Canon 1

A.C. No. 10676: September 8, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.

PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations,
chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous
activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession."

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University
of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or
barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being
admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP
Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a
series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from

1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved
with CCC.

ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

RULING: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral

conduct.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing
in this exclusive and honored fraternity.

In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous
and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of
email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.

In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of

the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the
Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions
showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar,
thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

AC No. 10548: December 10, 2014

Liberato Jimenez vs Guillermo Francisco

FACTS: In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in

the Philippine Veterans Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief of the
Investigation Section but still in a temporary capacity because he is not civil service
eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil service exam. In July 1951, Jimenez
received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen. Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is
being replaced by a civil service eligible. In September 1951, Jimenez received the
results of the civil service exam he took in 1950; he passed. He then appealed his
separation from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez should be reinstated.

HELD: No. In fact, he should have been separated from the service even before 1951.
Under the law, he was supposed to only hold such temporary appointment for three
months while the appointing power is still looking for a civil service eligible. His
extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing power. Further,
there is no law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to a permanent
one. When he met the civil service eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a
permanent position in the PVD. The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the
part of the proper authority, in this case the head of the department. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive position in the Civil
Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an appointment.
The Civil Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only certifies an
eligible to be possessed of the qualification as required for a position classified under its
rules.

Canon 6

AC No. 7314: August 25, 2015

Mary Ann Flores vs. Mayor, Jr.

FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from the Complaint for illegal dismissal filed
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by Jose Roberto Flores (Flores),
the husband of herein complainant, against JMJB International Services, Inc. The case,
docketed as NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, was raffled to respondent, who is a Labor
Arbiter. In a Decision dated 23 July 2001, respondent dismissed the case on a finding
that Flores had voluntarily resigned from employment.

Flores elevated the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for having been
filed out of time. The case was then brought to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its
Decision dated 21 October 2002, ruled that the appeal to the NLRC had been timely
filed. The appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolution for being null and void and
granted monetary awards to Flores. On 19 February 2003, the CA Decision became
final and executory. On 24 July 2003, Flores filed before respondent a Motion for
Execution of the CA Decision. On 15 November 2003, complainant claimed that the
counsel of her husband received from the CA a Notice of Transmittal of Records of
Case dated 19 August 2003 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC. As
respondent was not acting on the Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation on 20 September 2004 praying that the motion be
resolved with dispatch. Upon inquiry with respondent's labor arbitration associate, the
counsel learned that the records of the case were still being requested from the
Records Section of the NLRC. Apparently, as shown in the Certification dated 13
October 2004 issued by a Records Officer of the NLRC, the case records had been sent
for archiving sometime in 2003 and were difficult to retrieve.

On 16 November 2005, respondent finally issued a Writ of Execution against JMJB

International Services, Inc. By that time, the corporation had not yet been dissolved, but
had already amended its name to F .0. Maidin International Services, Inc. This
amendment prompted the counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ of Execution.
Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that F.O. Maidin
International Services, Inc. was not a party to the case. Accordingly, complainant filed
an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's act of archiving the
records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical
standards. In a Resolution dated 11 April 2007, this Court referred the administrative
case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The IBPs Investigating Commissioner, in a Report and Recommendation dated 21 July

2008, found respondent guilty and recommended his disbarment. The gist of the report
reads:

We find as unacceptable the respondents gross delay in performing what is supposedly

a purely ministerial act on his part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to
"archiving" which led to the disappearance of the case records, and his gross ignorance
of the law in refusing to issue a writ of execution against what the SEC has essentially
certified to be a company hiding under a new name. We believe that the respondent's
actions were not a product of ignorance, indolence, or negligence, but rather, were
clearly borne out of a willful, deliberate, and wholly malicious intent to misuse his
position by favoring one of the parties in NLRC Case No. 99-06-0972, thus causing no
small degree of serious injury to the complainant therein and to the integrity of the legal
process as a whole.

In a Resolution dated 14 August 2008, the IBP Board adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation with modification, lowering the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for three years.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the IBP Board
Resolution dated 21 March 2014. The Board affirmed its previous Resolution with
modification, reverting the penalty to disbarment. Neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer are Oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards.

