance of t h e
sublime, p r o v e d essential for t h e Third Critiquebut his u n p u b -
lished Reflections, his lecture formulations, his critical a n n o t a t i o n s
from Burke's treatise, a n d so o n . Meredith is correct, for t h e most
2 3

p a r t , a b o u t t h e vintage of t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime." B u t h e

misses t h e crucial difference between the bulk of the exposition
( 2 5 - 2 9 ) a n d t h e sections which, o n Tonelli's r e a d i n g , were in-
serted to ease t h e transitions into a n d o u t of this new s e g m e n t of t h e
"Analytic." Precisely t h e r e i n 2 3 - 2 4 , 30, a n d above all in t h e
first p a r t of t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 2 9 t h e m o r e sophisticated
idea of reflective j u d g m e n t i n t r u d e s . T h a t suggestsas Souriau
a n d T o n e l l i b o t h believethat t h e sublime was not "almost cer-
tainly i n c l u d e d " in t h e original "Critique of Taste," c o n t r a
Meredith.
W h y did Kant i n t r o d u c e it, a n d why, in spite of the new sophis-
tication of his t h e o r y of j u d g m e n t , did h e find his older formula-
tions of t h e sublime a p p r o p r i a t e ? H e r e is w h e r e Souriau's sense
t h a t t h e sublime r e p r e s e n t e d s o m e t h i n g m o r e m a t u r e in Kant's
t h o u g h t in t h e Third Critique can be rescued. While Tonelli is cor-
rect that it was not possible t h a t t h e "Analytic of the Sublime" could
b e d a t e d as late as 1790, as S o u r i a u wished, h e does not recognize,
as S o u r i a u did, t h e p r o f o u n d affinity between t h e changes which
w i t h o u t question K a n t did i n t r o d u c e in 1790 a n d t h e point b e h i n d
t h e "Analytic of t h e S u b l i m e . " B o t h of these reflect a n o t h e r t u r n in
Kant's t h i n k i n g , b e y o n d t h e "cognitive t u r n " of s p r i n g 1789. T h e
new t u r n was a n ethical t u r n . T h a t m a d e the sublime relevant for
inclusion in t h e Third Critique, because it h a d b e e n c o n n e c t e d with
Kant's ethical t h o u g h t from as early as 1764. Since t h e ethical t u r n
c a m e after t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e First Introduction, Tonelli is cor-
rect in d a t i n g t h e insertion of t h e sublime after s p r i n g 1789, b u t it
was old material (as M e r e d i t h claimed) used for the most m a t u r e
p u r p o s e s of t h e work as a whole (as Souriau claimed).
T h e sublime did not figure at all in t h e original "Critique of
T a s t e . " It was a d d e d only late in t h e composition of t h e Critique of
Judgment as a result of Kant's elaboration of t h e theory of reflective
j u d g m e n t , a n d even m o r e as a result of his "ethical t u r n . " In t h e text
as we n o w have it, the c o n c e p t first a p p e a r s in 14 in what is clearly a
t a c k e d - o n final p a r a g r a p h inserted, long after t h e composition of
t h e original section, to p r e p a r e t h e r e a d e r for t h e new s e g m e n t o n

276 The Critique of Judgment

t h e sublime that K a n t decided to a p p e n d to his t r e a t m e n t of t h e
beautiful. 24

K a n t took u p t h e idea of t h e sublime, as h e took u p so m a n y of

t h e t e r m s in t h e Critique of Judgment, from his context, redefining
a n d elevating such notions by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e m within his system
of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy. In the Third Critique, Kant d r e w cer-
tain features a n d illustrations from t h e conventional wisdom. H e
accepted t h e association, starting with L o n g i n u s , of t h e sublime
with t h e g r a n d i n d e e d , even t h e infiniteand within that frame-
work, with such ideas as formlessness a n d u n b o u n d e d n e s s . H e also
accepted t h e c o m p l e x psychological account of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of
the sublime which h a d b e e n articulated first for t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen-
tury by A d d i s o n , t h e n taken u p a n d refined in s u b s e q u e n t accounts
to achieve its definitive form in B u r k e , i.e., t h a t t h e sublime com-
m e n c e d in a feeling of sensual discomfort or pain, only later suc-
c e e d e d by a feeling of gratification. B u t Kant, in t r a n s f e r r i n g these
n o t i o n s into his own aesthetic philosophy, a n d especially in linking
t h e sublime with t h e m o r a l a n d rational, completely transfigured
t h e significance of these conventional connections.
I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e significance of t h e idea of t h e sublime in
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y aesthetics in general a n d in t h e genesis of t h e
G e r m a n Sturm und Drang, we n o t e d t h a t Kant h a d t r a n s f o r m e d that
g e n e r a l n o t i o n already in his essay of 1764 by a d v a n c i n g t h e con-
ception of t h e sublime as g r o u n d e d in t h e n o t i o n of h u m a n m o r a l
w o r t h . T h a t was not a line p u r s u e d by the British aestheticians,
2 5

n o r a tack t a k e n by t h e G e r m a n s of t h e Sturm und Drang. While they

stressed w o n d e r a n d awe, a n d even developed complex psychologi-
cal accounts of t h e e x p e r i e n c e , they first of all f o u n d t h e g r o u n d for
such a n e x p e r i e n c e in t h e objects of n a t u r e , a n d second, if they re-
lated it to subjectivity, f o u n d t h e relation n o t in h u m a n m o r a l g r a n -
d e u r b u t r a t h e r in h u m a n genius a n d creativity. I n d e e d , o n e m i g h t
call theirs a p o s t u r e of the primacy of t h e aesthetic. T h a t was a n a t h -
e m a to K a n t . H e e n d e a v o r e d , consequently, to assert t h e primacy
of t h e practical (ethical). His first move was to c a p t u r e t h e sublime
for his p u r p o s e . His next, as we shall see, was to c a p t u r e the n o t i o n
of genius. W i t h those two bastions fallen, h e could advance in tri-
u m p h to claim beauty itself as a symbol, i n d e e d " p e n d a n t , " of m o -
rality.
T h e first serious articulation of the p r o b l e m of the sublime in
t e r m s of t h e genesis of t h e Third Critique c a m e in the final section of
t h e First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment, h e n c e in early s p r i n g

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 277

 1789. K a n t conceived of t h e sublime t h e r e as t h e issue of "relative
p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in t h e aesthetic reflective j u d g m e n t . T h a t formula-
tion already signals t h e ultimate significance of Kant's theory.
B e a u t y b e t o k e n e d t h e recognition of a purposiveness in t h e f o r m
of t h e object as given, Kant a r g u e d , a n d h e n c e t h e i m p u t a t i o n of
t h a t p u r p o s i v e n e s s to t h e object of n a t u r e , a n d h e n c e to n a t u r e , in
itself. W i t h t h e sublime, however, t h e p h e n o m e n a were n o t
26

p u r p o s i v e in themselves, a n d j u s t that fact occasioned their signifi-

cance. S u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e "formless," t h e "boundless," t h e
u n p u r p o s i v e , a r o u s e d "a feeling of purposiveness lying a priori in
t h e subject ( p e r h a p s t h e supersensible d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e sub-
ject's m e n t a l p o w e r s ) . " I n t h e sublime a p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e
27

occasioned a reflection in t h e subject n o t r e g a r d i n g t h e object b u t

r e g a r d i n g itself. H e n c e n o "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " in t h e object
n e e d be involved in this e x p e r i e n c e , "because it d e p e n d s only o n
t h e c o n t i n g e n t [zuflligen] u s e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . [for] a dif-
ferent feeling, namely, t h a t of t h e i n n e r p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e con-
stitution of t h e powers of t h e m i n d . " In short, t h e sublime is a n
2 8

e x p e r i e n c e which occasions self-consciousness t h r o u g h aesthetic

reflection.
A correct estimation of t h e role of t h e "Analytic of t h e Sublime"
in t h e Third Critique m u s t find its function n o t simply in c o m p l e t i n g
t h e architectonic articulation of aesthetic j u d g m e n t s b u t m u c h
m o r e in d e m o n s t r a t i n g a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e
in g e n e r a l a n d t h e ultimate n a t u r e of t h e self. K a n t confirmed this
p o i n t by t e r m i n g his consideration of t h e sublime a Kritik des
Geistesgefhls, a critique of spiritual f e e l i n g . W h a t will e m e r g e
29

from a n exposition of t h e c o n c e p t of t h e sublime is that t h e aspect

of t h e subject to which t h e e x p e r i e n c e points is precisely t h e m o r a l
d i m e n s i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l freedom, a n d h e n c e t h e supersensible
g r o u n d of subjectivity.
In 2 3 , w h e r e K a n t c o m m e n c e d t h e "Analytic of the Sublime,"
his objective was to c o m p a r e a n d contrast t h e sublime with t h e
beautiful, which h a d h i t h e r t o b e e n t h e exclusive focus of his con-
sideration. I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 29, at t h e e n d of t h a t discus-
sion, Kant c o m p a r e d t h e sublime n o t only with t h e beautiful b u t
with t h e pleasant a n d t h e g o o d , m a k i n g all t h e m o r e palpable its
absence from t h e detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e s e experiences in
1 - 5 of t h e "Analytic of t h e Beautiful." T h e sublime was a d d e d
late, a n d it was a d d e d precisely to establish a m u c h m o r e substan-
tive relation b e t w e e n t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h e ethical o n e .
While t h e analogy of t h e form of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste with t h e

278 The Critique ofJudgment

m o r a l j u d g m e n t p r o v i d e d t h e original insight leading to the tran-
s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of t h e j u d g m e n t of taste, K a n t did n o t ini-
tially feel p r e p a r e d to press t h e analogy from form to substance. H e
h a d n o t yet seen t h e full potential of the idea of symbol. B u t with his
elaboration of t h e theory of symbolism, t h e sublime c a m e to play a
crucial m e d i a t i n g role in c o n n e c t i n g t h e aesthetic with t h e ethical.
T h e sublime was t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e which p a r excellence
symbolized t h e m o r a l d i m e n s i o n of h u m a n existence.
T h e discussion of t h e sublime in 23 begins with a discussion of
" i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts." I n t h a t section, i n d e e d , Kant suggested
t h a t t h e r e w e r e i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts n o t only of reason b u t also
of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h a t while t h e sublime h a d to d o with t h e
former, b e a u t y involved the l a t t e r . W h a t it can m e a n t h a t t h e r e
30

s h o u l d be i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g will be a
question which can only be clarified in the context of the notion of
"aesthetic ideas," a n d we will have a better p u r c h a s e o n t h a t w h e n
we u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e p r o c e d u r e works in t h e r e a l m of t h e sub-
lime, for which all o u r previous discussion p r e p a r e s us. T h e ques-
tion is: why d o e s t h e e x p e r i e n c e of the sublime arise? W h a t is the
place of this aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e in h u m a n life?
I n t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 29, in w h a t a p p e a r s to be a classic
instance of his p e n c h a n t for architectonic, Kant p r o c e e d e d to asso-
ciate each of t h e four sorts of feeling h e h a d identifiedthe pleas-
ant, t h e beautiful, t h e sublime, a n d t h e g o o d w i t h o n e of t h e four
m o m e n t s of logical j u d g m e n t q u a n t i t y , quality, relation, a n d
m o d a l i t y . T h e exercise m i g h t a p p e a r trivial, b u t some very im-
31

p o r t a n t implications derive from it. By associating t h e pleasant with

quantity, K a n t reasserted that strictly sensual gratification was h o -
m o g e n e o u s a n d could b e conceived only in t e r m s of its quantity (ei-
t h e r positive o r negative). T h e association of beauty with quality
can be c o n n e c t e d with the unanticipatable u n i q u e n e s s of each
event, c o m p a r a b l e to t h e u n a n t i c i p a t a b l e qualities of empirical
j u d g m e n t . T h e association of t h e g o o d with modality h a d to d o with
Kant's view t h a t t h e only feeling which could be established a priori
was t h e m o r a l feeling which a t t e n d e d the imperative necessity of
m o r a l law. T h i s idea of "respect" will preoccupy us shortly, b u t for
t h e m o m e n t we m u s t focus o n t h e association of the sublime with
relation.
I n 12 of t h e First Introduction, K a n t a r g u e d that, as distinct
from t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, which ascribed "intrinsic" p u r p o s -
iveness to its object, t h e sublime involved only a "relative" p u r -
posiveness in t h e sense of serving as t h e occasion for a subjective

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 279

reflection. Kant's whole t h e o r y of t h e sublime revolved a r o u n d
" s u b r e p t i o n " v i e w i n g a n object of n a t u r e as t h o u g h it were t h e
g r o u n d of a feeling which in fact h a d its source in t h e self. As K a n t
p u t it, "We m u s t seek a g r o u n d external to ourselves for t h e beauti-
ful of n a t u r e , b u t seek it for t h e sublime merely in ourselves a n d in
o u r a t t i t u d e of t h o u g h t , which i n t r o d u c e s sublimity into the r e p r e -
sentation of n a t u r e . " M o r e concretely, K a n t w r o t e : "the feeling of
3 2

t h e sublime in n a t u r e is respect for o u r own destination, which, by a

certain s u b r e p t i o n , we a t t r i b u t e to a n object of n a t u r e (conversion
of respect for t h e idea of h u m a n i t y in o u r o w n subject into respect
for t h e o b j e c t ) . "
33

As a n e x p e r i e n c e of n a t u r e , t h e sublime was a n e r r o n e o u s
projection, K a n t believed, a n d h e n c e h e f o u n d t h e sublime g e n e r -
ally fruitless for o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e , as c o m p a r e d with the
rich stimulation t h e e x p e r i e n c e of beauty p r o v i d e d for o u r study
a n d g r a s p of n a t u r e . W h a t t h e sublime illuminated r a t h e r was
3 4

metaphysics. 35
It m i g h t a p p e a r that such metaphysics should entail
only a subjective reference, a n d consequently at most, a subjective
idealism. B u t t h a t is precisely w h e r e t h e idea of relation b e c o m e s
m o s t interesting. H a v i n g this e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime with a n o b -
j e c t of intuition in fact d e m o n s t r a t e d o u r capacity to symbolize, i.e.,
to take a n actual object, however i n a d e q u a t e , as a n illustration, a
m e t a p h o r , for a supersensible idea. T h e sublime is, in t h a t m e a -
s u r e , t h e w a r r a n t for t h e possibility of art. B u t in j u s t t h a t m e a s u r e
it b r i n g s t h e supersensible subjectivity of o u r m o r a l sense t o g e t h e r
with t h e ostensibly merely sensible e x p e r i e n c e of beauty, a n d d e m -
o n s t r a t e s t h a t aesthetic feeling in g e n e r a l is g r o u n d e d far m o r e
d e e p l y t h a n a n y m e r e l y sensual e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s Kant could offer
a w h o l e n e w t h e o r y of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g r o u n d i n g of beauty a n d
of g e n i u s , a whole new, far m o r e metaphysical theory of taste, o n c e
h e h a d w o r k e d o u t the idea of the sublime.
Kant's idea of t h e sublime is that it constitutes the h a r m o n y of
i m a g i n a t i o n with r e a s o n , as contrasted with beauty's h a r m o n i z i n g
of i m a g i n a t i o n with u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t t h e n o t i o n of h a r m o n y , as
we have n o t e d earlier, is itself a m e t a p h o r , a n d we are now far ad-
vanced t o w a r d a m o r e discursive formulation of t h e unity of rea-
son. S t a r t i n g from t h e relation of i m a g i n a t i o n a n d reason via t h e
sublime, we can p r o c e d e to t h e relation between aesthetical ideas
a n d rational ideas (symbolism), a n d o n to t h e ultimate o u t c o m e
w h e r e b y beauty b e c o m e s t h e symbol of morality.
A c c o r d i n g to Kant, t h e sublime could be divided into two m o -
m e n t s , t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d t h e dynamical, because it r e f e r r e d

280 The Critique of Judgment

 i m a g i n a t i o n to t h e faculty of reason in its two aspects: theoretical
reason, t h e principle of "totality," i.e., finding the u n c o n d i t i o n e d
for every given condition; a n d practical reason, t h e principle of
" a u t o n o m y , " i.e., t h e categorical imperative s u p e r v e n i n g over
every interest of sense. I n t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l m o m e n t , t h e sublime
e x p e r i e n c e arises w h e n i m a g i n a t i o n a t t e m p t s to offer a n intuitive
whole for a n idea of r e a s o n so g r a n d that it defeats imagination's
effort. I m a g i n a t i o n , K a n t informs us, involves two projects, " a p -
p r e h e n s i o n " a n d " c o m p r e h e n s i o n . " It is able to a p p r e h e n d ad in-
36

finitum, t h a t is, it meets n o b o u n d or limit, since the forms of

intuition, space a n d time, a r e mathematically indefinite or "exten-
sively infinite," as K a n t h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d in t h e first a n t i n o m y of
t h e First Critique. 31
B u t it is n o t able to achieve the s a m e in its com-
p r e h e n s i o n . A c c o r d i n g to K a n t "in c o m p r e h e n s i o n t h e r e is a max-
i m u m b e y o n d which it [the imagination] c a n n o t g o . " As h e p u t s 3 8

it, s o m e of t h e "partial r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of s e n s u o u s intuition"

which it tries to hold t o g e t h e r a r e lost as new o n e s a r e a d d e d . It is o n
this g r o u n d t h a t we can have, for instance, n o intuition of n a t u r e as
a whole, t h o u g h conceptually we can carry t h e limits of t h e sensible
world b e y o n d t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n of i m a g i n a t i o n . " T h e logical
39

estimation of m a g n i t u d e goes o n without h i n d r a n c e to infinity." 40

T h e easiest illustrations of this are mathematical. While it is pos-

sible to form a n i m a g e of t h r e e a n d p e r h a p s four d i m e n s i o n s , it is
impossible to carry forward into additional d i m e n s i o n s in images,
b u t it is n o p r o b l e m at all to d o so in algebraic formulas.
K a n t c o n t e n d e d t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n tried to k e e p pace with t h e
d e m a n d s of r e a s o n , tried to e n c o m p a s s in o n e individual intuition
s o m e t h i n g "absolutely g r e a t " a c c o r d i n g to reason's r e q u i r e m e n t ,
a n d by its failure b o t h humiliated the subject a n d filled h i m with
respect. K a n t f o r m u l a t e d it as follows: " B u t because t h e r e is in o u r
i m a g i n a t i o n a striving t o w a r d infinite progress a n d in o u r reason a
claim for absolute totality, r e g a r d e d as a real idea, t h e r e f o r e this
very i n a d e q u a t e n e s s for that idea in o u r faculty for estimating t h e
m a g n i t u d e of things of sense excites in us t h e feeling of a s u p e r s e n -
sible faculty." T h a t reason can think of such absolute greatness as
41

a whole, t h a t it " r e n d e r s it unavoidable to think t h e infinite (in t h e

j u d g m e n t of c o m m o n reason) as entirely given (according to its total-
ity)" establishes that this faculty is itself b e y o n d sensibility, i.e., "sur-
passes every s t a n d a r d of sensibility," o r is, itself, n o u m e n a l . "The
bare capability of thinking this infinite without contradiction requires
in t h e h u m a n m i n d a faculty itself s u p e r s e n s i b l e . " It is capable, in
42

o t h e r w o r d s , of w h a t we have called t h e idea of "intrinsic infinity,"

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 281

t h e infinite "completely c o m p r e h e n d e d under o n e concept." T h i s
c o m p l e t e n e s s o r closure was n o t possible in t h e extensive infinitity
involved in "the m a t h e m a t i c a l estimation of m a g n i t u d e by m e a n s
ofconcepts of number. " 4 3

T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n with t h e p r o b l e m of infinity, t h e n , forms t h e

basis of t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l sublime. I m a g i n a t i o n is o v e r w h e l m e d ,
a n d in awe of reason's capacity for such synthesis, t h e subject feels
respect, which is a feeling of satisfaction. T h a t is to say, in relation to
theoretical reason, i m a g i n a t i o n finds itself faced with a task, t h e ini-
tial imposition of which is u n p l e a s a n t , b u t t h e ultimate conse-
q u e n c e of which is a feeling of satisfaction. H e n c e the sublime is a
c o m p l e x e x p e r i e n c e , o n e which involves m e n t a l " m o v e m e n t , "
shifting feeling: Rhrung or e m o t i o n . Kant claims that t h e sublime
can b e c o n t r a s t e d with t h e beautiful in this r e g a r d , for t h e latter is,
h e claims, "restful." T h i s is h a r d to reconcile with his notion of t h e
enlivening play associated with beauty, a n d it can p e r h a p s b e ex-
p l a i n e d by his effort to a p p r o x i m a t e his psychological accounts to
those of B u r k e , w h o m h e took as t h e e x e m p l a r y psychologist of aes-
thetic s t a t e s . Kant would have b e e n better off discriminating t h e
44

simplicity of t h e l i n g e r i n g play of the m i n d involved in t h e experi-

e n c e of beauty, its m e r e pleasure, from t h e complexity of t h e
c h a n g i n g state of t h e m i n d in the e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime, which
begins in p a i n a n d only eventually achieves satisfaction. I n any
event, t h e sublime is g r o u n d e d in the initial d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , frus-
tration, o r even humiliation of t h e imagination, followed by a real-
ization of h i g h e r p u r p o s e a n d a feeling of pleasure. T h e r e is to it,
consequently, n o t h i n g of play, n o t h i n g of c h a r m , b u t r a t h e r t h e
e a r n e s t n e s s of labor a n d t h e strain of d e p r i v a t i o n .
T h e whole d r a m a takes place within a n d between t h e faculties.
T h e p a r t i c u l a r objects of n a t u r e i n d e e d , even n a t u r e itself as a n
o b j e c t a r e really n o t intrinsically relevant. " A n d it is not t h e object
of sense, b u t the use which t h e j u d g m e n t naturally makes of certain
objects o n behalf of this latter feeling that is absolutely g r e a t . . .
C o n s e q u e n t l y it is t h e state of m i n d p r o d u c e d by a certain r e p r e s e n -
tation with which the reflective j u d g m e n t is occupied, a n d not t h e
object, t h a t is to be called s u b l i m e . " Yet objects in n a t u r e which
45

press i m a g i n a t i o n b e y o n d its capacity for c o m p r e h e n s i o n instill this

idea of infinity, create t h e situation in which we discover "the i n a d e -
quacy of t h e greatest effort of o u r imagination."
T h e feeling which a t t e n d s this discovery is "respect," because
r e a s o n set d o w n a law for i m a g i n a t i o n which it c a n n o t fulfill. K a n t

282 The Critique of Judgment

defines respect precisely as " t h e feeling of o u r incapacity to attain to
an idea which is a law for us." T h e m o r a l r e s o n a n c e of that defini-
46

tion is u n m i s t a k a b l e . B u t reason imposes laws, "regulates" the fac-

ulties of t h e m i n d , a n d imposes " r e q u i r e m e n t s " n o t simply in its
practical f o r m , b u t also in its theoretical form. I n t h e humiliation of
failing to achieve w h a t r e a s o n c o m m a n d e d , t h e subject experiences
a p a i n , b u t by t h e realization t h a t it is its o w n r e a s o n which not only
c o m m a n d e d b u t c o m p r e h e n d e d that which sensible intuition via
i m a g i n a t i o n could not achieve, satisfaction overcomes t h e pain.
T h e e x p e r i e n c e "arouses in us t h e feeling of this supersensible des-
tination" i n h e r e n t in o u r rationality. " T h u s t h a t very violence
which is d o n e to t h e subject t h r o u g h t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is j u d g e d as
p u r p o s i v e in reference to the whole determination of t h e m i n d . " T h e
4 7

evidence for t h e supersensible destination of t h e subject, it m u s t be

r e e m p h a s i z e d , takes the form of a feeling. Reflection can attain t h e
sense of t h e supersensible destination of the subject t h r o u g h the
e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime.
T h e t r e a t m e n t of the "dynamical sublime" simply carries the
s a m e line of a r g u m e n t forward in reference directly to t h e practical
laws of r e a s o n , i.e., t h e superiority of m o r a l law to all considerations
of material gratification, even t h a t of life itself. T h i s recognition of
o u r m o r a l g r a n d e u r is most vivid in confrontation with material
forces of such m i g h t as to d w a r f o u r n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h a n d imperil
( t h o u g h only by implication, n o t immediately) o u r n a t u r a l satisfac-
tions "(goods, health, a n d l i f e ) . " T h e e x p e r i e n c e of such awe-
48

inspiring p h e n o m e n a in n a t u r e a n d Kant can list t h e m as readily

as t h e most r o m a n t i c a u t h o r of his dayevokes in t h e m i n d of m a n
a sense of t h e superiority of his m o r a l destiny. "Reason exerts a d o -
m i n i o n over sensibility in o r d e r to e x t e n d it in conformity with its
p r o p e r r e a l m (the practical) a n d to m a k e it look o u t into the infi-
n i t e . " T h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime is inherently o n e which
4 9

points to t h e m o r a l g r o u n d of m a n , " t h e feeling for (practical)

ideas, i.e., to w h a t is m o r a l . "

The Spiritual Interpretation of Genius

Now we can fully a p p r e c i a t e h o w p r o f o u n d l y Kant i n t e n d e d his

claim that t h e essence of t h e sublime was its aspect of "relation," i.e.,
t h e relation of t h e sensible to t h e supersensible. T h i s theory of t h e
sublime explains Kant's metaphysical theory of genius, i.e., t h e n o -
tion of Geist as t h e faculty for "aesthetic ideas," a n d explains how

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 283

t h e full-fledged t h e o r y of symbolism can at last i n c o r p o r a t e n o t
only t h e idea of genius b u t also of beauty into Kant's notion of ex-
pressive r e a s o n . 5 0

I n 49, K a n t reevaluates t h e faculty of imagination, recogniz-

ing w h a t h a d l o n g b e e n latent in his t h o u g h t a n d which we have
b r o u g h t o u t in o u r consideration of t h a t " o t h e r kind of j u d g i n g , "
namely, t h a t it belongs o n t h e side of spontaneity a n d has a n inti-
m a t e a n d crucial c o n n e c t i o n with r e a s o n . " T h e imagination (as a
p r o d u c t i v e faculty of cognition) is a powerful a g e n t for creating, as
it were, a second n a t u r e o u t of t h e material s u p p l i e d to it by actual
n a t u r e , " K a n t w r i t e s . N o t only d o e s it e n t e r t a i n us w h e n experi-
51

e n c e is b o r i n g , b u t "we even use it to r e m o d e l e x p e r i e n c e [wir . . .

bilden diese [die Erfahrung] auch wohl um]"i.e., we reconfigure [um-
gestalten], in O d e b r e c h t ' s decisive sense. T o b e sure, r e p r o d u c t i v e
i m a g i n a t i o n functions a c c o r d i n g to t h e "laws of association," i.e., in
a "psychological" m a n n e r , as B u r k e a n d Hartley a r g u e d . B u t K a n t
now articulates clearly that " p r o d u c t i v e " i m a g i n a t i o n is n o t re-
stricted, n o t limited to such a merely sensationalist p a t t e r n , a n d in-
stead can b e seen as "also following principles which have a h i g h e r
seat in r e a s o n (and which a r e every whit as n a t u r a l to us as those
followed by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in laying h o l d of empirical na-
ture)." 5 2

H e r e K a n t has said it: t h e r e a r e principles of reason which are

" n a t u r a l " to us. W h a t " n a t u r e " is that? N o t t h e sensible o n e . "By this
m e a n s we get a sense of o u r f r e e d o m from t h e law of association
(which attaches to t h e empirical e m p l o y m e n t of t h e imagination),
with t h e result t h a t t h e material can be b o r r o w e d by us from n a t u r e
in a c c o r d a n c e with that law, b u t be worked u p by us into s o m e t h i n g
e l s e n a m e l y , w h a t surpasses n a t u r e . " K a n t is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y
5 3

talking a b o u t t h e n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m of the subject in this passage.

T h a t is, h e presses a metaphysical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of genius, instead
of t h e n a t u r a l o n e . Spirit [Geist], as t h e " a n i m a t i n g principle of t h e
m i n d , . . . is n o o t h e r t h a n t h e faculty of p r e s e n t i n g aesthetical ideas."
G e n i u s p r e s e n t s "aesthetic ideas," i.e., imaginative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
t h r o u g h which ideas of r e a s o n find symbolic expression a n d t h e r e -
with cultural articulation ("universal c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y " ) . 54

T h e c o n c e p t of aesthetical ideas was first b r o a c h e d in 17, b u t it

only achieved real clarity in t h e exposition of 49. I n t h e earlier sec-
tion, K a n t was still e n t a n g l e d in s o m e distinctions from the First Cri-
tique which r e q u i r e d modification to a c c o m m o d a t e his new t h e o r y
of symbolism. K a n t distinguished a n idea of r e a s o n from a n ideal:
" P r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , a n idea signifies a c o n c e p t of reason, a n d a n

284 The Critique ofJudgment

ideal t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a n individual entity [eines einzelnen . . .
Wesens] as a d e q u a t e to a n idea." H e distinguished f u r t h e r between
two kinds of ideals: those of r e a s o n a n d those of imagination. T h e
a r c h e t y p e of taste was "merely a n ideal of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n [blo ein
Ideal der Einbildungskraft] ."
55

I n the First Critique Kant h a d g o n e to s o m e l e n g t h to distinguish

a n "ideal of r e a s o n " from a n "ideal of imagination." Ideals of rea-
son, c o n c e p t u a l totalities which served as regulative goals for rea-
son's process of seeking the u n c o n d i t i o n e d for every condition,
" m u s t always rest o n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts a n d serve as a rule a n d
a r c h e t y p e , alike in o u r actions a n d in o u r critical j u d g m e n t s . " Such
i d e a l s G o d , h u m a n i t y , o r virtue, for e x a m p l e t h o u g h "we can-
n o t c o n c e d e to [them] objective reality (existence), . . . a r e n o t
t h e r e f o r e to be r e g a r d e d as figments of the brain; they supply rea-
son with a s t a n d a r d which is indispensable to i t . " As contrasted 56

with these rational ideals, K a n t wrote,

t h e p r o d u c t s of i m a g i n a t i o n a r e of a n entirely different na-

t u r e ; n o o n e can explain o r give a n intelligible concept of
t h e m ; e a c h is a kind of monogram, a m e r e set of particular
qualities, d e t e r m i n e d by n o assignable rule, a n d f o r m i n g
r a t h e r a b l u r r e d sketch d r a w n from diverse experiences t h a n
a d e t e r m i n a t e i m a g e a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n such as p a i n t e r s a n d
physiognomists profess to carry in their h e a d s a n d which they
treat as b e i n g a n i n c o m m u n i c a b l e image [Schattenbild] of their
creations o r even of t h e i r critical j u d g m e n t s . . . Such r e p r e -
sentations . . . furnish n o rules t h a t allow of b e i n g explained
and examined. 5 7

N o t only was t h e r e n o c o n c e p t u a l r e d e m p t i o n of a n "ideal of imag-

ination," because n o d e t e r m i n a t e r u l e could ever b e f o u n d for it,
b u t similarly t h e r e was n o way t h a t a n ideal of r e a s o n could find
suitable illustration in e x p e r i e n c e , K a n t claimed in t h e same a r g u -
m e n t . " T o a t t e m p t to realize t h e ideal in a n e x a m p l e , t h a t is, in t h e
[field of] a p p e a r a n c e , as, for instance, to depict t h e [character of
t h e perfectly] wise m a n in a r o m a n c e , is impracticable . . . a b s u r d
a n d far from edifying . . . in as m u c h as the n a t u r a l limitations . . .
a r e constantly d o i n g violence to t h e completeness of t h e idea . . .
a n d so cast suspicion o n t h e g o o d itself . . . by giving it t h e air of
b e i n g a m e r e fiction." 58

T h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d symbolic a n d artistic expression of ra-

tional ideas h a d c h a n g e d dramatically by t h e fall of 1789. Kant h a d

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 285

achieved a far m o r e m e a n i n g f u l theory of art a n d symbolism. Ac-
cordingly, in 49, K a n t gave a new definition of aesthetical ideas:

by a n aesthetical idea I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n which occasions m u c h t h o u g h t , without however
any definite t h o u g h t , i.e. any concept, b e i n g capable of being
a d e q u a t e to it; it consequently c a n n o t be completely com-
passed a n d m a d e intelligible by l a n g u a g e . We easily see that it
is the c o u n t e r p a r t ( p e n d a n t ) of a rational idea, which con-
versely is a c o n c e p t to which n o intuition (or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
t h e imagination) can be a d e q u a t e . 5 9

T h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a whole, a n individual which, t h o u g h per-

h a p s d e t e r m i n a t e as a n empirical object of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
stands metaphorically (symbolically) for m u c h m o r e t h a n that d e -
terminacy. For e x a m p l e , N a p o l e o n o r M a c b e t h o n e actual, a n d
o n e fictiveconstitute intuitive wholes for which we also have e m -
pirical concepts. We can explicate t h e m in t e r m s of d e t e r m i n a t e
concepts. N a p o l e o n lived for so m a n y years a n d did such a n d such;
Macbeth was a figure in Shakespeare's play of t h e same n a m e ; a n d
so o n . B u t t h e p o i n t a b o u t these two empirical individuals is t h a t
they occasion t h o u g h t s which vastly exceed their m e r e d e t e r m i n a t e
objectivity. T h e y symbolize a g r e a t field of conflict between p o w e r
a n d right, talent a n d virtue, a n d occasion meditations which can
scarcely r e a c h a simple resolution. W h a t they involve is t h e "en-
l a r g e m e n t " of t h e d e t e r m i n a t e concept into i n d e t e r m i n a c y . 60

T h e aesthetic idea initiates a m o v e m e n t of t h e m i n d ; it "occa-

sions in itself m o r e t h o u g h t t h a n can ever be c o m p r e h e n d e d in a
definite c o n c e p t a n d which consequently aesthetically enlarges t h e
c o n c e p t itself in a n u n b o u n d e d f a s h i o n . " T h a t is to say, u n d e r -
61

s t a n d i n g strives to offer a d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t for such a n intui-

tion. It seeks a "discursive r e d e m p t i o n , " in the l a n g u a g e of m o d e r n
criticism. B u t it fails. Such a n aesthetic whole " c a n n o t b e com-
pletely c o m p a s s e d a n d m a d e intelligible by l a n g u a g e . " We c a n n o t
e x p l a i n all t h e significances which flow o u t of such a s y m b o l . I n 62

F r e u d ' s t e r m s it is " o v e r d e t e r m i n e d . " By e x h a u s t i n g u n d e r s t a n d -

ing's capacity to d e t e r m i n e t h e concept, t h e imagination p r e s e n t s a
reflective j u d g m e n t which c a n n o t be converted into a d e t e r m i n a n t
o n e , which c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d definitively, i.e., cognitively, b u t
only reflected u p o n at a h i g h e r level, a n d h e n c e what occurs is t h a t
reason, t h e faculty of intellectual ideas, intervenes. Such an aes-
thetic idea "brings the faculty of intellectual ideas (the reason) into
movement." 6 3

286 The Critique of Judgment

 At this p o i n t we m u s t r e c o n s i d e r t h e relation between aesthetic
ideas a n d rational ideas. K a n t called t h e aesthetic idea "the c o u n t e r -
p a r t ( p e n d a n t ) of a rational idea." H e claimed it was easy to recog-
64

nize this, because such a rational idea was conversely a concept to

which n o intuition was a d e q u a t e . Now, it is i n d e e d easy to see t h e
formal s y m m e t r y of these two notions, their converse relation. B u t
it is q u i t e a n o t h e r m a t t e r w h e n o n e presses the idea further, a n d it is
pressed f u r t h e r by Kant's parenthetical insertion of t h e word " p e n -
d a n t . " " C o u n t e r p a r t , " t a k e n as " p e n d a n t , " suggests t h a t K a n t does
n o t wish to d e v e l o p simply t h e formal symmetry of converse p r o p o -
sitions, b u t a substantive relation between t h e two. T h i s entire dis-
cussion is n o t c o u c h e d in t e r m s of the passivity of the subject in
aesthetic c o n t e m p l a t i o n , b u t in t e r m s of a n articulation of t h e ele-
m e n t s in t h e subject which m a k e genius, t h a t is, artistic creativity,
possible. C o u n t e r p a r t as p e n d a n t signifies precisely a n expressive
potential, i.e., a symbolical relation between aesthetic ideas a n d ra-
tional ideas. N o t only is t h e faculty of reason mobilized by t h e in-
a d e q u a c y of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it was in fact t h e origin of t h e very
e n t e r p r i s e , a n d t h e aesthetic idea is its own symbolic project. If we
wish to view this p r o c e e d i n g merely from t h e vantage of aesthetic
r e c e p t i o n , however, t h e point only t u r n s o u t to be t h e same, for
w h a t we will b e describing is simply t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime.
K a n t d e v e l o p e d t h e c o n c e p t i o n of aesthetic ideas directly o u t of
t h e n o t i o n of i n d e t e r m i n a t e concepts in R e m a r k I to 57 of t h e "Di-
alectic of Aesthetic J u d g m e n t . " H e worked o u t m a n y of t h e im-
6 5

plications of 49 explicitly in t h a t R e m a r k , especially t h e idea of a

symbolical, n o t simply formal c o n n e c t i o n between rational ideas
a n d aesthetical ideas, a n d t h e a s s i g n m e n t of the origins of such a
c o n n e c t i o n to t h e d y n a m i s m of r e a s o n itself. I n t h a t light Kant r e -
defined genius. T h e " n a t u r e " with which genius h a d b e e n identified
in t h e original i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a r t (46ff.) h a d b e e n t h e material,
sensual, " n a t u r a l " e l e m e n t in h u m a n subjectivity. B u t now Kant
seized this n o t i o n from such "irrational" g r o u n d s a n d transferred
g e n i u s to a radically different " n a t u r e " in m a n : "It can only be that
in t h e subject which is n a t u r e a n d c a n n o t be b r o u g h t u n d e r rules of
concepts, i.e. t h e supersensible substrate of all his faculties (to
which n o c o n c e p t of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g extends), a n d consequently
t h a t with respect to which it is t h e final p u r p o s e given by the intelli-
gible [part] of o u r n a t u r e to h a r m o n i z e all o u r cognitive fac-
u l t i e s . " T h e d y n a m i c r e q u i r e m e n t of reason as t h e supersensible
66

unity of t h e subject n o w e m e r g e s as t h e real g r o u n d of genius,

as t h e source of its quest for m e t a p h o r i c a l expressions of its o w n

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 287

i m m e d i a t e b u t i n d e t e r m i n a t e essence. T h e drive toward "har-
m o n y " of t h e faculties is n o w to b e recognized as the i m m a n e n t
r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e unity of r e a s o n . B u t its g r o u n d i n g is n o t merely
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l ; it is t r a n s c e n d e n t ("supersensible"). A n d because
this t r a n s c e n d e n t g r o u n d i n g is b e y o n d t h e e x t e n t of u n d e r s t a n d -
ing, i.e., b e y o n d d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t a n d its schematism, t h e
only r e c o u r s e available to it is symbolical expression.
I n this light, all t h e efforts t o w a r d a c o n n e c t i o n of aesthetics
with e t h i c s " p e r f e c t i o n " a n d " d e p e n d e n t beauty," t h e "aesthetic
n o r m a l idea" a n d t h e "ideal of b e a u t y " w h i c h s e e m e d so p r o b -
lematic from t h e v a n t a g e of a merely aesthetic i n t e p r e t a t i o n , m a k e
perfect sense within a b r e a t h t a k i n g l y metaphysical revision of t h e
w h o l e project: art offers symbolic access to the ultimate. B u t t h e r e
is a f u r t h e r point, which K a n t articulates as t h e essence of this n o -
tion of "aesthetic ideas," namely, that t h e r e would b e n o r e c o u r s e to
metaphor unless t h e r e was a n ineluctable incapacity of discursive
r e a s o n i n g to secure metaphysics. A r t t h e r e w i t h assumes a central
place in c u l t u r e . Art is t h e vehicle t h r o u g h which t h e supersensible
gives t o k e n of its real p r e s e n c e . A n d it is j u s t for this reason that t h e
aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e is transcendentally g r o u n d e d .

N o w I say t h e beautiful is t h e symbol of t h e morally good, a n d

t h a t it is only in this respect (a reference which is n a t u r a l to
every m a n a n d which every m a n postulates in o t h e r s as a duty)
t h a t it gives p l e a s u r e with a claim for t h e a g r e e m e n t of every-
o n e else. By this t h e m i n d is m a d e conscious of a certain en-
n o b l e m e n t a n d elevation above t h e m e r e sensibility to pleasure
received t h r o u g h sense, a n d t h e worth of o t h e r s is estimated
in a c c o r d a n c e with a like m a x i m of theirj u d g m e n t . T h a t is t h e
intelligible to which . . . taste looks, with which o u r h i g h e r cog-
nitive faculties a r e in accord, a n d w i t h o u t which a d o w n r i g h t
c o n t r a d i c t i o n would arise between their n a t u r e a n d the claims
m a d e by t a s t e . 67

K a n t p u t it m u c h m o r e simply in 60: "Taste is at b o t t o m a faculty

f o r j u d g i n g t h e sensible illustration of m o r a l i d e a s . " 68

I n t h e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i.e., via feeling, reflection is

p o i n t e d t o w a r d t h e ultimate m e a n i n g of subjectivity which n o exer-
tion of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t s could ever at-
tain, a n insight into t h e unity n o t only of r e a s o n , b u t of being, in t h e
supersensible g r o u n d . K a n t w r o t e :

288 The Critique of Judgment

 H e n c e , b o t h o n account of this i n n e r possibility in t h e subject
a n d of t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of a n a t u r e t h a t agrees with it, it
finds itself to be r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g within t h e subject as
well as w i t h o u t h i m , s o m e t h i n g which is n e i t h e r n a t u r e n o r
f r e e d o m , b u t which is yet c o n n e c t e d with t h e supersensible
g r o u n d of t h e latter. I n this supersensible g r o u n d , therefore,
t h e theoretical faculty is b o u n d t o g e t h e r in unity with t h e
practical in a way which, t h o u g h c o m m o n , is yet u n k n o w n . 6 9

T h e unity of r e a s o n in the supersensible substrate: this was t h e

p o i n t to which all t h e a n t i n o m i e s "forced" us, in Kant's view. It was
t h e peculiar a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e a n t i n o m y of aesthetic j u d g m e n t , of
t h e whole faculty of reflective j u d g m e n t , to t h r o w o p e n to o u r at-
t e n t i o n , a n d to m a k e accessible to o u r consciousness, t h a t which
was at o n e a n d t h e s a m e t i m e n o t d e t e r m i n e d by concepts or di-
rectly objectified in a specific intuition.

Beauty as the Symbol of Morality

K a n t insisted u p o n t h e reservation of objectivity to t h a t coincidence

of actuality a n d validity which occurs in a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . 7 0

B u t t h a t obviously m a d e inadmissible what h e took to b e the essen-

tial aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e : t h e primacy of t h e practical a n d its
o p e n n e s s t o w a r d t h e supersensible. H e n c e , to m a k e these latter
c o n c e r n s accessible to o r d i n a r y consciousness h e t u r n e d to symbol-
ism. T h r o u g h m e t a p h o r K a n t could p e r m i t t h e articulation of t h e
metaphysical c o n c e r n s which h e p r o h i t e d within t h e s p h e r e of cog-
nition p r o p e r . N o t only h a d h e limited reason to m a k e r o o m for
faith, b u t h e also h a d elevated art to t h e m e d i u m of the expression
of reason's interests a n d insights in t h e supersensible realm. I m a g -
ination functioned n o t only a c c o r d i n g to the (mechanically) n a t u r a l
laws of association b u t also "in a c c o r d a n c e with principles which oc-
c u p y a h i g h e r place in reason (laws, too, which a r e j u s t as n a t u r a l to
us as those by which u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o m p r e h e n d s empirical na-
t u r e ) . " T h i s c o n n e c t i o n with reason gave art, via genius, t h e
71

p o w e r to work u p " t h e material supplied to us by n a t u r e . . . into

s o m e t h i n g different which surpasses n a t u r e . " 7 2

C o n s e q u e n t l y , for K a n t art could n o t be simply mimetic. Its pri-

m a r y p u r p o s e was to express t h e supersensible. Art was a vehicle for
t h e e x p r e s s i o n of religious a n d rational ideas. Philosophy itself h a d
n e e d of s u c h rhetorical recourses to illustrate its metaphysical a r g u -

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 289

m e n t s . K a n t several times a c k n o w l e d g e d this in his p r e s e n t a t i o n of
his t h e o r y of e t h i c s . Accordingly, formalism a n d play are insuffi-
73

cient to explain Kant's t h e o r y of art. T h e r e is a seriousness, a n "ear-

nest" a b o u t it, which suggests a discipline: taste, precisely, r e q u i r i n g
s o m e h i g h e r significance in t h e work. T h i s p o i n t bears directly
u p o n t h e aesthetics of m o d e r n i s m . If K a n t was p r o f o u n d l y sus-
picious of m e r e "inspiration," it would b e w r o n g to take h i m to ad-
vocate t h e d o m i n i o n of m e r e t e c h n i q u e . O n e of Kant's most p o t e n t
insights into t h e p r o b l e m of formalism is his recognition that aes-
thetic f r e e d o m can g e n e r a t e m e r e nonsense. 74
Once one abandons a
mimetic aesthetic, it b e c o m e s necessary to find some g r o u n d for a n
expressive o n e . T h e p o i n t of a symbol is to m e a n . W i t h o u t refer-
e n c e , e x p r e s s i o n is e m p t y . I n o n e of the most p e n e t r a t i n g essays
ever written o n t h e p a r a d o x a n d p r e t e n s i o n of aesthetic m o d e r n -
ism, J o s e O r t e g a y Gasset p u t this with characteristic precision:
" T h e r e is n o difficulty in p a i n t i n g or saying things which m a k e n o
sense whatever, which a r e unintelligible a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t h i n g .
O n e only n e e d s to assemble u n c o n n e c t e d words o r to draw r a n d o m
lines. B u t to construct s o m e t h i n g that is n o t a copy of ' n a t u r e ' a n d
yet possesses substance of its o w n is a feat which p r e s u p p o s e s n o t h -
i n g less t h a n g e n i u s . " As K a n t p u t the same t h o u g h t , the p o e t
75

"tries . . . to g o b e y o n d t h e limits of e x p e r i e n c e a n d to p r e s e n t
[ideas] to sense with a c o m p l e t e n e s s of which t h e r e is n o e x a m p l e in
n a t u r e . " A n expressionist t h e o r y of art, t h e n , involves m o r e t h a n
7 6

t e c h n i q u e , m o r e t h a n form. T h e message is m o r e t h a n the m e -

d i u m , a n d a strictly formalist " a u t o n o m y of art" can only be p u r -
chased at t h e cost of its u t t e r triviality. 77

B e a u t y was t h e symbol of m o r a l i t y . W h a t K a n t would not per-

78

mit theoretical r e a s o n to assert, h e now d e m o n s t r a t e d to be essen-

tial to m o r a l c o n d u c t a n d accessible b o t h in t h e p u r e thought of
r e a s o n , a n d even m o r e tangibly in t h e rich symbolism of aesthetic ex-
p e r i e n c e , b o t h in its receptive a n d in its creative d i m e n s i o n s . A n d
that, at last, resolves t h e n a g g i n g p r o b l e m of t h e idea of " d e p e n -
d e n t beauty." As K a n t f o r m u l a t e d the m a t t e r in 1 6 - 1 7 , it was im-
possible to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e p u r e j u d g m e n t of taste could b e
complicated into a j u d g m e n t of d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y without losing
e v e r y t h i n g aesthetic a b o u t it. Kant's t r e a t m e n t of perfection in t h a t
c o n t e x t s e e m e d in fact to p r e e m p t t h e aesthetic. Now we a r e in a
position to a p p r a i s e t h e situation m o r e judiciously. Let us consider
t h e crucial p a r a g r a p h of 16 in t h e light of t h e t h e o r y of beauty as
t h e symbol of morality. Kant's text reads:

290 The Critique of Judgment

 It is t r u e t h a t taste gains n o t h i n g by this c o m b i n a t i o n of aes-
thetical with intellectual satisfaction, i n a s m u c h as it becomes
fixed; a n d t h o u g h it is not universal, yet in respect to certain
purposively d e t e r m i n e d objects it becomes possible to p r e -
scribe rules for it. T h e s e , however, a r e not rules of taste, b u t
merely rules for t h e unification of taste with r e a s o n , i.e. of t h e
beautiful with t h e good, by which t h e f o r m e r b e c o m e s avail-
able as a n i n s t r u m e n t of design of the latter. T h u s t h e t o n e of
m i n d which is self-maintaining a n d of subjective universal va-
lidity is s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e way of t h i n k i n g which can be
m a i n t a i n e d only by painful resolve, b u t is of objective univer-
sal v a l i d i t y .
79

O n a strictly formalist r e a d i n g of art, t h e loss of a u t o n o m y involved

in this p r o c e e d i n g is u n d e n i a b l e . Beauty "becomes available as a n
i n s t r u m e n t , " it is " s u b o r d i n a t e d , " rules are "prescribed for it." T h e
liveliness a n d play which are essential to it a r e n o w h a r n e s s e d to t h e
"painful resolve" of duty. K a n t is clear that " p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , . . .
perfection gains n o t h i n g from beauty, or beauty by perfection . . ."
Morality's claim is valid w i t h o u t t h e sweetening of beauty. Beauty in
its p u r e formality can function without reference to perfection
( t h o u g h only with pulchritudo vaga). It only achieves it t r u e p u r -
pose, h o w e v e r w h i c h is n o t p l e a s u r e b u t t h e " h a r m o n y of t h e
faculties"when it d o e s in fact serve for the expression of perfec-
tion. " A n d t h u s w h e n b o t h states of m i n d are in h a r m o n y o u r whole
faculty of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p o w e r g a i n s . " T h e "whole faculty" is rea-
80

son in its unityits supersensible unity, which is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

f r e e d o m . T h e philosophical significance of beauty, t h e n , is t h a t it
symbolizes morality. Kant's whole discourse r e g a r d i n g aesthetics
culminates in t h e primacy of practical reason.

The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination 291

 Fifteen

AESTHETICS AS T H E KEY T O
ANTHROPOLOGY: LEBENSGEFHL
AND GEISTESGEFHL

T
h e s p o n t a n e o u s conformity to t h e rules of t h e u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g by t h e i m a g i n a t i o n in its free play reveals the
intrinsic o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d orientation of h u m a n con-
sciousness. T h a t is, t h e h u m a n m i n d has certain e n d s or
p u r p o s e s in its functioning, which a n event like t h e experience of
b e a u t y exposes to conscious scrutiny, m u c h as a n empirical j u d g -
m e n t e x p o s e s to conscious scrutiny t h e p r o b l e m of cognitive valid-
ity. B u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful involves a good deal m o r e
complexity t h a n t h e empirical cognitive j u d g m e n t , because all the
aspects of h u m a n responsiveness t u r n o u t to be involvedeven t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h n o t for its o w n p u r p o s e s . T h u s , the beauti-
ful c a n serve as a peculiarly illuminating field for t h e consideration
of h u m a n life as a whole. T h i s was articulated in 5 of the Third Cri-
tique, w h e n t h e beautiful was identified as a distinctively human ex-
p e r i e n c e , because it involved m a n both as rational a n d as a n i m a l . 1

T h i s s i m u l t a n e o u s animality a n d rationality is t h e core b o t h of t h e

t h e o r y of feeling a n d of t h e t h e o r y of morality which Kant devel-
o p e d in his p h i l o s o p h y generally a n d in t h e Third Critique specifi-
cally. B e a u t y allowed K a n t a scope in which to work o u t t h e full
complexities of the mixed f o r m which was m a n . Aesthetics was t h e
key to a n t h r o p o l o g y .
Kant's position is t h a t aesthetics can only b e placed p r o p e r l y
within a s c h e m e of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y which stresses t h e
primacy of t h e practical a n d t h e g r o u n d e d n e s s of h u m a n m e a n i n g
in a supersensible o r d e r of value. A r t can serve, in t h a t context, as a
vehicle for m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . K a n t developed this idea, via the m e d i -
ation of t h e sublime, as t h e basis of his c o n n e c t i o n of beauty with
morality in t h e G e n e r a l R e m a r k to 29. B o t h aesthetic feelings, t h e
beautiful a n d t h e sublime, insofar as they h a d their origins n o t in

292
m e r e sense b u t in reflection, w e r e "purposive in reference to t h e
m o r a l feeling." T h a t is, they c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e awareness a n d ac-
2

c e p t a n c e of t h e m o r a l principle in c o m p l e x h u m a n beings (animal

as well as spiritual).
K a n t d r e w a parallel b e t w e e n t h e purity of t h e form of these
aesthetic j u d g m e n t s a n d t h e purity of the form of m o r a l j u d g m e n t
in t e r m s of t h e resultant feeling. I n each case, t h e feeling derived
from a p u r e l y i m m a n e n t rational process. As a result, Kant wrote,
" t h e m o r a l feeling . . . is . . . so far c o g n a t e to t h e aesthetical j u d g -
m e n t a n d its formal conditions t h a t it can serve to r e p r e s e n t t h e
conformity to law of action from d u t y as aesthetical, i.e. as sublime
o r even as beautiful, w i t h o u t losing p u r i t y . " T h a t is to say, o n e can
3

symbolize m o r a l considerations via t h e aesthetic feelings, because

t h e feeling evoked by m o r a l law in the subject is "cognate" with
these feelings.
T h e sublime showed a m u c h closer fit t h a n t h e beautiful, h e n c e
Kant's qualifier "even." Kant m a d e t h e point a b o u t t h e closer p r o x -
imity of t h e sublime to t h e m o r a l feeling a bit later in t h e G e n e r a l
Remark:

T h e object of a p u r e a n d u n c o n d i t i o n e d intellectual satisfac-

tion is t h e m o r a l law in t h a t m i g h t which it exercises in us over
all m e n t a l motives that precede it. T h i s m i g h t m a k e s itself aes-
thetically k n o w n to us t h r o u g h sacrifices (which causing a
feeling of deprivation, t h o u g h o n behalf of internal freedom,
in r e t u r n discloses in us a n u n f a t h o m a b l e d e p t h of this super-
sensible faculty, with c o n s e q u e n c e s e x t e n d i n g b e y o n d o u r
k e n ) . . . H e n c e it follows t h a t t h e intellectual, in itself p u r p o s -
ive, (moral) g o o d , aesthetically j u d g e d , m u s t b e p r e s e n t e d as
sublime r a t h e r t h a n beautiful, so that it r a t h e r awakens t h e
feeling of respect (which disdains c h a r m ) t h a n t h a t of love a n d
familiar inclination; for h u m a n n a t u r e does n o t attach itself to
this g o o d spontaneously, b u t only by t h e a u t h o r i t y which rea-
son exercises over sensibility. 4

As c o m p l e x , a n i m a l a n d spirit, m a n e x p e r i e n c e s this supersensible

n o t as play b u t as obligation. While t h e essence of m a n ' s s u p e r s e n s -
ible g r o u n d is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m , t h e n a t u r e of that f r e e d o m
as e x p e r i e n c e d concretely is duty. Consequently, o n c e again, t h e r e
is a closer a p p r o x i m a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e sublime
a n d t h e m o r a l t h a n between t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e beautiful a n d t h e
moral:

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 293

 a l t h o u g h t h e i m m e d i a t e p l e a s u r e in the beautiful of n a t u r e
likewise p r e s u p p o s e s a n d cultivates a certain liberality in o u r
m e n t a l a t t i t u d e , i.e. a satisfaction i n d e p e n d e n t of m e r e sen-
sible e n j o y m e n t , yet f r e e d o m is t h u s r e p r e s e n t e d as in play
r a t h e r t h a n in law-directed occupation which is the g e n u i n e
characteristic of h u m a n morality, in which reason m u s t ex-
ercise d o m i n i o n over sensibility. B u t in aesthetical j u d g m e n t s
u p o n t h e sublime this d o m i n i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d as exercised by
t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , r e g a r d e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t of r e a s o n .
5

Yet d e s p i t e t h e closer proximity of t h e sublime to t h e m o r a l , by

d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e fittingness of aesthetic feeling in general for t h e
e x p e r i e n c e (and the expression) of o u r rational g r o u n d in m o r a l
obligation, t h e sublime also m a k e s the relation b e t w e e n t h e beauti-
ful a n d t h e m o r a l accessible.
W h a t makes t h e beautiful in itself purposive for morality is t h a t
it " p r e p a r e s us to love disinterestedly s o m e t h i n g , even n a t u r e it-
self." M o r e generally, "it cultivates us, in t h a t it teaches us to a t t e n d
to t h e p u r p o s i v e n e s s in t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " In t h e reflection
6

a b o u t beauty, t h e subject n o t only recognizes p l e a s u r e b u t reflects

u p o n its sources a n d its w o r t h . It is this capacity to rise above a p -
petite which is precisely taste, o r cultivation. Consequently, as K a n t
a r g u e d in 59: "taste makes possible the transition, without any vio-
lent leap, from t h e c h a r m of sense to habitual m o r a l interest." 7

The Transcendental Relevance of Feeling

For K a n t t h e r e is a very i m p o r t a n t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l relation between

feeling a n d r e a s o n . Feelings t u r n o u t to have great value in t h e sub-
jective r e c k o n i n g of consciousness r e g a r d i n g its states a n d its p u r -
p o s e s . In a d d i t i o n to t h e p u r e rational self-appraisal called " a p p e r -
8

c e p t i o n , " t h e r e is a n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n of self-awareness u p o n which

we can c o u n t for evidence of m e n t a l states a n d m e n t a l functions:
the s p h e r e of feelings a n d t h e reflective j u d g m e n t a b o u t t h e m . Re-
flection arrives at t h e s a m e result t h a t p u r e rational a p p e r c e p t i o n
achieves. Feeling can b e t h e m a r k of the existence of a relation of
r e a s o n . As a m a r k of existence, it is empirical. B u t it refers, subjec-
tively to be s u r e , to a n a priori rational principle. Feeling is possible
because m a n is sensible, b u t n o t all feelings a r e caused by sense.
T h e peculiar feeling of respect is the crucial instance of this. "Sen-
s u o u s feeling . . . is t h e condition of the particular feeling we call
respect, b u t t h e cause t h a t d e t e r m i n e s this feeling lies in t h e p u r e

294 The Critique of Judgment

practical r e a s o n . " T h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l potential of feeling is most
9

striking in t h e later Critiques. T h e relation between imagination a n d

u n d e r s t a n d i n g is m a r k e d by t h e distinctive feeling of beauty. T h e
relation b e t w e e n imagination a n d reason is m a r k e d by t h e distinc-
tive feeling of t h e sublime. A n d the relation between will a n d rea-
son is m a r k e d by t h e distinctive feeling of respect.
H o w is self-consciousness, immediately via t h e feelings of one's
i n t e r n a l state, possible? In 1 of t h e Third Critique Kant wrote of "a
quite s e p a r a t e faculty of distinction a n d j u d g m e n t . . . c o m p a r i n g
t h e given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e subject with t h e whole faculty
of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , of which t h e m i n d is conscious in the feeling of
its state [das ganze Vermgen der Vorstellungen . . . , dessen sich das
Gemt im Gefhl seines Zustandes bewut wird]. . . H e r e t h e r e p r e s e n -
tation is a l t o g e t h e r r e f e r r e d to t h e subject a n d its feeling of life
[Lebensgefhl], u n d e r t h e n a m e of t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e or p a i n . " 1 0

Kant a r g u e s t h a t we can infer from a feeling to the rational struc-

t u r e which d e t e r m i n e s it by reflection. W h e n t h e m i n d a t t e n d s its
"feeling," it a t t e n d s its subjective processes. Pleasure a n d pain are
not t h e final t e r m s o f t h a t consciousness, but only the data, the mat-
ter for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , for j u d g m e n t . Lebensgefhl is g r o u n d e d in
Kant's t h e o r y of subjective self-consciousness u n d e r the rubric of
reflection, o r w h a t we have identified with that " o t h e r kind of j u d g -
ing." K a n t is loath to call this cognition, yet it is self-consciousness of
t h e subject n o t as merely passive b u t as active. T h e m i n d has t h e
p o w e r to r e s p o n d to its appraisals of its states, a n d to alter t h e m .
A n d it has at least o n e criterion by which this d a t a p l e a s u r e o r
p a i n i s to b e evaluated: the feeling of life.
W h a t does Lebensgefhl point to, what does it m a r k by its d a t a of
pleasure? Life, for Kant, is t h e p r o p e r t y of a n intelligent will, t h e
capacity to choose, to a c t . " It is freedom of will in its actuality:
Willkr, in Kant's precise sense. T h e feeling of life, t h e r e f o r e , is t h e
awareness of o u r empirical freedom, o u r status as practically p u r -
posive in t h e world of sense. Pleasure, in that context, is either what
fosters o u r consciousness of this freedom, or what accompanies
a n d u n d e r s c o r e s its efficaciousness. I n either case, pleasure is
b o u n d u p with t h e materiality of m a n , his capacity to sense, his
bodily existence. Kant referred to E p i c u r u s in this connection:

[A]s E p i c u r u s m a i n t a i n e d , all gratification or grief may ulti-

mately b e c o r p o r e a l . . . because life without a feeling of
bodily o r g a n s would b e merely a consciousness of existence,
w i t h o u t a n y feeling of well-being or the reverse . . . For the

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 295

 m i n d is by itself a l o n e life (the principle of life), a n d hin-
d r a n c e s o r f u r t h e r a n c e s m u s t b e s o u g h t outside it a n d yet in
t h e m a n , consequently in u n i o n with his b o d y . 1 2

Similarly, in 54, Kant connects gratification with a "feeling of the

f u r t h e r a n c e of the whole life of t h e m a n , a n d consequently also of
his bodily well-being, i.e. his h e a l t h . " T h u s Lebensgefhl, like
13

Willkr, is involved in t h a t c o m p l e x dualism of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e

as b e t w e e n p u r e r e a s o n a n d m e r e matter. It can be r e a d simply
physiologically, a n d t h e n assuredly we are in t h e realm of e m p i r i -
cal psychology, not only with Lebensgefhl, b u t also with Willkr.
B u t it can also b e r e a d mentally, in accordance with t h e technical
sense of Kant's t e r m life. I n t h e latter sense, b o t h Lebensgefhl a n d
Willkr offer t h e possibility of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l significance: they
p o i n t to a p u r e rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n . While t r a n s c e n d e n t a l self-
consciousness ("apperception") a t t e n d s principles of p u r e reason a
priori in " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l reflection," reflective self-consciousness
(Lebensgefhl) a t t e n d s feelings as keys to its state (Gemtszustand),
a n d t h u s u n d e r t a k e s aesthetic r e f l e c t i o n .
14

