(Analecta Husserliana 52) Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Auth.), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Eds.)-Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition_ Book I Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field-Sprin

Miguel Jarquin conference
TheMarin and Anna-Teresa

in progress.Tymieniecka.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE AND THE
HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION
BOOK I
ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA
THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
VOLUME LII
Editor-in-Chief:
ANNA- TERESA TYMIENIECKA
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning

Belmont, Massachusetts
For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF
LIFE AND THE HUMAN
CREATIVE CONDITION
Book I
Laying Down the
Cornerstones of the Field
Edited by
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
The World Phenomenology Institute
Published under the auspices of

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
A-T. Tymieniecka, President
''
~
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Phenomenology of life and the human creative condition 1 edited by
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.
p. cm. -- <Analecta Husserliana ; v. 52-54>
Papers presented at the Second World Phenoaenology Congress, Sept.
12-18, 1995, Guadalajara, Mexico.
"Published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advances
Phenomenological Research and Learning.
!ne 1udes index.
Contents: bk. 1. Layfng down the cornerstones of the field -- bk.
2. The reincarnating mfnd, or, The ontopofetic outburst in creative
virtualitfes -- bk. 3. Ontopo1etic expansion in hu1an self
-1nterpretat1on-in-ex1stence.
ISBN 978-90-481-4805-9 ISBN 978-94-017-2604-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2604-7
1. Phenomenology--Congresses. 2. Husserl, Edund, 1859-1938-
-Congresses. 3. L1fe--Congresses. 4. Creative abfl1ty--Congresses.
I. Tym1en1ecka, Anna-Teresa. II. World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenologfcal Research and Learnfng. III. World Congress of
Phenomenology <2nd : 1995 : GuadalaJara, Mexfcol IV. Ser1es.
B3279.H94A129 vol. 52-54
[8829.57)
142' .7--0C21 97-2276
ISBN 978-90-481-4805-9
Prepared with the editorial assistance of Robert S. Wise
Printed on acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved

1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1998
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced
or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix
THE THEME xi
INAUGURAL LECTURE
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA I The Great Plan of Life: The

Phenomenology of Life's Return to the Sources of Western
Philosophy 3
PART ONE
LIFE, LOGOS, PHENOMENON
LIU QINGPING I Life as Logos and Tao: On Husser/'s

Ideas and the Comparative Study of Western and Chinese
Philosophies 33
DEBABRAT A SINHA I Logos, Telos and the Lived World: A
View in Phenomenological Reflection 57
HoRsT MATT H A I I The Pseudo-concepts Phenomenon and
AOrOE in the Phenomenological Philosophies: A Viable
Alternative 71
ALEXANDRU GIUCULESCU I The Leibnizian Dimension of
Husserl 's Phenomenology 99
PART TWO
SELF-INDIVIDUALISA TION OF LIFE:
INGATHERING AND OUTWARD RADIATION
FRANS SOONTIENS I The Intrinsic Value of Life and the

Problem of Natural Teleology 117
CARLOS MINGUEZ I Predetermination and Change in Living
Beings: A Study Based on Nicolai Hartmann's Contribution 133
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
THOMAS E. SPREY I The Self-Individualization of Life:

Parallels Between the Generative Principles in Psychological
and Biological Development 147
CHRISTEN A. BLOM-DAHL I Emanuel Swedenborg's Physical
and Metaphysical Revelation 167
SPAS SPASSOV I Metaphysics and Vitalism in Henri Bergson's
Biophilosophy: A New Look 197
PART THREE
THE EGO, SUBJECTIVITY, AND THE INCARNATED SUBJECT
FERNANDO MONTERO MOLlNER I El Mito de Ia Subjetividad 209

FRANCISCO LOPEZ-FRIAS I Ortega y Gasset's Executive I
and His Criticism of Phenomenological Idealism 229
MASA YUKI HAKOISHI I Becoming of Ego and the Incarnated
Subject 249
JESUS CON ILL I Reason in Vital Experience in Ortega y Gasset 267
PART FOUR
HUMAN CREATIVE VIRTUALITIES RADIATING AT THEIR PEAK
MARLIES KRONEGGER I The Creative Source: Rodin 281

PATRICIA TRUTTY-COOHILL I Visualizing Tymieniecka's
Poetica Nova 303
v. c. THOMAS I Authenticity and Creativity: An Existentialist
Perspective 317
N. A. KORMINE I The Ontology of Artistic Time and the
Phenomenology of Husser! 333
PART FIVE
LIFE TIMING ITSELF CREATIVELY THROUGHOUT AND BEYOND
JORGE GARCIA-GOMEZ I A Bridge to Temporality:

Phenomenological Reflections on the Presence of Things Past
and Future According to St. Augustine's Confessions 341
ANTONIO CALCAGNO I Actio, Passio et Creatio in the Endliche
und ewige Philosophie of Edith Stein: A Poetico-Personal
Response to the Challenges of Postmodernity 369
IDDO LANDAU I Meister Eckhart on Temporality and the
"Now": A Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Interpretation 387
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
DANIEL ZELINSKI I Zen and Tymieniecka's Three Movements

of the Soul 397
PART SIX
CREATIVE PERMEATION OF VITAL SENSE:
THE AESTHETIC SENSE OF LIFE AND SCIENCE
LUIS FLORES H. I The Imagination as the Origin of Science:

Rupture and Continuity with the Quotidian Lifeworld 405
WOJCIECH BALUS I From Mourning to Melancholy: Toward
a Phenomenology of the Modern Human Condition 411
JAN M. BROEKMAN I Mimesis, Law and Medicine 419
PART SEVEN
ATTUNEMENT OF SAMENESS AND AL TERITY IN THE
CULTURAL AND SOCIETAL NETWORKS OF LIFE
CARMEN LOPEZ SAENZ I A. Schutz: Phenomenology and

Understanding Sociology 435
STEPHANIE GRACE SCHULL I A Cultural Archaeology of the
Insane Genius 459
VLADISLAV BORODULIN, ALEXEY V ASILJEV AND VITALlY
POPOV I Schizophrenia as a Problem of the Theory of
Intersubjectivity 475
JOZEF SIVAK I Regne animal et humain: Nature intersubjective 483
PART EIGHT
DRIVE TOWARD THE UNITY-OF-EVERYTHING-THERE-IS-ALIVE
ZAIGA IKERE I Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Philosophy of Life

and the Fostering of Ecological Thinking 507
DANIEL R. WHITE I Spirit in Flames: Toward a Postmodern-
Ecological Phenomenology 517
W. KIM ROGERS I On the Mode of Being of Living Beings
and Their Environment: Preliminary Ideas for an Ecological
Approach in Philosophy 531
INDEX OF NAMES 549

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The present volume features in a special thematic perspective a portion

of the papers constituting the work of the Second World Phenomenology
Congress convened September 12-18, 1995 in Guadalajara, Mexico.
In the Introduction (The Theme) we will present the specific signif-
icance of this work. Let us here express warmest thanks to our hosts,
Dr. Santiago Mendez Bravo, Rector of the Universidad del Valle de
Atemajac, to Dr. Sergio X. Vazquez, President of the Instituto de Terapia
Gestalt Region Occidente (INTEGRO), our co-host and co-organizer, and
to Dr. Miguel Jarquin Marin, President of the Organization Committee
of the Congress, for their generous hospitality which permeated the
marvellous atmosphere of friendship and cordiality characterizing our
congresses with a unique human warmth, felt and appreciated by all
participants.
My thanks go also to my assistant Dr. Tomasz Panz for his attentive
and dedicated work in the organization phase of the Congress. The
promptitude and carefulness which he brought to this task has certainly
facilitated the participation of many scholars coming from afar for the
first time to this wonderful country of Mexico. In this respect we are
deeply grateful to our Mexican colleagues belonging to the closer or
further extended membership of the INTEGRO, especially to Professor
Sergio X. Vazquez himself, for having opened their homes to host foreign
scholars and show them around - helping them to discover the beauty
of Mexico, which we all left with regrets and a yearning to return.
A special note of appreciation has to be offered to both directors of
INTEGRO for offering a reception at which the Ibero-American Scholars
gathered in order to found a new Society of the World Phenomenology
Institute, the Sociedad Ibero-Americana de Fenomenologia. This society
being thus founded, we extend our thanks to Professor Dr. Jorge Garcia-
Gomez, of Long Island University, for having accepted the responsible
post of Secretary General of this scholarly body. The steps to establish
it are under way.
Now it is time that I express my great satisfaction with the work
done before and during the conference in typing the program, registra-
ix
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/1, ix-x.

1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
X ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
tion, and numerous other tasks by my most dedicated Assistant Editor,

Robert J. Wise, Jr. It has been for many participants and myself a pleasure
to have him with us, continuing the task he performed before at the
First World Congress of Phenomenology which we held at Santiago de
Compostela. On these occasions the precious labor he performs behind
the scenes for The World Phenomenology Institute is seen in the fore-
ground. He has established himself as an active partner of our scholarly
pursuits.
He was assisted in the Guadalajara activities by Louis T. Houthakker,
our Administrative Assistant who "behind the scenes" keeps our mem-
bership and conference participation records and is responsible for
the distribution of Phenomenological Inquiry, our review. His faithful
dedication is most precious for the Institute's day-to-day progress.
Last but not least, we are grateful to Mr. Wise, Miss Isabelle
Houthakker and Mr. Mitchell Seagrave for the copy-editing, proofreading,
and indexing work on these volumes, which their attentive care will
see through to publication.
A-T. T.
THE THEME
PHENOMENOLOGY WORLDWIDE
Worldwide phenomenology has been revived, and reverberates in innu-

merable ideas, reflections, and insights, having acquired a new identity
and a new platform in the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human
Creative Condition. From its source a century ago the stream of phe-
nomenological thought has assidously meandered - cutting its way into
novel emphases: the eidetic, the transcendental, the life-world, the body.
In this last decade it has been seeking a new set of identifying princi-
ples and a new network of associative links. In short it has been seeking
a "reincarnation." It is precisely this new life of a reincarnated phe-
nomenology that we are going to present in this four-book publication,
as unexpected as it may seem.
Indeed, phenomenology, this once powerful philosophical tool and
current, has disseminated its inspirational ideas, reflective tendencies,
seminal intuitions all over the universe of scholarly pursuit. In the process
the original association of these within the context of phenomenolog-
ical theories has become diffused so that it is difficult now to distinguish
easily just when the adopting of a phenomenological approach to an issue
is justified. There is simply no recognized criterion for present day phe-
nomenological thought.
There is a tendency to talk about "phenomenologies" rather than "phe-
nomenology" as a common denominator of the various theories in which
phenomenology abounds, at least in name. Does this diffusion amount
to total loss of phenomenological identity? Or of a criterion?
These sharp questions almost lose their edge when we consider the
general philosophical climate of today. Succeeding the phenomenolog-
ical enthusiasm for certain, indubitable, or, at least relatively valid
cognition and faith in its possibility, is a new philosophical atmosphere
permeated by a radical loss of philosophical faith - rampant relativism,
and the abandonment of any claim to truth, "objective truth," "neces-
sary truth," "ultimate truth," indeed even of the "truth of the facts." Even
the possibility of raising the question of truth seems to be obliterated.
Criterion? Of what?
In the face of this pessimistic wave, I submit that not only the work
xi
A-T. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Lll, xi-xvii.

xii THE THEME
of our Congress, but also all the work the World Phenomenological
Institute has published in many volumes, over twenty-seven years, with
the number of adherents constantly growing, makes it manifest that we
have more today than diffuse theories with some pretension, for lack
of a better word, to be phenomenologies. I further submit that there is
a) a core of common commitment that brings the otherwise disparate and
widespread conceptions of research into harmony; b) that there are foci
of universal validity which serve as pointers for the association of ideas
and their subsequent "networking" with reference to a context as wide
as it can be projected; c) a basic faith in the possibility of a valid pursuit
and advance in the disclosure of reality and irreality in its concatena-
tions; d) most obviously, however, and this is the crucial point for
reflection that could claim to be "phenomenological," is the overt or tacit
assumption of immediate, direct evidence which lies at the roots of all
human experience: direct evidence accompanying states of affairs, objec-
tive formation by the mind, emotional complexes, intentional acts, etc.
It is with reference to this root-evidence that we may measure the degree
of, and the modes of, validity of our thinking, reflecting, feeling and
judging. This direct evidence is the source of givenness in its positing
acts. It also accompanies all its operations, as Husserl has pointed out.
This direct evidence is the guarantee of reality in the praxis of life for
all living beings as well as the point to which all mental and spiritual
acts of life converge. It carries a power that no devious speculations
may uproot without falling into an irremediable chaos.
This commitment to the validity of human experience in dealing with
reality, objectively valid for all living beings, as well as to yielding a
legitimate access for the probing mind to the reality's nature in order
to view its workings and to assess its powers, allows praxis and theory
to work in tandem for the progress of human life. It is matched by the
human experiential capacity to gain insight into the rules and regulations,
laws and reasons upon which reality with the human mind included is
suspended, a capacity which I discovered a long time ago to be useful
and which I termed "conjectural inference."
Thus, overtly or tacitly it is the conjectural inference which taking
off from the differentiating reconstructing of reality by the human mind,
becomes the tool of the inquiry into the "hidden," inner workings of
Nature, bios, life, cosmos on the one hand, and of the human self-inter-
pretative effort in the human spirit, on the other. In short, it is the
"natural" tool of the human mind, which relentlessly seeks to calculate
THE THEME xiii
not only the elements of its existence but also its sense, as well as the
sense of everything within and without.
This brings us to the central point which human creative virtualities
constitute for our common research and which will come out forcefully
as such in all the four books of the present publication.
Presenting them, let me first state that since our First World
Phenomenology Congress in Santiago de Compostela and the four-book
publication of its work, we have witnessed its influence upon the philo-
sophical scene at large.
This first Congress manifested a deep seated transformative progress
in the phenomenological orbit at work in enunciating some basic new
and original points of philosophical reorientation. This Second World
Congress of Phenomenology marks a crucial step in advance over the
previous one. These original ideas which emerged there in their pristine
freshness were in the Second Congress already cornerstones of a novel
field of inquiry. We witness now a complete tum-over of the philosophical
priorities and, through the novelty and originality of the new guiding
ideas, a reincarnation of phenomenology in the philosophy of life. In fact,
instead of (what the pessimistic minds would expect) vastly disseminated
and loose-end research, we have gathered from the Second World
Congress a rich harvest, palpitating with ideas and philosophical vigour.
Older and younger scholars from all around the world brought a treasury
of insights, ideas, conceptions; and, remarkably enough, this widespread
variety situated within the field of the phenomenology of life and of
the Human Creative Condition naturally threw some anchors, and delin-
eated some common lines of encounter toward each other, such that a
meeting of minds could yield a further nourishment.
Let me point out that this new orchestration of philosophical ques-
tioning which allows the reorganization, the re-shuffling, the re-
interpretation of the classic mind, is due to two main perspectives into
which phenomenology of life - and by the same stroke the organiza-
tion of the Second World Congress and of these present four books -
falls: first, the unravelling of the inner workings of life which opens
an entirely new field of research; second, the revealing of the creative
virtualities of the Human Condition. They open together this new field
I am talking about.
Precisely four cornerstone ideas are bringing about a complete trans-
formation of the "scenery" of phenomenological pursuits, as well as
philosophical pursuits at large. They are the cornerstones of a "new
xiv THE THEME
order"; of a new formulation and distribution of questions, a projection