HELD: We adopt the IBP Board Resolution. There is a clear neglect of duty and
ignorance of the law on the part of respondent on account of his failure to immediately
act on the Motion for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution
despite having been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution -
of the corporation against which the writ was issued. The justification offered by
respondent to explain his delay in acting on the motion cannot be countenanced, as it
was through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he archived the case
records at the NLRC Records Section, not on the basis of official or sanctioned
guidelines but only because it was the common practice in his office, reflects his lack of
due diligence and care in the custody of official documents. While delay in the
processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for
respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the
motion. This omission amounts to gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has
caused prejudice to complainant. As defined, gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause.

Respondent also erroneously interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could
not have been issued against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc., because it was
not a party to the case. His argument contravenes the pronouncement of the Court in
Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals, in which it said that "a change in the
corporate name does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act
or under general law, has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property,
rights, or liabilities."

As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer who must at all times be accountable
to the people, whom he must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency. The unjustified delay in his actions and his failure to act according to law
constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the public
in general.

Further, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to delay no man for money or
malice, and abandoned his professional responsibility to exert every effort and consider
it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalties, including suspension and disbarment these
penalties are imposed with great caution, because they are the most severe forms of
disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond repair.Disbarment, in particular,
may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.

The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the
guilty party has become a repeat offender.

Herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months in another case, Lahm Ill v. Mayor, Jr., 39 in which he was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For that offense, he was warned that the commission of the
same or a similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. In light of respondent's previous suspension from the practice of law in an
earlier administrative case as above-mentioned, the recommendation of the IBP Board
to disbar respondent is only proper.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent ATTY. JOVENCIO LL. MAYOR, JR. guilty of grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility rendering him unworthy of continuing membership
in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

AC No. 5377: June 30, 2014

Victor Lingan vs. Atty. Calubaquib & Baliga

Canon 7

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457: February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO

A.C. No. 7973

FACTS: On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo
before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia
alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children,
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a
dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992,
Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually
granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros
Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39
years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia
returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias children learned abouthis return,
Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he
learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only
on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus,
Sesbreo should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar
complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that
Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.

In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

FACTS: A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a
complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that
Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case
No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully
served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his
verified complaint against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C.
No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and
the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted.
Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification
applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that homicide
does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Garcias complaint was
motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for
representing Garcias daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties
agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a
conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found
Sesbreo guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced
Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD
found that Sesbreo was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his
acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor
Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the
decision of this Court convicting Sesbreo for the crime of homicide, and found that the
circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD
stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was

shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion
Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the
wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear
the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in
Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance
and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be
slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early
morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken men
who had one too many. Respondents inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of
drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive without a
cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon 3 where the respondent was
disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended
that Sesbreo be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD.
Sesbreo alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct,
and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the
grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and
political rights. Finally, Sesbreo alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he
already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia
and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia
already withdrew the complaints against him.

On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31
denying Sesbreos motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of
the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273
was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Courts Resolution dated 30 September
2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution
No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11
February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.

ISSUE: Whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this
Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC

RULING: This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in
seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and
yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude
and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.7

In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreo
is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of
9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.

A.C. No. 8000: August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA

Facts: In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of
honor in her best friends wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of
America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought
the services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on
November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract), whereby
respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor,
complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and
undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.The
parties likewise stipulated that should complainants visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal
conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to
return the said downpayment. However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking
within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in
the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint
against respondent.

In his Comment dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply
with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico
Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom
he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had
a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas
to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain
Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US
visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent
claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but,
nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.To
buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family
with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the
latter.

In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable,
and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer
penalty. The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in
deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to
deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants
downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence
to respondents defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that
the latters identity was not proven and in light of respondents self-serving evidence,
i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification
increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return
the amount of P350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.

ISSUE: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

RULING: After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs
findings, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 14 In this regard, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which

resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa
and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In
truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a
contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US
visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pinedas identity
considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and
thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative
value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondents
deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under
the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of
complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to
wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by
his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes
on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. 18 The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. 19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the same time, failed to
return the latters money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 21 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the money
given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz, 22 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his
legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to
facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa and return her money, he likewise
committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting
in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be
imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase
the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to
note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his
civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." 23 Hence, since respondent received
the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in
order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the

legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

CANON 8

A.C. No. 9881: June 4, 2014

Alan F. Paguia vs. Manuel T. Molina
FACTS: The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit
compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the
following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs.
Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda
San Juan. The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners
save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled"Times Square
Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on
matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of
security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the
contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking
arrangements.
On February 4, 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Moina for allegedly giving legal advice to the
latters clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu,
who was never a party to the contract.
In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as petty quarre; among
neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into for
purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr.
Abreu, signed the document.
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed
two cases against his clients, Mr. and Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was
not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with Housing and
Land Use Regulatory. Board (HLURB), which was an action for declaratory relief. Both
cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time
by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit case Mr. Abreu had allegedly
taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gathe of
the Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages,
coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579.
According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12
December 2008.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case will be dismissed