K a n t believed t h a t t h e r e is (or o u g h t to be) a difference be-

tween " s e n s u o u s " a n d "intellectual" pleasure, n o t so m u c h in t e r m s
of psycho-physical r e s p o n s e as in t e r m s of rational significance. 15

" S e n s u o u s " p l e a s u r e is occasioned by t h e senses o r t h e imagination;

"intellectual" p l e a s u r e by concepts or ideas. For K a n t n o t all feel-
ings w e r e h o m o g e n e o u s quantities (such that, o p p o s e d , they would
cancel o n e a n o t h e r ) , for b o t h in t h e Anthropology a n d in t h e Third
Critique h e identified circumstances in which it makes sense to find
p a i n justified a n d j o y bitter. As Kant p u t it in t h e Anthropology, "a
higher satisfaction o r dissatisfaction with ourselves (namely, a m o r a l
one) [serves to] j u d g e e n j o y m e n t a n d p a i n . " I n t h e Third Critique
1 6

K a n t e x p l a i n e d : " T h e satisfaction or dissatisfaction h e r e d e p e n d s

o n r e a s o n a n d is t h e s a m e as approbation or disapprobation; b u t grati-
fication a n d grief can only rest o n the feeling o r prospect of a pos-
sible . . .well-being o r its o p p o s i t e . " 17

If all t h a t m a t t e r e d w e r e quantitative gratification, Kant a r g u e d

in 3 of t h e Third Critique, " t h e impressions of sense which deter-
m i n e t h e inclination, f u n d a m e n t a l propositions of reason which
d e t e r m i n e t h e will, m e r e reflective forms of intuition which deter-
m i n e t h e j u d g m e n t , a r e q u i t e t h e same as r e g a r d s t h e effect u p o n
t h e feeling of p l e a s u r e . " If o u r goal were simply h a p p i n e s s , we
18

would n o t scruple over t h e source of pleasure, b u t simply maximize

it; i n d e e d , t h e r e would b e n o m o r a l issue at all, only a question of

296 The Critique of Judgment

efficiency. B u t obviously for K a n t t h e r e was a m o r a l issue h e r e . A n d
t h a t p r o f o u n d l y colored his view of m e r e gratification. T h u s K a n t
i n t r o d u c e d a crucial complication: t h e r e were conflicting criteria
for t h e evaluation of states of m i n d a n d for actions taken to alter
t h e m . H e discriminated b e t w e e n a feeling of life (Lebensgefhl) a n d
a feeling of a u t o n o m o u s spirituality (Geistesgefhl). 19

"'Spirit [Geist]' in a n aesthetical sense, signifies t h e a n i m a t i n g

principle [das belebende Princip] in t h e m i n d , " K a n t writes in 4 9 . 2 0

" A n i m a t i n g , " "enlivening," "life"a whole series of words which

previously a r o s e in c o n n e c t i o n with Kant's characterization of t h e
" h a r m o n y of t h e faculties"here achieve r e n e w e d p r o m i n e n c e .
K a n t elaborates in t h e following t e r m s :

B u t t h a t w h e r e b y this principle a n i m a t e s t h e s o u l t h e m a t e -
rial which it employs for t h a t p u r p o s e i s t h a t which sets t h e
m e n t a l p o w e r s into a swing t h a t is purposive, i.e. into a play
which is self-maintaining a n d which s t r e n g t h e n s those powers
for such activity [Dasjenige aber, wodurch dieses Princip die Seele
belebt, der Stoff, den es dazu anwendet, ist das, was die Gemthskrfte
zweckmig in Schwung versetzt, d.i. in ein solches Spiel, welches sich
von selbst erhlt und selbst die Krfte dazu strkt]. 21

While b e a u t y o p e r a t e s in t h e r e a l m primarily of Lebensgefhl, it has

within it, as its only source of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l value, a reference as
well to Geistesgefhl. T h e h a r m o n y a n d conflict b e t w e e n these two
subjective states parallels t h e relation of subjective a n d objective
will-determinations. I n 54 K a n t c o n n e c t e d gratification with a
"feeling of t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e whole life of the m a n , a n d conse-
q u e n t l y also of his bodily well-being, i.e. his h e a l t h . " B u t h e t h e n
22

m a d e w h a t was for h i m t h e key distinction: b e t w e e n gratification

which was merely "animal [animalische], i.e. bodily sensation," a n d
t h a t which was a "spiritual feeling [geistigen Gefhl] of respect for
moral ideas." 23

For K a n t , h e a l t h (physical well-being) was a particularly indica-

tive aspect of t h e feeling of life, b u t d u t y was t h e ultimate g r o u n d of
t h e feeling of spirituality. W i t h health (as a physiological as well as
psychical quality) h e associated t h e general idea of h u m a n h a p p i -
ness. W i t h t h e feeling of spirituality (as a satisfaction, respect,
which involved s u b o r d i n a t i o n of physical desires) h e c o n n e c t e d t h e
majesty of m o r a l law. While Lebensgefhl o p e r a t e d o n the n a t u r a l
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t health a n d well-being were good, Geistesgefhl in-
t r o d u c e d t h e question of w o r t h , of value in a n ultimate sense, which
t h r e w this n a t u r a l a s s u m p t i o n into suspicion. Kant's ethical rigor-

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 297

ism t h r u s t at t h e very h e a r t of subjective purposiveness as e n h a n c e -
m e n t of liveliness by asking: W h a t is t h e p u r p o s e of life itself, a n d is
e n j o y m e n t m a n ' s p u r p o s e ? I n 4 h e m a d e his position clear:

Even in t h e j u d g i n g of health we may notice this distinction. It

is i m m e d i a t e l y pleasant to everyone possessing it . . . But in
o r d e r to say t h a t it is g o o d , it m u s t b e considered by reason
with r e f e r e n c e to p u r p o s e , viz. that it is a state that makes us fit
for all o u r business . . . r e a s o n can never b e p e r s u a d e d that
t h e existence of a m a n w h o merely lives for enjoyment (however
busy h e may b e in this p o i n t of view) has a worth in itself. . .
O n l y what h e does, w i t h o u t reference to enjoyment, in full
f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of what n a t u r e c a n p r o c u r e for
h i m passively, gives a n (absolute) worth to his p r e s e n c e (in t h e
world) as t h e existence of a p e r s o n . 2 4

M a n m u s t evaluate all in t e r m s of his spiritual estate, his m o r a l p u r -

pose, a n d consequently life itself, empirical freedom, a n d t h e
capacity to enjoy it m u s t c o m e u n d e r a s t e r n e r criterion. I n t h a t
light, "life as such . . . has n o intrinsic value at all . . . it has value
only as r e g a r d s t h e use to which we p u t it, t h e e n d s to which we di-
rect i t . " " T h e value of life for us, if it is estimated by that which we
25

enjoy, . . . sinks to zero . . . T h e r e r e m a i n s t h e n n o t h i n g b u t t h e

value which we ourselves give o u r l i f e . " 26

T h e full significance of t h e tension b e t w e e n Lebensgefhl a n d

Geistesgefhl lies in m a n ' s recognition of his supersensible destiny.
I n t h e s p h e r e of feeling, t h a t recognition is called "respect." T h e
distinctiveness of respect lies n o t only in its necessity a n d a priori
derivation, b u t also in t h e difference it manifests as feeling from
o t h e r f e e l i n g s . K a n t writes of it as "a positive feeling n o t of e m -
27

pirical origin . . . which c a n be k n o w n a priori . . . a feeling p r o -

d u c e d by a n intellectual c a u s e . " "Respect is p r o p e r l y t h e r e p r e -
28

sentation of a worth that thwarts my self-love," b u t o n e which as a

feeling is " n o t received t h r o u g h any outside influence . . . h e n c e it
is specifically different from all feelings of t h e first k i n d . " It is n o t29

a feeling of sense, t h o u g h it is sensible. It is a feeling which refers to

t h e supersensible. It is n o t Lebensgefhl b u t Geistesgefhl.
T h e p r i m a r y practical role of sensibility, of course, is in g e n e r -
a t i n g "inclinations" o r i e n t e d t o w a r d " h a p p i n e s s " o r "self-love."
C o n s e q u e n t l y , "whatever checks all inclination of self-love neces-
sarily has, by t h a t fact, a n influence o n f e e l i n g . " F r o m t h e side of
30

r e a s o n , it can b e established a priori from t h e n a t u r e of m o r a l law,

298 The Critique of Judgment

a n d from t h e actual condition of m a n as a natural-material subject,
a finite rational b e i n g necessarily d e t e r m i n e d by t h e m o r a l law, t h a t
h e m u s t e x p e r i e n c e this d e t e r m i n a t i o n subjectively in feeling as
c o m p u l s i o n a n d p a i n : "[W]e can see a priori that t h e m o r a l law as a
g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will, by t h w a r t i n g all o u r inclina-
tions, m u s t p r o d u c e a feeling which can be called pain. H e r e we
have t h e first a n d p e r h a p s t h e only case w h e r e i n we can d e t e r m i n e
from a priori concepts t h e relation of a cognition (here a cognition
of p u r e practical reason) to t h e feeling of pleasure o r dis-
p l e a s u r e . " Since "respect" is for law, for t h e necessity of duty, it is
31

a necessary, n o t a voluntary feeling: "a tribute we c a n n o t refuse to

pay to merit w h e t h e r we will o r n o t . " It is also a n ultimately affir-
32

mative o n e , d e s p i t e t h e initial displeasure. T h e subject experiences

a p a i n , b u t reflection u p o n this p a i n , i.e., j u d g m e n t a b o u t t h e state
of m i n d via Lebensgefhl, leads to the recognition that the rejection
of desire was c o m m a n d e d by r e a s o n within t h e subject. Reflection,
t h r o u g h Lebensgefhl, becomes aware of a relation to its o w n i m m a -
n e n t rationality, a n d of t h e authority of t h a t rationality in t h e sub-
ject. B u t this p r o d u c e s a feeling of "intellectual p l e a s u r e , " or, m o r e
precisely, a p p r o b a t i o n . T h a t is Geistesgefhl.
T h e c o n c e p t of Geistesgefhl has already arisen in o u r consider-
ation of t h e feeling of t h e sublime, a n d t h e parallelisms between the
feeling of respect a n d the feeling of the sublime are obvious. T h e
first parallel is in t h e psychology of t h e e x p e r i e n c e . Both respect
a n d sublimity a r e "mixed feelings" or c o m p l e x states of m i n d in-
volving c h a n g e . B o t h start o u t with a feeling of displeasure or p a i n .
B u t this feeling in t h e sensible subject is discerned to b e caused by
t h e subject's o w n rational d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d this induces a new
feeling of a p p r o b a t i o n , which is pleasant b u t in a different m a n n e r .
T h u s t h e subjective e x p e r i e n c e of b o t h respect a n d sublimity is a
m o v e m e n t in m e n t a l states, a Rhrung, a stirring of e m o t i o n s . B u t
the c o n n e c t i o n is n o t merely o n e of similar subjective process. I n
b o t h cases, t h e e x p e r i e n c e is n o l o n g e r merely a feeling of life
[Lebensgefhl], i.e., t h e actual efficacy of the will. It is a feeling of
spirit [Geistesgefhl], i.e., t h e rational authority in t h e will.
Kant a r g u e s t h a t in t h e e x p e r i e n c e of respect for the law, "con-
t e m p l a t i n g t h e majesty of this l a w , . . . the soul believes itself to b e
elevated in p r o p o r t i o n as it sees t h e holy law as elevated over it a n d
its frail n a t u r e [die Seele sich in dem Mae zu erheben glaubt, als sie das
heilige Gesetz ber sich und ihre gebrechliche Natur erhaben sieht]. " T h e 3 3

v e r b K a n t u s e d is in its n o m i n a l f o r m t h e t e r m for t h e sublime.

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 299

Again, in describing duty, K a n t writes t h a t it is " s o m e t h i n g which
elevates m a n above himself as p a r t of t h e world of sense, s o m e t h i n g
which connects h i m with a n o r d e r of things which only t h e u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g can t h i n k [was den Menschen ber sich selbst (als einen Theil
der Sinnenwelt) erhebt, was ihn an eine Ordnung der Dinge knpft, die nur
der Verstand denken kann]." 34
A n d K a n t uses t h e n o m i n a l form of
sublimity as well: "the sublimity of o u r o w n s u p e r s e n s u o u s exis-
t e n c e . . . subjectively effects respect for their h i g h e r vocation in
m e n . " T h u s t h e c o n n e c t i o n is extremely close between t h e feeling
3 5

of respect a n d t h e feeling of t h e sublime. Yet they can a n d s h o u l d

be distinguished. K a n t writes t h a t respect "applies to p e r s o n s only,
n e v e r to t h i n g s . " A bit later h e clarifies himself still further: " r e -
36

spect c a n n e v e r have o t h e r t h a n a m o r a l g r o u n d . " T h i s accords

3 7

with t h e a r g u m e n t h e m a d e in t h e Grounding: "All respect for a per-

son is p r o p e r l y only respect for t h e law. . . of which the p e r s o n p r o -
vides a n e x a m p l e . " T h u s K a n t comes back to his basic assertion:
3 8

"only t h e law itself can b e a n object of r e s p e c t . " I n o t h e r s a n d in

39

oneself, w h a t causes respect is t h e law. Subjectively it is duty. Objec-

tively it is t h e m o r a l law a n d , b e h i n d it, t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e will in
rational f r e e d o m .
Precisely w h a t distinguishes t h e m o r a l feeling from t h e sub-
lime is t h a t t h e m o r a l feeling a t t e n d s t h e subjective supersensible
directly, while t h e sublime involves a " s u b r e p t i o n , " whereby it
seeks it in a n object of n a t u r e . Yet the sublime is the e x p e r i e n c e
4 0

w h e r e b y t h a t s u b r e p t i o n reveals t h e limitations of t h e merely p h e -

n o m e n a l p r e s e n c e of n a t u r e . T h u s K a n t defined the feeling of t h e
sublime as " a n object (of n a t u r e ) the representation of which determines
the mind to think the unattainability of nature regarded as a presentation of
ideas." T h e e x p e r i e n c e of seeking such a n "objective correlative,"
41

such a "sensible illustration" in n a t u r e d e m o n s t r a t e s not p e r h a p s

t h e idea, b u t t h e process of r e a s o n itself, "as t h e faculty expressing
t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of absolute totality [als Vermgen der Independenz
der absoluten Totalitt]," t h a t is, w h a t really gets p r e s e n t e d is " t h e
subjective p u r p o s i v e n e s s of o u r m i n d in t h e e m p l o y m e n t of t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n for its supersensible d e s t i n a t i o n . " While Kant is
42

merely restating t h e t h e o r y of t h e sublime in this passage, it is even

m o r e clear h o w decisively t h e n o t i o n of aesthetic ideas, t h e t h e o r y
of symbolism, r e p r e s e n t s t h e culmination of his whole vision of aes-
thetics, a n d h o w t h a t fits p r o f o u n d l y into his c o n c e p t i o n of m a n as a
b e i n g g r o u n d e d in t h e supersensible.
W h a t t h e Third Critique s o u g h t to establish is that this awe w h e n

300 The Critique of Judgment

projected u p o n n a t u r e was a " s u b r e p t i o n , " a m i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e
actual g r o u n d of t h e feeling, which authentically b e t o k e n e d t h e su-
persensible destination in t h e subject. T h i s " s u b r e p t i o n " distin-
g u i s h e d t h e feeling of t h e sublime from t h e feeling of respect.
Respect was inevitably aware of its p r o p e r a n d t r u e g r o u n d , while
t h e sublime feeling was characteristically m i s g u i d e d a b o u t its
source. Yet this s u b r e p t i o n was fruitful precisely for t h e m e t a p h y s i -
cal o p e n n e s s it occasioned, namely, for t h e h a r m o n y of n a t u r e with
Geist, a n d h e n c e t h e possible ontological unity of t h e supersensible
g r o u n d of n a t u r e with t h e supersensible g r o u n d of m a n .

Kant's Speculations about Geist

Kant's discussion of Geist in 49 is o n e of t h e most difficult a n d r e -

w a r d i n g sections in the whole Third Critique. For t h e intellectual his-
torian, t h e t r e a t m e n t of Geist is fascinating simply for its relation to
t h e articulation o f t h a t crucial c o n c e p t in s u b s e q u e n t Idealism. B u t
even w h e n o u r a t t e n t i o n r e m a i n s strictly with Kant, this section
o p e n s u p a s t o n i s h i n g d e p t h s of Kantian metaphysics. All of Kant's
metaphysical intimations c u l m i n a t e d in t h e idea of Geist. B u t Kant
p r o v e d e x t r e m e l y reticent a b o u t acknowledging t h e metaphysical
potential latent in t h a t concept.
I n his criticism of rational psychology in t h e First Critique, h e
h a d i n t i m a t e d (negatively) t h e potential in t h e n o t i o n . H e o b -
served: " N e i t h e r t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object which u n d e r l i e s o u t e r
a p p e a r a n c e s n o r that which u n d e r l i e s i n n e r intuition, is in itself ei-
t h e r m a t t e r o r a t h i n k i n g b e i n g , b u t a g r o u n d (to us u n k n o w n ) of
t h e a p p e a r a n c e s which supply to us t h e empirical concept of t h e
f o r m e r as well as of t h e latter m o d e of e x i s t e n c e . " T h e inac-
43

cessibility of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject a n d t h e universality of its

impositions u p o n t h e empirical ego's e x p e r i e n c e of i n n e r sense a r e
such t h a t it can in n o way be established w h e t h e r it is s o m e t h i n g
specific to each individual o r s o m e t h i n g which in fact e n c o m p a s s e s
all such empirical i n d i v i d u a l s i n d e e d , all reality, i.e., not merely
t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject b u t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l object as well
within t h e totality of its o w n n o u m e n a l n a t u r e . " I f . . . we c o m p a r e
t h e t h i n k i n g T n o t with m a t t e r b u t with t h e intelligible t h a t lies at
t h e basis of t h e o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e which we call matter, we have n o
k n o w l e d g e whatsoever of t h e intelligible, a n d t h e r e f o r e a r e in n o
position to say t h a t t h e soul is in any inward respect different from
i t . " T h u s t h e e n t e r t a i n m e n t of such speculations as t h e g r o u n d
44

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 301

for a subjective idealism could n o t p r e c l u d e t h e i r extension to a n
even vaster objective idealism.
While K a n t used such a r g u m e n t s in t h e "Paralogisms" in a
negative m o d e , to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e e m p t i n e s s of these specula-
tions, h e was nevertheless conceiving possibilities which h a d doc-
trinal significance in b o t h t h e school-rationalist tradition a n d the
religious tradition in G e r m a n y , a n d possibilities which h e would
himself take u p , in t h e context of t h e Third Critique, in defense of
these o r t h o d o x i e s against t h e t h r e a t of a n alternative, p a n t h e i s t on-
tology. W h a t rational psychology tried to establish from the t r a n -
scendental subjectivity of t h e "I think" was quite g r a n d i o s e :

T h e substance, merely as object of i n n e r sense, gives t h e con-

cept of immateriality; as simple substance, t h a t of incorrup-
tibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, personality; all
these t h r e e t o g e t h e r , spirituality; while t h e relation to objects
in space gives commercium with bodies, a n d so leads us to r e p -
r e s e n t t h e t h i n k i n g substance as t h e principle of life in matter,
t h a t is, as soul (anima), a n d as t h e g r o u n d of animality. T h i s
last, in t u r n , as limited by spirituality, gives t h e concept of im-
mortality.^

K a n t p r o c e e d e d in his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Dialectic" to d e n y that ra-

tional psychology could attain any of these crucial conceptions
t h r o u g h a cognitive p r o c e d u r e , a n d yet, via "practical r e a s o n " a n d
"rational faith" (Vernunftglaube) K a n t rescued e a c h a n d every o n e of
t h e c o n c e p t i o n s for his o w n philosophy. T h e ideas of "life" a n d "an-
imality" play a c r u c i a l t h o u g h heuristicrole in his theory of or-
ganic f o r m . T h e idea of "spirituality" figured n o t only in his m o r a l
a n d religious teaching, b u t also in his analysis of the subjective
f o u n d a t i o n s of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . A n d of course, t h e notions of
"personality" a n d "immortality" were essential to his specific m o r a l
teachings. Yet Kant, despite his belief in each a n d every o n e of
these notions, d e n i e d their cognitive certainty.
T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t r e m a i n s is how m u c h of a t u r n Kant m a d e in
his a t t i t u d e t o w a r d Geist, as t h e n o u m e n a l g r o u n d o r substrate of
h u m a n f r e e d o m , by t h e time of t h e Third Critique. T h e whole t h r u s t
of his r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e a n t i n o m y in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic
J u d g m e n t " was to "force" us to consider t h e "supersensible sub-
strate" of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d r e a s o n as a " u n i t y . " B u t this line of
46

speculation carried b e y o n d a subjective to a n objective idealism. I n

302 The Critique of Judgment

 ii of t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n , Kant w r o t e : " T h e r e must, therefore, b e a
g r o u n d of t h e unity of t h e supersensible, which lies at t h e basis of
n a t u r e , with t h a t which t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m practically con-
t a i n s . " I n R e m a r k II to 57, K a n t m a d e t h e same metaphysical
47

a r g u m e n t , a n d h e took it u p again in t h e c u l m i n a t i n g section of t h a t

whole "Dialectic," 59, in t h e following t e r m s :

H e n c e , b o t h o n a c c o u n t of this i n n e r possibility in t h e subject

a n d of t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of a n a t u r e t h a t agrees with it, it
finds itself to be r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g within the subject as
well as w i t h o u t h i m , s o m e t h i n g which is n e i t h e r n a t u r e n o r
f r e e d o m , b u t which yet is c o n n e c t e d with the supersensible
g r o u n d of t h e latter. In this supersensible g r o u n d , therefore,
t h e theoretical faculty is b o u n d t o g e t h e r in unity with t h e
practical in a way which, t h o u g h c o m m o n , is yet u n k n o w n . 4 8

Despite his epistemological scruples, Kant insisted o n the legit-

imacy of rational belief in this unity of t h e supersensible. "We have
t h e r e f o r e in us a principle capable of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e idea of t h e
supersensible within us, a n d t h u s also that of the supersensible
without us, for knowledge, a l t h o u g h only in a practical point of
view . . . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e concept of f r e e d o m (as f u n d a m e n t a l
concept of all u n c o n d i t i o n e d practical laws) can e x t e n d reason be-
y o n d those b o u n d s within which every n a t u r a l (theoretical) c o n c e p t
m u s t r e m a i n hopelessly l i m i t e d . " In this context it would a p p e a r
49

t h a t Kant's n o t i o n of practical reason did entail a " k n o w l e d g e "

which e x t e n d e d r e a s o n b e y o n d t h e theoretical p a r a m e t e r s of " u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h i s was a kind of " k n o w l e d g e " which h a d a h i g h e r
validity t h a n m e r e "belief," a n d which also h a d clearly metaphysical
implications. As we t u r n to Kant's ethics, we will press this point to-
w a r d a teleological a n d metaphysical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his notion of
m a n a n d of his relation to t h e o r d e r of t h e world. T h o s e notions
would be t a k e n u p by his successors u n d e r t h e r u b r i c Geist a l o n g t h e
very lines which Kant was implying.
T h e richest insight into t h e metaphysical potential in Kant's
c o n c e p t of Geist is to be f o u n d in his Reflections of the late 1770s.
T h e s e private speculations, which p r o v e d m o r e d a r i n g t h a n his
p u b l i s h e d writings, set o u t from t h e definition of Geist which Kant
would e n u n c i a t e in 49 of t h e Third Critique, namely, t h e "animat-
ing principle of the m i n d . " H e h a d f o r m u l a t e d this definition al-
5 0

ready in 1 7 7 1 . Yet in t h e Reflections Kant was m o r e c a n d i d a b o u t

5 1

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 303

i
the latent metaphysical potential of t h e n o t i o n . In Reflection 782
K a n t w r o t e of t h e geistige Gefhl as a sense of "participation in a n
ideal w h o l e . " H e identified this ideal whole with t h e " f u n d a m e n t a l
idea of r e a s o n . " In a n o t h e r Reflection h e w r o t e : "the feeling of
52

spiritual life [das Gefhl des geistigen Lebens] has to d o with u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g a n d f r e e d o m , for m a n has within himself t h e bases
of k n o w l e d g e a n d w e l l - b e i n g . " For Kant, Geist was this "secret
53

s p r i n g of life." It was n o t subject to volition, b u t arose s p o n t a n e -

ously, "from n a t u r e . " T h a t was w h a t it m e a n t to say t h a t what arises
from spirit is "original" [ursprnglich]. 54
Geist, Kant wrote, was t h e
" i n n e r principle of activity." It r e q u i r e d t h e "sustained exertion of
the m i n d . " 5 5

I n s o m e linked Reflections from t h e late 1770s, Kant d e v e l o p e d

t h e idea in its most r e m a r k a b l e form. H e first n o t e d that t h e t e r m
itself was novel, a n d t h a t "a n e w t e r m does n o t find i m m e d i a t e ac-
c e p t a n c e if it is n o t very apt."

I n us t h e r e a r e delightful a n d compelling, b u t also enlivening

causes of m e n t a l power; this last principle has its o w n quite
u n i q u e n a t u r e a n d laws. N o t h i n g is enlivened b u t a certain
universality which t h e m i n d fastens u p o n p r i o r to all particu-
lars, a n d f r o m which it fashions its viewpoint a n d its p r o d u c t s .
T h a t is why g e n i u s resides in this capacity to create t h e univer-
sal a n d t h e i d e a l . 56

Geist is t h e "generative g r o u n d [Erzeugungsgrund] of i d e a s . " T h e 57

"expression of t h e idea t h r o u g h manifold a n d unified sensibility is

p r o o f of spirit." It is t h e source of "system" as contrasted with m e r e
a g g r e g a t i o n . It is n o particular talent, b u t t h e " a n i m a t i n g principle
of all t a l e n t s . " Geist is t h e active principle; "soul" is what is ani-
58

m a t e d . Geist is t h e source of all a n i m a t i o n , a n d can be derived from

n o t h i n g p r i o r . T h i s line of t h o u g h t b r o u g h t K a n t to his ultimate
5 9

c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e concept:

Because spirit involves t h e universal, it is so to speak divinae

particula aurae [a particular e m a n a t i o n of t h e divine] a n d it is
c r e a t e d o u t of t h e universal spirit. T h a t is why spirit has n o
specific p r o p e r t i e s ; r a t h e r , according to t h e different talents
a n d sensibilities it affects, it a n i m a t e s in varying ways, a n d ,
because t h e s e a r e so manifold, every spirit has s o m e t h i n g
u n i q u e . O n e o u g h t to say n o t that it belongs to t h e genius. It is
t h e unity of t h e world s o u l . 60

304 The Critique of Judgment

T h e metaphysical potential of the Idealist concept of Geist was al-
ready fully latent in t h e r e p r e s s e d speculations of I m m a n u e l Kant,
a n d it filtered t h r o u g h , above all in t h e Third Critique, to stimulate
his successors to its o u t r i g h t a r t i c u l a t i o n .
61

Aesthetics as the Key to Anthropology 305

 Sixteen

T H E UNITY OF MAN: MAN

AS AN "END-IN-HIMSELF "

K
a n t b e g a n his critical philosophy by acknowledging na-
t u r e as causal necessity, but conceiving of morality as free
will a d h e r i n g only to its o w n law. His p r o b l e m was to rec-
oncile these two c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e First Critique devel-
o p e d t h e a n t i n o m i a n a r g u m e n t t h a t f r e e d o m a n d necessity n e e d
n o t be logically contradictory, b u t it could only succeed in this by
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p h e n o m e n a from n o u m e n a , a n d assigning f r e e d o m
to t h e n o u m e n a l . T h i s p r o d u c e d , in the Second Critique, a new anti-
n o m y which asserted t h e "practical necessity" of r e g a r d i n g oneself
as morally responsible a n d h e n c e free. But, o n c e again, f r e e d o m
h a d its locus exclusively in t h e n o u m e n a l . T o b e m o r a l was a m a t t e r
of motive, n o t efficacy. Acting from d u t y sufficed b o t h to evidence
t h e f r e e d o m of t h e will a n d to satisfy m o r a l obligation. Yet m o r a l
d u t y a n d free will, while they w e r e strictly n o u m e n a l in their origin,
exercised a u t h o r i t y over a n actual being. C o n c e r n for t h e effica-
ciousness of morality in t h e world of sense motivated Kant's "ethi-
cal t u r n " in t h e Third Critique.
T h e practical, as t h e active c h a r a c t e r of t h e whole p e r s o n , inev-
itably raised two distinct b u t related issues for Kant: t h e p r o b l e m of
t h e real "unity of r e a s o n , " since h e identified r e a s o n b o t h with its
theoretical a n d with its practical uses; a n d also the p r o b l e m of t h e
unity of t h e person, for t h e practical entailed n o t merely a disem-
b o d i e d ratiocination b u t a h u m a n act in t h e world of sense. Meta-
physically, K a n t r e q u i r e d a n intrinsic (self-determining) d y n a m i s m
of r e a s o n , f r e e d o m as a u t o n o m y , m a n as a n "end-in-himself," for
his n o t i o n of morality to b e possible. T h e p r o b l e m h e faced was t h a t
it was epistemologically impossible to prove such a t h i n g . Yet h e in-
sisted it was m o r e t h a n merely a "belief," even a rational belief (Ver-
nunftglaube). It was a "fact of p u r e r e a s o n . " Even vaster m e t a -
1

306
 physical ideas i n t r u d e in t h e second line, for K a n t h a d to establish
transcendentally how it was possible that n o u m e n a l f r e e d o m could
b e a n efficacious cause in t h e p h e n o m e n a l world. I n a decisive pas-
sage in t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Third Critique, K a n t a r g u e d that it
was a "metaphysical principle a priori" that t h e empirical elective
will (Willkr) was free a n d efficacious as " n a t u r a l c a u s e . " Ulti- 2

mately, Kant's ethical t u r n involved two issues of "metaphysics"

first, t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e "objective reality" of freedom, a n d second,
t h e question of t h e efficacy of n o u m e n a l causality in t h e world of
sense. K a n t c o m m i t t e d himself to a d e t e r m i n a t e claim a b o u t each
of these. T h e first involved his idea of m a n as a n "end-in-himself"
in a " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " T h e second involved his idea of the "high-
est g o o d . " T h e historical K a n t was in fact c o m m i t t e d to each of
these n o t i o n s : t h e "primacy of practical r e a s o n " within t h e "unity
of r e a s o n , " t h e idea of m a n as a n "end-in-himself" in a " k i n g d o m of
e n d s , " a n d t h e "highest g o o d " as t h e "ideal" p u r s u e d by efficacious
h u m a n f r e e d o m in t h e actual world. T h i s c h a p t e r traces t h e a r g u -
m e n t c o n c e r n i n g free will from t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of
Morals t h r o u g h t h e Second a n d Third Critiques, to d e m o n s t r a t e h o w
t h e "primacy of practical r e a s o n " in the "unity of r e a s o n " culmi-
n a t e d in t h e idea of " a u t o n o m y , " t h e notion of m a n as a n "end-in-
himself." T h e n e x t c h a p t e r will c o n c e r n itself with t h e "highest
good."

The Unity of Reason

Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l philosophy explains t h e involuntary s p o n -

taneity of consciousness by recognizing it as the act n o t of t h e
empirical, b u t of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject. Kant's a t t e m p t to con-
ceive h u m a n consciousness in t e r m s of two subjectsone empirical
and one transcendental, one phenomenal and one noumenal
while at t h e s a m e time insisting u p o n t h e identity of the h u m a n
p e r s o n a n d t h e unity of reason, t h r e a t e n e d a grave i n c o h e r e n c e . 3

O n t h e o n e side, K a n t was so a d a m a n t a b o u t t h e p u r e formalism of

t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject t h a t it b e c a m e very difficult to recognize
it as a " b e i n g " [Wesen]. O n t h e o t h e r side, K a n t was so a d a m a n t
4

a b o u t t h e m e r e p h e n o m e n a l i t y of t h e empirical e g o that it b e c a m e
very difficult to recognize it as a subject.
If it was impossible, a c c o r d i n g to Kant's teachings in t h e "Para-
logisms," a n d m o r e generally according to his doctrine of " i n n e r
sense," to m o v e b e y o n d t h e m e r e formality of t h e " I " of transcen-
d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , it was j u s t as impossible to d e m o n s t r a t e any

The Unity of Man 307

i
f o u n d a t i o n for ascribing s p o n t a n e i t y to t h e empirical ego. T h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject could n e v e r b e k n o w n objectively because
t h e process o r act which constituted consciousness could never be
a n object of c o g n i t i o n . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject did have knowl-
5

e d g e that it existed, b u t n o t how, in what d e t e r m i n a t e form it did s o . 6

T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e which it could discern were n o t

p r o p e r t i e s of p r i m o r d i a l active intelligence, b u t merely its effects
u p o n a passive sensible i n t u i t i o n " i n n e r sense." T h a t u p o n which
it acted was a "passive subject." It was at best a " m e . " K a n t claimed
7

t h a t empirical consciousness could n e v e r achieve t h e kind of unity

which h e posited for t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n d also for t h e practical
subject. H e w r o t e : " t h e empirical consciousness, which accom-
panies different r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , is in itself diverse a n d without r e -
lation to t h e identity of t h e subject." Kant assigned empirical
8

e x p e r i e n c e of t h e self merely to t h e s p h e r e of t h e "analytic unity of

consciousness" which derived from a n d d e p e n d e d u p o n a p r i o r
"synthetic unity of consciousness" in t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject. 9

" T h e empirical unity of consciousness, t h r o u g h association of r e p -

resentations, itself c o n c e r n s a n a p p e a r a n c e , a n d is wholly con-
tingent." 10

K a n t insisted that these two notions of subject, active a n d pas-

sive, could n o t b e collapsed into o n e , a n d yet at t h e same time h e
c o n s i d e r e d b o t h to b e e l e m e n t s in a n identical h u m a n p e r s o n . K a n t
i n d e e d strove to k e e p t h e two subjects distinct, insisting "the least
object of p e r c e p t i o n (for e x a m p l e , even p l e a s u r e o r displeasure), if
a d d e d to t h e universal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of self-consciousness, would
at o n c e t r a n s f o r m rational psychology into empirical psychol-
o g y . " B u t empirical psychology, which e n c o m p a s s e d e v e r y t h i n g
11

a b o u t t h e e g o except t h e e m p t y formality of t h e "I think," could

in its o w n right achieve virtually n o t h i n g in t h e way of concrete
k n o w l e d g e of t h e self. C o n s e q u e n t l y h e cast t h e notion of self-
12

consciousness into considerable o b s c u r i t y . 13

W h i l e K a n t d e n i e d valid cognition of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l sub-

ject, it is clear h e also ascribed s o m e form of p r e s e n c e o r reality to
it. It is t h e "intellectual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of spontaneity," t h e con-
sciousness of self as intelligence a n d act. A m o d e of awareness (not
"cognition" in t h e strict sense) a n d a m o d e of existence (not "intui-
t i o n " in t h e strict sense) a r e indicated. Obviously they d o n o t fall
clearly within t h e f r a m e w o r k of Kant's synthetic j u d g m e n t s , e m -
pirical o r a p r i o r i . K a n t refused to a d m i t t h a t any ontological
14

j u d g m e n t was possible h e r e , despite a n o v e r w h e l m i n g " n a t u r a l dia-

lectical" p r o p e n s i t y to m a k e j u s t such a j u d g m e n t . " [ T ] h e r e is n o t h -

308 The Critique of Judgment

i n g m o r e n a t u r a l a n d m o r e misleading t h a n t h e illusion which leads
us to r e g a r d t h e unity in t h e synthesis of t h o u g h t s as a perceived
unity in t h e subject of these t h o u g h t s . We m i g h t call it t h e s u b r e p -
tion of t h e hypostatised consciousness (apperceptionissubstantiae)." 15

K a n t insists u p o n t h e irreducible mystery of t h e origins of t h e

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t . Space a n d time, t h e n u m b e r a n d n a t u r e
16

of t h e categories, i n d e e d , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n
itself: all of t h e s e a r e given. W i t h o u t t h e m , e x p e r i e n c e as we know it
w o u l d n o t b e possible at all. T h i s givenness c a n n o t b e explained
empirically because it is logically p r i o r t o e x p e r i e n c e . It exerts n e -
cessity n o t only u p o n t h e subject b u t u p o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e , such
t h a t this a p p e a r a n c e can be conceived of as a n object. It is this
givenness which is t h e "synthetic" unity u p o n which all s u b s e q u e n t
analysis a n d exposition a r e g r o u n d e d . H e n c e it is unconditionally
valid. If it is b o t h universal a n d necessary, if it is a priori valid, it is
objective. It would seem to follow, t h e n , t h a t it is real. Yet K a n t
wished to reserve t h e n o t i o n of reality exclusively to empirical ref-
e r e n c e , to possible e x p e r i e n c e o r "actuality." I n themselves, a p a r t
from such e x p e r i e n c e , space, time, a n d t h e categories r e m a i n e d
merely "formal."
Kant's restriction of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n to i m p o t e n c e
in self-consciousness derived from his hostility to t h e n o t i o n of
"intellectual intuition" a n d t h e dialectical license which traditional
rationalism allowed itself o n t h e p r e m i s e of t h e c a n d o r of self-
awareness. K a n t was certainly correct in c h a l l e n g i n g t h e view, typi-
cal of Descartes a m o n g t h e m o d e r n s , that everything subjective was
t r a n s p a r e n t to self-consciousness. T h a t was perniciously false, b o t h
cognitively a n d morally. Cognitively, it gave license to all sorts of
dialectical fantasies. Morally, it d e l u d e d t h e subject as to his g r a s p of
his o w n motives. Kant's p r o b l e m was to articulate this insight, a n d
to discriminate b e t w e e n two sources of t h a t internal obscurity
the i n v o l u n t a r y s p o n t a n e i t y of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures of
consciousness a n d t h e involuntary passivity of m a n ' s physical
actualityyet to d o so in a way t h a t d i d n o t a n n u l utterly what cog-
nitive insight a n d m o r a l conscience did in fact exist in m a n ' s com-
plex e x p e r i e n c e .
It is n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear t h a t h e could d o t h e latter w i t h o u t
s o m e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e objective reality of reason, at t h e very least
as practical. C o n s e q u e n t l y , it is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o n s i d e r Kant's o b -
j e c t i o n s to t h e idea of a n "intellectual intuition." T h e best account
of w h a t K a n t m e a n t by intellectual intuition c a m e , as we have seen,
in 7677 of t h e Third Critique. B u t t h e idea was used extensively

The Unity of Man 309

in t h e First Critique, precisely in o r d e r to establish t h e discursiveness
of h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n t h a t context, K a n t associated his n o -
tion of intuition in g e n e r a l with u n q u e s t i o n a b l e givenness, with
immediacy, a n d with wholeness. K a n t held "intellectual intuition"
inaccessible t o m a n in that, first, only t h e sensible is indubitably ac-
tual for consciousness a n d second, t h a t t h e principles of the activity
of t h e h u m a n subject can only be logically d i s e m b e d d e d t h r o u g h a n
analysis of consciousness, h e n c e t h a t act is n o t cognitively i m m e d i -
ate in itself. Finally, t h e unity of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, while
logically indispensable, can n e v e r b e k n o w n a t least not in t e r m s
of a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t .
Yet K a n t s e e m e d to wish to distinguish "intellectual intuition"
not merely negatively as against these limitations of t h e discursive
(sensible) intuition of m a n , b u t positively in t e r m s of its originary or
creative capacity to t r a n s c e n d the distinction of actuality a n d possi-
bility so t h a t a n y t h i n g conceived by t h e intellectual intuition is
m a d e actual by that very c o n c e p t i o n . Most assuredly that is a
capacity b e y o n d t h e h u m a n m i n d . Yet if this capacity, which Kant
p r u d e n t l y restricts to a p r i m o r d i a l Creator, is only a most extrava-
g a n t form of intellectual intuition, a n d if, considering the o t h e r
p r o p e r t i e s , a n a r g u m e n t m i g h t b e m a d e t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e to con-
sciousness of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject does in fact have t h e
e l e m e n t s of individuality, givenness a n d immediacy which charac-
terize intuition, t h e n it m i g h t be possible to claim t h a t a n inferior
but crucial sense of intellectual intuition can b e ascribed to h u m a n s ,
a n d m o s t vividly so in t h e self-consciousness of t h e subject as mor-
ally active.
T h a t p r e s e n c e to consciousness would b e precisely t h e "fact of
p u r e r e a s o n . " Against Kant, b u t in strict conformity with his o w n
definitions, t h e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " would signify non-sensible in-
tuition. Moreover, t h e involuntary spontaneity which organizes
1 7

a n d s t r u c t u r e s consciouness with transcendentally necessary valid-

ity m i g h t be r e g a r d e d as yet a n o t h e r instance of this "fact of p u r e
r e a s o n . " T h e p h r a s e "fact of p u r e r e a s o n " in t h e Second Critique sig-
nified inescapable a n d ubiquitous necessity, p r i o r to a n d constitu-
tive of h u m a n consciousness of m o r a l obligation. Such compelling
force was real for Kant. If we conjecture a theoretical "fact of p u r e
r e a s o n " it is because it exerts a similarly c o m p e l l i n g force u p o n h u -
m a n consciousness. B o t h "facts of p u r e r e a s o n " are g r o u n d e d
within t h e subject, a n d yet c o m m a n d also in reference to objects.
B o t h g e s t u r e to t h e ontological p r e s e n c e of s o m e t h i n g without
which t h e empirical e x p e r i e n c e would be impossible.

310 The Critique of Judgment

 K a n t did occasionally, even in the First Critique, acknowledge
t h e p r o s p e c t of a n a p p e r c e p t i o n of t h e rational subject.

M a n , . . . w h o knows all the rest of n a t u r e solely t h r o u g h the

senses, knows himself also t h r o u g h p u r e [bloe] a p p e r c e p t i o n ;
a n d this, i n d e e d , in acts a n d i n n e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n s which h e
c a n n o t r e g a r d as impressions of t h e senses. H e is t h u s to him-
self . . . in respect of certain faculties the action of which can-
n o t b e ascribed to t h e receptivity of sensibility, a purely [blo]
intelligible object. We entitle these faculties u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a n d r e a s o n . T h e latter, in particular, . . . views its objects ex-
clusively [blo] in t h e light of i d e a s . 18

K a n t h e r e seems to a r g u e that t h e r e is real knowledge of the n o u -

m e n a l self n o t only practically (as t h e faculty of reason) b u t also
cognitively (as t h e faculty of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) . T h i s passage lends
s u p p o r t to t h e notions of spontaneity as the i m m a n e n t principle of
r e a s o n a n d of r e a s o n as a n objective r e a l i t y .19

T h e h e a r t of K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y is t h e idea of consciousness
of r e a s o n a s act. K a n t defined "spontaneity" as t h e p o w e r to p r o -
d u c e concepts o r to t h i n k w h e n h e first i n t r o d u c e d it at t h e outset of
t h e " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Logic," in contradistinction to t h e receptivity
of i n t u i t i o n . S p o n t a n e i t y is t h e decisive characteristic of reason as
20

such. It is identified with a n " a c t . " Spontaneity is responsible for

21

all acts of c o m b i n a t i o n , of s y n t h e s i s . It is, as act, p u r e a p p e r c e p -

22

t i o n . Moreover, it is identifed as "the g r o u n d of t h e threefold syn-

2 3

thesis which m u s t necessarily be f o u n d in all k n o w l e d g e . " 24

I n t h e " T h i r d A n t i n o m y , " Kant d e v e l o p e d the conception of

" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m " a n d e q u a t e d it with "absolute spontane-
ity." H e r e t u r n e d to this notion in explicating t h e cosmological a n -
25

t i n o m y : " r e a s o n creates for itself t h e idea of a spontaneity which

can begin to act of itself, without r e q u i r i n g to b e d e t e r m i n e d to ac-
tion by a n a n t e c e d e n t c a u s e . " Kant was only able fully to explicate
26

t h e m e a n i n g of spontaneity a n d of reason, insofar as it h a d as its

essence this i m m a n e n t d y n a m i s m , by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e notion of
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m . Kant suggested that r e a s o n could n o t b e
r e a d simply in t h e light of t h e cognitive aspect of h u m a n experi-
e n c e , b u t t h a t it h a d its g r o u n d r a t h e r in the practical.
Practical reason, K a n t believed, offered the best prospect of a
"correct e m p l o y m e n t of p u r e reason," i.e., a positive or "real" use.
I n t h e "Paralogisms" of t h e B-version, K a n t allowed t h e possibility
t h a t reason's s p o n t a n e i t y m i g h t b e determinately k n o w n b y prac-
tical r e a s o n . H e w r o t e :

The Unity of Man 311

 S h o u l d it b e g r a n t e d t h a t we may in d u e c o u r s e discover not in
e x p e r i e n c e b u t in certain laws of t h e p u r e e m p l o y m e n t of
r e a s o n l a w s which a r e n o t merely logical rules, b u t which
while h o l d i n g a priori also c o n c e r n o u r e x i s t e n c e g r o u n d for
r e g a r d i n g ourselves as legislating completely a priori in r e g a r d
to o u r o w n existence, a n d as d e t e r m i n i n g this existence, t h e r e
would t h e r e b y b e revealed a s p o n t a n e i t y t h r o u g h which o u r
reality would b e d e t e r m i n a b l e , i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the condi-
tions of empirical intuition. A n d we s h o u l d also b e c o m e aware
t h a t in t h e consciousness of o u r existence t h e r e is contained
a s o m e t h i n g a priori, which can serve to d e t e r m i n e o u r
e x i s t e n c e t h e c o m p l e t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of which is possible
only in sensible t e r m s a s b e i n g related, in respect of a cer-
tain i n n e r faculty, to a non-sensible intelligible w o r l d . 27

I n t h e crucial section of t h e First Critique called t h e " C a n o n of P u r e

Reason," K a n t w r o t e : "Reason is impelled by a t e n d e n c y of its na-
t u r e to g o o u t b e y o n d t h e field of its empirical e m p l o y m e n t , a n d to
v e n t u r e in a p u r e e m p l o y m e n t , by m e a n s of ideas alone, to t h e ut-
m o s t limits of all k n o w l e d g e , a n d n o t to be satisfied save t h r o u g h
t h e c o m p l e t i o n of its course in a self-subsistent systematic w h o l e . " 28

I n all his p h r a s e s r e g a r d i n g t h e i m m a n e n t propensities of r e a s o n

" n e e d s , " "interests," "vocations," " e n d s " K a n t implied, w h e t h e r
h e wished to d e f e n d it or not, a conception of r e a s o n n o t as a m e r e
"logical" form for empirical agents, b u t as a real force d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e m as it d e t e r m i n e d t h e " n a t u r e " of their subjective e x p e r i e n c e .
29

The Primacy of Practical Reason

H u m a n consciousness is n o t exclusively, i n d e e d n o t even primarily

cognitive. It is active or p r a c t i c a l . In Kant's own words, "in t h e e n d
30

all t h e o p e r a t i o n s of o u r faculties m u s t issue in t h e practical a n d

u n i t e in it as t h e i r g o a l . " T h i s principle K a n t t e r m e d the "primacy
31

of practical r e a s o n . " By " p r i m a c y " h e m e a n t " t h e p r e r o g r a t i v e of

o n e [thing] by virtue of which it is the p r i m e g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a -
tion of t h e c o m b i n a t i o n with t h e o t h e r s . " It was in t e r m s of t h e
32

unity of r e a s o n t h a t t h e practical h a d primacy. "It is only o n e a n d

t h e s a m e r e a s o n which j u d g e s a priori by principles, w h e t h e r for
theoretical o r for practical p u r p o s e s . " K a n t a r g u e d that r e a s o n
33

h a d its o w n "interests," a n d t h a t within r e a s o n each of its p r e e m i -

n e n t u s e s c o g n i t i o n a n d volitionhad interests. T h e question of
primacy h a d to d o with t h e relation of those interests. T h e very con-

312 The Critique of Judgment

cept of interest, K a n t realized, was practical in its ultimate sense,
a n d t h e r e f o r e "every interest is ultimately practical, even that of
speculative r e a s o n . " 34

T h e p r o b l e m was w h e t h e r theoretical reason s h o u l d tolerate

t h e postulation of t h e reality of ideas of reason which practical rea-
son r e q u i r e d for t h e p u r s u i t of its interests. If reason could n o t rec-
ognize a n y t h i n g b e y o n d what cognition could establish as valid
k n o w l e d g e , t h e n crucial interests of practical r e a s o n would be
t h w a r t e d . B u t K a n t h a d already d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t theoretical rea-
son was free to think a n y t h i n g n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , a n d t h e r e f o r e
could recognize t h e possibility of t h e ideas which practical reason
r e q u i r e d . F u r t h e r , t h e a n t i n o m i e s h a d s h o w n that t h e positing of
these ideas, h o w e v e r i n d e t e r m i n a t e for cognition, was absolutely
necessary for t h e internal functioning of cognitive r e a s o n itself.
T h u s , subjectively, these ideas were necessary. Practical reason
claimed a n objective, i.e., ontological status for o n e of these ideas,
that of f r e e d o m , a n d a postulated reality of o t h e r s for t h e sake of
this f r e e d o m . T h e "primacy of practical reason," for Kant, m e a n t
t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e interest of practical r e a s o n in d e m a n d i n g t h a t
theoretical r e a s o n abide by this in their unity.
T h i s idea of t h e primacy of practical reason is controversial. Its
critics a r e certainly correct in p o i n t i n g o u t that K a n t could n o t
m e a n by it t h a t cognitive r e a s o n s h o u l d accept s o m e t h i n g clearly
i n c o n g r u o u s with its o w n p r i n c i p l e s . Practical r e a s o n could n o t
35

r e q u i r e cognition to accept t h e validity of two contradictory asser-

tions, for e x a m p l e . T h e "methodological" primacy of practical rea-
son is a m y t h . But, as Beck points o u t , practical reason does n o t
3 6

m a k e such d e m a n d s . It p r o p o s e s to take possession of a r e a l m for

3 7

which cognitive r e a s o n has already established itself incapable of

prescribing constitutive rules, b u t which it has also d e s i g n a t e d as a
territory of vital interest to its o w n intrinsic f u n c t i o n i n g . 38

T h i s discreet formulation is n o t yet clear e n o u g h . W h a t t h e pri-

macy of practical r e a s o n m e a n s is t h e claim to objective reality, i.e.,
to ontological status, for r e a s o n itself. Reason's ultimate concept for
itself is f r e e d o m , which is t h e metaphysical principle which inte-
grates s p o n t a n e i t y a n d a u t o n o m y . It was only w h e n Kant advanced
from t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m as s p o n t a n e i t y w h a t Beck t e r m s
"negative f r e e d o m " a n d K a n t " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m " t o t h e
c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m as a u t o n o m y , a step h e took a r o u n d 1785, that
K a n t could m a k e a n y a d v a n c e o n t h e metaphysical c o n u n d r u m of
t h e reality of r e a s o n from t h e v a n t a g e of a finite rational b e i n g . 39

K a n t c a m e to recognize that in o n e crucial s p h e r e t h e subject

The Unity of Man 313

participated voluntarily in his spontaneity a n d was t h u s raised into
the s p h e r e of p u r e r e a s o n : a u t o n o m y , "practical self-legislation."
With a u t o n o m y Kant h a d a c o n c e p t of freedom a d e q u a t e to t h e
dignity of a rational subject. While t h e finite rational subject partici-
p a t e d in p u r e r e a s o n , at t h e constitutive level t h a t participation h a d
s e e m e d to K a n t p u r e l y a u t o m a t i c a n d mechanical, h e n c e from
t h e individual-empirical v a n t a g e , passive. Cognitively, p u r e reason
acted as a n involuntary spontaneity constituting sensible intuition
into empirical k n o w l e d g e . Morally, p u r e reason acted as com-
pulsory obligation m a k i n g constitutive rules for practical action in
t h e world of sense. Insofar as spontaneity was involuntary, it could
n e v e r be t h e empirical subject's own. B u t K a n t recognized that
m e r e passivity was n e i t h e r an accurate depiction of empirical m a n ' s
m o r a l (or e v e n cognitive) e x p e r i e n c e n o r f a r m o r e crucially
consistent with t h e m o d e l of reason's actualization. H e n c e h e
stressed m a n ' s cognitive capacity to l e a r n t o discover a n d to
i n v e n t b u t even m o r e , m a n ' s practical self-legislation: a u t o n o m y .
T h e r e w e r e two sides to this innovation in his t h o u g h t . O n t h e
o n e h a n d , K a n t h a d to loosen t h e d e t e r m i n a c y of t h e u n d e r s t a n d -
ing in cognition of t h e empirical to m a k e possible t h e active p u r s u i t
of k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h j u d g m e n t . O n t h e other, Kant h a d to ac-
k n o w l e d g e t h e m o r a l f r e e d o m of the empirical will in o r d e r to vin-
dicate t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e rational will as accessible even to a finite
rational b e i n g . As rational, h u m a n n a t u r e could ascribe to itself a
f r e e d o m of self-determination a n d a capacity to modify reality in
a c c o r d a n c e with t h a t f r e e d o m . T h u s concrete m a n could partici-
p a t e in t h e r e a s o n which d e t e r m i n e d t h e laws of his action a n d in
t h e constitution of those laws.
K a n t ultimately f o u n d a way to assert t h e "objective reality" of
f r e e d o m t h r o u g h his ethical philosophy, his "metaphysics of morals."
K a n t claimed that m a n was a n "end-in-himself." A u t o n o m y posited
q u i t e unequivocally a rational being. K a n t r e q u i r e d a concept
t h r o u g h which to articulate this problematic ontological c h a r a c t e r
of r e a s o n . H e f o u n d it in the idea of "objective e n d [ p u r p o s e ] . " T h e
essential c o n n e c t i o n was between practical reason a n d "intrinsic
p u r p o s i v e n e s s . " All a l o n g this study has a r g u e d for t h e centrality of
t h e l a n g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . While t h e l a n g u a g e of system is rea-
son's l a n g u a g e of self-consciousness as formal or logical, reason's
self-consciousness as effective o r real finds articulation in the lan-
g u a g e of p u r p o s i v e n e s s . T h e s e notions w e r e at t h e o u t e r m o s t
e x t r e m e of Kant's consideration in the First Critique, but, as o u r
whole study has established, they b e c a m e central for t h e Third

314 The Critique ofJudgment

Critique. Objective purposiveness b e t o k e n e d t h e single most cru-
cial metaphysical idea of I m m a n u e l Kant: reason as a u t o n o m y , as
freedom.
P u r p o s e is a l a n g u a g e of r e a s o n . It is in fact a l a n g u a g e ex-
clusively a n d natively rational: n o t for t h e d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g m e n t of
p h e n o m e n a , b u t for reason's internal process, most importantly its
practical r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h u s the decisive e l e m e n t K a n t i n t r o d u c e d
into his discussion of t h e "unity of reason" was the idea of p u r -
posiveness. " T h i s highest formal unity, which rests solely o n con-
cepts of r e a s o n , is t h e purposive unity of t h i n g s . " A few pages later
40

K a n t a d d e d : " C o m p l e t e p u r p o s i v e unity constitutes what is, in t h e

absolute sense, p e r f e c t i o n . " Absicht, or intention, is a m a t t e r ex-
41

clusively of rational beings. Objects of desire, however, are actual

for all a n i m a l life forms. T h i s desire can be i m p u t e d to t h e m as a
necessary trait or drive [Trieb], b u t its o p e r a t i o n is merely in-
stinctual, not rational, i.e., n o t p u r p o s e f u l but purposive. T h a t was
t h e whole t h r u s t of Kant's a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g so-called " n a t u r a l
p u r p o s e s . " T h e i r "intrinsic p u r p o s i v e n e s s " was i m p u t e d to t h e m
o n analogy to rational p u r p o s e . B u t with m a n himself we a r e n o
l o n g e r in t h e d o m a i n of analogy. M a n is intentional (absichtlich). H e
is p u r p o s e f u l , i.e., a n intelligent c a u s e . H e is a n end-in-himself.
42

K a n t believed t h a t the involuntary spontaneity b e h i n d cogni-

tion a n d t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l f r e e d o m b e h i n d choice were identical:
they were t h e n o u m e n a l h u m a n soul. But h e q u e s t i o n e d w h e t h e r it
was possible to p r o v e this, a n d h e also questioned w h e t h e r it was
wise to d o s o . T h e first scruple was epistemological. T h e second
4 3

was religious. T o d i s r e g a r d the first scruple would t h r e a t e n t h e

principle of t h e discursiveness of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T o disregard
t h e second scruple would t h r e a t e n t h e idea of m o r a l freedom.
O n l y t h e preservation of his distinction between t h e p h e n o m e n a l
a n d t h e n o u m e n a l could avoid t h e s e t h r e a t s , h e a r g u e d .4 4

T h i s t e n s i o n between belief a n d p r o o f was of t h e essence of his

n o t i o n of Vernunftglaube, rational belief. H e held that by limiting
t h e scope of r e a s o n h e m a d e r o o m for faith, a n d in that m e a s u r e
took n o t h i n g away from c o m m o n h u m a n i t y b u t only d e m o l i s h e d
t h e m o n o p o l y of t h e s c h o o l s . At t h e same time, h e was anxious to
45

d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t belief in G o d , f r e e d o m , a n d immortality could be

s h o w n to be rational according to t h e critical philosophy. Religion
within t h e limits of reason is b u t o n e half of Kant's g u i d i n g prin-
ciple, for it would a p p e a r t h a t p r u d e n c e r e q u i r e d r e a s o n within the
limits of religion as w e l l . 46

T h e idealism of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in n a t u r e as a whole tallied well

The Unity of Man 315

with Kant's critical project of clearing a space for faith by d e n y i n g
d e t e r m i n a t e capacities to r e a s o n in t h e s p h e r e of t h e supersensible.
K a n t wished only to establish t h e possibility of i m m a n e n t p u r p o s e ,
t h e subjective necessity of its p r e s u m p t i o n , b u t n o m o r e . If it were
possible to p r o m o t e this subjective possibility into a n objective actu-
ality, t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s would b e very serious for his whole system.
T h e possibility of p u r p o s e in t h e world of n a t u r e was necessary to
a c c o m m o d a t e h u m a n ethical action, b u t it was n o t necessary to se-
c u r e t h e validity of aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e . Conversely, t h e actuality
of p u r p o s e in n a t u r e would destroy aesthetic f r e e d o m , a n d h e n c e
t h e whole possibility of beauty, by m a k i n g it c o n t i n g e n t u p o n na-
t u r e . Even m o r e profoundly, it w o u l d t h r e a t e n h u m a n m o r a l free-
d o m , by m a k i n g n a t u r e as a n o u m e n a l force immediately real to
o u r consciousness. Such immediacy before the m i g h t of God, K a n t
believed, would destroy the i n d e p e n d e n c e h u m a n beings n e e d e d
to b e authentically m o r a l . T h u s , crucially, t h e metaphysical sur-
4 7

vival of b o t h b e a u t y a n d morality h i n g e d u p o n t h e denial of t h e ob-

jectivity of p u r p o s i v e n e s s in n a t u r e .

