JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

It is the competence or power of a court to render a judgment that will bind the
parties to a case. A State has the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual on one or more of the following bases:
Presence
Domicile
Residence
Nationality or citizenship
Consent
Appearance in an action
Doing business in the State
An act done in the State
Causing an effect in the State by an act done elsewhere
Ownership, use or possession of a thing in the State
Other relationships to the State which make the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction reasonable

How acquired:
Person of the PLAINTIFF the moment he invokes the aid or power of the
court by institution of action through proper pleading

Person of the DEFENDANT

1. Voluntary appearance
2. Summons
a. Personal service
b. Substituted
c. Constructive service by publication

Pantaleon v. Asuncion 105 Phil 761 (1959)

Facts:
Pantaleon instituted an action against Asuncion for recovery of a
sum of money. Summons was issued but was returned since according to
reliable information, Asuncion is residing in a different address. Hence,
alias summons was issued. However, such summons was returned
unserved since the Sheriff found out that Asuncion was no longer residing
in that address and diligent effort served no purpose so he was
summoned by publication. Having failed to appear, the court declared
him in default and rendered a decision against him. It was only 46 days
after rendition of the decision that Asuncion learned of the complaint as
well as of the adverse decision. Aggrieved, Asuncion filed a petition for
relief alleging that he had not been summoned or notified of the hearing;
no copy of the summons and publication were sent since he had not
received any even thru mail; and his nonappearance is excusable it being
due to the mistake of the authorities. Pantaleon urged that the
requirement of an affidavit showing that copy of the summons and of the
 order for its publication had been sent by mail to defendant's last known
address, refers to the extraterritorial service of summons

Issue: WON the summons was served and thus conferred jurisdiction
upon the lower court.

Held:
No. In an action strictly in personam, like the case at bar,
personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. Summons by publication cannot confer upon the court jurisdiction
over said defendant. It prescribes the proof of service by publication,
regardless of whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not.
Section 16 must be read in relation to section 21, which complements it.
Then, too, there is no reason why copy of the summons and of the order
for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to
resident defendants. Considering that strict compliance with the terms of
the statute is necessary to confer jurisdiction through service by
publication the conclusion is inescapable that the lower court had no
authority whatsoever to issue the order declaring Asuncion in default and
to render decision against Asuncion, and that both are null and void ad
initio.

Note: The ruling in Pantaleon vs Asuncion has been superseded by Santos PNOC.

Santos v. PNOC GR No. 170943 September 23, 2008

Facts:
PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money
against Santos in the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint, sought to collect
Santos unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by PNOC when he
was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons
to Santos failed because he could not be located in his last known
address. Subsequently, on PNOCs motion, the trial court allowed service
of summons by publication. Santos moved for a reconsideration assailing
the validity of the service of summons and claiming that service by
publication may be availed of only in an action in rem.

Issue: WON the service of summons was proper

Held:
Yes. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the
old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule
was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application
of the old rule to in rem actions only. However, the present rule
expressly states that service by publication applies "IN ANY
ACTION where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner,
or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to
any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own
voluntary appearance in the action against him when he filed the
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer."

d. Service upon foreign private juridical entities

d.i. Transacted business in the Philippines through its resident
agent
d.ii. Not registered to do business in the Philippines

e. Extraterritorial service

PHILSEC Investment vs CA GR No. 103493 June 19, 1997

Facts:
Ducat obtained a loan from PHILSEC in US dollars secured by his
shares of stocks. To facilitate payment of the loans, 1488, Inc, through its
president assumed Ducats obligation under an agreement whereby 1488,
Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to a
Certain Athona Holdings a parcel of land in Texas, USA. Philsec extended a
loan to Athona as initial payment of the purchase price. Ducats obligation
was then subsequently released. Athona failed to pay the loan. 1488, Inc
sued Philsec and Athona in the US for breach of contract and fraud.
Philsec and Athona likewise instituted a case for sum of money agaist
1488, Inc. (The case mainly involves the issue on res judicata but we will
tackle on the jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of 1488, Inc and its
president who are both non-resident aliens)

Issue: WON the RTC was correct in ruling that it is without jurisdiction
over 1488 and Daic, its president because they were non-residents and
the action was not an action in rem or quasi in rem rendering
extraterritorial service ineffective