HELD: On August 3, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a

Report and Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on
the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations, and 2) even
assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held
accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith. On May 14, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors passed Resolution dated August 2, 2011 but was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors on December 29, 2012. Notices of the denial were received by the
parties on March 21, 2013. No petition for review has been filed with this Court. Thus,
the complainant did not file a petition with the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice
of the Boards resolution. This rule id derived from Section 122 of Rule 139-B made the
complaint to be deemed terminated.
 Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still
cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended
with bad faith or malice. The rule mistake committed by lawyers in the exercise of their
profession is as follows: An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an
honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice said that, no attorney is
bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or
counsel, or even a judge is bound to know the law. The default rule is a presumption of
good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be
drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is
no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice assuming it was indeed given, was
coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith therefore stands
the case.

A.C. No. 10628: July 1, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III vs. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES

FACTS: Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a
Complaintfor damages against his own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom
Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint,
Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance
No. II-0008689 /Issued on March 10, 2008. Maximino claimed that at the time of the
filing of the said complaint. Orlandos IBP O.R. number should have already reflected
payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just
the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa 5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was
furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando
had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel,
claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among
others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as
[your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice
to Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximina " has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a
manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from
charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for
motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to
Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for
the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late
submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the
aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in
his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication"
and were uttered in good faith.

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against
Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily
entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation,
consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case "

In a Report and Recommendation dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of
the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find
any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo,
who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor
intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for
reconsideration which was however denied in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014 with
modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is a special
privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients
and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to
uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer
must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers. In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as
well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides: Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper .Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. Though a lawyer's language
may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession.The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. In Buatis Jr. v. People, the Court treated
a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan"
in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the
opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession. In this
case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as
casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's
mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages
were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the
word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately
terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his
colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of
guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo
was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and
disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion
of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and
uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and
may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon
them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed
to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom
fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and
insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,

constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While
a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. The Court has consistently
reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the
IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the
complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint
as well as the expunction thereof from the records.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
CANON 9
A.C. No. 8103: December 3, 2014

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR. VS. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY

Facts: Atty. Aurelio (Angeles), Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan wrote a letter to the
Hon. Remigio Escalada, Executive Judge of RTC Bataan regarding the alleged
notarisation by Atty. Renato Bagay of 18 documents from March 13, 2008 to April 8,
2008 when he was out of the country. These documents were forwarded to the
Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who knew that Renato was in Mexico
to attend a Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico, and accompanied by affidavits of the
persons who executed the documents who all alleged that they did not see Renato
notarise the documents but her secretary. Verification with the Bureau of Immigration
revealed that Renato was out of the country from March 13, 208 to April 8, 2008. The
judge indorsed the letter to the IBP Bataan, which in turn endorsed it to the IBP National
Office. It was then referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation and
report. The IBP endorsed the letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant in view of the
manifestation by Atty. Angeles that his letter was not meant as a compliant but merely to
clarify the status of the documents allegedly notarised by Renato. The Court then
required Renato to comment. In his comment, Renato averred that it was his secretary
who caused the notarisation of the documents without his knowledge and authority and
he had already terminated her services. The Court referred the matter to the IBP for
investigation and report, and only Renato submitted his position paper in view of the
manifestation of Atty. Angeles that he be excused from participating in the case. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Renato be suspended from the practice
of law for two years, in view of his admission that he employed an office secretary who
had access to his office, his notarial seal and records without proper training, thus he
failed to live up to his obligation under the Rules on Notarial Practice. The IBP adopted
the recommendation of the Commissioner. Renato in his motion for reconsideration
argued that his case should be treated with leniency since he admitted and owned up to
his shortcomings and it was done without wrong intention. His case should be a case of
simple negligence