Man As an End-in-Himself

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l principle of Kant's metaphysics of morals is t h e

idea of m a n as a n end-in-himself, i.e., t h e objective reality of free-
d o m . B u t K a n t r e m a i n s epistemologically s c r u p u l o u s to claim
4 8

t h a t we c a n n o t know such a reality, because it is n o u m e n a l . We

c a n i n d e e d we m u s t t h i n k it, a n d practically we can infer its ob-
jective reality from o u r e x p e r i e n c e of necessary law. Still, Kant
w a r n s against t h e "mysticism of practical r e a s o n " which "makes
into a s c h e m a t h a t which s h o u l d serve only as a s y m b o l . " Kant's
49

o w n u s a g e of "objective reality" for practical reason, however, is n o t

too far r e m o v e d from t h e very practice h e chastises, b u t for a bit
m o r e discretion, a n d it is clear t h a t h e is n o t too hostile to such
"mysticism." Still, h e cloaks himself in t h e full rigor of "criticism"
a n d consequently, in his m o s t extensive discussion of m a n as a n
end-in-himself, in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n r a t h e r circumspectly, in a hypothetical vein:
" S u p p o s e t h a t t h e r e were s o m e t h i n g whose existence has in itself
a n absolute w o r t h , s o m e t h i n g which as a n e n d in itself could be a
g r o u n d of d e t e r m i n a t e l a w . " T h i s sentence r e q u i r e s the most
50

careful analysis. F o r K a n t t h e only t h i n g whose existence can have

a n absolute w o r t h is a n end-in-itself. T h a t is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n -

316 The Critique of Judgment

ciple of t h e a p p o s i t i o n . Each clause contributes distinctive e l e m e n t s
to Kant's c o n c e p t i o n which only c o m e clear o n t h e basis of subse-
quent comments.
O n l y a n intrinsic p u r p o s e can g r o u n d all e x t e r n a l p u r p o s e s ,
a n d t h e r e f o r e all purposiveness is g r o u n d e d in this capacity a n d d e -
rives its possibility a n d value from it. A n end-in-itself, Kant tells us,
is a n "objective e n d [ p u r p o s e ] " t h a t is, it exists as the capacity to
assign w o r t h , a n d , as t h e only such capacity in t h e world, it pos-
sesses "absolute" w o r t h . T h e capacity to assign worth is t h e
51

capacity to h a v e intentions, Absichten. T h a t capacity is autonomy:

t h e power, which is exclusively reason's, of legislating for itself
( " g r o u n d i n g d e t e r m i n a t e law"). A " p e r s o n " (an objective e n d in t h e
m o r a l context) has "dignity" (absolute worth in t h e m o r a l context)
by virtue strictly of the rationality which is the g r o u n d a n d also t h e
principle of one's capacity for choice, one's n a t u r e as a p u r p o s e -
m a k e r , a n end-in-itself. Reason alone has absolute w o r t h . Reason
52

a l o n e provides t h e " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of law" according to which p u r -

pose is possible. B u t most importantly, r e a s o n alone is t h e real
g r o u n d for w o r t h , p u r p o s e , a n d principle.
" T h e g r o u n d of all practical legislation lies objectively in t h e
rules a n d in t h e form of universality, which . . . makes t h e rule ca-
pable of b e i n g a law . . . Subjectively, however, t h e g r o u n d of all
practical legislation lies in the e n d [ p u r p o s e ] ; b u t . . . t h e subject of
all e n d s [purposes] is every rational b e i n g as a n e n d in h i m s e l f . " 53

K a n t is m a k i n g t h e usual moves with t h e t e r m s "objective" a n d

"subjective" h e r e . By "objective" h e refers to validity a n d form, b u t
t h e issue is w h e t h e r K a n t is entitled to call t h e reality in this situa-
tion m e r e l y subjective. It is n o t t h e sensible subject which is at stake
h e r e b u t "every rational b e i n g as a n e n d in himself."
Kant's metaphysics of morals r e q u i r e s that t h e r e be rational, es-
sential being. "Rational n a t u r e is distinguished from t h e rest of na-
t u r e by t h e fact that it sets itself a n e n d . . . t h e e n d m u s t h e r e b e
conceived, n o t as a n e n d to be effected, b u t as a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y
existing e n d . " T h a t is, it is possible for rationality to d e t e r m i n e
5 4

t h e will as a formal principle only if it is real as a prior g r o u n d . A u -

t o n o m y g r o u n d s rational choice. Reason is at o n e a n d t h e s a m e
time real a n d legislative. "Rational n a t u r e exists as a n e n d in itself."
Moreover, t h e r e a s o n which g r o u n d s a n d d e t e r m i n e s legislatively
t h e p u r p o s i v e action of any rational being is t h e same for every ra-
tional being. Self-recognition of t h e "objective principle of t h e will"
o r t h e " m o r a l law" m u s t lead o n e to recognize at the s a m e time

The Unity of Man 317

"what is necessarily a n e n d for everyone," t h e " g r o u n d of such a
principle," i.e., s h a r e d r e a s o n . If t h e r e are rational beings, a n d
5 5

my o w n self-conception as an end-in-myself could have n o o t h e r

basis, t h e n n o t only I b u t every rational being, simply by virtue of
rationality, m u s t also b e a n e n d in itself. 56

T h a t is why t h e recognition of oneself as a n end-in-itself, i.e.,

t h e recognition of one's o w n capacity to have intentions, in a n d of
itself b i n d s o n e to t h e c o m m u n i t y of all ends-in-themselves. Man, as
a finite rational being, recognizes t h e capacity to choose in himself,
i.e., recognizes his own rationality "as legislating for itself a n d only
o n this a c c o u n t as b e i n g subject to t h e l a w . " B u t t h a t immediately
57

entails his recognition that s h o u l d any o t h e r rational beings exist,

they too w o u l d necessarily enjoy t h e same status. H e n c e Kant's n o -
tion of "a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a k i n g d o m
of e n d s " i . e . , a c o m m u n i t y n o t of objects of will but of wills: "a
systematic u n i o n of rational beings t h r o u g h c o m m o n objective
l a w s . " T h e law is c o m m o n n o t only "because [it is] legislation be-
58

l o n g i n g to all p e r s o n s as m e m b e r s " b u t also because o n e a n d the

s a m e r e a s o n is involved, as g r o u n d a n d as p r i n c i p l e . T h e m e m -
59

b e r s h i p in a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " which derives from s h a r e d ration-

ality is the key point we m u s t harvest at once. "A rational being m u s t
always r e g a r d himself as legislator in a k i n g d o m of e n d s r e n d e r e d
possible by f r e e d o m of t h e w i l l . " A u t o n o m y a n d spontaneity, as
60

t h e essential e l e m e n t s of r e a s o n , constitute f r e e d o m of the will.

In t h e "Dialectic of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " Kant went at
length into t h e hypothetical c h a r a c t e r of a n intellectus archetypus as a
cognitive m o d e l of p u r e rationality. I n the Grounding of the Meta-
physics of Morals Kant d e v e l o p e d t h e n o t i o n of a "holy will" to
characterize a practical m o d e l of p u r e rationality. I n a holy will, t h e
i m m a n e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e a s o n are automatically, s p o n t a n e -
ously a c t u a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o g a p between is a n d o u g h t , n o labor
61

to b e u n d e r t a k e n , n o external p u r p o s e as m e a n s or as e n d (result) to
b e distinguished from t h e i m m a n e n t self-sufficiency of t h e holy will
itself. S u c h a holy will K a n t also t e r m e d a "sovereign" in t h e "king-
d o m of e n d s . " N o w this sovereignty could not involve t h e d o m i n a -
tion over a n y o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e k i n g d o m , for to treat t h e m as
m e a n s a n d n o t e n d s is forbidden even to a holy will, t h o u g h it would
n e v e r be t e m p t e d to violate this principle. H e n c e t h e idea of sov-
ereignty suggests a new c o n c e p t i o n of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " Sov-
ereignty lies n o t in t h e relation of t h e holy will to o t h e r rational
wills, w h o m it may n o t c o m m a n d , b u t in relation to the objects of all

318 The Critique of Judgment

wills. A "sovereign" will immediately actualizes all its objects. All
nonintuitive, n o n h o l y intelligences n e e d to labor to realize or actu-
alize t h e specific e n d s (results) they have chosen according to their
intentions (motives). T h i s set of results, w h e n i n c l u d e d with the "in-
d e p e n d e n t l y existing e n d s , " results in a second, e x p a n d e d notion of
t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s . " Kant wrote that it was "possible to think of a
whole of all e n d s in systematic connection (a whole of both rational
beings as e n d s in themselves a n d also of the particular e n d s which
each may set for h i m s e l f ) . " 62

Let us be clear a b o u t o u r result so far. M a n as a rational b e i n g

possesses autonomy, t h e capacity to legislate his o w n freedom. As
such h e belongs to the c o m m u n i t y of all such legislators, the "king-
d o m of e n d s " in its first, clear a n d unequivocal sense of a com-
m u n i t y of wills, in which all, by virtue of their c o m m o n reason,
stand as ends-in-themselves in relation to o n e a n o t h e r . B u t since
n o t all rational wills are pure rational wills, i.e., not every intelli-
gence is a n intellectus archetypus a n d n o t every will is a holy will, t h e
intentions which these imperfect, finite legislators r e q u i r e m u s t be
actualized by exertion in t h e world of sense. T h a t occasions uncer-
tainty. Moreover, as finite, these legislators also find themselves
s a d d l e d " b u r d e n e d " is Kant's p r e f e r e d t e r m w i t h actual needs.
Since m e m b e r s h i p in the k i n g d o m of e n d s p r e c l u d e s exploiting
o t h e r s as m e a n s merely a n d since t h e prospect of actualizing one's
legislations m u s t be c o n t i n g e n t u p o n their toleration a n d may be
c o n t i n g e n t o n their assistance, t h a t occasions some risk. B u t if any
goal can b e actualized, any result achieved within these b i n d i n g
constraints, t h a t result belongs, as well, within t h e " k i n g d o m of
e n d s . " T h e latter now becomes a n e x p a n d e d concept: n o t merely a
c o m m u n i t y of wills b u t this c o m m u n i t y t o g e t h e r with all its legiti-
mate achievements.
T h i s e x p a n d e d c o n c e p t of a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " was a n "intelli-
gible world," a " m o r a l world" which Kant called t h e "highest
g o o d . " As such, K a n t m a i n t a i n e d in t h e Grounding of the Meta-
6 3

physics of Morals, it was "certainly only a n i d e a l . " T h e point is, this

64

would be t h e world were t h e rational agents in t h e " k i n g d o m of

e n d s " capable of the powers of actualization of a n intellectus arche-
typus. T h e issue t h a t r e m a i n s is: given t h e limitations of h u m a n na-
t u r e ("finitude"), what becomes of t h e notion of this e x p a n d e d
" k i n g d o m of ends"? B u t t h a t is n o l o n g e r a question of p u r e ration-
ality. T h a t is a question of m a n in his full complexity as sensual as
well as rational. T h a t is a q u e s t i o n of being-in-the-world.

The Unity of Man 319

The "Kingdom of Ends" As the "Ectypal World"

T h e crucial question for a finite rational b e i n g is how to conceive it

possible to act as a legislator in t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " which is its
rational right, w h e n it finds itself, as its n a t u r a l condition, in a world
of sense g o v e r n e d by n a t u r a l laws. T h e p r o b l e m is o n e of t h e t r a n -
scendental applicability of t h e p u r e law of practical r e a s o n in t h e
c o n c r e t e case of a finite rational being. "A k i n g d o m of e n d s is pos-
sible only o n t h e analogy of a k i n g d o m of n a t u r e , " K a n t w r o t e . 65

T h a t is t h e p r o b l e m of "practical j u d g m e n t . " I n analogy to the First

Critique, we may t e r m it t h e p r o b l e m of " s c h e m a t i s m " K a n t ' s dis-
cussion of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics
of Morals b e c o m e s a discussion of t h e "typic of practical j u d g m e n t "
in t h e Critique of Practical Reason.
T h a t transition is m a d e m o r e intelligible by his discussion of
"ectypal n a t u r e " earlier in t h e "Analytic." Kant i n t r o d u c e d t h e n o -
tion of "ectypal n a t u r e " in a discussion of t h e possibility of a t r a n -
scendental d e d u c t i o n of p u r e practical r e a s o n . T h e question, in
66

analogy to t h a t of t h e First Critique, is w h a t w a r r a n t p u r e reason may

have to legislate over given actuality. B u t t h e situation is by n o
m e a n s so strained as in t h e First Critique, for while t h e r e t h e radical
alienness of m a t t e r given in sensation ("actuality without validity")
c o n f r o n t e d p u r e r e a s o n , h e r e it is instead " n a t u r e " as p h e n o m e n a
o r d e r e d a n d constituted by r e a s o n cognitively according to law.
While a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " r e q u i r e s the law of f r e e d o m , t h e king-
d o m of n a t u r e is b o u n d by mechanical laws of causality; n e v e r t h e -
less, t h e feature they s h a r e is precisely lawfulness, t h e authority of
r e a s o n . It is, t h e n , simply a m a t t e r of finding a m o d e of r e a d i n g t h e
lawfulness of o n e sort into t h e lawfulness of t h e o t h e r .
Already in t h e Grounding, K a n t recognized t h e striking con-
v e r g e n c e of m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d teleological j u d g m e n t in this con-
text: "Teleology considers n a t u r e as a k i n g d o m of e n d s ; morals
r e g a r d s a possible k i n g d o m of e n d s as a k i n g d o m of n a t u r e . In t h e
f o r m e r t h e k i n g d o m of e n d s is a theoretical idea for e x p l a i n i n g
w h a t exists. I n t h e latter it is a practical idea for b r i n g i n g a b o u t w h a t
d o e s n o t exist b u t can b e m a d e actual by o u r c o n d u c t , i.e., what can
b e actualized in a c c o r d a n c e with this very i d e a . " We have con-
67

sidered t h e q u e s t i o n of teleology as a n e x a m i n a t i o n of n a t u r a l p u r -
pose. W h a t we m u s t n o w see is h o w it serves as a vehicle for
c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e c o m p l e x "schematization" of practical reason.
Morality conceives of a world t h a t does n o t yet exist in n a t u r e
a n d seeks to actualize it by acting in t h e given world according to

320 The Critique of Judgment

t h e laws of t h e possible o n e . " T h i s [moral] law gives to t h e sensible
world, as s e n s u o u s n a t u r e (as this concerns rational beings), the
form of a n intelligible world, i.e., t h e form of s u p e r s e n s u o u s n a -
t u r e , w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e f o r m e r . " 68

T h e p r e s u m p t i o n is t h a t t h e n a t u r a l world can a c c o m m o d a t e this at

least in s o m e m e a s u r e . T h a t is j u s t w h a t is at stake in t h e discussion
of "ectypal n a t u r e . " T h e idea of a " s u p e r s e n s u o u s n a t u r e " refers
back to t h e mundus intelligibilis of t h e First Critique a n d to the "moral
world" as a " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e e x p a n d e d sense in t h e Ground-
ing. It is t h e world as n o u m e n a l , which is not accessible to h u m a n
cognition. B u t it is also conceivable in t e r m s of a shift in optics from
w h a t is to w h a t o u g h t to be. Reason, even finite h u m a n reason, can
readily e n o u g h conceive of a j u s t world, even in its absence. For
Kant, such a j u s t world would d r a w its material from t h e n a t u r a l
world, b u t it would be f o r m e d by t h e ideal, m o r a l world: " s u p e r s e n -
suous n a t u r e , so far as we can form a concept of it, is n o t h i n g else
t h a n n a t u r e u n d e r the a u t o n o m y of p u r e practical reason. T h e law
of this a u t o n o m y is t h e m o r a l law, a n d it, t h e r e f o r e , is t h e funda-
m e n t a l law of supersensible n a t u r e a n d of a p u r e world of the u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h i s is natura archetypa, t h e world we can know only
69

by r e a s o n , a n intelligible world. B u t its " c o u n t e r p a r t m u s t exist in

t h e world of sense without interfering with the laws of t h e l a t t e r . . .
[this] could b e called t h e ectypal world (natura ectypa), because it
contains t h e possible effects of t h e idea of t h e f o r m e r [natural arche-
typa] as t h e d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d of t h e w i l l . " I n t h e "Typic," K a n t
70

picks u p this very a r g u m e n t : "we a r e t h e r e f o r e allowed to use t h e

n a t u r e of t h e s e n s u o u s world as t h e type of a n intelligible n a t u r e . " 7 1

I n t h e "Typic" Kant offered a careful t r a n s c e n d e n t a l justifica-

tion of this p r o c e e d i n g . T h e p r o b l e m of t h e "Typic" was p a r t of t h e
g e n e r a l p r o b l e m of "hypotyposis"of finding in t h e world of sen-
sible intuition correlates for t h e concepts of r e a s o n . I n t h e s p h e r e
72

of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sensible intuition, t h e hypotyposis o c c u r r e d

t h r o u g h s c h e m a t i s m in a d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t , a n d t h e result was
n a t u r a l law a n d n a t u r e as existence (actuality) u n d e r this law. In the
case of t h e p u r e ideas of reason, t h e p r o b l e m of t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n
(Darstellung) was e x t r e m e , a n d K a n t clarified it only in his theory of
symbolism in t h e Third Critique. B u t in t h e case of applied ideas of
r e a s o n , i.e., m o r a l j u d g m e n t s as imperatives, t h e hypotyposis was
a c c o m p l i s h e d by t h e m e d i a t i o n of a postulated law of n a t u r e . As
K a n t p u t it, " n a t u r a l law serves only as the type of a law of free-
d o m . " Because n a t u r e is lawful cognitively (for t h e u n d e r s t a n d -
7 3

ing), " r e a s o n has a right, a n d is e v e n compelled, to use n a t u r e (in its

The Unity of Man 321

p u r e intellible form) as t h e type of j u d g m e n t . " T h e w a r r a n t or
7 4

right lies in lawfulness as such, t h e m a r k of r e a s o n in general: "laws

as such a r e all equivalent [as rational], regardless of w h e n c e [which
faculty] they derive their d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d s . " 7 5

B u t having established how it was possible did not of itself es-

tablish that it was completely actual or even t h a t it would be com-
pletely actualized. T o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e was a n obligation to
actualize this ideal world, s o m e serious p r o b l e m s arose, in Kant's
view. Kant's " k i n g d o m of e n d s , " in its e x p a n d e d sense, entailed t h e
actualization of t h e "highest g o o d . " "For, in fact, t h e m o r a l law ide-
ally transfers us into a n a t u r e in which reason would b r i n g forth the
highest g o o d w e r e it a c c o m p a n i e d by sufficient physical capacities;
a n d it d e t e r m i n e s o u r will to i m p a r t to t h e s e n s u o u s world the form
of a system of rational b e i n g s . " We m u s t p l u n g e , at last, into the
76

controversy over t h e n a t u r e a n d necessity of Kant's n o t i o n of the

"highest good."

322 The Critique ofJudgment

 Seventeen

T H E UNITY OF MANKIND:
T H E HIGHEST GOOD,
HISTORY, AND RELIGION

T
h e viability of m a n ' s m o r a l p u r p o s e in t h e world of sense
is, as I have a r g u e d , t h e most salient t h e m e of Kant's Third
Critique in its final form. H e e n u n c i a t e d this t h e m e in ii of
t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n . H e closed the work with it in t h e "Meth-
odology of Teleological J u d g m e n t " in t h e discussion of "moral tele-
ology." T h e issue for " m o r a l teleology" is t h e reconciliation of
1

n a t u r e as it is with n a t u r e as it o u g h t to be if we a r e to be effective
free a g e n t s : "[M]oral teleology concerns us as beings of t h e world,
a n d t h e r e f o r e as beings b o u n d u p with o t h e r things in the w o r l d . . .
[and] has to d o with the r e f e r e n c e of o u r o w n causality to p u r -
poses a n d even to a final p u r p o s e t h a t we m u s t aim at in t h e world
. . . a n d t h e e x t e r n a l possibility of its a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . " T h e m o r a l
2

law which is t h e g r o u n d of o u r f r e e d o m c o m m a n d s t h a t f r e e d o m
act in t h e world to realize justice. "Moral teleology" involves the
p r o b l e m of t h a t realization, t h e highly controversial idea of the
"highest g o o d " in Kant's e t h i c s . I n t h e preface to Religion Within the
3

Limits of Reason Alone h e stated it with great clarity:

It c a n n o t b e a m a t t e r of u n c o n c e r n to morality as to w h e t h e r
o r n o t it forms for itself the c o n c e p t of a final e n d of all things
( h a r m o n y with which, while not multiplying m e n ' s duties, yet
provides t h e m with a special point of focus for the unification
of all e n d s ) ; for only t h e r e b y can objective, practical reality b e
given to t h e u n i o n of t h e purposiveness arising from f r e e d o m
with t h e purposiveness of n a t u r e , a u n i o n with which we can-
n o t possibly d i s p e n s e . 4

As J o h n Silber notes, Kant claimed reason's task was to achieve t h e

unity of t h e g o o d . T o d o so K a n t n e e d e d to e x t e n d his analysis of
5

ethics from m a n as a merely rational b e i n g to m a n as a rational a n d

323
a sensible b e i n g at o n c e . G r a n t e d t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e good,
i.e., two forms of t h e g o o d which m a n m u s t recognize a n d integrate
into his practice as a finite rational being, t h e n t h e idea of t h e "high-
est g o o d " as " i m m a n e n t " b e c o m e s intelligible within Kant's m o r a l
p h i l o s o p h y . T h e "schematization" of t h e m o r a l law in actuality can
6

b e rationally r e c o g n i z e d by t h e subject as t h e project of p r o m o t i n g

t h e highest g o o d in t h e w o r l d . I n this way Kant in Religion, for ex-
7

a m p l e , writes of " t h e synthetic e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e concept of t h e

law t a k i n g place t h r o u g h [reference to] t h e n a t u r a l character of
m a n as a b e i n g of n e e d s w h o c a n n o t be indifferent to t h e results of
his a c t i o n s . "8

O n a c o h e r e n t r e a d i n g , K a n t never i n t e n d e d to claim that t h e

h i g h e s t g o o d constituted t h e d u t y i m p o s e d by t h e m o r a l law, b u t only
t h a t it specified it in actuality, a n d t h a t as a m o r a l ideal it could b e
k n o w n a priori. K a n t r e q u i r e s t h e "schematization," i.e., actual a p -
plication of p u r e m o r a l law in t h e world of sense by a finite rational
b e i n g with objective n e e d s . T h e r e f o r e h e conceives of " e n d s (re-
sults) which a r e duties," a n d f u r t h e r of t h e entire set of such e n d s
for each individual a n d for m a n k i n d as a w h o l e a s a " k i n g d o m of
e n d s " a n d as a "highest g o o d . " Beck writes t h a t "the m o r a l will m u s t
have a n object as well as a form, a n d , because of t h e finite a n d sen-
sible n a t u r e of m a n , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e possiblity of t h e highest
g o o d is necessary to the m o r a l disposition, b u t n o t to t h e definition
of d u t y . " Still, Beck rejects this a r g u m e n t as " h e t e r o n o m y , " the sul-
9

lying of p u r e m o r a l will with "all-too-human" e n d s . It is h a r d to see

how Beck can u p h o l d his position without a r r o g a t i n g t h e good e n -
tirely to t h e p u r e will. T h a t r e d u c e s K a n t to Stoicism, which h e
could n e v e r have accepted. Moreover, t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of t h e
g o o d is g r o u n d e d in t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y of h u m a n n a t u r e . Man's
m i x e d n a t u r e i n t r u d e s equally in t h e discursiveness of cognition.
Beck d o e s n o t by that t o k e n d e n y t h e efficacy of p u r e reason in ac-
tual h u m a n cognition. T h a t m a n is n o t a n intellectus archetypus is in-
d e e d a pity, b u t it d o e s n o t p r e v e n t h i m from m a k i n g actual
cognitive j u d g m e n t s in which p u r e r e a s o n constitutes (legislatively
d e t e r m i n e s ) n a t u r e without losing any of its rational character.
S c h e m a t i s m is certainly involved in this synthetic (ampliative)
j u d g m e n t . T h a t m a n is n o t a holy will is also a pity, for such a holy
will, p r e s u m a b l y because it is a n intellectus archetypus, would a u t o -
matically actualize all its m o r a l intentions a n d t h e r e would arise for
it n o g a p b e t w e e n is a n d o u g h t . B u t t h a t does n o t entail t h a t t h e
s a m e p u r e m o r a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n could n o t be a p p l i e d to actuality,

324 The Critique of Judgment

t h a t this application by its very n a t u r e would be synthetic (or ampli-
ative), o r t h a t it would constitute t h e r e b y a morally legitimate object
r a t h e r t h a n sully p u r e m o r a l will itself. Beck's " p u r i s m , " while it has
s o m e w a r r a n t in Kant's texts, has serious limitations.
Mary Zeldin devotes a careful article to t h e defense of Kant's
n o t i o n of t h e h i g h e s t g o o d against Beck's c r i t i c i s m s . S h e c o n t e n d s
10

t h a t t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n t h e categorical i m p e r a -
tive, since it is a n ampliative synthetic j u d g m e n t which applies t h a t
i m p e r a t i v e to t h e concrete conditions of actuality. "Just as t h e sche-
matized categories c o n t a i n m o r e t h a n t h e ' e m p t y ' p u r e categories,"
she writes, so d o e s t h e highest g o o d as a synthetic practical j u d g -
m e n t c o n t a i n m o r e t h a n t h e p u r e m o r a l law as stated in t h e
categorical imperative. T h e highest good, she claims, is in fact a
" m o r a l ideal" o r goal of p u r p o s i v e action in t h e world of sense. It
conceives t h e synthetic totality of all t h e achievements in t h e actual
world which a r e compatible with t h e m o r a l law a n d conducive to
t h e welfare of m a n k i n d . It r e p r e s e n t s t h a t ampliative, second sense
of t h e " k i n g d o m of e n d s " which includes n o t only all rational wills
b u t all t h e i r legitimate a c h i e v e m e n t s . 11

Allen W o o d m a k e s t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t in Kant's Moral Religion.

H e a r g u e s t h a t " t h e r e m u s t b e a systematic unity in which n a t u r a l
e n d s , t h e e n d s given by m a n ' s finite n e e d s , can be i n c l u d e d within
t h e e n d s of morality, t h e objects of p u r e practical r e a s o n . " I n his 12

a r g u m e n t , W o o d distinguishes between t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d (pure)

g o o d a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n e d (schematized) good, associating t h e first
with t h e m o r a l law a n d t h e categorical imperative a n d t h e second
with t h e c o m p l e t e d actualization of that imperative in t h e world of
sense. W o o d a r g u e s t h a t Kant's m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y aims at m o r e
t h a n a n analysis of particular m o r a l choices. It carries forward to
larger totalities: a c o n c e r n for t h e p e r s o n a n d his virtue, n o t j u s t
r i g h t action in a given instance. A p e r s o n is a c o h e r e n t rational
b e i n g with a c h a r a c t e r a n d disposition, a b e i n g of intrinsic worth.
T h e d e g r e e of t h a t w o r t h is virtue. Virtue is n o t a single right action
b u t a whole p a t t e r n of choice a n d t h e g r o u n d i n g disposition b e h i n d
it. Finally, W o o d a r g u e s , morality involves n o t simply motives b u t
c o n s e q u e n c e s . M e n have actual obligations in t h e world. T h e r e a r e ,
as K a n t would insist in Metaphysics of Morals (1797), " e n d s which a r e
duties." Even to oneself as a n a t u r a l b e i n g such duties obtained,
W o o d points o u t , a n d K a n t accepted t h a t position as t h e key to his
rejection of S t o i c i s m . 13

P e r h a p s t h e m o s t e x t e n d e d effort to f o r m u l a t e this m o r a l inter-

The Unity of Mankind 325

p r e t a t i o n of t h e idea of t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is to be f o u n d in T h o m a s
A u x t e r ' s works o n "ectypal n a t u r e . " Particularly fruitful is the dis-
tinction A u x t e r i n t r o d u c e s b e t w e e n a n ethic of inclusive e n d s a n d
a n ethic of ultimate e n d . While a formalist r e a d i n g (and a fortiori
1 4

a rigorist one) would take K a n t to u p h o l d a n ethic of ultimate e n d ,

i.e., t h e e x e c u t i o n of d u t y for duty's sake, t h e r e is sufficient textual
evidence, in Auxter's view, to suggest t h a t Kant also wished to u p -
h o l d t h e idea of a n ethic of inclusive e n d s , a n ethic which h a d as its
s u p r e m e principle t h e idea of a m a x i m a l i n t e g r a t i o n of all the spe-
cific p u r p o s e s of rational a g e n t s into wholes. Within the individual
this signified unity of personality, character, disposition, virtue.
B u t this " h a r m o n i o u s o r d e r of h u m a n p u r p o s e s " e x t e n d e d b e y o n d
a n y single individual a n d involved a social a n d historical, a species
d i m e n s i o n . T h e highest g o o d was, A u x t e r a r g u e s , a "regulative
15

p r i n c i p l e " for t h e expression of this idea of m o r a l p r o g r e s s : " T h e

final g o o d is a n inclusive e n d a life in which we h a r m o n i z e t h e ex-
ercise of all n a t u r a l abilities t h r o u g h t h e influence of r e a s o n . " 16

A u x t e r tries to develop a t h e o r y of Kant's "highest g o o d " in this

sense a c c o r d i n g to t h e idea of a "teleological c o n v e r g e n c e " in which
a "progressive h a r m o n i z a t i o n a n d realization of h u m a n values"
(morality as a n inclusive e n d ) substantiates o r actualizes the p u r e
m o r a l law (morality as a n ultimate e n d ) . 1 7

T h e objectification of t h e m o r a l law in t h e world of sense in-

volves t h e actualization of m a n ' s latent capacities, a n d above all t h e
q u e s t i o n of m a n ' s effort to achieve a j u s t world. T h i s is a m a t t e r n o t
so m u c h of individual c o n d u c t as of interaction a m o n g m o r a l
a g e n t s . It is a universal, not a particular m a n d a t e , to be s o u g h t not
simply individually b u t collectively. T h e r e f o r e it raises t h e issues of
t h e m e a n i n g of history a n d of political-religious c o m m u n i t y , as
w e l l . K a n t p u t this in t e r m s of the " k i n g d o m of e n d s " in t h e
18

Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals a n d in t e r m s of a "just civil

c o m m u n i t y " in " I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n
I n t e n t , " t h e n r e f o r m u l a t e d it in t e r m s of "ectypal n a t u r e " in t h e
Second Critique a n d " m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws" as t h e "final p u r p o s e of
c r e a t i o n " in t h e Third Critique. W h a t is most exciting for m o d e r n
t h i n k e r s is t h e strictly m o r a l r e a d i n g of t h e "highest g o o d " as t h e
e x t e n s i o n of n o u m e n a l l y g r o u n d e d m o r a l law into t h e actual world
b e y o n d t h e subject: justice, c o m m u n i t y , history, cosmology, a n d r e -
ligion. T h e s e issues c a m e to formulation in t h e very last p h a s e of
c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e Third Critique, in early 1790, above all in t h e
" M e t h o d o l o g y of Teleological J u d g m e n t . " 1 9

326 The Critique of Judgment

The Methodology of Teleological Judgment

I n t e r m s of t h e architectonic of t h e work, t h e "Methodology of

Teleological J u d g m e n t " set o u t to e x p l o r e t h e p r o b l e m of relative
p u r p o s i v e n e s s in theoretical reflective j u d g m e n t . A "relative"
2 0

p u r p o s e is t h a t which serves s o m e other, active a n d h e n c e "intrin-

sic" p u r p o s e . It is t h e r e f o r e "external"; its purposiveness is n o t
2 1

s o m e t h i n g i n h e r e n t in its o w n essential principle, b u t only serves

t h e i n t e n t i o n of s o m e o t h e r entity. It is n o t i n h e r e n t in t h e n a t u r e of
cork bark, for instance, t h a t it stop wine bottles. It takes t h e external
i n t e r v e n t i o n of m a n to m a k e t h e cork bark purposive in this way. It
is t h e n relative to m a n ' s p u r p o s e . It is n o t the p u r p o s e of m a n to
p r o v i d e b l o o d for mosquitos. B u t they use h i m anyway. M a n is a
relative p u r p o s e for t h e m . Purposiveness in this e x t e r n a l a n d rela-
tive sense is n a t u r a l in a world which is p o p u l a t e d by organic forms,
i.e., intrinsic p u r p o s e s . M o r e problematic, of course, is t h e n a t u r e
of a n intrinsic p u r p o s e itself, a n d w i t h o u t this, relative purposive-
ness b e c o m e s impossible. A n intrinsic p u r p o s e , o n Kant's r e a d i n g ,
sets its o w n p u r p o s e s , o r is self-organizing. W h a t e v e r t h e difficulties
this n o t i o n poses for t h e categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n a t u r e , K a n t
finds it necessary in o r d e r to m a k e sense of certain things in t h e
world.
All of this is q u i t e familiar. T h e new issue K a n t raises is t h e rela-
tive p u r p o s i v e n e s s n o t of particular things in n a t u r e to o t h e r s , b u t
of n a t u r e as a whole. If n a t u r e as a whole is to b e a relative p u r p o s e ,
w h a t intrinsic p u r p o s e is it serving? I n o r d e r to be "ultimate," i.e.,
serve as t h e p u r p o s e for n a t u r e as a whole, such a n intrinsic p u r -
pose would n e e d to b e "final," n o t only " o r g a n i z e d " b u t of value in
itself (i.e., capable of m o r a l f r e e d o m ) . T h e r e a r e two logical can-
22

didates for this status. T h e first is m a n , taken n o t as n a t u r a l b u t as

n o u m e n a l . T h e second is G o d , t a k e n n o t as i m m a n e n t b u t as t r a n -
s c e n d e n t . I n short, to think of n a t u r e in t e r m s of its "ultimate p u r -
p o s e " we m u s t t h i n k of m a n or of G o d as "final p u r p o s e s , " i.e., as
ends-in-themselves, a u t o n o m o u s rational wills. T h e y a r e , as such,
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y n o u m e n a l . T h e y are b e y o n d categorial d e t e r m i n a -
tion. B u t they a r e n o t b e y o n d t h o u g h t . K a n t p r o p o s e s t h a t they b e
t h o u g h t t h r o u g h q u i t e rigorously.
If we seek within n a t u r e itself for a n "ultimate p u r p o s e , " t h e
only c a n d i d a t e is m a n . T o see m a n as n a t u r e ' s ultimate p u r p o s e is to
t h i n k h i m "privileged" by n a t u r e . While h e is intrinsically p u r p o -
sive even as a n a t u r a l o r g a n i c form, h e is by n o m e a n s " n a t u r e ' s dar-

The Unity of Mankind 327

ling," for h e is as m u c h t h e victim of n a t u r e as h e r b e n e f i c i a r y . 23

While t h e r e a r e certainly occasions in which it a p p e a r s to h i m as

t h o u g h t h e e n t i r e world is t h e r e for his sake, t h e r e a r e o t h e r s in
which, as with t h e m o s q u i t o s , it seems t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d . As
n a t u r a l p u r p o s e , m a n seeks to maximize his " h a p p i n e s s . " U n f o r t u -
nately for h i m , " h a p p i n e s s " is a c h i m e r a . It is a n o m i n a l , not a real
24

universal. It c a n n o t b e specified concretely, because it is i n d e t e r m i -

n a t e , shifting n o t only b e t w e e n h u m a n subjects b u t even for each
h u m a n subject. It is nevertheless a n inevitable result of o u r m a t e -
rial subjectivity. N o t only will it necessarily exist; it will necessarily
exact practical a c k n o w l e d g m e n t . T h e claim of " h a p p i n e s s " can-
25

n o t b e e x t i r p a t e d a n y m o r e t h a n it can b e satiated. B u t if t h a t w e r e
n o t b a d e n o u g h , n a t u r e h a r d l y seems driven to a c c o m m o d a t e h i m
anyway.
W h a t d o e s n a t u r e d o for m a n , t h e n , if n o t p r o v i d e h i m " h a p p i -
ness"? K a n t answers this q u e s t i o n in t h r e e distinct veins. First, most
notoriously, n a t u r e challenges his skill, a n d t h e r e w i t h forces h i m to
d e v e l o p his talents in o r d e r to survive a n d p r o s p e r in t h e w o r l d . 26

N a t u r e proves p u r p o s i v e for m a n in j u s t t h e m e a s u r e t h a t she r e -

sists his ease a n d comfort, forcing h i m to exert himself to d o m i n a t e
h e r a n d extract from h e r t h a t q u o t i e n t of " h a p p i n e s s " h e restlessly
a n d vainly p u r s u e s . T h i s is p u t most bluntly in Kant's essay of 1784,
" I d e a for a Universal History with C o s m o p o l i t a n I n t e n t " :

T h a n k s a r e d u e to n a t u r e for [man's] q u a r r e l s o m e n e s s , his

enviously competitive vanity, a n d for his insatiable desire to
possess o r to rule, for w i t h o u t t h e m all t h e excellent n a t u r a l
faculties of m a n k i n d w o u l d forever r e m a i n u n d e v e l o p e d .
M a n wants c o n c o r d b u t n a t u r e knows better w h a t is g o o d for
his kind; n a t u r e wants discord. M a n wants to live comfortably
a n d pleasurably b u t n a t u r e i n t e n d s t h a t h e s h o u l d raise him-
self o u t of lethargy a n d inactive c o n t e n t m e n t into work a n d
t r o u b l e a n d t h e n h e s h o u l d find m e a n s of extricating himself
adroitly from these l a t t e r . 27

T h i s is t h e f o u n d a t i o n of Kant's philosophy of history a n d politics

a very stark, H o b b e s i a n f o u n d a t i o n , however Rousseauist t h e solu-
tion h e believes will eventually s u p e r v e n e .
T h e s e c o n d provision of n a t u r e is to cultivate his taste. In this
disciplining of taste, schooling m a n ' s gratification away from coarse
a p p e t i t e a n d elevating it to m o r e u r b a n e a n d dispassionate d e -
lights, K a n t finds t h e c o n n e c t i o n between b e a u t y a n d morality, t h e
principle of "aesthetic e d u c a t i o n , " as Schiller would soon p u t i t . 28

328 The Critique of Judgment

O n c e again, however, this strictly n a t u r a l cultivation, while it is less
s t r e n u o u s a n d privative t h a n t h e first, does n o t satisfy m a n ' s n a t u r a l
craving for h a p p i n e s s . It merely sublimates it a bit. Desire is d e -
flected from its original o b j e c t s . T h a t is p r o g r e s s , to b e s u r e , b u t
29

n o t o n t h e s t a n d a r d of m a n ' s n a t u r a l i m p u l s e . N a t u r e is inadver-
tently at t h e service of s o m e t h i n g u n n a t u r a l . It is satisfying to m a n ' s
rationality, b o t h cognitive a n d practical. T h e beautiful a n d t h e sub-
lime reinforce m a n ' s awareness of these " n o u m e n a l " e l e m e n t s in
his " n a t u r e . "
A n d t h a t awareness, o r r a t h e r t h e stimulation to such reflec-
tion, is t h e t h i r d distinct a n d i m p o r t a n t p u r p o s e n a t u r e serves for
m a n . N a t u r e occasions reflection, t h r o u g h its o r d e r , a b o u t its ulti-
m a t e p u r p o s e a n d h e n c e m a n ' s o w n intrinsic p u r p o s e , a n d helps
b r i n g m a n to t h e crucial recognition of his f r e e d o m . A n ultimate30

p u r p o s e w o u l d have to be a final (intrinsic) p u r p o s e . B u t m a n is a

final p u r p o s e , a c c o r d i n g to Kant, n o t as n a t u r a l , b u t as m o r a l . T h u s
n a t u r e is p u r p o s i v e for m a n precisely in m a k i n g m a n ask after his
o w n final p u r p o s e . I n all t h r e e of t h e s e services, n a t u r e m a k e s m a n
b e t t e r able to b e w h a t h e already is: a free w i l l . 31

T h e discussion in 83 of t h e Third Critique reformulates t h e

p h i l o s o p h y of history which K a n t h a d first sketched in " I d e a for a
Universal H i s t o r y . " K a n t raised t h e issue t h e r e : Did history m a k e
32

sense? W h a t a historian h a d to d o , h e asserted, was " a t t e m p t to dis-

cover a n e n d of n a t u r e in this senseless m a r c h of h u m a n e v e n t s . " 33

Accordingly, t h e p h i l o s o p h e r of history h a d to posit "teleology" in

n a t u r e , since conjectures a b o u t historical c o h e r e n c e r e q u i r e d a d e -
t e r m i n a t e " n a t u r a l p u r p o s e of m a n . " K a n t asserted as his first p r i n -
ciple: "All n a t u r a l faculties of a c r e a t u r e a r e destined to unfold
completely a n d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r e n d [Zweck]."
T h e i n c o n g r u o u s a n d d o g m a t i c c h a r a c t e r of Kant's use of "na-
t u r e " in this work has occasioned a g r e a t deal of c o m m e n t . N a t u r e 3 4

in t h e s e p h r a s e s can only have signified God's providential design

for t h e world. T h a t K a n t did n o t write " P r o v i d e n c e " may be simply
a q u e s t i o n of stylistic grace a n d c o m m o n usage. T h i s was a p o p u l a r
essay. B u t t h e r e a r e two o t h e r possibilities. First, K a n t may n o t have
felt comfortable p u b l i s h i n g his w o r k o n history "with cosmopolitan
i n t e n t " in s u c h unequivocally religious garb, especially as it was to
a p p e a r in t h e Berlinische Monatsschrift, o n e of t h e most aggressive of
t h e secularizing-rationalist j o u r n a l s of t h e period. B u t second, a n d
m o r e plausibly, Kant m a y have m e a n t his r e a d e r s to b e struck by
t h e e x t r a v a g a n c e of t h e personification of n a t u r e . A d e e p e r literary
t r o p e m a y h a v e u n d e r l a i n t h e m o r e obvious o n e : irony directed at

The Unity of Mankind 329

p r o p o n e n t s of a n i m m a n e n t n a t u r a l destiny of m a n a view very
p o p u l a r in intellectual circles in G e r m a n y associated with H e r d e r ,
t h e first v o l u m e of w h o s e Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit was a p p e a r i n g almost simultaneously with the essay, a n d
w h o m K a n t was a b o u t to attack in a series of h a r s h r e v i e w s . 35

In short, h e r e again t h e controversy with H e r d e r proves essen-

tial to t h e Third Critique. 36
T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n Kant a n d H e r d e r
over t h e m e a n i n g of history a n d t h e p r o p e r relation between na-
t u r e a n d c u l t u r e was o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t events in t h e liter-
ary life of G e r m a n y in t h e last years of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. It
b r o u g h t to a climax t h e whole extensive discussion of the phil-
o s o p h y of history which was o n e of t h e most lively aspects of
A u f k l r u n g . It would b r i n g forward even m o r e i m p o r t a n t spec-
37

ulation a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of history, that of t h e G e r m a n Idealists

a n d Karl M a r x . Yet t h e r e is interesting evidence that as h e com-
p o s e d t h e Third Critique, K a n t b e g a n a shift in his historical think-
ing, p e r h a p s influenced by t h e events taking place simultaneously
in F r a n c e , which m o v e d h i m away from his harshly Hobbesian ori-
e n t a t i o n a n d closer, if n o t to H e r d e r , t h e n to t h a t g e n e r a t i o n which
inherited Herder's a g e n d a . 3 8

I n any event, with t h e p r e m i s e of Providence in h a n d , t h e essay

of 1784 p r o c e e d e d to claim a crucial second principle: t h e n a t u r a l
p u r p o s e of m a n could n o t b e realized by t h e individual b u t only by
t h e species. "Every m a n w o u l d have to live excessively l o n g in o r d e r
to l e a r n h o w to m a k e full use of all his faculties." T h i s was because
those faculties w e r e g r o u n d e d in reason, which h a d to progress by
l e a r n i n g t h r o u g h "trials, e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n " a n d
which recognized n o b o u n d a r y o r limit in its "capacity to e n l a r g e
t h e rules a n d p u r p o s e s of t h e use of his resources." Not only did this
result in t h e discomfiture of particular individuals, b u t all those
transitional g e n e r a t i o n s which slowly wove t h e rich fabric of h u -
m a n realization would themselves be d e n i e d t h e full fruits of t h e i r
labor. K a n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t "it r e m a i n s p e r p l e x i n g that earlier
g e n e r a t i o n s s e e m to d o t h e i r laborious work for t h e sake of later
g e n e r a t i o n s . . . [but, h e c o n c l u d e d ] however mysterious this may
b e , it is nevertheless n e c e s s a r y . " K a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t at t h e level of
39

t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d p e r h a p s even for t h e whole of t h e transition

"Rousseau was n o t so very w r o n g w h e n h e p r e f e r r e d t h e condition
of s a v a g e s . " B u t K a n t insisted that Rousseau was nevertheless
40

w r o n g , for it was n o t t h e individual b u t t h e species, a n d i n d e e d , t h e

u l t i m a t e destiny of t h e species, t h a t h a d to serve as c r i t e r i o n . 41

H o w did n a t u r e see to it t h a t t h e h u m a n species progressed?

330 The Critique ofJudgment

Kant's t h i r d principle replied t h a t it was by t h r o w i n g m a n u p o n his
o w n devices: " N a t u r e seems to have delighted in t h e greatest par-
simony; s h e seems to have barely p r o v i d e d m a n ' s a n i m a l e q u i p -
m e n t a n d limited it to t h e most u r g e n t n e e d s of a b e g i n n i n g
existence, as if n a t u r e i n t e n d e d t h a t m a n s h o u l d owe all to him-
self." By d e n y i n g h i m a d e t e r m i n a t e physical a d v a n t a g e in t h e
42

struggle for survival, n a t u r e c o n s i g n e d m a n to his latent faculties

r e a s o n a n d free will. T h i s deviousness of n a t u r a l p u r p o s e , this "in-
visible h a n d " o r " c u n n i n g of n a t u r e , " d i d n o t halt at t h e physical
e n d o w m e n t s of m a n . Kant's f o u r t h principle took u p Rousseau's
4 3

gravest strictures a n d r e a d t h e m in a n ironically constructive light.

K a n t saw in Rousseau's amour propre n o t merely m o r a l viciousness
b u t social productivity. N a t u r e used " t h e a n t a g o n i s m of m e n in so-
ciety," t h e i r "asocial sociability," as t h e device for species progress.
M a n , "impelled by vainglory, ambition a n d avarice, . . . seeks to
achieve a s t a n d i n g a m o n g his f e l l o w s . " 44

"Private vice c o n d u c e s to public virtue." H e r e was t h e g r e a t r e -

lief t h a t political e c o n o m y offered t h e anxious moralists of t h e
e i g h t e e n t h century. C o m p e t i t i o n , with its e n f o r c e m e n t n o t only of
labor b u t of p r u d e n c e u n d e r t h e rubric of "interest," offered n o t
only a n o r d e r , b u t a p r o s p e c t of " i m p r o v e m e n t . " T o be sure, n o
45

a p p e a l was m a d e to virtue, which seemed, in a n y event, too weak to

weld society together. It was i n a p p r o p r i a t e in a h a r d h e a d e d , n a t u -
ralistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h u m a n b e h a v i o r . I n t h e 1780s, Kant
46

r e a d t h e history at least of t h e past o n such a strictly mechanistic,

naturalistic, i n d e e d H o b b e s i a n l i n e . K a n t was willing to c o u n t e -
47

n a n c e n o t m e r e l y t h e loss of h a p p i n e s s , b u t even t h a t a m o r a l
i n d e e d i m m o r a l a g g r e s s i o n , for t h e sake of t h e p r o g r e s s it h a d
achieved. T h r o u g h competition, relentless p u r s u i t of p e r s o n a l in-
terest, "all m a n ' s talents a r e gradually u n f o l d e d , taste is developed
. . . t h e basis is laid for a f r a m e of m i n d which, in t h e course of time,
t r a n s f o r m s t h e raw n a t u r a l faculty of m o r a l discrimination into def-
inite practical principles." K a n t f o u n d t h e justification for these
"unlovely" m e a n s in t h e e n d : "a pathologically enforced coordina-
tion of society finally t r a n s f o r m s it into a moral w h o l e . " T h e diffi-
48

culty of such a project was n o t lost o n h i m . " M a n is a n animal w h o , if

h e lives a m o n g o t h e r s of his kind, needs a master, for m a n certainly
misuses his f r e e d o m in r e g a r d to o t h e r s of his k i n d . . . M a n t h e r e -
fore needs a m a s t e r w h o can b r e a k m a n ' s will a n d c o m p e l h i m to
obey a g e n e r a l will u n d e r which every m a n could be f r e e . " T h e 49

final t e r m s a r e Rousseau's, b u t w i t h o u t Rousseau's h u m a n s with a

n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t of g o o d . I n d e e d , K a n t articulates far m o r e

The Unity of Mankind 331

clearly t h e s t a u n c h L u t h e r a n conviction of m a n ' s baser n a t u r e a n d
t h e n e e d for a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n state to control i t . Kant's dim view
5 0

of " b r u t e n a t u r e " in m a n lies at t h e c o r e of his philosophy of history.

A n i m a l s i n d e e d , m e n w e r e schooled by their very "asocial so-
ciability" to a n a t t i t u d e a l t o g e t h e r inconsistent with a "moral
w h o l e . " K a n t c o m m e n t e d : " T h e task involved is t h e r e f o r e most dif-
ficult; i n d e e d , a c o m p l e t e solution is impossible. O n e c a n n o t fash-
ion s o m e t h i n g absolutely straight from wood which is as crooked as
t h a t of which m a n is m a d e . " N o , a n d still less if one's whole con-
5 1

c e p t i o n of " p r o g r e s s " is a w a r p i n g of t h a t wood o n a n a l t o g e t h e r

different line!
K a n t characterized m a n ' s "final p u r p o s e " (Endzweck), "the
h i g h e s t task n a t u r e has set m a n k i n d , " as a " m o r a l whole," "a com-
pletely just civic constitution." T h i s was t h e most difficult p r o b l e m
m a n k i n d h a d to solve; nevertheless K a n t believed it was also t h e
c u r r e n t p r o b l e m , or, in short, t h a t " t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of a civil so-
ciety which administers law generally" was t h e task to which t h e
"age of e n l i g h t e n m e n t " h a d t u r n e d . Yet it is n o t at all to be seen
5 2

h o w a "pathologically enforced c o o r d i n a t i o n of society finally t r a n s -

forms it into a moral w h o l e . " K a n t wrote: "great experience in m a n y
53

activities a n d a. good will which is p r e p a r e d to accept such a constitu-

tion a r e all r e q u i r e d . " W h e n c e would they have come? H o w should
they prevail?
It was to e v a d e t h e e m b a r r a s s m e n t of this p r o b l e m that K a n t
r e f o r m u l a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n in 83 of t h e Third Critique. K a n t shifted
from a view of history as p r o g r e s s i n g according to s o m e mechanical
n a t u r a l law, to o n e of history as a voluntary project of h u m a n m o r a l
realization. N a t u r e still h a d a tutelary role to play, b u t Kant, in t h e
context of his pervasive purposiveness in t h e Third Critique, clearly
assigned to voluntarism a n d p u r p o s e a g o o d deal m o r e responsibil-
ity in t h e fabric of history. T h e r e were still e n o r m o u s p r o b l e m s of
transition a n d m e d i a t i o n , b u t K a n t p r o p o s e d a whole new principle
for history with this shift. History b e c a m e a r e a l m between n a t u r e
a n d f r e e d o m : t h e r e c o r d of t h e interventions of f r e e d o m in t h e
world of m e c h a n i c a l causality a n d t h e string of t h e i r consequences
( i n t e n d e d a n d u n i n t e n d e d ) . Moreover, reason's intervention d i d
n o t c o m e only at t h e e n d (or at t h e p r e s e n t , " E n l i g h t e n e d " t u r n i n g
point, t h o u g h t h a t c o n t i n u e d to have a decisive role to play in
Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history). Reason i n t e r v e n e d from t h e origin of
t h e species. I n " M u t h m a l i c h e r A n f a n g d e r Menschengeschichte,"
K a n t h a d t a k e n u p this issue, d r a w i n g o n Rousseau (and d i s p u t i n g
H e r d e r ' s use of Genesis). H e traced t h e n a t u r a l ("pragmatic" o r

332 The Critique ofJudgment

"technical") interventions of r e a s o n in h u m a n fate p r i o r t o t h e
moral i n t e r v e n t i o n . At t h e s a m e t i m e h e e l a b o r a t e d o n n a t u r e ' s in-
54

t e r v e n t i o n in h u m a n affairs, t h w a r t i n g , t e m p t i n g , cajoling, struc-

t u r i n g . T h e dialectic of history, in this new formulation, p r o v e d far
m o r e intricate.
Kant's m o d e l of history started from t h e p r e m i s e t h a t n a t u r e
was n o t s p o n t a n e o u s l y m o r a l b u t could b e c h a n g e d by h u m a n
praxis. At t h e s a m e time, n a t u r e did act in ways t h a t stimulated t h e
e m e r g e n c e of h u m a n praxis as this m o r a l transfiguration. It
schooled m a n in his o w n f r e e d o m . T h r o u g h discipline a n d
55

cultivation, n a t u r e p r i m e d m a n ' s n a t u r a l capacities a n d evoked ra-

tional reflection a n d t h e realization of m a n ' s f u n d a m e n t a l p o w e r to
seize control of his o w n fate. T h i s decisive t u r n i n g p o i n t in univer-
sal history K a n t identified with E n l i g h t e n m e n t . T h a t was t h e m o -
56

m e n t w h e n n a t u r e s u r r e n d e r e d control of t h e h u m a n project a n d
left t h e b a l a n c e of history in the h a n d s of f r e e d o m . Prospective his-
tory would, in a Kantian frame, p r o c e e d u n d e r t h e self-conscious
a n d voluntary ideal of a perfection of the world a c c o r d i n g to m o r a l
laws: t h e p u r s u i t of t h e "highest g o o d . " T h e vehicles for this p u r s u i t
in history would be t h e political c o m m u n i t y o r state o n t h e level of
legalitythe "civil c o m m u n i t y " to which K a n t devoted a great deal
of a t t e n t i o n in his writings o n history a n d especially o n t h e philoso-
p h y of r i g h t a n d t h e "ethical c o m m u n i t y " which f o u n d its institu-
tional e m b o d i m e n t in religion, b u t its philosophical essence in the
" k i n g d o m of e n d s . " 5 7

T h e s e ideas, i n t i m a t e d in 83 of the Third Critique, b e c a m e t h e

major focus of Kant's a t t e n t i o n in t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e , stimu-
lated n o d o u b t by t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . H u m a n action t r a n s -
58

figuring t h e world from t h e d e t e r m i n i s m which characterized t h e

n a t u r a l o r d e r into a n o r d e r of f r e e d o m , Y i r m i a h u Yovel a r g u e s , is
Kant's richest sense of t h e h i g h e s t good. It is n o t h i n g less t h a n " t h e
regulative idea of history," a c c o r d i n g to Y o v e l . For h i m , Kant's
59

c o n c e p t of t h e highest g o o d only comes fully into its o w n at this

communal-collective level. It is as a species interest t h a t t h e highest
good m a k e s sense in Kant's system of philosophy. It is t h e ideal ac-
c o r d i n g to which rational, i.e., voluntary history as a work of h u m a n
f r e e d o m , p r o c e e d s . " T h e work of m o r a l history is to o v e r c o m e t h e
alienness of n a t u r e by i m p r i n t i n g h u m a n p a t t e r n s a n d e n d s u p o n
i t . " T h e l a n g u a g e Yovel uses is strikinglyand a p p r o p r i a t e l y
60

H e g e l o - M a r x i a n . B u t it is also K a n t i a n : "we have to create a 'second

n a t u r e ' which exhibits m o r a l i d e a s . " T h e task of m o r a l history is
61

t o t r a n s f o r m t h e empirically given into a h u m a n p u r p o s e , to objec-

The Unity of Mankind 333

tify morality. " K a n t m a k e s this idea of s u b d u i n g n a t u r e a n d r e s h a p -
i n g it in a c c o r d a n c e with h u m a n r e a s o n t h e principle of critical
h i s t o r y . " T h i s "can only b e c r e a t e d by a cumulative a n d c o o p e r a -
62

tive effort of h u m a n i t y . " I n religious l a n g u a g e , what K a n t saw as

63

t h e project of m o r a l history was t h e creation of the " k i n g d o m of

God on earth." 6 4

K a n t wished to use this d i m e n s i o n of t h e c o n c e p t also as a t r a n -

sition to theology. G. E. Michaelson notes that t h e r e was a shift, in
t h e Religion, from a political to a religious conception of the "ethical
c o m m u n i t y " to be associated with t h e "highest g o o d " in t h e w o r l d . 65

W o o d , t o o , a r g u e s t h a t t h e ultimate sense of Kant's " k i n g d o m of

e n d s " m u s t be t h a t of t h e " K i n g d o m of G o d o n e a r t h . " T h i s posi-
6 6

tion is reinforced by Michel D e s p l a n d , w h o a r g u e s for t h e centrality

of a Christian eschatology in Kant's philosophy of h i s t o r y . Yet 67

Kant's p h i l o s o p h y of history e n d e d in failure, even his most careful

expositors t e n d to c o n c l u d e . Rather, his t h o u g h t has s e e m e d to be
68

m o r e c o h e r e n t as political theory, because essentially it is t h r o u g h

his timeless m o r a l t h e o r y that h e most richly a n d powerfully e n -
dows social t h e o r y with a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e . T h u s , critics of his
6 9

a p p r o a c h to history a n d teleology nevertheless find in his theory of

political r i g h t s t r o n g stimulus to t h o u g h t . Still, in essaying t h e inte-
g r a t i o n of morality with teleology in historical time, K a n t c a m e to
grips with g r e a t questions of t h e h u m a n state, a n d accorded t h e m
dignity as p a r t of t h e r e a l m of philosophy.
T h e Third Critique is recognized as t h e crucial text for t h e foun-
d a t i o n of this historical, political, a n d religious philosophy in Kant,
yet h e offers t h e r e a r e m a r k a b l y c o m p r e s s e d account of these areas,
with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e theological aspect of religion. It is m o r e
t h e case t h a t t h e Third Critique clears t h e g r o u n d for t h e work in
these fields which would occupy Kant extensively in t h e 1790s t h a n
t h a t it actually accomplishes m u c h of that work. It is the vehicle for
accessing such questions, a t h r e s h o l d before t h e rich fields of social
a n d cultural philosophy. T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s i m p a c t of t h e F r e n c h
Revolution could only have a c c e n t u a t e d this r e o r i e n t a t i o n . Yet t h e
very fact of this massive contextual impact, to say n o t h i n g of t h e
e m e r g e n c e of t h e rival Idealist school within G e r m a n y in t h a t same
d e c a d e , suggests t h a t a c o n t e x t u a l r e a d i n g of Kant's t h o u g h t o n his-
tory a n d politics in t h e light of t h e Third Critique would n e e d to b e
q u i t e a m b i t i o u s a n d extensive. T h a t is clearly b e y o n d t h e scope of
this study.
T h e r e is, however, a contextual point t h a t is g e r m a n e , namely,
t h e s t r o n g religious interest t h a t a n i m a t e s t h e Third Critique, grow-

334 The Critique of Judgment

ing o u t of Kant's struggle with Spinozism, p a n t h e i s m , a n d m a t e -
rialism. T h e insistence u p o n theism which is so central to t h e
"ethical t u r n " of t h e Third Critique, a n d i n d e e d , a n even m o r e deter-
m i n a t e ^ Christian r e a d i n g of t h a t theism, finds s t r o n g expression
in t h e final pages of the work. K a n t elaborated extensively u p o n t h e
religious d i m e n s i o n of the "highest g o o d " in t h e "Methodology of
Teleological J u d g m e n t " in o r d e r to buttress his case against the
Spinozists. While t h e extraordinarily i m p o r t a n t discussion of his-
tory o c c u p i e d only 83, t h e discussion of ethico-theology took u p
almost t h e e n t i r e s e g m e n t , 8 4 - 9 1 .

"Ethico-theology" in the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment"

T h e historical issue distracted us from t h e o n g o i n g a r g u m e n t of t h e

" M e t h o d o l o g y " a b o u t t h e relative purposiveness of n a t u r e as a
whole, a n d t h e relation b e t w e n "ultimate" a n d "final" p u r p o s e s .
K a n t c o n t i n u e s t h a t discussion in 84. Only as a morally intrinsic
p u r p o s e is m a n a "final p u r p o s e " o n e which "needs n o o t h e r as
condition of its possibility." Because m a n is certain via t h e "fact of
70

p u r e r e a s o n " of his status as m o r a l a n d h e n c e final p u r p o s e , h e can

see himself, as a m o r a l entity ( " u n d e r m o r a l laws"), eligible to be t h e
"ultimate p u r p o s e " of n a t u r e .