of a new "field" because they are superseding the classic assumptions
of traditional philosophy cultivated in classical phenomenology following
the philosophical tradition.
I mean here in the first place, the priority of the creative act of the
human being over the cognitive intentional act. Second, there is the
revealing of the human Creative Condition as being pivotal in tracing the
specific human powers, which undercuts the previously assumed cen-
trality of transcendental consciousness and the strictly human-conditioned
intentional system. Third, there is the realization that the creative act
of the human being is the meeting ground for all human endeavors:
vital action, sociability, artistic work, spheres of the human spirit, all
domains of cognitive pursuit (scholarly work, etc.), and hence the spread
and order of our work in all realms of human endeavor - cognitive,
practical, artistic such as we may witness in the present work. Fourth,
and the foremost idea, is the key-principle opening this new horizon of
the phenomenology of life, that of the ontopoietic self-individualiza-
tion of life.
It is in this essentially dynamic, evolutive progress of life as the cosmic
event that one of its phases emerges as the Human Creative Condition;
creativity is the radical formative novum within the entire expansion
of life's functions. It is the creative transformation of life operated in
the crystallization of the Human Condition that projects our human
universe; that offers the human creative act as its Archimedean
point. The first volume of this four-book publication of the Congress
brings out these cornerstones. This is introduced by the study of A-T.
Tymieniecka. Indeed, her visionary idea of "the Great Plan of Life" is
exfoliated against the background of the new field. This vast, all-encom-
passing, limitless field is the territory of the profound, otherwise "hidden"
workings of life ranging between the cosmos, whose horizons escape
us, and the universe of the human spirit. "The plan" emerges more clearly
in some circuits and more dimly in others as the above enunciated cor-
nerstones determine. Though the field of life has undefined and maybe
undefinable parameters, the bold proposition of the "Great Plan of Life"
is not as strikingly against common sense as it may appear to the philoso-
phers of the current pessimistic wave, or to those who seek grounding
for their loftier aspirations in the imaginary idea of Being separated, in
itself, from beings and from the reality as it is lived and being experi-
enced. On the contrary, its idea is of paramount urgency. The enormous
THE THEME XV
progress of the inquiries of the life-sciences and the other sciences

along with the falling apart of our more tangible probings into the
workings of the spirit, leaving the human being without a firm foothold
for his/her individual understanding of his "place" and "role" and
"destiny," call for an attempt to seek an overall network within which
human beings can situate their existence amidst those of the rest of living
beings. Moreover, and it is more strikingly from the side of the life
sciences as such that the outcry comes, there is an urgent need for finding
at least the outline of a basic, foundational blueprint which brings together
all the main operations of the inner workings of life being investigated
but so far only as disparate fragments. It is these two exigencies, the
call for the underlying blueprint of life, on the one hand, and the call
of the human spirit for an understanding of life in its cohesion that
underlie my proposal of the "Great Plan of Life."
It is within the perspective of the second exigency that we focus
upon the Archimedean point that is THE CREATIVE EXPERIENCE
of the human being in its primogenital work of establishing the specif-
ically human functioning of drawing from the reservoirs of the Human
Condition.
Let me repeat what I have voiced so frequently, that within the evo-
lutive advance of the forms of life, or types, the phase in which the
Human Condition is introduced by the incessant drive of life forces
constitutes such a striking moment, the advent of a functional transfor-
mation and augmentation of life's individualizing forces, that the very
significance of life acquires totally new, original modalities. Indeed it
is this surging of the creative virtualities of the Human Condition within
the evolution of life that allows the operational life-systems to enlarge
their operational instruments and skills, to expand them and foster further
means for processing the wealth of material projected ever anew by the
now emergent Imaginatio Creatrix as it sets to work. The function of
this specifically novel creative life-station within the ongoing stream
of life plunges deep and gives us a full measure of the creative trans-
formation of vital functioning that brings about the universe of the human
spirit. It is to this "plunge" into the creative forge, which the fine arts
and literature have the privilege of typifying in a most essential way,
that we will devote Book Two.
The creative expansion of life's significance into the specifically
human modalities of "culture" is yet another perspective in which our
work is to be viewed. Morality, ethics and cultural differentiation on
xvi THE THEME
the one hand, and the meanders of individual integration with and attune-
ment to the human group, on the other, with its loss of links by which
to participate in and retrieve it, the good and evil as points of oscilla-
tion in the evaluating of human relations ... all this will be treated in
Book Three.
However, a most important perspective which encompasses all this
research and which has been present throughout our own work these
past years, a striking perspective which phenomenology of life has
opened, together with the work of the World Phenomenology Institute,
has revealed the cornerstones enumerated above. It has deepened and
gathered momentum since our first world congress. These serve as new
points of departure for the phenomenological quest after the final reason
of things. This perspective has profoundly affected the approach of
scholars to the classic phenomenological authors. Their attention being
awoken now to the phenomenology of life, has discovered hitherto unob-
served points left out in previous lines of interpretation and which now
come out forcefully in the new vision founded on our cornerstone ideas.
As a matter of fact, for some time now examination of HusserI's late
writings and notes have shown that he himself had seen the fulfillment
of his endeavors in a "scientific phenomenology of life" (see A-T. T.'s
introduction to Vol. L of Analecta Husserliana). Ideas concerning life
and focusing upon human life are to found in Max Scheler and numerous
phenomenological authors such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (cf.
Arion Kelkel, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L). The idea of life in its bio-
logical sense is to be found in Conrad Martius (cf. A-T. Tymieniecka,
Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LVII). Thus a new interpretative perspec-
tive enriches our inquiry. Special attention is due to Ortega y Gasset
and his follower Julian Marias, who both gave voice to a philosophy
of life proper on their own account. But most strikingly there is a reason
for a new reading of Edmund Husserl. I propose a thorough reinterpre-
tation of Husserl himself, one that is not prompted by his own statements
about his findings, but by analysis of the genius which he unfolded. Such
a reinterpretative analysis is initiated, such that the main tenet of the
phenomenology of life, namely the life's self-individualizing principle,
is seen lurking through the Husserlian analytic net (cf. A-T. Tymieniecka,
Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L). Numerous examples of this new inter-
pretation of the classics of phenomenology have been published in our
Analecta Husserliana volumes in response to the topics of the phe-
nomenology of life which were proposed. These new foci of interpretation
THE THEME xvii
will attract our attention throughout these four volumes, but a special
attention is devoted to them in Book Four.
One could say that the great renewal of philosophical reflection and
thinking which occurred in the second half of this century due to the
revitalizing influence of philosophical sensibilities through existential
thought, personalism, the philosophical anthropologies of Plessner and
Scheler, the phenomenological psychiatry of Binswanger, hermeneu-
tics, semiology and the like is now bearing ripened fruit- these influences
having now been incorporated into their proper place within the phe-
nomenology of life, the new field of inquiry. Underlying them all lies,
in fact, the field of the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Creative
Condition.
Indeed, radiating from the center of human creative virtualities being
crystallized in the human sphere of inner life as well as in human coex-
istence with others, the co-creation of the self with respect to the Other
WHO IS co-creating himself eradicates the modem solipsistic assump-
tions opening a perspective upon the deep-seated trans-actional weavings
of the specifically human world of existence: the polis, citizenship, rights
and obligations in interplay between the self and the other.
It is with the Human Condition as actualized in the unfolding central
self-individualizing agency (cf. A-T. Tymieniecka, Analecta Husserliana,
Vol. L) of the self-hood in the networks of trans-actional as well as
personalized experiential empathy and reaction in the oscillation between
the self and the other that the studies of the Fourth Book are concerned.
The final section of the volume is devoted to the contribution made to
this inter-human conundrum of life forces by the productions of the
"higher" sphere of the human spirit, that is by culture.
It is not possible in this brief introduction to do more than outline
the main perspectives of the new field for philosophy that is the
Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. The reader
is invited to see that philosophy at work in detail as it proposes itself
in the content of the books.
INAUGURAL LECTURE
THE GREAT PLAN OF LIFE

The Phenomenology of Life's Return to the Sources
of Western Philosophy
INTRODUCTION
Progress in philosophy is questionable. It is not only that we nourish our-

selves on the theories and ideas of the thinkers who preceded us, that
we then establish our own thought (or what coming out of our own reflec-
tion we consider to be "our own" thought) with reference to previously
established theories, but when we find that our own ideas coincide with
our predecessors' insights or intuitions, it is as if a stamp of authority,
testimony that "things are this way," is conveyed upon them.
Actually, each new thinker does contribute corroborations, nuances,
new approaches to, or perspectives on, the real. Thus, I submit that
instead of moving in a "circle," philosophy, like life, advances in a
spiral move-ment. So it is with philosophy/phenomenology of life and
of the Human Condition. Although, I declare that phenomenology of
life as philosophy par excellence is opening a new philosophical per-
spective, one new in Western thought, and is outlining an original system
of thought that could have emerged only at the confluence of ideas,
insights, results obtained by present day science, culture, and the entire
history of philosophy, nonetheless, it is to the reflections of Heraclitus,
which surged forth at the initial phase of Western thinking, that the crucial
innovative intuitions and the development of them laying the ground-
work for the phenomenology/philosophy of life are to be traced.
Heraclitus startled his contemporaries and has been tantalizing thinkers
throughout the history of Western philosophy with his strikingly provoca-
tive statements going against prevailing philosophical attitudes and
running in the face of common sense, that is, the "natural" attitude of
the human being. Their enigmatic, puzzling nature intimates a mysterious
depth often seen as an occult wisdom eluding the rational philosoph-
ical mind. Would this really be so? Furthermore, throughout history his
insights into the nature of change have been swept aside by most and
the gist of his thinking identified globally with his vision of the ever-
lasting flux of all things: panta rei. Is this ready identification correct?
A-T. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/1, 3-29.

4 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
Is there not in Heraclitus another insight into the nature of things, which
instead of leaving perpetual change free to reign wild in a haphazard
way, counterbalances it with a search for order? It is actually this latter
insight that animates Heraclitus' reflections throughout.
It is my intention to show here how Heraclitus' dispersed and cryptic
statements betoken intuitions relevant to the basic questions of philos-
ophy, inviting further corroboration and renewed questioning in depth.
Numerous great thinkers in history nourished by Heraclitean insights have
given them specific adumbration within their philosophical frameworks.
It is enough to mention Hegel, Marx, Heidegger. However, it is extra-
ordinary that a fully outlined phenomenology of life and its ontopoiesis
has independently, out of an inspiration entirely its own, validated,
reaffirmed, and carried further the foundational inquiries of Heraclitus as
well as the main intuitions guiding his answers to them. It is as if the his-
torical development of scientific research as well as of our Occidental
culture, by which the phenomenology of life and of the Human Creative
Condition was prompted, has reached a point at which Heraclitus'
thinking comes fully into its own, flux and order being reconciled in
our philosophy. In the phenomenology of life and its ontopoiesis, and
of the Human Condition, it is the logos of life that accounts for the
flux as well as for the order of the All in their indissociable nature. Its
incipient focus falls upon the innermost, primogenital nucleus of life's
ontopoietic course and aspires to chart the inner network of that ontopoi-
etic unfolding with its ties to all the factors that subtend it and so disclose
the inner workings of life, the common genesis of both flux and order.
SECTION I
THE OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT
A. The Intuitions Inherent in Heraclitus' Declarations and the

Questions They Raise; The New Corroborating Answers Given to
Them by Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Condition
The great points of the philosophical concern, or cornerstones of the
Heraclitean vision of the All, center upon the nature, possibility, and
distribution of order. First and foremost, there is the "great plan," the
universal plan of all things which directs the universe, the "account"
of all, or the logos. 1 Second, Heraclitus raises the question of how this
plan could be discovered since the ordinary man lives without even being
THE GREAT PLAN OF LIFE 5
aware of it in his everyday practical cognitions. 2 Heraclitus considers

the possibility of bringing the plan to light as the attainment of a special
wisdom. 3 At the same time, in the Heraclitean view, which goes counter
to classical as well as contemporary skepticism, this attainment is within
human reach. In the philosophical expanse between these two poles lie
Heraclitus' startling and enigmatic insights into the nature of reality,
which in entering into the universal plan would be directed by it. Here
we strike the crux of the matter: in the Heraclitean view the discovery
of the plan calls for the investigation of the real constitution of things. 4
However, how can things be distinguished, what may this "real con-
stitution" reveal if, as Heraclitus insists in his vision of "panta rei," things
are, all is:
I. (a) in perpetual flux; 5 and (b) this constitution itself lies at the cross-
section of radical opposites,6 all things remaining in a process of
perpetual change. 7 How can we then differentiate them? How, fur-
thermore, could the coherence of a plan, of the universal account (tou
logou, brought out in Fragment 1) be conceived, since:
II. the differentiation of real things occurs through the play of "oppo-
sites" - be they opposite forces, qualities, relations - and there is
an intrinsic law of opposites: they remain in perpetual change. 8
We are immersed in perpetual flux, then, but there must be - as
Heraclitus' arguments indicate - an intrinsic law of the differentiation
of things within it.
In fact, and here we come to the crucial point of his vision, which
offsets (balances) the engulfing doom of flux, Heraclitus affirms
throughout insistently that the differentiation of reality is measured out:
(a) there is a measure in all things in the universe and life; 9 (b) the soul
also is ordained by its very own measure; 10 (c) and so is society.
In raising the question of measure as the indispensable factor of reality,
Heraclitus challenges us with three significant and profound questions.
First, what is this measure that in its universality holds for all the sectors,
nay, all types and singularities of the real? Second, how within this per-
petual flux of change in which the very constitution of things unfolds
and which is governed by the law of opposites can we find and ascer-
tain their intrinsic measure? Third, assuming that, as Heraclitus believes,
there is a special kind of knowledge that within the manifestation of
reality common to all is available to only a few, what are the grounds
of its possibility? How can we reach and legitimize it? How can we grasp
and express it?
With this last question we reach the bone of contention. Indeed,

