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122039

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SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.122039May31,2000

VICENTECALALAS,petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALS,ELIZAJUJEURCHESUNGAandFRANCISCOSALVA,respondents.

MENDOZA,J.:

Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariofthedecision1oftheCourtofAppeals,datedMarch31,1991,reversing
the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to
privaterespondentElizaJujeurcheSungaasplaintiffinanactionforbreachofcontractofcarriage.

Thefacts,asfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,areasfollows:

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshmanmajoringinPhysicalEducationattheSilimanUniversity,tookapassengerjeepneyownedandoperated
bypetitionerVicenteCalalas.Asthejeepneywasfilledtocapacityofabout24passengers,Sungawasgivenbythe
conductoran"extensionseat,"awoodenstoolatthebackofthedoorattherearendofthevehicle.

OnthewaytoPoblacionSibulan,NegrosOccidental,thejeepneystoppedtoletapassengeroff.Asshewasseated
at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
drivenbyIglecerioVerenaandownedbyFranciscoSalvabumpedtheleftrearportionofthejeepney.Asaresult,
Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibiafibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under
sedation.HerconfinementinthehospitallastedfromAugust23toSeptember7,1989.Herattendingphysician,Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and
wouldhavetoambulateincrutchesduringsaidperiod.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriagebytheformerinfailingtoexercisethediligencerequiredofhimasacommoncarrier.Calalas,ontheother
hand,filedathirdpartycomplaintagainstFranciscoSalva,theowneroftheIsuzutruck.

ThelowercourtrenderedjudgmentagainstSalvaasthirdpartydefendantandabsolvedCalalasofliability,holding
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case
(CivilCaseNo.3490),filedbyCalalasagainstSalvaandVerena,forquasidelict,inwhichBranch37ofthesame
courtheldSalvaandhisdriverVerenajointlyliabletoCalalasforthedamagetohisjeepney.

OnappealtotheCourtofAppeals,therulingofthelowercourtwasreversedonthegroundthatSunga'scauseof
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasidelict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligencerequiredundertheCivilCode.TheappellatecourtdismissedthethirdpartycomplaintagainstSalvaand
adjudgedCalalasliablefordamagestoSunga.Thedispositiveportionofitsdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE,andanotheroneis
enteredorderingdefendantappelleeVicenteCalalastopayplaintiffappellant:

(1)P50,000.00asactualandcompensatorydamages

(2)P50,000.00asmoraldamages

(3)P10,000.00asattorney'sfeesand
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(4)P1,000.00asexpensesoflitigationand

(5)topaythecosts.

SOORDERED.

Hence,thispetition.PetitionercontendsthattherulinginCivilCaseNo.3490thatthenegligenceofVerenawasthe
proximatecauseoftheaccidentnegateshisliabilityandthattoruleotherwisewouldbetomakethecommoncarrier
aninsurerofthesafetyofitspassengers.HecontendsthatthebumpingofthejeepneybythetruckownedbySalva
was a casofortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
supportedbyevidence.

Thepetitionhasnomerit.

TheargumentthatSungaisboundbytherulinginCivilCaseNo.3490findingthedriverandtheownerofthetruck
liable for quasidelict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicatadoesnotapply.

NoraretheissuesinCivilCaseNo.3490andinthepresentcasethesame.TheissueinCivilCaseNo.3490was
whetherSalvaandhisdriverVerenawereliableforquasidelictforthedamagecausedtopetitioner'sjeepney.On
theotherhand,theissueinthiscaseiswhetherpetitionerisliableonhiscontractofcarriage.Thefirst,quasidelict,
also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractualobligation.

Consequently, in quasidelict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action,whereasinbreachofcontract,theactioncanbeprosecutedmerelybyprovingtheexistenceofthecontract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.2Incaseofdeathorinjuriestopassengers,Art.1756oftheCivilCodeprovidesthatcommoncarriers
arepresumedtohavebeenatfaultortohaveactednegligentlyunlesstheyprovethattheyobservedextraordinary
diligenceasdefinedinArts.1733and1755oftheCode.Thisprovisionnecessarilyshiftstothecommoncarrierthe
burdenofproof.

Thereis,thus,nobasisforthecontentionthattherulinginCivilCaseNo.3490,findingSalvaandhisdriverVerena
liableforthedamagetopetitioner'sjeepney,shouldbebindingonSunga.Itisimmaterialthattheproximatecause
ofthecollisionbetweenthejeepneyandthetruckwasthenegligenceofthetruckdriver.Thedoctrineofproximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
deviceforimputingliabilitytoapersonwherethereisnorelationbetweenhimandanotherparty.Insuchacase,the
obligationiscreatedbylawitself.But,wherethereisapreexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties,itisthe
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumptionofnegligenceincasesofdeathorinjurytopassengers.Itprovides:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengerstransportedbythem,accordingtoallthecircumstancesofeachcase.

Suchextraordinarydiligenceinthevigilanceoverthegoodsisfurtherexpressedinarticles1734,1735,
and1746,Nos.5,6,and7,whiletheextraordinarydiligenceforthesafetyofthepassengersisfurther
setforthinarticles1755and1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresightcanprovide,usingtheutmostdiligenceofverycautiouspersons,withdueregardforallthe
circumstances.

Art.1756.Incaseofdeathoforinjuriestopassengers,commoncarriersarepresumedtohavebeenat
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribedbyarticles1733and1755.