N o w we have in t h e world only o n e kind of beings whose

causality is teleological, i.e. is directed to p u r p o s e s , a n d is at
t h e s a m e t i m e so constituted t h a t t h e law according to which
they have to d e t e r m i n e p u r p o s e s for themselves is r e p r e -
s e n t e d as u n c o n d i t i o n e d a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of n a t u r a l condi-
tions, a n d yet as in itself necessary. T h e b e i n g of this kind is
m a n , b u t m a n considered as n o u m e n o n , t h e only n a t u r a l
b e i n g in which we can recognize, o n t h e side of its peculiar
constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) a n d also t h e law
of causality, t o g e t h e r with t h e object, which this faculty may
p r o p o s e to itself as highest p u r p o s e (the highest good in t h e
world). 71

H e n e e d s n o f u r t h e r g r o u n d for his o w n f r e e d o m o r for the possi-

bility of his relation to n a t u r e as ultimate p u r p o s e . T h e p r o b l e m
7 2

lies n o t with t h e possibility of this relation, b u t with its full actualiza-

tion. M a n is eligible to b e n a t u r e ' s ultimate p u r p o s e . B u t does na-
t u r e even have a p u r p o s e ?
While m a n ' s f r e e d o m is a fact, its efficacy in t h e actual world is
entirely c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e laws of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , a n d those

The Unity of Mankind 335

laws n e e d n o t necessarily accord with his design, however final. I n
t h a t m e a s u r e , n a t u r e may n o t b e a consistent o r even a f r e q u e n t
"relative p u r p o s e " for m a n . We m i g h t r e f o r m u l a t e Kant's a r g u -
m e n t as follows. While m a n " u n d e r m o r a l laws" was indubitably a
"final p u r p o s e " a n d h e n c e h e could see himself as a possible "ulti-
m a t e p u r p o s e " for n a t u r e , h e could n o t establish himself as its ac-
tual "ultimate p u r p o s e , " m u c h less its necessary o n e . H e r e q u i r e d ,
t h e r e f o r e , a w a r r a n t which would secure this actuality. T h a t is, h e
n e e d e d a g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e "highest g o o d " was possible, for this
w o u l d m a k e m a n " u n d e r m o r a l laws" t h e actual ultimate p u r p o s e
of n a t u r e . T h e only way this actuality could be w a r r a n t e d , Kant
7 3

a r g u e d , was for a n o t h e r "final p u r p o s e " to establish with necessity

t h e u l t i m a t e p u r p o s e of n a t u r e as m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws. T h a t
o t h e r final p u r p o s e , of course, was God, a n d t h a t ultimate p u r p o s e
h e w o u l d have for n a t u r e w o u l d b e Providence, creating t h e possi-
bility for m a n ' s realization of f r e e d o m . T h e existence of G o d would
g u a r a n t e e m a n ' s actual c h a n c e to realize t h e "highest good,"
t h r o u g h t h e transfiguration of t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r into a " k i n g d o m of
e n d s , " i.e., " m a n u n d e r m o r a l laws." G o d did not g u a r a n t e e the n e -
cessity of success, for it was m a n ' s task to see to it. G o d simply m a d e
n a t u r e a m e n a b l e to t h e project.
By t h e t i m e of t h e Third Critique, t h e highest g o o d for Kant was
a step in a n a r g u m e n t which was from t h e outset intentionally t h e o -
logical, n o t merely m o r a l . If we consider t h e m a n n e r in which
7 4

K a n t c o n s t r u c t e d his a r g u m e n t from "moral teleology" to t h e

"highest g o o d " in t h e "Methodology of Teleological J u d g m e n t , " we
can see t h a t his interest lies q u i t e unequivocally in justifying belief
in t h e existence of a t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . His classic refuta-
tion of all rational proofs of G o d in t h e First Critique h a d included a
refutation of t h e so-called "physico-theological" p r o o f . N e v e r t h e -
75

less h e e x p r e s s e d respect for this a r g u m e n t . T h e Third Critique a d -

7 6

vanced t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t it was at least subjectively necessary to

t h i n k of a n intelligent will as t h e original cause of t h e w o r l d . B u t 77

t h e r e "physico-theology" r e a c h e d its o u t e r limit. It could n o t p r o -

ceed from this to t h e full n o t i o n of a G o d . T h a t step was possible
7 8

only in a n d t h r o u g h m o r a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d "ethico-theology."
K a n t tried in t h e " M e t h o d o l o g y " to establish a necessary con-
nection b e t w e e n " m o r a l teleology" a n d "theology." T h i s a r g u m e n t
m o v e d from t h e practical reality of f r e e d o m t h r o u g h the obligation
to realize t h e "highest g o o d , " to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t for a w a r r a n t of
t h e possibility of t h a t realization. Kant claimed we n e e d a theology
precisely for t h e sake of t h e "highest g o o d " n o t , to b e sure, for

336 The Critique ofJudgment

o u r obligation to p u r s u e it, b u t for t h e h o p e t h a t this obligation is
n o t Sisyphean. In seeking a w a r r a n t for t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of justice
in this world m a n first conceives t h e rational n e e d for G o d . T h e r e
a r e two crucial points which m u s t be clarified in this c o n n e c t i o n .
First, m a n ' s m o r a l obligation is n o t g r o u n d e d in t h e existence of
G o d . As K a n t a r g u e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e "highest g o o d " itself, t h e exis-
t e n c e of G o d is n o t "necessary for m o r a l s , " b u t r a t h e r "necessitated
by m o r a l i t y . " It is because we a r e morally obliged to secure justice
79

in t h e world t h a t we m u s t believe in a G o d to m a k e this possible. I n

o t h e r words, it is n o t w h a t o n e knows of G o d t h a t m a k e s h i m m o r a l ,
b u t w h a t is m o r a l which tells o n e w h a t h e knows a b o u t G o d . T h e
idea of G o d is t h e principle necessary to secure t h e possibility of t h e
full realization of t h e "highest g o o d . " N o t h i n g m o r e is n e e d e d in
t h a t concept, a n d n o t h i n g less. Second, "theology" arises o u t of a n
i m m a n e n t practical c o n c e r n , o u t of " m o r a l teleology," a n d h e n c e
t h e n a t u r e a n d t h e validity of theology derive from t h a t context.
O n e n e e d have n o c o n c e r n with w h a t God may b e as a speculative
entity, b u t only with k n o w i n g t h a t G o d provides certain essential
r e q u i r e m e n t s for m a n ' s practical destiny in t h e world. W i t h t h a t the
w a r r a n t for t h e reality of G o d shifts from a cognitive principle to a
practical r e q u i r e m e n t . K a n t wrote extensively in t h e balance of t h e
" M e t h o d o l o g y " to s q u a r e t h e circle of his c o m m i t m e n t to d e t e r m i -
n a t e beliefs a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of G o d with t h e "critical" restrictions
of k n o w l e d g e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t . His p r o t r a c t e d discussion r e -
affirmed all t h e positions of t h e "critical philosophy," including t h e
d o c t r i n e of "rational belief." T h o u g h it was to serve a metaphysical
function, t h e h i g h e s t good as a w a r r a n t for postulating G o d could
n o t a p p e a l to theoretical r e a s o n , because it originated in practical
reason.
At t h e level of t h e individual h u m a n being, K a n t a r g u e d , t h e
only k i n d of justice which m a n can find consistent with his principle
of morality a n d his condition as a n a t u r a l being is o n e in which h a p -
piness, as t h e inevitable aspiration of his n a t u r a l existence, is legiti-
m a t e d by worthiness. As a n a t u r a l , n o t merely rational being, m a n
has objective n e e d s which r e a s o n associates with h a p p i n e s s . As a
free b e i n g , m a n can act purely for t h e sake of t h e m o r a l law. Such
a n act, a c c o r d i n g to Kant, is v i r t u o u s a n d a d d s to t h e worth of t h e
a g e n t w h o p e r f o r m s it. T h i s "merit" should, in a perfect world,
find r e c o m p e n s e in a p r o p o r t i o n a t e h a p p i n e s s . For a n individual
h u m a n b e i n g , t h e highest g o o d involves t h e relation of his virtue to
its r e w a r d . T h e p r o b l e m for m a n is that his empirical e x p e r i e n c e
suggests t h a t n e i t h e r in his o w n particular case n o r in t h e universal

The Unity of Mankind 33 7

case of his species a r e t h e prospects of such a j u s t world e n c o u r a g -
ing. It r e m a i n s , however, t h a t it is a l t o g e t h e r h u m a n to askover
a n d above " W h a t s h o u l d I d o ? " t h e question " W h a t may I h o p e ? "
T h a t question m u s t n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e will, b u t it is certainly a ra-
tional q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e subject may ask a b o u t t h e disposition of
affairs in the cosmos. K a n t believed t h e question " W h a t may I
h o p e ? " was legitimate a n d i n d e e d inevitable in m a n as a finite ra-
tional b e i n g . Such a question, however, was at least as speculative as
it was p r a c t i c a l . Ultimately, it involved a religious, n o t merely a
80

m o r a l d i m e n s i o n . H e n c e , in t h e highest g o o d as t h e p r o b l e m of in-
dividual r e w a r d , t h e link b e t w e e n morality a n d religion is at its most
salient.
K a n t a r g u e d t h a t "speculative r e a s o n " would n o t find the plau-
sibility of t h e "highest g o o d " confirmed by a n inspection of t h e real
world, a n d it w o u l d t h e r e f o r e e i t h e r t h i n k it "an u n g r o u n d e d a n d
vain, t h o u g h well-meant, e x p e c t a t i o n " or have to satisfy itself t h a t
t h e r e was a G o d to m a k e it right. If it could n o t convince itself of
God, "it would r e g a r d t h e m o r a l law itself as t h e m e r e deception of
o u r r e a s o n in a practical a s p e c t . " Kant claimed t h a t despair could
81

i n d u c e m a n n o t to strive to live u p to his duty. " [ A l t h o u g h t h e n e -

cessity of d u t y is very plain for practical r e a s o n , yet t h e a t t a i n m e n t
of its final p u r p o s e , so far as it is n o t altogether in o u r power, is only
a s s u m e d o n behalf of t h e practical use of reason, a n d t h e r e f o r e is
n o t so practically necessary as d u t y itself." K a n t t h e r e f o r e a r g u e d
82

t h a t m a n h a d to expect some success in his e n d e a v o r s o r h e would

s u c c u m b to despair. T h e n o t i o n of t h e highest g o o d served as a se-
curity t h a t such success would a t t e n d m a n ' s project of m o r a l virtue.
K a n t s o u g h t to d e f e n d his view by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the plight of a
putative " r i g h t e o u s atheist" (such as Spinoza):

[H]is effort is b o u n d e d ; a n d from n a t u r e , a l t h o u g h h e may

e x p e c t h e r e a n d t h e r e a c o n t i n g e n t accordance, h e can never
e x p e c t a r e g u l a r h a r m o n y a g r e e i n g according to constant
rules . . . with t h e p u r p o s e t h a t h e yet feels himself obliged
a n d impelled to accomplish. Deceit, violence, a n d envy will al-
ways s u r r o u n d h i m , a l t h o u g h h e himself be honest, peace-
able, a n d kindly; a n d t h e r i g h t e o u s m e n with w h o m h e meets
will, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g all their worthiness of h a p p i n e s s , b e yet
subjected by n a t u r e , which r e g a r d s n o t this, to all t h e evils of
want, disease, a n d untimely d e a t h , j u s t like the beasts of the
e a r t h . So it will b e until o n e wide grave engulfs t h e m t o g e t h e r
(honest o r not, it m a k e s n o difference). . . T h e p u r p o s e , t h e n ,

338 The Critique of Judgment

 which this well-intentioned p e r s o n h a d a n d o u g h t to have be-
fore h i m in his p u r s u i t of m o r a l laws, h e m u s t certainly give
u p as i m p o s s i b l e .83

K a n t believed t h a t without G o d this "tragic" d i l e m m a would occa-

sion cynicism a n d t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of m o r a l righteousness. It
n e e d n o t . It s h o u l d n o t . It certainly does n o t abolish t h e d u t y
8 4 8 5

entailed by t h e m o r a l law, for t h a t is a priori a n d i n e l u c t a b l e . B u t 86

Kant's profession of despair of such tragic e n d u r a n c e is consistent

with his religious b a c k g r o u n d a n d culture. T h e Christian origin of
this whole constellation of considerations is n o t to b e overlooked 8 7

K a n t clearly relates the ethical life to t h e p r o b l e m of radical evil a n d

t h e Christian n o t i o n s of a t o n e m e n t a n d s a l v a t i o n . 88

W h a t is K a n t really c o n c e r n e d a b o u t in this t r e a t m e n t of t h e
"highest good"? While it would a p p e a r that h e is c o n c e r n e d with
t h e p r o b l e m of psychological despair t h a t results w h e n morality
c o m m a n d s things which a r e too h a r d for the n a t u r a l subject, o n e
m u s t w o n d e r a b o u t this. K a n t is rigoristic in his m o r a l t h e o r y . At 89

t h e s a m e time, h e clearly has n o s y m p a t h y for m a n ' s n a t u r a l

n e e d s . H e barely m a k e s r o o m for t h e m within his s c h e m e of m o -
9 0

rality. T h a t h e s h o u l d nevertheless m a k e such a n issue of psycho-

logical discomfort suggest t h a t h e m u s t have a n ulterior motive to
secure rational access to two very h i g h desiderata of his c u l t u r e a n d
his religion: t h e immortality of t h e soul a n d the existence of a
t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d . T h e s e were principles which his t h e -
oretical p h i l o s o p h y could n o t secure as objectively real. T h e y ex-
isted at best as "ideas of r e a s o n " with a regulative a n d subjective
value for r e a s o n . T h a t did n o t suffice for Kant or for t h e c u l t u r e to
which h e was c o m m i t t e d . H e n c e h e n e e d e d to find a way to provide
t h e m objective reality in t h e critical philosophy. K a n t s o u g h t a p a t h
to t h a t r e i n t e g r a t i o n via t h e " p r o b l e m of t h e highest good."
I n t h e Third Critique, Kant is really c o n c e r n e d with the kind of
world which would exist were e v e r y o n e to be fully m o r a l . I n a world
of full worthiness, everyone s h o u l d also be p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y h a p p y .
W h a t is r e q u i r e d to c o m p e l t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r to m a k e h a p p i n e s s for
m a n as a species a real possibility is n o t h i n g less t h a n God. It m i g h t
t h e n take all m a n ' s strivings to actualize that possibility, a n d h e n c e
his skill a n d his merit would b e entailed, b u t G o d m u s t provide t h e
crucial metaphysical security for t h e whole project. T h e realization
of t h e "highest g o o d " would accordingly b e c o m e t h e realization of
t h e " K i n g d o m of G o d in this world." Kant's philosophy culminates,
it would a p p e a r , in t h e affirmation of some crucial tenets of t h e

The Unity of Mankind 339

 Christian religion, t h o u g h ostensibly "within t h e limits of reason
a l o n e . " Rational belief in G o d a n d t h e immortality of t h e soul finds
justification in t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of practical reason to realize t h e
h i g h e s t g o o d . T h e objective reality of these spiritual n o u m e n a is to
be "postulated."
T h e u l t i m a t e question of t h e "highest g o o d " can be t a k e n to b e
t h e c o h e r e n c e of t h e cosmos itself a n d its absolute worth. T h e q u e s -
tion t h e n b e c o m e s o n e of the unity of n a t u r e a n d freedom, t h a t real
u n i t y of t h e supersensible at t h e g r o u n d of n a t u r e with that at t h e
g r o u n d of f r e e d o m . T h e ideal of t h e highest good r e p r e s e n t s in
this light n o t only t h e idea of a n ultimate wholeness a b o u t the
cosmos, b u t of a prior, g r o u n d i n g wholeness at its origin. T h i s
wholeness, t h e ens perfectissimum of classical metaphysics a n d t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t - p e r s o n a l G o d of o r t h o d o x Christianity, was obvi-
ously, again, b e y o n d t h e pale of a r i g o r o u s epistemology, o n c e
a g a i n " d o g m a t i c m e t a p h y s i c s . " B u t t h a t did n o t keep K a n t from
91

p u r s u i n g these questions, n o t only in t h e Third Critique b u t also in

t h e work which took u p w h e r e it left off, Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone. T h e r e K a n t used t h e idea of t h e "highest g o o d " to ar-
ticulate a n eschatological sense of t h e c o n s u m m a t e wholeness of
t h e cosmos, t h e c o m i n g of Utopia, the " K i n g d o m of G o d o n E a r t h . "
In this context, religion m e r g e d with a notion of a freely chosen fu-
t u r e . Secular a n d sacred history c o n v e r g e d .
T h e core of Kant's a r g u m e n t is t h e suggestion that m a n n e e d e d
Divine P r o v i d e n c e in o r d e r psychologically to motivate t h e actual
will to persist in t h e c o u r s e of virtue. T h e obvious objection is, of
c o u r s e , t h a t psychological n e e d is n o t a logical a r g u m e n t . T h i s o b -
j e c t i o n was m a d e by W i z e n m a n n against t h e Kantians in t h e con-
text of t h e P a n t h e i s m C o n t r o v e r s y . Beck is correct to invoke it
92

against this particular form of t h e Kantian a r g u m e n t for t h e high-

est g o o d . W o o d tries to d e f e n d this a r g u m e n t by u r g i n g that it is
9 3

n o t psychological b u t m o r a l , a n " a b s u r d u m p r a c t i c u m " which r e -

sults t h e m o m e n t o n e accepts m o r a l d u t y in t h e context of a recal-
citrant w o r l d . B u t t h e ulterior, religious-dogmatic c o m m i t m e n t
94

clearly i n t r u d e s into Kant's m o r a l a r g u m e n t . Beck is quite correct

to a r g u e t h a t at t h e very least t h e religious sense of t h e highest g o o d
(reward for merit) was not necessary to g r o u n d m o r a l obligation,
b u t p a r t of a "practical-dogmatic metaphysics" which s o u g h t to
b r i n g theoretical a n d practical reason t o g e t h e r i n t o a unity. F o r
Beck, this unity is merely a "dialectical Ideal of r e a s o n . " U p - 95

h o l d i n g Beck's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Jeffrie M u r p h y calls it a n "aesthetic

i d e a l . " T h a t is, t h e motive b e h i n d t h e idea of t h e highest g o o d was
96

340 The Critique of Judgment

n o t ethical b u t speculative, a n d t h e sense of " t i g h t n e s s " s o u g h t was
n o t m o r a l o r even theoretical b u t " a e s t h e t i c . " Moreover, t h e doc-
97

trinal c o m m i t m e n t a n d its contextual motive a r e particularly clear.

A c c o r d i n g to A u x t e r , in t h e Second Critique " t h e distinction be-
tween the m o r a l ideal of t h e A n a l y t i c ' a n d t h e religious ideal of t h e
'Dialectic' c a n n o t be too strongly insisted u p o n . " While h e denies
9 8

t h e h i g h e s t g o o d conceived in t h e latter, h e reformulates t h e notion

of t h e objectification of m o r a l principle in t e r m s of Kant's idea of
"ectypal n a t u r e . " T h e " m o r a l ideal" was indispensable for Kant's
" m o r a l teleology," i.e., for t h e actualization of m o r a l p u r p o s e s in
t h e world of sense, a n d h e n c e w a r r a n t e d a notion of t h e "highest
g o o d " as t h e ideal expressing t h e goal in actuality. B u t t h e "re-
ligious ideal" p o i n t e d in directions which were n o t strictly necessary
to Kant's m o r a l philosophy a n d h a d , for Auxter, a blatantly d o g -
matic metaphysical c h a r a c t e r . It is very difficult, in light of all this,
99

to resist t h e view t h a t Kant's Third Critique, a n d above all its "ethical

t u r n , " intensely h i g h l i g h t e d all t h e metaphysical issues in t h e "crit-
ical philosophy." Kant's contextual struggles a n d his p e r s o n a l com-
m i t m e n t s to a "theistic" if n o t o u t r i g h t Christian p o s t u r e strongly
colored t h e u l t i m a t e s h a p e of t h e work.

The Unity of Mankind 341

 Conclusion

T H E ULTIMATE MEANING
OF T H E THIRD CRITIQUE

T
h e Third Critique finds its decisive c o n c e r n s n e i t h e r in
questions of beauty n o r in questions of empirical biology,
b u t r a t h e r in t h e ultimate questions of t h e place of m a n in
t h e o r d e r of t h e w o r l d h i s f r e e d o m a n d his destiny. T h e
evidence a m a s s e d in t h a t e n d e a v o r r a n g e s from t h e i m p r o m p t u
b e a u t y of n a t u r e to t h e intractable purposiveness of organisms to
t h e mysterious n a t u r a l gift of genius. Across it all, however, n a t u r e
serves only as a m i r r o r : its purposiveness as a sign of o u r p u r p o s e ,
its b e a u t y as t h e symbol of morality. T h e design of n a t u r e a n d even
its very chaos give occasion for reflection u p o n t h e sublime p o w e r
of f r e e d o m a n d for a stern consideration of its p r o p e r uses. T h e
Third Critique t h u s stands as Kant's m a s t e r work o n m a n ' s c o m p l e x
being-in-the-world.
If this r e a d i n g of t h e ethical t u r n a n d consequently of t h e ulti-
m a t e p u r p o s e of t h e Critique offudgment is valid, it goes a long way
t o w a r d establishing t h a t t h e occasion for Idealism lay within t h e p h i -
losophy of K a n t himself. Despite c o n t e m p o r a r y inclinations to dis-
t i n g u i s h K a n t from his Idealist successors, t h e continuity from t h e
later K a n t to t h e Idealists is very clear. T h e "sage of Knigsberg"
h a d definite ontological a n d theological preferences, which be-
c a m e increasingly explicit over t h e 1780s a n d took o n exceptional
p r o m i n e n c e in t h e Third Critique (1790).
Kant's Third Critique was a work of g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e n o t only in
its influence o n t h e s u c c e e d i n g g e n e r a t i o n of G e r m a n Idealism a n d
Romanticism b u t also in its revision of t h e K a n t i a n philosophy.
T h e r e a r e s t r o n g g r o u n d s for t h e view t h a t Kant's t h i n k i n g evolved
b e y o n d t h e p o s t u r e of t h e First Critique, a n d t h a t a historical a p p r e -
ciation of his philosophizing m u s t take into a c c o u n t a t e n d e n c y in
his later t h o u g h t to try to resolve certain d i l e m m a s of dualism

342
which h a u n t e d t h a t first g r e a t effort. T h a t t e n d e n c y , u n d e r t h e
1

aegis of such t e r m s as t h e "unity of reason," t h e "primacy of practi-

cal r e a s o n , " a n d "intrinsic purposiveness," d r e w K a n t close to t h e
kinds of speculations in metaphysics which his " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Di-
alectic" of t h e First Critique h a d proscribed. It is well to u n d e r s t a n d
t h a t K a n t m a i n t a i n e d into t h e Third Critique his distinction of
" t h o u g h t " from " k n o w l e d g e , " a n d h e n c e a d h e r e d to t h e essential
critical p o s t u r e a b o u t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of r e a s o n b e y o n d sensible
intuition. Nevertheless, t h e d e g r e e of d e t e r m i n a c y to which his
t h i n k i n g e d g e d in t h e discussion of t h e " s u p e r s e n s i b l e " b o t h
within m a n a n d as a g r o u n d w i t h o u t which the c o h e r e n c e of knowl-
e d g e even of t h e sensible world would be impossiblesuggests t h a t
his critical stance h a d to it a n e l e m e n t of transparency, b e n e a t h
which a p r o f o u n d l y metaphysical Kantianism lay clear for any w h o
wished to see it.
T h e r e w e r e two aspects of metaphysics in Kant's philosophy.
First, metaphysics was involved in t h e entailment of the empirical: in
t h e actualization of reason, w h e t h e r theoretical or practical. T h i s 2

was t h e front o n which K a n t m e t H u m e a n d s o u g h t to rescue t h e

possibility of valid k n o w l e d g e . Second, metaphysics involved access
to the transcendent: g r a s p i n g those f u n d a m e n t a l ideas indispensable
for h u m a n m e a n i n g b u t inaccessible to material m e a s u r e m e n t .
H e r e K a n t c o n f r o n t e d t h e d o g m a t i c metaphysicians of "school p h i -
l o s o p h y " a n d t h e whole h e r i t a g e of traditional Western m e t a -
physics. I n t h e First Critique h e h a d salvaged t h e first kind of
metaphysics a n d scuttled t h e second. Nevertheless, h e acknowl-
e d g e d even in t h e First Critique t h a t h u m a n beings could n o t r e -
n o u n c e t h e questions raised in t h e second vein, a n d h e m a d e
provision t h a t we m i g h t "think" a b o u t these, t h o u g h such t h o u g h t
would be vain of all k n o w l e d g e . Such a conclusion, h e assured his
r e a d e r s , m a d e r o o m forfaith. T h a t this faith should also b e rational
was p e r h a p s a piety even e x c e e d i n g t h e notion t h a t faith could
serve at all. T o o m u c h t h a t was vital to h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e h a d b e e n
sealed off from rational consideration by t h e First Critique, a n d we
can only m a k e sense of t h e n e x t twenty years of Kant's t h i n k i n g
w h e n we realize t h a t h e h a d to rebuild rational structures to access
t h e s e d o m a i n s a n d t h a t his later works were devoted to this task.
Epistemologically, grave reservations can be raised against t h e
p o s t u r e of t h e First Critique. I n this study, t h r e e such p r o b l e m s have
surfaced r e p e a t e d l y : t h e p r o b l e m of a singular intuition, t h e p r o b -
lem of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n (the u t t e r disjunction of r e a s o n
a n d sense), a n d t h e p r o b l e m of self-consciousness (the unity of t h e

Conclusion 343
 subject). K a n t h a d modified his stance o n each of these questions,
in my view, by t h e Third Critique. O n t h e first, his theory of reflective
j u d g m e n t r e p r e s e n t e d a major effort to revise his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of p e r c e p t i o n . O n the second, his n o t i o n of
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n s " allowed h i m to take into the critical
p h i l o s o p h y crucial new aspects of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d relate
t h e m to a m u c h m o r e d y n a m i c a n d integral t h e o r y of r e a s o n in
which t h e two key t e r m s w e r e system a n d p u r p o s e . O u t of this
e m e r g e d t h e crucial idea of "intrinsic p u r p o s e , " which expressed a
view of holism a n d i m m a n e n t causality distinctly i n c o n g r u o u s with
his t h e o r y of categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e b u t which
p r o v e d indispensable b o t h for a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c c o u n t of reason
a n d for a n empirical a c c o u n t of o r g a n i s m s . Finally, o n t h e t h i r d is-
sue, K a n t elaborated substantially o n his idea of practical reason
over t h e d e c a d e of t h e 1780s, a n d t h e g l i m m e r of belief in "practical
a p p e r c e p t i o n " which surfaced in t h e First Critique took o n m o r e in-
tensity a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l w a r r a n t in t h e Second. T h e Third Critique
s u p p l e m e n t e d this "practical a p p e r c e p t i o n " with a theory of self-
consciousness via reflection o n subjective states (Geistesgefhl), e n -
r i c h i n g a n d confirming Kant's central conviction of m a n ' s m o r a l
essence as a n end-in-himself. With his idea of Geist all these m e t a -
physical impulses c a m e to t h e i r c o n s u m m a t i o n , for it was the idea
of t h e "unity of t h e supersensible g r o u n d " of which h e spoke in t h e
I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e Third Critique a n d in t h e "Dialectic of Aesthetic
J u d g m e n t " as t h a t to which r e a s o n "forced" t h o u g h t a b o u t t h e fun-
d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e of k n o w l e d g e a n d being.
As Michaelson has p u t it, " F o r K a n t to have posited such a com-
m o n g r o u n d would have involved h i m in t h e creation of a h i g h e r
metaphysical unity m o r e characteristic of H e g e l t h a n of the a u t h o r
of t h e Critique of Pure Reason." I n t h e Third Critique K a n t at times
3

did c o m e very close to s o u n d i n g like a H e g e l i a n Idealist. Patrick

Riley recognizes, too, t h a t in t h e Third Critique, a n d especially in
57, t h e discussion of t h e supersensible in t h e "Dialectic of Aes-
thetic J u d g m e n t , " K a n t c a m e closest to H e g e l in recognizing t h e r e -
ality of r e a s o n . Yovel articulates t h r o u g h o u t his study of Kant's
4

p h i l o s o p h y of history t h a t i m p e t u s in his work which f o u n d e x p r e s -

sion in H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y . With the Third Critique K a n t signaled
5

to his heirs t h e vision they w e r e to try to realize. Kantianism itself

m a d e Idealism inevitable. R e a d i n g t h e Third Critique created a n
u r g e n t a n d specific philosophical p r o b l e m for Kant's successors. 6

By d e m o n s t r a t i n g at t h e very least t h e intensity a n d u r g e n c y with

which K a n t took u p these questions in his work, this study has

344 Conclusion
s h o w n t h a t K a n t i n addition to, a n d p e r h a p s even in conscious
supersession of, his epistemological scruplescarried within his
system t h e g e r m s of t h a t metaphysics which his i m m e d i a t e disciples
c r e a t e d largely in his n a m e : G e r m a n Idealism.
T h e m o s t p r o f o u n d way to express this from within Kantia-
nism would b e to say t h a t K a n t recognized that t h e most i m p o r t a n t
m a t t e r s a b o u t t h e ultimate reality of t h e universe a n d a b o u t m a n
himself w e r e b e y o n d t h e limits of m e r e cognitive j u d g m e n t , b u t
t h a t n o t only t h e u r g e n c y of practical life b u t t h e most rigorous p u r -
suit of this strictly cognitive function compelled m a n to recognize
his m e m b e r s h i p in t h a t ultimate reality a n d h e n c e to t r a n s c e n d t h e
limitations of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For K a n t that realization took o n
a religious d i m e n s i o n . For his successors it r e m a i n e d a philosophi-
cal o n e . W h a t K a n t believed, they s o u g h t rationally to d e f e n d . His
successors wished to reestablish those beliefs at t h e c e n t e r of phi-
losophy in t e r m s of reason's o w n reality. W h a t K a n t h a d locked
away in a n inaccessible t r a n s c e n d e n c e , they retrieved as a trans-
figuring i m m a n e n c e .
Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e idea of a "unity of r e a s o n " is n o t
q u e s t i o n e d even by so epistemologically stringent a n i n t e r p r e t e r as
Beck. H e simply says t h a t K a n t could never achieve it. T h a t it was a
7

very serious philosophical a n d "systemic" p r e o c c u p a t i o n of K a n t

from at least t h e time of t h e Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals
forward is clear. T h e r e K a n t asserted the necessity for t h e critical
elucidation of t h e unity of r e a s o n . T h e Second Critique reaffirmed
8

his c o m m i t m e n t . B u t t h e ambition was n o t completely realized

9

t h e r e . Beck believes t h e a m b i t i o n was misguided in t h e first place,

a n d h e n c e incapable of realization. Yet in t h e Third Critique Kant
m a d e his most s t r e n u o u s effort to achieve t h e unity of r e a s o n . 10

T h o s e very e l e m e n t s of epistemological scruple t h a t Beck praises,

t h e g e n e r a t i o n of y o u n g Idealists after 1790 would see as Kant's r e -
n e g i n g o n his o w n d e e p e s t i n s i g h t s .
11

" T h e rational is r e a l " t h a t is o n e half of Hegel's objective ide-

alism, t h e subjective half. K a n t h a d in fact g o n e very far toward
g r o u n d i n g t h a t subjective idealism, a n d it is this i m p e t u s in his
t h i n k i n g which I have tried to recover in as m u c h systematic detail
as Kant allowed to escape his o w n self-censorship. T h e reality of
r e a s o n is t h e key issue in t h e p r o b l e m of self-consciousness in Kant.
I n d e e d , it is exactly h e r e t h a t t h e most a u t h e n t i c challenge to K a n t
m u s t be m a d e : w h a t is the ontological status of p u r e reason itself?
K a n t vacillated b e t w e e n a merely logical a n d a n ontological c o n c e p -
tion of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l unity of a p p e r c e p t i o n . T h a t vacillation

Conclusion 345
p r o v e d u n a c c e p t a b l e to his successors in Idealism. T h e y o p t e d for
t h e ontological c o n c e p t i o n as t h e only o n e capable of sustaining t h e
e n t i r e architectonic of systematic philosophy, a n d as the only o n e
which recognized t h e full rights of reason. If, as Kant in fact be-
lieved, it c o n s t i t u t e d a spiritual b e i n g with t h e p o w e r to c h a n g e t h e
world (of e x p e r i e n c e ) , t h e n it was utterly prejudicial to its dignity,
its a u t o n o m y , a n d its ultimate significance to d e n y it reality a n d
r e c k o n it merely a formal s t r u c t u r e latent in empirical e x p e r i e n c e .
K a n t offered r e m a r k a b l e insights into t h e n a t u r e a n d p o w e r of rea-
son, b u t his fear of dialectical hypostasis h e l d h i m back from a full
ontological c o m m i t m e n t to t h e reality of reason, at least cognitively.
B u t w h a t K a n t believed, a n d t h e vivid formulation of those beliefs
in his works, s e e m e d to his followers to cry o u t for a m o r e whole-
h e a r t e d articulation a n d defense. I n Kant's own work they believed
they could see t h e basis for such a stance. T h e y c a m e to believe t h a t
t h e involuntary s p o n t a n e i t y K a n t associated with the active, t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l subject s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d , t o g e t h e r with t h e essen-
tial, ontological g r o u n d of h u m a n n a t u r e , as Geist. T h a t is, they
identified g e n e r a t i v e ("spontaneous") a n d systemic r e a s o n with t h e
metaphysical g r o u n d of being.

346 Conclusion
 Sfr Notes

Abbreviation and Citation Format

Sources are cited in abbreviated form in the notes and given with full de-
tails in the bibliography. German titles for Kant's works indicate that I am
translating from the original; English titles indicate that the reference is to
a translation. The following particular conventions are used:
Critique ofJudgment, [no]:[page][GR = General Remark] = Bernard trans-
lation
Critique of Judgment, [no]:M[page][GR = General Remark] = Meredith
translation. All citations from this translation amend "judgement" to
"judgment" for uniformity.
A.A. [vol]:[page] = Kants Gesammelte Schriften Herausgegeben von der Preu-
ischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. (Akademie Ausgabe).
Hauptschriften = Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismus Streit zwischen Jacobi und
Mendelssohn. Ed. Heinrich Scholz.

Introduction

1. In English, N. Kemp-Smith's Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure

Reason is the most obvious instance; he derived his approach from German
scholars of the close of the nineteenth century like E. Adickes and H.
Vaihinger.
2. For example: T. Cohen and P. Guyer, eds., Essays in Kant's Aesthetics,
esp. "Introduction," 113; P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste; and E.
Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics.
3. In addition to the works cited above, see F. Coleman, The Harmony of
Reason; D. Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory; K. Rogerson, Kant's Aesthetics;
and M. McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic.
4. See especially K. Dsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Welthegriff; P.
Heintel, Die Bedeutung; W. Bartuschat, Zum Systematischen Ort; H. Mertens,
Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung; F. Kaulbach, sthetische Welterkenntnis bei
Kant; A. Model, Metaphysik und reflektierende Urteilskraft; and the exchange

347
between in R. Horstmann and R. Brandt in E. Frster, ed., Kant's Transcen-
dental Deductions, 157-190.
5. The Germans have been attentive to this systematic importance of
teleology and the Third Critique since the late nineteenth century: see A.
Stadler, Kants Teleologie.
6. Among the older German works the following are most important:
R. Odebrecht, Form und Geist; K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien; and G.
Lehmann, Kants Nachlawerk and his collected essays, Beitrge.
7. Writing of the young Friedrich Nietzsche, M. Silk and J. Stern have
noted: "'Aesthetics'... is not confined to art, not even to 'art as a whole.' It
runs into history, psychology and moral philosophy, into life itself. . . the
most significant of German 'aesthetic' enquiries have invariably moved be-
yond 'aesthetic' in the narrow sense, and often into a quest for the 'whole
man.'" M. Silk and J. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy, 35. It is just this sense of
'aesthetic' that the young Idealists drew out of Kant, especially out of his
Third Critique, to create Idealism. See E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlighten-
ment, 332, for a similar contention.
8. See especially P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy; Y. Yovel, Kant and
the Philosophy of History; H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy; W.
Booth, Interpreting the World: Kant's Philosophy of History and Politics; A.
Wood, Kant's Moral Religion; T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology; and M.
Despland Kant on History and Religion.
9. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology.
10. See G. Schrder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment."
11. See, for example, J. McFarland, "The Bogus Unity."
12. A new and very important effort to draw out the implications
of Kant's teleology for hermeneutics, based on the Third Critique, is R.
Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.
13. M. Souriau, Lejugement reflechissant; F. van de Pitte, Kant as Philo-
sophical Anthropologist; F. Williams, "Philosophical Anthropology"; E.
Cassirer, "Critical Idealism."
14. Kant, letter to K. L. Reinhold, December 28-31, 1787, in Brief-
wechsel, A.A. 10:513-15.
15. Windelband, "Einleitung in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft"; G.
Lehmann, "Einleitung zur Ersten Einleitung."
16. J. Meredith, "Last Stages," xxxvii1.
17. G. Tonelli, "La formazione."
18. See Kant's letters to K. L. Reinhold, May 12,1789 (A.A. 11:39) and
M. Herz, May 26, 1789 (A.A. 11:48).
19. Kant was also embroiled in his controversy with Eberhard at this
time, which helps to account for the substantial delay, from October 1789
to January 1790, in Kant's dispatch of the manuscript of the Third Critique.
20. Tonelli, "La formazione," 444.
21. E. Schulz, "Kant und die Berliner Aufklrung." On Lessing's role
in the Aufklrung, see H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment. On the
whole Aufklrung see H. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung, and J. Schober, Die
deutsche Sptaufklrung (1770-1790). F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, sees the
period as one in which Aufklrung, despite Kant, suffered defeat, but

348 Notes to Pages 3-8

Kant certainly did not see it that way, and it is certainly arguable that the
generation of the Idealists did not either.
22. In his observations about the genesis of the Third Critique, J.
Meredith wrote: "an attack on the leaders of the Sturm und Drang move-
ment was almost certainly meditated from the start" ("Last Stages," xli).
See R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang. See also H. Korff, Geist der
Goethezeit, vol. 1.
23. See especially K. Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant; E. Cassirer, Kant's Life
and Thought; and W. Ritzel, Kant, eine Biographie. For an overview of Kant
biographies see R. George, "The Lives of Kant." But George, like the biog-
raphers themselves, concludes: "Not much can be said about Kant's per-
sonal development in [the 1780s] that would aid us in understanding his
work; there are no external influences to be recounted and, indeed, devo-
tion to the work itself left little room for other matters" (493). I strongly
disagree.
24. For a similar position, see G. Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," in
Beitrge, 41121. Lehmann argues that Kant's biography takes on great
relevance after the publication of the First Critique in 1781.
25. The best account of the early reaction to Kant's philosophy is B.
Erdmann, Kants Kriticismus, esp. 98128. See also K. Vorlnder, Immanuel
Kant, 406-30.
26. In addition to Erdmann, see H. de Vleeschauwer, La deduction
transcendentale, 497535.
27. Kant to Mendelssohn, Aug. 16, 1783, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:346.
28. See Kant's correspondence, esp. with Johann Schulz about a pop-
ularization of the First Critique, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:34854.
29. K. Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant, 317n. Some Kant scholars have min-
imized the reliability of this report (e.g., A. Tumarkin, Herder und Kant, 23).
But there is too much intensity about Kant's preoccupation with Herder. It
has a long and important history which we must unearth.
30. See L. Beck, Commentary, 5657; and esp. F. Beiser, Fate of Reason,
165225, for discussion of Kant's critics and his attitude toward them.
31. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to A-version, Ax.
32. Kant, Prolegomena, 6 - 8 (A.A. 4:261-62).
33. A brilliant pursuit of that connection is G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics
and History, 92-178.
34. For a similar conclusion, see Beiser, Fate of Reason, 153-64.
35. On Lessing I have relied upon W. Dilthey, Das Erlebnis unddie Dich-
tung, 18123; H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment; K. Aner, Die The-
ologie der Lessingzeit; and E. Zeller, "Lessing als Theolog."
36. For a recent study of the Spinoza controversy see H. Timm, Gott
und die Freiheit, vol. 1, and on its role in the philosophy of the period,
Beiser, Fate of Reason.
37. See H. Brunschwig, La crise de l'Etat prussien and R. Koselleck,
Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution.
38. SeeT. Greene, "Historical Context."
39. Kant, "Was heit: sich im Denken orientieren?" A.A. 8:143n.
40. The Pantheism Controversy did contribute to Kant's popularity,

Notes to Pages 8-12 349

because K. L. Reinhold used that dispute to highlight the strengths of the
Kantian position in his Briefe ber die kantische Philosophie. See Beiser, Fate of
Reason, 45, 233.
41. By the time Mme. de Stael made her historic survey of Germany,
this cultural identity was not only available but prominent. See de Stael's
classic account, Of Germany.
42. See W. Dilthey, "Die dichterische und philosophische Bewegung,"
11-27; W. Windelband, Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie; E. Troeltsch,
"Der deutsche Idealismus"; F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National
State; E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form; K. Vorlnder, Kant-Schiller-Goethe.
43. For the social context see M. Walker, German Home Towns and W.
Bruford, Germany in the Eighteenth Century. For the social character of the
intellectuals, see esp. H. Gerth, Die sozialgeschichtliche Lage and H. Holborn,
"German Idealism," 1-32; and on Weimar "classicism," see W. Bruford,
Culture and Society in Classical Weimar, 17751806.
44. E. Aron, Die deutsche Erweckung; J. Taminiaux, La nostalgie de la
Grece; and H. Hatfield, Winckelmann and his German Critics.
45. This key term, Bildung, is at the heart of German Idealism. See the
classic accounts of its significance: F. Paulsen, "Bildung"; see also E.
Troeltsch, Deutsche Bildung, and H. Weil, Die Entstehung des deutschen
Bildungsprinzips. For a recent bibliographical essay on this concept, see R.
Vierhaus, "Bildung."
46. See part 2 of Meinecke's Entstehung des Historismus, for the most
extended statement of this. For a recent and penetrating assessment of
these matters, see P. Reill, The German Enlightenment. Unsympathetic is the
account by G. Iggers, The German Conception of History.
47. The literature on Schiller and Kant is vast. Some views which have
clarified the issues for me are: K. Vorlnder, "Ethischer Rigorismus und
sittlicher Schnheit"; E. Cassirer, "Die Methodik des Idealismus in
Schillers Philosophischen Schriften"; P. Menzer, "Schiller und Kant"; E.
Schaper, "Schiller's Kant: A Chapter in the History of Creative Misunder-
standing," in Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 99117; and D. Henrich,
"Beauty and Freedom."
48. J. W. von Goethe, "Einwirkung der neueren Philosophic" The
historiography of the deutsche Bewegung and of Idealism places enormous
stress on the link between Kant's Third Critique and Goethe. A. Bumler
wrote: "The Critique ofJudgment and Goethethat means the thought and
its existential expression. In their division as in their unity with equal sig-
nificance Kant and Goethe come before us as symbols of our historical exis-
tence . . . One could never fathom Kant from the vantage of Goethe. On
the other hand it is easy enough to grasp Goethe from Kant's vantage. Kant
knew nothing personally or actually about Goethe, but he thought him.
Goethe's having been thought by Kant is perhaps the greatest and most
significant occurrence of German intellectual history" (Kants Kritik der Ur-
teilskraft, vi-vii). Windelband, in his history of philosophy, also made this
connection, as E. Cassirer has noted: "Kant's Critique ofJudgment. . . con-
structs, as it were, a priori the concept of Goethe's poetry, and . . . what the
latter presents as achievement and act is founded and demanded in the for-
mer by the pure necessity of philosophical thought" (Philosophy of the

350 Notes to Pages 13-14

Enlightenment, 278). See also E. Cassirer, "Goethe and the Kantian Philoso-
phy"; K. Vorlnder, "Goethe und Kant"; and F.J. v. Rintelen, "Kant and
Goethe."
49. See R. Bubner, ed., Das lteste Systemprogramm.
50. F. Beiser notes: "If one were a Kantian in the early 1790s, the main
question was no longer how to defend Kant against his enemies, but how to
rebuild the critical philosophy from within upon a new foundation. The
center of interest thus shifted from external defense toward inner reform.
Reinhold's demand for a new foundation was indeed the starting point for
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Although they disagreed with Reinhold con-
cerning the nature ofthat foundation, they accepted his contention that it
was a necessity" (Fate of Reason, 227).
51. See Kant's public letter against Fichte, Aug. 7, 1799, in Brief-
wechsel, A.A. 12:396-97 (Philosophical Correspondence, 25354).
52. On the idea of an "aesthetic solution" see G. Rohrmoser, "Zum
Problem der sthetischen Vershnung"; and F. Strack, sthetik und Freiheit.
53. The classic locus is, of course, Schelling's System of Transcendental
Idealism [ 1800], but perhaps just as crucial and not so well known is his Phi-
losophy ofArt [1802-3].

One: Kant and the Pursuit of Aufklrung

1. As P. Gay proposed in his important study, The Enlightenment. Gay
acknowledged a great debt to E. Cassirer's classic Philosophy of the Enlighten-
ment but dissented from him on this question (see Gay, 1:544). Cassirer's
assessments are nevertheless far more apt on this point.
2. See the classic essay by E. Troeltsch, "The Ideas of Natural Law and
Humanity in World Politics." See also the important effort to establish a
history of specifically German philosophy: L. Beck, Early German Philoso-
phy, upon which I have drawn heavily, though occasionally in dissent.
3. On the Pietist movement, see F. Stoeffler, The Rise ofEvangelical Pie-
tism and German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century. On university culture,
see the classic work by F. Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts, and the
recent study, C. McClelland, State, Society and University in Germany, 1700
1914.
4. On the religious orientation of the German Aufklrung see K.
Aner, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit; W. Philipp, Das Werden der Aufklrung in
theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht; K. Barth, Protestant Thought from Rousseau to
Ritsehl; and W. Ltgert, Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende.
5. W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Groe," esp. 134ff.
6. On the conflict between Wolff and Thomasius, see esp. Hans Wolff,
Die Weltanschauung, 109-71.
7. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 394-402.
8. Tonelli mentions A. Reinhard in particular in his article "Crusius,
Christian August."
9. L. Beck has pointed to Crusius's importance in distinguishing the
formal logical relation between ground and consequence from the "syn-
thetic" or ontological relation between cause and effect. Kant would follow
out this distinction all the way to the key notion of "synthetic a priori judg-
ment" (Early German Philosophy, 396-99).

Notes to Pages 14-19 351

 10. See R. Popkin, History of Scepticism, for a penetrating account of the
connection between skepticism and fideism in the early modern period.
11. G. Tonelli, "Crusius," 269.
12. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 439.
13. "Kant, educated in the Pietistic, eclectic, and anti-Wolffian milieu
of Knigsberg University, was mainly trying . . . to counteract Wolffian
philosophy . . . [He] appealed both to recent anti-Wolffian trends
Maupertuis and his Berlin circle and through Maupertuis to Newton
and to Crusius, the new leader of Pietist philosophy . . . whose reputation
grew tremendously from 1744 on" (G. Tonelli, "Crusius," 270). See also G.
Tonelli, "Die Umwlzung von 1769 bei Kant." (Both brief articles present
the results of his monograph, Kant, dall' estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoem-
pirica, Memorie delta Academia delle scienze di Torino, series 3, vol. 3, part 2
[1955]. Unfortunately, the Italian text is inaccessible to me.) That Kant
should conceive the philosophical battle-line in any measure to lie between
Pietism and Wolffianism is very important for our future construction of
his works, especially his response to the Pantheism Controversy. It would
be misguided to take Kant for a Pietist. On the other hand, he was steeped
in the Pietist background; Pietism shaped his character and moral sense,
and it was an issue in the public controversies of his day from which he
could not remove himself had he even wished to. See P. Schilpp, Kant's Pre-
Critical Ethics, 50ff. for some telling remarks on this score.
14. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 431; see also G. Buchdahl, "Gravity
and Intelligibility" and "The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philoso-
phy of Science."
15. L. Beck makes much of the issue of space as the major concern of
the early Kant, Early German Philosophy, 44651.
16. A. Bumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.
17. See also M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der
Aufklrung, and E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form.
18. On this inauguration of modern aesthetics, see P. Kristeller, "The
Modern System in the Arts (II)," 34ff.; on Baumgarten see esp. M. Gregor,
"Baumgarten's Aesthetica."
19. A. Bumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 200.
20. P. Menzer, Kants sthetik, 28.
21. Reflection 2387, dated 1755-56 by Menzer, ibid., 26.
22. See Voltaire, Letters on England, 5786.
23. R. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie."
24. For the importance of cosmopolitanism and cultural nationalism
in the German context of the later eighteenth century, F. Meinecke's Cos-
mopolitanism and the National State is indispensable. R. George, "The Lives of
Kant," 490, 495-96, stresses the importance of this in Kant's life especially
in the 1760s in his review of the recent biographical literature.
25. See L. Beck, "Philosophers on the Spree," in Early German Philoso-
phy, esp. 324ff.
26. G. Tonelli, "Conditions in Knigsberg and the Making of Kant's
Philosophy."
27. He wished to assess the wide variety of travelogues and histories
dealing with people and places remote in space (and time) which the Euro-

352 Notes to Pages 19-23

pean Enlightenment was amassing to develop what we would now call cul-
tural anthropology, and through this, evolve a theory of human nature, or
philosophical anthropology. For reflections on these questions see F. van
Pitte, Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist, 729.
28. P. Menzer, Kants sthetik, 37.
29. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 431.
30. Herder, Werke 18:324-25, cited in Kant, Critique of Practical Rea-
son, xxii.
31. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 13, 31.
32. On the popularity of English trends, see Bumler, Kants Kritik der
Urteilskraft, 117,261.
33. L. Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche sthetik.
34. F. Will, "Cognition through Beauty," 100.
35. Ibid., 97-105, and the chapter on Mendelssohn in Will's mono-
graph, Intelligible Beauty; E. Cassirer, Freiheit und Form, 9 9 - 2 2 1 .
36. L. Beck, Commentary, 105.
37. Mendelssohn, "Uber die Mischung" (Gesammelte Schriften, 1:254),
cited in Menzer, Kants sthetik, 44.
38. On this, the German historians of aesthetics are all of one voice.
Thus Bumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 39ff.; Menzer, Kants sthetik, 54;
and R. Sommer, Grundzge einer Geschichte, 120.
39. For a mercifully brief summary of their views see E. Cassirer, Phi-
losophy of the Enlightenment, 331 ff.
40. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 115.
41. Mendelssohn reviewed each of these works in his Briefe, die neueste
Literatur betreffend, in letters 9293, reprinted in Mendelssohn, Gesammelte
Schriften, 4:2,46-54.
42. The wording of the essay competition was as follows: "Whether
metaphysical truths generally, and in particular the fundamental princi-
ples of natural theology and morals, are not capable of proofs as distinct as
those of geometry; and if they are not, what is the true nature of their cer-
tainty, to what degree can this certainty be developed, and is this degree
sufficient for conviction [of their truth]?" (cited in L. Beck, Early German
Philosophy, 441-42).
43. His effort, part of the overall strategy of the Berlin Academy, in
this particular instance had the good fortune to encounter among the
French themselves a new attunement to the spiritual element in genius,
particularly in Diderot. See H. Dieckmann, "Diderot's Conception of Ge-
nius," esp. 13ff. See also H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 63ff.
44. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 146; see also P. Menzer, Kants s-
thetik, 85. Sulzer's major work only appeared in 1771, when it was too late to
have much impact on Kant (though not too late to have some, however ill
received, on Goethe and the Sturm und Drangsee R. Pascal, The German
Sturm und Drang, 297).
45. It made a very big impression in Germany when it was translated,
less than a year later, as well. See M. Steinke, Edward Young's "Conjectures on
Original Composition " in England and Germany, who tries to minimize this im-
pact, but still documents its importance in the epoch.
46. H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 30n. The title of this collection of

Notes to Pages 23-26 353

publications is in itself a marvelous documentation of the project of the
Berlin Aufklrung.
47. E. Hooker, "The Discussion of Taste"; W. Bate, From Classic to Ro-
mantic; and G. McKenzie, Critical Responsiveness.
48. A. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as Aesthetic Norm," "The First Gothic Re-
vival and the Return to Nature," and "The Chinese Origins of a Romanti-
cism," in Essays in the History of Ideas; C. Thacker, The Wildness Pleases.
49. D. Morris, The Religious Sublime, 4.
50. Hence the subtitle of M. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain
Glory: The Development ofthe Aesthetics of the Infinite. The phrase "aesthetics of
the infinite" she acknowledges as Ernest Tuveson's creation.
51. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom; E. Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means
of Grace, and especially his earlier article, "Space, Deity, and the 'Natural
Sublime,"' the basis for chap. 3 of his monograph.
52. "Eighteenth-century man experienced the sublime in two main
contextsliterature and naturebut while the context changed, the ex-
perience remained much the same. And perhaps the single most impor-
tant point of continuity is the basic association between sublimity and
religion" (Morris, The Religious Sublime, 8).
53. "fT]he scientists and popularizers of science . . . were lyrical on
the subject of the fullness and diversity of the universe. Their 'Prefaces'
and 'Conclusions' are often paeans of praise to the Infinite God of an infi-
nitely full universe" (M. Nicolson, Mountain Gloom, 142n.).
54. See M. Nicolson, Newton Commands the Muse.
55. F. Staver, "'Sublime' as Applied to Nature."
56. See H. Thme, Beitrge; H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte; and J.
Engell, The Creative Imagination.
57. E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 322-25.
58. Ibid., 316.
59. H. Thme, Beitrge, 68ff; H. Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 16ff.
60. "In England,. . . Shaftesbury has been largely ignored," J. Stolnitz
has noted, since "among his countrymen . . . his writings seem . . . a mere
Schwrmerei." Yet Stolnitz recognizes that Shaftesbury "exercised a pro-
found influence on the continental, particularly the German thinkers of
his century" (Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern
Aesthetic Theory"). See also H. Thme, Beitrge, 7475; W. Alderman,
"The Significance of Shaftesbury in English Speculation"; and D. Towns-
end, "From Shaftesbury to Kant."
61. J. Addison, "Genius"; see H. Thme, Beitrge, 78ff; H. Wolf, Ver-
such einer Geschichte, 26ff; J. Engell, The Creative Imagination, 37.
62. Even earlier, M. Akenside, in Pleasures of Imagination, had insisted
upon the element of frenzy and ecstasy, i.e., great emotion, as essential to
genius, and had equated genius with divinity in its creative power. These
elements did not sit lightly within a neoclassical frame. While Addison,
Akenside's avowed mentor, had been clear about the connection between
passion and imagination, he had tried to keep it circumscribed by taste and
reason. The upshot, as far as the new generation felt, was a body of de-
adening rule.
63. The Germans have traced the Prometheus motif from Shaftes-

354 Notes to Pages 2 7-28

bury to Goethe and beyond. See O. Watzel, Das Prometheussymbol, and H.
Wolf, Versuch einer Geschichte, 20ff.
64. E. Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, 45. What is impor-
tant about Young is the religious and spiritualist element in his celebration
of original genius. There was a strong connection between his faith in
imaginative creativity and his faith in human spirituality, and indeed, in a
transcendent divinity. That was what Tuveson was getting at with his title,
"The Imagination as a Means of Grace." And see H. Wolf, Versuch einer
Geschichte, 36, who stresses "the deep religiosity and 'irrationality' in
Young's concept of genius." Wolf thinks it very important that Young was a
Theist, for in that measure he could not accept fully the Shaftesburian
pantheist interpretation of genius. He substituted a version of Milton's di-
vine inspiration. A similar line would be taken up by Klopstock in Ger-
many, defended by such critics as Resewitz and Hamann, and feed into the
Sturm und Drang.
65. J. Benziger, "Organic Unity."
66. H. Thme suggests that these "naturalistic" theorists of genius fell
into as one-sided an error as the neoclassicists they rejected. For in their
theory there was no place for "conscious artistry" (Beitrge, 94).
67. A. Gerard, An Essay on Genius.
68. M. Nahm makes this the crux of his many disquisitions on genius.
He distinguishes, along these lines, between Addison, Kames, Duff (and
Herder), who succumbin Nahm's viewto the "mystagoguery of in-
spiration" or the "cult of genius," and the sober and rational approach
which sees the artist as a mere artisan, remaking the naturally given
through his craft, which he associates with Gerard (and Kant) (Nahm,
"Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating Another Nature
. . ."'). See also Nahm's other works: Genius and Creativity and "Genius and
the Aesthetic Relation of the Arts."
69. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 319n. But see a more re-
cent effort to trace Kant's evolving aesthetic exclusively to Baumgarten: H.
Juchem, Die Entwicklung des Begriffs des Schnen bei Kant.
70. E. Carritt, "Sources and Effects in England of Kant's Philosophy
of Beauty," 315.
71. T. Gracyk, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics."
72. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 332.
73. L. Beck argues that in terms of elegance and clarity, Mendels-
sohn's essay was certainly more impressive than Kant's admitted uncer-
tainty. But Kant was on the verge of crucial innovations across the board,
while Mendelssohn was telling the German philosophical community only
its own conventional wisdom. See L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 332.
74. Cited in ibid., 443n.
75. Lessing, for example, translated Hutcheson's System of Moral Phi-
losophy in 1756.
76. See D. Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant."
77. B.Erdmann, "Kant und Hume urn 1762 ."One important connec-
tion is Johann Hamann. He went to England in 1757, and he returned to
Knigsberg shortly thereafter with a lively awareness of British intellectual
life, in particular with a very enthusiastic if eccentric appreciation for

Notes to Pages 29-30 355

David Hume. (See his important letter to Kant, July 27, 1759, in Brief-
wechsel, A.A. 10:7-16 (Philosophical Correspondence, 35-43.) The experience
was undoubtedly complex and Hamann's assimilation partial, but we can
be very confident that all of it, in Hamann's inimitable fashion, got com-
municated to Kant. See P. Merlan, "From Hume to Hamann" and "Kant,
Hamann-Jacobi and Sendling on Hume"; I. Berlin, "Hume and the
Sources of German Anti-Rationalism"; and F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 24ff.
78. His great early work, the Treatise on Human Nature, on the other
hand, did not get translated during the period of Kant's decisive philo-
sophical work. See R. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie."
79. In Germany and especially in Kant, this took the form of a distinc-
tion between a priori and a posteriori judgments.
80. In addition to Wolff, see W. Piper, "Kant's Contact with British
Empiricism."
81. L. Shaw, "Henry Home of Karnes."
82. Kant, Logic, A.A. 9:15, my translation.
83. Kant, Reflection 1588, A.A. 16:27.
84. Most notably 622, 623, 624, and 626: Kant, A.A. 15:269-72.
85. Kant's connection of history with learning, discipline, and disci-
pleship, and science with system, autonomy, and mastery forms much of
the argument in such works as Logic, and is not without relevance to the
great Critiques.
86. Kant, Reflection 626, A.A. 15:272, and see the equivalent stance in
the First Critique, A21.
87. Kant, Observations, 72.
88. Kant, Reflection 622 (1760s), A.A. 15:269.
89. Kant, Reflection 623 (1769 or earlier), A.A. 15:270.
90. Kant, Reflections 648, 653, 686, 721, A.A. 15:284, 289, 306, 319.
See P. Guyer, "Pleasure and Society in Kant's Theory of Taste," esp. 41ff.
91. Kant, Nachricht, A.A. 2:311.
92. Gracyk, "Kant's Shifting Debt to British Aesthetics," 207.
93. Kant, Observations, 58.
94. See G. Tonelli, "Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)."
95. Kant, Reflection 621 (1769 or perhaps the mid- 1760s), A.A. 15:268.
96. Kant, Reflection 622 (1760s), A.A. 15:269. Genius and aesthetic
judgment or "taste" could not be learned, but only exercised (gebt). The
notion of bung preceded the use of the specific word.
97. Baumgarten's Psychologia empirica, with Kant's annotations, is re-
printed in A.A. 15:3-54; for 648, p. 39.
98. It was with Addison that imagination began its great surge to the
throne of human capacities in the course of the eighteenth century (see J.
Engell, The Creative Imagination, passim). But behind Addison's enthusiasm
were some Lockian reservations, and these came to stark restatement in the
philosophical writings of David Hume. Hume's discontent with imagina-
tion goes back to Locke, even as his rigorous affirmation of the "association
of ideas" goes back to Hobbes. He was also the first to formulate the idea of
imagination as the function of synthesizing new images (see M. Kallich,
"Association of Ideas and Critical Theory," 303n., 314). In the British tra-
dition a distinction arose accordingly between constructive "imagination"

356 Notes to Pages 30-33

and wild "fancy" (see J. Bullitt and W. Bate, "Distinction of Fancy and
Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Criticism").
99. Kant's early observations on the negative potential of imagination
suggest the influence of foreign thought, most likely Hume.
100. Kant, Reflection 313, A.A. 15:122.
101. In one Reflection he connects it explicitly with the Herrenhuter
and Pietists in Germany. In another with Mme. Guyon.
102. Shaftesbury, "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm to My Lord
***** " 3_39
103. Dieckmann, "Diderot's Concept of Genius," 21.
104. R. Unger, Hamann und die Aufklrung; W. Alexander, Johann
Georg Hamann; J. O'Flaherty, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia; L. Beck, Early
German Philosophy, 374ff; F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 16ff.; and the proceed-
ings of the last two Hamann colloquia: B. Gajek, ed., HamannKant
Herder and B. Gajek and A. Meier, eds., Johann Georg Hamann und die Krise
der Aufklrung.
105. Kant,Trume eines Geistersehers, A.A. 2:3157 3. The editor's notes
suggest that the work was completed in the year 1765, though it only ap-
peared in the subsequent year. That it was provoked by the opinions of
friends was stated in the text itself, as the editor noted, A.A. 2:500-1.
106. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:73-74.
107. That Kant was not wrong in seeing there the origins of the Sturm
und Drang cult of genius has long been recognized. See J. Ernst, Der Genie-
begriff der Strmer und Drnger und der Frhromantiker, 17ff. See also M.
Steinke, Edward Young's 'Conjectures on Original Composition'in England and
Germany. Hamann is considered by many to be the real founder of the
movement. See F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 34, for a recent statement of this
view.
108. G. Tonelli, "Die Umwlzung von 1769 bei Kant."
109. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:69-
73.
110. J. Hamann, Sokratische Denkwrdigkeiten/Aesthetica in nuce; F.
Beiser, Fate of Reason, 3537. Contrasting Hamann's approach to Kant's,
Beiser underestimates the measure to which even Kantprecisely in the
Third Critiquedoes develop a symbolic theory of art.
111. Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:73-74.
112. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 5ff.
113. These essays were accompanied by an essay on local history by
the older historian Justus Moser. Moser was sympathetic to their efforts to
establish an indigenous literary culture, steeped in locality. Moser had the
courage to respond publicly to Frederick IPs denigration of German as a
literary language and to celebrate the literary renaissance in Germany.
114. On Lavater, see R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 2.
115. E. Flajole, "Lessing's Attitude in the Lavater-Mendelssohn Con-
troversy," and H. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, 198.
116. E. Flajole, "Lessing's Attitude"; E. Schoonhoven, "Hamann in
der Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn"; and Z. Levy, "Hamanns
Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn."
117. Evidence of this can be found in his letter to Mendelssohn of Au-

Notes to Pages 33-36 357

gust 1783, in which Kant praised Mendelssohn's Jerusalem, the ultimate
formulation of Mendelssohn's position in the controversy. See E. Schulz,
"Kant und die Berlin Aufklrung."
118. In the Observations, Kant had treated both ideas in a rather posi-
tive light, particularly Rhrung.
119. Kant, Reflection 767 (1772-73), A.A. 15:334. The parenthetical
remark was lined out later by Kant, but it is the most revealing passage in
the Reflection.
120. See Menzer on this, Kants sthetik, 15ff.,esp. 20-21; and L.Beck,
Early German Philosophy, 427, who, in the context of sketching Kant's
"Weltanschauung" observed that it was hostile to the sort of Schwrmerei that
the Strmer engaged in.
121. Kant, Reflection 767, A.A. 15:334. See also Reflection 762 (1772-
73): "In order to appear a genius, nowadays one abandons rules. It is all
well and good to go beyond the rules where they arise out of a constriction
of the spirit; but where they merely have to do with the familiar and coinci-
dental, one should have the modesty to accept them, because otherwise,
since others will also demand their freedom, in the end everything will be-
come unruly" (A.A. 15:332).
122. R. Pascal, The German Strum und Drang, 95ff.
123. R. Lowth, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews (Latin, 1753;
German tr. 1758). This was a favorite work of Hamann's and the basis of
many of his arguments with Kant about the superiority of his approach to
that of the Enlightenment.
124. See H. Wolf, "Die Genielehre des jungen Herder."
125. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 18.
126. Kant, Reflection 771 (1774-75), A.A. 15:337.
127. Kant, Reflection 775 (1774-75), A.A. 15:339.
128. R. Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 97, makes this point.
129. Kant, Reflection 765 (1772-73), A.A. 15:333.
130. Kant, Reflection 789 (1774-75), A.A. 15:345.
131. Kant, A.A. 15:34445n. The anthropology lectures are cited
from a manuscript in the Royal Berlin Library (see the bibliographical
note, A.A. 15:vii) and from Immanuel Kants Menschenkunde oder philoso-
phische Anthropologie, ed. Fr. Ch. Starke (1838), 152.
132. Kant to Hamann, Apr. 6, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:156.
133. Hamann to Kant, Apr. 7, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:156-58.
134. Kant to Hamann, Apr. 8, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:160.
135. Lavater to Kant, Apr. 8, 1774, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:165-66.
136. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, passim.
137. M. Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Powerand Judaism, tr.
A. Arkush (University Press of New England, 1983).
138. J. Engell, Creative Imagination, 1023.
139. P. Menzer noted (Kants sthetik, 87) that Kant was unusual in his
day for rejecting the idea of genius in science. None of the others who
wrote on the subject made such distinctions, and especially those who
shared his "cold-blooded" view tended to write about Newton as frequently
as about Homer in elaborating their theories of genius. Menzer was my-
stified by Kant's choice to depart from the others, and pointed out that he

358 Notes to Pages 3 7-41

had not always thought that way. His earliest Reflections accept the idea of
genius in science. What Menzer missed was Kant's outrage at the excesses
of the Sturm und Drang cult of genius, and hence the polemical slant behind
the theory of genius Kant constructed.
140. K. Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant, 243n.
141. Ibid, and W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Groe," 136. Dilthey dates
the prize to the year it was awarded, not the year it was announced.
Eberhard would later, in the time Kant was finishing the Third Critique,
open the school-philosophical onslaught against Kant's critical philoso-
phy.
142. W. Dilthey, "Friedrich der Groe," 137.
143. Ironically, both Goethe and Herder had begun to disengage
themselves from the excesses of the Sturm und Drang as soon as they moved
to Weimar, and their enterprise was to achieve a classical balance. See R.
Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, 31; H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:16.
Kant never recognized this, not even in the 1780s when it was apparent to
the rest of Germany.
144. R. Pascal, 7e German Sturm und Drang, 134ff.; Beiser, Fate of Rea-
son, 127ff., 145-49.
145. Kant,Reflection 911 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:398.
146. Kant,Reflection 912 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:399.
147. Kant, Reflection 896 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:391.
148. Kant, Reflection 897 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:392.
149. Kant, Reflection 898 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:393.
150. Kant, Reflection 899 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:393.
151. Kant, Reflection 914 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:399.
152. Kant,Reflection 921 (late 1770s),A.A. 15:406.
153. Kant, Reflection 92 la (late 1770s),A.A. 15:407.
154. Kant, Reflection 335 (mid to late 1770s), A.A. 15:132.
155. Kant, additions from the late 1770s to Reflection 364, A. A. 15:142.
156. See Kant, Reflections 369 and 499, A.A. 15:144, 217.