Heraclitean views about the constitution of thing, of reality, of the world,
the cosmos ... run counter to our current rules of rationality and logic
as they have been established in Western culture, and not without reason.
Opposites as the constitutive factors of the real, should, it would seem,
cancel each other out. In any case, unless substantiated by the intrinsic
constitutions of things, they remain abstract notions. Heraclitus' insis-
tence on the complementarity of their interrelation does not suffice to
account for an ordering sequence upon which the Occidental type of
logic, rationality, order as such relies: the laws of non-contradiction,
the excluded middle, and identity, seen as guaranteeing the differentia-
tion and identity of the real, and upon which the Occidental reconstruction
of reality, of the manifestation of life, of human transactions, in brief,
Occidental logic, relies. Hence, there follows the question: How could
the human mind even, first, gain access to the core of being and becoming
and so grasp the constitutive rules and norms, their separating and
unifying links but by dealing with and using the established rules
of Occidental rationality and logic, and, second, express them in the
rationale of a "plan," an "account of things," the Logos? Following the
Heraclitean lead we seem to see even the possibility of philosophy under-
stood in its full aspirations undermined and rendered helpless before
skepticism.
However, in following Heraclitus' lead, are we irrevocably pitched
against the laws of logic? It is up to the phenomenology of life to take
up this basic challenge and to explain how we find access to the "hidden"
springs of reality, 11 by what means we may follow the changing consti-
tution of things with a mind shaped by traditional logic, and so grasp
the plan of All?
Having reached the question of the seemingly radical opposition
between rationality and flux, we will treat that question first.
B. Flux versus Stasis: The Logic of Contradiction

versus the Logic of Essences
Is this opposition valid? Is the aporia that it opens at the heart of phi-
losophy well founded? I answer in the negative. We do not need to
introduce a new type of logic (e.g., the dialectic) in order to mediate
this aporia. It remains precisely up to the phenomenology/ontopoietic
metaphysics of life to transcend this aporia by establishing upon its
groundwork the common essential core of the constructive logos. Let

us begin by establishing a provisory equipoise between them, provi-
sory because it is the intent of this study to lay down its foundations
in depth.
Undoubtedly throughout the history of Occidental philosophy there
runs a fascination with the seemingly stable, static forms of reality. In
our common-sense attitude, which is the leitmotif of our life conduct,
we constantly struggle with change. Change, the fleetingness of every-
thing within and around us, is our constant enemy.
We are perpetually concerned in following our intrinsic transforma-
tions that they conform to a "norm." We have to consider when planning
action that it adjust to the changing tides of the circumambient world;
we witness our entire beingness growing and flourishing and then
shrinking toward an irremediable extinction. In short, we are caught,
together with all living beings, in the world of which we are a member,
in perpetual change. And yet we maintain our identity and steer our
course in meandering moves. We tame the flood of change by pro-
jecting "objective" forms by means of which we project a network of
interconnections among the moves of change; we articulate these
according to the abstract patterns that we introduce into the flux. In brief,
we differentiate and grasp instants of the flux of things in universal forms,
structures, essences, and principles of our mind that are like honeycombs
which we fill with our sentient and emotive stuff. We thus dominate
the flux of change, at least partly, but enough to project a relatively stable
life network within which we carry on our life course. Our experience,
our imagination, our ingeniousness fill the honeycomb to overflowing
with marvelously expanding life dimensions; this is the manifestation
of life that we project. 12
It is this manifestation of life, the world around us, the heavens and
the stars all moving in apparent stable permanency, this manifestation
that is life's "glory," and to which we will return further on, that for
obvious reasons constitutes the object of marveling, fascination, and
unending inquiry for the Occidental thinker. And the Aristotelian logic
that has fashioned our culture and science for centuries is rooted in and
expresses rationality by means of the principles and modes of compo-
sition of the structures that manifest themselves by means of the work
of the human mind.
Is the concrete-in-flux that reality remains in according to Heraclitus,
with its logic of opposites, a logic of contradiction, to be seen as radi-
cally opposed to the logic of essences? Such an opposition is unwar-

ranted. Reality is neither pure fleetingness, a passing dream, a mirage
set upon moving sands, nor is it the depository of immovable, immutable
atemporal entities residing within an equally imperturbable network of
interrelations, like the heaven of Platonic ideas. Here is an archetyp-
ical aporia. To elevate it is what I propose here. Upon the groundwork
of the phenomenology of life and of the Human Condition, we will
discover that the intrinsic means of the flux, of change, of advance are
the selfsame means that bring about articulations, structuring, and the
entire apparatus of the manifestation of life (that is, of the logic of
essences).
Sharing Heraclitus' insight into the real, that the gist of all is flux, that
we cannot enter the same river twice, and even, as my unforgettable friend
Jean Wahl used to emphasize, maybe not even once, we will improve
upon Bergson in his belief that the flux of life is haphazard, that it moves
by bounds and whims. I have proposed as the principle of all princi-
ples, the constructivism of life. Life is the Pandora's box hiding all the
secrets of reality.
As Julian Marias stated, the recognition of life as the focal subject
of philosophy was delayed till our century; he had in mind the voice
of Ortega y Gasset. That voice, however, did not carry far enough and
quickly faded. First of all, he failed to find the key to Pandora's box
and did not find the crucial links between philosophy and the sciences
of life. It has remained for us to do so.
C. Outline of the Main Tenets of the Phenomenology of Life and

of the Human Condition. The Key Principles for Transcending the
Aporia between the Fleetingness of Being and Its Essences
I submit: It is life that transcends our aporia and answers all the ques-
tions underlying the seeming oposition between the logic of essences and
the logic of contradiction. Heraclitus insistently affirmed that whereas
common knowledge is "in the open" and shared by all, knowledge of true
reality, "wisdom," is hidden. Yet we have access to it. His idea of the
"uncovering of the hidden," of aletheia, has attracted particular atten-
tion in our times. It inspired the metaphysical speculation on the hidden
that in Heidegger is identified with the notion of Being. Although
Heraclitus' insight into the "hiddenness" of the roots of reality appears
in the phenomenology of life as a very pertinent feature of double-faceted
reality, it finds on that ground a nonspeculative, concrete crystalliza-

tion. Not a hidden being, but a primogenital origination and genesis of
beings as onta comes out of hiding, principles and vehicles of becoming,
of living beings as such. What is revealed are the "inner workings" of
life's unfolding, generating, progressing, which simultaneously bring
in the differentiation of beings and their existential interrelations, tem-
porality, space.
These inner workings of life do not reach the surface of life's "objec-
tive" manifestation but subtend it and carry on its progress. They offer
the basis for its relative stability while remaining out of sight, hidden
from the resplendent light of the accomplished life they carry.
We will then, in what follows, excavate this subterranean ground of
life and all beingness and show how the inner workings of life bring
in a constructive complex movement and order and spread tentacles
toward the furthest limits of relevance giving meaning to the cosmos
as well as to societal life, culture, and the life of the human spirit, in
short, how they reveal the strategic coordinates of the great plan along
which the Logos of life unfolds.
In the first place, we will uncover the vehicle of the Logos of life -
the self-individualizing process that proceeds from within, radiates
without, and advances ahead.
Second, we will follow the thread of life to the disclosure of the
next primal means of life - its primeval web, which is woven over the
perpetual flux and subtends its cyclic order, the cyclic order of unfolding
life.
Third, we will see that while the phases of life return in cycles, their
concrete individualized constitution-in-process is never the same, it
having not a circular but a spiraling order.
Fourth, we will show that in the differentiation of living types
life's innermost functioning progressively loosens the grip of repetitive
entelechial direction. Hence, the Human Condition as a specific phase
of the constructivism of life surges with its unique inner system of radi-
ation and in evolving carries within itself all the strings of bios and yet
is endowed with the virtualities - unique - of the vertiginous creative
mind. Here the mystery of the possibility of wisdom is to be plumbed.
Fifth, we see that the spiral progress of the flux of life does not stop
at a climactic point of accomplishment. Passing through its zenith, life
projects a new spirit, that of the self-examining quest that dismantles
the very significance of its accomplishments and launches the human
being in search of the ultimate significance of all: toward the sacred,

the divine.
It is along the lines of these five points that I will attempt to examine
briefly the answers given to the Heraclitean intuitions by the scientific
phenomenology of life, answers found in life itself.
SECTION II
THE WEB OF LIFE AND THE ORIGIN OF ORDER
A. The Selflndividualization of Life:

Ingathering and Outward Radiation
From time immemorial philosophers have been marveling at the extra-
ordinary manifestation of a harmonious, coherent universe within which
individuals maintain relatively steady but always coherent courses of their
own within life's turmoil. The great issue is this: How may a coherent
universe of beings, things, processes, events in movement be realized?
Here is the issue of the phenomenology of life par excellence.
Whoever says "life," says self-individualization-in-existence. When we
attempt to differentiate between life and non-life, we distinguish as life
a coherent, self-promoting, constructively advancing segment of devel-
opment aiming at further progressive stages, over against an inert, static
mass that undergoes changes only as provoked by outside forces, and
projects no constructive designs. This means that life consists basically
of a sequence of moves, operations that form a design that remains
consistent within itself and is differentiated over against the external.
No matter at what cost of trial and error, the initial spontaneity of life
drives toward the surging of innumerable differentiating processes by
gathering in the germinal seeds/propensities of energies, synergies, forces
according to their propensities to fuse, mix, interact with each other
and linking them together in self-individualizing complexes, such that
due to their intrinsic coherence of inner operations that stand out against
external forces, they form what we distinguish as individual living beings.
I have elsewhere characterized the genesis of life and its unfolding as
fundamentally and originally consisting of such a self-individualizing
constructive progress. Let me point out here again that the vehicle of
this progress consists of a sui generis, unique to the individualizing
progress, "agency," which, to begin with, already carries the germs of
the developing virtualities to be unfolded. But it does not contain them
passively; to the contrary they are the equipment of its innermost propul-
sion to spring forth in a profusion of constructive moves. Finally, and
this determines the orientation of those dynamic steps that follow, this
"agency" contains an organizational schema, an "operational" schema
that proceeds in a threefold movement that draws in forces, energies,
matter from "without," their most specific processing and transformation
within, all leading to the enrichment of forces and the generation of novel
synergies, and in a twofold outward radiation: the radiation of the novel
synergies for participation in life's traffic outside the agency's dominion,
as well as the rejection of unusable material that in the outer realm of
life contributes to the furtherance of the basic material processes. This
core of self-propelling and transforming operations establishes the self-
individualizing process of life. (Following Aristotle and Leibniz, I called
it an "entelechial design" or "principle of life".) It as such performs
crucial functions with respect to the establishment of life's expansion;
doing so it brings about the primogenital articulations of the workings
of nature-life, that is, of rationality, order, significance.
To begin with, by its intrinsic self-oriented core, the self-individual-
izing process is a reservoir into which the wildly and idly floating forces
and synergies pour and flow together. It gathers them into its own life-
operational order and processes them into life's individualizing arteries.
That is to say, this process employs them for life's propagating purposes.
Then, the transformed and already life-informed synergies and forces
radiate with their acquired life significance outward, entering into and
invigorating other arteries of life projected by other self-individualizing
beings. Thus, the oriented operational nucleus of self-individualizing life
is a processional station of life with a threefold orientation, first by estab-
lishing a point at which forces are gathered, are transmuted into life
significant energies, with these energies then being radiated outward.
In this way living beings project the web of life - nature - a web that
draws all self-individualizing beings into the existential interaction of the
unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. Springing forth from the self-indi-
vidualizing entelechial nucleus, the ontopoiesis of life proceeds. (We shall
see what great significance the web of life continues to have in the
stage of life that is the human creative condition.)
B. The Ontopoietic Primal Ordering of the Inner Workings of Life