ISSUE: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he

was out of the country constituted negligence

RULING: The Court answers in the affirmative.Respondent admitted in his comment

and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial
seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes
negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary.
Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a Notary Public refers to
any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary publics
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary
public.Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretarys act which
he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed.
He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary
could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant
negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple
negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondents flimsy excuse was a
mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of
what his secretary did.Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A
person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries
in his notarial register[1]. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
buck to his secretary.As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it.
Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a
notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His
experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented
possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act
towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of
notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years is appropriate.Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to
solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly affected
by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and
degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer[2]. Where the notary public
is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn
oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any[3].Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly
or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized
person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and
with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents
without any restraint.Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The people who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to
the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents
would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the
notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person,
their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties
imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to
act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general[4].
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined[5].
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will
not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his
duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable
this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

CANON 10
A.C. No. 7325: January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. vs. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL

FACTS: Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases involving cancellation of

emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of
attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of
parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered
23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty.
Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters
while Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents
and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the
program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainants spouse, Raymunda
Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs
derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law.
This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court
of Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant, filed
a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full
implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision. On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol
filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he
signed as Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela. Villahermosa filed this complaint
alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren
could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had
already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracols real client was
a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land.
Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efrens widow and daughter both stating that Efren
never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa
through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they were familiar with Efrens signature.
They state that the signature in the waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and
manufactured evidence into the proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document
denominated as Waiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto
Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases in favor of
Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case for falsification of public document and
use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol. Atty. Caracol insists
that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as additional counsel. He said that
he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover,
he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto
Aguirres favor.

IBP RECOMMENDATION: In its Report and Recommendation,the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed
deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible
evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of
record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren
was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor
did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to
hold him liable for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the
DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto
Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty.
Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent will be Disbarred

HELD: The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but
modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Caracol
moved for reconsideration but was denied. Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal which
this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required in administrative cases.han
by adopting the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers
appearance on behalf of his client, Hence:chanroblesvirtual

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to
produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon
make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a
person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., this Court said that while a
lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that
he show such authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act, Thus: A
lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed
by the counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion
of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person
without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by
leave of court If an attorney appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the
requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse
party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or
is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction. We
must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an
attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the
proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to
appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in
fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed
the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an
honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his
clients passing and presented authority that he was retained by the clients successors-
in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza where
he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop,
presumably upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the
PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his
indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the ponencia observes,
outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by
which Magalop could have been implicated.

It seems to me that if anyone is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any
moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The
defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he
prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the
present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our
judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an attorneys function it is essential
that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his
clients.Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

This flows out from the lawyers oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the
law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more
circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the
judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his
purpose. Atty. Caracols blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be
countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyers oath and in violation
of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem
it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of one year.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. And SUSPENDEDrespondent Atty.

Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this
Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 10568 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753] : January 13, 2015

MARILEN G. SOLIMAN vs. ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY

FACTS: In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty.
Amboy on May 27, 2007 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the
Retainer Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy
P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latters engagement, Soliman paid her
P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer institute a partition
case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the partition thereof.
Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said property from
the co-owners to the individual owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to her was then
treated as payment for her professional services.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer
tax. In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in
the issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to
submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the
Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of
P80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD
agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00. Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount
of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboys bank account as payment for the real property tax for the
year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboys
bank account as payment for the latters contact in the RD.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the
property were then only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty.
Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners
to the subject property.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboys secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the
RD was asking for an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said
certificates of title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty.
Amboys secretary.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the
said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman
and Atty. Amboys secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of
Manila. Soliman asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the P50,000.00 as payment for
the release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to
facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not be
processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file certain
documents.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent
documents she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back
the P50,000.00 that was already paid to her.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but
denied having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She
claimed that the retainer agreement was not implemented since the partition case was
not instituted. She claimed that she merely undertook to research, gather and collate all
documents required in the partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to
the individual owners. She denied having failed to submit the relevant documents to the
RD which caused the delay in the processing of the said titles. She likewise denied
having asked Soliman for P50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said
titles.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a
Report and Recommendation, which recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from
the practice of law for six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty.
Amboy violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due
diligence in dealing with Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform the latter of the
status of the proceedings for the issuance of the said titles.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted
and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the
modification that the period of Atty. Amboys suspension from the practice of law
was increased from six (6) months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return
the entire amount she received from Soliman.

Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated March 21, 2014.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent will be Suspended

HELD: After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and that he should be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence
and diligence; to never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client
informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information. The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy,
after receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to submit
material documents relative to the issuance of separate certificates of title to the
individual owners of the property. It was her negligence which caused the delay in the
issuance of the certificates of title. To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the
commission of an illegal act when she asked from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to
be paid to her contact inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the
said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of P50,000.00, Atty.
Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title. Instead of procuring
the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for an
additional P10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in
dealing with a client. Atty. Amboys acts undermined the legal processes, which she
swore to uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to
respect the law and legal processes.

The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of
P50,000.00 which she paid in order to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To
reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having
received any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a
demand therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the
certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified
withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action.A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy

is found GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal interest
thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. The respondent is
further DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her compliance
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.

CANON 11

A.C. No. 10135: January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA

FACTS: In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable
Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He
alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." 3

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know
the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes.4

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings
and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined
his capability, to wit:

(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that
the latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of
Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for
rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got
angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him
since there was nobody to help him.

(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint
Motion for Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying
on the Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to
represent them.
 (3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she
allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.

In her unverified Answer dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the
latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo
City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained.
These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against
anybody who does not accede to his demand. Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is
not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one. She alleged that the
motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a
waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to
submit their respective position papers.9

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he
must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money
from Areolas co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also
uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not
the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached
to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions
would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating
Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza
degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) months.
In a Notice of Resolution dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution dated November 19, 2011 but the
IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution dated May 10, 2013. The
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not be DISBARRED

RULING: After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant
Complaint against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations
contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed
the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses
Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No
affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola
raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements, especially as regards Atty.
Mendozas alleged demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to
acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO
clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine
laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not
authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His
familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO
instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities.
It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than
Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply, he made fun of her
grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english. He also called the PAO as
"Pa-Amin Office"which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola
may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of
cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work
with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge
and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission
corresponds to one of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients
" Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to
dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is
uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months
as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark
"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents length
of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondents advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the
Courts determination of the imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas
lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of
livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the only
reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendozas own
admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 7676: June 10, 2014

AMADO T. DIZON vs. ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA

FACTS: Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along
with his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to
represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and
Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in February
2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and
above the parties stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. 3

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or
in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same
reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of
their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts 4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza
were submitted by the complainant, which state:

15 Jan. 2007

Receipt

That the amount received P300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn
shall result in the following:
 1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;

2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be

included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007

Receipt

The amount of P500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the
process before the courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon
and the same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon winning the case with
finality.

Signed

Atty. Norlita De Taza6

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and
learned that the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary
to Atty. De Tazas representations that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found. 7

Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for

disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and
documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed
an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks11 in her favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank.
Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit 12 was attached to
the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check 13 for P50,000.00 as payment
for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed
account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit, 14 stating that Atty. De

Taza owes her P29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated
demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter 15 informed the Court that Atty.
De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the United
States of America (U.S.A.).

In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to
file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the
postal carriers notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then resolved by
virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Tazas office
address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned
unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."

It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant
inform the Court of Atty. De Tazas new address, which the complainant faithfully
complied with by giving Atty. De Tazas new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the
Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza
using the latters U.S.A. address.

Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with
the complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carriers notation "RTS-
Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that the said
copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as
having waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to
appear. Thus, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The
complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he was already residing
abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his documentary evidence at the
time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position
paper.

In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from
the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Disciplines

recommendation in a Resolution24dated January 3, 2013, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents demand of [P]800,000.00 to
expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been
dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE: WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE

FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY
FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED.

RULING: The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the
accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to
defend herself from the complainants allegations, but all these efforts were only met
with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part
to evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the Court is
concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the
complainants charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a
hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.

The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by
the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty.
Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x. 28 (Italics supplied)

"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required."29 Based on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it
appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The
complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Tazas involvement in an
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed
account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such
conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more
abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De
Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice,
equity and fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.1wphi1 It also
manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem."30

Atty. De Tazas actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as
she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the
Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of
money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her
clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Tazas actions are reprehensible and her greed more
than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.31 In this case, the purpose for
which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand
should not have even been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo 33 suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for two years when the latter issued checks which were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 34 the
same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued worthless
checks to pay off her loan.

Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the
practice of law for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded
his client into paying P42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a petition for
annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his client a copy of the
petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was
filed.