Two: Kant's Return to Aesthetics

1. M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content in the Critique of
Judgment," 194n.
2. Although M. Liedtke wished to establish that the idea of reflective
judgment was already latent in the First Critique, his work demonstrates the
degree to which it is not fully worked out there. See Liedtke, Der Begriff.
Similarly, G. Prauss makes the point quite compellingly that Kant had not
really conceived clearly of the problem of subjective consciousness in the
first edition of the Critique ofPure Reason, and that this led to his revisions in
the Prolegomena culminating in the idea of "judgments of perception"
(Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 102). This will all be taken up in detail in the
next chapter.
3. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A21.
4. Kant to K. L. Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A.
10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127-28).
5. See K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," for an excellent overview.

Notes to Pages 42-48 359

 6. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 640.
7. K. Ameriks, "Recent Work."
8. This demand to recognize the historical Kant's frame of reference is
the strength of J. Hintikka's essay "Transcendental Arguments," esp. 274;
this principle may be generalized from an extremely perceptive statement
found in H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account'": "[T]he troubles of
Anglo-American philosophers with Kant's [philosophy]. . . are due not so
much to a lack of solid knowledge of German as to a lack of familiarity with
Kant's philosophical environment and, even more so, to our strong ab-
sorption in contemporary philosophical discussions" (126). He insists that
we must "grasp Kant's explanation in its own historical context first" (123),
indeed "entwicklungsgeschichtlich" (115). That is the methodological com-
mitment of this study.
9. See Kant, Logic, 17, 39ff., esp. 40-41 (A.A. 9:15,35ff, esp. 35-37).
10. In a Reflection which is impossible to date precisely, but which
seems to fall just at this logical juncture in his thinking, Kant jotted: "Ex-
tensive clarity through external characteristics [Merkmale], intensive
through inner, the former through coordinated, the latter through subor-
dinated [characteristics]. In the former, a broad, in the latter a deep clarity.
The flaw of the one: dryness; of the second, flatness. The advantage of the
former: aesthetic; of the latter: logical" (Reflection 2368, cited in P. Menzer,
Kants sthetik, 29).
11. Kant, Reflection 204, A.A. 15:79.
12. Kant, Reflection 643 (1769-70), A.A. 15:283.
13. Kant, Reflection 179, 182, A.A. 15:67-68.
14. Kant, Reflection 619, A.A. 15:268.
15. Ibid.
16. Kant, Reflections 619, 620, 622; A.A. 15:268-69.
17. "Sensation has in it feeling [Gefhl] and perception [Wahrnehmen];
the first is subjective, the second is objective" (Reflection 279 [1770], A.A.
15:105).
18. Kant, Reflections 177 (1769) and 681 (1769), A.A. 15:65, 303; and,
from a later period, 408 (1770s), A.A. 15:165.
19. Ibid., most particularly 408.
20. Kant, Reflection 680 (1769), A.A. 15:302. In another such reflec-
tion, Kant writes: "Sensible representations are either sensations and re-
quire sense, or appearances and are grounded upon the power of
intuition; the former are changes in the condition of the subject through
the presence of the object; the latter are representations of the object itself
insofar as it is open to the senses" (Reflection 650, A.A. 15:287).
21. Kant,e/2:fc'orc287(1770s),A.A. 15:107. The notion oiEinbildung
as a spontaneous power was not entirely clear to Kant in the period 1769
70. It only emerged over the 1770s. For detailed discussion of Kant's
precritical theory of imagination, see R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpre-
tation, 925; and H. Mrchen, "Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant," esp. 386ff.
(reprint, 76ff.).
22. Kant, Reflection 643 (176970), A.A. 15:283.
23. On Tetens, see J. Barnouw, "The Philosophical Achievement and

360 Notes to Pages 48-50

Historical Significance of Johann Nicolas Tetens," 301-35, and L. Beck,
Early German Philosophy, 412-25.
24. Kant, Reflection 624, A.A. 15:270
25. Kant, Reflection 638, A.A. 15:276.
26. Kant, Reflection 209, A.A. 15:80; and Reflection 681, A.A. 15:303.
27. Kant, Reflection 625, A.A. 15:271.
28. Kant, Reflection 683, A.A. 15:304.
29. Ibid.
30. See Kant's discussion of the "threefold synthesis" in the First Cri-
tique, A97.
31. See Reflection 213 (1770), A.A. 15:82, where Kant begins to sense
the difficulty.
32. This crucial insight into the holism of space and time constituted
Kant's great breakthrough of this period, leading to the theory of pure
(sensible) intuition (see Reflection 662, A.A. 15:293). Space is a prior whole,
unitary and interpersonally valid, according to Kant. It is the form of sen-
sible intuition. The perfection which sensibility has, compared with rea-
son, is the prior unity of the whole form itself. Such a prior whole is only a
conceptual goal ("totality") for rationality. On the other hand, the im-
perfection of intuition is sensibility itself, namely, dependence upon the
matter of sensation, and the limitation of the sensible forms to space and
time. Reason is not limited in these ways.
33. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, AI 1/B25. See T. Pinder, "Kants Be-
griff der transzendentalen Erkenntnis." Pinder stresses the antidogmatic
thrust of this phrasing and insists on Kant's departure from his pre-
decessors' usage. See, in this connection, the debate between I. Angelelli
and N. Hinske: Angelelli, "On the Origins of Kant's 'Transcendental'";
Hinske, "Kants Begriff des Transcendentalen und die Problematik seiner
Begriffsgeschichte."
34. Kant, Prolegomena, 37 (A.A. 4:294).
35. See Critique of Pure Reason A56: "not all cognition a priori must be
called transcendental, but instead only that by means of which we recog-
nize that and how certain ideas (perceptions and concepts) are a priori ap-
plied and possible."
36. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 646; J. Hintikka, "Transcendental
Arguments," 274-76.
37. That the mind works by processes which need not be self-
conscious in their functioning is a fundamental and necessary element in
the "transcendental" philosophy. That Kant thought along these lines is
clear if nowhere else at the very least in the Logic: "The exercise of our own
powers also takes place according to certain rules which we first follow
without being conscious of them" (13 [A.A. 9:11]).
38. This is why Hegel insisted that a phenomenology of spirit entail a
bifurcation of perspective as between the consciousness appropriating its
own experience and that of the philosopher already conversant with the
essentials of that experience. Hegel argued that consciousness was not, for
a substantial segment of its itinerary of self-discovery, aware of what it was
or what it was about.

Notes to Pages 50-53 361

 39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A367-74, A490-97/B518-25.
40. Ibid., B145.
41. The difference between Objekt and Gegenstand is essential. In tradi-
tional school philosophy, it was the difference between res and ens, i.e., be-
tween a matter of formal judgment and a matter entailing an existent
entity. See H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account.'" On the distinc-
tion in Kant himself, see esp. H. Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 2728,
135-36.
42. D. Kolb, "Thought and Intuition in Kant's Critical System." And
see H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account'": "in order for the con-
ceptual reality of a thing to be the reality of a possible object of experience,
the thing has to be posited also in accordance 'with the formal conditions of
experience, that is, with the conditions of intuitions and concepts.' [B265]
And in order for it to be the reality of an actual object of experience, it has to
be posited as 'bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is,
with sensation,' [B266] as well" (122).
43. I take this to parallel Allison's argument in Transcendental Idealism
that the two parts of the proof in the "Transcendental Deduction" involved
first the "metaphysical deduction," i.e., the theoretical constitution of a
"real use" for the categories, and then the "transcendental synthesis"
which established that this "real use" did apply to "pure intuition" and
could be articulated as a "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" in
the "Schematism" chapter.
44. On this notion of pure or originary synthesis see H. Allison,
"Transcendental Schematism"; and R. Aquila, "The Relationship between
Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant" and Matter in Mind, 49ff.; skeptical
of this notion is P. Guyer, "Apperception and A Priori Synthesis."
45. See H. Allison, "Transcendental Schematism," 6465.
46. It was against this that S. Korner protested, albeit too drastically, in
"The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions." Schaper's response,
"Arguing Transcendentally," presupposes the regressive Kantian for-
mulation and so defends Kant's sense of "deduction," but fails to confute
Korner's logical point, as Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments,"
esp. 460n., observed. The point is that Korner and a fortiori P. Strawson
(The Bounds of Sense), B. Stroud ("Transcendental Arguments," 5469),
and R. Wolff (Kant's Theory of Mental Activity) are seeking in Kant a kind of
deduction he never intended.
47. D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion"; see also J. Rosenberg, "Transcen-
dental Arguments Revisited," 612.
48. J. Rosenberg, "Transcendental Arguments Revisited," 612-13;
Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," 54; and Bubner, "Kant, Transcen-
dental Arguments," 461.
49. P. Guyer, "Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction." See
also G. Bird, "Logik und Psychologie in der Transzendentalen Deduk-
tion," and W. Walsh, "Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique."
50. D. Henrich, "Kant's Notion," 34-35.
51. K. Ameriks, "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive
Argument," 273-87, esp. 282n. See also N. Rescher, "Kant and the 'Spe-
cial Constitution' of Man's Mind."

362 Notes to Pages 53-55

 52. Frustration with this phantom form of logical argumentation is
the driving impetus of M. Gram's several refutations of transcendental ar-
guments: "Transcendental Arguments" and "Must Transcendental Argu-
ments be Spurious?" See also G. Bird, "Recent Interpretations of Kant's
Transcendental Deduction," for a criticism of the antiskeptical concept of
transcendental argument in Strawson, Stroud etc. Gram, in his turn, pro-
voked J. Hintikka to protest that the argument had been transposed en-
tirely out of the Kantian key (Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments,"
27481). He was right. Gram set aside at the very outset of his remarks the
only fruitful content for considering transcendental arguments: "his
theory of the synthetic a priori and his doctrine of the categories" (15).
53. "That Kant not only sets out from this fact of empirical judgment
but actually must and also has a right to do so is immediately apparent. He
has to set out from this because otherwise his philosophy as a theory of ex-
perience would be literally lacking an object." Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant,
62.
54. For a thorough consideration of this notion, see R. Pippin, Kant's
Theory of Form, passim and esp. 15.
55. Kant, "ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:183-84.
56. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 29 (A.A. 5:30).
57. The modality of necessity in the intentional act in general signaled
to Kant the presence of his sought-after pure a priori principle of practical
reason: the moral law with its "categorical"and more essentially
apodicticimperative. See L. Beck, "Apodictic Imperatives."
58. This interpretation I take to be congruent with that of L. Beck in
"The Putative Apriority of Judgments of Taste," in Essays on Kant and
Hume, 16770; and also of G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 86.
59. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A56/B81. Beck puts this clearly in
terms of analytic versus syntheticjudgments: "the distinction between ana-
lytic and syntheticjudgments is not one of formal logic, for formal logic
abstracts from the meaning of all terms" ("Can Kant's Syntheticjudgments
Be Made Analytic?" 10-11). See also F. Grayeff, "The Relationship of the
Transcendental and Formal Logic," and T. Swing, Kant's Transcendental
Logic, 28-46.
60. This sense can be expressed in terms of the logical versus the real
use of reason, a distinction Kant makes throughout his work. Beck ex-
plains: "A real definition not only puts the word in place of others, but the
definiens contains a clear mark by which the object can be recognized and by
virtue of which the defined concept is shown to have 'objective reality'. . .
Kant is saying that in a real definition we do not mainly equate a word with
a logical product of arbitrarily chosen logical predicates, but we make at
least a problematical existential judgment and state the conditions under
which this judgment could be justified" ("Kant's Theory of Definition,"
26-27). This line of thought has been developed by H. Allison in his
debate with M. S. Gram on syntheticity with specific reference to the Kant-
Eberhard controversy, but with direct relevance to the whole "critical phi-
losophy": M. Gram, Kant, Ontology and the A Priori; H. Allison, The Kant-
Eberhard Controversy, esp. 54ff.; Gram, "The Crisis of Syntheticity"; and

Notes to Pages 55-57 363

Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic and Syn-
thetic Judgments."
61. That was why, among other things, the ontological proof of God
fell apart, as Kant argued so forcefully in the Critique of Pure Reason (A592-
602/B620-31). That was also why Leibniz's great speculative system
failed, as Kant argued there as well in a crucial appendix entitled "The Am-
phiboly of Concepts of Reflection" (A260-92/B316-49). This appendix is
the seedbed of many of Kant's later epistemological and ontological con-
siderations.
62. Ibid., A260/B316.
63. See M. Liedke, "Kants Begriff der Reflektion."
64. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15
(Philosophical Correspondence, 12728).
65. See, e.g.: D. Henrich, "The Proof-Structure," Identitt und Objek-
tivitt, and "Kant's Notion of a Deduction." For evaluations of Henrich, see
P. Guyer, Review of Identitt und Objektivitt, and K. Ameriks, "Recent
Work," 15-16.
66. This point is all too frequently neglected by contemporary phi-
losophers, but it was essential to Kant. See Critique of Pure Reason A3/B7;
Prolegomena, 2 - 3 (A.A. 4:257). It is time to return to a discriminating meta-
physical interpretation of his work. (Ameriks suggested this prospect in his
review, "Recent Work," 1.)
67. Scholars have maintained that most of the revisions of the
B-version worked to eliminate the "psychologism" and to suppress the
"faculty-talk." While there can be no doubt that Kant reformulated his ar-
gument in the B-version, it did not imply at all a repudiation of what he had
written in the A-version, and certainly not of the "subjective deduction." It
remained implicit in the B-version, and its elements figured explicitly
throughout the unrevised "Analytic of Principles." (See esp. Critique ofPure
Reason, A180/B223.) Moreover, a concern for an account of subjective
mental process stayed with Kant in his later critical work and played a ma-
jor role in the genesis of the Third Critique. (See esp. First Introduction to the
Critique of Judgment, 24 [A.A. 20:220].)
68. On this concern for a "gap" which haunted Kant to the end of his
years, see E. Frster, "Is There a 'Gap' in Kant's Critical System?"
69. "[T]hat there should be a second or even a third Critique with an
'Analytic' and a 'Dialectic' was a completely foreign thought for Kant in
1781": Brandt, "The Deductions in the Critique ofJudgment," 183.
70. In the Third Critique he would attempt his most comprehensive
characterization not merely of each aspect of consciousness in itself but
also of the systematic interrelations among them. See W. Bartuschat, Zum
Systematischen Ort, for the most thorough statement of this interpretation.
71. This takes the "critical philosophy" to be essentially a philosophi-
cal anthropology, as E. Cassirer has argued in "Critical Idealism as a Phi-
losophy of Culture."
72. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15
(Philosophical Correspondence, 12728).
73. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10:54.
74. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 9n. (A.A. 5, 9n.).

364 Notes to Pages 57-62

 75. Kant gave several examples of such "transcendental explanations"
in this footnote: "Life is the faculty of a being by which it acts according to
the laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of desire is the faculty such a
being has of causing, through its [representations], the reality of the ob-
jects of these [representations]. Pleasure is the [representation] of the
agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e.,
with the faculty through which [a representation] causes the reality of its
object (or the direction of the energies of a subject to such an action as will
produce the object)" (ibid.). The analysis of the concrete nature of each of
these transcendental explanations will concern us later in this study.
76. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-92/B316-49.
77. My historical interest in finding continuities between Kant's Third
Critique and the later Idealists will be apparent. On transcendental argu-
ments in the later Critiques I have learned a great deal from R. Benton,
Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments, 24 and
passim.
78. Originally this allowed the extension of transcendental analysis to
volition and feeling, but eventually it would double back on the transcen-
dental analysis of cognition itself, i.e., the categorial determination of ob-
jects of experience would come under reexamination in terms of the
structure of purpose of a dynamic rationality. This was the "cognitive turn"
which led to the highly systematic First Introduction to the Critique of Judg-
ment.
79. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-15
(Philosophical Correspondence, 127-28).

Three: Validity and Actuality

1. R. Meerbote raises this question, but in an entirely different light.
See "Kant's Use of the Notions of'Objective Reality' and 'Objective Valid-
ity.'" More to the point are H. Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account,"'
and H. Allison, "Objective Validity and Objective Reality," chap. 7 of Tran-
scendental Idealism.
2. Is there a "real use" of reason with reference to its own immanent
process? See R. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 90 and esp. 102: "[A] claim
that we possess concepts a priori is a transcendental claim; it is a claim
about a kind of knowledge."
3. According to Prauss, Kant only came to recognize a problem in his
theory of subjective consciousness after he published the A-version of the
First Critique, and his response to that lacuna was the theory of a "judgment
of perception" in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783 (Prauss,
Erscheinung bei Kant, 102).
4. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B161. In making this interpreta-
tion I believe I find myself in the company of Aquila, Matter in Mind, 126;
and Young, "Kant's View of Imagination." Also emphatic on this point is
G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant: "The theory of judgments of perception
which was evolved in the Prolegomena, of which the first edition of the Cri-
tique [of Pure Reason] had not even a trace, was not only not surrendered by
Kant in the second edition, but only actually introduced into the Critique for

Notes to Pages 62-65 365

the first time [cf. B139f.]. This [mis]perception fails to take cognizance,
further, that also in the Critique ofJudgment the distinction between judg-
ments of perception and judgments of experience serves as a necessary
and, for Kant, self-evident presupposition" (14In.).
5. Kant, Logic, 69ff. (A.A. 9:63). The idea of concept formation in re-
lation to empirical judgments and the constitution of objects is richly ex-
amined in Bumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, and deserves more
consideration as a link between the projects of Leibniz and Baumgarten
before, and Hegel after Kant. See A. Model, Metaphysik und reflektierende Ur-
teilskraft, on these issues.
6. An empirical concept, Kant makes quite clear, differs little from a
mere name: "an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but only made
explicit. For since we find in it only a few characteristics of a certain species
of sensible object, it is never certain that we are not using the word, in de-
noting one and the same object, sometimes so as to stand for more, and
sometimes so as to stand for fewer characteristics . . . The word, with the
few characteristics which attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as
merely a designation than as a concept of the thing" (Critique of Pure Reason
A727-28/B755-56). See R. Pippin, "The Schematism and Empirical Con-
cepts" and "Kant on Empirical Concepts"; and G. Schrder, "Kant's
Theory of Concepts."
7. Synthesis is the crucial concept in Kant's epistemology. This has
been recognized by many scholars. See R. Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental
Arguments," 466; R. Aquila, chap. 3 of Matter in Mind, 49ff; and H.
Allison, Transcendental Idealism, passim and esp. 141-44, 15964. R.
Makkreel (Imagination and Interpretation, 25ff.) construes synthesis nar-
rowly in terms of transcendental constitution, but it may well be that the
term is Kant's most general for the spontaneous activity of mind in many
aspects, including those Makkreel sees as "formative" rather than "syn^
thetic." In any event, it is crucial to reconstruct this constitutive process and
to recognize that since it is sequential, in some sense, parts of it can be car-
ried out without always necessarily completing the whole constitutive pro-
cedure. That will prove the key to those peculiar sorts of judgment that
Kant calls subjective.
8. Kant, Prolegomena, 26:52 (A.A. 4:309).
9. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, vii:29. See R. Aquila, "Is Sensation the
Matter of Appearances?" 14.
10. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 14. These are of course synonyms
for Bildung, formation, the most important such concept, as we shall see.
11. For this sense of "besides" see Kant, Prolegomena, 26:52 (A.A.
4:309), and Critique of Pure Reason A166/B207.
12. Kant, Prolegomena, 26:52.
13. On primary and secondary qualities see: R.Jackson, "Locke's Dis-
tinction"; R. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism"; E. Curley, "Locke,
Boyle,"; J. Bennett, "Substance, Reality"; and M. Ayers, "Substance, Real-
ity."
14. See Bennett's discussion of phenol as a secondary quality, "Sub-
stance, Reality," 8.

366 Notes to Pages 65-67

 15. On Kant's "transcendental idealism" and the continuing con-
troversy over its precise meaning, see Ameriks, "Recent Work," 1-11, for a
careful overview. While there are elements of the "two view" approach
which seem attractive from the contemporary vantage, it remains that
there is probably a good deal to the "two world" view, with its attendant
metaphysics, as a historical gloss of Kant's doctrines. That will be considered
further at a later point in this study.
16. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A189-90/B234-35.
17. Ibid., A191/B236.
18. Ibid., A178/B220. The centrality of the categories of relation in
the establishment of objective reference has become central to the discrim-
ination of "subjective" from "objective" judgments, as will appear below.
19. Ibid., A180/B223.
20. Ibid., A191/B236.
21. Ibid.
22. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, iv: 15.
23. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A195/B240.
24. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 76, makes this point vividly in terms of
the discursiveness of human consciousness.
25. I take this interpretation to be roughly congruent with L. Beck's
analysis in "The Putative Apriority of Judgments of Taste," in Essays on
Kant and Hume, 167ff.
26. Intuition is perhaps the most problematic notion in Kant's epis-
temology. It has been interpreted in terms of three distinct properties in
the scholarly literature: "singularity" or "individuality," in the sense of
completeness of a manifold in a whole; "givenness," in the sense of indubi-
table actuality for consciousness (hence, for Kant, there is no certainty
equal to intuitive certainty); and finally, "immediacy" to consciousness,
that which needs and can have no rational mediation to assure its presence
to consciousness. See J. Hintikka, "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (An-
schauung)"; M. Thompson, "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epis-
temology"; K. Wilson, "Kant on Intuition"; M. Gram, "The Sense of a
Kantian Intuition"; K. Robson, "Kant's Concept of Intuition"; and R.
Smyth, Forms of Intuition, 134-69.
27. As E. Schaper does in "Imagination and Knowledge," in Studies in
Kant's Aesthetics, 117.
28. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception."
29. R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, 29, notes Kant's text-
emendation in his personal copy of the B-version of the First Critique sub-
stituting "understanding" for "imagination" as the source of all synthesis;
nevertheless Young ("Kant's View of Imagination," 148) claims that the
A-version is more authentic to the critical philosophy taken as a whole. I
concur.
30. Schaper, "Imagination and Knowledge" and "Kant und das Prob-
lem der Einbildungskraft." More moderate is M. Warnock, "Imagination
and Perception."
31. M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics; H. Mrchen,
"Die Einbildungskraft in Kant." For a criticism of Heidegger's metaphysi-

Notes to Pages 67-69 367

cal project with imagination, see D. Henrich, "ber die Einheit der Subjek-
tivitt."
32. On some readings of the First Critique, one might question
whether "matter," the manifold in sensation, can even be registered by
consciousness apart from judgment's synthesis of recognition. One pas-
sage where Kant raises the possibility of incoherence, only later to repudi-
ate it, is Critique of Pure Reason A90/B123. See R. Wolff, Kant's Theory of
Mental Activity, 156ff; and E. Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 1875.
33. For a recent statement of this view, see D. Kolb, "Thought and In-
tuition," 229.
34. Not only will the Third Critique offer this evidence; there is also a
letter from Kant, written to Herz during the time of that Critique's composi-
tion, which bears decisively on this question. See below.
35. G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, is surely the most important work
on the phenomenology of subjective consciousness in Kant in recent times.
K. Ameriks ("Recent Work," 18) clearly assigns Prauss this stature; see also
W. Marx, Review of Prauss. But Prauss has not been without his critics. See
H. Seigfried, "Zum Problem des Wahrnehmungsurteil bei Kant," and R.
Pippin, Review of Prauss and Kant's Theory of Form, 18081. Prauss has res-
cued the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of
experience from centuries of disdain and neglect and brought it to the
center of attention. For other considerations of this distinction see T.
Uehling's survey, "Wahrnehmungsurteile and Erfahrungsurteile Recon-
sidered."
36. L. Beck, "Did the Sage of Knigsberg Have No Dreams?" in Essays
on Kant and Hume, 3860.
37. See W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, 159; R. Aquila, "Is Sensa-
tion the Matter of Apearance?" 11-29; and Aquila's other studies: Matter
in Mind, "The Relationship between Pure and Empirical Intuition in
Kant," and "Matter, Forms, and Imaginative Association in Sensory Intui-
tion." See also J. Baumgartner, "On Kant's 'Matter of the Appearance.'"
38. Gram, "Must Transcendental Arguments Be Spurious?" 311-12.
39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B122.
40. G. Bird, "Recent Work in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," 8-9.
41. D. Henrich, "Proof-Structure," 654.
42. P. Guyer, "Apperception and A Priori Synthesis," 210.
43. D. Kolb, "Thought and Intuition," 229.
44. P. Guyer, Review of Identitt und Objektivitt, 160. For appreciation
of this formulation, see K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," 16.
45. K. Ameriks, "Recent Work," 16.
46. Ibid., 17.
47. Ibid., 18.
48. Prauss generically encompasses with Erscheinung all the other
Kantian terms for givenness-in-sensation like Empfindung and Wahrneh-
mung (Erscheinung bei Kant, 148). My own purpose is to associate Kant's
usage of Erscheinung with Vorstellung eines Objekts and to reserve Empfindung
or Wahrnehmung for a more primordialunreferred (unbezogene)
representation in consciousness.

368 Notes to Pages 70-71

 49. A very clear formulation of this, without explicit reference to
Prauss, is in R. Aquila, "Matter, Forms," 87.
50. Even such terms as "whiffs" and "hues" are in fact conceptual-
objective, as R. Pippin points out, Kant's Theory of Form, 33.
51. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, passim.
52. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, 39.
53. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 237.
54. K. Ameriks makes this quite clear in his review: "[T]he realm of
subjective objects is thought of as tied not to a peculiar stratum of pre- or
suprajudgmental items (such as mere association, dreams or commands)
but rather to a kind of consciousness that is present precisely in the most
ordinary acts of objective perception; it is the purely subjective side of such
acts" ("Recent Work," 17).
55. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 163.
56. Ibid., 145-46.
57. R. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 121 and note (234).
58. Ibid., 54, citing A.A. 24:907.
59. Ibid., 55.
60. Aquila, "Matter, Forms," 74.
61. Ibid., 80.
62. Ibid., 92.
63. Ibid., 94.
64. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 138.
65. Aquila writes: "the 'application' of concepts to objects (or appear-
ances) can in its own turn be nothing other than an 'application' of the very
faculty of understanding itself. For nothing else is given to the understanding
to 'apply' to objectsnot even concepts" (Matter in Mind, 134).
66. H. Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Ana-
lytic and Syntheticjudgments," 20; Kant, note to J. S. Beck letter of Nov.
11, 1791, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 1 l:298n. (Philosophical Correspondence, 181).
67. Allison, "The Originality of Kant's Distinction between Analytic
and Syntheticjudgments," 18.
68. Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 105.
69. Ibid., 117.
70. Ibid., 164.
71. Ibid. ,171. All of these insights bear with great consequence upon
aesthetic judgments, as I will demonstrate. The crucial connection lies in
the concept of imagination.
72. L. Beck, "Did the Sage of Knigsberg Have No Dreams?" in Essays
on Kant and Hume, 45.
73. Ibid., 47-48n.
74. L. Beck acknowledges in a note the influence of Prauss in this real-
ization, ibid., 52n.
75. Ibid., 56.
76. Ibid., 58.
77. R. Aquila, Matter in Mind, 127ff., takes a very strong stance that
accords with my own, as does Prauss, Erscheinungen bei Kant, 141 n.
78. M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form," 195.

Notes to Pages 71-75 369

 79. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 150.
80. Ibid., 158.
81. This qualifier will be elaborated below.
82. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51 /B75.
83. Kant, Logic, 11:103 (A.A. 9:97).
84. Meerbote, '"Objective Validity' and 'Objective Reality,"' 53ff.
85. The notion of a "subjective principle a priori" is, of course, essen-
tial to the argument of the Third Critique.
86. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, vii:25.
87. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A44/B61.
88. Mathematical constructions take place in "pure" intuition, accord-
ing to Kant. Pure intuition is not empirical. The space of mathematical
construction is ideal, and therefore any "object" which is "realized" in a
mathematical construction is not a real object. It is merely formal, not ac-
tual. What it lacks is precisely material existence. In his preface toMetaphys-
ical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant explained this distinction in terms
of a contrast of "nature" with "essence." Nature, he wrote, "signifies the
primal, internal principle of everything that belongs to the existence of a
thing," whereas "essence is the primal, internal principle of everything that
belongs to the possibility of a thing." Kant continued: "Therefore, one can
attribute to geometrical figures only an essence and not a nature (since
there is thought in their concept nothing which expresses an existence)"
(Metaphysical Foundations, 3). The heart of the distinction between nature
and essence is the contrast between existence (actuality) and possibility.
Kant makes the same distinction in the Third Critique, arguing that the
ground of this distinction "lies in the subject and in the nature of our cogni-
tive faculties." He elaborates: "if the understanding thinks . . . a thing
(which it may do at pleasure), the thing is merely represented as possible. If
it is conscious of it as given in intuition, then it is actual" (Critique of Judg-
ment, 76:249-50).
89. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A320/B376-77.
90. Kant, Logic, 7In.
91. "In man (and so in beasts too) there is an immense field of sen-
suous intuitions and sensations we are not conscious of, though we can con-
clude with certainty that we have them. In other words, the field of our
obscure [representations] is immeasurable, while our clear [representa-
tions] are only the infinitesimally few points on this map that lie open to
consciousness: our mind is like an immense map with only a few places il-
luminated." (Anthropology, 5:16. Here and in all citations from this transla-
tion, I replace Gregor's "idea" with the standard "representation" for the
German term Vorstellung in order to avoid confusion.)
92. Kant, Letter to Herz, May 26,1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:51-52
(Philosophical Correspondence, 15354).
93. G. Prauss, Erscheinung bei Kant, 75, notes Kant's revealing use of
"metamorphosis (Verwandlung) of [subjective] appearance [Erscheinung] into
cognition [Erkenntnis]" in such works as Metaphysical Foundations (A.A.
4:555) and the Prolegomena (A.A. 4:297).
94. Kant, Logic, 71 (A.A. 9:65).
95. J. M. Young holds that his cat is capable of this sort of discrimina-

3 70 Notes to Pages 76-81

tion: "What the cat has, if my suggestion is correct, is the capacity to inter-
pret his sensible states in accordance with certain rules and to discriminate
sensible things of one sort from those of other sorts" ("Kant's View of
Imagination," 149-50). Aquila writes: "Kant himself is prepared to grant
that, animals are in fact capable of a kind of judgment . . . a kind of 're-
flective'judgment . . . the notion of a certain sort of suitability or affinity
between the work of the mere imagination and that of an at least potential
understanding" (Matter in Mind, 69).
96. Animals can "recognize" in the sense of comparing likeness and
difference; they are manifestly acquainted with such things as scents,
tracks, salt licks, and water holes without having to subsume these "objects"
to conceptual universals. Indeed, they don't articulate an experience like
"That is George," but they certainly have it. The animal would not be per-
plexed by the emptiness of "that" or "this" in these propositions, for it
would never have come to propositions. It is humans who articulate, who
name. Yet erkennen in this sense would still have the sense of acquaintance
(kennen, not wissen). "That is George" remains a matter of attaching arbi-
trary signs to the signified, not yet a matter of logical understanding. Yet
humans worry over sentences and their referents. Having named, they
wish to "understand" (verstehen) and therefore have to reflect upon propo-
sitions, elevating them to logical scrutiny and universal validation. See
Sellars and Gram, cited in notes 37 and 26 above, for divergent notions
about the status of "thises" and "thats" in judgments of recognition like
"That is George."
97. Kant, Prolegomena 18:41-42 (A.A. 4:298).
98. Ibid., 20:43 (A.A. 4:300). The repeated reference to "conscious-
ness of my state" and "state of my mind" should be connected with the ar-
gument in the "Amphiboly" of the First Critique. We will return to this
notion.
99. Ibid., 22:48 (A.A. 4:305).
100. See Critique ofJudgment iv: 1516. This would apppear to be the
predominant sense ofjudgment in the First Critique. See A132-34/B171-
73. On the implicit distinction from reflective judgment in the First Critique
see M. Liedtke, Der Begriff.
101. This issue resurfaces in Kant's own epistemology as the problem
of "empirical entailment" in the Third Critique, and especially in its First In-
troduction.
102. See Kant's note on the letter from Jacob Sigismund Beck, Nov.
11, 1791,A.A. ll:298n. (PhilosophicalCorrespondence, 181).
103. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A120.
104. Ibid., A78/B103.
105. Kant called imagination "a blind but indispensable function of
the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of
which we are scarcely ever conscious" (Critique of Pure Reason, A78/B103).
106. Kant, Anthropology, 6:19:
107. Ibid., 31:50.
108. Ibid., 52. In connection with this see the controversial text in the
First Critique, A90/B123.
109. Ibid. Note the symmetry with conduct in the practical sphere that

Notes to Pages 81-84 371

is "in accordance with" but not done "for the sake of" duty, i.e., in explicit
acknowledgement of its rule.
110. Ibid., 25:40. The use of "concept" here may seem a bit mislead-
ing, yet by its placement in the text and by the term "attention" associated
with it, we must recognize that the only sense of concept here is that of an
empirical concept, and Kant is clear that it differs little from a mere name.
111. Ibid., 44:73.
112. Ibid., 54:89. On this see the extensive discussion in A. Bumler,
Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 142ff; O. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie, 268;
and G. Tonelli, "Kant's Early Theory of Genius." See also that remarkable
passage about judgment in the First Critique (A132-36/B171-75), which
obviously takes judgment in a different sense from the standard determi-
nant judgment under the authority of the categories. See M. Liedtke, Der
Begriff, for details.
113. Kant, Anthropology, 55:90.
114. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 141-42.
115. This draws close to Makkreel's project to construe imagination in
Kant's Third Critique as a source for hermeneutics as a mode of "interpreta-
tion."
116. J. M. Young, Kant's View of Imagination," 147.
117. E. Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 1-17.
118. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 149.
119. Ibid., 151. We will return to these issues in our discussion of hypo-
typosis ox Darstellung in connection with Kant's theory of symbolism in part
3 of this study.
120. This sense of a faculty ofjudgment with distinctive features par-
allels closely the remarkable passage concerning judgment in the First Cri-
tique: AXM-MI
121. Makkreel conceives of imagination in this determined sense as
"synthetic," while he calls undetermined (or indeterminate) imagination
"formative." The terms are certainly distinguishable, but what seems to
differentiate the so-called "synthetic" from the "formative" is the explicit
acknowledgement of rule in the judgment, a distinction Kant formulates
most clearly as that between determinant and reflective judgment.
122. J. M. Young, "Kant's View of Imagination," 154.
123. Kant, Anthropology, 40:69.
124. In 26 of the Third Critique, Kant will term this capacity of imag-
ination "comprehension."
125. Kant, Anthropology, 28:45.
126. Kant, Critique ojJudgment, 10:55-56.
127. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-61/B316-17. See also M.
Liedtke, Der Begriff.
128. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A260-61/B316-17.
129. Ibid., A261/B317.
130. Ibid., A269/B325.

Four: The Transcendental Grounding of Taste

1. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 29 (A.A. 5, 30).
2. See Meredith, "Last Stages," xxxvii1.

372 Notes to Pages 84-90

 3. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 9.
4. Kant to K. L. Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A.
10:513-15 {Philosophical Correspondence 127-28).
5. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10:55.
6. On Kant's language of purpose see esp. K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Stu-
dien, part 2: Wesen und Arten der Zweckmigkeit. My view is heavily indebted
to his work. For other recent contributions, see G. Tonelli, "Von den ver-
schiedenen Bedeutungen"; and W. Pluhar, "How to Render 'Zweckmig-
keit.'" For the older literature, see, e.g., R. Eisler, Der Zweck. On the
superiority of "purpose" and "purposiveness" as renderings of Zweck and
Zweckmigkeit over Meredith's "end" and "finality," I find myself in com-
plete agreement with Pluhar.
7. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10:55.
8. Ibid.
9. N. Rescher, "Noumenal Causality"; R. Wolff, "Remarks."
10. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 164 (AA 5:160).
11. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A23/B38.
12. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 31:M135, 33:M140, 8:M53-55.
13. Ibid., 33:M140. A second passage contrasted identical proposi-
tions, substituting rose for tulip (ibid., 8:M55).
14. Ibid., 3.
15. Ibid., 12:M63, 35:M142-43, 36:M144, 37:M145.
16. Ibid., vii:25-26.
17. Ibid., 8. See L. Beck, "On the Putative Apriority ofJudgments of
Taste," in .Essays on Kant and Hume, 167-70; E. Schaper, "Epistemological
Claims and Judgments of Taste," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 18ff.; P.
Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 31026; K. Ameriks, "Kant and the Ob-
jectivity of Taste."
18. Kant defined "exemplary necessity" as "a necessity of the assent of
all to a judgment which is regarded as the example of a universal rule that
we cannot state." Critique ofJudgment, 18:74.
19. Ibid., 29:M117.
20. Ibid., 8:M53.
21. Ibid., 13:M64.
22. Ibid., 14:M65.
23. Ibid., 31:M135-36.
24. Ibid., 32:124.
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Ibid., 36:M144-45.
27. Ibid., 40:M151.
28. Ibid., 40, 8, 6, 22.
29. Ibid., 34.
30. Ibid., 34:M141.
31. These ideas have been explored extensively in the article literature
on Kant's Third Critique. For some important contributions, see T. Greene,
"A Reassessment of Kant's Aesthetic Theory"; R. Zimmermann, "Kant:
The Aesthetic Judgment"; H. Blocker, "Kant's Theory of the Relation
of Imagination and Understanding in Aesthetic Judgments of Taste";
B. Lang, "Kant and the Subjective Objects of Taste"; S. Petock, "Kant,

Notes to Pages 90-95 3 73

Beauty, and the Object of Taste"; W. Henckmann, "Das Problem der s-
thetischen Wahrnehmung in Kants sthetik"; M. Neville, "Kant's Charac-
terization of Aesthetic Experience"; and J. Fisher and J. Maitland, "The
Subjectivist Turn in Aesthetics."
32. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 32:M137.
33. Ibid., 9:M58.
34. Ibid., 9:M60.
35. Ibid., 12:M63.
36. Ibid., 10.
37. Ibid., 10:55.
38. Ibid., iv:l7.
39. Ibid., 10:55.
40. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A686-94/B714-22.
41. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment 15:64, and K. Marc-Wogau, Vier
Studien, 70-71.
42. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 62:210.
43. Ibid., vii:26.
44. We will have to correct this impression ultimately and claim that
precisely because of the "animality" in man, his susceptibility to "subjective
material purposiveness" operates even prior to any empirical cognitive
judgment, through a mere "judgment of sense."
45. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 64:216. See also 43:M163: "if, as
sometimes happens, in a search through a bog, we light on a piece of hewn
wood, we do not say it is a product of nature but of art [artifice]. Its produc-
ing cause had an end in view to which the object owes its form." Though we
can ascribe such artifice to nature figuratively, as in the case of bee's work,
on analogy to art, it is because it is only conceivable to us "in such a way that
its actuality must have been preceded by a representation of the thing in its
cause . . . although its effect could not have been thought by the cause." And
see, finally, 64:21617: "If in a seemingly uninhabited country a man
perceived a geometrical figure, say a regular hexagon, inscribed on the
sand, his reflection busied with such a concept would attribute, although
obscurely, the unity in the principle of its genesis to reason, and conse-
quently would not regard as a ground of the possibility of such a shape the
sand, or the neighboring sea, or the winds, or beasts with familiar foot-
prints, or any other irrational cause. For the chance against meeting with
such a concept, which is only possible through reason, would seem so infi-
nitely great that it would be just as if there were no natural law, no cause in
the mere mechanical working of nature capable of producing it. . . This,
then, would be regarded as a purpose."
46. Of course, even there we have difficulty with the unintended conse-
quences of our purposesboth in recognizing and in acknowledging
them. But that is a Hegelian insight, not a Kantian one. See Hegel, Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, 21152.
47. For a sense of the richness of this particular illustration for the
mentality of the age see A. Lovejoy on changes in styles of gardening in
the eighteenth century ("The Chinese Origins of a Romanticism" and
"The First Gothic Revival and the Return to Nature," in Essays in the History
of Ideas).

3 74 Notes to Pages 95-97

 48. Kant, Critique of Judgment 45:149, 48:154. A great deal more
needs to be said about these notions, but this is not the place. See below.
49. This is Kant's essential point about organisms.
50. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10:55.
51. See L. Beck, Commentary, 90-108, on the role "interest" plays in
Kant's theory of action. See P. Guyer, "Interest, Nature and Art," "Disin-
terestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics," and Kant and the Claims of
Taste, 174ff., for a considered view of the role of this notion in Kant's aes-
thetics.
52. It is a notion with which the Third Critique will wrestle ever after,
and never completely resolve. Kant's notion of "objective purposiveness" is
problematic because it fails of both the two senses in which "objective"
works in the Kantian philosophy. It cannot be primordially given, because
purposiveness is always an inference, not an inherent property of the object
(Third Critique, Introduction, vii:26). And it cannot be objectively valid be-
cause it cannot be brought under determinant judgments.
53. Kant, Grounding, 42. There are two key attributes of such an "end-
in-itself." First, it is a rational agent, an "independently existing end"a
will, not an object of will. Second, as such, it is "final." By "final" Kant
meant two things: ultimacy, that which can never be taken as a means for
any other purpose; and autonomy, having the capacity independently to
determine its own purposes (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 82:276). It is in
the concept of "final purpose" that Kant supplies the crucial clarification of
"objective purpose" which specifies it within the general category of "in-
trinsic purposiveness" and allows the essential claim that man is an end-in-
himself. But this clarification was only achieved in the Third Critique. It was
the fruit of Kant's "ethical turn."
54. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 15:63.
55. Kant, Reflection 696 (1769-71), A.A. 15:309.
56. Kant, Reflection 403 (1750s), A.A. 15:161.
57. Kant, Reflection^,A.A. 15:269.
58. Kant, Reflection 628 (1769), A.A. 15:273.
59. Ibid., 267.
60. That, and even the example which first comes to his mind, the
beauty of flowers, anticipates what became the crux of Kant's theory of
"free beauty" in the Third Critique.
61. Kant, Reflection 628 (1769), A.A. 15:267.
62. Kant, Reflection 656 (1769), A.A. 15:290.
63. Kant, Reflection 643 (1769-79), A.A. 15:283.
64. Kant, Reflection 694, A.A. 15:308. Kant added a further comment:
"the form of synthesis for any purpose in general [die Form der Zusam-
menstimmung zum Belieben berhaupt] is absolute perfection." This definition
should be related to Kant's later formulations of objective purposiveness as
organism and system, i.e., as a self-determining whole.
65. Kant, Reflection 279 (1770), A.A. 15:105. A little later, in 1771,
Kant comes even to distinguish between the cognitive and the evaluative
approach to the object. A cognitive representation of the object is distinct
from the evaluation [Beurteilung] of the object, which has to do with its
worth (Reflection 714 [1771], A.A. 15:316).

Notes to Pages 97-101 375

 66. Kant, Reflection 676 (1769), A.A. 15:299-300.
67. Kant, Reflection 630 (1769), A.A. 15:274.
68. Kant, Reflection 618 (mid-1760s), A.A. 15:266. There were the
germs of his own later theory.
69. Kant, Reflection 638 (1769), A.A. 15:276.
70. Kant, Critique of Judgment, vii:26.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 10:55.
73. Ibid., vii:26.
74. It might seem that I have unduly complicated matters by introduc-
ing the notion of aesthetic matter, when only form was alluded to in the pas-
sage. But the Kantian distinction of the agreeable from the beautiful will be
seen to turn on just this discrimination.
75. Compare Guyer's discussion of "form of finality" and "finality of
form," Kant and the Claims of Taste, 211 ff.
76. Kant, Anthropology, 15:32.
77. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 3:40.
78. "It is also not to be denied that all representations in us, whether,
objectively viewed, they are merely sensible or are quite intellectual, may
yet subjectively be united to gratification or grief, however imperceptible
either may be, because they all affect the feeling of life, and none of them,
so far as it is a modification of the subject, can be indifferent" (Critique of
Judgment 29:119). See also 1, where Kant considers it possible that ra-
tional representations can have mere subjective reference and be, then,
aesthetical. In his discussion of the cognitive use of the language of pur-
posiveness, Kant suggested that satisfaction could accompany even an
empirical judgment about nature. He was speaking of the thrill of discov-
ery, as he made clear in vi of the Introduction. He wrote there: "The dis-
covery that two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature may be
combined under one principle comprehending them both is the ground of
a very marked pleasure" (Critique ofJudgment, 1:24). Nevertheless, Kant
did not believe there was any necessary role for pleasure in a logical re-
flective judgment. See the preface to the Third Critique (5). A determinant
judgment, presumably, would be altogether abstracted from any possible
"aesthetic character" in the representation.

Five: The Beautiful and the Pleasant

1. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 34:127.

2. Ibid., 9:M59.
3. Ibid., 9:M60.
4. Ibid., 39:M149.
5. Ibid., 9:51.
6. Ibid., 26.
7. A. Bumler, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, 84ff.
8. See, for example, T. Cohen and P. Guyer, introduction to Essays in
Kant's Aesthetics, 4; and P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 1011.
9. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 4:41-42, 5:43, 7:46-47.
10. Kant, First Introduction, 28.

3 76 Notes to Pages 101-8

 11. Ibid., 28-29. Translation slightly amended.
12. Ibid., 28. Translation slightly amended.
13. See Kant's letter to M. Herz, May 26,1789, A.A. 11:51-52.
14. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 3:41.
15. Ibid., 8:49-50.
16. Ibid., 8:50, 33:127.
17. Ibid., 4:42.
18. Ibid., 2:38.
19. Ibid., 13:58.
20. Ibid., vii:27.
21. L. Beck, "On the Putative Apriority ofJudgments of Taste," in Es-
says on Kant and Hume, 167-70; and E. Schaper, "Epistemological Claims
and Judgments of Taste," in Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 18ff. On this ques-
tion Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, is the most rigorous extended study;
see esp. 310-26.
22. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 9:51.
23. Ibid., 9:5Iff.
24. Ibid., 1:38.
25. Ibid., 49:157.
26. Ibid., 36:131.
27. Ibid., 37:131-32.
28. Ibid., vii:27.
29. The sequential or stage theory is at the heart of Guyer's interpreta-
tion in Kant and the Claims of Taste, esp. 11 Off., whose analysis of 9 and 37
makes a very compelling case for the superiority of the second argument.
For an earlier formulation of this view, which Guyer drew upon, see A.
Tumarkin, "Zur transscendentalen [sic] Methode der Kantischen s-
thetik."
30. Kant, Critique offudgment, 8:4950.
31. Ibid., 22GR:77-78.
32. Ibid., 22GR:78.
33. Kant, Anthropology, 31:52.
34. Ibid., 67:108.
35. Ibid., 12:29.
36. R. Odebrecht, Form und Geist, 97.
37. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 14:61.
38. Ibid., 31:122.
39. Ibid., 9:51.
40. Ibid., 9:53.
41. Ibid., 6:46. Note the centrality of disinterestedness in this ap-
proach.
42. Ibid., 40:136.
43. Ibid., 8:50-51, 40:135.
44. Ibid., 9:52.
45. Ibid., vii:26.
46. Ibid., 35:129.
47. Ibid., 39:135.
48. Ibid., 9:52.
49. Ibid., 21:75.

Notes to Pages 108-18 377

 50. Ibid.
51. See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, passim; A. Tumarkin, "Zur
transscendentalen Methode"; and A. Genova, "Kant's Transcendental De-
duction of Aesthetical Judgments" for critical examinations of this deduc-
tion in detail.
52. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 9:54.
53. Ibid., 12:58.
54. On the face of it, if the process is entirely subjective in its ground-
ing, and presumably the faculties work in harmony freely, it should be en-
tirely at the subject's disposition which representations should occasion
beauty. If it isn't, then something about the object must be necessary to the
experience. It is not the case that a parallel with empirical cognitive judg-
ment resolves the issue, because all sensible intuition is constituted the mo-
ment any ground for the applicability of categories of understanding has
been established. That only some empirical intuitions occasion the feeling
of beauty, however, poses an altogether different problem.
55. There are some who argue that on Kant's theory, every object
should occasion this feeling, and that this decisively weakens Kant's ap-
proach. The criticism has been formulated by R. Meerbote, "Reflection on
Beauty." An attempt to answer the criticism, by accepting but reinterpret-
ing its key assertion, was made in T. Gracyk, "Sublimity, Ugliness, and
Formlessness." Both essays recognize in Kant's aesthetics a notion of a pre-
conceptual ordering with aesthetic value. For a very effective treatment of
this issue, see M. Gregor, "Aesthetic Form."
56. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 17:68.
57. Ibid., 14:M66 amended.
58. To say that representations-of-objects are eligible for objective ref-
erence is simply to say that they necessarily occur in space and time, i.e.,
they have the form of sensible intuition.
59. P. Guyer has analyzed this confusion in terms of the convergence
of the "finality of form" with the "form of finality." See P. Guyer, Kant and
the Claims of Taste, 211 ff.
60. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 14:M66 amended.
61. The distortion finds echoes later in the text. In 42 Kant gave an-
other go at distilling "form" from the Reiz of color and tone. "The charms
[Reize] in natural beauty, which are to be found blended, as it were, so fre-
quently with beauty of form, belong either to the modifications of light (in
coloring) or of sound (in tones). For these are the only sensations which
permit not merely of a feeling of the senses, but also of reflection upon the
form of these modifications of sense" (ibid., 42:M161).
62. Ibid., 14:61.
63. Ibid., 22GR:M86-87, substituting "purposiveness" for "final-
ity."
64. See Kant's Reflection 706 (1771-72), A.A. 15:313, for an anticipa-
tion of this conception of the dialectic.
65. For the "ease" of the "Deduction," see 38, Remark; for the pov-
erty in transcendental determinations, see the letter to Reinhold, Dec. 2 8 -
31,1787, in Briefwechsel A. A. 10:513-15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 127-

3 78 Notes to Pages 118-22

 28); for further reflections on this question, see 55, the introduction to
the final version of the "Dialectic."
66. Tonelli, "La formazione," 447.
67. Meredith, "Last Stages," 253-54.

Six: Kant's Philosophy of Art in the Year 1788

1. M.Johnson, "Kant's Unified Theory of Beauty."

2. R. Burch, "Kant's Theory of Beauty as Ideal Art."
3. It is useful to look to the Latin for these terms. "Free beauty" is
termed pulchritudo vaga. "Dependent beauty" is pulchritudo adhaerens. To
render vaga as "free," as Kant did, is indicative of the peculiar character of
. the freedom he wished to assign to taste.
4. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 15:M70.
5. Ibid., 16:67. See E. Schaper, "Free and Dependent Beauty," in
Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, 7895; and P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste,
242-52.
6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 48:M173, substituting "purposiveness"
for "finality."
7. Kant goes to great lengths to distinguish among merely sensual
pleasure, das Angenehme, beauty, das Schne, and the good, aas Gute, in 1
5 of the Third Critique. These ideas had been distinguished in his thinking
since the 1760s.
8. Ibid., 15:M70. And see e/fecfem 656 (1769), A.A. 15:290.
9. Ibid., 16:67.
10. It is, in other words, an "ideal" in the terminology of the First Cri-
tique. Why Kant insists on calling it an "aesthetic idea" will only be fully
clear after we have incorporated his theory of symbolism. For the moment,
let us suspend that question.
11. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 17:M77, with emendations.
12. Ibid., 17:M78-79.
13. Ibid.; Kant discusses the ideal of the imagination along similar
lines in the First Critique at B384-85.
14. Or, alternatively, has its source in something less determinately
applicable to sensible intuition, namely, ideas of reason. This last possibil-
ity is the one Kant will eventually opt for.
15. The phrase, which is so utterly apt, is from Max Weber, who uses it
in an entirely different context. Kant's sense accords more with an idea
which one of Weber's students developed: Georg Lukcs's idea of the typi-
cal as a Hegelian "concrete universal." See, e.g., Lukacs, Realism in Our
Time, 122.
16. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 17:M77.
17. Ibid., 17:M78.
18. Ibid., 17:M79.
19. What could be an image of anyone cannot very well serve as a por-
trait of someone. A. Malraux makes a very interesting analysis of this idea
in juxtaposing a head sculpted in antiquity with one sculpted in the Middle
Ages. The Roman head is in just the relevant sense impersonal. The medi-
eval head is utterly personal. See Malraux, Voices of Silence, 218-19.

Notes to Pages 123-29 3 79

 20. Kant, Critique ojJudgment, 17:68.
21. Kiesewetter to Kant, Jan. 29, 1790, A.A ll:126ff.
22. Hegel was one who criticized Kant along these lines. See Hegel's
Introduction to Aesthetics, esp. 56ff.
23. Nietzsche has a great deal to say about the difference this intro-
duces into the aesthetic theory one composes. See "The Will to Power as
Art" in Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 419-53, and the discussion in M.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 1:107ff.
24. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 45:M167.
25. Ibid., 48:M173.
26. See Kant, First Introduction, 1. For these two senses of rationality
in Weber, see "Politics as a Vocation," 12022.1 wish only to use his terms
to help illuminate Kant.
27. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 43:146.
28. Ibid., 43:M164.
29. Ibid., 45:149.
30. Ibid., 45:M167.
31. Ibid., 49:M181.
32. Ibid., 43:M164.
33. Ibid., 44:M165.
34. Ibid. Kant frequently distinguished merely historical learning
from rational or philosophical science. See his First Critique, A836/B864,
and his announcement of his lectures, A.A. 2:305-313.
35. In all this one can see the enormous appeal of Kant to the Positi-
vists of the late nineteenth century, whose phrase "back to Kant" was a re-
bellion largely against all the "Romantic excesses." In their acceptance of
Kant's ironic handling of genius, they mislaid the very powerful Romantic
stress on creativity, however. It is the great philosophical contribution of
Michael Polanyi in all sobriety to reintroduce these questions with explicit
reference to the philosophy of Kant, in Personal Knowledge.
36. Meredith cites Alexander Gerard, William Duff and Edward
Young as the most likely sources of Kant's theory of genius. O. Schlapp,
Kants Lehre vom Genie, offers a host of English sources. G. Tonelli, "Kant's
Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779)," tries to sort out the early sources.
What is clear, in any event, is that Kant had closely read the existing litera-
ture, and had taken Gerard, in particular, as the most important theorist
before himself, and the one he had therefore to improve upon.
37. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 46:M168.
38. Ibid., 169.
39. Ibid., 47:M 169-70.
40. The notions of the limitation of art, that this limitation in human
culture had already been reached, and the consequent demotion of art in
terms of its rank among elements in human culture constitute the decisive
starting point for Hegel's philosophy of art, and also the basis of his crit-
icism of Romanticism. It is remarkable that Kant should have made these
assertions. Yet Kant never pursued or developed them. Indeed, he did not
even justify them. They remained bald assertions in his work. All the real
labor was left to Hegel.
41. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 47:M171-72.

380 Notes to Pages 129-41

 42. Ibid., 172.
43. Kant to F. H. Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. U:73f.
44. What we have here, in short, is yet another chapter in that "ancient
quarrel between the philosophers and the poets," as Plato put it long ago.
45. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 43:M163.
46. Indeed, he had an even more profound trick in mind: to steal ge-
nius away from the Schwrmer and make it a vehicle for reason. Kant's phi-
losophy of art contains two theories of genius. The first, consistent with all
that has gone before, regards genius as "natural" in the sense of belonging
to sensibility, givenness, and imagination, and it articulates the phe-
nomenology of genius in terms of the subjective conditions of the faculties
of the mind. It is this "naturalistic" theory of genius that concerns us here.
But in 49 Kant also articulates for the first time publicly a much more rad-
ical possibility, namely, that genius emanates not simply from "nature" in
that sense of "actuality," but rather from "nature" in its noumenal sense,
i.e., from reason as supersensible but real being. The latter notion, which is
the foundation of Kant's theory of symbolism, only came to full articula-
tion, however, in the wake of his "ethical turn," and we will reserve analysis
of it for that later context.
47. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 48: Ml 74.
48. Kantian theory of art sees play as a form of abstraction from the
binding character of rule through the use of such rules for other purposes,
as in setting up rules in a game through which to make play possible, but
not out of any earnestness about the rules as such. There is a good deal of
literature picking up on Kant's use of play in this context, starting with
Schiller and carrying forward to some of the most recent scholarly efforts
to make sense of Kant's theory of art. See, e.g., H. Gadamer, Truth and
Method, 9Iff., and A. Trebels, Einbildungskraft und Spiel.
49. See J. Barzun, Classic, Romantic and Modern, and I. Howe, ed., The
Idea of the Modern.
50. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:M175.
51. Ibid., 43:M164.
52. Ibid., 17:M75.
53. Kant uses the contrast geistreich andschn in 50 to make his point.
A work may be geistreich, full of spirit, when the imaginative genius supplies
a good deal of its distinctive "material," but it may not be beautiful. Indeed,
like those English gardens, it might verge on the grotesque. Conversely,
that which has only taste, but no spark of genius, is, to be sure, in the
measure that it conforms to the rules, "correct" and, Kant even seems to
suggest, beautiful (schn), yet unequivocally lifeless.
54. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A90/B123; Anthropology, 31,52.
55. See Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 5.
56. Ibid., 29GR:M120.
57. Ibid., 48:M172.
58. Thus Meredith notes, in his commentary: "Of course, 'representa-
tion' is not here used in the technical sense with which readers of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason will be familiar. At the same time it is somewhat difficult
to fix its meaning . . . Kant's distinction raises more difficulties than it
solves" (Kant's Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, editor's note, 285).

Notes to Pages 141-46 381

 59. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 48:M174.
60. In fact, the meaning of this essentially expressive theory of art will
only become clear when we address ourselves to Kant's theory of symbol-
ism.