We have outlined above the ontopoietic axis of life's arteries. However,
having given an idea of the main tenet of the ordering of life, with the
insight that life means propulsion, force, and order- the self-individu-
alizing entelechial nucleus and its inner workings as well as outreach -
it remains to be seen how it projects the cornerstones of the ordering
of life. It is our contention that the inner workings of this primal factor
of life lay down the crucial principles of differentiation and unity.
Entering into the concrete workings of the intrinsic ontopoietic
nucleus, there are indeed to be distinguished two primal and concrete
operational systems by means of which the above-outlined intrinsic
nucleus of the self-individualizing differentiation and radiation of life
proceeds. Although both of these systems consist basically in gathering
in the life-material, transforming it appropriately, and radiating it outward
again, yet they differ basically in the seminal virtualities that promote
their initial differentiation. The first system is geared to establishing
the primal rational articulations; it dissolves the seeming contradiction
of opposites within the concrete progress of life. The other system aiming
at the promotion of the ontopoietic differentiation beyond the singular
individualization of life, dissolves the seeming universal contradiction of
necessity and contingency.
Let us first consider the singularization of the ontopoietic process.
Its constructive initial instrument is the ontopoietic operation. It is identity
and selfhood that are pursued within the multifaceted operations that
establish distinctiveness. First there is to be distinguished here the
ontopoietic moment of "operation." This "operation" is the performance
of the basic function of gathering and processing materials, synergies,
energies within the transformatory complex of the nucleus. This is the
poietic task of distinguishing between disjointed elementary particles
of forces and then carrying out the first transformational move. Not
only is the distinction here made between the "disjointed" and the "coin-
cident," but simultaneously there is the introduction of the transformatory
"passage" between the one and the other, a passage due to an elemen-
tary, primal "move." The first pair of elementary opposites are thus
dissolved within a change, a transformation, a move bringing them
"closer." The operation as a primal category of the ontopoiesis of life
performs the tasks of: (1) creating the above-mentioned passage between
elements that it simultaneously differentiates as disjointed; (2) releasing
in activation some of their propensities, which, inert and dormant, are
lying in wait as virtually present resources; (3) circumscribing closer and

further circles of its own dynamic proficiency even though as an oper-
ation it is per se restrictive and restricted as to access to the factors among
which it works; and (4) waiting for the coincidence of appropriate
elements allowing it to surge, or introducing its performance into a wider
net of operations, that is, into a process.
Let us mark the point: the dynamic moment of the operation serves
emerging and unfolding life by bringing in the basic articulations of order,
rationality; it lays the ground for the significance of "becoming."
C. The Game of Opposites in the Dynamic Unfolding

and Construction of Forces
As the basic operation lays the ground for what we would call life's
"initial rational articulations," on the one hand, on the other, it serves
to prepare the groundwork for the initiation of the self-individualizing
progress that projects itself in a process that sends forth its branches
like a young tree. We may see the dynamic complex of the process as
the vehicle of the proto-ordering of life. Process is the constructive
vehicle of order within the flux. A process, indeed, remains in flux
while its phases differentiate from each other. Each phase performs a
distinctive segment of operations drawing upon the circumambient/
environmental field and carrying out its assignment with respect to its
favorable, unfavorable or fostering impact. This "efficient" assignment
is "laying in wait" in the preceding phase, which, therefore, although
not actually present, is and is not disjoined from its successor. On the
contrary, its significance is adumbrated, amplified, efficiently reaffirmed
with respect to the constructive progress going on, progress that with
each phase delineates itself more clearly. Each actual phase, just now
in performance, already anticipates the next, the one into which it passes.
If this flux differentiates into phases at all it is first because of its con-
structive progress, and, second, because it is progress in a constructive
outline that introduces the now, the before, and the after as successive
stages, that is, introduces the succession of time with its sequence, its
instant, and its measure. It is the delineating ontopoietic progress in its
processional advance that introduces this constructive point of refer-
ence - constructive progress that meanders as a translacing continuity
of the intrinsic design of life that makes the river with its changing
water the same. In the primogenital ordering of the logos of life there
are no sharp edges between "what is" and "what is not"; the reality of
the constructive becoming emerges within an artery of processes that

is its "profile," its "design"; there is only the translacing continuity of
the self-individualizing life whose essence is being-in-process. The
human creative mind in its creative manifestation of life cuts into this
incessant flux, and by establishing correspondences with its "logic of
contradiction" it establishes objectified reality according to a logic of
its own, the logic of structures and essences.
Multiple lines of processes with multiple arteries of operations carry
the entire bulwark of the differentiation and articulation of life's primal
poiesis. In the rhythm of taking, processing, absorbing, and radiating
or rejecting, the rational principles of "sameness" and "otherness,"
of "inwardness" and "outwardness," of "penury," "sufficiency" and
"excess," are projected and installed. The fruits of a transformational
function, they radiate outward as vital principles of significance.
The three concrete phases processing the substances which bring in
the energy and material needed for the living progress to unfold are called
"metabolism"; but, as we have pointed out, that which since Vico has
been considered the focus of empirical nourishment is, however, not
restricted in its significance to the organic circuits of the ontopoietic
course. Metabolism is merely a single instance of the empirical embod-
iment of the overarching strategy of the logos of life which consists in
drawing upon all, transmuting all, and radiating onward. The same
transformatory system of gathering, transmuting, radiating/rejecting runs
through all the phases of the unfolding of life's ontopoiesis; it is its
axis. As a matter of fact, it reaches, as we will see, its peak in the
specifically human phase of the ontopoiesis of culture.
It should be emphasized that it is precisely in the self-individual-
izing principle of life's role as the axis of the entirety of life's expansion
(that is, of its cosmic, inorganic/organic, vital, sentient, societal, and
cultural significances) that lies its crucial role as the key to life as such.
Philosophies that are restricted to one of these realms alone (e.g., Jonas'
concentration on biology, Henry's on the inner self, Ortega's on the
human realm) do not reach to the springs of the unity-of-everything-there-
is-alive, that is, to life as such.
D. Life in Its Ties to Non-Life

There is certainly to be acknowledged a further reach of life's opera-
tions as well as processes throwing out cosmic articulations of order.
They establish and maintain the cosmic order, on the one hand; on the
other, they, from the perspective of life, prepare a profusion of synergetic

material to nourish life at its advent and so coalesce in congenial networks
forming a "nurturing zone" for life. They become life's relevancies. Their
essential difference from the processes carrying life itself is that the
latter consist in a most consistent, tightly organized processional nucleus
that assumes the role of an operational agency reposing in itself and
thus projecting an "innerness" juxtaposed to the "outwardness" from
which nutrients flow in and into which rejected elements go. This
operational consistency delimits the contours of "sameness" over against
the "otherness" of what lies beyond of "autonomy" reposing in itself
over against the "heteronomy" of what lies in the circumference of vital
operations.
Indeed, there proceeds a differentiation of elementary significance with
the advent of life that occurs in the bringing forth of opposites in forces,
qualities, tensions, with an infinite gradation of intensity between them.
Useful and noxious, hot and cold, light and dark, moist and dry, strength
and weakness, etc. Differentiated in the operations of the life-process,
they are, in fact, opposites in transition; they acquire their gradation of
"opposition" in the play of vital forces that transforms substances (see
Heraclitus, Fragments 11, 8, 51, and 126 in Diels). With this trans-
formability covering seemingly the entire field of Western thought, the
question of what there was first in the universe, that is, of what is the
irreducible primary substance, was pondered.
The game of life consisting in the play of trial and error, in the con-
fluence and transformation of otherwise disparate elements unfolds the
entire gamut of opposed tensions, and according to their intrinsic germinal
propensities they are differentiated into an infinite gradation of qualita-
tive or operational intensities, forcefulness, etc. bringing about extreme
points that oppose each other at the "opposite" ends of a common line.
These opposites maintain each other's "meaningfulness," as the meaning
of one horn depends upon contrast with the other; they remain infi-
nitely movable, in transition. This differentiation flows, indeed, from
the heart of the logos of life initiated with the cosmos on the one end
and culminating in the Human Condition at the other.
E. The Surge of Scanning and Spacing at the Protogenesis of Life

Indeed, in the nuclear proto-existential operations of life, those of coming
together, distantiating, processing, rejecting, transforming, generating,
that is, in the "scanning" of life's genesis, growth, fruition, diminishment,
extinction, "envelopment," and transformation again, etc., the "scanning"

and "spacing" (temporality and spatiality) unfold: succession, simul-
taneity, coming together, distantiation, moving "here," going "there,"
processing material "in-here," fishing for it "out-there," life projects
proximities, distances, coincidences, etc. that are the "trading posts" of
life's progress within the immeasurable network of the interchange of
actual and future, past and possible.
Amid the tensions between the opposites in perpetual strife, the
equilibria, that is, the adequate proportions, measures, equivalences,
are established; these equilibria hold all together and maintain living
beings' intrinsically orchestrated autonomy, allowing them to float in a
constructive progress upon the turmoil of conflicting forces in life's
dynamics.
F. Flux, the Constructivism of Life, Measure

We have struck a sensitive chord: measure. We asked at the outset how
can there be a measure within the Heraclitean flux? Leaving open the
question of whether there is a supreme instance of measure, for which
Heraclitus employs the metaphor of the Sun (the Sun being perhaps a
god?), we have to observe that the inner workings of life are imple-
menting a measure, that from the very start of the game of forces each
operation carries in its performance a "limit," a "circumference" already
lying-in-wait for the signal of budding life. This operation is itself
embedded in a "complex" of forces that all together establish its
"measure." Indeed, each element entering into fusion with another carries
in itself elements for which there lies a measure according to which
they may fuse and become transformed or reject each other. In short,
to say "perform an operation" or "transform" - each dynamic bursting
forth - means concurrently to valuate. 13 A comparison, a discrimina-
tive "weighing against each other" and establishing the "right measure"
of the dynamic bursting forth is concurrent with this valuation.
I would say that the constructive progress of life processing the flux
and harnessing its forces means transformation, and that transforma-
tion means measure. The dynamic flux of life can be harnessed only
because there are intrinsic "trading posts" for measure present in its forces
and ready to negotiate.
SECTION III
THE GLORIOUS ASCENT, THE SPIRAL EVOULUTION OF TYPES,
THE HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION
A. The Overarching Swing of the Self-Replication of Life:

Dissolving the Opposition between Contingency and Necessity
Life's differentiation proceeds from within. Amidst the crucial endow-
ment of the entelechial nucleus of life's self-individualization, prime is
the seminal capacity for singular self-individualizing progress, and second
in importance is the capacity for the intergenerative replication of types.
In fact self-individualizing progress carries within its system a replicating
code of virtualities and a mechanism for unfolding, that is, it lies within
the innermost virtualities of the entelechial nucleus to prompt genera-
tion within a new living individual and to bring it to an autonomous
life course carried on outside the nucleic womb. The striking phenom-
enon characteristic of life alone is that the novel being replicates the type
of its bearers (since its origination is triggered by a confluence of appro-
priate seminal moments from two differentiated kinds of individuals of
the same type). It is the replicating nature of this intrinsically orches-
trated process that accounts for the spread of life in projecting ever novel
nuclei for its expansion horizontally in concurrent "generations" as well
as vertically in a continuous succession of generations, vanishing,
receding, and incoming.
The replicating process rejuvenating life follows the life cycle.
However, this cycle assumes a unique line of ascent. The recurrence
of types does not guarantee their identity. This recurrence is not, as
philosophers assume, circular, but spiral. Due to variations in genera-
tive composition within and to transformative influences in conditions
without, the type undergoes a long winding transformatory change. This
continuity of the "same" type and yet the becoming of an "other" is
continuity-in-transition. The sameness of the type loses the sharp edge
of the necessity that it represents because the "same" is "in transfor-
mation"; and yet, it still guarantees a recurrence within the change.
The advance of types embodied in contingent, concrete beings is
contingent in the concrete while it is perduring in the universal-in-trans-
formation. Hence, we have the moving ahead with novel types emerging
through long stages of spiraling transformations carrying a measure of
change and advance.
In fact, it is by an essential transformation of the measuring modal-

ities of life's progress that we may grasp the gist of the spiral ascent.
To cut a long matter short, here is a loosening of the automatized por-
tioning of fused elements found in the operations of the simpler forms
of living beings allowing the advance of a self-individualizing progress,
what characterizes this progress most essentially. The automatic attune-
ment of elements coming together for the release of appropriate
"nourishment" that operates on the level of the least evolved forms of
life using the automatic closed criterion of "fitness," is with the advance
in complexity of life's inner mechanisms open to several options among
the matter available so that selection is left to discrimination, to choices
made by the individualizing being that progressively establishes an ever
more refined inner agency for dealing with this increased flexibility by
establishing an adjustment to the available seminal points of the measure
applied. Through this process the freedom to project measuring criteria
is attained. This attainment is accomplished with the glorious ascent of
life toward freedom in the Human Condition.
B. The Human Condition: The Flashpoint of

Inventive Rationalities in the Creative Forge
With the loosening of lockstep preordination in the mechanically adjusted
confluence of elements within the entelechial nucleus of self-individu-
alization and the life agency's concurrently taking on the task of seeking,
supplying and selecting elements for the transformatory processes of life,
there are to be distinguished numerious types of living beings ranked
along the ladder from preordination to selection, from entelechial deter-
mination to creative freedom.
In fact, I have written too much about the creative condition of the
human surge at the breaking point between determination and freedom
in their living translacing continuity by means of our creative virtuali-
ties to dwell upon the nature and composition of that august condition
here. Let me, however, for the sake of the argument running through
this paper, point out again the striking of the creative breakout of the
specifically human rationalities by means of which the living being selec-
tively projects its very own, creative self-individualizing life course.
As the individual does so, he or she concurrently endows with signifi-
cance, and enacts upon his or her own initiative, each step of life's course.
Here there is clear self-awareness in the life agency, the level of a self-
directing and all overseeing mind now having been reached, a mind
that allows the human being to encompass the circumambient condi-
tions to the point of forging one's own routes and proceeding like a spider
on its own thread.
Within the creative forge in which the creative virtualities have surged
as a novum in the spiral evolutive course of types by establishing the
phase of the Human Creative Condition, the inward/outward self-indi-
vidualizing process occurs seemingly according to the same set of
dynamic principles as always: ingathering, transformation, radiation.
However, now there enter into the transformation inventive/creative
virtualities that process in an unprecedented fashion the received material;
they invent innumerable novel rationalities and radiate them without, pro-
jecting into the circles of circumambient conditions rays of novel
significance: the specifically human significance of life.
In the Human Condition there is thus operated a unique encounter
between the "old" and the emerging "new." At this transitional station
of life thrown like a fisherman's net upon a stormy wave the myste-
rious potentialities of life are retrieved from the flux and through human
creative genius are brought to a glorious achievement, the manifesta-
tion of intellectual life.
C. The Creative Manifestation of Life