In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded P14,000.00 from the
complainant to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on
other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was handling the case. When the
complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the respondents allegations.
The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the application
for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public
at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 37 "The Judiciary has
been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of
the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with
such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated." 38

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De
Taza from the practice of law for two years.
CANON 12

A.C. No. 6677: June 10, 2014

Euprocina Crisostomo vs. Atty. Philip Nazareno

FACTS: In 2001, the complainants In the disbarment case filed against Atty. Philip
(Nazareno), bought housing units in Patricia South Subdivision, from Rudex
International Development Corporation (Rudex). They then filed, in two batches,
complaints for rescission of contracts against Rudex. In all of these cases, Rudex was
represented by Atty. Philip. In the first batch of cases, the HLURB rendered judgments I
default against Rudex, hence the latter filed Petitions for Review before the HLURB
assailing them. In the certifications against forum shopping, Atty. Philip Rudex through
its president Ruben, and legal counsel Philip stated that they have not commenced or
has knowledge of any action involving the same issues pending before the NLRC, this
despite the fact that Rudex filed ejectment cases against the complainants therein.
Rudex again filed a complaint for rescission of contract with the HLURB against Melinda
Sioting. Again, the certification against no forums shopping signed by Norilyn stated that
no pending action involving the same issues were pending, which certification was
notarised by Atty. Philip. On April 1, 2004, Rudex again filed six complaints for
rescission of contract against the other complainants, with the same manifestation in the
certification against forum shopping.The complainants then filed a dsibarment complaint
against Philip, alleging that he made false declarations in the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the several complaints filed by Rudex against them. Despite
notice, Atty. Philip did not submit his comment during the proceedings. In the meantime,
the HLURB dismissed the complaints filed by Rudex due to the erroneous certifications
against forum shopping. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the
suspension from the practice of law for six months of Atty. Philip. The IBP adopted the
findings and recommendation of the investigating commissioner but modified it to one
month suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Philip will be Disbarred

RULING: The Court affirms the IBPs findings with modification as to the penalty
imposed. Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the
certification requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case
of Sps. Ong v. CA as follows:

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification
requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate,
compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and
independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in
the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation
of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but
also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon
motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt.
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and
subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions,
viz.:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. (Emphases supplied)

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) which read as follows:

CANON 1 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. CANON Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudexs pleadings, for which he
should be held administratively liable.

Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudexs counsel, filed, in August 2003,
petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of
rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the
existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue
related to the complainants rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against
Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence
of Siotings May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudexs own
September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1,
2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the
other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum
shopping the existence of complainants own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty.
Nazareno as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the
Code should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering
that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due
notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBPs resolution on his
administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it
proper to modify the IBPs finding on this score.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat[4], a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of
law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made
false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazarenos
infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned
from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby
suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary
public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to
the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints
for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been
treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the
notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others,
the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each
instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register[5]. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with
the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all
the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material
falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not
aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other
forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly
delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the
Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradi[6] to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct[7]. (Emphasis supplied)
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false
statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being
commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary
public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such nature
against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled with
his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his
existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a
notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that[8]:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. When a notary public
certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he
gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.

;
A.C. No. 6760: January 30, 2013

ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES

FACTS: In his complaint,1 Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as
counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The
first ccise, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,2 involved the settlement of the intestate
estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty.
Gonzales assisted

Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207, 3 for Annulment of Document,

Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled.
The tiling of the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum
shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.

Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He
asserted, however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were
not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also
opined that the complainant only filed the disbarment case to harass him. 4

The Investigating Commissioners Findings

In our Resolution5 dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation 6 dated
July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively
liable for forum shopping.

According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil
Case No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela
held the Malate property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I.
Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial.

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T.

Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her
lifetime, Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila.
According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio
and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of administration so
that Manuelas properties could be inventoried and settled in accordance with law.

In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a
trust held by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No.
99-95587. They alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to
Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio;
and to issue a new one in their names.

The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the
other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No.
00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In
committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular
prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month
from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit
a more severe penalty.

The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. In a

resolution7 dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case
against Atty. Gonzales for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, but we modify the commissioners
recommended penalty to censure and a warning that another violation would merit a
more severe penalty.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in

anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari.8

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought. 9

Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed
Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.

Identity of Parties
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-
99207. In both cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato,
Teodoro-Marcial, Jorge I. Teodoro, Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T.
Teodoro. They represented the same interest in both cases. All claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners of the land that she held in trust for them.

Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the
sole defendant in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same
interest, as transferee-owner of the lot allegedly held in trust by Manuela.

Identity of causes of action

The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken,
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the
present causes of action.10 The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of their action or by adopting a different method of
presenting it.11

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over
the case, as Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate,
Manila, which was the sole property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included
in her estate, has been sold to Rogelio and Anastacio when Manuela was still alive. The
trial court did not give credence to their claim that Manuela held the property in trust for
them.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting
Anastacios Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had been
unable to prove their claim that Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither
were they able to prove that the sale of a portion of the lot to Anastacio was void.

In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had to
be decided by the trial court. The initiating parties claim in the two cases depended on
the existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence
necessary to prove their claim was the same.

Identity of relief sought

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration, the liquidation of Manuelas estate, and its distribution among
her legal heirs.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment of
the deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked
the court to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter,
and to issue a new one in their names.

While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in
form, a ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate,
had the lot been declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No.
99-95587, there would have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil Case
No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been annulled, then
the property would go back to the hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing the property
under administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, would have
been unnecessary.

Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are
substantially similar in the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res
judicata are present, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case
No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still
pending.

As Commissioner Dulay observed:

Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised
the issue of trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of
Administration case and that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000
annulment case xxx

To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the
second case (annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the
same or similar issue would constitute misconduct which should be subject to
disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do so,
in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a
predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and obedience to
the law.12

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation." 13

The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the
practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. 14 Willful and
deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect
contempt of court in SC

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994. 15

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, 16 and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes.17

To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of
all the circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioners recommended penalty
of suspension consistent with prior rulings of the Court.

In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al. 18 we severely censured Renecio
Espiritu, the counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a
similar petition had been filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of
direct contempt.

The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty.
Gonzales misused court processes in contravention of the express rule against forum
shopping. We held then that Espiritu should be penalized and we imposed the penalty
of censure the penalty usually imposed for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature.19

Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or
the client.20 As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty
to obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition
against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. 21 It also violated his duty
as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
CANON 13

A.C. No. 8108: July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO,

JR.

Adm. Case No. 10299

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.,

Facts: Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3 In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions
during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery
and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the
House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was
revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the release order for his
three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery
of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondents alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and
legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official,
even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozanos verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9

Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACCs filing of
disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint
on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. 11 On 2 June 2009,
the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation,
report and recommendation. RESPONDENTS VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the
charges against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also
ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes
of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still
refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to
their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits
that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then
everything may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release
order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper
with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: The Commissioner noted that
both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges.

However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent

drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of
"feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that
he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action. 15

RULING: We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation
into charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints
brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. 16 By now, it is
basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17

As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in

Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant

does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant
or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable
grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by
the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the
regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the
rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,

respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a
direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the
Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic]
kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that day because
of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila
maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw
gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a
lawyer nowI prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing
authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA.
So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si
Blancaflor.

So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first
with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00
oclock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho
ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho
namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think
that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty
Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang
maki-usapsabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of
fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us,
and we were discussing the case.19

Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very
open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political
family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he
knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress.
In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him." 20 Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally
acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close. 21

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondents
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the
case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the
draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with
the end in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith inthe judicial
process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice.1wphi1 To that end, their clients success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of
a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer,
even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. 22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a
lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the bounds of
the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if
an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for
the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling
whenshe solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her
help in the case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme
Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high court. 24 We
find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that a
lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. We believe that
other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the
justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member
of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,
respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a
direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the
Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic]
kasi he is very political also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken that day because
of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila
maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw
gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a
lawyer nowI prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing
authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA.
So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si
Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first
with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00
oclock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho
ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho
namin in-explain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think
that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty
Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang
maki-usapsabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of
fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us,
and we were discussing the case.[4]
Respondent likewise stated that his experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very
open; and that because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political
family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he
knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they were together in Congress.
In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him.[5] Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally
acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.[6]
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondents
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the
case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the
draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with
the end in view of expediting the case.
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent
is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to
influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith in the judicial process
is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To
that end, their clients success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the
bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any
means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.[7]
Rule 1.02 states: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Further, according to Rule 15.06, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body. The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer to impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the bounds of
the law.[8] A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected
if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for
the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling
when she solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her
help in the case of her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a pending case with the
Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high
court.[9] We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.