Seven: The Cognitive Turn

1. R. Horstmann recognizes the problem of the process of develop-

ment: "The two years during which Kant wrote the book must have wit-
nessed a remarkable process of adjusting the initial idea of a Critique of Taste
to needs originating from sources not directly related to the theory of
taste." Yet he declines to "investigate the details of the historical develop-
ment of the Critique ofJudgment" ("Why Must There Be a Transcendental
Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment?" 16061).
2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 23:M92.
3. In these considerations the cognitive and the practical senses of "in-
tellectual" were peculiarly fused, because the matter which was at issue was
the "purposiveness of nature." Insofar as it was "purposive," it referred to a
judgment of reason rather than understanding, but insofar as it had to do
with "nature," it seemed at least in some sense cognitive. In 42, Kant
wrote: "it. . . interests reason that the ideas (for which in the moral feeling
it arouses an immediate interest) should have objective reality, i.e that na-
ture should at least show a trace or give an indication that it contains in
itself a ground for assuming a regular agreement of its products with our
entirely disinterested satisfaction" (143). What Kant is intimating is that, in
fact, there are two interests involved in the rational consideration of
beauty, first a cognitive one in finding empirical order, but second an ethi-
cal one in finding our moral purposes compatible with nature's laws. The
first interest would lead him to his "cognitive turn" and the second to his
"ethical turn."
4. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 30:M133 (replacing "finality" with
"purposiveness").
5. Ibid., 23:M92 (replacing "finality" with "purposiveness"). In his
Remark to 38, Kant elaborated on the "profound inquiries" he meant in
the following terms: "But if the question were: How is it possible to assume
a priori that nature is a complex of objects of taste? the problem would then
have reference to teleology, because it would have to be regarded as an end
of nature belonging essentially to its concept that it should exhibit forms
that are final for our judgment" (ibid., 38:M148). Kant insists that two
considerations be kept clearly in mind: first, this speculation about the in-
trinsic purposiveness of nature cannot be proven, and hence remains sub-
ject to doubt. And second, it is unnecessary to his theory of beauty in
nature.
6. Ibid., 43:145.
7. In the First Critique, Kant explained that analogy could not, in phi-
losophy, achieve the specificity of result that it could in mathematics. It
could not give the fourth element, when the other three were given in ana-
logical relation, but it could only validate the relation. Yet analogies were
extremely important in human cognition. They functioned especially in

382 Notes to Pages 147-53

the sphere where determinate concepts failed, i.e., where understanding
was not legislative. In this context, it is worthwhile to point out that Kant
used the term "Analogies of Experience" for the crucial categories of rela-
tion in the "Transcendental Analytic," and distinguished them as "regula-
tive" and "dynamical" in contrast to the more mathematical categories
{Critique of Pure Reason, A179-80/B222). This suggests that the dividing
line between analogy and indicative assertion in Kant's theory of knowl-
edge may not be as simple as he would have wished.
8. Kant, First Introduction, 7:24 (A.A. 20:220).
9. Ibid., 5:18 (A.A. 20:213-14).
10. Ibid., 1:8 (A.A. 20:200-1). Beurtheilen is less rigorous than
urtheilen; it does not have the same cognitive validity as erklren and seems
closer to kennen than to wissen.
11. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 23, paragraphs 4 and 5. This was
Kant's point about the beneficial impact of natural beauty upon scientific
inquiry. It was also his point about the affective accompaniment of discov-
ery, and the more sustained (transcendental) gratification at the confor-
mity of empirical nature with human reason, which occasioned Kant's
memorable apostrophe to the starry heavens. Compare iv of the Intro-
duction, on the delight associated with discovery in science, which attends
the cognition of gratuitous order.
12. See the crucial line in the Transcendental Dialectic, A643/B671:
"All errors of subreption are to be ascribed to a defect of judgment
[Urtheilskraft], never to understanding or to reason." This is a matter to
which we must return.
13. First Introduction, 5:20 (A.A. 20:215).
14. Ibid., 7:24 (A.A. 20:220).
15. Ibid., 9:38 (A.A. 20:234).
16. Ibid., 9:38-39 (A.A. 20:234-35).
17. Kant makes this assertion in his preface to the B-version. It is also
implicit in his letter to Reinhold of 1787, of which we have made so much
use.
18. The question of "popularity" was a sore point for Kant. He
seemed to have had a rather sound attitude about it in the preface to the
first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, but its reception clearly annoyed
him, and he was far more irrascible about the issue in his prefaces both to
the Prolegomena and to the second edition of the First Critique.
19. For a more detailed analysis of this question, see H. de
Vleeschauwer, La deduction, 2:552ff. and vol. 3, passim. See also B.
Erdmann, Kants Kriticismus, 163ff.; and M. Washburn, "The Second Edi-
tion of the Critique."
20. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to B-version, Bxlxli.
21. Kant discusses "purposiveness" in a very important manner
in the "Transcendental Dialectic," A625/B653; A686-87/B714-15;
A743/B771; A815/B843. We will take this up below.
22. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 211.
23. Horstmann, "Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in
Kant's Critique ofJudgment}" 166-69 and 259n., discusses the perplexity of

Notes to Pages 153-57 383

the status of Zweckmigkeit in the First Critique in terms of methodological
versus transcendental principles of subjective consciousness.
24. Kant, First Introduction, 4 (A.A. 20:203n). See K. Dsing.fli Tele-
ologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 57, for a very clear exposition of this.
25. The best statement of this insight, and one which has deeply influ-
enced my study, is G. Schrder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in
the Critical Philosophy." But see also H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of
Spinoza," 211, who argues that the "conformity [of particulars to empirical
laws] was not guaranteed by the Transcendental Analytic." And, too,
Horstmann, "Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's
Critique ofJudgment}" 163: the transcendental principles established in the
First Critique "do not account for the contingent or empirical fact that na-
ture consists of very many individual objects [with] . . . special contingent
characteristics."
26. See the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,
where Kant promised a Metaphysics of Nature "not half as large, yet incom-
parably richer in content than this present Critique" (A:xxi). While the
Critique offered an exhaustive synthesis of transcendental principles a priori,
Kant argued that the concepts so constituted contained a great deal more,
and consequently "there will remain the further work of making their anal-
ysis similarly complete" (ibid.).
27. Ibid., "Transcendental Aesthetic," B:40. The contrast of "tran-
scendental" and "metaphysical" expositions was an innovation of the
B-version, in which Kant was working toward the conception of a mediat-
ing role for metaphysical principles as analytic corrollaries of his transcen-
dental principles which would provide the transition to their empirical
employment.
28. Kant's physics was only partly Newtonian, as commentators have
noted in evaluating his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. See G.
Brittan, Jr., Kant's Theory of Science, 131-40; and M. Jammer, Concepts of
Force, 82ff.
29. Kant, First Introduction, 4:14 (A.A. 20:209).
30. G. Schrder, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Kantian
Philosophy."
31. K. Dsing, Die Teleogie in Kants Weltbegriff, 65; I. Bauer-
Drevermann, "Zuflligkeit in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft"; Allison, "Kant's
Critique of Spinoza," 218: "the concept of contingency is central to the en-
tire Third Critique."
32. One of the important shifts that transpires over the course of the
"Critical" decade of Kant's works is that whereas in the First Critique "un-
derstanding" clearly dominates over all other faculties and seems to be the
driving force of the mind altogether, in the later works, reason and judg-
ment come to the fore. It is particularly important to note that already in
the First Critique there were grounds for ascribing dynamism to "reason"
within the whole operation of the mind. See the apt arguments for this of-
fered by R. Brandt, "The Deductions in the Critique of Judgment." Most
modern, and a fortiori most Anglo-American, philosophers routinely priv-
ilege "understanding" in their reading of Kant's theory of mental activity.
See G. Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason' in

384 Notes to Pages 158-61

the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy." Though Kant began with that
posture, by the later critical writings, reason and judgment had become far
more importantand they were consistently complementary, one in the
"pure," and one in the complex sphere of human rational activity.The par-
allelism of reason in pure operations with judgment in empirical applica-
tions is the striking counterpart of the restriction of the understanding. See
the preface to the Third Critique for a very clear statement of this. The close
parallel between judgment in its "technical" function (teleological judg-
ment) and judgment in its "practical" function (moral judgment) is a sys-
tematic principle which deserves far more philosophical attention than it
has hitherto received.
33. See A. Stadler, Kants Teleologie und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Be-
deutung, for the first sustained analysis of this relation between the "Tran-
scendental Dialectic" of the First Critique and the Third Critique. For more
nuanced readings, see W. Bartuschat, Zum systematischen Ort; H. Mertens,
Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft; and the ex-
change between Horstmann and Brandt, in E. Frster, ed.,Kant's Transcen-
dental Deductions.
34. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A304/B360.
35. Kant, First Introduction, 2:8 (A.A. 20:201).
36. See Kant, Logic, 125-30; Critique of Pure Reason A303-5/B359-
61.
37. See J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 70.
38. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A642-68/B670-96, esp. A 6 5 7 -
58/B685-86.
39. Kant, First Introduction, 4:14 (A.A. 20:209).
40. See: J. Dister, "Kant's Regulative Ideas and the 'Objectivity' of
Reason"; R. Zocher, "Der Doppelsinn der kantischen Ideenlehre"; and J.
Evans, "The Empirical Employment of Pure Reason."
41. Kant used the term "idea" in a very specific sense, which he
worked out at the outset of the "Transcendental Dialectic," A310
38/B36696. He saw fit to make no changes in this section of the "Dialec-
tic" in the B-version.
42. At several junctures, Kant wrote of reason as governing the under-
standing in a way strictly analogous to understanding's legislation, through
the schematism, for experience. On the importance Kant attached to this
parallelism, see McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 27.
43. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A178/B221.
44. Ibid., A178/B220.
45. Ibid., A179/B222.
46. Ibid., A180/B222-23.
47. Ibid., A180/B223. Even within the mathematical categories there
is a difference between quantity and quality. All that can be "anticipated" as
regards the "real" in appearances is that it will have degree, but which prop-
erties and what degreei.e., all that is essential to the specification of an
empirical object of experiencecannot be anticipated or "constructed" a
priori.
48. See S. French, "Kant's Constitutive-Regulative Distinction."
49. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A508-10/B536-38.

Notes to Pages 161-65 385

 50. Ibid., A643/B671.
51. Ibid., A644/B672.
52. Ibid., A664/B692.
53. That is the point of Kant's distinction of philosophy from mathemat-
ics. Philosophy is the exclusive affair of reason. It works with concepts, not
constructions in intuition. See Critique of Pure Reason, A713-27/B741-55.
54. Ibid., A646-47/B674-75.
55. Michael Polanyi has explored these matters in a rigorous and in-
sightful manner from a "post-critical" vantage in Personal Knowledge.
56. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A643/B671.
57. Compare M. Liedtke, Der Begriff.
58. A.A. 8:133-47.
59. See, e.g., Critique of Pure Reason, A69/B94, where the faculty of
judgment is the set of "all acts of the understanding," or A81 /B106, where
the faculty ofjudgment is held to be "the same as the faculty of thought."
60. See ibid., AI 32/B171, where the faculty ofjudgment is contrasted
with understanding: "understanding in general is to be viewed as the fac-
ulty of rules, judgment will be the faculty of subsuming under rules" and
similarly at A247/B304: "the employment of a concept involves a function
of judgment [Urtheilskraft] whereby an object is subsumed under the con-
cept." And especially see A646/B674 of the "Transcendental Dialectic,"
where Kant comes closest to the sense of a "determinant judgment": "If
reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal, and if the
universal is already certain in itself and given, only judgment [Urtheilskraft] is
required to execute the process of subsumption, and the particular is
thereby determined in a necessary manner."
61. This is the most striking, indeed even incongruous usage of
Urtheilskraft in the First Critique, and smacks of Kant's style in the Anthropol-
ogy or in the Third Critique. Kant wrote: "judgment [Urtheilskraft] is a pecu-
liar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be taught. It is the
specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make
good . . . [I]n the absence of such a natural gift no rule that may be pre-
scribed to [a learner] for this purpose can ensure against misuse . . . He
may comprehend the universal m abstracto, and yet not be able to distin-
guish whether a case in concreto comes under it" (A13334/B17273). This
is, so far as I can establish, the only place in the First Critique where Kant
treats the faculty ofjudgment autonomously of understanding in the larg-
est sense. Hence here Kant approached the "other kind ofjudging" which
he only came fully to acknowledge in the Third Critique.
62. Kant explains all this in his "architectonic" first section of the First
Introduction, 1:3-8 (A.A. 20:195-201).
63. See Horstmann's discussion of the distinction in the First Critique
between methodological and transcendental principles, "Why Must There
Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique ofJudgment}" 164-76.
Kant did not yet recognize in the First Critique the idea of a subjective tran-
scendental principle a priori, but he was forced to in the Third Critique in
terms of the faculty of judgment.
64. Kant, First Introduction, 5:20 (A.A. 20:215).

386 Notes to Pages 165-68

 65. See, above all, G. Tonelli, "La formazione," and M. Souriau, Le
jugement reflechissant.
66. Kant to Reinhold, May 12, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:39.
67. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, iii: 1314. Kant made the claim of the
systematic closure of the faculties in his letter to Reinhold of December
1787 as well.
68. Kant did allow the text to be published, unedited, later, and he also
claimed that it was not in any philosophical way different from the final
version of the Introduction, only longer. The latter claim is clearly inaccu-
rate, and the significance of the later publicationas a fragmentis un-
clear. What is clear, however, is that Kant was never before or after so
caught up with the idea of system.
69. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 8.
70. Kant, Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, 11, A.A. 20:241
42 (my translation).
71. Ibid., 242.
72. It appears in none of the section tides in the final version. In its
place, the language of "purpose" increases in prominence.
73. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 70.
74. See H. Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung, and A. Genova,
"Kant's Complex Problem of Reflective Judgment."
75. "What is peculiarly distinctive of reason . . . is that it prescribes
and seeks to achieve its systematisation, that is, to exhibit the connection of its
parts in conformity with a single principle" (Critique of Pure Reason,
A645/B673). See G. Buchdahl, "The Kantian 'Dynamic of Reason.'"
76. "Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. It can have
no other vocation" (ibid., A680/B708).
77. Ibid., A680/B708.
78. Ibid., A645/B673.
79. Ibid., A647/B675.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., A680-81/B708-9.
82. These issues assume ineluctable saliency in the sphere of practical
reason, as we shall see when we return to them in the context of the "ethical
turn."
83. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A65/B89-90.
84. For this distinction of architectonic from system, see H. Mertens,
Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung, 71.
85. In terms of Kant's theory of space, it is not Leibnizian, i.e., merely
the result of the interrelation of things, that which is "between" them, link-
ing them, but more Newtonian, i.e., that within which they are deployed.
But the fundamental question which obviously arises is whether Kant, like
Newton, takes this ground to have objective reality (space as Divine sub-
stance) and hence considers reason as being (the soul, in rational psychol-
ogy), or only takes it to be merely transcendentally ideal, i.e., a necessary
structure of consciousness but not by that alone warranted as objectively
real.
86. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A832-33/B860-61.

Notes to Pages 169-73 387

 87. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 38.
88. Weldon, Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 239.
89. K. Dsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 89.
90. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxiii.
91. SeeJ. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason."
92. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxvii-xxxviii.
93. See K. Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft.
94. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A64-65/B89.
95. Hence Kant's revision of the title of his First Critique in his famous
letter to K. L. Reinhold of Dec. 2 8 - 3 1 , 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-
15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 12728), and in many other texts of this
and later periods to read "Critique of Pure Theoretical (or Speculative)
Reason."
96. Kant's letter to Reinhold gave clear notice of a change in his posi-
tion. While he wrote as though the change only made possible a Third cri-
tique, the change was involved in creating the possibility of the Second. See
R. Benton, Kant's Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments,
24 and passim.
97. Kant, Grounding, 4.
98. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 94.
99. Kant to Reinhold, Dec. 28-31, 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:513-
15 (Philosophical Correspondence, 12728).
100. Kant makes an explicit distinction between theism and deism in the
First Critique: "Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not
merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source of all things,
but a supreme being who through understanding and freedom is the Au-
thor of all things; and since it is in this sense only that the concept interests
us, we could, strictly speaking, deny to the deist any belief in God, allowing
him only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause. However. . .
it is less harsh and more just to say that the deist believes in a God, the theist in
a living God (summa intelligentia)" (A63233/B66061).
101. Kant, Prolegomena, 2 - 3 (A.A. 4:257).
102. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A3/B7.
103. Kant, "Was heit: sich im Denken orientieren?" A.A. 8:136.
104. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 72:237.
105. Ibid., 75:246.

Eight: Kant's Critique of Science

1. Thus Kant's remarks about the German spirit of thoroughness and

those who had tried to dissolve it, in the second preface, e.g., Bxliixliii.
2. See F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 165-225, for a current discussion of
Kant and his critics in the early to mid-1780s. He notes that it was only in
1788 that the intensity of criticism from empiricists and Wolffians alike as-
sumed such proportions that Kant felt compelled to defend himself pub-
licly.
3. These were the essays with which Kant assumed leardership of the
Aufklrung movement. Most of them appeared in the Berlinische Monats-
schrift, one of the flagship journals of the movement. For bold statements of

388 Notes to Pages 173-79

Aufklrung ideology from Kant, see the preface to the A-version of the
First Critique, Axi, note; the entire section entitled "The Discipline of Pure
Reason in Respect of its Polemical Employment" in the First Critique,
A737-57/B766-86; and the preface to the B-v-sion, Bxxxii-xxxv. The
locus classicus is, of course, his essay "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784).
4. For a similar conclusion, see F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 14950.
5. C.Schtz to Kant, July 10, 1784, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:371.
6. C. Schtz to Kant, Aug. 23, 1784, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:373.
7. When he took up the project of his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte
der Menschheit, Herder was at the prime of his powers, and in that project he
addressed his most important concern. The result, without question, was
his greatest work. (For the finest study of Herder to this day see R. Haym,
Herder; on this specific point, 2:193.) It remains one of the greatest works
of the German 1780s. Yet, because of Kant, Goethe, and Hegel, Herder's
bright star is dimmed as by glaring suns. It was his peculiar historical lot to
be a grand figure dwarfed by titans. Yet he deserves better than the con-
descension or even contempt to which he has been so frequently subjected
by literary and historical scholars. Even so major an effort as I. Berlin's
"Herder and Enlightenment" fails to do him full justice. More just, if
briefer, is L. Beck in Early German Philosophy, 38292.
8. Haym, Herder, makes this important point, 2:262-63.
9. Hamann to Herder, May 8, 1785, in Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:432.
10. See his remark to Hartknoch in 1783, cited by K. Vorlnder, Imma-
nuel Kant, 317n.: "Kant's works were certainly not enjoyable for him and
against his way of thinking, but at the same time he had neither written nor
occasioned to be written anything against them." Of course, Kant would
disagree: Von Erkennen und Empfinden ssemed a direct attack on his philoso-
phy-
11. Those reviews, intervening in the middle of his great synthetic
project, adversely affected the balance of Herder's work, and the bitter hos-
tility to Kant they engendered worked like a cancer to corrode his thinking
thereafter, until it resulted in those last bilious and futile outburststhe
Metakritik der reinen Vernunft and the Kalligoneof the close of the century.
See Haym, Herder, 2:251, for the question of Kant's immediate and de-
structive impact on the composition of the Ideen.
12. Herder, Atom, vol. 1, 13:13.
13. Ibid., 65.
14. Ibid., 109ff. The issue of erect posture had drawn Kant's attention
in an earlier review, "Recension von Moscatis Schrift" (A.A. 2:42325).
15. See J. Herder, Essay on the Origin of Language.
16. Herder, Ween, book 5. See R. Clarke, "Herder's Concept of 'Kraft.'"
17. Haym, Herder, 2:212ff.
18. H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit 2:22.
19. Ibid., esp. 2:1 Iff.
20. Ibid., 2:14.
21. Goethe, "Natur-Fragment."
22. Goethe, letter to Kanzler von Mller, May 24,1828, cited in Pascal,
German Sturm und Drang, 210.
23. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:18-19; but see the very negative as-

Notes to Pages 179-83 389

sessment of Goethe as scientist despite praise for his poetry of nature, illus-
trated by this fragment, in C. Sherrington, Goethe on Nature and Science. For
a monumental rebuttal of this utter severance of poetic from scientific in-
sight, see E. Sewell, The Orphic Voice, esp. part 3, "Erasmus Darwin and
Goethe," 169-276. On the impact of Goethe's thinking see J. Hoffmeister,
Goethe und der deutsche Idealismus.
24. See Herder's letter to F. Jacobi, Feb. 6, 1784, Herders Briefe, 227,
and the preface to God: Some Conversations, 67.
25. See esp. E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, chap. 6.
Cassirer has throughout his works shown a sound appreciation for the im-
portance of the Earl of Shaftesbury for eighteenth-century thought.
26. O. Walzel developed this idea explicitly: "Shaftesbury prophet-
ically anticipated the later recognition that the cosmos and every particular
organism is a system, in which the parts are coordinated into a whole by the
unity of purpose" ("Shaftesbury"). On the relation of the idea of organic
unity to pantheist metaphysics in the eighteenth century, see J. Benziger,
"Organic Unity," esp. 29.
27. W. Dilthey, "Aus der Zeit des Spinozastudien Goethes." See also
Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 85.
28. Shaftesbury's "metaphor of the world as a living body anticipates
the later conception, held by such Romantics as Diderot and Goethe, that
the universe is a complex of active processes rather than a mechanism com-
posed of dead matter" (Tuveson, "Shaftesbury and the Age of Sensibility,"
87).
29. A. Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times, esp. "The Moralists" (1709), 2:1156.
30. Walzel, "Shaftesbury," 428.
31. "The highest good for man is to imbue the microcosm, his life,
with the 'vital principle' which animates [Nature as a work of God]." J.
Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury," 102.
32. E. Tuveson, "Shaftesbury and the Age of Sensibility," 83.
33. Ibid., 82.
34. On the whole notion of aesthetic attunement as implicating cogni-
tive or ethical validity, see the first part of H. Gadamer, Truth and Method,
5-90.
35. Cassirer, Philosophy ofthe Enlightenment, 314. And: "Nature itself in
its deeper sense is not the sum total of created things but the creative power
from which the form and order of the universe are derived" (ibid., 328).
"The deeper truth of this world . . . consists in the fact that an operative
principle obtains in it, which is embodied in and reflected by all its crea-
tures in varying degrees and force" (ibid., 314). The beautiful "is indepen-
dent and original, and innate and necessary, in the sense that it is no mere
accident but belongs to the substance of the spirit and expresses this sub-
stance in an entirely original way" (ibid., 322).
36. Ibid., 317.
37. "Shaftesbury's doctrine of'enthusiasm,' of'disinterested passion,'
of genius in man which is akin to and not inferior to the 'Genius of the
World,' contain the first seeds of this new fundamental conception whose
development and systematic justification took place at the hands of Less-

390 Notes to Pages 183-84

ing, Herder, and Kant." Cassirer, Philosophy ofthe Englightenment, 319 20n.
See also: O. Walzel, "Shaftesbury"; and W. Bruford, Culture and Society in
Classical Weimar 17751806, 2637. See also C. Weiser, Shaftesbury und das
deutsche Geistesleben; and I. Hatch, Der Einflu Shaftesburys auf Herder.
38. The text is in A.A. 8:44-55. The scientific substance of the review
will be treated in a later chapter.
39. C.Schtz to Kant, Feb. 18,1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:375. Iron-
ically, this defender of Herder, whom Kant demolished in short order in a
response printed in the March issue of Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, proved
to be none other than K. L. Reinhold, who would, a year later, use the same
Teutsche Merkur as the forum for his Briefe ber die Kantische Philosophie
(178690), the decisive popularization of Kantianism in Germany.
40. Kant, "Recension von Herders Ideen," A.A. 8:53-54.
41. Ibid., 27.
42. Haym, Herder, 2:247-48, and K. Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant, 319,
blame Kant. Even L. Beck writes that "Kant deserved all the blame" for the
falling out (Early German Philosophy, 384) but he also insists that Kant was
correct (ibid., 390-91).
43. Haym wrote aptly: "Kant uncovered with victorious sharpness
and clarity the halftruths and confusions of his opponent, but he passed
over without recognition the legitimate motives of the latter, indeed, he did
him an injustice" (Herder, 2:256). And see Hamann to Herder, Feb. 4,
1785: "Kant is too full of his own system to be able to judge you
objectivelyand no one is in a position yet to see the whole scope of your
project" (Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:352).
44. The first volume of Herder's Ideen is preponderantly Natur-
philosophie. The second volume, which Kant also reviewed, dealt with phys-
ical anthropology and race theory, scientific topics of direct relevance to
Kant's teleology essay. For background on these questions in the eigh-
teenth century, see C. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, 508ff.
45. Kant, Grounding, 2.
46. Kant, Reflection 990 (later 1780s), A.A. 15:435.
47. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B:xxxvi.
48. Ibid., Bxlii-xliii.
49. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 23.
50. Kant, "ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:161.
51. Ibid., 180.
52. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 102. On Priestley's "syncretism"
see J. McEvoy and J. McGuire, "God and Nature."

Nine: Kant Against Eighteenth-Century Hylozoism

1. See P. Menzer, Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung. For correction see A.
Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," and G. Lehmann, "Kant und der Evolu-
tionismus: Zur Thematik der Kantforschung Paul Menzers," in Lehmann,
Beitrge, 219-243.
2. K. Roretz, Zur Analyse von Kants Philosophie des Organischen, 112-50;
E. Ungerer, Die Teleologie Kants und ihre Bedeutungfr die Logik der Biologie,
64-132; P. Bommersheim, "Der vierfache Sinn der inneren Zweckmig-

Notes to Pages 184-89 391

keit in Kants Philosophie des Organischen"; and H. Lieber, "Kants Phi-
losophie des Organischen und die Biologie seiner Zeit." For a recent study
of Kant's theory of organic form see R. Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, esp.
138ff.
3. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 75:248, 77:254.
4. On Kant's concept of life see Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, 153-
67. And see R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, 91 ff.
5. Hence Kant situated himself squarely in the tradition of the new
scientific rationalism. For an old but still trenchant assessment of this view
seeE. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Physical Science. Forarecent
and penetrating analysis, see G. Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of
Science.
6. That did not escape younger intellectuals in Germany who did keep
abreast of the latest developments in natural science, and who could sense
in Kant's work, even of the later 1780s, a position which did not quite incor-
porate the then current level of scholarship. In the aftermath of the pub-
lication of the Third Critique, young philosophers, steeped in the latest
science, came to find his posture insupportable. Hence here was one of the
impulses which led to German Idealism.
7. For this notion of "paradigm" see T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions.
8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A39-40/B56-57. See L. Beck, Early
German Philosophy, 44651, for a consideration of this. For more detail, see
G. Martin, Kant's Metaphysic and Theory of Science, which stresses the Leib-
nizian origins, and Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science.
9. This is the thrust of the "Second Antinomy" of the Critique of Pure
Reason, A434-45/B462-73, A523-27/B551-55. See J. Ellington, "The
Unity of Kant's Thought" and "Translator's Introduction," esp. vi-x; 2 0 5 -
13.
10. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, chap. 2, "Meta-
physical Foundations of Dynamics," 4 0 - 9 4 (A.A. 4:496-535).
11. Ibid., 60 (A.A. 4:470).
12. See, for example, R. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism.
13. J. D'Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedic; see also
Cassirer's use of D'Alembert's work in Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 8ff.
14. See L. Crocker, "Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Trans-
formationism."
15. See B. Glass, ed., Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859, esp. 5183.
16. Or perhaps he did, but only in the Opus posthumum, where it was
too late to salvage the relationship between the elder Kant and his Idealist
heirs. See G. Lehmann, Kants Nachlawerk, and K. Dsing, Die Teleologie in
Kants Weltbegriff, 143.
17. In the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the First Critique Kant made
quite clear the extent of his commitment to this principle: "Order and pur-
posiveness in nature must themselves be explained from natural grounds
and according to natural laws;. . . the wildest hypotheses, if only they are
physical, are here more tolerable than a hyperphysical hypothesis" (A772-
73/B800-1).

392 Notes to Pages 189-91

 18. Indeed, Kant never relented from his stance that valid scientific
knowledge was possible only through mechanical explanationsnot even
in the "Critique of Teleological Judgment."
19. For a clear statement of his objective in the course, see his Nachricht
(A.A. 2:305-13, esp. 312).
20. J. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason."
21. See, e.g., E. Dijkterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, and
J. Heilbron, Elements of Early Modern Physics.
22. H. Guerlac, "Newton's Changing Reputation in the Eighteenth
Century"; M. and A. Hall, "Newton's Electric Spirit"; I. Cohen and A.
Koyre, "Newton's Electric and Elastic Spirit"; J. McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm," 187208, "Transmutation and
Immutability," "The Origins of Newton's Doctrine of Essential Qualities,"
and "Atoms and the 'Analogy of Nature'"; M. Jammer, Concepts of Force,
158-87; M. Hesse, Forces and Fields, 157-88.
23. P. Heimann and J. McGuire, "Newtonian Forces and Lockean
Powers"; P. Heimann, "Voluntarism and Immanence" and '"Nature is a
perpetual worker'"; P. Harman, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy; A.
Thackray, Atoms and Powers; J. Yolton, Thinking Matter; M. Jacob, The Radi-
cal Enlightenment, esp. 164.
24. I by no means wish to suggest anything but respect for E.
Dijkterhuis's masterful study of these developments, The Mechanization of
the World Picture, but only to suggest that the same model on which he so
acutely interpreted the seventeenth century does not hold for the eigh-
teenth.
25. See Voltaire's amusing comments in his Letters on England (1734)
that upon crossing the channel the language for describing the physical
world suddenly underwent a radical transformation. This persistence of
Cartesianism in France cannot be written off to any cultural chauvinism,
for the same resistance was to be found in the low countries among the
eminent disciples of Huygens and in Germany of Leibniz himself.
26. J. Keynes, "Newton, the Man."
27. J. McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible
Realm," 187-208.
28. The finest treatment of these questions is without doubt Alexandre
Koyre's From the Closed World, esp. 125235. Koyre's influence upon my
interpretation of the history of science in this period has been decisive.
29. On the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, the work of Koyre is again de-
finitive. See not only From the Closed World, 235-76, but also his article with
I. Cohen, "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence."
30. This is my only reservation about the otherwise so powerfully
wrought and original work of M. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Within
the limits she has sketched out, her thesis is compelling and provocative,
but it leaves us a bit at a loss to account for figures like Joseph Priestley in
the second half of the British eighteenth century. See J. Yolton, Thinking
Matter, for a more encompassing perspective.
31. A. Thackray, Atoms and Powers, 56, and "Matter in a Nut-Shell."
32. That Schofield's categories are confusing has been recognized nu-

Notes to Pages 191-95 393

merous times in the literature. See the pointed criticisms in P. Heimann
and J. McGuire, "Newtonian Forces and Lockian Powers," 234-35 and
passim.
33. R. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism, 68.
34. Ibid., 95.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 99.
37. The parallels between these two positions were worked out long
ago by A. Lovejoy: "The Parallels of Deism and Classicism," in Essays in the
History of Ideas.
38. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism, 94.
39. Ibid., 100.
40. H. Metzger, Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la Doctrine Chimique; L.
King, "Stahl and Hoffmann" and "Basic Concepts of Eighteenth-Century
Animism"; L. Rather, "G. E. Stahl's Psychological Physiology"; and L.
Rather and J. Frerichs, "The Leibniz-Stahl Controversy."
41. G. Rudolph, "Hallers Lehre von der Irritabilitt und Sensibilitt";
S. Roe, Matter, Life and Generation; A. Vartanian, "Trembley's Polyp, La
Mettrie and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism"; T. Ha\\,IdeasofLife
and Matter, 1:351-407 and vol. 2, passim, and "On Biological Analogs of
Newtonian Paradigms"; J. Schiller, "Queries, Answers and Unsolved Prob-
lems in Eighteenth-century Biology"; and P. Ritterbush, Overtures to Biol-
ogy.
42. Bordeu appeared in fiction as the attending physician in Diderot's
provocative little essay on the perplexities in implication of the new sci-
ence, D'Alembert's Dream. Diderot represents a remarkable figure in this
whole matter, for he seemed at once at home with the utter materialists,
and yet attuned to aspects which one would normally associate with the
more vitalist currents of the age. His insertion of the redoubtable Dr.
Bordeu into his text suggests he was quite aware of the importance of
Bordeu's conjectures. See H. Dieckmann, "Theophile Bordeu und Di-
derots Reve de D'Alembert."
43. S. Moravia, "From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible."
44. Kant, "Recension von Moscatis Schrift," A.A. 2:425.
45. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen," A.A.
2:429-43; editor's note, 518.
46. See C. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, 512ff.
47. Kant, "Von den verschiedenen Racen," A.A. 2:429.
48. Ibid., 434n.
49. Ibid., 434.
50. Ibid., 435.
51. Ibid.
52. A. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," 179. See also the essay on
Buffon in that volume, where Buffon's theory of species and principles of
method in natural science are given a sympathetic exposition.
53. J. Larson, "Vital Forces"; T. Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach and Vital
Materialism in Germany Biology" and "Teleology without Regrets."
54. Kant offered a very interesting observation on Maupertuis's sug-
gestion for selective breeding of men to segregate virtuous and productive

394 Notes to Pages 195-202

people from the less worthy. Kant conceded this might be possible, but it
would not be wise. Nature was "wiser" in using the "mingling of the good
and the bad" as the great driving force [Triebfeder] which "sets the sleeping
powers of humanity into motion and requires it to develop all its talents
and thus approach the perfection of their destiny [Bestimmung]" ("Von den
verschiedenen Racen," A.A. 2:431). The anticipation of his arguments in
"Idea for a Universal History" (1784) is striking.
55. E.g., A317-18/B374, A384, A526-27/B554-55.
56. Ibid., A526/B554, A661/B689.
57. Ibid., A668/B696. Hence Kant was familiar with Bonnet's work at
least by 1781, and presumably earlier.
58. Ibid. On the whole theme of the law of continuity, see Lovejoy's
classic, The Great Chain of Being.
59. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxivxxxv.
60. Kant, "Recension von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der
Geschichte der Menschheit, Theil I" (1784), A.A. 8:52.
61. Cited in ibid., 46.
62. Ibid., 54.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 53.
65. Kant, "Recension von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der
Geschichte der Menschheit, Theil II" (1785), A.A. 8:62.
66. Kant, "Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace" (1785),
A.A. 8:97; tr. in A. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," 184.
67. A. Lovejoy has some interesting things to say about this in his es-
say. According to Lovejoy, Kant "recoils in horror before the idea of admit-
ting that real species are capable of transformation . . . because of certain
temperamental peculiarities of his minda mind with a deep scholastic
strain . . . one that could not quite endure the notion of a nature all fluent
and promiscuous and confused, in which series of organisms are to an
indefinite degree capable of losing one set of characters and assuming
another set. He craved, above all, a universe sharply categorized and
classified and tied up in orderly parcels . . . [T]his scholastic side of his
mind prevented him from making any thorough application of the prin-
ciple to biology" (Kant and Evolution, 185). Lovejoy is often intemperate in
his criticism of Kant (see L. Beck, "Lovejoy as a Critic of Kant," in Essays on
Kant and Hume, 61-79), but there is at least a germ of truth in this passage
which we will try to cultivate in the balance of the exposition.
68. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 6 (A.A. 4:470).
69. Ibid., 8 (A.A. 4:471).
70. As A. Lovejoy put it, "Kant was, of course, by no means abreast of
the latest chemistry of his time" ("Kant and Evolution," 186n.). But the
point is that even if Kant had been perfectly well informed, he would not
have able to accept the new ideas. That, and not Kant's familiarity with the
literature, is the real consideration. Kant had certainly read much of the
pioneering literature in biology, and one suspects that he was also familiar
with chemistry from his frequent use of chemical analogies in his writing.
But he could not accept the new theories emerging in those fields.
71. J. Wubnig, "The Epigenesis of Pure Reason." These analogies

Notes to Pages 202-7 395

work in the inverse direction, as well, toward a conceptualization of human
reason.
72. Kant, "berden Gebrauch" (1787),A.A. 8:159-84, editor's notes,
48789; and "Vorarbeit zu ber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der
Philosophie," A.A. 23:75-76.
73. For example by G. Tonelli, "Von den verschiedenen Bedeutun-
gen," 156; J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 50ff.
74. See M. Riedel, "Historizismus und Kritizismus."
75. Kant certainly used the language of providence liberally in his
writings on nature, but he clarified the methodological significance of this
language in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the First Critique, A698
702/B72630. That he could be quite extravagant in exploiting this meta-
phorical license was clear in the essay "Idea for a Universal History," and it
was this, with its ironical cut at figures like Herder who did believe in a form
of immanent purpose, which roused the ire of the hylozoist camp, and per-
haps led to Forster's counterthrust.
76. Forster, "Noch etwas ber die Menschenraen." A. Lovejoy's as-
sessment of "Muthmalicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte" would
seem to support Forster's complaints (see "Kant and Evolution," 196n.).
But they are both being too literal-minded. Kant's method in the essay only
makes sense as a rejoinder to Herder's work on the same subject, toward
which Kant had always been very negative.
77. Kant, "ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:163n., 178.
78. Ibid., 161,178.
79. Ibid., 159, 169.
80. Kant, "Vorarbeit zu ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 23:75.
81. Kant, "ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:179.
82. Ibid., 161.
83. Ibid., 168.
84. Ibid., 179.
85. Ibid., 17980; reference to Bonnet in note, 180; Kant also men-
tioned in this note that Blumenbach had made some very fine criticisms of
such a stance in his work on natural history.
86. Ibid., 180.
87. Kant did not believe that all the capacities or powers (Krfte) of the
mind could be reduced to a single, all-comprehensive fundamental force
(Grundkraft). Some effort at conceiving such "forces" was necessary, he
conceded, and reason did make the effort. It strove "to bring them nearer
to a radical, that is, absolutely fundamental power."
Though logic is not capable of deciding whether afundamental power
actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a
systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. The logical
principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as com-
pletely as possible; and the more the appearances of this or that
power are found to be identical with one another, the more probable
it becomes that they are simply different manifestations of one and
the same power. (First Critique, A649/B677)
But, Kant went on, such "relatively fundamental powers" could not them-

396 Notes to Pages 207-12

selves be brought to unity. "This unity of reason is purely hypothetical"
(ibid.). It was only an operating maxim, not an ultimate reality, Kant in-
sisted. Thus the idea of an all-encompassing Vorstellungsvermgen such as
Wolff had placed at the foundation of his theory of mind was, in Kant's
view, merely nominal, not real. No real concept of a fundamental power,
from which all the others could be derived, was possible. See D. Henrich,
"ber die Einheit der Subjektivitt," for a penetrating discussion of these
issues. Henrich disputes the metaphysical attempts of Heidegger (and
Hegel) to develop such a unity, and upholds Kant's disclaimer of such a
possibility.
88. Kant, "ber den Gebrauch," A.A. 8:181.

Ten: The Problem of Organic Form

1. K. Roretz. Zur Analyse, 1274; E. Ungerer.Dze Teleologie Kants, 64

119; Bommersheim, "Der Begriff"; H. Driesch, "Kant und das Ganze";
and R. Low, Philosophie des Lebendigen, 138ff.
2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 68:230.
3. Ibid., 75:246-47, esp. 85:286-92.
4. A. Lovejoy puts this correctly: "No contemporary of Kant's, read-
ing this passage in the Critique ofJudgment as a whole, was likely to find in it
encouragement to risk that 'bold adventure of the reason' of which it
speaks" ("Kant and Evolution," 199). Even so careful a Kantian as Cassirer
occasionally succumbs to the temptation to misread Kant, as in "Goethe
and the Kantian Philosophy," 71-72.
5. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 80:267.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 267-68.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 268n.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 81:272.
12. Ibid., 274.
13. Ibid., 80:269-70.
14. Ibid., 65:221.
15. Ibid., 223. The parallelism with the language of the "Vorarbeit zu
Uber den Gebrauch" cited earlier is striking, and confirms the close relation-
ship between that essay and the shape of the final Critique.
16. Kant, First Introduction, 24 (A.A. 20:219).
17. "For since we do not, properly speaking, observe the purposes in
nature as designed, but only in our reflection upon its products think this
concept as a guiding thread for our judgment, they are not given to us
through the object" (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 75:247).
18. Kant, First Introduction, 24n.
19. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 100 (A.A. 5:97).
20. For other considerations of this particular conundrum see: P.
Baumanns, Das Problem der organischen Zweckmigkeit, 99-131; E. Heintel,
"Naturzweck und Wesenbegriff"; N. Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Sys-
tematization, 88110; M. Kraft, "Kant's Theory of Teleology"; J. Simon,

Notes to Pages 213-20 397

"Teleologisches Reflektieren und kausales Bestimmen"; D. Siewert,
"Kant's Dialectic of Teleological Judgment"; and F. van de Pitte, "Is Kant's
Distinction between Reflective and Determinant Judgement Valid?"
21. See Critique of Judgment, 65:220, 77:255-56.
22. Ibid., 76:251-52. The kind of individual an organism represents
as an empirical problem is more intractable of solution than the individual
constituted by space, which we can be satisfied to render as the indefinitely
vast frame of reference for the vastest set of motions and relations we wish
to consider (see ibid., 77:257).
23. Ibid., 65:221-22; 73:242. One wonders how other human beings
as phenomenal objects should be construed under this rubric: as phenom-
ena, presumably, lifeless and determined. How does one square that with
one's ethical obligation to regard them as ends, i.e., as real purposes? Pre-
sumably we infer from their merely phenomenal presence a noumenal
being within them. But how is that different from the case with organisms,
apart from a religious bias about a human spirit or soul?
24. Ibid., 65:221.
25. Ibid., 222.
26. Ibid., 75:247, and, most vividly, 65:221-22.
27. Ibid., 69-71,232-36.
28. J. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 30-32, 70-74.
29. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 70:234.
30. Ibid., 78:258-59.
31. Ibid., 80:267.
32. Ibid., 78:264.
33. Ibid., 79:265-66.
34. Ibid., 72:237.
35. Ibid., 71:236. K. Marc-Wogau, Vier Studien, 275, observes that
Kant's dialectic is resolved in the very course of stating it in 70, and that
the remaining sections appear redundant. They do indeed if all that Kant
cared to do was resolve the scientific, and not the metaphysical issues at
stake. He is willing to allow the speculative inferences to run their course
because he has metaphysical concerns. H. Allison notes that the "Dialectic of
Teleological Judgment" has two movesa preliminary (methodological)
one"the assertion of the merely regulative status of the maxims" (which
is all that McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, 120 21, finds significant)
and an ultimate, metaphysical one: "an appeal to the supersensible (noume-
nal) ground of phenomenal nature" ("Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 213).
Allison observes: "the second move (the appeal to the supersensible) . . .
seems to constitute the actual solution" (ibid., 214). The notion of the "su-
persensible" is the keyword of the "ethical turn," as I will argue in part 3. Its
centrality in the "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment" signals the moment
of crisis at which Kant's work would begin its third and final meta-
morphosis.
36. Ibid., 77:257.
37. Ibid., 66:223.
38. Ibid., 67:225.
39. Ibid., 78:260.
40. Ibid., 75:246.

398 Notes to Pages 220-26

 41. Ibid., 72:237.
42. Ibid., 75:246.
43. Even in the context of the First Critique's rigorous assault on the
dialectical errors of reason, this physico-theological approach to a proof of
God's existence was treated with great respect. See A623-24/B651-52.
44. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 73:242.
45. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 105.
46. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 84:285.
47. Ibid., iv:16.
48. Ibid., 48:M173.
49. Ibid. While our reason is driven that far, it cannot make the final
step and establish "the determinate concept ofthat supreme intelligence."
Kant concluded: "the concept of a deity, which would be adequate for our
teleological judging of nature, can never be derived according to mere tele-
ological principles of the use of reason (on which physico-theology alone is
based)" (ibid., 85:290). The notion of a transcendent, intelligent cause
can only be promoted from its heuristic, theoretical use to the full-fledged
notion of God through "ethico-theology," Kant argued in the closing seg-
ments of the Third Critique. Yet the kind of being physico-theology re-
quired to make the world coherent for discursive understanding tallied
with the kind of being practical reason required in terms of the indu-
bitability of the moral law and all the consequences it brought in its train.
This, in turn, allowed Kant to translate his "theist" notionmerely conjec-
turally, of coursefrom the one sphere to the other. The resultant notion
of "Providence" tallied well with traditional religion.

Eleven: The Pantheism Controversy

1. Jacobi, ber die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 92-93, 102. [Unless spec-

ified, all citations are from the original, 1785 edition.] The best analysis of
Jacobi's conversations with Lessing is in A. Altmann, "Lessing und Jacobi."
On Jacobi and Spinoza, see: T. van Stockum, Spinoza-Jacobi-Lessing; A.
Hebeisen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi; and H. Nicolai, Goethe und Jacobi, esp.
156-77.
2. Mendelssohn argued that even if Lessing appreciated Spinoza,
he remained a conventional theist. Lessing advocated at most a "refined
Spinozism" (geluterte Spinozismus) consistent with orthodox theism. See
Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, in Hauptschriften, 144.
3. The vitriolic pamphlets which the two antagonists exchanged
thereafter, Mendelssohn's An die Freunde Lessings and Jacobi's Wider
Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, are reprinted in Hauptschriften.
4. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 47ff.
5. For a similar conception of the issues in the controversy, see H.
Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 201.
6. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 47. "What is at stake for Jacobi and Men-
delssohn is not the specific question whether Spinoza's metaphysics ends in
atheism and fatalism, but the more general question of whether all meta-
physics ends in it" (80). For Beiser, the essential development of this epoch
in philosophy was to discredit the authority of reason. A much more radi-

Notes to Pages 226-28 399

cal skepticism and relativism asserted itself under the sponsorship of such
maverick critics as Hamann and Jacobi, but with powerful connections
backwards to Hume and forwards to Nietzsche. Beiser goes so far as to ar-
gue that, in this sense, the Pantheism Controversy was more important for
the history of philosophy in the next century than was Kant's First Critique
itself (44). While this long-term view is insightful, and while it raises the
historical stature of such figures as Hamann and Jacobi, it nevertheless un-
derestimates the immediate outcome of the controversy, which was not the
triumph of skepticism and relativism but rather one of the most remark-
able outbursts of metaphysical rationalism in the history of philosophy,
German Idealism. As Beiser himself recognizes, Fichte, Sendling, and
Hegel were striving to "preserve the authority of reason" (48). In this, they
were self-consciously striving to carry out a Kantian project.
7. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 5660.
8. M.Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, traces Spinozism in the rise of
English deism and in the Masonic forms of free-thinking and radical re-
publicanism. This movement read Spinozism and "pantheism" (coined,
adjectivally, by the Deist John Toland in 1705 in reference to Spinoza and
"Socinianism"), interchangeably to signify materialism. She points to a sig-
nificant body of literature tracing a similar outcome in France: P. Verniere,
Spinoza et la pensee franqaise avant la revolution and H. El Noussy, "Le pan-
theisme dans les lettres franchises au XHIe siecle."
9. Jacobi, ber die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 81.
10. Thomas Wizenmann made this painfully obvious in his powerful
intervention into the dispute. On Wizenmann, see Beiser, Fate of Reason,
109-13.
11. On this, see Spinoza's "Letter on the Infinite" (= Letter to Lewis
Meyer, Apr. 20, 1663) in B. Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understand-
ing, 31723. The doctrine of intrinsic infinity does not derive the notion
from a contrast with or endless expansion of a prior finite magnitude, as in
the conventional mathematical notion of infinity, but rather reckons the
infinite as a complete whole in itself. Such a concept of infinity has always
characterized the religious notion of God as infinite. Spinoza reckoned that
the concept should be taken as the first and primordial concept, upon
which substance itself could find a metaphysical ground, and a coherent
ontology find foundation. One might even claim that Spinoza's philosoph-
ical greatness resides precisely in striving to grasp intrinsic infinity first and
in itself, sub specie aeternitatis. The centrality of this notion of infinity in
Spinoza's metaphysic was recognized by the Wolffian school in Germany,
esp. in Wolff's Theologia naturalis (1737), 671716, and in M.
Mendelssohn's An die Freunde Lessings (1786), though they did not do full
justice to Spinoza's position.
12. Lessing used this phrase in his conversation with Jacobi: ber die
Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 77. Hen kaipan (the one is the all), a Greek slogan of
murky origins but unquestionably pantheistic or monistic implications,
took on a very prominent role in the evolution of German Idealism.
Lessing introduced the phrase hen kai panat least for the German au-
dience of the late eighteenth century. See R. Knoll, Johann G. Hamann und
Friedrich H. Jacobi, 5253 on the novelty and impact of the phrase. Jacobi

400 Notes to Pages 228-29

did manage to find an earlier usagein Giordano Bruno's Of the Cause,
Principle and One, which he quoted at some length in an appendix to the
second edition of his book. See Hauptschriften, 205-23. For the importance
of the phrase to one of the Idealists, see M. Bumler, "Hlderlin und das
Hen Kai Pan."
13. Goethe and Herder were thrilled with the news about Lessing.
(Goethe to Herder, mid-Dec. 1784, in F. Dntzer and F. v. Herder, eds.,
Aus Herders Nachla, 1:84.) Lessing's praise for Spinoza galvanized their
latent enthusiasm for the Jewish philosopher, and stimulated their own de-
viations from religious orthodoxy. In his autobiography, Dichtung und
Wahrheit, Goethe made the most perspicacious assessment of the Panthe-
ism Controversy and its disclosure about Lessing's attitudes in religion. He
compared the revelation to "an explosion which suddenly uncovered the
most hidden conditions of men of the first rank, conditions which, un-
known even to themselves, lay dormant in the midst of an otherwise ex-
tremely enlightened society." (Cited in H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit 2:23
24. See also B. Suphan, "Goethe und Spinoza, 1783-86," 164.) Certainly
he and others felt a monumental affirmation of their deepest intuitions in
what they were surprised to learn their great compatriot had believed. It
gave them a courage of conviction which played no small part in the incom-
parable intellectual boldness of the epoch of German Idealism. The in-
volvement of Goethe and Herder is crucial not only to the history of the
Pantheism Controversy itself, but to Kant's response as well, since ulti-
mately it was Herder's views of Lessing and Spinoza which provoked Kant's
arguments in the Third Critique.
14. Herder to Jacobi, Feb. 6, 1784, Herders Briefe, 227.
15. B. Suphan, "Goethe und Spinoza, 1783-86," 174-75.
16. Herder to Hamann, end Oct. 1784. in Hamanns Briefwechsel
5:24849. This was part of the controversy which had been launched
by Lavater's attack on Mendelssohn. See E. Schoonhoven, "Hamann in
der Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn"; and Z. Levy, "Hamanns
Kontroverse mit Moses Mendelssohn."
17. On the mentality which Hamann and Jacobi shared, see I. Berlin,
"Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism"; and L. Beck, Early
German Philosophy, 36 Iff: "The Counter-Enlightenment." For an effort to
distinguish Hamann from Jacobi's "irrationalism," see Beiser, Fate of Rea-
son, 29,47.
18. R. KnolfyoAann G. Hamann und Friedrich H. Jacobi, 33ff. The vol-
ume of their correspondence swelled to flood proportions from late 1784
to Hamann's death in 1788. See Hamanns Briefwechsel, vols. 57.
19. K. Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant, 90ff, 231ff.
20. Hamann to Jacobi, Sept. 28, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel 6:74.
21. Hamann to Jacobi, Oct. 3, 1785, ibid., 77. Hamann's correspon-
dence, despite its gargantuan self-indulgence, proves to be a most instruc-
tive source for the assessment of Kant's connection with the Pantheism
Controversy.
22. Indeed, one wonders how closely Kant read the Bchlein. It seems
unlikely that Kant would have been pleased if he had read the text closely
enough to note certain footnotes linking the First Critique with Spinozism.

Notes to Pages 229-31 401

 23. See Hamanns Briefwechsel, 5:264, 271, 317, 326.
24. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary, not only inferentially
from his writings, but directly in his testimony to Hamann.
25. Mendelssohn, "Erinnerungen an Hrn. Jacobi," in Hauptschriften,
120.
26. Ibid., 119.
27. Jacobi, ber die Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 146n. The passages in
question are from the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and have to do with the
unique and all-inclusive totality of space and time as forms of sensibility.
Jacobi cited Kant again in his footnote to point twenty-one, this time refer-
ing to A107 of the First Critique, where Kant articulated the notion of the
transcendental unity of apperception (15657n). See H. Allison, "Kant's
Critique of Spinoza," 203 and n.
28. See the Anzeige of Jacobi's work which appeared in the Jena Allge-
meine Literatur-Zeitung, Feb. 11, 1786, in all likelihood by Christian Schtz.
The key points of that text are reprinted in Hauptschriften, lxxviii-lxxix.
29. Mendelssohn to Kant, Oct. 16, 1785, in Briefwechsel, AA. 10:390.
30. C. Schtz to Kant, Nov. 13, 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:400.
31. Hamann to Jacobi, Oct. 28, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:107;
Hamann to Jacobi, Nov. 10, 1785, ibid., 127.
32. Kant to Schtz, end of Nov. 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:406.
33. Jacobi to Hamann, Nov. 18, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:146.
34. Hamann to Jacobi, Nov. 30, 1785,ibid., 161. There is no reason to
question this statement's authenticity. As I will argue in detail in the next
chapter, there is no evidence that Kant ever thoroughly studied Spinoza. I
am not convinced by H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," who offers
references in Kant's lectures as evidence of a more careful assessment.
Even Allison acknowledges that Kant's conception of Spinoza's philosophy
was "not particularly well-informed" (201). Indeed, I will contend that it
was based all too heavily on secondary materialsWolff, Mendelssohn,
and above all Jacobi.
35. Reprinted in Hauptschriften, 283-325.
36. On Biester and Kant, see Vorlnder, Immanuel Kant 31011.
37. Biester to Kant, Nov. 8, 1785, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:394; Biester
to Kant, Mar.6,1786, ibid.,410; Herz to Kant, Feb. 27,1786, ibid., 408-9.
38. Kant to Herz, Apr. 7, 1786, ibid., 419.
39. Jacobi to Hamann, Mar. 21, 1786 (323), Mar. 24, 1786 (325), May
12, 1786 (385) in Hamanns Briefwechsel, vol. 6.
40. C. Schtz to Kant, Feb. 1787, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:407.
41. Jacobi to Hamann, Mar. 24,1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel 6:32425.
42. Ibid.
43. Jacobi, Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, reprinted in
Hauptschriften, 327-64. For the reference to Kant see 351-52.
44. Jacobi to Hamann, May 5, 1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:384.
45. Jacobi to Hamann, Apr. 9, 1786, ibid., 325.
46. Hamann to Jacobi, May 28, 1786, ibid., 408.
47. It was this review by Schtz which provoked Jacobi's ire at the Jena
Kantians.

402 Notes to Pages 231 -35

 48. L.Jakob to Kant, Mar. 26, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:413.
49. For a similar assessment of Biester's importance, see Beiser, Fate of
Reason, 115. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," misses this connec-
tion.
50. Biester to Kant, June 11, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:430.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Kant to Herz, Apr. 7, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:419.
54. Biester, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:432.
55. Beiser writes that Kant's essay "reveals the motivation and justifi-
cation behind his allegiance to reason" (Fate of Reason, 115). Kant said noth-
ing in his essay on the question of Lessing, and virtually nothing on the
question of the meaning of Spinoza. He had taken Biester's lead very skill-
fully. While Biester was charmed that Kant had "conquered the hydra" of
Genieschwrmerei and expressed his contentment with Kant's essay, Jacobi
was not charmed at all. (Biester to Kant, Aug. 8, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A.
10:439; Jacobi to Hamann, Oct. 31,1786, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 7:37. Bies-
ter read Kant's essay in manuscript, since it was submitted to his journal.
Jacobi only saw it once it was in print, in October 1786.) He felt wronged by
Kant's characterization of belief. "About Kant's essay I don't know what to
tell you," he wrote to Hamann. "The man is trying with all his might to
found a sect. I'm going to try to see if I can make clear to people what he is
really saying." Accordingly, Jacobi set himself to buttressing his own posi-
tion regarding belief by a lengthy recourse to David Hume. The result,
David Hume ber den Glauben, a work if anything even more important for
the emergence of German Idealism than his Bchlein, appeared in 1787,
together with a short appendix aimed directly at Kant in which his famous
and fruitful objection was entered that without the thing-in-itself it was im-
possible to enter the Kantian system, and with it it became impossible to
remain inside (Jacobi, "Zur transcendentalen Idealismus," 289ff.; the fa-
mous line is on 304). That objection inspired much of the Idealist recon-
struction of Kant's metaphysics, from Reinhold and Fichte to Schelling and
Hegel. But for Jacobi the Hume book was a continuation of the Pantheism
Controversy at its deepest level, with Kant's philosophy now the target of
the charge of nihilism.
56. Kant, "Was heit," A.A. 8:133.
57. Mendelssohn had expressed sympathy for Jacobi's turn to thesalto
mortale in the face of the difficulties encountered in speculative philosophy.
It was sometimes necessary, he agreed, to descend out of the speculative
clouds and seek orientation by common sense. This was a phrase Kant
would seize upon in the article "Was heit: sich im Denken orientieren?"
(See Mendelssohn, "Erinnerungen," Hauptschriften, 114.)
58. Kant, "Was heit," 136.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 139n.
61. On Kant's notion of moral feeling see: A. MacBeath, "Kant on
Moral Feeling"; A. Broadie and E. Pybus, "Kant's Concept of Respect."
62. It drives him from his conjectures about formal beauty through

Notes to Pages 235-39 403

the perplexities of sublimity and art to his grand metaphysical insight of
the link between beauty and morality in term of his conception of aesthetic
ideas. See part 3, below.
63. Kant, "Was heit," 137.
64. The term Vernunftglaube was articulated in the Kanon of the First
Critique, A820-30/B848-58. The question that will be explored in the
third part of this study is the degree to which Kant's philosophy changed in
its orientation toward this concept, and whether, in the later Critiques, more
of an effort was made toward establishing the transcendental validity of
such beliefs.
65. Kant, "Was heit," A.A. 8:138.
66. Ibid., 145.
67. This premonitory construction of the consequences of religious
extremism is, I think, read too literally as Kant's interpretation of history by
M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 35ff.
68. See "What Is Enlightenment?" (Berlinische Monatsscrift, Dec.
1784). Kant was acutely aware that his Aufklrung was still in the process
of being born and that the existing state could still abort it. For the context,
see J. Schober, Die deutsche Sptaufklrung (1770-1790), 241-72; and L.
Beck, Early German Philosophy, 43435.
69. That still leaves open the question of the profundity of Kant's own
Christian religious feelings. No less hostile a figure than Jacobi reckoned
Kant an authentic Christian in his personal life, but he did not believe that
carried through to Kant's thought. M. Despland, Kant on History and Re-
ligion, has marshalled a very interesting case than even this thought must be
grasped from the Christian Pietist vantage. At the very least, Kant was
committed theoretically to a "theism" consistent, in his mind, with
Christian tradition.
70. See N. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 815;
Beiser, Fate of Reason, 226ff.
71. Hamann to Jacobi, May 10, 17'87', Hamanns Briefwechsel, 7:194.
72. There were many challengers, but few he took seriously. Among
the latter was, however, Thomas Wizenmann, whose response to Kant's
"Was heit" drew substantial attention in the Second Critique.
73. Kant, Grounding, 47.
74. J. Bering to Kant, Sep. 21, 1786, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 10:442.
75. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 165-92.
76. Hamann to Herder, Aug. 18, 1785, Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:55.
Just this sort of thing was what alarmed the officials at the Tbingen semi-
nary and also provoked the cabinet order at Marburg.
77. R. Maker, "Zeitgenssische Reaktionen auf Kants Religionsphil-
osophie," 14567.
78. Tbingen was the seat of one of the most important seminaries in
Germany. The fact that Kant felt anxious about criticism emanating from
there already in 1786 (see the remarks ascribed to him about criticism in the
press of Tbingen and Gttigen in Hamann's letter to Jacobi of May 28,
1786, in Hamanns Briefwechsel, 6:409) adds weight to the contextualist in-
terpretation of Kant's philosophy in this period. That orthodox sentiment
at Tbingen did become suspicious of Kantianism is now well established.

404 Notes to Pages 239-42

See D. Henrich and J. Dderlein, "Carl Immanuel Diez." That the whole
question of Kantianism at Tbingen is of course crucial follows simply
from the fact that the great young generation of Idealists, Schelling, Hld-
erlin, and Hegel studied there and became exposed to the entire ferment
in that context. On the Wrttemberg context of Hegel and his classmates,
see L. Dickey, Hegel.
79. See G. Krner's interpretation of Herder's Gott in his letter to
Schiller, Aug. 19, 1787, in Schillers Briefwechsel mit Krner, 92-96.
80. Herder, God, 67.
81. Schiller to Krner, Aug. 8, 1787, Schillers Briefwechsel mit Krner,
84.
82. See note 11 above.
83. Herder, God, 107.
84. H. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 2:28, gets this exactly.
85. Herder, God, 102,119.
86. The first phrase is from Spinoza's Ethics, Book 1, def. 6, p. 45; the
second phrase is Herder's, from God, 103.
87. Herder, God, 105.
88. On the notion of Herder's "dynamic pantheism" see F. Schmidt,
Herders pantheistische Weltanschauung; E. Hoffart, Herders 'Gott'; W.
Vollrath, Die Auseinandersetzung Herders mit Spinoza; J. Dieterle, "Die
Grundgedanken in Herders Schrift 'Gott' und ihr Verhltnis zu Spinozas
Philosophie."
89. Herder, God, 145. That is, they agreed that Spinoza argued for an
intrinsic infinity. Otherwise there were substantial differences in their re-
spective interpretations of Spinoza's metaphysics. Mendelssohn was very
critical of such pantheism. See Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, 38, and
Beiser, Fate of Reason, 1045.
90. Herder, God, 146. <
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., 147.
94. Ibid., 119 for the statement on Spinoza, and 126 for the comment
on Leibniz and anthropomorphism.
95. See Jacobi's Appendices 4 and 5 to the second edition of ber die
Lehre, in Hauptschriften, 23647. For Kant, see his letter to Jacobi of Aug.
30, 1787, A.A. 10:73f. and 85 of the Third Critique, 290: "Others who
wished to be theologians as well as physicists . . . "
96. See notes 79,81.
97. C. Kraus to C. Schtz, Dec. 11,1787, cited in Vorlnder, Immanuel
Kant, 323n.
98. See Jacobi's reference to this essay in his notes to the third and final
edition of his Spinoza-Bchlein, in Hauptschriften, 17677n.
99. Kant to Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. 11:73f. Jacobi
must have been astounded to learn this was what he had been doing. The
line shows how deeply enmeshed Kant had become in his own problems
and system, and how outside impulses tended to be incorporated into his
own project and even his own language.
100. That it was not a Nebensache for either of them (as they each well

Notes to Pages 243-46 405

knew) gives us a sign of just how threatened Kant must have felt that he
should welcome such an alliance.
101. Kant to Jacobi, Aug. 30, 1789, in Briefwechsel, A.A. ll:73f.
102. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 65:221.

Twelve: Kant's Attack on Spinoza

1. H. Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 219.

2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 73:239.
3. Ibid., 73:242.
4. This language I take from M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics
and What is a Thing?
5. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 73:241.
6. Here I find myself in disagreement with Allison's analysis, "Kant's
Critique of Spinoza," 205-6.
7. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 73:241.
8. Ibid., 15:63, and note the translator's reference there to Kant's
elaboration of these notions in the preface to his Metaphysical Elements of
Justice.
9. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 13, 15, 128, 147, and esp. 154 recognizes the
issue, but does not pursue it.
10. H. Allison writes of a "broad brush [which] covers all pre-critical
metaphysics," "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 204.
11. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 73:240.
12. Ibid., 72:239.
13. Ibid. Since Kant makes rather extensive appeals to the supersens-
ible himself throughout the Third Critique, the query that immediately pre-
sents itself is what difference Kant saw between his recourse and Spinoza's.
To suggest that Spinoza offered determinations of the supersensible object
which were "dialectical," i.e., incapable of objective validation, is of course
true. But so did Kant in conjecturing theism.
14. Kant associatedjust these traits with his notion oilife. See above all
his statement in Metaphysical Foundations, 105.
15. Kant's interpretation strongly suggests his reliance upon Jacobi's
gloss of Spinoza. There is reason to doubt whether Kant ever closely stud-
ied the Ethics. Spinoza is not mentioned once in the Critique of Pure Reason.
(K. Vorlnder noted this in Immanuel Kant, 331.) The names of his de-
cisive precessors somehow manage to intrude, however marginally, into
his great work. Plato and Aristotle, Galileo and Newton, Locke and
Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume, Wolff and Baumgarteneven Lambert and
Mendelssohnfind their way to mention in the First Critique. But not
Spinoza. Kant regarded Spinozism philosophically as old business. He
might never have troubled himself with Spinoza had not the pantheistic
revival of his ideas threatened Kant's own rise to philosophical ascendancy
in the Germany of the late 1780s.
16. For a different fourfold explication of Kant's quarrel with
Spinoza, see Allison, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 2049.
17. "By God, I mean a being absolutely infinitethat is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes" (Spinoza, Ethics, book 1, def 6, p. 45);

406 Notes to Pages 247-51

"Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing" (book 2, prop.
1, p. 83); "God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential" (book 1,
prop. 33, note 2, p. 73); "God's power of thinking is equal to his realized
power of action" (book 2, prop. 7, corollary, p. 86); "In God there is neces-
sarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which neces-
sarily follow from his essence" (book 2, prop. 7, corollary, p. 86); "God
understands himself," (book 2, prop. 3, p. 84; book 22, prop. 3, note, p. 84).
18. This is precisely what the eighteenth-century materialists took
him to have meant, and what Jacobi insisted he had to have meant.
19. Spinoza, Ethics, 60.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 61.
22. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, note, p. 62.
23. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10:54-55, iv:17.
24. See ibid., 10:55: "Where then not merely the cognition of an ob-
ject but the object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only
possible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a purpose."
25. Spinoza, Ethics, 77. Allison aptly stresses the theocentric commit-
ment of Spinoza's philosophy and its methodological expression: sub specie
aeternitatis, "Kant's Critique of Spinoza," 22526.
26. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, note, p. 61.
27. Ibid., book l,def. 7, p. 46.
28. Ibid., book 1, prop. 17, p. 59-60.
29. Spinoza expressed himself very bluntly to this effect: "men think
themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and
desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have
disposed them so to wish and desire . . . [M]en do all things for an end,
namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it
comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause
for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources,
they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what
end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event,
and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own" (Ethics, book 1,
Appendix, 75).
30. Allison develops this Kantian criticism extensively, "Kant's Cri-
tique of Spinoza," 205-6, 21 Off.
31. L. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 452.
32. Kant, Critique of Judgment, ii:12.
33. Ibid., 77:253.
34. Ibid., 76:250. The parenthetical remarks are Kant's.
35. Ibid., 252.
36. Ibid., 77:254-55.
37. Ibid., and also 74:243.
38. Ibid., 65:222.
39. Ibid., 77:256-57.
40. M.Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment.
41. See Schelling's letter to Hegel of Feb. 4, 1795 i n j . Hoffmeister,
ed., Briefe von und an Hegel, 20-23. See also Hegel's famous remarks in the

Notes to Pages 251-57 407

preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 10: "everything turns on grasping
and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject... If
the conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was
proclaimed, the reason for this w a s . . . an instinctive awareness that, in this
definition, self-consciousness was only submerged and not preserved."
42. On Spinoza's notion of intellectual intuition and his epistemology
generally, see G. Floistad, "Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics."
43. The term panentheism was invented by Karl Christian Krause
(1781-1832), a disciple of Sendling. Its philosophical meaning had been
implicit in many earlier metaphysical speculations. See esp. H. Schwarz,
"Die Entwicklung des Pantheismus in der neueren Zeit"; and W. Dilthey,
"Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus nach seinem geschicht-
lichen Zusammenhang mit den lteren pantheistischen Systemen."
44. See K. Rehorn, G. E. Lessings Stellung zur Philosophie des Spinoza and
the excellent discussion in A. Altmann, "Lessing und Jacobi," 4557.