The Encounter of Both Modes of Rationality - Stability and Flux
It is in virtue of the creative virtualities - aesthetic, moral, and intel-
lectual- that the human being became "human," that is, having unfolded
a specific type of nucleic life agency, the mind, they bring forth this
glorious spectacle of life. This is life within a world extending in trans-
parency in all directions as if encircling us, life as the center of its most
fascinating intricate ramifications, the meaningful rays of which attract
us, draw or repel, play upon our sensibilities and desires, tantalize us
awake, and inhabit us while asleep. This seemingly unlimited realm of
surprises awaiting at each tum of the road, and endless expanse of expec-
tations, unformulated hopes, and wild dreams in which we are entangled
with other human beings with whom we play ever renewed card games,
establish friendships with or part from as enemies, and all this so clearly
"objectified" within the structures with which our mind frames all
relations, bring everything forward and out of hiding into the light of
reason.
Well, here it is that the human mind steering the individual human
station set upon the flux has projected all means of a relative stability
in the manifestation of the logos of life. We constantly seek to maintain
that stability and the further progress of which the specifically human
self-individualization-in-existence consists by, in fact, projecting ever
new means for subjugating the flux upon which we float, in launching
upon the waves ever new kinds of craft.
The recognition of the order of objective reality thus follows - as
was pointed out at the outset - first this urge to maintain oneself afloat,
the structures of objectivity being the capital, principal correlate of this
existential urge, necessity, device. There it is that the logic of essences
finds its foothold.
We pursue our life facing and dealing with this glorious manifesta-
tion of life, and there are objective structures that uphold it that we
have to deal with in forging our own life course.
Let us marvel! Is this not a glorious accomplishment of life to have
begun with the nucleic dust, dust, dust and to have reached this infi-
nitely varied and yet coherent world radiating the spectra of colors and
sounds and yet without dashing the harmony between them, fulgurating
in the ingenious achievements (societal, cultural, etc.) of human group-
ings, animal species, climatic zones, vegetation ... and all this brought
to full light by the objectifying creative genius of the human being?
Does this overwhelming achievement of the manifestation of life mean
its radical distantiation from the underlying flux? And from the logic
of contradiction? Here we may ask again whether "wisdom" is accessible
to us. It is precisely at this point that having uncovered the breakout of
the creative human condition in the evolution of types, and having
focused on the creative act of man that explains how we can know, we
enter into the spring of creative self-individualized life.
SECTION IV
THE SACRAL SPRING AND THE REVERSAL "BELOW,"
"ABOVE"; "NOWHERE," "EVERYWHERE"; "NOW," "ALWAYS"
A. The Median Plane of the Human Soul within the Manifested

Inward/Outward Operative Extension of the Human Life Agency
The human being capable of the far-reaching awareness we discussed
above is also capable of self-awareness, and consequently we distinguish
functional territories within the human self-individualizing life agency.

All living beings show themselves to be alive through a "spark of life"
which runs throughout their frame, an "animus." Expanded in the creative
human frame this "animated" region covers the entire functional terri-
tory of the self-individualizing creative agent. As anima, the soul carries
as well the functions of vital organic significance as the creative mind;
it serves them all. And yet, at the peak of this glorious creative mani-
festation of life in the specific creative endeavor of the human being,
the creative propulsion of the logos of life loosens its hold upon the forces
of the soul that nourish and sustain it.
From within itself, its own resources, the soul, as I have shown else-
where in great detail, releases a virtuality of its own, a virtuality that
in expanding goes counter to and dissolves slowly the great swing of
the creative logos: a virtuality seeking the "ultimate sense" that the logos
of life falls short in seeking.
Here we meet the Heraclitean mysterious intuition of the unfathomable
depth of the soul (Fragment 45). Indeed the quest for the ultimate
proceeds again along the tension of opposites but does not have a measure
common to either side. It proceeds "deeper and deeper" into the secret
meanders of the soul and seeks "below" what Coleridge in Kubla Khan
intimates to be an unfathomable depth of subterranean caverns inac-
cessible to the human being, through which "the sacred river runs." I will
call this depth the "sacral spring." 14
Strange to behold, when the cycles of a singular life's individual-
izing course streaming from its entelechial nucleus and continuing in
spiral fashion in the creative forge is completed, when the spiraling cycles
of the evolving types of beings pass into one another in their striving
onwards in the contingency intrinsic to the transformation as such tend
toward some or other finale, then the spontaneous onward swing of life
turns from its zenith toward its nadir, from its ascent to its extinction,
and is elevated yet again by the prompting of the sacral spring of the
soul's very own unfathomable resources. In fact the specific complex
of functions that phenomenology of life differentiates as the soul plays
a role of its very own, meeting the Heraclitean vision of being without
confines and augmenting of its own the human soul's pick-ups. Life's
"conatus" as Spinoza and Unamuno after him would say, picks up the
self-individualizing device of emanation from within by shifting gears
from striving to unfold the soul's sacral destiny in a transnatural quest
for another type of accomplishment in its cycles, not in the contingent
22 ANN A- TERESA TYMIENIECKA
now but in eternity. This sacral course spins its thread "above" life and
"within" life. It moves with the all-pervading tension of the opposed
directions passing from the spirit of life to the spirit of the divine.
B. The Reversal of Life
Given this tension that this vision of an "other" life that is "within"
and "without" the life of nature and culture provokes, the human transnat-
ural streak of the soul plays its innermost drama involving all. This
tension of fleetingness and perdurance provokes an arduous struggle to
salvage from the imperturbable pendulum of nature, the coming to be
and passing away, some "absolutely" valid moments. The soul forges
its very own vocabulary of significance for life.
In a quest propelled by the sacral spring, myriads of new meanings
alien to life's concrete and abstract meanings are arrived at: these consist
of experiences with significance of hazy contours, feelings with vague
content, and forebodings as well as strivings that from our innermost
depths lift up and carry, the soul from a "below" not found on life's maps
- a nowhere in the geography of the world - bringing up with it myriads
of transformatory intuitions, intimations that are "above" the frontiers
of life's own most elevated creative meanings, that exist in a sphere
also off the map of life. The sacral spring sends forth an entire new
universe, which, although it appears to be the reverse of the one that
we know and dwell in concretely, can in fact transform it in our expe-
rience of meaningfulness and enactment of life.
This new universe of meanings that are strangers to the vocabulary
of the logos of life emerges amid this innermost tension between the
logos of life and its nadir. The logos of life belongs to the older universe.
The new vocabulary from an "other" world has crucial points of corre-
spondence to that of the lifeworld. But faith exceeds belief as found in
the world of vital interests, hope exceeds expectation as found in the
world of vital interests, and charity exceeds love as found in the world
of vital interests. And forgiveness utterly transposes hate in the world
of vital interests, and self-sacrifice, self-interest. Thus, this "otherness"
breaks into the autonomy of the lifeworld revealing as it were a reverse
side: at the limit of the tension between these opposing values we even
speak of establishing in this world the "kingdom of the Divine." 1314
This "otherness" belongs to life, from which it appears to draw its
natural dynamisms projecting its battle inside its arteries- and it belongs
not to life, counteracting it and suspending its meaningfulness.
Where does the sacral quest come from? Where does it tend to? No
wonder that emanating from within the soul's intimate resources and
enveloping nature-life with its meaningfulness, the soul can be seen as
the source from which in stages there emanates the entire expanse, natural
and sacral alike, that divinizes it all. Considering the fact that the soul
is the foyer, the gathering and transforming forge, of all nature-life,
there is a temptation to attribute the transnatural to the manifestation at
the opposite hom, making of it an epiphenomenon of life. Yet being of
life and not being of life, the sacral domain combines them moving
upon the heart of this tension. It is, indeed, at the heart of the human
being that the great game of salvaging life, the great drama of incarna-
tion and redemption, is being played.
All seems suspended upon this ultimate and crucial thread as it is
pulled in opposite directions: "whereto," "wherefrom" remains open-
ended. We here reach the edge of the final questioning of Heraclitus, who
credits the Sun with "setting the final bonds" for life, doubling it,
however, with the "primal god." Here is the frontier of the phenome-
nology of life proper and of the metaphysics of religion, a frontier at
which we stop today.
CONCLUSION
THE GREAT PLAN
I hope to have in this brief outline at least evoked the great and glorious
vision of life. The innumerable arteries of the fulguration, as Leibniz
would say, of ever new self-individualizing beings, of their intermingling
in dynamic unfolding, of their transformations in cyclic progress while
they promote the continuity of life's swing ... the myriads of signifi-
cant articulations that the human creative mind brings into this great game
of forces ... all this proceeding against the tensions of seemingly opposed
forces, energies being set on a collision course, makes the possibility
of a great plan for it all, a plan spoken of by Heraclitus, as remote as
it seemed to be given his logic of contradiction. Here we have attempted
to unravel the outlay of the dynamism of life precisely through its inner
workings, which entail the logic of the concrete, the logic of dynamic
becoming, a logic at odds with the constitution of objectivity in the struc-
tures of the manifestation of life, with the manifestation of our human
reality in which we pursue our own self-individualizing course according

to the rules of the logic of this constituted objectivity, a logic of stasis
and relative perdurance in contrast with that of change.
Yet I submit that we have now come quite close to envisaging the
possibility of the great plan of All. As a matter of fact phenomenology
of life, having elaborated its entire field, is uniquely prepared to lay down
the plan's cornerstones and describe its main outline.
A. The Key: The Axis of Life

First and foremost we have unraveled from the conundrum of life's
dynamic interplays the axis that runs through all the phases of its
unfolding: inward/outward oriented self-individualization and an intrin-
sically transforming scheme of operations equipped with its very own
initial propulsion and an entelechial seminal unfolding design. (a) This
auto-promoting self-initiating progress of life carries an entelechial core
in the empirical unfolding of nature-life: inorganic and organic, be it
vegetal or animal. (b) When it loosens its automatic ordering until the
entelechial code opens up predetermination to the creative freedom of
the human condition, the self-individualizing is then self-invented and
self-enacted given the new significance of the conscious self. (c) It is
also from within and in a self-specifying, self-projecting swing that the
soul projects her transnatural destiny in a direction that is the reverse
of the empirical and creative courses both. The logic of contradiction
is the axis of the manifestation of life as well as of its reversal and ele-
vation in a spiral. It is the axis of all the arteries of life's dynamisms
as well as its great plan, the key to the investigation of science, culture,
religion alike in their different conundra of significance.
B. Philosophy, Metaphysics, Wisdom Possible

Due to the Creative Virtualities of Man
We have shown how life itself defies the spurious opposition between
the logic of opposites and the logic of essences in its inner workings,
which ground the manifestation of life and offer pointers for structuring
the spectacle. In virtue of what, however, do we arrive at the excava-
tion and grasp of the inner workings of nature-life while dealing with
the logic of this manifestation? Heraclitus attributed knowledge of it to
an access to the real that is different from natural cognition, an access
to the "inner constitution" of things. But how is it possible for the few
who, he said, can attain this access to penetrate to the innermost arteries
of life, which remain hidden, mute and do not reach the surface of the
manifested world of life, cognitions of which are shared by all? This is
a question that cannot be answered. With the constitutive powers with
which we have established this marvelous edifice of the world of life, we
slide above its surface. It is the creative act of the human being that offers
the Archimedean point giving purchase in the quest for wisdom. The
human being gathers within his or her creative forge all the strings
along which a human person operates on the level of nature-life; he
ties them in a knot in order to reach further into its own operational realm.
With cognition/constitution geared to survival and vital praxis proper
to hoi polloi, ordinary people, we slide upon the surface of the knot;
we reach into it, however, and untie it for our own purposes following
in the arteries of the creative act that not only draws directly upon the
inner workings of life but also refashions its resources. That is to say,
with the creative act we discover the underlying cornerstones of the great
plan and may proceed to investigate its articulations.
The human being, the creator, participates fully in all the circuits of
the great game of life and has urgent reasons, more pressing at the present
moment of history than ever, to strive to unravel and grasp its inner-
most sense. Phenomenology of life aspires merely to have offered the
key to this search and to outline some of its main strategies. 15
NOTES
1 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The First Principles of Metaphysics of Life; Charting
the Human Condition", Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXI (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1986) and, inter alia, Logos and Life, Book 1: Creative Experience and the
Critique of Reason, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1988); Logos and life, Book 2: The Three Movements of the Soul, Analecta
Husserliana, Vol. XXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988); Logos and
Life, Book 3: The Passions of the Soul and the Elements in the Ontopoiesis of Culture.
The Life Significance of Literature (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).
2 I refer here, above all, to Fragments 1 and 2, of course:
Fragment I
tOU ot A.&yov tooo' 6vtoc; aiel USVVtOL y(vovtm liv9pW1tOl KUL7tp6o9ev il CtKOOOm
Kal CtKoooavtec; to 7tp&tov. ')'tvo~Jivwv ')'itp Tt<ivtWv KUtc'x. tov A.(yyov t6voe Ct7tdpmotv
f:oiKaot 1tEtpw~vot Kal 1twv Kal E~v tmovtwv 6Koiwv t:yW otTJj'EUflllL Katc'x.
cpuotv otmpf:wv fKUOtOV KUL cppcii;;wv t5Kwc; EXEL. toile; OE liAA.ovc; <iv9pW1tOV<;
A.av9avn 6K6ou tyep9vtec; Ttotofutv ISKwo1tp 6K6ou d)oovtec; f:TttA.aveavovtm.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7. 132.
Fragment 1
But of this account, which holds forever, people forever prove un-comprehending, both
before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although all things
happen in accordance with this account, they are like people without experience when
they experience words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing (as I do) each thing
according to (its) real constitution, i.e. pointing out how it is. The rest of mankind, however,
fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do
while asleep.
Fragment 2
()Lo81 l:JtE09at t/P <stJV/P>. [tO\JtEOtl t/P KOLV/P. S\JVO~ )'ilp 6 KOlVO~.] tOU A.&yov 8'
i:6Vto~ 1;vvou l;;roovotv ot JtoUol roc; to(uv l:'xoVte~ 4>P6Vllotv.
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7. 133.
Fragment 2
That is why one must follow that which is (common) [i.e, universal. For "common" means
"universal"]. Though the account is common, the many live, however, as though they
had a private understanding.
Fragment I might have been the opening statement of Heraclitus' presumed book.
But even if it finds itself up front in an arbitrary way, it offers nevertheless a scope, a
synthesis, a leading idea of logos (tou de logou), of an "everlasting plan" according to
which all things happen. This idea of logos has received numerous interpretations in
line with the widespread philosophical use of this term in Greek philosophy, as well as
in response to numerous intimations coming from the texts of the fragments themselves.
Our interpreting it as a "great plan" seems to synthesize not only the various side meanings
which the term logos displays and to which it is related but to do justice to the issue of
rationality as an order of things, on the one hand, and the form of cognition, on the
other.
First, it is almost unanimously accepted by interpreters that in Fragment I a radical
distinction is made between the prephilosophical knowledge of the ordinary human being
and the knowledge of the philosopher. Already Sextus Empiricus pointed out that,
according to Heraclitus, man is furnished with two organs for gaining knowledge of
truth, namely, "sensation and reason" (Against the Mathematicians 7: 126-134). Of these
organs he considers sensation to be untrustworthy and posits reason as the standard of
judgement. However, although it is reason that he declares to be "the judge of truth," it
is not "any sort of reason" but "that reason which is 'common' and divine." As human
cognition, reason has to have a specific and unique access to all things to which it is
common. This is a special insight into reality, an insight that allows one to penetrate
into the hidden laws of reality, laws inaccessible to the ordinary mind. In this sense the
logos of the human mind can be said to be, as Euripedes says quoting Homer, "like the
day brought to them by the sire of gods and men" (Odyssey 18: 136-137), to be "divine"
then. By "divine" the Greeks tend to mean that which is above the power of humans,
what eludes direct experience and explanation. Empiricus quotes to this effect Euripedes,
who addresses Zeus by saying that it is "hard to puzzle out" whether he be "necessity
of Nature or mankind's intelligence." Heraclitus speaks about "insight" in Gragment