Held:
No. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to
hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because
this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial
service. Rule 14, Section 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of
summons on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines
by leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines." It is not disputed that the properties,
real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to
service of summons under the Order of the trial court dated.
U.S. DECISIONS

Minimum contacts with the state is sufficient for the courts of that state to
acquire jursdiction over the person of the defendant

International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 US 310 (1945)

Facts:
International Shoe Co. is a Delaware corporation with its principle
place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It has no offices in the state of
Washington and made no contracts for sale there nor does it keep
merchandise in Washington and make deliveries of goods in intrastate
commerce originating from the state. International Shoe employed 11-13
salesmen for three years who resided in Washington. Their commissions
each year totaled more than $31,000 and International Shoe reimbursed
them for expenses. Prices, terms, and acceptance or rejection of footwear
orders were established through Missouri.
The State of Washington passed a law mandating all employers
doing business to contribute to the Unemployment Compensation Fund.
The State brought suit against International Shoe in Washington State
Court to recover its unpaid contribution. Notice was served personally on
an agent of the defendant within the state and by registered mail to
corporate headquarters. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the
state had jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issue: Did International Shoes activities in Washington make it subject to

personal jurisdiction in Washington courts?

Held:
Yes. Minimum contacts with the forum state can enable a court in
that state to exert personal jurisdiction over a party consistent with the
Due Process clause. A casual presence of a corporation or its agent
in a state in single or isolated incidents is not enough to
establish jurisdiction. Acts of agents of the corporation, because
of the nature, quality, and circumstances of their commission,
may be deemed sufficient. Consent may be implied from the
corporations presence and activities in the state through the
acts of authorized agents. The activities carried on by the
corporation in Washington were systematic and continuous
rather than irregular or casual. The defendant received the benefits
and protection of the laws of the state and is subject to jurisdiction there.
International Shoe had conducted systematic and continuous business
operations in Washington.

Note: A large volume of interstate business for the defendant was created
through its agents within the state and the corporation received the benefits
and protection of Washingtons laws. International Shoe had established
 agents in the state permanently.

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 342 US 437 (1952)

Facts:
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. was a Philippine mining
corporation that temporarily stopped its mining operations and relocated
its president to Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
Perkins, a stockholder of Benguet, sued the latter in the state of Ohio,
alleging that it failed to issue stock certificates and dividends to her. The
trial court had sustained a motion to quash the summons in each case
because the defendant was a foreign corporation and, as such, the Court
did not have personal jurisdiction over it. Neither its corporate
headquarters nor its principal place of business were in Ohio, and it had
not applied for the required license to transact business in Ohio nor
appointed an agent for service of process in state.

Issue: WON the Ohio courts can assume jurisdiction over the Philippine
corporation

Held:
Yes. An Ohio state court could exercise general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of that
company's "continuous and systematic" contacts with the state of
Ohio. The president's use of his office in Ohio to carry on
continuous business activities during this period allowed Ohio to
properly assert general jurisdiction over his company. It was thus
not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause for Ohio
to assert general jurisdiction over the company on the even though the
claim arose from activities conducted outside the forum state and entirely
distinct from those activities conducted inside the forum state.

This is a notable United States civil procedure case in the area of general
jurisdiction. It represents one of the rare instances in which a state's
exercise of general (as opposed to specific) personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident will be deemed to comport with the requirements of due
process, due to the non-resident's extensive activities within the state.

No Minimun Contact

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 444 US 286 (1980)

Facts:
The Robinsons purchased an Audi from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., a
 New York car dealership. A year later while driving through Oklahoma,
another car hit them from behind, resulting to a fire which caused severe
injuries to Mrs. Robinson and her two children. The Robinsons brought a
products liability suit in a state court against four parties including
Seaway and its distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. The defendants
were New York corporations and conducted no business in Oklahoma. The
defendants entered special appearances claiming that Oklahoma could
not exert personal jurisdiction over them by virtue of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Did Oklahoma acquire jurisdiction over defendant corporations?