Thirteen: The Ethical Turn

1. Kant, First Introduction, 12:51-55 (A.A. 20:247-51).

2. Ibid., 12:53 (A.A. 20:249); Kant explicated that distinction three
times in the body of the Third Critique, in 15, 63, and 82.
3. Ibid., 55 (A.A. 20:251).
4. A related earlier discussion, 16-17 of the "Analytic of the Beauti-
ful," on "dependent beauty" and the "ideal of the beautiful," was probably
revised to accord with the new conception achieved in 1789.
5. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, ii: 11.
6. Ibid., 10.
7. Ibid., 12.
8. Ibid.
9. It should be noted that the term "supersensible" appears already in
1 of the final version of the Introduction and goes on to quite extensive
usage there, whereas it is mentioned only rarely and without obtrusiveness
of any kind in the First Introduction. The notion of the "supersensible" in ii
should be compared especially with its usage in the final sections of the
main body of the work, the "Dialectic" and the "Methodology of Teleologi-
cal Judgment." It is discernibly absent in the sections originally belonging
to the "Critique of Taste."
10. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 82:277.
11. Ibid., 83:280.
12. Ibid., 82:276.
13. Ibid., 84:285.
14. Ibid., ii:12.
15. G. Tonelli, "La formazione," 444, notes that it tripled in length in
the period from February to March 1790, just before Kant committed the
whole work to press.

Fourteen: The Sublime, the Symbolic, and Man's Destination

1. On the idea of "discipline" as the defense against dogmatists (athe-
istic and otherwise) see First Critique, A738-94/B766-822. The same point

408 Notes to Pages 258-69

is articulated in the Third Critique (90:312). On the positive aspect of the
antinomy see Critique of Judgment, 57, Remark II. See also G. Schrder,
"The Status of Teleological Judgment in Kant's Transcendental Philoso-
phy."
2. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 57, Remark I.
3. Ibid., 57, Remark II, 190.
4. Ibid., 57:186-87.
5. This argument for transcendental idealism was made especially in
the Preface to the B-version of the First Critique, and then reiterated in the
Third.
6. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 57:18485.
7. Ibid., 57:186.
8. Ibid., 57, Remark II, 184-85.
9. Ibid. This is parallel to the argument regarding transcendental ap-
perception in the "Paralogisms" of the First Critique.
10. P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 331 ff. argues that Kant need
not have drawn this conclusion, and that in doing so he clearly abandoned
the transcendental for a "metaphysical" treatment of beauty. Guyer finds
this misguided. R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, 79,
8 Iff., also sees a metaphysical drift in these portions of the work, and like-
wise seeks to minimize it. I would argue, however, that this metaphysical
turn is significant and needs to be taken seriously.
11. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 57, Remark II, 191.
12. Ibid., 22:77.
13. Ibid., 57, Remark I, 188.
14. Ibid., 59:197.
15. A.A. 8:137.
16. Note that the phrase "requirement of reason" appears in the pas-
sage from 22 cited above. This notion represents Kant's most explicit ac-
knowledgement of the intrinsic dynamism of reason, or as the ontological,
not simply methodological, sense of the spontaneity of reason.
17. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A179-80/B222.
18. Kant, "Was heit," A.A. 8:137; Critique of Judgment, 90:315n.
19. Kant, First Introduction, 12:54 (A.A. 20:250).
20. Meredith, "Last Stages," xli.
21. Souriau, Lejugement reflechissant, 8586.
22. Tonelli, "La formazione," 442ff. Much of Tonelli's essay focuses
on his dispute with Souriau over the placement of this section.
23. Lehmann ("Einleitung") had the most clearminded approach to
these questions in recognizing that Kant would hardly have had to start
from scratch in composing most of the material that went into the "Cri-
tique of Aesthetic Judgment," especially the "Analytic" and the "Deduc-
tion." He had been reading and writing and lecturing about these ideas for
thirty years.
24. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 14:62.
25. Kant, Observations (1764).
26. Especially in his distinction of the beautiful from the sublime,
Kant indulged in what we have termed "objective subreption."
27. Kant, First Introduction, 12:53-54 (A.A. 20:250-51). The tenta-

Notes to Pages 269-78 409

tiveness of the term "perhaps" and the parenthetical formulation of the
whole idea suggest the diffidence with which at the point of composing the
First Introduction Kant still regarded discussion of the supersensible. That
tentativeness vanished in the full "ethical turn" of late 1789 and early 1790.
28. Ibid., 54 (A.A. 20:250).
29. Ibid. For other conceptionsmany starkly disparagingof
Kant's treatment of the sublime in the Third Critique, see: R. Bretall, "Kant's
Theory of the Sublime"; M. Nahm, "'Sublimity' and the 'Moral Law' in
Kant's Philosophy"; A. Lazaroff, "The Kantian Sublime"; J. Barnouw,
"The Morality of the Sublime"; P. Guyer, "Kant's Distinction between the
Sublime and the Beautiful"; W. Hund, "The Sublime and God in Kant's
Critique of Judgment"; R. Makkreel, "Imagination and Temporality in
Kant's Theory of the Sublime"; D. Crawford, "The Place of the Sublime in
Kant's Aesthetic Theory"; and T. Gracyk, "Sublimity, Ugliness, and Form-
lessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory," 49-56.
30. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 23:82.
31. Ibid., 29GR: 106-7.
32. Ibid., 23:84.
33. Ibid., 27:96.
34. Ibid., 23:84.
35. Ibid., 29GR: 115-16.
36. Ibid., 26:90.
37. Kant, First Critique, especially exposition of the first antinomy,
A510-23/B538-51.
38. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 26:90.
39. Again, this whole line of thought is grounded in the "First Anti-
nomy" of the Critique of Pure Reason.
40. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 26:93.
41. Ibid., 26:8889. The phrase "striving toward infinite progress"
is redolent with the metaphysics of Fichte and the sensibility of Romanti-
cism.
42. Ibid., 26:93.
43. Ibid.
44. Kant claimed Burke gave the best psychological account of these
states (29GR:118). Yet the idea is still inappropriate except in that qua
pleasure, the impetus is to remain in the state rather than to change it.
45. Ibid., 26:88-89.
46. Ibid., 27:96.
47. Ibid., 27:98.
48. Ibid., 28:101.
49. Ibid., 29:105.
50. M. Nahm, "Imagination as the Productive Faculty for 'Creating
Another Nature . . ."' and "Productive Imagination, Tragedy and Ugli-
ness"; and M. Zeldin, "The Role of Art and Genius in the 'Vocation of
Man'" and "Kant's Theory of Art and Genius."
51. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:M176. See also Kant's discussion of
imagination in GR22.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.

410 Notes to Pages 278-84

 54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 17:M76.
56. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A569-70/B597-98.
57. Ibid., A570-71/B598-99. This anticipates Kant's formulation of
the "aesthetic normal idea" in 17 as a schema.
58. Ibid., A570/B598.
59. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:157.
60. We might make the same point about the Grand Canyon or Van
Gogh's Starry Night. That is, the empirical objects need not be intrinsic pur-
poses, and they can be both objects of nature and objects of art. What they
require, however, and what distinguishes them from the sorts of things
which belong to pulchritudo vaga, is just some higher significance for the
subject, which Kant associates with purposiveness, and hence with perfec-
tion.
61. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:158.
62. This is the only sense to be made of Kant's notion of indeterminate
concepts of the understanding associated with beauty.
63. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:158.
64. Ibid., 49:157.
65. Ibid., 57, Remark I, 187.
66. Ibid., 189.
67. Ibid., 59:198-99.
68. Ibid., 60:202.
69. Ibid., 59:199.
70. "Nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and
representation, so far as it belongs to cognition. For it is only thus that this
latter can be objective, and only through this has it a universal point of ref-
erence, with which the representative power of everyone is compelled to
harmonize" (Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 9:51).
71. Ibid., 49:157.
72. Ibid.
73. See Kant, Grounding, 41.
74. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 50:163.
75. J. Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, 23.
76. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 49:158.
77. See H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 7390, for a similar position.
78. For other readings of the notion of beauty as the symbol of moral-
ity in Kant, see: J. Glenn, "Kant's Theory of Symbolism"; T. Cohen, "Why
Beauty is a Symbol of Morality"; D. White, "On Bridging the Gulf between
Nature and Morality in the Critique ofJudgment"; and R. Kuhns, "That Kant
Did Not Complete His Argument Concerning the Relation of Art to Moral-
ity and How It Might be Completed."
79. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 16:67.
80. Ibid.

Fifteen: Aesthetics As the Key to Anthropology

1. It "concerns men, i.e. animal, but still rational, beingsnot merely

qua rational (e.g. spirits), but qua animal also" (Kant, Critique of fudgment,

Notes to Pages 284-92 411

5:44). See O. Larere, "Sentiment esthetique et unite de la nature hu-
maine," and J. Mller, "Die anthropologische Relevanz der sthetik."
2. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 29GR: 108.
3. Ibid., 29GR:107.
4. Ibid., 29GR:111-12.
5. Ibid., 109.
6. Ibid., 107-8.
7. Ibid., 59:200.
8. G. Schrder, "The Status of Feeling in Kant's Philosophy."
9. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 78.
10. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 1:38.
11. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 105.
12. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 29GR:119.
13. Ibid., 54:175.
14. See R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, chap. 5, "The Life
of the Imagination," 88 107, a reworking of his earlier article, "The Feel-
ing of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-Philosophy," Dilthey-Jahrbuchfur
Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 3 (1985), 83 104.
15. Kant, Anthropology, book 2: "Of Pleasure and Pain," opening re-
marks, 99. And see Critique of Practical Reason, 122.
16. Ibid., 64:105.
17. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 54:175-76. This disjunction ex-
pressed Kant's key ethical insight into the "heterogeneity of the good." See
J. Silber, "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics."
18. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 3:40.
19. Geistesgefhl points to two key elements: first, to the tension be-
tween natural inclination and "supersensible destination," i.e., moral self-
consciousness; and, second, to the metaphysical potential in the idea of
Geist, especially as Kant articulated it in 49.
20. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 49:157'.
21. Ibid., 49:M175.
22. Ibid., 54:175.
23. Ibid., 54:180.
24. Ibid., 4:42-43.
25. Kant, Anthropology, 66:107.
26. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 83:284n.
27. A. Broadie and E. Pybus, "Kant's Concept of Respect"; A. Mac-
Beath, "Kanton Moral Feeling."
28. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 76.
29. Kant, Grounding, 14n.
30. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 77.
31. Ibid., 75.
32. Ibid., 80.
33. Ibid., 80.
34. Ibid., 89.
35. Ibid., 91.
36. Ibid., 79.
37. Ibid., 84n.

412 Notes to Pages 293-300

 38. Kant, Grounding, 14n.
39. Ibid., 13.
40. What Kant is referring to by admiration and astonishment for
such things as "lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of
the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many animals, etc."
(Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, 79) is what is called the "natural sublime."
Kant also discusses admiration, astonishment, awe and their distinctions in
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, and in the Third Critique these
distinctions are revived in connection with the sublime. That it could move
even Kant was betokened not only in the magnificent apostrophe which
ended the Second Critique"Two things fill the mind with ever new and
increasing admiration and awe . . . the starry heavens above me and the
moral law within me." (ibid., 166)but by his earlier writings and concern
with natural science. (P. Menzer, Kants sthetik in ihrer Entwicklung, 37.)
41. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 29GR:108.
42. Ibid.
43. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A379-80.
44. Ibid., A360.
45. Ibid., A345/B403.
46. Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 57:187.
47. Ibid., ii: 12.
48. Ibid., 59:199.
49. Ibid., 91:327.
50. Ibid., 49:157.
51. Kant, Reflection 740 (1771, perhaps earlier), A.A. 15:326.
52. Kant, Reflection 782 (1772-75), ibid., 342.
53. Kant, Reflection 824 (1776-78), ibid., 367.
54. The insistent wordplay with "spring" is certainly not inadvertent.
Kant, Reflection 831 (1776-78), ibid., 371.
55. Kant, Reflection 844 (1776-78), ibid., 375.
56. Kant, Reflection 932 (1776-78), ibid., 413.
57. Kant, Reflection 933 (1776-78), ibid., 414.
58. Ibid.
59. Kant, Reflection 934 (1776-78), ibid., 415.
60. Kant, Reflection 938 (1776-78), ibid., 416. The notion of Weltseele
is extraordinarily important. Not only does it gesture to pantheism as advo-
cated by Herder in the 1780s, but it obviously found its great articulation
also in Schelling's Idealism of the 1790s. See G. di Giovanni, "Kant's Meta-
physics of Nature and Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature." That the
notion of Weltseele was of profound significance within Kantianism in the
1790s is clear not only from Kant's own opusposthumum, but in the specula-
tions along those lines by that remarkable Kantian Solomon Maimon in the
early 1790s, which he published ("ber die Weltseele") and to which he
sought to draw Kant's attention. (Maimon to Kant, May 15, 1790, in Brief-
wechsel, A.A. ll:174ff.). See K. Dsing, Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff,
164, 174ff. See also G. Lehmann, Kants Nachlawerk, 19-40.
61. H. Dreyer, Der Begriff Geist in der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis
Hegel; R. Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of Geist."

Notes to Pages 300-305 413

Sixteen: The Unity of Man
1. More precisely, freedom was an a priori metaphysical corollary of
the fact of pure reason, which was itself the apodictic imperative of the
moral law. It remains that both had unconditional validity in Kant's view,
hence represented something significantly higher than mere belief.
2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, v:18.
3. In the "'Transcendental Aesthetic" of the First Critique, Kant ac-
knowledged the paradoxical nature of his theory of subjectivity (Critique of
Pure Reason, B68 and B152-53.) He claimed that the problem of self-
consciousness was inevitably difficult in any philosophical approach:

How the "I" that thinks can be distinct from the "I" that intuits itself
(for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible),
and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter;
and how, therefore, I can say: "I, as intelligence and thinking subject,
know myself as an object that is thought, in so far as I am given to
myself [as something other or] beyond that [I] which is [given to my-
self] in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only
as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding"these are
questions that raise no greater nor less difficulty than how I can be an
object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition
and of inner perceptions. (Ibid., B155-56.)

This is surely one of the most daunting sentences in Kant's entire First
Critique.
4. That Kant nevertheless thought of it in such a manner, at least in
terms of practical reason, is apparent in the transcendental definitions he
offered for the notions of "life," the "faculty of desire," and "pleasure" in
the crucial footnote to the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, 9 (A.A.
5,8-9n.).
5. Pure reason is determining (ratiocinans), hence it cannot catch itself
as such, but only in its determinations (ratiocinatae). Kant wrote: "since I do
not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am con-
scious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, . . . I
cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can
do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the
determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is,
as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I
entitle myself an intelligence" (Critique of Pure Reason, B156-58n.). In the
"Paralogisms," Kant wrote: "this identity of the subject. . . cannot. . . sig-
nify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of
the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its
states" (ibid., B408). It was too empty. Hence, "I have no knowledge of my-
self as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is
thus very far from being a knowledge of the self . . . I exist as an intelli-
gence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" (ibid., B158).
See K. Ameriks, "Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality" and Kant's
Theory of Mind.
6. "In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of

414 Notes to Pages 306-8

myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am"
(Critique of Pure Reason, B157). While the "I think" as transcendental sub-
ject was utterly certain, it was not even a concept but rather "a bare con-
sciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it (the
thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental
subject of the thoughts = X" (ibid., A346/B404). Such bare consciousness
is merely form and process, not thing.
7. Ibid., B153.
8. Ibid., B133.
9. Kant, First Introduction, 10n. (A.A. 20:204n.); K. Diising, Die Tele-
ologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 57.
10. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B140.
11. Ibid., A343/B401.
12. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, 8; T. Mischel, "Kant and the Possi-
bility of a Science of Psychology"; M. Washburn, "Did Kant Have a Theory
of Self-Knowledge?" In the First Introduction, Kant argued that there could
be no empirical psychology as a science because time "does not furnish
enough material for an entire science, unlike the pure theory of space (ge-
ometry)" (First Introduction,41 [A.A. 20:237]).
13. P. Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self."
14. In a footnote to the B-version of the "Paralogisms," Kant intro-
duced some new ideas on this subject:
The "I think" expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e.
perception (and thus shows that sensation, which as such belongs to
sensibility, lies at the basis of this existential proposition) . . . An in-
determinate perception here signifies only something real that is
given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance,
nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually [in
der Tat] exists, and which in the proposition, "I think," is denoted as
such. (First Critique, B422-23n.)

This language of an "indeterminate perception" seems to suggest the

transcendental subject is experienced neither as appearance (phenome-
non) nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but rather as a bare "fact." But that
"fact" is of the essence of reason. It is not simply empirical. It is grounded
in a necessary transcendental structure. It isor rather, it ought to bea
"metaphysical principle," in Kant's precise sense, namely, that which can
be analytically inferred from transcendental principles and thereby form
the basis for valid knowledge. Kant suggests this possibility not only in his
explanation of transcendental and metaphysical expositions in the
B-version of the First Critique (B38-40) but also in the Introduction to the
Critique of Judgment in a crucial passage concerning our certainty of
the freedom of the empirical will (v: 17).
15. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A402.
16. D. Henrich, "ber die Einheit der Subjektivitt."
17. Its "factuality" is an unresolved matter in Kantian epistemology.
Beck notes this in passing in a footnote in his Commentary, 273n.; see also P.
Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 56.
18. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A546-47/B574-75.

Notes to Pages 308-11 415

 19. Heimsoeth stresses the importance of this passage in his classic es-
say, "Persnlichkeitsbewutsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Phi-
losophic" While D. Henrich adopts a more guarded approach, he too
notes a definite cognitive element to at least practical apperception: "Der
Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Ver-
nunft" and "Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und im
spekulativen Idealismus." Benton, Kant's Second Critique, 14748, also
Stresses this passage as the strongest evidence of a "practical apperception"
in Kant's First Critique. For a critical analytic stand on these questions, see L.
Beck, "The Fact of Reason" and "Towards a Meta-Critique of Pure Rea-
son."
20. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A50-51/B74-75.
21. Ibid., A68/B93. See R. Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of
Mind."
22. Ibid., B130. And see B152: "[S]ynthesis is an expression of spon-
taneity."
23. Ibid., B132.
24. Ibid., A97.
25. Ibid., A446/B474.
26. Ibid., A533/B561.
27. Ibid., B430-31. This passage seems to point to Kant's notion of a
"fact of pure reason" as it would be developed in the Second Critique, proba-
bly only a few months after Kant composed these revisions of the "Paralog-
isms." For evidence that Kant developed the notion of the "fact of pure
reason" while revising theFirst Critique, see preface to B-version, B:xxxviii:
"a priori data of reason."
28. Ibid., A797/B825, following Silber in dropping Kemp-Smith's in-
terpolation. See J. Silber, "The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest
Good as the Canon of Pure Reason," 233.
29. Yovel writes, in Kant's Philosophy of History, "the Kantian texts are
studded with expressions that amount to a virtual erotic glossary of reason.
Reason is not only endowed with 'ends,' 'tasks,' and 'interests'; it also has
'needs,' 'satisfactions,' 'aspirations,' 'strivings,' and 'affection'; it has a 'voca-
tion,' a 'destiny,' a 'calling,' and an 'appellation'; and needless to say, it has
'requirements,' 'claims,' and 'pretenses'which Kant portrays as concrete
attitudes. Many of these expressions should certainly be understood as
metaphors; but metaphors for what? For . . . certain aspects of the interest
of reason which, in itself, is no longer a metaphor in the same sense, but
rather a systematic concept" (16). Nowhere before have I encountered so
clear a recognition of the language Kant employs with reference to reason
or of its metaphysical, not just metaphorical significance. See his develop-
ment of these ideas: Yovel, "The Interests of Reason." See also M. Renault,
"Le principe d'auto-conservation de la raison est le fondement de la
croyance rationelle"; P. Vignola, "'Seele' et 'Gemut' selon Kant"; and M.
Westphal, "In Defense of the Thing in Itself."
30. The "practical" itself had two components: there was the praxis of
cognitive-technical thinking"judgment" in its teleological senseand
there was the praxis of moral evaluations"practical judgments" and
"practical purposes"i.e., concrete projects grounded in a rational choice.

416 Notes to Pages 311-12

Spontaneity expressed these two dimensions of praxis as a freedom to in-
augurate cognition or action. While it was subjectively possible to feel these
aspects of praxis, Kant also insisted that it was cognitively possible to think
them and even barely possible to know that they functioned via direct ap-
perception. In 1789, Kant would shift the notion of technical praxis from
the realm of moral philosophy to that of theoretical philosophy. Zweckra-
tionalitt was, Kant's First Introduction to the Critique ofJudgment now pro-
claimed, merely theoretical. Spontaneity had its ground exclusively in
moral purposiveness: in the "law of freedom."
31. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 3:40.
32. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 124.
33. Ibid., 125.
34. Ibid., 126.
35. See, e.g., N. Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Systematization, 111
31.
36. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 288-89; and M. Casula, "Der
Mythos des Primats der praktischen Vernunft."
37. L. Beck, Commentary, 249-50. See also N. McKenzie, "The Pri-
macy of Practical Reason in Kant's System."
38. On "realm" and "territory" see Kant, Critique ofJudgment, ii: 10
11.
39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B476, B560ff, B830-31; L. Beck,
Commentary, 177.
40. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A686/B714. Kant identified the
principle of totality in systems with the idea of a purpose also in his crucial
discussion in the "Architectonic of Pure Reason," A832-33/B860-61.
41. Ibid., A694/B722.
42. "Whatever in an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I
entitle intelligible. If, therefore, that which in the sensible world must be
regarded as appearance has in itself a faculty which is not an object of sensi-
ble intuition, but through which it can be the cause of appearances, the
causality of this being can be regarded from two points of view. Regarded as
the causality of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the
causality of an appearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects"
(Critique ofPure Reason, A538/B566). "The idea of a moral world has, there-
fore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of an intelligible intui-
tion (we are quite unable to think any such object), but as referring to the
sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its
practical employment, that is, as a corpus mysticum of the rational beings in
it" (ibid., A808/B836).
43. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 90:310-12.
44. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 105-6.
45. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to B-version, B:xxxii-xxxv.
46. The Wllner Edict of 1788 made the question of censorship and
orthodoxy very vivid in Prussia, and Kant suffered from it soon enough.
But one might go so far as to argue that Kant had not only a prudent but
also a positive ground for his campaign to "limit reason to make room for
faith," namely, a genuinely religious commitment. See Despland, Kant on
History and Religion, and A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion.

Notes to Pages 312-15 417

 47. J. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," lxxx.
48. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 6. For alternative views, see J.
Marshall, "Man as an End in Himself"; and P. Haezrahi, "The Concept of
Man as an End-in-Himself," 29Iff.
49. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 73.
50. Kant, Grounding, 35 (A.A. 4:428).
51. Ibid., 3 5 - 3 6 (A.A. 4:428).
52. "Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of
every rational nature." Ibid., 41 (A.A. 4:436).
53. Ibid., 38 (A.A. 4:431).
54. Ibid., 42 (A.A. 4:437).
55. Ibid., 36 (A.A. 4:428-29).
56. Kant was not very explicit about how we would be certain of the
existence of other rational beings. He went to such lengths about the valid-
ity of finding reason in oneself that he left undeveloped the problem of the
recognition of other rational beings. For him that was so obvious that it did
not occasion practical concern. It is, however, neither obvious nor effort-
less to make these linkages. The point would be worse if we could attain the
idea of the validity of the concept of an end-in-itself only via its universality
among rational beings. But since it is in fact grounded immanently upon
the necessary rationality of any, then it can be unhesitatingly ascribed to all
rational beings. That includes even, should they exist, extraterrestrial or
supernatural intelligences. Reason, not universality, but as reality, not
merely as form, is the key here.
Here we must invoke the distinction between intersubjectivity and
universality, and even more that between universality and validity. Validity
grounds universality, not the converse. The essence of a priori validity is
necessity, not universality. (Here I differ sharply with L. Beck, Commentary,
22, 67.) The latter follows inevitably, and may therefore be taken as an in-
dicator, but it is not itself a modality which is apodictic. What is merely im-
puted to everyone is not as such objectively valid, as Kant made clear in a
crucial argument in the Critique ofJudgment, 8:49. Objective validity is a
matter of necessary rationality; reason's intrinsic determination is decisive
in this context. All rational beings share in taking themselves as ends in
themselves, but it is not that they so share which makes them rational, but
rather that they are rational which makes it possible for them to share. Rea-
son is primary. It is the ground.
57. Kant, Grounding, 38 (A.A. 4:432).
58. Ibid., 39 (A.A. 4:433).
59. Ibid., 43 (A.A. 4:438).
60. Ibid., 40 (A.A. 4:434).
61. A purely rational being would necessarily actualize all the imma-
nent interests of reason. In the First Critique, Kant wrote: "Now in an intelli-
gible world, that is, in the moral world, in the concept of which we leave out
of account all the hindrances to morality (the desires), such a system, in
which happiness is bound up with and proportioned to morality, can be
conceived as necessary, inasmuch as freedom, partly inspired and partly
restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness,
since rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would them-

418 Notes to Pages 316-18

selves be the authors of both their own enduring well-being and ofthat of
others" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A809/B837). Similarly, Kant wrote
extensively in the Grounding of the "holy will" for which there would be no
impediments to perfect morality, and hence no need for the compulsion of
duty. It was not that such a being would have no moral principle, but rather
that this moral principle would not be experienced as constraint. Kant ar-
gued in the Second Critique that reason had the capacity to determine the
moral intention entirely without reference to any intuition outside reason
itself. The pure immanence of reason's autonomous self-determination in
the practical domain betokened the objective reality of reason. This was a
crucial result, at once the linchpin of the critical philosophy and the stum-
bling block for all empiricist philosophies.
62. Kant, Grounding, 39 (A.A. 4:433).
63. Kant, First Critique, A809/B837. The use of the concept of the
"highest good" in the "Analytic" of the Second Critique hearkens back to the
treatment of the term in the "Canon of Pure Reason" of the First Critique
and to the discussion of the "kingdom of ends" in the Grounding. The ques-
tion is: Is it the same concept as the one which Kant develops in the "Dialec-
tic" of the Second Critique and takes up again in the "Methodology of
Teleological Judgment" in the Third Critique} Is there only one concept of
the "highest good" in Kant?
64. Kant, Grounding (39, A.A. 4:433).
65. Ibid., 43 (A.A. 4:438).
66. See the works of T. Auxter on this idea and its implications: "The
Teleology of Kant's Ectypal World," "The Unimportance of the Highest
Good," and Kant's Moral Teleology.
67. Kant, Grounding, 42n. (A.A. 4:436n.).
68. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 44.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 72.
72. Kant explained the notion of "hypotyposis" in Critique of Judgment,
59:197-98. See chap. 13 above.
73. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 73.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 73.
76. Ibid., 45.

Seventeen: The Unity of Mankind

1. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, passim. See also F. van de Pitte,

"The Importance of Moral Teleology for Kant's Critical Philosophy."
2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 87:298.
3. Kant entertained more than one notion of the highest good. As Y.
Yovel has put it, the "Kantian concept of the highest good is ambiguous; its
meaning varies not only from one work to the next, but occasionally even
in the same chapter. In fact there is no single text in which Kant discusses it
exhaustively, and all his treatments of the notion must be taken as frag-
mentary and as calling for reciprocal supplementation and illumination"

Notes to Pages 319-23 419

(Kant's Philosophy of History, 81). The core definition Kant offered of the
idea of the "highest good" was a proportionality of happiness to worthi-
ness. This formula, or a close variant, appeared in a very large number of
Kant's published works over a considerable span of time. But it frequently
did so in the company of other definitions which at the very least amplified
and often obscured the core meaning: the "Kingdom of God," Critique of
Practical Reason, 128; the "intelligible world," ibid., 132; "natural beings
under moral law," Critique ofJudgment, 86; "moral vocation of man," Cri-
tique ofPure Reason, A840/B868. See Beck, Commentary, 242, for discussion.
The most important distinction to make in approaching the issue of
the highest good in Kant is that between the problem of the objectification
of moral laws in the actual world and the problem of the reward for worthi-
ness and its transcendent requirements. Kant merged these two ideas to-
gether, perhaps for a motive ulterior to the strict question of morality. The
result has been a monumental controversy over the meaning and even the
legitimacy of this notion in his philosophy.
4. Kant, Religion, 5.
5. J. Silber, "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics,"
179ff.
6. J. Silber, "Kant's Concept of the Highest Good as Immanent and
Transcendent," 469ff.
7. J. Silber, "Der Schematismus der praktischen Vernunft," 253ff.
8. Kant, Religion, 6n.
9. Beck, Commentary, 243.
10. M. Zeldin, "The Summum Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Exis-
tence of God." See also R. Friedman, "The Importance and Function of
Kant's Highest Good"; A. Reath, "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good
in Kant"; S. Smith, "Worthiness to Be Happy and Kant's Concept of the
Highest Good"; M. Packer, "The Highest Good in Kant's Psychology of
Motivation"; R. Friedman, "Hypocrisy and the Highest Good"; and W.
Brugger, "Kant und das Hchste Gut."
l l . J . Atwell argues that if objects of the will derive their value other
than from the law, then their achievement cannot be a duty. He denies that
"objective ends" as results can be taken up by reason as moral ("Objective
Ends in Kant's Ethics," 16971). Yet the morally responsible agent is a sen-
sual entity with already built-in propensities to seek certain natural goods.
While duty could override them, it could not extirpate them entirely, and,
more, it should not. The question Atwell's intepretation of Kant can never
clarify adequately is the reason behind this "should."
12. A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 55.
13. Ibid., 117n.
14. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 60.
15. T. Auxter, "Ectypal Nature," 488.
16. T. Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 24.
17. Ibid., 150.
18. G. Barnes, "In Defense of Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good,"
esp. 453; G. Krmling, "Das hchste Gut als mgliche Welt"; S. Anderson-
Gold, "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"; and T. Godlove, Jr., "Moral Ac-
tions, Moral Lives."

420 Notes to Pages 323-26

 19. They would also lead from the Third Critique into Kant's next
projects, both his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which pursued
the religious dimension, and his On the Old Saw: That Might Be Right in
Theory but It Won't Work in Practice, which carried on the historical-political
analysis. See R. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation, chap. 7, for a dis-
cussion of the connection of the Third Critique to this output of the 1790s.
20. Kant, First Introduction, 12:53 {A.A. 20:249).
21. In 82 of the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment" Kant res-
tated the distinction between relative and intrinsic purposiveness which he
had formulated earlier in 15 of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" and
63 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment."
22. Kant makes this distinction in ibid., 82:276.
23. Ibid., 83:280.
24. Kant discusses the concept of happiness in ibid. 83:280, 284n.
and 84:286n.
25. In the Second Critique Kant observed that no one needs to be com-
manded to pursue happiness. A human being cannot help but do that (Cri-
tique of Practical Reason, 38). This is a notion that has not received sufficient
attention in some interpretations of Kant's ethics, especially as regards the
controversial issue of the "highest good."
26. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 83:281ff.
27. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 121.
28. Ibid., 283-84. See Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a
Series of Letters.
29. The connection with Freud's theory of sublimation has not es-
caped some interpreters, e.g., N. Hertz, "The Notion of Blockage in the
Literature of the Sublime."
30. This is what Kant means about the propaedeutic function of phys-
ical teleology in theology. See Critique ofJudgment, 85.
31. This is Kant's definition of "culture." See ibid., 83:281.
32. The most thorough and in many ways provocative study of this is
G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 89178.
33. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 126.
34. G. Kelly; Idealism, Politics and History, 13940.
35. Ibid., 100, 121. Also, E. Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of His-
tory"; and K. Weyand, Kants Geschichtsphilosophie, 49136.
36. On the Kant-Herder dispute in history see H. Irmscher, "Die
geschichtsphilosophische Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Herder"; J.
Simon, "Herder und Kant"; and M. Sakabe, "Freedom as a Regulative
Principle."
37. P. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, passim.
38. L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 1056.
39. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 119-20.
40. Ibid.
4L The asceticism of this posture was extreme. It provoked Herder in
the 1780s, and later it even roused the Kantian Schiller to protest. Schiller
had absorbed enough of the social theory of the Enlightenment to "con-
cede that, litde as individuals might benefit from this fragmentation of
their being, there was no other way in which the species as a whole could

Notes to Pages 326-30 421

have progressed" (On the Aesthetic Education ofMan, 11). Yet Schiller was far
more attentive to the loss involved. "Thus, however much the world as a
whole may benefit through this fragmentary specialization of human
powers, it cannot be denied that the individuals affected by it suffer under
the curse of this cosmic purpose" (ibid., 14). Kant could claim that man
deserved no more, since in terms of his own "natural dispositions . . . he
himself, as far as in him lies, works for the destruction of his own race" (Cri-
tique ofJudgment, 83:280). Schiller would not accept this: "But can Man
really be destined to miss himself for the sake of any purpose whatsoever?
Should Nature, for the sake of her own purposes, be able to rob us of a
completeness which Reason, for the sake of hers, enjoins upon us? It must,
therefore, be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sac-
rifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of Nature tends in
that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher Art the
totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed" (On the Aes-
thetic Education ofMan, 15). That is the essence of the "aesthetic solution" of
German Idealism.
42. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 119.
43. Relating Kant's idea of nature to the "invisible hand" suggests the
enormous importance that the Scottish Enlightenment idea of a "civil so-
ciety," as the impersonal order imposed by the market economy, had on
German social thought, starting at least with Kant. The idea of a "cunning
of nature"a take-off on Hegel's full "cunning of reason"was invented
by Eric Weil and employed extensively by Y. Yovel to refer to the purely
mechanical role nature plays in fostering man's capacity for freedom prior
to his rational self-assertion.
44. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 120; Kelly, Idealism, Politics
and History, 120.
45. See A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, for a full articula-
tion of this essential argument about the culture of the eighteenth century
and the modern West, which found expression above all in the writings of
the Scottish Enlightenment.
46. On this naturalistic line see Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History, 120
21, 135, 143; Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 93-94; and W. Booth,
Interpreting the World, 96, 109.
47. In the 1790s he became more critical of such Hobbesianism, e.g.,
in On the Old Saw (1793), 57-65. See L. Krieger, The German Idea ofFreedom,
93-95; P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 73-80; and Y. Yovel, Kant's Phi-
losophy of History, 139ff, 161.
48. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 120.
49. Ibid., 122. The incongruity between the idea of "general will" and
man needing a master is even starker than the well-cited contradictions in
Rousseau himself. See, e.g., the tension in Kant's exposition of "constitu-
tional law" in On the Old Saw, 5774.
50. On Lutheran notions of the inevitability of sin in the world, and
consequently of the need for a powerful secular authority, see: C.
Trinkaus, "The Religious Foundations of Luther's Social Views," and E.
Troeltsch's classic account The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, esp.
518-31.

422 Notes to Pages 331-32

 51. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 123. This reflects Kant's idea
of "radical evil." See Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 208ff., for a careful de-
fense of Kant's notion. See also J. Silber, "Ethical Significance of Kant's Re-
ligion," passim; and E. Fackenheim, "Kant and Radical Evil."
52. This was the thrust of the second key essay of 1784, "What is En-
lightenment?"
53. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 95; L. Krieger, The German Idea
of Freedom, 104.
54. Kant, "Muthmalicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte," A.A.
8:107-23; E. Fackenheim, Kant's Concept of History, 384-89; Y. Yovel,
Kant's Philosophy of History, 12541, 16469; and G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics
and History, 140-70.
55. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 83:281-82.
56. "Kant always emphasizes that the Enlightenment is not just a form
of consciousness but a real historical force that can be institutionalized
through praxis and become embodied in historical reality" (Yovel, Kant's
Philosophy of History, 175).
57. This is the sphere of Kant to which Wood, Despland, Auxter, and
Yovel have all devoted such innovative attention. That Kant was interested
in the history of the future and in what philosophy could say about it, and
that this interest had strong religious and political dimensions which were
anchored firmly in his context all suggest the degree of continuity between
Kant and his Idealist successors. It is the basis for a possible ultimate unity.
"If one stresses reason and reason's ends as the known substrate of morality
and as the estimated substrate of nature and art, then a (Godless) synthesis
remains possible" (P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 92). Riley uses this
argument to refute McFarland's claim in "The Bogus Unity" that the only
unity the system could have would be God and Kant cannot be proven to
have really believed in a God.
58. L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 112ff.; G. Kelly, Idealism,
Politics and History, 153f.
59. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 31.
60. Ibid., 73n.
61. Ibid., 84.
62. Ibid., 135.
63. Ibid., 75.
64. Ibid., 72.
65. G. Michaelson, Jr., The Historical Dimension of a Rational Faith, 133
83.
66. A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, passim.
67. M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 203ff., 263ff.
68. Thus Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History," 398; Y. Yovel,
Kant's Philosophy of History, 300ff. See also P. Stern, "The Problem of His-
tory and Temporality in Kantian Ethics."
69. W. Booth, Interpreting the World, 125ff.; E. Vollrath, "Kants Kritik
der Urteilskraft als Grundlegung einer Theorie des Politischen"; D. Pasini,
"Das 'Reich der Zwecke' und der politisch-rechtliche Kantianische
Gedanke"; and R. Pippin, "On the Moral Foundations of Kant's Rechts-

Notes to Pages 332-34 423

lehre." The influence of Kant on contemporary political theory, especially
in view of the reconstruction ofJ. Rawls, is substantial.
70. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 84:284.
71. Ibid., 84:285.
72. Ibid., 91:320-21.
73. Ibid., 87:299n.
74. K. Dsing, "Das Problem des hchsten Gutes in Kants praktischer
Philosophie."
75. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A590-642/B618-70, esp. A 6 2 0 -
30/B648-58.
76. Ibid., A623/B651.
77. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 85:287.
78. Ibid., 290-91.
79. Ibid., 87:301n.
80. Kant, First Critique, A805-19/B833-47; L. Beck, Commentary,
241.
81. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 91:323n.
82. Ibid., 91:323.
83. Ibid., 87:303.
84. The "tragic worldview" takes this position. See Auxter, Kant's
Moral Teleology, 97ff, 123, 183; A. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 179. Kant's
treatment of the tragic position is not adequate. But see W. Booth, Inter-
preting the World, 114ff, for an effort to define Kant's position as "tragic"
via the category of the sublime.
85. This is the Stoic position. On Kant's ambivalent relation to the
Stoics, see Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 117n., and esp. Booth, Interpreting
the World, 4347, who argues that Kant is ultimately quite close to Stoicism.
86. Kant says so much himself, in Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, 4.
87. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 128n., 132ff. There are those
who question the sincerity of this belief and its consequence, Kant's "the-
ism." See Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, 94ff., 109; and J. McFarland,
"The Bogus Unity," 280. That position seems to me irreconcilable with his-
torical evidence. Here, Wood, Despland, and Silber have the stronger case
by far. Yet there is a world of difference between the sincerity of this belief
and its validity. With that at stake, the stance of Yovel and McFarland takes
on a new importance. But see Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 9193, for a
response.
88. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," cxxicxxxiii.
89. "Rigorism" is the suspicion of worthiness raised to a principle.
Kant's rigorism is at times quite stark. While his defenders protest against
the "caricature" of Kant as a rigorist, there is too much textual evidence for
this caricature not to have caught (and admittedly exaggerated) some
prominent features. The strongest articulation of this rigorism is in the
first part of Kant's Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone, where, in keep-
ing with traditional Christian theology, though on the basis of his own crit-
ical philosophy, Kant argued for a radical disposition to evil in human
nature. In another of his most rigoristic passages Kant argues that "when

424 Notes to Pages 335-39

we pay attention to our experience of the way human beings act, we meet
frequent andas we ourselves admitjustified complaints that there can-
not be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure
duty" (Kant, Grounding, 19). This is an anthropological observation, and
hence empirical, as Kant certainly recognized, but it makes a very strong
negative claim, namely, that every action of a human being can be sus-
pected, and that this suspicion is in itself sufficient warrant to deny worthi-
ness. One can be very severe with oneself on that score. One's worthiness
may be easily disproved, even if it is hard to prove. Still, only the most
"rigoristic" posture would deny any worthiness. For a rigorist, mankind is
guilty until proven innocent, and the proof is impossible. This kind of
thinking, the "hermeneutic of suspicion," has its ground in the Pauline-
Christian notion of sin as a condition, not an act, and finds its later expres-
sion in Freudian theories of unconscious (and unsavory) motivation. This
idea of the "hermeneutic of suspicion" is developed by P. Ricoeur in refer-
ence to Freud and his predeccesors, Marx and Nietzsche. But, as he cer-
tainly knows, its origins lie far deeper in the religious tradition of the West.
See Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 3235.
90. That is the ascetic element in Kant. The "rigorism" and the "ascet-
icism" of Kant should be carefully distinguished, though there is an inti-
mate association between them. Kant had a strong personal disposition
toward asceticism, and this influenced his writings on ethics. For Kant, it
was hard ever to regard "inclinations" of man's sensual nature otherwise
than as a "burden." (See Critique ofJudgment, 83:284n.) This dour attitude,
which comes to clear expression in his ethics and in his anthropology, pro-
voked sharp opposition from Herder, and later from the Idealists. It was
the point over which Schiller publicly quarreled with Kant. Kant admitted
philosophically that such asceticism was unjustified, but his personal pref-
erences continued to color his treatment. Kant's ambivalence toward the
"natural good" is one of the most pervasive and problematic features of his
ethics.
91. For rigorous epistemologists, the only sphere left to consign this
kind of thinking to is the aesthetic. It goes without saying that it could claim
no objective validity.
92. See Kant's acknowledgement of the argument in Second Critique,
149n.
93. Beck, Commentary, 253f.
94. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 28-29.
95. Beck, Commentary, 245.
96. J. Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content for Kant's Ethical For-
malism," 109.
97. For "rigorists" of their school, no more damning conclusion could
be reached. But for those seeking to find in Kant's Third Critique the sources
of the metaphysics of German Idealism, this result has quite another
meaning. This whole realm of thought is decisive for the "aesthetic solu-
tion" of the Idealists.
98. Auxter, "Ectypal World," 493.
99. Auxter, "The Unimportance of the Highest Good."

Notes to Pages 339-41 425

Conclusion: The Meaning of the Third Critique
1. As E. Fackenheim put it, the Third Critique was the effort "to join
together what the first two Critiques have put asunder" ("Kant's Concept of
History," 389). This same point is made by L. Krieger in The German Idea of
Freedom, 106, and by E. Cassirer in Kant's Life and Thought, 360. Kant
sought to do so under the rubric of purposiveness or teleology. As G.
Michaelson puts it, "Kant turns to teleology when he wants to bridge the
gap between the worlds of nature and freedom" (Historical Dimension of a
Rational Faith, 141).
2. Hence such titles for Kant's works after 1781 as "Metaphysics of Na-
ture" and "Metaphysics of Morals." Those titles persisted for two decades
after he ostensibly "preempted" metaphysics, according to the formalist
reading.
3. Michaelson, Historical Dimension of a Rational Faith, 181; see P. Riley,
Kant's Political Philosophy, 3, for a similar observation.
4. P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 71.
5. Y. Yovel, Kant's Philosophy of History, passim, esp. 302.
6. F. Beiser, Fate of Reason, 227.
7. L. Beck, Commentary 54; and see J. McFarland, "The Bogus Unity."
8. "If a critical examination of pure practical reason is to be complete,
then there must, in my view, be the possibility at the same time of showing
the unity of practical and speculative reason in a common principle; for in
the final analysis there can be only one and the same reason, which is to be
differentiated solely in its application" (Kant, Grounding, 4).
9. Kant wrote of the "expectation of bringing some day into one view
the unity of the entire pure rational faculty (both theoretical and practical)
and of being able to derive everything from one principle." This, he went
on, was "an unavoidable need of human reason, as it finds complete satis-
faction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its cognitions" (Kant, Critique
of Practical Reason, 94).
10. For a similar conclusion, see P. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, 67
68.
11. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 92.