114. He emphasizes its universality: "those who speak with insight must base them-
selves firmly on that which is common to all" (all things?). Here he brings the meaning
of the "common" to the level of significance of the law, and of a law "higher" than the
laws of a society, city laws. Insight refers to the one law, the "divine law," the law of
All. Common to all, the logos bespeaks the everlasting law. (However, it remains to be
seen in virtue of which human beings who are otherwise "asleep" in sensuous common
sense may attain the "private" knowledge that is insight. Heraclitus does not answer
this question.) Thus Heraclitean logos is simultaneously insight into the hidden spheres
of reality which reaches the level of universal laws. Robinson, in his presentation of
Heraclitus' fragments emphasizes that the logos of which Heraclitus speaks in Fragments
1, 2, and 50 means essentially "statement." "This statement is uttered by the cosmos itself,
which descriptively tells of how things are, and prescriptively lays down patterns of cosmic
activity that serve as the basis for human laws" (T. M. Robinson, Heraclitus. Fragments:
a Text and Translation with a Commentary [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987]).
I use Robinson's translations here finding them the most subtle and accurate in compar-
ison with others.
Second, Logos understood as a statement of the inner law and measure of cosmic
(and human) reality corresponds with the understanding of it as the factor of coinci-
dence (homolog en) among the insights penetrating reality binding them together then while
bringing forth the statement, the law, the world order.
Third, since Schleiermacher the fundamental meaning of the Heraclitean logos has
often derived from the verb legein understood as gathering, putting together, the gath-
ering of the similar in order to give an account of it in a statement. (See Edwin L. Minar,
Jr., "The Logos of Heraclitus," Classical Philosogy 34 [1939], p. 323.)
I understand the complete meaning of the Heraclitean logos to be that of a state-
ment, an account of the universal, the "great" plan of reality, of the All.
3 Cf. Fragment 1.
4 Ibid.
5 Although the majority of Heraclitean statements have the innermost flux of things under-
lying them, the most striking and discussed ones are Fragments 9la (91b) given here in
the original and in the English translation by T. M. Robinson. (We will follow this as
our main translation consulting, however, the major translations in French, German, and
Italian.)
Fragments 9Ja? [9lb]

[nota.J.I4>'yap oiJK i::mtv J,$fjvm 15L~ tljla.iJtlj>Ka.9' 'Hpnt<A.Ettov oill5 9'VIltfl~ ova Ca.~
ot~ fuva.oem Ka.tu tstv <tfl~ a.iJtfl~>. o.u- osiitTJn Ka.l taxm IJ.Eta.~oA.fi~l oKLI5V11m
KUL1ttlALV <Jl!Vtl')'EL [().UiAAOV OE owe 1tMLV oiJI5' OOtEpov, O.U' lif.IU)] (JlJVL<Jta.ta.t
Ka.i Ct1tOAEL1tEL KUL7tpO<JEL(JL KUL ii1tEL<JL.
Plutarch, De E apud Delphous 392b.
(a) [For, according to Heraclitus, it is not possible to step twice into the same river,
nor is it possible to touch a mortal substance twice in so far as its state (hexis) is con-
cerned. But, thanks to (the) swiftness and speed of change,] (b) it scatters (things?) and
brings (them?) together again, [(or, rather, it brings together and lets go neither "again"
nor "later" but simultaneously)], (it) forms and (it) dissolves, and (it) approaches and
departs.
6 Fragment 126
t<l 'lf"UXPU 9Eptm, 9piJ.(>v 'lf\Jxtm, tJwov aua1Vtm, Kapc~~A.eov VOtL~tm.
John Tzetzes, Scholia ad Exegesin in Iliadem, p. 126 Hermann.
Fragment 126
Cold things become warm, a warm thing becomes cold; a moist thing becomes dry, a
parched thing becomes moist.
1 Fragment 88
taut6 t' E"vL ~wv Kal t9VTJKO<; Kal to twrnupoc; Kal. to Ka9ooov Kal veov Kal
"Y'1Pm6v. tel& ,Up 1.1ta1toovta Kiva totL KciKiva 7t<iA.Lv 1.1ta1to6vta tauta.
Pseudo-Plutarch, Consolatio ad Apollonium 106e.
Fragment 88
And, (?) as (one and) the same thing, there is present (in us?) living and dead and the
walking and the sleeping and young and old. For the latter, having changed around, are
the former, and the former, having changed around, are (back) again (to being) the latter.
8 Fragments 10 and 51.
9 Fragment 94
''HI..w<; ")Up OUX tlnP~llotm !ltpa l B fJ.tl, 'EpLVU<; fJ.LV 6LK1}<; 7t(KOUpoL
l:Supt1ooumv.
Plutarch, De exilio 604a.
Fragment 94
The sun (god) will not overstep (his) measures. Otherwise (the) avenging Furies, minis-
ters of Justice, will find him out.
Fragment 100
... [7tpL6aouc; <iN b t)A.wc; 1tLot<it11c; mv Kal. oKo1toc; 6p(~LV Kal ~pa~uLV Kl
civaBLKvUVL Kal civac~~CvLv j.lta~oA.cic; Kal] 6Spac; a'L 7tavta ~oum Ka9'
'Hp<iKAELtOV ....
Plutarch, Quaestiones Planonicae 1007d-e.
Fragment 100
[The sun ... shares with the chief and primal god the job of setting bounds to ... (the)
changes and] seasons that bring all things, [according to Heraclitus].
10 Fragment [115]
'lf\JXilc; l:otL A.O;Q<; tamov aiJ!;rov.
John Stobaeus 3.1.180a.
Fragment [115]
Soul possesses a logos (measure, proportion) which increases itself.
11 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "La Fenomenologia in quanto nuova Critica della Ragione",
L'Atto aristotelico e le sue ermeneutiche. Enrico Berto and Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo
(eds.) (Rome: Herder, Universita Lateranense, 1990), pp. 232-255.
12 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "La C{)ndizione Umana all'lntemo dell'Unita-di-tutto-
cio-che-e-vivante," in the series Collana Dialogo di Filosofia, No. 11 (Rome: Herder,
Universita Lateranense, 1994) and Logos and Life, Book 2: The Three Movements of
the Soul, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXV (Dordrecht: Kluuwer Academic Publishers,
1988).
13 Commenting on Fragment 115, Diels writes: "Die Seele is mit ihrem wesen, ihrem
Gesetz (logos) in dem Urprinzip am ttiefsten gewurzelt. Ihre grenzen reichen also an
die grenzen des Ails" (Hermann Diels, Neue Jb (1910), p. 12).
14 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Dal Sacro al Divino", Teologia razionale,filosofia della
religione, linguaggio su Dio. Enrico Berti and Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo (eds.) (Rome:
Herder, Universita Lateranense, 1992), pp. 337-357.
15 Discovering the creative act of the human being as the access to the hidden inner
workings of life exhibiting through their ramifications and constructive relevances the
inner order/law of being/becoming, phenomenology of life seems to meet Heraclitus'
intuitions as interpreted by Wilhelm Capelle: "Die Natur der Welte enthuelle sich ihm
als er in die Tiefen seiner eigenen Natur Hinabsteigt" (Die Vorsokratiker; die Fragmente
und Quellenberichte iibersetzt und eingeleitet [Leipzig: A. Kroner, 1935], p. 148).
PART ONE
LIFE, LOGOS, PHENOMENON

Miguel Jarquin Marin and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.
LIU QINGPING
LIFE AS LOGOS AND TAO

On Husserl's Ideas and the Comparative Study of
Western and Chinese Philosophies
The problems of a comparative study of Western and Chinese philoso-

phies, or, more generally speaking, of a "phenomenology as the cross-
cultural philosophy of man," 1 are not the "thematic" object of Husserl's
philosophical research at all. Nevertheless, he does put forward some
stimulating ideas for such a study in his later writing Philosophy and
the Crisis of European Man. The purpose of this essay will be to develop
the topic around these ideas and thereby to engage in an intercultural
dialogue between Western and Chinese philosophies.
In the monograph, Husserl presents a striking contrast between Greek
and Oriental philosophies, holding that "the attitude of these two kinds
of 'philosophers,' the overall orientation of their interests, is thoroughly
different." "Only with the Greeks," he says, "do we find a universal
('cosmological') vital interest in the essentially new form of a purely
'theoretical' attitude." On the other hand, although Chinese and other
Oriental philosophies may also lead "to universal cognition of the world,"
their attitude seems to remain a primitive one, which while Husserl some-
times calls it "mythical-religious" as well, is "practical" in essence,
especially in the contrast with the theoretical one of Greek philosophy,
because the latter by every standard is "thoroughly unpractical." What
is more, since "attitude bespeaks a habitually determined manner of
vital willing," and "in its historical situation mankind always lives within
the framework of some sort of attitude, its life always has a normative
orientation and within this a steady historicity or development," the
conclusion seems to be that there must be some fundamental differ-
ences or sharp cleavages between the ideal images of life, the spiritual
structures and the cultural accomplishments of the Oriental and the
Occidental peoples. 2
Within the extent of the comparative study between Western - or
"European," as Husser} expresses it - and Chinese philosophies, i.e.,
leaving aside the other Oriental philosophies, I would like to say that
33
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/1, 33-56.

34 LIU QINGPING
the idea is not a mere conjecture of a scholar but rather an essential

insight of a thinker, in spite of Husserl's lack of historical knowledge
of Western and, to a greater extent, of Chinese philosophies. Of course,
it will be shown later that the attitude of Chinese philosophy is neither
purely primitive nor merely mythical-religious; but, in my own opinion,
it is the very contrast between the spirit of reason and the spirit of
practice, or in Husser} 's own words, between the theoretical and the prac-
tical attitudes, that constitutes the most essential difference between
Western and Chinese philosophies; 3 and this difference of the philo-
sophical spirits has indeed been greatly and deeply influencing the two
types of life that Western and Chinese peoples have lived so far, so
that we can even say that the two kinds of spirits respectively repre-
sent the Logos of Western life and the Tao of Chinese life. It is true
that the two terms, as the basic concepts of the two philosophical tra-
ditions respectively, have both some common implications of "speaking"
and "necessary laws" in etymology; yet it is also quite clear that they
are always defined and interpreted in the rather different ways, i.e. the
former in the light of the rational spirit in Western philosophy, and the
latter in the light of the practical spirit in Chinese philosophy. Surely
in this regard Husserl does speak something true and profound about
the comparison between the two philosophical traditions.
Besides, it is also worth noting that Husserl demands the placement
of "every spiritual image" and "all types of human beings and of cultures"
into their "historical connections" from the point of view of the spirit's
history, albeit he eventually attempts to reveal the extraordinarily his-
torical teleology that is "innate only in our Europe." 4 That might be
considered as another essential insight, which is especially unusual with
Husserl, for he deals little with historical problems in his earlier writings.
In fact, if we recognize in an equivalent sense that there is also a dis-
tinctive teleological historicity in Chinese philosophy, and thus probe into
the developments of each of the two kinds of philosophical spirits
according to the insight, their extraordinarily significant connections
in historical movements will manifest themselves more evidently and
the investigations of the above-mentioned contrast will become more
constructive.
For example, in following Husserl's way of teleological thinking,
we may find it justified that not only the theoretical attitude of Greek
philosophy, but also the practical one of Chinese philosophy, which
should be also characterized as an Umstellung or a transformed attitude
LIFE AS LOGOS AND TAO 35
like the former, can be "referred back to a previous, more primitive