Held:
No. There was a total absence of circumstances that are necessary
to permit an exercise of personal jurisdiction. The defendants did not
solicit business in Oklahoma through salespersons or advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the state. A state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a party only if the party has minimum contacts
with the forum state. The partys contacts with the state must be
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The relationship
between the party and the state must be such that it is
reasonable to require the corporation to defend the particular
suit which is brought there. Although it was foreseeable that one of
their cars could be involved in an accident in Oklahoma, foreseeability
alone is not sufficient for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause. The degree of foreseeability that must exist is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the state, but that the
defendants conduct and connection with the state are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there.

Even if there is no minimum contact in the state, the state can acquire
jurisdiction in torts or libel cases:

Calder v. Jones 465 US 783 (1984)

Facts:
South and Calder are the editor and president of National Enquirer,
based on Florida. South wrote an article that accused Shirley Jones of a
drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her acting career.
Jones brought a suit for libel against them before a Californian Court.
South and Calder challenged Californias personal jurisdiction over them
since neither had any physical contacts with California. South did rely on
sources from California, and Jones life and career were centered in
California.

Issue: whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder
 through their targeting of Jone with the libelous article

Held:
Yes. California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners. The first
step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm
suffered, and that was in California. The Petitioners actions intentionally
aimed at a Californian resident, and the injuries suffered would be in that
state. Petitioners knew it would have its effects there. "An individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons
who....knowingly causes the injury in California."

This new rule introduces radical changes to our long-arm statute. Before, our long-arm
statute applied only to limited cases and could be availed of only where the (a) court
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (b) the case relates to, or the subject
of which, is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has a claim or
interest, actual or contingent; (c) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
of excluding the defendant from any interest in any property within the Philippines; or
(c) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines (Section 15, Rule
14, Revised Rules of Court; De Midgeley v. Ferandos, G.R. No. L-34313, May 13,
1975, 64 SCRA 23; Cariaga, et al. v. Malaya, et al., G.R. No. L-48375, Aug. 13, 1986,
143 SCRA 441).
As a result of these limitations, the Supreme Court held that extraterritorial service of
summons could not be availed of in a money judgment sought by the plaintiff (Boudard
et al. v. Tait, 67 Phil. 170 [1939]) or in an action for injunction (Kawasaki Port Service
Corp. et al. v. Amores et al., G.R. No. 58340, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 230).
Under the amended rules, however, extraterritorial service of summons is now available
for purely personal actions or actions in personam such as an action for recovery of
damages, breach of contract or an action for injunction against an unregistered foreign
corporation.
In addition, the new rule expanded the modes of extraterritorial service. Service of
summons may now be done, with the permission of the court, on foreign private
juridical entities that are either not registered or have no resident agent through any of
the following ways:
By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with
the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the
defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by
registered mail at the last known address of the defendant.
By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service.
 By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.
Obviously, summons to these entities now go beyond our countrys borders. And, in
keeping up with the times, the Supreme Court has allowed service of summons through
facsimile or electronic devices.
A word of caution
The new rule makes our long arm statute more sensible and practical, designed as it is to
prevent injustice to local plaintiffs who are disadvantaged vis-a-vis their foreign
counterparts in terms of seeking redress against foreign entities in the courts of their own
country.
Lest we lawyers get excited, a word of caution. We have to consider that a case does not
end with the judgment of the court. The court judgment should be enforceable in the
country of residence of the defendant or where its properties may be found. In this
regard, it is an accepted principle in private international law that a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for purposes of rendering valid and
enforceable judgment against it only if there exist minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state. This principle aims to protect the defendant against the
burden of litigating in a distant forum even as it ensures that states, through their courts,
do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal
sovereigns (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 [1980]).
The presence of minimum contacts, often exhibited through defendants doing or
transacting business in the forum state, is a requirement of due process. As the US
Supreme Court has stated, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Doing so would lay too great
and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 [1945]).
In short, the new rule should not be taken as an unbridled license for haling foreign
juridical entities before our courts of law. An indiscriminate use of the new rule, without
the required minimum contacts, will serve no useful purpose because a favorable
judgment that may be rendered therein cannot be enforced against the foreign defendant.

http://business.inquirer.net/2502/toward-a-more-sensible-long-arm-statute