426 Notes to Pages 343-45

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Bibliography 453

Act, aesthetic, 114-15, 119 (see
also Imagination); cognitive,
49, 54-55, 70, 72, 74, 77,
164, 308, 310, 311 (see also
Synthesis); practical, 95, 105,
221, 295 (see also Freedom;
Will)
Action at a distance, 190, 193
Activism. See Spontaneity
Actuality (see also Existence; Va-
lidity), 18-21, 72, 77, 91, 95,
212, 219, 232, 309, 315, 325,
336, 341; objective, 51-52,
68; with validity, 60, 64, 86,
163, 166, 289, 316; without
validity, 64, 97, 109, 135, 145,
160, 320
Actualizing the moral law (see also
Efficaciousness of morality in
world of sense), 133, 264-68,
314, 319, 320, 322, 332; and
highest good, 323-26, 3 3 3 -
34, 340-41
Addison, Joseph, 26, 28, 277,
355n.68, 356n.98
Adickes, Erich, 39
Aesthetic and ethical, relation of,
3, 273, 278-79, 288, 291,
292-94
Aesthetic vs. logical, 19-21, 4 8 -
49, 61, 64, 78-79, 159
Index
Aesthetics, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 131,
273, 292
Aesthetics: (critical theory) of
18th century, 5, 122, 273,
277; Kant's "Copernican Rev-
olution" in, 45, 46, 94; and
teleology, 88, 151-52
Aggregate vs. system, 160, 171,
173, 174, 268, 304
Agreeable. See Pleasant
Akenside, Mark, 354n.62
Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, 233
Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 180,
184, 205, 234
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und
Theorie des Himmels, 19
Allison, Henry, 74, 248, 363n.60,
402n.34
Ameriks, Karl, 48, 55, 71,
369n.54
Analogy, 3, 239, 264, 274-75,
279, 320-21, 324; of judg-
ment of taste and pure moral
choice, 7, 89, 93, 278-79,
293; of nature to purpose, 96,
153, 216, 221-22, 315; of rea-
son with organism, 173-74;
of symbol to schema, 274, 316
"Analytic of Teleological Judg-
ment," 186, 218, 224, 260
"Analytic of the Beautiful," 2, 4,
455
"Analytic of the Beautiful" (cont'd)
9 0 , 9 5 , 121, 123, 130, 272-73,
278
"Analytic of the Sublime," 5, 92,
123, 130, 264, 269, 275-76,
278
Animal consciousness, 64, 8081,
370n.91, 371n.95, 371n.96
Animality. See Materiality of man
Anomaly of empirical cognition
and recourse to teleology, 96,
97, 155, 219-20, 224, 227
Anthropology: cultural, 181, 182,
191-92, 199, 205, 353n.27;
philosophical, 3, 32, 39, 61,
179, 292, 303, 334, 353n.27,
364n.71, 425n.90; physical,
180-81, 191-92, 198, 199,
391n.44
Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View, 83-84, 85, 103,
114, 145, 413n.40
Anticipation (prediction) (see also
Singularity: of an event or ex-
perience), 86, 91, 108, 112,
118, 126, 239, 279, 385n.47
Antinomy, 122, 163, 269-70,
271, 281, 289, 302, 306, 311,
313
Appearance (Erscheinung), 49
50, 66, 67, 71, 75, 79, 164
Apperception (see also Self-
consciousness): practical, 303,
344, 416n.l9; transcendental,
294, 296, 307, 308, 309, 311,
414n.3, 414n.5, 414n.6,
415n.l4
Appetite, 31, 109, 114, 328
Aquila, Richard, 73-74
Architectonic: as oversystematiza-
tion, 90, 107, 162, 170, 279;
systematic articulation, 3, 130,
142-43, 172, 174, 176, 227,
278, 327, 346
Aristotle, 406n.l5
456 Index
Art, 5, 10, 20, 31, 42, 46, 120,
123, 129-47, 280, 286, 2 8 8 -
92, 404n.62; the mechanical
in, 129, 134, 137, 139, 141,
14445; parallel with nature,
14, 131-32, 152, 155; philoso-
phy of, 124, 129-47, 286,
320n.40, 381n.46, 381n.48;
and rule, 134-36; work of,
29, 97, 100, 124-25, 129-47,
155, 213
Artifice, 97-98, 124, 132, 153,
155, 158; vs. art, 130, 133-36,
144; vs. nature, 130-33
Asocial sociability, 331-32
Association, laws of empirical,
80, 284, 289
Atheism: alleged against Kant,
234; Enlightenment trends to-
ward, 194, 196, 229, 257;
Kant's hostility to, 187, 191,
230, 240, 338; Lessing, Spi-
noza and, 228, 235, 236-37,
399n.6
Aufklrung, 1, 8-14, 17-34,
228-29, 230, 330, 348n.21,.
388n.3; and epistemology,
19-21; and political-religious
reaction, 11, 228-29, 241-43;
relation to Western Enlighten-
ment, 13, 17, 22; vs. Sturm
und Drang, 26, 34, 35-44,
186, 187, 228
Augustan taste (see also Neoclassi-
cism), 26, 28
Authorities, political, and repres-
sion, 8, 179, 228, 241-43,
246-47, 332, 404n.78
Authority of reason, 63, 228-29,
235, 237, 238, 283, 293-94,
299, 320, 399n.6; vs. irra-
tionalism of genius, 26, 35,
38-40, 43, 186-87
Autonomy (see also Freedom):
aesthetic, 89, 93, 290-91; eth-
 ical, 89, 172, 266, 281, 300,
306, 307, 313-19, 321, 327,
346, 419n.61
Auxter, Thomas, 326, 341
Awareness, noncognitive, 81
Awareness: vs. conscious atten-
tion, 77
Bacon, Francis, 22, 195
Basedow, Johann, 34
Batteux, Charles, 24
Baumgarten, Alexander, 19-21,
24, 3 0 - 3 1 , 46, 48-49, 59, 82,
406n.l5; and perfection, 20,
21, 30, 99; and "science of
aesthetics," 20, 30
Bumler, Alfred, 19, 29
Bayle, Pierre, 243
Beattie, James, 30
Beauty (beautiful), 2, 20-21, 29,
32, 75, 93, 95, 104, 122, 263,
292, 316, 342; in art, 131,
146-47; dependent
(pulchritudo adhaerens), 97,
124-29, 146-47, 288, 2 9 0 -
91, 379n.3; empirical canon
of, 118-19, 139; as enlivening
the mind, 94, 101-2, 117,
118, 282; free 'pulchritudo
vaga), 125, 291, 379n.3,
411n.60; intelligible, 24, 184;
as mark of immanent deter-
mination by mental process,
28, 93, 95, 295; of nature, 5,
131-32, 146, 151-52, 280,
294, 342; and objective per-
fection, 2 0 - 2 1 , 31, 99-101,
184; vs. the pleasant (charm),
101-2, 105-21, 134, 376n.74;
as stimulus to scientific in-
quiry, 151-53, 280, 383n.ll
Beauty, ideal of, 124, 126-28,
134, 146, 288
Beauty as symbol of morality, 7,
14, 268, 273, 275, 277, 280,
288, 289, 291, 293, 294, 328,
342, 404n.62
Beck, Jacob Sigismund, 74
Beck, Lewis, 18, 23, 29, 70, 75,
313, 324-25, 340, 345,
351n.9, 363n.59
Being, original, 35, 230, 232,
239, 244, 250-51, 340, 346;
as intelligent creator, 191,
215, 225, 226, 227, 239, 249,
310, 336 (see also Theism);
Spinoza's theory of, 244, 248,
250-59
Being, rational, 307, 314, 3 1 7 -
18, 319, 321, 322, 323, 344,
346; finite, 94, 268, 299,
313-14, 318, 320, 321, 324,
338
Being-in-the-world (see also Hu-
man nature), 226, 268, 269,
319, 323, 342
Beiser, Frederick, 228, 235,
348n.21, 351n.50, 399n.6,
403n.55
Belief (see also Faith), 78, 234,
238, 240-41, 245, 306,
403n.55
Belief, rational (Vernunftglaube),
239-40, 241, 302, 303, 306,
315, 337, 340, 343, 404n.64
Bennett, Jonathan, 69
Beobachten and bemerken (see also
"Judging, other kind of"), 87,
104
Berlin Academy, 17, 18, 21, 22,
36, 42; 1761-63 Prize Com-
petition, 24, 26, 29-30, 31,
353n.42, 355n.73
Berlin Aufklrung, 11, 22-34,
231, 233-34, 235-36, 329
Berlinische Monatsschrift, 179, 205,
207, 233, 234, 329
Biester, Johann Erich, 233, 2 3 5 -
37, 403n.55
Biology, science of, 151, 174,
Index 457
Biology, science of (continued)
181, 188, 191-92, 195-214,
215, 225, 245, 260, 342,
395n.70; Kant's interpretation
of, 189, 199-214, 225
Bird, Graham, 70
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich,
201-2, 218
Boerhaave, Hermann, 197
Bhme, Jacob, 44
Bonnet, Charles, 36, 191, 202,
211
Bordeu, Theophile, 191, 198,
394n.42
Boscovich, Ruggero Giuseppe,
182, 195, 206, 244
Boyle, Robert, 194
Bridsh aesthetics, 26-29, 3 0 - 3 1 ,
95, 184, 277
Buffon, Georges, 191, 199-200,
2 0 1 - 2 , 394n.52
Burke, Edmund, 24-25, 32, 41,
276, 277, 282, 284
Carritt, Edgar, 29
Cartesian. See Descartes
Cassirer, Ernst, 29, 184
Categories: and constitutive de-
termination, 65, 72, 75, 76,
88, 168, 220; dynamic, 74, 75,
164, 383n.7; mathematical,
74, 75, 76, 164, 166, 383n.7,
385n.47; as pure concepts of
understanding, 82, 273, 292;
of quantity and quality, 69,
74, 75, 76, 385n.47; of rela-
tion, 67-68, 74, 75, 164,
383n.7; and schematism, 325
(see also Schematism); as tran-
scendental structures, 54-55,
80, 118, 159, 161, 309; and
valid knowledge, 59, 68, 158,
219, 362
Causality, 75, 117, 159, 248, 255;
immanent vs. transeunt, 253
458 Index
55, 344; mechanical/efficient,
132, 152, 190-97, 209, 215,
218-25, 332; noumenal, 91,
197, 217, 255, 335, 417n.42;
through a concept, 9 0 - 9 1 , 95,
132-33, 212-13, 222, 335
Charm (Reiz), 37, 93, 102, 115,
116, 120, 282, 293, 378n.61
Chemistry, science of, 192, 195,
196, 206, 207, 244, 245,
395n.70
Choice, pure moral, 63, 89, 9 2 -
93, 105, 133, 315, 317,
325
Christianity, orthodox (see also
Pietism; Theism: orthodox
Christian): alarm over theo-
logical rationalism, 11-12, 17,
19, 40, 194, 228-29, 242-43,
257, 260; doctrinal commit-
ments, 19, 182, 194, 243, 332,
339; Kant's affinity to, 243,
253, 302, 315, 332, 334-41,
345, 404n.69, 4I7n.46,
424n.89
Clarity vs. distinctness, 20, 49,.
249
Cognition (Erkenntnis), 51, 77,
79, 8 0 - 8 1 , 158
Cognitive turn, 45, 133, 151,
152, 155, 156-61, 169, 178,
259-60, 275, 276, 365n.78,
382n.3
Coldbloodedness of judgment
(see also Rigor vs. speculation),
38, 131, 358n.l39
Community, ethical (see also
Unity of mankind), 319, 326,
332; political vs. religious,
332, 333
Comparison, 74, 82, 87-88
Concept, 58, 62, 106, 111, 270;
vs. intuition, 4849, 51, 54,
57; universality of, 76, 79, 82,
83, 84, 86, 117, 166
Concept, determinate, 121, 2 7 0 -
71, 2 8 5 - 8 6
Concept, empirical, 61, 65, 68,
76, 77, 160-61, 165, 301,
366n.6; formation of, 19, 50,
65, 69, 73, 158, 286, 366n.5
Concept, indeterminate (indefi-
nite), 76, 127, 171-72, 328,
343; and symbolism, 269-75,
279, 286-87
Condillac, Etienne de, 190
Configuration (Gestaltung), 66,
114
Confused knowledge, 21
Consanguinity (Verwandtschaft),
200, 204, 209, 211, 216
Conscious attention, 72, 77, 81
Constitutive determination, 54,
64-65, 70, 72, 84-86, 96,
154-55,162, 164-65, 2 2 0 -
21, 266, 274, 313, 314, 327,
344, 366n.7
Constructions, mathematical, 79,
96, 273, 370n.88
Contextual-historical method, 48,
62, 342, 360n.8
Contextualization of Kant's phi-
losophy, 1, 8-14, 178-88,
227, 334, 342, 349n.23,
360n.8, 367n.l5, 404n.78
Contingency (Zuflligkeit), 159,
160, 176,218,219, 226, 250,
257, 278,308, 335
Coordination of an entity into a
whole, 2 0 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 0 - 5 1 , 76,
84
Correctness, academic (see also
Aesthetic normal idea), 129,
134, 136, 137,141, 144-45
Cosmology, 151, 157, 191, 203,
311,326, 340
Cosmopolitanism, 17,21, 22-23
Creativity, 2 1 , 2 8 , 3 3 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 5 -
36, 183, 259, 277, 287,
290
Criticism vs. science, 3 0 - 3 1 , 3 2 ,
43,46, 137,168, 178
"Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,"
2 , 4 , 5 , 15, 75,92,94, 122-23,
130,272,408n.23
Critique ofJudgment (Third Cri-
tique), 1, 66, 81; archaeology of
composition, 1, 38, 10,46,
121-23,154,214, 227,230;
contextualization of, 37,46,
227, 382n.l; determinant vs.
reflective judgment in, 64, 77,
82, 88; epistemological con-
cerns of, 52, 159; final form, 6,
7, 188,259,263-64, 323, 342;
impact on epoch, 1,2,13-14;
83 and "Idea for Universal
History," 10, 329, 332; system-
atic import in critical philos-
ophy, 3 , 6 , 4 5 , 6 2 , 75; unity of,
2,3,151,239
Critique of Practical Reason (Second
Critique), 4, 7 , 4 7 , 5 7 , 6 2 , 6 3 ,
157, 187, 220, 230, 240, 246,
264, 269, 271,307, 320, 326,
344, 345,404n.72,413n.40,
419n.61; as model for Third
Critique, 89, 91,93; "Analytic,"
320,420n.63; "Dialectic," 341,
419n.63; "Typic of Practical
Judgment," 320-21
Critique of Pure Reason (First Cri-
tique), 8, 12,43,45,46,47, 52,
56,57,60,61,63,64,155,202,
342, 344, 383n.l8; archaeology
of, 1,4,42; B-version (revi-
sions), 64, 75,156,178,187,
192, 241, 364n.67; and empiri-
cal judgments, 59, 64, 158;
hierarchy (Stufenleiter) of repre-
sentations, 79, 81, 82; on
imagination, 69, 78, 82-83;
and limits of valid knowledge,
4 5 , 1 5 2 - 5 3 , 238, 269,271;
linked to Spinozism, 231-32,
Index 459
Critique of Pure Reason (continued)
401n.22,402n.27; purposive-
ness in, 314; reception of, 89,
12, 179; and regulative ideas,
161; and subjective judgment,
76, 145, 358n.2; subjective va-
lidity in, 78; "Amphiboly of
Concepts of Reflection," 62,
87, 364n.61, 371n.98; "Analo-
gies of Experience," 68, 164,
274, 383n.7; "Analytic of Prin-
ciples," 59, 69; "Anticipation of
Perception," 75; "Architectonic
of Pure Reason," 173; "Canons
of Pure Reason," 312, 419n.63;
"Introduction," 53, 176;
"Metaphysical Deduction," 59,
362n.43; "Paralogisms," 302,
307, 311; "Refutation of Ideal-
ism," 60; "Regulative Em-
ployment of the Ideas of Pure
Reason," 162, 171; "Second
Analogy," 223; "Subjective De-
duction," 50, 60,69; "Third
Antinomy," 156, 267,311;
"Transcendental Aesthetic,"
46,69, 79,119, 190; "Tran-
scendental Analytic," 60, 61,
66,69, 164,271,383n.7;
"Transcendental Deduction,"
53, 55, 7 0 - 7 1 ; "Transcenden-
tal Deduction" of B-Version,
53-54, 59,60,65, 80, 192,343;
"Transcendental Dialectic," 60,
156, 162,163,165,171, 176,
178,202,259,260,271,302,
396n.75; "Transcendental
Doctrine of Method," 173;
"Transcendental Logic," 311;
"Transcendental Schematism,"
59,69, 362n.43
"Critique of Taste," 1,45,46,47,
151, 169,170,259; composi-
tion of, 47, 89,90, 92, 121-23,
188; original project, 2, 3 - 4 , 5,
460 Index
7, 121-23, 267, 269, 275-76,
408n.9
"Critique of Teleological Judg-
ment": archaeology of, 3, 5 - 6 ,
10-11,152-55,178-79,186-
88,207,214,267; and biology,
189-91, 197, 214-23; and his-
tory, 1011; and Pantheism
Controversy, 11, 186-88, 191;
and "ber den Gebrauch teleo-
logischer Principien in der Phi-
losophie," 207,212, 124
Critiques, later, 59, 60, 61, 62, 174,
295, 404n.64
Crusius, Christian August, 17-19,
23,351n.50
Cultivation (education, Bildung),
292-94,328-39,333
Culture, 7, 10, 13, 181,288,
350n.45
Cunning of nature, 331, 442n.43
DAlembert, Jean, 22, 190
De la Garde, Frangois, 6
Deduction, historical sense of, 55
"Deduction of Aesthetic Judg-
ments," 2,5, 7,95, 112, 122,
129-30
Deism, 27, 196, 247, 256, 257,
388n.l00,400n.8
Delineation (Zeichnung), 66, 115
Democritus, 248
Descartes, Rene, 18, 20, 27,66,
181, 192, 239, 244, 309; and
mechanistic science, 18, 25, 27,
189, 192-96, 393n.25
Design: appearance of, 95,98,
103, 132, 135, 153, 169; as in-
ference about empirical
objects, 97,158,215
Desire, 24, 109,273,299, 315,
328-29; faculty of, 47,62,80,
91,110,365n.75
Despair, 338-39
Despland, Michel, 334
Determinacy. See Individuality
Determination. See Constitutive
determination
Determinism, 179,191, 267, 333
"Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment,"
5, 7 - 8 , 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 264, 269,270,
287,302, 303,344
"Dialectic of Teleological Judg-
ment," 6, 186,214,218,222,
223, 224, 225,226, 230, 247,
248, 260,318
Dialectical excess, 6, 163, 166,
176, 222, 226, 251,260, 270,
271,308, 309, 346,406n.l3
Diderot, Denis, 190-91,394n.42
Dignity of reason, 63, 142, 146,
167, 199,314,317,346
Disciples of Kant (Kantians), 12,
14,232-35,242-43,246-47,
344-45, 351n.50,404n.78
Discursiveness, 4855,61, 159
61,237,288,310,315, 324,
399n.49; vs. intuitive intellect,
252-57; and recourse to teleol-
ogy, 219-27
Disinterestedness of pleasure in
beauty, 24, 9 2 - 9 3 , 108, 125,
273, 294
Dubos.Jean, 24
Duff, William, 355n.68, 380n.36
Dsing, Klaus, 3, 173
Duty, 32, 255, 264, 268, 291, 297,
299, 300, 306,326,338-39
Eberhard, Johann, 42, 348n.l9,
359n.l41,363n.60
Ectypal nature, 320,321,326, 241
Education. See Cultivation
Efficaciousness of morality in
world of sense (see also Actualiz-
ing the moral law), 265-66,
295, 299, 306-7,314,323, 325
Emotion (Rhrung), 27-28, 32,
37,93,115,282,299
Empiricism, 19,46,53,101,178,
195,388n.2,419n.61
Encyclopedist, 26, 190
End-in-itself (see also Purpose: in-
trinsic), 99, 306-7, 314-19,
327, 344,375n.53,418n.56
Endowments, natural (natrliche
Anlagen), 200-201, 217-18
Ends, objective, 324, 325,420n. 11
Enlightenment, 8, 17, 21, 22,24,
27,35, 139, 183, 241,332-33,
421n.41; British, 22,24, 29;
French, 13, 2 1 - 2 2 , 23, 24, 183;
Radical (materialist), 196, 228,
240, 257, 258; and religious
tolerance, 11, 241; Scottish,
422n.43, 422n.45
Enlivening (liveliness) of mind (see
also Spirit), 118, 144-45, 274,
286, 291,297-99, 304
Entailment: problem of empirical,
6 0 - 6 1 , 158-61,260, 343,
384n.25
Entelechy (see also Purposiveness:
intrinsic), 99, 171
Enthusiasm (Schwrmerei) (see also
Fanaticism, religious; Sturm
und Drang: and irrationalism),
12,28-29,33-36,38,41,42,
44,178, 184, 232, 233,236,
238-39,240,246,247,
381n.46,403n.55
Epicurus, 248,295
Erect posture, 181-82,199,204
Ethical turn, 6 - 8 , 1 2 9 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 9 -
6 0 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 265,276,306,
307, 335, 341,342, 375n.53,
381n.46,382n.3,398n.35
Ethico-theology, 226,240,253,
335, 336, 399n.49
Euler, Leonhard, 120
Evolution: 18th-century theories
of, 205, 214,217
Exemplary instance of beauty,
118-19,128-29, 139,141,145
Index 461
Exemplary necessity, 92,373n.l8
Existence (see also Actuality), 6 7 -
68, 75, 76,82, 86,164,239,
285, 308
Experience, empirical (Erfahrung),
56, 75, 80, 154, 165,211,309,
310, 346
Explanations, transcendental, 6 2 -
63,90-91,159,344,365n.75
Expressionism of reason (see also
Symbolism), 275, 284,287-88,
289, 290,304, 382n.60
Extensive vs. intensive clarity, 20,
4 8 - 4 9 , 360n.l0
Extensive vs. intensive magnitude,
66
Fact of pure reason, 306, 310,
335,414n.l,416n.27
Faculties: relation of the, 58, 94,
117-18,238,270, 282,294-95
(see also Harmony of the fac-
ulties); system of cognitive
(Erkenntnisvermgen), 58, 59,
6 2 , 7 9 , 9 4 , 115, 117, 162, 168,
169,170, 227; system of hu-
man (mental; Gemtsvermgen),
42,47, 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 2 , 6 3 , 8 9 , 1 6 9 ,
170, 211,238,263,278, 2 9 4 -
95
Faculty: cognitive, 47, 48, 62, 108,
110
"Faculty-talk," 60,162,170,
364n.67
Faith (see also Belief), 60, 236,240,
289,315-16,343
Fanadcism, religious (see also En-
thusiasm; Sturm und Drang:
and irrationalism), 33, 4 0 - 4 1 ,
187,232,236-37
Fantasy (fancy; Phantasterei), 44,
357n.98
Fatality (see also Determinism),
187, 229,230,248, 250-51,
254,258, 399n.6
462 Index
Favor, nature's, 154
Feder, Johann, 242
Feeling (Gefhl), 2 4 , 3 0 , 4 9 , 6 3 ,
111, 115, 238,267, 272, 278,
280, 288, 292,295; faculty of,
4 7 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 8 0 , 89,94,267; as
mark of relation of human fac-
ulties, 294-95
Feeling, moral (see also Respect),
30, 32, 238,279, 293,300
Feeling of life (Lebensgefiihl), 101,
292, 295-99
Fichte, Johann, 12, 14, 175,
400n.6,403n.55
Figure (Gestalt), 49, 50, 51,66,
120-21, 151
First Introduction to the Critique of
Judgment: in archaeology of
text, 4 - 6 , 80, 152-53,167,
170, 175,214, 260, 276; and
beautiful and pleasant, 107-8;
contrast with final Introduc-
tion, 265,408n.9,410n.27;
plan for whole work, 263; and
sublime, 265, 277-79; and
technic of nature, 133, 219; on
technical vs. practical, 96, 4 1 6 -
17n.30; and theory of judg-
ment, 157-58,161-67,169
Force (Kraft), 27, 182, 193; of at-
traction and repulsion, 193,
195, 212, 244; fundamental
(Grundkraft), 188, 203, 204,
211,212,214, 396n.87;
Herder's theory of, 182, 188,
203-4, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 230, 244; in
nature, 27,182, 188, 190,194,
206,207,210,212
Form, aesthetic, 103-4, 106, 110,
113, 119, 120-21, 128,
376n.74; vs. objective form,
120-21
Form, pure, 8 9 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 133
Form-giving, act of. See Synthesis
Formalism in art, 29091
Formlessness and sublime, 2 7 7 -
78
Forster, Georg, 2 0 7 - 1 1 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 ,
396n.75
Frederick II (of Prussia), 11, 17,
2 1 - 2 2 , 4 2 , 2 4 2 , 357n.ll3
Frederick William II (of Prussia),
11,242
Free-thinking, 187, 241,257,
400n.8
Freedom (see also Autonomy): ac-
tual individual, 255,259, 264,
266-67, 295,298,314,315,
329,342; aesthetic (Liberalitt),
93, 116, 135-37, 139, 145-46,
290, 294, 379n.3; non-Kantian
ideas of, 28, 183,204, 240, 254;
noumenal (transcendental),
254, 266-67,268, 269, 271,
278,284,291,293,300,302,
307,311,315,329, 335; practi-
cal, 6-7, 91, 99,176, 191, 266,
315,316, 327,329,418n.61;
Spinoza's denial of human,
255,407n.29
French influence. See Enlighten-
ment, French
French Revolution, 207, 330, 333,
334
Galileo, 406n.l5
"Gap" in Kant's system (see also
Entailment: problem of em-
pirical), 60
Gardens, geometric vs. spon-
taneous, 97,381n.53
Garve, Christian, 89
Garve-Feder review, 8
Geliert, Christian, 26
Genius, 24-25, 28,46, 342; Ad-
dison on, 25, 28; Baumgarten's
theory of, 25, 33; cult of, 34,
40,41,233,236,240, 247,
355n.68,357n.l07,359n.l39;
danger of nonsense and mad-
ness, 145-46, 290, 381n.53;
and enthusiasm, 3334, 35, 38,
233,354n.62, 381n.46; Gerard
on, 29, 41; Herder as self-
proclaimed, 37; as inspiration,
138-39, 290, 355n.64,
355n.68; Kant and, 10,32-33,
38,43, 46, 187,380n.36,
381n.46; Kant's ironic inter-
pretation of, 136-42, 380n.35;
Mendelssohn on, 2 4 - 2 6 , 3 3 ;
metaphysical interpretation of,
269, 280, 283-84, 287, 2 8 9 -
90, 304, 381n.46; naturalistic
account of, 16, 29, 136-42,
381n.46; vs. rule, 27, 28, 136,
354n.62, 358n.l21; vs. science,
4 1 - 4 2 , 358n.l39; Shaftesbury
on, 28; Sturm und Drang and, 5,
8, 13,46,183, 277; as supply-
ing material for beauty in art,
141, 14345; unschooled vs.
learned, 25, 28; Young and,
28-29, 355n.64
Gerard, Alexander, 29,41,
355n.68, 380n.36
Givenness of material in sensa-
tion, 49, 51, 52,66, 86-87,
109,113-15,310,367n.26,
381n.46
God: belief in, 241, 315-16, 340
(see also Deism; Theism); and
Providence, 327,329,336, 338,
339, 340 (see also Providence);
rational idea of, 61, 79, 176,
179,215,236,240,285; of
Spinoza, 193-94, 244, 245-46,
248,250-59
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von,
13-14, 36,42, 182-84, 229,
230-31, 350n.48, 359n.l43,
389n.7, 390n.23, 390n.28,
401n.l3
Good, beautiful, pleasant, 25,
278-79
Index 463
Good, the, 30,98,99, 110,125,
126, 279,291,298, 323; het-
erogeneity of, 324, 325,
412n.l7,420n.ll,425n.90
Gottsched, Johann, 26
Gracyk, Theodore, 32
Gram, Moltke, 70
Gregor, Mary, 45, 7576
Ground and consequence, 51,
220-21,255, 351n.9
Grounding of the Metaphysics of Mor-
als, 157, 175, 186, 242,300,
307,310,316,318,319,321,
326, 345,419n.61,419n.63
Guyer, Paul, 70-71
Halle, University of: controversy
over Wolff, 11, 17
Haller, Albrecht von, 198
Hamann, Johann, 33-35, 36, 40,
44, 137, 181,231-34, 241,242,
355n.64; 355-56n.77,
357n.l07,391n.43,400n.6,
401n.21,402n.34
Happiness, 93, 296, 297, 298,328,
329,331,337,418n.61,
420n.3,421n.25
Harmony, 85, 118
Harmony of the faculties, 25, 33,
85,94, 101-2, 116-18, 119,
122, 128, 131, 143, 287-88,
291,297, 378n.54
Hartknoch, Johann, 9, 156,
389n.l0
Hartley, David, 22, 284
Health (see also Well-being), 296,
297,298
Hegel, G.W.F., 14, 141, 333, 3 4 4 -
45, 361n.38, 380n.40, 389n.7,
397n.87,400n.6,403n.55,
405n.78,407n.41,422n.43
Heidegger, Martin, 69,397n.87
Hen kaipan, 229-30, 258-59,
400n.l2
Henrich, Dieter, 48, 55,70-71
464 Index
Herder, Johann, 14, 23, 30, 46,
188, 242, 243, 355n.68,
359n.l43, 391n.37,421n.41,
425n.90; and "beautiful sci-
ence," 42, 14142; career of,
3536; disparagement of Kant,
245, 389n. 10, 389n. 11; and
Hamann, 34-36; on history,
180-81, 330, 396n.75; Kant's
rivalry with, 8-10, 39-44,
178-88, 243, 349n.29; and
pantheism, hylozoism, 6, 187
88, 199, 203-6, 211, 230, 245,
40In. 13; and Spinozism, 2 2 9 -
31, 243-47; and Sturm und
Drang, 8-10, 12, 35-37, 137-
42; Works: Alteste Urkunde des
Menschengeschlechts, 36, 37, 39
40; Auch eine Philosophie der
Geschichte, 36; Gott: einige
Gesprche, 10, 12, 186, 188,
208, 230, 243-47, 258; Ideen
zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, 9, 10, 36,138, 179,
180-86, 197, 203-6, 207, 243,
330, 332, 389n.7, 389n.8,
391n.44; "ber den Einflu
der schnen in die hheren
Wissenschaften," 42; ber die
neuere deutsche Literatur: Frag-
mente, 35; Von Erkennen und
Empfinden, 42,389n.l0
Hermeneutic of suspicion,
425n.89
Herz, Marcus, 80, 233,235, 236
Highest good (see also Actualizing
the moral law; Community,
ethical; Mankind), 7, 239, 268,
307,319, 322,323-26, 333,
419n.63,419n.3,421n.25; as
moral ideal, 322,324-25,326
History, 7, 14, 200, 268, 323, 3 2 6 -
34, 340; German idea of, 13,
330; Kant's philosophy of, 10,
186,205,268,328-29, 344,
 423n.57; Kant's rivalry with
Herder over, 10, 178-79, 3 3 0 -
34,396n.75
Hobbes, Thomas, 22,194, 328,
330
Hlderlin, Friedrich, 14, 405n.78
Homer as unschooled genius, 28,
140, 358n.l39
Hope, 337, 338
Human experience, complex, 3,
59,61, 292, 293, 296, 297, 299,
309,319, 323,337
Human nature, animal and ra-
tional (unity of man) (see also
Being-in-the-world), 42,62,93,
268, 293, 302, 306,41 In. 1
Humanity, idea of (see also Man-
kind), 63,280, 285
Humbolt, Wilhelm von, 14
Hume, David, 17,22,23,24, 30,
31,34,35, 52,55,59,178,196,
218, 240,343,356n.77,
356n.98,400n.6,403n.55
Hutcheson, Francis, 29-30, 31
Huygens, Christiaan, 393n.25
Hylozoism (see also Matter vs. life;
Nature: as living whole; Vital-
ism), 6, 186,189,192,202,
205,213,216,218, 222,226,
227, 244, 247,248, 250, 258,
260, 396n.75
Hypotyposis (see also Presentation),
273, 321
Iatromechanical approach to biol-
ogy, 197-98
Idea, aesthetic (see also Symbol),
275, 279, 280,283, 286, 287,
288, 300,404n.62
Idea, aesthetic normal, 12629,
134,285, 288
Idea of reason (rational idea), 79,
126, 164, 172, 176, 240, 339;
vs. ideal, 284-85; and indeter-
minate concept, 270-71, 274;
and symbolism, 281, 286-89,
304,321
"Idea for a Universal History," 10,
13,179, 205, 326,328,329,
395n.54, 396n.75
Ideal: of imagination vs. reason,
127,284-85,319
Idealism, dogmatic, 60, 131; ob-
jective, 302, 345; subjective,
280, 302, 345; transcendental,
53,67, 230,367n.l5; as unre-
ality, 248-49,315
Idealism, German, 1,2, 7, 12-14,
156,174,175,180,185,189,
229-30, 301,305,330, 334,
342, 344-46, 348n.7,350n.45,
350n.48, 392n.6,400n.6,
400n.l2,401n.l3,403n.55,
422n.41, 423n.57, 425n.90,
425n.97; and Spinoza, 14,229,
231, 257-59,407n.41
Imagination (Einbildungskraft), 29,
44, 50, 82-87, 114,185,239,
244, 274, 289, 296,356n.98,
37In. 105, 381n.46; apprehen-
sion vs. comprehension, 281^-
82; danger in, 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 4 ; fac-
ulty of, 33, 211, 284; as faculty
of presentation (Darstellung),
127; following rules without in-
tention, 83-84, 114,117,145;
formative vs. synthetic, 366n.7,
372n. 121; free play of, 28,84,
85,95, 101,113,114-15,116,
118,121,127,128,131,135,
145, 292, 297; harmony with
reason in sublime, 280,281
84; harmony with understand-
ing in beauty, 84-85, 87,95,
117, 157, 280,295; as inter-
pretative, 85; and intuition,
68-69, 76; problem of, 52-53,
61; productive, 114, 284; and
reconfiguration (umbilden), 84,
114-15, 121,127; role in
Index 465
Imagination (continued)
knowledge, 68-69, 76, 83-84,
159, 367n.29; and spontaneity
(act), 83, 85, 114-15, 220; syn-
thesis of, 50,67, 68-69, 73-74,
86,104,362n.43, 367n.29
Imitation (Nachahmung), 129
Immediacy, 5 0 , 6 8 , 8 2 , 8 3 , 79,
310, 367n.26; subjective, 70, 81
Immortality, 61, 176,182, 204,
302,315,339,340
Imperative, categorical, 93, 266,
281,321,325,363n.57
Inclination (Neigung) (see also In-
terest, material), 110, 116, 296,
298, 299,412n.l9,425n.90
Indeterminacy. See Concept, inde-
terminate
Individuality as determinate sin-
gularity (see also Intuition;
Singularity: of an intuition),
19, 20, 21, 52, 84, 126-27, 160,
239, 249,310, 367n.26
Infinity, intrinsic, 229, 243-44,
258, 281-82,400n.l 1, 405n.89
Inner sense, 80, 87, 103, 301,302,
307
Intelligible (noumenal) form, 99,
269, 287, 288,301,311,312,
322,417n.42
Intelligible world (see also King-
dom of ends), 256,319, 321,
417n.42,418n.61
Intention (Absicht), 132-33, 155,
315,317,318,319,327
Interest, ethical, 125, 294
Interest, intellectual, 104, 176,
289; in the beauty of nature, 5,
131, 151,382n.3
Interest, material (see also Inclina-
tion), 92,93,98, 108-11, 116,
134, 281,315,331
Interest of reason, 60,176, 312,
382n.3,416n.29,418n.61
Interest: as practical idea, 312
466 Index
Interior sense, 103, 110
Introduction to Third Critique, fi-
nal version, 6, 8,63,66, 78,96,
175, 226, 264-67, 303, 307,
323, 344,408n.9
Introductions: encyclopedic vs.
propaedeutic, 170,263
Intuition (Anschauung): and atten-
tio, 83; and cognition, 82-83;
as faculty of form-giving in
sensibility, 5052; vs. concept,
4 8 - 4 9 , 5 4 , 5 7 , 79; and imag-
ination, 6 8 - 6 9 ; as immediate
and singular representation,
20,68, 74, 79, 8 2 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 , 286,
343, 367n.26 (see also Individu-
ality; Singularity: of an intui-
tion); pure, 65, 74,76, 79,158,
272, 3 0 9 - 1 0 , 3 1 8 - 1 9 , 3 2 4 ;
as receptive, 68-69; sensible,
65,274, 281, 310; specification
in, 76-77, 83; synthesis of, 67,
83,86,281
Intuition, intellectual (intellectus
archetypus), 43, 184, 225, 251,
253, 255-57,272, 309-10,
318-19,324
Jacob, Margaret, 228, 393n.30,
400n.8
Jacobi, Friedrich, 142,404n.69;
alliance with Kant, 246-47,
260, 405-6n.l00; and belief
(leap of faith), 229, 245,
403n.55,403n.57; influence on
Kant's view of Spinoza, 2 5 1 -
52, 257,402n.34,406n.l5; and
nihilism, 229, 399n.6,403n.55;
and Spinozism, 179, 228-37,
243,402n.27
Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich, 235
Jena: and Kant's disciples, 234,
246; University of, 180
"Judging, other kind of," 82,85,
86-88,94,104,107,109,113,
 114,115,152,154,160,219,
284
Judgment, 74,157; as natural tal-
ent to differentiate (Beur-
teilung: iudkium), 31, 32, 84,99,
167-68,386n.61
Judgment, aesthetic (see also Judg-
ment of taste), 75, 76, 78, 85,
92,107, 1 1 1 - 1 5 , 1 2 6 - 2 7 , 1 4 6 -
47, 151, 154, 169, 272, 278,
289, 293; of sense, 108-10,
111, 122, 134,374n.44
Judgment, determinant (as objec-
tive), 68, 82,87, 104,127,167,
220, 222-24, 274,310,315,
321, 376n.78, 386n.60; and
anomaly, 219, 286, 288; vs. re-
flective, 4,64, 88, 166, 222-24,
263, 372n.l21
Judgment, empirical cognitive,
5 9 , 6 4 - 7 0 , 83, 85,91,92,126,
161, 164, 279, 345; and judg-
ment of taste, 97,99, 109, 111,
113, 292; vs. subjective, 7 1 -
77
Judgment, faculty of (Urteilskraft),
4,63, 80, 85-86, 108, 238, 259,
263, 270, 384n.32; discovery
of, 151-70
Judgment, moral (practical), 99,
109,125-26,272-73,320-21,
385n.32
Judgment of experience, 64,68,
71-73, 8 2 - 8 3 , 8 6 - 8 7 , 9 9 ,
103-4, 110-13, 165, 168,218,
220,222,223
Judgment of perception, 64, 7 2 -
86, 1 0 3 - 4 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 6 5 , 2 2 0 ,
359n.2,366n.4, 368n.35
Judgment of taste (see also Judg-
ment, aesthetic), 2,45,46, 128,
143,152,157,263,278-79;
metaphysical theory of, 270
75; original theory of, 89-95,
10622; pure vs. conditioned,
75-77,91,92,93,124-25,
130-31,290
Judgment, reflective: aesthetic,
96, 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 - 8 , 1 2 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 2 0 -
25,259,263,271; in archaeol-
ogy of text, 4 - 5 , 7,45,64,
275-76; vs. determinant, 45,
45,64, 166-69, 263, 344,
359n.2, 372n.l21; and indeter-
minate concepts, 271-75, 286,
289; logical, 77,96, 104, 263,
271, 327 (see also Judgment,
teleological); and "other kind
ofjudging," 88; and subjective
states, 112, 117, 151-58, 270,
282, 289
Judgment, subjective, 43, 72, 7 4 -
75, 77-88, 106, 107, 366n.7
Judgment, synthetic a priori, 57,
164, 308, 324-25, 363n.59
Judgment, teleological, 104, 151,
155, 169,225,248, 265, 272,
320, 385n.32
Just society, 14, 321, 326, 332,
337-38
Karnes, Lord (Henry Home), 29,
30-31,46
Kennen anderkennen, 8182, 84,
85,86, 87,104,109
Kepler, Johannes, 23, 220
Kiesewetter, Johann Gottfried,
130
Kingdom of ends (mundus intel-
ligibilis), 307, 318-19, 320,321,
417n.42, 419n.63; expanded
sense, 319, 322, 324-26, 333,
336
Kingdom of God on earth, 334,
339, 340
Klopstock, Friedrich, 34,43,
355n.64
Knigsberg, 11, 22, 23, 231, 233,
246,342,355n.77
Index 467
Knigsberg, University of, 11, 19,
35,156, 205, 352n.l3
Korff, Hermann, 182-83
Krner, Gottfried, 246
Kraus, Christian, 231, 246
La Mettrie, Julien, 190, 198
Lambert, Johann, 406n. 15
Lavater, Johann Caspar, 26, 36,
40-41,182
Law, moral, 168, 256, 265-68,
271,279, 283,314,317,
418n.61; compatibility with law
of nature, 320-25, 335-36,
338; and spiritual feeling
(Geistesgefhl), 293-99
Law, natural, 154, 265-66, 268,
320, 321,332,335
Law: empirical vs. transcendental,
160-61,218
Lawfulness: as mark of reason,
128, 135-36, 160, 266, 267,
320,321-22
Lehmann, Gerhard, 1, 4
Leibniz, 17-18, 19,20, 22, 23, 25,
26, 28, 49, 59, 182, 183, 193,
195, 202, 206, 230, 243, 244,
246, 364n.61,387n.85,
393n.25, 406n.l5;and
Nouveaux Essais, 25, 49; and
spontaneity of the subject, 25,
26, 28
Leibniz-Clarke debate, 19, 190,
194
Lenz, Jakob, 23,43
Lessing, Gotthold, 8, 11, 13, 14,
182, 390-91n.37; and Berlin
Aufklrung, 22; and hen kai
pan, 400n.l2; and Lavater-
Mendelssohn controversy, 36,
37; and Pantheism Contro-
versy, 228-31,233, 235, 243,
245,400n.l3,403n.55; as trans-
lator of Burke, 25, 32, 41; and
Wolffenbttel Fragments, 11,40
468 Index
Letter to Reinhold, December
1787,4,46-47, 56, 5 8 , 6 2 - 6 3 ,
89,90, 122,170,175
Life (intelligent will) (see also Mat-
ter vs. life), 249, 255, 259, 296,
298, 302, 304,365n.75
Life, feeling of. See Feeling of life
Limits of reason, 234, 238, 289,
302,315-16,345
Linnaeus, 196, 199-200, 201-2,
210
Locke, John, 22, 55,406n.l5
Logic, formal, 18,92, 162,171,
237, 279, 363n.59; moments of
judgment, 9 0 - 9 2 , 164, 2 2 0 -
21, 279; vs. transcendental, 57,
64,92
Logic, transcendental, 57, 63, 163,
164, 174, 224,227
Logic, 3 0 - 3 1 , 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 7
Longinus, 27,277
Lovejoy, Arthur, 201, 395n.67,
395.70
Lowth, Robert (Bishop), 37,
358n.70
McFarland, John, 3,183, 223
Maimon, Solomon, 413n.60
Makkreel, Rudolf, 366n.7,
367n.29, 372n.l21
Man, distinguished from other
life-forms, 181, 189, 191-92,
199, 202, 203,204, 206
Mankind: historical and religious
destiny of, 3, 7,268,280, 324,
330, 337, 342; unity of, 258,
323, 324, 326, 330,332, 333
(see also Community, ethical)
Manner (Manier): and "free
beauty," 100; vs. method, 137,
178, 183
Mark of rational determination:
feeling as, 9 3 , 2 9 4 - 9 5
Marx, Karl, 330,333
Materialism, 179,183, 187, 191,
 194,216,218,248,257, 258,
260, 335,400n.8; French, 183,
190, 196
Materiality of man, 97, 98, 110,
116, 267-68, 295,302, 309,
328, 331-32, 374n.44
Materiality of object (see also
Usefulness), 79,92, 102, 109,
110, 120
Materialization of spirit (see also
Determinism; Materialism),
192
Matter, aesthetic, 103, 106, 110,
113, 120-21,376n.74
Matter and form, 4951, 54, 56,
57,66
Matter given in a representation
(see also Sensation), 64,65, 77,
79,94, 113,119, 368n.32
Matter, physical, 159, 189, 190,
192, 193-94, 259; fundamen-
tal atoms of, 190, 191,194;
inertness of, 190-91, 192-93,
194, 196, 215; properties in-
herent in, 193, 194-96
Matter vs. life, 186, 189, 192, 198,
203,206,218, 222,226,244,
248
Matter vs. spirit in cosmology,
192, 194,196,198, 203,257
Maupertuis, Pierre, 21-22, 191,
201-2, 352n.l3, 394n.54
Maxim, 96, 215, 219, 222, 224,
237,239, 265,271,302
Mechanism (see also Teleology vs.
mechanism), 18, 25, 27, 196,
2 2 0 - 2 9 , 2 6 7 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 1 ; as only
valid science, 216, 223-24,
392n.l7, 393n.l8
Meier, Georg Friedrich, 19, 20,
21,24
Meiners, Christoff, 242
Meister, Leonhard, 41
Mendelssohn, Moses, 8, 9, 179,
406n. 15; and aesthetic theory,
24-34; and Berlin Academy
Prize, 29-30, 355n.73; and
Berlin Aufklrung, 22-34;
controversy with Lavater, 3 6 -
41; on Kant's destruction of
rational theology, 232, 242;
and Pantheism Controversy,
228, 229, 231-41,245,
399n.6,402n.34,403n.57,
405n.89
Meredith, James, 1, 4, 90,123,
275-76, 349n.22, 380n.36
Metaphor and metaphysics, 280,
287-88,289
Metaphysical commitment of
Kant, 6, 63, 176, 206, 227, 247,
264-65,301,315-16,343,
398n.35
Metaphysical potentiality of Third
Critique, 2, 3, 14, 146, 176, 225,
278,303, 305
Metaphysical turn in Third Cri-
tique, 3,7, 175-76,214, 268,
288, 343-44,409n. 10
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, 159, 186, 191, 192,
206, 370n.88,384n.28
Metaphysics, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 6 , 6 1 , 6 9 ,
153,176, 179,185,215,218,
225, 249-50,426n.2; dogmatic
(traditional), 6,28, 34-35,176,
178,185,217,233,237,239,
248, 250, 340,343; and sci-
ence, 189-90, 192-96;
speculative, 60, 182, 245, 260,
269,343,403n.57
Metaphysics of morals, Kant's,
159,314,316-17
Metaphysics of Morals, 325
Metempsychosis, 182, 245
Methodology of natural science, 3,
61, 178, 185-86, 188, 189-90,
191,207,215
"Methodology of Teleological
Judgment," 7-8, 230, 264,
Index 469
"Methodology" (continued)
268, 323, 326-41,335, 336,
337,408n.9,419n.63
Michaelson, G. E., 334,344
Milton, John, 43
Modality ofjudgment, 57,68, 75,
164
Modality of necessity, 57,68,89,
92, 279, 363n.57
Modernism, aesthetic, 144, 290
Moravia, Sergio, 198
More, Henry, 194
Morris, David, 27,354n.52
Moscati, Peter, 199
Moser, Justus, 42,357n.l 13
Motive, 306, 309,319, 325
Murphy, Jeffrie, 340
"Muthmalicher Anfang der Men-
schengeschichte," 179, 207,
208, 332
Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner
Vorlesungen... 1765-1766, 32
Nahm, Milton, 355n.68
Nationalism, cultural (deutsche Be-
wegung), 13, 22, 350n.48,
357n.ll3
Natural history, 23, 189, 200-201,
209
Nature and freedom, reconcilia-
tion of, 91, 135, 155, 220, 2 6 5 -
66,267, 271,289,327,332,
340,426n.l
Nature, empirical: as artistic, 5,
15255, 183 (see also Technic
of nature); and conformity to
human reason, 161; dynamism
of, 27, 28,97, 135,183,190,
244, 259; as existence of phe-
nomena under laws, 135, 145,
220,223,320,321,370n.88; as
living whole, 182-83, 197, 226,
258, 259, 390n.88; Kant's
metaphysical principles of,
159, 202, 225; shift in 18th-
470 Index
century attitude toward, 27,
192,229; as system of empiri-
cal laws, 91, 135,155, 161,220,
225,248, 267,320, 327
Nature vs. culture, 1 0 , 1 8 1 , 3 3 0 -
34
Naturphilosophie, 10, 12, 180, 182,
185-86,192, 202, 203, 243,
391n.44
Necessity, 18, 53, 54, 5 6 , 6 8 , 9 1 -
92,162, 240,254,267,272,
306, 418n.56; and universality
in a priori, 67,92,94, 110
Neoclassicism (see also Augustan
taste), 26, 27, 136-37
Newton, Isaac: and difference of
science from genius, 140,
358n.l39; Kant and, 206,
384n.28, 387n.85,406n.l5;
and Newtonianism in German
Aufklrung, 18-27; theory of
physical matter, 157-58, 189-
97
Nicolai, Friedrich, 22,25,233
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 400n.6
Nominal vs. real classes (Schulgat-
tungen vs. Naturgattungen), 200,
212-13,216, 223,271,328,
397n.87
Noncognitive experience, tran-
scendental grounding for, 45,
4 7 , 6 0 , 6 3 , 9 4 , 267
Noumena, 99, 176, 224, 226, 259,
269,272,281,301,315,316,
321,327, 329,398n.35; vs.
phenomena, 156, 226, 26465,
266, 267, 306, 307, 315,
398n.23
Novalis, 14
Object-in-general (Objekt), 67, 68,
72; vs. actual object (Gegen-
stand), 54,72,158,362n.41
Objectivity (see also Actuality; Re-
ality, objective; Validity,
 objective), 60,63, 70, 74, 82;
ambiguity of validity vs. actu-
ality, 64,68,83,163,166, 289
Observations on the Feelings of the
Beautiful and the Sublime, 31,
276
Odebrecht, Rudolf, 114-15,284
Ontological argument for God,
18-19, 239,245,364n.61
Ontology: dialectical sense of,
163, 176; and existence claims,
49, 57, 172,212, 239, 308,310,
3 1 3 - 1 4 , 3 4 5 - 4 6 ; Kant's rivalry
with other, 6,18,21,212,230,
248-51,260, 302,342,
390n.26
Openness of Kandan system (see
also System [systematicity]: in
Kant's philosophy as a whole),
14,175, 351n.50
Opus postumum, 413 n. 60
Organic form (organism): analogy
to reason (purpose), 173-74,
222, 249, 256; analogy to work
of art, 221; definition of, 2 0 9 -
10, 212-19; as empirical fact,
189,219-20, 221,224, 342,
398n.22; and entelechy, 171,
344; ineptness of mechanical
account of, 202, 215-16,218,
220-21, 225; vs. life, 198,222,
226; and metaphysical implica-
tions, 225-27; as natural
purpose, 98,215, 221,222,
224, 263, 327; variation and in-
herited characteristics, 2 0 0 -
201,209,215-17,218,
395n.67
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 290
Ossian, 27, 36
Panentheism, 229-30, 244,258,
413n.60
Pantheism (see also Panentheism):
and Herder's Naturphilosophie,
180,103, 187,205,208, 230,
243-46; Kant's opposition to,
6 - 7 , 1 8 6 , 191,208,218,246,
259, 260, 264-65, 302, 335;
and materialism (Radical En-
lightenment), 196,257-58,
400n.8; and Spinozism, 14,
187,218,227,229,243,250,
257-58,264-65,405n.89
Pantheism Controversy, 6, 1012,
179, 228-48,274,340,
349n.40, 352n.l3, 400n.6,
401n.l3,401n.21,403n.55
Paradox of art, grounding, 131
36,145,146, 154, 275
Partiality (see also Inclination), 110
Passivity vs. acdvism in conscious-
ness (see also Spontaneity;
Synthesis), 4 8 - 5 0 , 5 2 , 6 8 - 6 9 ,
1 1 3 - 1 5 , 2 8 7 , 3 0 7 - 8 , 309,311,
314
Perception (Wahrnehmung), 66,68,
72,75, 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 1 6 5 , 2 1 9 ,
221,308
Perfection (Vollkommenheit), 20
21,99-102,125-27,146-47,
221, 252, 2 7 2 - 7 3 , 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 -
91; qualitative, 99, 249; quan-
titative, 99,249; subjecdve, 101
Person (personality), 298, 300,
302, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 - 8 , 3 1 7 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6
Phenomenology of subjective con-
sciousness, 45, 51, 5 2 , 6 1 - 8 8 ,
238, 344, 365n.3,368n.35
Philosophy, cognitive (theoreti-
cal), 47,60,265,339
Philosophy, critical (transcenden-
tal), 4,6, 7,45,46, 48,53, 54,
55,57, 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 2 , 78,89,
93,113, 157,158,167,175,
176,211,233,234,241,272,
277, 306, 307, 315, 337,339,
341, 344,351n.37,363n.60,
364n. 71,419n.61,424n.89
Philosophy, political, 3, 328, 334
Index 471
Philosophy, practical (moral; ethi-
cal), 3, 9, 3 2 , 4 7 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 5 7 ,
242, 265, 276, 2 9 0 , 2 9 2 , 3 2 3 -
26, 341
Physico-theology, 27, 176-77,
215, 227, 239, 336, 399n.43,
399n.49
Physics: mathematical, 159-60,
181, 192, 197, 207; Newtonian,
189-97,219
Pietism, 11, 17-19, 22, 182,
352n.l3,404n.69
Plato, 44,406n.l5
P l a y ( S ^ ) . 84, 101, 121, 134,144,
183,282,290,291,293, 297,
381n.48
Pleasant (agreeable; Angenehme),
9 2 - 9 3 , 96, 100, 105-11, 120,
134, 279, 376n.74
Pleasure and pain, feeling of, 63,
89-95,100,102-16,128,294-
99, 308, 365n.75
Pleasure, intellectual (moral satis-
faction), 293, 296-97, 298,
299
Plotinus and intelligible beauty,
184
Pope, Alexander, 26, 28,35
"Popular essays," 10, 178-79,
186, 191,233
Popular philosophers (see also
Berlin Aufklrung), 22,23
Popularization of Kantian phi-
losophy, 8-9, 56, 156, 179-80,
208,234,241,349n.40,
383n.l8, 391n.39
Possible vs. actual (see also Discur-
siveness), 68, 251, 256, 310,
316, 322, 335-36, 362n.42,
370n.88
Prauss, Gerold, 7 0 - 7 3 , 74, 77, 78,
86,359n.2, 365n.3, 365n.4,
368n.35
Preference. See Inclination
Presence-to-consciousness (see also
472 Index
Subjective objects), 51, 79, 108,
310; without conscious atten-
tion, 5 1 , 6 5 , 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 2 - 7 4 , 7 7 ,
79-80
Presentation (Darstellung), 83,
127, 147,273,274,285, 300,
321
Priestley, Joseph, 182, 188,
393n.30
Primary vs. secondary qualities,
66-67, 119
Principle: metaphysical, 61, 155,
159, 168, 206, 307,312,
384n.27, 415n.l4; subjective,
78,92, 122,263,266, 271;
transcendental, 59, 61, 89, 124,
157, 159, 163, 164-65, 202,
270,294,415n.l4
Private, 52, 67, 78, 106, 108-11,
112,116, 122
Prolegomena, 8-10, 53, 66, 68, 73,
74, 75,81,86, 176, 383n.l8;
and judgment of perception,
64, 73, 78, 82,359n.2,365n.3,
365n.4
Providence, 227, 245, 329-30,
336, 340, 396n.75
Prussia, 17,21,22,23,42
Psychologism, 60,62, 364n.67
Psychology: empirical, 55,62, 75,
92, 207, 284, 296, 308,
410n.44,415n.l2; rational, 60,
3 0 1 - 2 , 308, 387n.85; transcen-
dental, 61,62,69, 72,
128
Purity, 62, 89, 92, 93, 293
Purpose, 87, 8 9 , 9 0 - 9 1 , 9 5 - 1 0 5 ,
221,249,267,272,294,298,
315, 317, 344; as causality of a
concept, 9 0 - 9 1 , 9 5 , 110,132-
33, 221, 253; final (Endzweck),
268,287,323,326, 329,332,
335, 338, 375n.53; immanent
in nature, 6,396n.75 (see also
Hylozoism); intrinsic (imma-
 nent), 98,128, 316,317, 327,
329, 335, 344,41 ln.60; natu-
ral, 98,100,127,215,221,222,
224,225,249,263,265,315,
320, 328 (see also Organic
form); ultimate, (letzte Zweck) of
nature as a whole, 263, 264,
268, 327-29,331,333, 335-36
Purposiveness, 87, 88, 90, 91,95,
157, 158,219, 266-67,314,
317; as discursive approxima-
tion, 88, 96,97, 154, 158,219,
256-57,315, 376n.78; human
technical, 96, 132-33, 155,
332-33, 385n.32,416n.30; in-
trinsic, 98-99, 125, 132,147,
174,218,221,226,263,278,
273, 279,314,315,327, 343,
375n.53, 382n.5; language of,
88,95-97, 105,249,253,255,
256, 267, 314, 376n.78; of na-
ture as a whole, 151, 15355,
158,214,219, 225,226, 239,
249, 271,315-16, 323, 327,
335, 382.3, 382n.5; objective,
97,98,125-26,155,221,225,
248, 249,314,315,316,
375n.52,375n.53, 375n.54 (see
also End-in-itself); objective
formal, 96-97; practical, 97,
253,293,295, 333,416n.30 (see
also Will); relative, 98, 263,
278, 279, 327,335, 336 (see also
Usefulness); subjective formal,
8 7 , 9 1 , 9 4 - 9 6 , 9 7 , 102-5,108,
118, 122, 143,152, 158, 168,
259, 278 (see also Beauty); sub-
jective material, 96, 108-10,
134, 374n.44 (see also Charm);
of variation in organisms, 201,
208; without purpose, 95, 126,
135, 141, 143,157,315, 342
Quantum discretum vs. continuity,
202, 204,210-11,216
Race, anthropology of, 192, 199,
200, 2 0 5 - 7 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 8 ,
391n.444
Reality, objective (see also Ontol-
ogy), 266, 272,285,307, 308,
309-14, 316, 317, 339, 340,
345-46, 363n.60, 387n.85,
417n.42
Realm vs. territory, 26465, 313
Reason, 50, 381n.46; dynamism
of, 92,164, 171,172, 238, 287,
306,311,384n.32,409n.l6,
416n.29; faculty of, 99, 270,
281,286, 287,311; immanent
principles of, 50,93, 108, 124,
157,162-64,168,238-39,
293,296, 299,311,315,
364n.67, 418n.56; meth-
odological vs. ontological view
of, 163; practical, 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 7 4 -
75,266, 281,294-95,299,
302-3, 306, 309, 311, 320-21,
337-40, 344, 399n.49; primacy
of practical, 277, 278, 291, 292,
307, 312-16, 343; reality of,
163, 166, 172,311-13,317,
345-46,419n.61; requirement
of (Bedrfnis der Vernunft), 175
76, 238, 272, 274, 283, 2 8 7 -
88,312,315,318,340,
409n.l6; systematicity of, 157,
170-71, 173, 174, 238; the-
oretical, 138, 154, 157, 174,
265,266, 281, 282, 290,306,
312,337
Receptivity. See Passivity
Reciprocal determination and
organic form, 209-10, 212,
218-19
Reconfiguration (umbilden), 84
85, 114-15, 121,284
Reference (beziehen), 60, 66, 78,
107, 119; intuitive external, 83,
86, 168; objective (outer sense;
Sinn), 49, 51,66,67, 74, 77,
Index 473
Reference (continued)
78-79, 8 2 , 8 6 , 9 1 , 1 0 3 - 4 , 1 1 9 ,
126,165,168,239,309; subjec-
tive (Gefhl), 49,61,64, 77, 7 8 -
7 9 , 8 2 , 9 1 , 102, 107,114-15,
119,125-26,294
Reflection, 31, 74, 87-88, 104,
107-8, 151, 152, 154,157,158,
168,219,271,274; aesthetic,
271, 272, 274, 278, 288, 2 9 3 -
94, 296; subjective, 58,103,
279-80, 293, 295, 299, 329,
333, 342 (see also State of mind,
subjective); transcendental, 54,
58, 296
Reflections, 9, 31, 33, 3 7 - 4 0 , 4 2 -
44, 50, 9 9 - 1 0 1 , 187, 276, 303,
304
Regulative vs. constitutive, 155,
161-62,164-66,215,222,
223,224,237,239,272,284,
326, 333,383n.7
Reimarus, Hermann, 11,40
Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, 46,
169,207,208,246,403n.55;
and Briefe ber die Kantische Phi-
losophie, 56,208,241,350n.40,
391n.39,403n.55
Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, 241, 323-24, 334,
340
Representatio singularis (see also In-
tuition), 73
Representation (Vorstellung), 50,
51, 67; hierarchy (Stufenleiter)
of, 79; of an object (Vorstellung
eines Objekts), 5 0 - 5 1 , 7 8 - 7 9 ,
91, 102; of an object and aes-
thetic reference, 91, 102,106,
112,118, 119,126; process of,
49, 5 0 - 5 1 , 6 6 , 7 1 , 9 4
Resewitz, Friedrich, 26, 355n.64
Respect (see also Feeling, moral),
93, 279, 282, 293,294-95,
298-99
474 Index
Reward linked to virtue, 337-38,
420n.3
Rigor vs. speculation, 178,186
88,210-11
Rigorism, ethical, 297-98, 339,
424n.89
Riley, Patrick, 344
Romanticism, 1, 14,131,136,138,
144,203, 342,280n.35,
280n.40, 390n.28
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 23, 35,
44, 328, 330-31,332,422n.49
Rule (see also Categories; Lawful-
ness), 28; subsumption under,
52, 54, 55, 59, 68,83, 84-85,
86, 87, 166, 167 (see also Con-
stitutive determination)
Schaper, Eva, 69, 85
Sendling, Friedrich, 14,400n.6,
403n.55, 405n.78, 408n.43,
413n.60
Schema, 127-28, 165,215, 285
Schematism, 65,68, 69, 75, 76,
164, 165, 1 6 8 , 2 6 4 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 3 -
74, 288,320, 321,324,325
Schiller, Friedrich, 10, 13-14,
243, 246, 328, 381n.48,421-
22n.41,425n.90
Schofield, Robert, 195-96
School philosophy, German (see
also Wolffianism, orthodox),
19-21, 22, 24-25, 3 1 , 4 8 - 4 9 ,
95,101,107,178,187,249,
302, 343
Schrder, George, 3
Schtz, Christian Gottfried, 179-
8 0 , 1 8 4 - 8 5 , 232-33,234,235,
246, 391n.39
Science, natural empirical, 61,
157,158, 159, 181,208,216,
224,260, 267; aestheticism in,
178-79, 180, 188, 208, 260; vs.
art, 136-42; vs. criticism, 3 0 -
 31,46, 137,168, 178; vs. ge-
nius, 4 1 - 4 2 ; Kant's philosophy
of, 19, 23, 185,194,415n.l2;
mathematical essence of, 190,
207; metaphysical concomi-
tants of, 191-92, 193-94, 244;
new ideas in 18th century, 12,
27, 189-90,192-99, 229, 243;
and philosophy, 19
Sciences, beautiful (humanities:
schne Wissenschaften), 21, 42,
137-38,141-42
Secularism, 11, 17,329
Seigfried, Hans, 360n.8
Self-consciousness, 70, 103, 116,
278, 2 9 4 - 9 5 , 3 0 8 - 1 0 , 3 1 4 ,
343, 345,412n.I9,414n.3,
415n. 14; rational (see also Ap-
perception), 294, 296, 344,
414n.5, 414n.6; reflective,
294-95,344
Self-determination (self-
constitution) (see also End-in-
itself; Purposiveness: objec-
tive), 218, 219, 221,224, 226,
249,254,297,306,313,327,
375n.64,419n.61
Sensation (Empfindung), 4950,
64,65,66,67,76,79,81,106,
107, 311; as matter for objec-
tive reference, 66,103; as
subjective state, 49, 106
Sensationalism, 19, 22, 24, 284
Sense (Sinn) (see also Reference:
objective), 49, 50,91, 119,294
Sensibility, faculty of, 19, 50,51,
274,281,381n.46;in knowl-
edge, 19, 20, 21, 29,48-49, 52,
54,59,311
Sensibility (emotive attunement to
world), 183; British school of,
2 6 , 2 8 - 3 2 ; shift in, towards Ro-
manticism, 27,143
Sensus communis (common sense),
2 , 3 1 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 116,272-73
Shaftesbury, Earl of (Anthony
Ashley Cooper), 28, 29,33,
183-84, 230, 243,354n.60,
355n.64, 390n.26, 390n.27,
390n.37
Shakespeare, 27, 28, 36, 124-25
Silber, John, 323
Silent decade, 3 7 , 4 2 , 4 4 , 5 2
Singularity: of an event or experi-
ence, 106, 108,109, 112, 118,
127-29, 279; of an intuition,
52,68, 7 6 - 7 7 , 7 9 , 8 2 , 8 4 , 8 6 ,
367n.26
Skepticism, 52,53,60, 240,270
Skill (Geschicklichkeit), 129, 133,
141,328, 339
Soul, 2 5 , 4 9 , 6 1 , 79,176,182,204,
222,297,301,302,304,315,
387n.85
Souriau, Michel, 1,4, 275-76
Space and time as form of sensible
intuition, 49, 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 4 , 6 5 - 6 7 ,
77,80, 103,158, 281,309,
361n.32,387n.85
Species, fixity vs. mutation of,
200-201, 202,204,205,210,
214,215,216-17, 395n.67
Specification vs. abstraction, 76,
162
Spinoza, Benedict, 6,12,14,194,
228,229-32,236,243,245-
59, 260,400n.ll,405n.89,
406n.l7; Kant's interpretation
of, 230,231,233,237,246,
248-59, 338,402n.34,
403n.55,406n.l3,406n.l5;
and Pantheism Controversy, 6,
11, 12, 179,183,191,401n.l3
Spinozism, 6,12, 187-88, 218,
227,228,229,234,243,244,
246, 247, 248, 250-51,258,
260, 264, 265, 335, 399n.6,
400n.8,406n.l5
Spirit (Geist), 38, 112, 137,144-
45, 182, 187,192, 204,259,
Index 475
Spirit (continued)
283, 284,297, 3 0 1 - 3 , 304, 344,
346, 381n.53,412n.l9
Spiritual feeling (Geistesgefhl),
275, 278, 281,292,297, 298,
299, 304, 344,412n.l9
Spirituality, 28,32, 182, 198, 298,
302, 355n.64
Spontaneity (innate activism of
subject), 25,28,49, 5 1 - 5 4 , 8 3 ,
113-15, 154, 172, 284, 304,
311,313,318, 346,366n.7,
408n.l6, 417n.30; involuntary,
53, 55, 307, 309, 310,314, 315,
346, 361n.37, 361n.38
Stahl, Georg Ernst, 198
State of mind, subjective (Zustand
des Gemtes): as awareness, 58,
64, 75, 87, 107, 125,157,282,
294-304, 344, 371n.98; as con-
tent, 49, 72,96, 100, 104, 118,
128, 291; pleasure in maintain-
ing, 90, 105,106,109,110,
112, 114-15,116
Stoicism, 324-25
Stolnitz, Jerome, 184, 354n.60
Strawson, Peter, 69
Sturm und Drang: and genius, 5,
34, 136-42, 144, 357n.l07;
and irrationalism, 26, 29, 34,
35,178 (see also Enthusiasm;
Fanaticism, religious): Kant's
hostility to, 5, 8-14, 3 5 - 4 4 , 4 6 ,
136-44, 349n.22; as move-
ment, 1, 8-14, 3 4 , 3 5 - 4 4 , 1 3 6 ,
277, 359n.l43; and vitalism,
182-84, 196, 203, 243
Subject: empirical (sensible), 55,
172, 299, 301, 3 0 7 - 8 , 3 1 2 - 1 3 ,
314, 317, 339; noumenal (tran-
scendental), 172, 267,301,
307, 308, 309,311,327, 335,
346,414n.3,414n.5,414n.6,
415n.l4
Subjective (noncognitive) re-
476 Index
sponse, 78, 80, 105, 106, 110,
113, 118, 128,151,294
Subjective conditions (subjektive
Bedingungen) of knowledge, 58,
87,117,381n.46
Subjective objects (subjektive
Gegenstnde), 71-72, 77-78,
369n.54
Subjectivity, problem of (see also
Apperception; Self-
consciousness), 5 2 - 5 3 , 6 1 ,
359n.2
Sublime: as aesthetic confronta-
tion with infinity, 27, 277, 2 8 1 -
82; in archaeology of text, 7-8,
263-64,275-77,403-4n.62;
vs. the beautiful, 2, 27, 32, 263,
277-80, 282,292-94, 328,
409n.26; dynamical, 280, 283;
18th-century views of, 2425,
27-28, 277, 354n.52; as mark
of harmony of imagination
and reason, 280,294, 295;
mathematical, 280-82; and
metaphysics, 280, 301; and
moral worth, 32,130, 276, 277,
279, 280, 283, 293-94,342;
as movement of emotion
(Rhrung), 187, 277, 282-83;
natural, 27-28,413n.40; re-
lated to respect, 299-301
Subordination (see also Constitu-
tive determination; Rule:
subsumption under), 48-49,
50-51
Subreption, objective, 121, 132,
146,151, 154,167,169,172,
270,271,280,300,301,309,
409n.26
Substance, 18, 75, 117, 172, 212,
232, 245, 249,254, 279,302
Sulzer, Johann, 26,42,353n.44
Supersensible: in archaeology of
text, 7, 267-68,408n.9,
410n.27; artistic (symbolic) ac-
 cess to, 287-90; as necessary
metaphysical thought, 176,
225,267, 269,271,274,289,
343,406n.l3; unity of, 271,
288-89,303, 340, 344,
423n.57
Supersensible destination, 269,
275, 278, 280, 283, 298,
412n.l9
Supersensible faculty, 281, 291,
293, 335,381n.46
Supersensible ground of empiri-
cal nature, 268, 270, 283,
398n.35
Supersensible ground of subjec-
tivity (freedom), 271, 275, 278,
287, 289, 292, 300-302
Supersensible realm as undeter-
minable, 238-39, 251, 258,
265-66,271,272, 275,280,
288,316
Swedenborg, Emanuel, 34, 38
Syllogism, 162,164,167
Symbol, 273, 275, 277, 279,286,
290; vs. schema, 274,316
Symbolism, 274, 275, 280, 2 8 4 -
90, 293; as sensible illustration
of moral ideas, 288, 300, 321;
and sublime, 3,268,269,280;
theory of, 129, 130, 269-75,
284-86, 300, 321,381n.46,
382n.60
Symmetry (regularity) and beauty,
120-21
Syncretism, 187-88,208,246,247
Synthesis (act of form-giving), 6,
14,49, 5 0 - 5 2 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 58, 59,
66, 67,69, 157, 163,169, 309,
310,311, 366n.7; empirical
(of recognition), 65,69, 70,
368n.32; of imagination, 50,
6 7 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 73-74,104,
362n.43; transcendental (origi-
nal), 54-55, 59,65,362n.43,
362n.44
System (systematicity), 107,157,
169-75,238,304,344, :
375n.64; in empirical laws,
161,219,224 {seealso Nature:
as system of empirical laws); in
Kant's philosophy as whole, 3,
6, 1 4 , 4 6 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 3 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 9 ,
186,219, 265,277,316,333,
403n.55
Talent, natural, 33, 84, 139, 167,
328, 331
Taste, 38, 42, 118, 122, 126, 272,
288, 290, 294, 328, 331,
382n.5; and academic correct-
ness, 141, 144-45; vs. appetite,
31; and Aufklrung cosmo-
politanism, 2 2 - 2 3 ; as free
choice, 93; and judgment, 31,
106, 129; as providing form for
art, 141-45; and rule, 26, 28;
only in society, 31
Technic of nature, 127, 132-33,
152-55,219, 259,271
Teleology, 2, 3, 7,47, 104, 176-
7 7 , 2 0 8 - 9 , 223,224,249,250,
264, 266-67, 320, 329, 382n.5,
426n. 1; as cognitive judgment,
5, 157; and "Critique of Taste,"
89,90,94; vs. mechanism, 98,
173,201,209-10,215,217,
220-29, 390n.28; moral, 323,
336-37, 341,348n.5
Tetens, Johann, 9, 50, 55
Teutsche Merkur, 42,185,207,
208
Theism (seealso Being, original: as
intelligent creator): Kant's
metaphysical commitment to,
6-7, 176, 191, 197,243, 249,
253, 256, 257,260, 335, 336,
339,341, 388n.l00, 399n.49,
404n.69; orthodox Christian,
253, 257, 258,260,264, 335,
339-40,404n.69
Index 477
Theological rationalism, 11, 17,
19, 329
Theology (religious philosophy),
3,157,177,196,225,226,237,
246,335-41,342
Thinking vs. knowing, 153, 176,
224,226,265,269,271,272,
274,290,327,343
Thomasius, Christian, 17
Tonelli, Giorgio, 1,4-7, 19, 90,
123, 169,275-76, 352n.I3,
380n.36
Totality (systematic whole) (see also
Whole vs. parts), 52, 170-74,
229, 232, 238,255,256, 258,
281,285, 300, 301,304,312,
325
Transcendental, 52; argument,
45,46,48, 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 9 , 6 0 ,
61,71, 122,260, 362n.46,
363n.52; deduction, 5 2 - 5 3 ,
59,61,68, 89, 114, 160, 163,
168, 238; deduction of practi-
cal reason, 168,174-75, 320;
deduction of taste, 2 - 3 , 5, 7,
46,90-95, 105-6,111-19,
124,168, 260,270-72,279,
280, 316; object (thing-in-
itself),27l,301
Trume eines Geistersehers, 8, 34
Tbingen, 242,404n.76,404n.78
Tuveson, Ernest, 183-84,
355n.64
"ber den Gebrauch teleolo-
gischer Principien in der
Philosophie," 188, 207-13,
214,218
Understanding, faculty of, 31,40,
4 8 - 4 9 , 5 4 , 57,59, 74, 81-82,
85, 111, 114, 117, 152,159,
162, 163, 167,263,311,
367n.29,384n.32
Unity: analytic vs. synthetic, 158
59, 308, 309; of an intuitive
478 Index
manifold, 48, 50, 51, 86,120,
232,281,310
Unity of apperception, transcen-
dental, 54, 70, 76,80,158, 161,
232,309,310, 345
Unity of reason, 6,60, 157, 170-
75,259, 260, 269, 280, 2 8 7 -
88, 289, 291,300-316, 340,
343-46, 397n.87, 426n.8,
426n.9
Universality: and communi-
cability,95,115,284; of
concepts, 76, 7 9 , 8 2 - 8 4 , 86,
117, 166; of consent, 91-92,
112, 11617; and intersubjec-
tive validity, 92, 112-13, 117,
418n.56; and necessity in a pri-
ori, 54, 5 6 , 9 2 - 9 4 , 117,273,
309,418n.56; vs. particularity,
48,50, 52, 108; subjective, and
necessity, 168
Use of reason: empirical, 163,
271; hypothetical, 161, 163,
166; logical, 57, 162, 172; real,
52,58, 76, 163,172, 311; real
vs. logical, 5 7 - 5 8 , 1 0 4 , 162,
167, 362n.43, 363n.60; regula-
tive, 162-66,171,238,339
Usefulness (see also Purposiveness:
material), 96,98,108,110
Validity vs. actuality, 64,97, 163,
172, 289
Validity, cognitive (objective
knowledge), 58, 59, 61,65, 74,
85, 154,216, 223,240,269,
292, 302,313
Validity, intersubjective, 2,94, 111
Validity, objective, 64,138,145,
255, 260; as logical-universal,
4 8 - 4 9 , 52, 54,59, 70, 74, 82,
86, 117, 120,164-66,418n.56;
and objective reference, 51,54,
59,72,82,86,165,237,238,
289
Validity, private, 106,112
Validity, subjective, 72, 78, 82, 96,
176,224,291,316,339
Validity, transcendental, 56, 59,
111, 168, 270,310,404n.64
"Vienna Logic" of Kant, 73
Virgil as learned genius, 28
Vitalism (see also Hylozoism; Mat-
ter vs. life; Nature: as living
whole), 135,198, 230
Voltaire, 17, 22, 196, 240, 393n.25
Von deutscher Art und Kunst, 36
Walzel, Oskar, 183-84,390n.26
Warton, Joseph, 26, 28
"Was heit: sich im Denken orien-
tieren?" 12,167,176, 230,235,
237-41,247,274,403n.57,
404n.72
Weldon, Thomas, 173
Well-being, feeling of (see also
Health), 295-96,297
"What is Enlightenment?" 13
Whole vs. parts (see also Totality),
51,218, 220-21,244, 256-57
Wieland, Christoph, 42, 184, 207
Will: actual (Willkr), 98,133,
265-66, 295, 296, 299, 307 (see
also Desire, faculty of); deter-
minations, objective vs. sub-
jective, 297,299,317,321;
free, 260, 264, 295, 299-300,
306,318,329,331 (seealso
Freedom, practical); holy, 3 1 8 -
19, 324, 419n.61; rational (in-
telligent) (Wille), 133,221,226,
295, 319, 325,327; transcen-
dental explanation of, 90-91
Will, Frederic, 24
Windelband, Wilhelm, 4
Wit (Ingenium) as natural talent for
similarities, 84
Wizenmann, Thomas, 235,
404n.72
Wolff, Christian, 11, 17-19, 23,
25,59, 187,212,397n.87,
402n.34,406n.l5
Wolffianism, orthodox (see also
School philosophy, German),
18-21,42, 352n.l3, 388n.2,
400n.ll
Wllner, Johann V., and Edict of
1788, 11-12, 247,417n.ll
Wood, Allen, 325, 334, 340
World-soul (Weltseele), 183-84,
230,304,413n.60
World-whole, idea of nature as a,
79, 176,184, 226, 271,281
Worth, moral, 277, 283, 294, 297,
298,316,317,325,337
Worthiness commensurate with
happiness, 338,339,424n.89
Young, Edward, 26, 2 8 - 2 9 , 3 4 ,
355n.64, 380n.36
Young, J. Michael, 75, 76, 84-86
Yovel, Yimiahu, 333, 344,416n.29
Zeldin, Mary, 325
Index 479