Inthecaseatbar,uponthehappeningoftheaccident,thepresumptionofnegligenceatoncearose,anditbecame
thedutyofpetitionertoprovethathehadtoobserveextraordinarydiligenceinthecareofhispassengers.

Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmostdiligenceofverycautiouspersons,withdueregardforallthecircumstances"asrequiredbyArt.1755?We
donotthinkso.Severalfactorsmilitateagainstpetitioner'scontention.

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First,asfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,thejeepneywasnotproperlyparked,itsrearportionbeingexposedabout
twometersfromthebroadshouldersofthehighway,andfacingthemiddleofthehighwayinadiagonalangle.This
isaviolationoftheR.A.No.4136,asamended,ortheLandTransportationandTrafficCode,whichprovides:

Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to
obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
loadingorunloadingfreight,obstructthefreepassageofothervehiclesonthehighway.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney,aviolationof32(a)ofthesamelaw.Itprovides:

Exceedingregisteredcapacity.Nopersonoperatinganymotorvehicleshallallowmorepassengers
ormorefreightorcargoinhisvehiclethanitsregisteredcapacity.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transportingpassengers.

Wefindithardtogiveseriousthoughttopetitioner'scontentionthatSunga'stakingan"extensionseat"amountedto
animpliedassumptionofrisk.Itisakintoarguingthattheinjuriestothemanyvictimsofthetragediesinourseas
shouldnotbecompensatedmerelybecausethosepassengersassumedagreaterriskofdrowningbyboardingan
overloadedferry.Thisisalsotrueofpetitioner'scontentionthatthejeepneybeingbumpedwhileitwasimproperly
parkedconstitutescasofortuito.Acasofortuitoisaneventwhichcouldnotbeforeseen,orwhich,thoughforeseen,
wasinevitable.3Thisrequiresthatthefollowingrequirementsbepresent:(a)thecauseofthebreachisindependent
ofthedebtor'swill(b)theeventisunforeseeableorunavoidable(c)theeventissuchastorenderitimpossiblefor
thedebtortofulfillhisobligationinanormalmanner,and(d)thedebtordidnottakepartincausingtheinjurytothe
creditor.4Petitionershouldhaveforeseenthedangerofparkinghisjeepneywithitsbodyprotrudingtwometersinto
thehighway.

Finally,petitionerchallengestheawardofmoraldamagesallegingthatitisexcessiveandwithoutbasisinlaw.We
findthiscontentionwelltaken.

Inawardingmoraldamages,theCourtofAppealsstated:

Plaintiffappellantatthetimeoftheaccidentwasafirstyearcollegestudentinthatschoolyear1989
1990attheSillimanUniversity,majoringinPhysicalEducation.Becauseoftheinjury,shewasnotable
to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of
continuingwithherschooling,becauseshecouldnotwalkanddecidednottopursueherdegree,major
inPhysicalEducation"becauseofmylegwhichhasadefectalready."

Plaintiffappellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she cried in pain
becauseofherinjuredleftfoot.Asaresultofherinjury,theOrthopedicSurgeonalsocertifiedthatshe
has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
Educationashermajorsubject,because"myleftleg...hasadefectalready."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she
suffered.UnderArticle2219oftheCivilCode,sheisentitledtorecovermoraldamagesinthesumof
P50,000.00,whichisfair,justandreasonable.

Asageneralrule,moraldamagesarenotrecoverableinactionsfordamagespredicatedonabreachofcontractfor
it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relationtoArt.2206(3)oftheCivilCodeand(2)inthecasesinwhichthecarrierisguiltyoffraudorbadfaith,as
providedinArt.2220.6

Inthiscase,thereisnolegalbasisforawardingmoraldamagessincetherewasnofactualfindingbytheappellate
court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
petitioner'sadmissioninopencourtthatthedriverofthejeepneyfailedtoassistheringoingtoanearbyhospital
cannotbeconstruedasanadmissionofbadfaith.ThefactthatitwasthedriveroftheIsuzutruckwhotookherto
thehospitaldoesnotimplythatpetitionerwasutterlyindifferenttotheplightofhisinjuredpassenger.Ifatall,itis
merelyimpliedrecognitionbyVerenathathewastheoneatfaultfortheaccident.

WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,datedMarch31,1995,anditsresolution,datedSeptember11,
1995,areAFFIRMED,withtheMODIFICATIONthattheawardofmoraldamagesisDELETED.

SOORDERED.
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BellosilloandBuena,JJ.,concur.

QuisumbingandDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,areonleave.

Footnotes
1PerJusticeArtemonD.LunaandconcurredinbyJusticesHectorL.HofilenaandB.A.Adefuindela
Cruz.
2SeeB.BALDERRAMA,THEPHILIPPINELAWONTROTSANDDAMAGES20(1953).

3CIVILCODE,ART.1174.

4JuanF.Nakpil&Sonsv.CourtofAppeals,144SCRA596(1986)Vasquezv.CourtofAppeals,138
SCRA553(1985)Republicv.LuzonStevedoringCorp.,128Phil.313(1967).
5Foresv.Miranda,67105Phil.267(1959)Mercadov.Lira,3SCRA124(1961).

6PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.v.Esguerra,117SCRA741(1982)SabenaBelgianWorldAirlines
v.CourtofAppeals,171SCRA620(1989)ChinaAirlines,Ltd.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt,169
SCRA226(1989).

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