normative attitude," i.e., to "the essentially primitive attitude, the fun-
damental historical mode human existence," whose basic character is that
"on the basis of generation men naturally live in communities - in a
family, a race, a nation."5 Indeed, it can be said in some sense that both
Logos as the rational spirit and Tao as the practical spirit had already
been latently included in the "originally natural life," in "the first prim-
itively natural form of cultures," because even primitive man also had
his aims and acted with reflection, considering practical possibilities. 6
Before the Chinese and the Greek nations established their own civi-
lizations and developed their own cultural traditions, the two kinds of
spirits were not gradually separated from each other and did not become
the distinctive innate entelechies in the humanity of the two nations
respectively and, as such, did not thoroughly control the changes of
their spiritual images as human beings and give to them the sense of
the developments in different directions of the ideal image of life and
of being, as moving toward the different eternal poles. Moreover, if we
want to search for the factual motivations in the concrete circumstances
of historical events by which the two kinds of spirits were introduced
into the philosophies and the existence of the two nations, it can be
also said that perhaps they lie just in the following fact: on the one
hand, the Greek nation founded its new communities as pure states, which
were based no longer on the consanguinity of clan but rather on the purely
economic, political and ethical relationships among the independent,
individual persons or "citizens," so that "that thaumazein could introduce
itself and at first become established in individuals," and "consequent
upon this emerges a completely new type of spiritual structure" and "a
systematically rounded cultural form," 7 namely, a rational spirit and a life
of Logos; on the other hand, the ancient Chinese nation still maintained
its life on the basis of generation or of consanguinity to the extent of
constituting the communities peculiar to it, wherein the economic-
political-ethical relationships and familial ones among the interdepen-
dent, socialized persons were always intertwined together, so that
the nation always put special stress on the practical orientation toward
its Umwelt, especially toward its political-familial communities, in
its distinctive spiritual structure and philosophical tradition, and thus
people led a life of Tao. We could even say that all of the most essen-
tial differences of principle between Western and Chinese philosophies
may be reduced to these specially historical situations that underlay
36 LJU QINGPING
and determined the different transformations of human existence of the

two peoples.
Still, it seems that there are some other important questions worthy
of being investigated carefully in the comparative study between the
two philosophies. For instance, how have the two kinds of philosoph-
ical attitudes or spirits developed themselves in their immanently
teleological frameworks of historicity and toward the different eternal
poles respectively after they emerged from the aforesaid historical situ-
ations? Is it possible that, having been so different and separate in the
past and even in the now, they will be combined and integrated, along
with the genuine human attitudes and spirits of other philosophies and
cultures in the world, into one and the same general philosophical and
cultural spirit "that draws the whole of mankind under its sway and is
therefore a progressive transformation in the shape of a new historicity"8
in the future? Or, on the contrary, would they remain in a sharp tension
of alienating and even clashing with each other for ever? In the explo-
rations of those questions, perhaps we could discover from Husserl's
monograph more insights as well as some one-sided misunderstandings
concerning the comparative study of Western and Chinese philosophies.
II
For Husserl, "the spiritual telos of European Man ... lies in infinity;
it is an infinite idea" that sustains a special class of cultural structures,
whose proper title is the "philosophy-science" and in which European
man pursues the absolute, eternal, universal, necessary and objectively
valid truth of the world as the lofty ideal in his "philosophical life," or
in his life of Logos. Thus "a new spirit stemming from philosophy and
the sciences based on it, a spirit of free criticism providing norms for
infinite tasks, dominates (European) man, creating new, infinite ideals."9
It is easy to ascertain that the spirit Husserl highly praises here is the
very spirit of reason, for the latter has usually been understood in Western
philosophy as an infinite ability of human beings to approach and to
achieve that kind of truth in a theoretical attitude. In fact, Husserl himself
makes it clear when he emphasizes that "the concept 'Europe' would
have to be developed as the historical teleology of infinite goals of reason;
it would have to be shown how the European 'world' was born from ideas
of reason, i.e., from the spirit of philosophy." 10
As mentioned above, Husserl considers the Greek nation as the birth-
place of the rational spirit, as "the original phenomenon of spiritual

Europe," and even thinks that the rationality in the original Greek sense
is one in "that noble and genuine sense." 11 It is true that Greek philos-
ophy confirmed the first original form of the rational spirit in the history
of Western philosophy, which, in order to distinguish it from the other
forms of the spirit in its later development, I would call the reason of
episteme, for it was aimed solely at necessary, universal and absolute
knowledge, which is directly opposite doxa based on the sense organs
and the contingent, individual and relative experiences, of the world.
At the same time, while its theoretical attitude is "thoroughly unprac-
tical," it still not only gave "the good old definition" of man as the
rational living being, but also tried to lay the rational foundations for
the political, ethical and other practical life of human beings, as shown
in such famous propositions as "virtue is knowledge" 12 and the like. In
this regard it is really the first principle of Greek philosophy that Logos,
as something common to all men, should guide and govern human exis-
tence as a whole, and stamp on persons, groups, and all their cultural
accomplishments an all-unifying character.
Nevertheless, this reason of episteme is, after all, a mere starting point
in the teleological historicity of the rational spirit. We should not over-
estimate it, for, compared with the rational spirit identified by modern
Western philosophy, it had more "naivete" and "aberrations," and even
kept in contact with the primitive "mythical-religious" attitude to some
extent. We can easily recall how Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
treated Logos, telos, the "ideas" or reason as something "divine" in a
mythical-religious way, and submitted that there was still a certain hier-
archical distinction among people as rational living beings. Besides,
Greek philosophy and the sciences based on it did not yet really lift
human knowledge of the world to the "scientific" level in the strictest
sense of the term, i.e., in its modern sense. In this regard, though Greek
philosophy indeed set up an ideal image whose dimension was the infinite
when it began to look beyond facts to ideas, its infinitude still lived in
finitude and was given a merely relative character. So, it is not surprising
that the reason of episteme as a starting point would necessarily undergo
further development in the historicity of Western philosophy.
We can perceive such a development even in the philosophy of the
Middle Ages. Husserl seldom speaks of it when he makes the leap from
ancient times to modern times, probably because he thinks that the
mythical-religious attitude is essentially a primitive and natural one,
38 LIU QINGPING
and even belongs to the Oriental philosophy alone. However, the Christian
philosophy of this era could be justifiably regarded to some degree as
a more sophisticated integration of the theoretical attitude with the reli-
gious one that is something "traditionally accepted" in Western culture,
or as "a blending of the absoluteness of God with that of philosophical
ideality," in which for the first time "God is, so to speak, logicized and
becomes even the bearer of the absolute logos," and His infinitude "is
reformed in the spirit of philosophical ideality." 13 Consequently there
grew up a new form of the rational spirit, which, carrying the "divine"
aspect of the Greek reason of episteme to extremes, might be called "reli-
gious" or "theological" reason. Thus Augustine, Anselm, Thomas
Aquinas and others always attempted to make use of reason, along with
Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies, as an instrument for searching after
the rational demonstration and elucidation of belief in God. Maybe such
"religious" reason had even more "aberrations" than the Greek reason
of episteme, but it is still one necessary stage of the teleological his-
toricity of the Western rational spirit, notwithstanding. Without it as an
intermediate link, the rationality "that became an ideal in the classical
period of Greek philosophy" would not have become the ideal of the
intellectual life of European man in the later centuries. Moreover, only
in terms of this religious reason peculiar to Western culture, could we
explain and understand why the Lebenswelt of European man, whose
innate entelechy is the very spirit of reason, has always been immersed
in such a deep-rooted religious atmosphere, why the ideal image of his
existence in the daily Lebenswelt is often one of the "divine" Logos.
Husser! pays more attention to the philosophy of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries in the monograph; perhaps, however, his teleolog-
ical thinking also shows more one-sidedness in this respect. Generally
speaking, he seems to emphasize the shortcomings or aberrations more
than the honors and achievements of modern philosophy, including both
rationalism and empiricism, and he affirms its achievements in the field
of science more than those in the other more practical fields of human
existence.
Yet, as is well known, it is during modem times that the spirit of reason
took a great leap forward in its teleological development, for it is just
in modem philosophy that reason itself became authentically human
and autonomous, no longer something "divine" and subordinate to belief
in God. In the sphere of science, for example, such famous rationalist
philosophers as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and others established
"scientific" reason in the strict sense as the primary form of the rational
spirit, and thereby highlighted the absoluteness, universality and neces-
sity of the scientific truth of the world as its ultimate norms and infinite
telos. Even Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume as
empiricists made their own contributions to the development of the
rational spirit by trying to base it upon perceptual experience, or by
limiting and even denying its functions in scientific knowledge and thus
bringing about tensions between the rational and the empirical; for
without their endeavors in this aspect, Kant would not have accomplished
his world-renowned philosophical revolution by synthesizing the rational
and the empirical with a most radical vigor in his critique of reason.
What is more, modern philosophy also tried further to set up the
supreme authority of reason in the more practical spheres of human
existence as Greek philosophy did, but at a new and higher level, for it
powerfully confirmed and convincingly accounted for such individual
human rights in modem society as freedom, equality, fraternity, democ-
racy and so on in the light of reason as the innate ability or natural gift
of every human being. I would prefer to call such a form of reason
playing an important role in the political, ethical and other practical
life of the modem Western Lebenswelt "Enlightenment" reason. The work
of modem philosophy in this respect is absolutely necessary and very
significant for both the rational spirit of Western philosophy and the
real existence of Western man, because it has really awakened a new style
of personal existence and a special type of humanity and resulted in a
new mode of sociality and a new form of enduring society, all of which
is essentially different from the past. In fact, reason as the essence of
human beings would be imperfect, abstract and even fragmentary without
this important aspect as an inseparable element. At bottom, human exis-
tence as a whole, even one following the Logos, cannot be held only
within the narrow sphere of science and philosophy, or even of pure
consciousness; rather, it embraces such abundant contents and aspects
as the religious, the aesthetic, the ethical, the political, the practico-
technical, and others, in itself, and is first and foremost existence in
the reality, or in the entirety of the "life-world." Thus it is natural that
reason has to exert an active influence on those aspects as well.
Though admitting that "universal philosophy, along with all the par-
ticular sciences, constitutes only a partial manifestation of European
culture," 14 and insisting that the sciences should not lose their ties to
human life, and thus putting forward the concept of the Lebenswelt,
40 LIU QINGPING
Husser! still tries to reduce European man primarily to the "philosoph-

ical and scientific man," human life to the philosophical and scientific
life, and thus regards the life-world as one that is of significance first
of all in the field of epistemology and scientific knowledge, i.e., as "the
intuitive environing world, purely subjective as it is. " 15 As a result, the
other more practical fields of human existence, along with the active role
of reason and the positive accomplishments of modem rationalism in
these fields, seem to vanish over the horizon of Husserl's transcen-
dental phenomenology to some degree, which is mainly concerned with
"pure" consciousness. As it will be shown later, the very tendency of
"scientism" comprises the fatal defect of HusserI 's philosophy and makes
it one-sided in some of its aspects.
Undoubtedly, there are indeed some serious aberrations in modem
philosophy, including the rationalism of the Enlightenment, in which
the European crisis has its roots. As Husserl points it out, "the crisis"
means "the downfall of a rational culture" and the "seeming collapse
of rationalism. " 16 As stated above, in the teleological historicity of
Western philosophy, the reason of episteme in Greek philosophy, the reli-
gious reason in the Middle Ages, and the scientific and Enlightenment
reason in modem rationalism actually constitute a progressive movement
of the rational spirit toward the absolute, universal, necessary and objec-
tively valid truth as its ultimate telos and infinite tasks, and each of
them as a historical fact belonging to this or that time "is the more or
less successful attempt to realize the guiding idea of the infinity, and
thereby the totality, of truths." 17 Then we find, however, that the phi-
losophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries launches a fierce attack
upon human reason and its telos and tasks, and makes a notable impact
on the real existence of European man. Consequently, the rational culture
and the life of the Logos peculiar to spiritual Europe is under serious
and powerful challenges. "The European nations are sick; Europe itself
... is in critical condition," 18 - of course from the viewpoint of the
rational spirit.
Due to the aforementioned tendency of "scientism," Husserl attributes
the origins of the crisis mainly to the naturalist, dualist, or objectivist
aberations of modem rationalism, particularly in its explanations of
human Geistigkeit, and he often regards it only as the crisis of the
"European sciences." It is true that the positivist and empiricist philoso-
phies and sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shake the
supreme authority of modem rationalism in the field of scientific know I-
edge to a great extent by placing the empirical above the rational; strictly
speaking, nevertheless, they do not totally deny the significance of reason
itself, especially in the practical fields of human existence. In this sense
they are neither irrationalism proper nor the major cause of the crisis.
Therefore, it is hardly possible to resolve the crisis merely by clari-
fying "the profoundest reasons for the origin of fatal naturalism," by
eliminating the dualist and objectivist absorption of modem rationalism,
or even by "grounding a purely self-contained and universal science of
the spirit" and grasping the fundamental essence of spirit in its inten-
tionalities by transcendental phenomenology.
In fact, only such schools of "renowned irrationalism" as Schopen-
hauer's and Nietzsche's voluntarism, Bergson's philosophy of life,
Heidegger's and Sartre's existentialism and so on, really undermine not
only modern rationalism but also the rational spirit itself, and advocate
"that rationality as such is an evil or that in the totality of human exis-
tence it is of minor importance." 19 And yet it is also clear that they
directly result from the "overrationalizing" aberration of modern ratio-
nalism rather than its naturalist, dualist or empiricist aberrations. Of
course, there is neither absurdity nor error in rationalism itself as the
essence of human beings; but, when modern rationalism placed special
stress only on the rational, namely, the universal and necessary aspects
of human existence, and overlooked and even dismissed the signifi-
cance of its sensual, individual and contingent aspects; rationality itself
became one-sided and even an evil. It is to be noted that not only would
human existence be fragmentary without the latter aspects as intrinsic
constituents, which cannot be simply reduced to and negated by the
rational, but they also have become more and more important in the
real and daily life of European man since the nineteenth century. In the
final analysis, it is the especially historical situation that gives rise to
the irrationalist reaction, which greatly highlights the significance of
the irrational and opposes it sharply to the rational not only in the field
of scientific knowledge but also in the more practical fields of human
existence, and thereby attempts to deconstruct Logos as the center of
Western life. It is in the very sense that the crisis is authentically the
"crisis of European existence," which is of more extensive and profound
origins in the real Western life-world. In this regard it can be said that,
while it brings about the alienation of Europe from its rational sense
of life and thus also becomes one-sided in essence, the irrationalism of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is still of some positive, neces-
42 LIU QINGPING
sary and even reasonable significance in the teleological historicity of

Western philosophy, just as "it can also be said that it belongs to the
very essence of reason that philosophers can at first understand and
accomplish their infinite task only on the basis of an absolutely neces-
sary one-sidedness"20 of rationality.
Now it is obvious that only when both of the two kinds of absolutely
necessary one-sidedness are sublated, can the crisis be overcome and
ended. Of course, it is still necessary for a genuine philosophy of
humankind to save the honor of modem rationalism and to keep taking
pursuit of scientific truth as an important task of the rational spirit and
of human life. Nevertheless, since the crisis of rational culture and the
tensions between the rational on the one hand and the perceptual and
the irrational on the other hand opened by it have proven that the absolute,
universal and necessary truth is not the totality of the ultimate telos
and infinite tasks of human existence and even of reason itself, it is
inevitable for us to set them up anew as a whole at a higher level. That
is why we need a new critique of reason as a primary prerequisite for
contemporary philosophy, by which not only will the rational reveal its
own one-sidedness and no longer be absolutized and monocratic in human
existence, but also the irrational will become a positive and indispens-
able element of human life and no longer be "what is contra-essential"
in human existence. It is my opinion that such a critique is possible
only through the integration of the rational spirit and the practical spirit
of human existence and human philosophy, because it is just in human
practical activities that the rational, the perceptual and the irrational all
have their deep roots.
III
For Husserl, the practical attitude of Chinese and other Oriental philoso-
phies is evidently inferior to the theoretical or rational one of European
philosophy in many respects, for the former seems to be something not
only "subservient to the natural interests of life, or ... to natural prac-
ticality," but also finite, perishable, pre-scientific, external and "real"
whereas the latter is essentially infinite, eternal, scientific, internal and
ideal. 21 Perhaps it is on this account that Husser} does not even try to
search for the teleological historicity in the Oriental philosophies.
It is true that reason is the essence of human beings; however, it is
not the sole one. Or rather, man is not only the rational living being
but also first and foremost the practical living being, for it is the creative
practice as the prototype of all human action that first establishes the
specificity of man over all other types of living beings. It should be espe-
cially emphasized here that the rational spirit, or the theoretical attitude,
is not something a priori innate in the human mind, but the result of
human practical activities, just because it is "a deliberate epoche from
all practical interests"22 that have precedent in human life. In other words,
if, as Husser! himself points it out, for the investigator of nature, "the
constant foundation of his admittedly subjective thinking activity is the
environing world of life," and "this latter is constantly presupposed as
the basic working area, in which alone his questions and his methodology
make sense," then the life-world is first and foremost a practical world,
wherein "man is oriented toward the world in all his concerns and activ-
ities ... , of which he considers himself a part.'m For example, the
passion of Greek philosophy for observing and knowing the world, or
"the theoretical interest that comes on the scene as that thaumazein, is
clearly a modification of curiosity that has its original place in natural
life as an interruption in the course of 'earnest living,' as a working
out of originally effected vital interests, or as a playful looking about
when the specific needs of actual life have been satisfied or working
hours are past," just as "from the art of surveying develops geometry;
from counting, arithmetic; from everyday mechanics, mathematical
mechanics, etc." 24 In this regard it can indeed be said that "I create" is
prior to "I cognize."25 Moreover, if "philosophical reason" represents a
new level of humanity and its reason, it can also be said to the same
extent that practical creativity does represent a new level of humanity
and its practicality. In the final analysis, the practical spirit or attitude
is also an essentially human spirit or attitude, because practical activity
is very human activity.
It is in this sense that Chinese philosophy takes a practical attitude
toward the life-world taken as its practical theme as well as toward every
philosophical problem. It is quite interesting that it defines the concept
"practice," or Wei in Chinese, which is one of the "key words" of tra-
ditional Chinese philosophy, in almost the same way as Husser! interprets
the word "live," namely, "as signifying purposeful living, manifesting
spiritual creativity - in the broadest sense, creating culture within his-
torical continuity"; 26 for Wei means exactly all the purposeful practical
action by which human beings create all the abundant cultural accom-
plishments in the life-world, especially in their social political-familial
44 LIU QINGPING
community. At the same time, Chinese philosophy always regards the

action peculiar to human beings alone, and thus thinks that practice is
the foundation of human existence as a whole. So, its "theoretical interest
is directed exclusively to human beings as persons, to their personal
life and activity, as also correlatively to the concrete results of this
activity.'m It is also in this sense that Chinese philosophy already shows
a specific concern, in the terms of contemporary phenomenological
movement, over "the modalities of human life" in practice, over "the irre-
ducible creative act," i.e., Wei, and over "the creative function of man,"
"man's power to 'act,'" "the acting person," "the human being in action"
within the context of actual existence from the angle of the practical spirit,
and thus it emphasizes that "the creative 'I can' carries the progress of
the human being from the vital origins, through the cultural world, toward
his specifically human destiny.'m It is in this sense again that Chinese
philosophy should be placed on the same level as Greek and even Western
philosophy, because it also defines the very essence of human beings,
though from a different orientation.
It is true that, in the practical attitude of Chinese philosophy, all knowl-
edge "has as its purpose to serve man toward his human aims, to enable
him to live the happiest possible life on earth, to protect that life from
sickness, from misfortune, need, and death." 29 That often makes it more
realistic and seemingly finite in some sense. Yet, on the other hand, it
may be considered also as one of its advantages, if compared with the
religious attitude that enable man to live the happiest possible life on
the "other side" or in the Kingdom of Heaven (so the practical attitude
of Chinese philosophy is not a religious one; rather, there is always a
want of religious tradition in the strict sense in Chinese culture just
because of its realistically practical spirit), or with the purely theoret-
ical attitude that enables man as a merely disinterested spectator of the
world to live the happiest possible life in scientific research or meta-
physical speculation. It is also here that lies the distinctive significance
and contribution of Chinese philosophy to human philosophy as a whole,
because it reveals some specifically essential contents and values of
real and practical life in human existence which are often overlooked
to some extent by Western philosophy.
Furthermore, there are also "a horizon of infinity for the future - an
infinity of generations finding constant spiritual renewal," and infinite
tasks and ideal attainments "whose very infinity is man's field of
endeavor"30 in Chinese philosophy, because it fixes Tao as the ultimate
telos of human life, especially as the ideal image of the harmonious unity
between man and Nature, between the individual and society, from the
angle of the practical spirit. While the infinitude is greatly different
from that of the universal, necessary and absolute truth pursued by
Western philosophy, it is still an infinite ideal of human life, an insep-
arable part of the infinitude of human existence. For instance, it is in
the solution of the problem about the relationships between man and
the world that Chinese philosophy most clearly manifests its distinc-
tive infinitude, for it takes the inherent unity of man and Nature as the
ultimate telos of human existence exactly due to its practical spirit, which
always puts special stress on the interaction and interconnection between
them, whereas the Western philosophical tradition prefers to draw a sharp
distinction between man the subject and the outer world the object,
because its rational spirit, or its pure theoretical attitude, always insists
that "man becomes the disinterested spectator, overseer of the world." 31
Husserl seems to regard "naively direct living immersed in the world"
as primitive and natural; 32 however, it is evident that the tendency of
Chinese philosophy to unify man and the world has more elements of
infinitude than does the tendency of Western philosophy to distinguish
between them, because the former does not set up a mutual limitation
or opposition between the objective and the subjective.
Therefore, innate in Chinese philosophy there is also an immanently
teleological historicity with respect to its own ultimate telos and infinite
tasks, of which we will give a brief clarification below.
Lao Zi was the first Chinese thinker who systematically investigated
the relation between Tao and Wei at the level of philosophy. For him, Tao
as Nature itself "invariably takes no purposeful action and yet purpose-
fully makes all things done." So, man should follow Tao as an ideal
modality in his life in order to realize the direct unity between man
and Nature, i.e., "man should support all things in their natural state
but take no purposeful action," "man should put all things in the gov-
ernment in order by acting without purposeful action," and "man should
have no personal interests and yet be able to see them fulfilled. " 33 There
seems to be some primitive historical significance in Lao Zi 's philos-
ophy; however, it is just the starting point of Chinese philosophy and
provides the first ideal modality for human existence in practice. From
it we can even perceive something infinite, though seeming to take a
negative form.
Then, Confucius and Mo Zi attempted to establish the Tao of human
46 LIU QINGPING
life on the basis of a new form of the practical spirit, which was positive
but relatively finite; and both philosophers presented something similar
to the practical attitude of the politician in their thoughts. For example,
Confucius was especially attentive to the common good and advocated
that the ruler should "take purposeful action to govern his state by virtue,"
and that a gentleman should "master himself and return to propriety"
and "practice benevolence purposefully by himself." 34 Thus he took
"benevolence" in the moral sense as the Tao of human life in order to
accomplish harmonious unity between the individual and society, even
at the cost of sacrificing the full development of individual talents. This
ideal image of life has influenced the Chinese nation comprehensively
and profoundly for two thousand years. Mo Zi also asserted that the ruler
and gentleman should take purposeful action in the social and political
life, however, not out of ethical "benevolence," but for the utilitarian
benefits and public welfare. 35 Therefore, both of these thinkers empha-
sized the social and political meaning of the practical spirit rather than
its individual meaning.
On the other hand, Zhuang Zi, who also gave Tao an ontological impli-
catiton as Lao Zi had, severely criticized Confucius' and Mo Zi 's
doctrines on taking purposeful action mainly for the social and polit-
ical goals, no matter whether they were ethical or utilitarian, and declared
that "I stand in the universe by myself ... and roam between Heaven
and Earth so as to make my own mind and spirit free and happy. Why
do I take action for the political governance of society?" 36 In this way
he set up the unity between man and the Natural in individual freedom
as the Tao of human life. Similarly, Hui Neng, the genuine founder of
Zen, which is not only a sect of Buddhism, but first of all a philosophy
of real human life, also insisted that everyone should fulfill his individual
freedom in the spiritual life by realizing that his self-nature was naturally
pure, cultivating for himself the Law-body of his self-nature, acting
and achieving Buddhahood for himself. 37 So opposite Confucius and
Mo Zi, both thinkers insisted that man should take action mainly for
the spiritual freedom and independence of the individual.
In fact, ancient Chinese philosophy as a whole after Lao Zi ever found
itself amid tensions between the social, political and ethical goals of prac-
tical activities, on the one hand, and individual and even "existential"
goals, on the other hand, so that its practical spirit often fell into a kind
of finitude in the debates among various different points of view and con-
tradictory orientations: accepting some activities for some purposes,
not accepting other activities for the other purposes, though there was
still something infinite as the ultimate telos in the two kinds of ideal
modality of human existence in practice.
Modern Chinese philosophy shows a clear tendency to synthesize
the different doctrines of ancient Chinese philosophy, and furthermore,
to integrate them with Western philosophy, though still sticking to the
distinctive spirit of practice. Thus, it urges the Chinese people to take
almost every action for almost every modern purpose in almost every
dimension of human life: to develop material production and a com-
modity economy, to carry out political reforms or revolutions, to pursue
the ideals of social democracy and of individual freedom, to promote
scientific and technological progress, and so on. Despite the lack of great
attainment in constructing magnificent theoretical systems, therefore, the
higher level of teleological historicity of Chinese philosophy is still
achieved by sublating the finitude of ancient Chinese philosophy and
setting up anew the infinity of the practical spirit in a new ideal modality
of human existence in practice.
It is worth noting that the rational spirit in the proper sense is con-
spicuously lacking in the Chinese philosophical tradition. Most ancient
philosophers seldom discussed the problems of pure epistemology and
of pure logic, and sometimes showed a tendency to underestimate or even
disdain the purely rational and speculative knowledge. Those problems
were significant only when they were linked directly with the problems
of practice; or rather, they were often reduced to those of "praxiology."
Though learning a lot from Western philosophy, even modern Chinese
philosophy prefers to introduce and absorb empiricist, positivist, prag-
matist, or even irrationalist theories, rather than rationalist ones. Thus,
it is still difficult for many Chinese scholars to take a phenomenolog-
ical viewpoint or a purely theoretical attitude even today.
This certainly does not mean that there is no spiritual structure at
all in a Chinese historical life of the Tao and in Chinese philosophical
tradition. Instead of rational knowledge, however, it is human feelings
and will, which are connected with human practice directly and naturally,
that are at the center of the spiritual structure of Chinese life and phi-
losophy. For example, Confucius, who was known as "the one who knows
a thing cannot be done and still wants to do it" during his lifetime, laid
special stress on the feelings of "benevolence," and demanded gentlemen
to "set his will on Tao," and thought that "to know Tao is not as good
as to desire it, and to desire it is not as good as to take delight in it." 38
48 LIU QINGPING
Hui Neng also asserted that "there would be no Buddhahood if without

feelings." 39 So, the harmonious unity between the individual and society,
between man and Nature, as the ultimate telos, is always inseparable
from human feelings and will, which often give the unity a brightly emo-
tional and empathetic coloring. Generally speaking, the feelings and
will advocated by Chinese philosophy are not irrational; we could even
find out a logic or necessity in them. Due to the lack of the rational spirit,
however, such a logic or necessity is thoroughly different from that of
rational knowledge that is universally, absolutely and objectively valid
and applicable in essence. This logic is fundamentally based on the
hierarchically political-ethical-familial relationships among people and
is deeply limited by various particular, relative and subjective elements
in the consanguinity group, and thereby by some serious one-sidedness.
It is on the account of such a specific logic that Chinese philosophy is
usually regarded as mystical and illogical by many Western philosophers,
even though its attitude is not a mythical-religious one.
Observed from this angle, it seems that, in the teleological historicity
of Chinese philosophy and of a Chinese life of Tao, there is no so-
called "crisis" in the sense of the downfall of a rational culture like the
crisis of Western philosophy and of European life of the Logos.
Nevertheless, Chinese existence would still be one-sided and fragmen-
tary if it excluded the rational spirit from itself; for, apart from the
question of whether or not the rational life is the best one, it is apode-
ictic that a human life without reason as a part of its essential contents
is not the absolutely best one, particularly in the contemporary histor-
ical situation. In fact, the lack of the rational spirit is a fatal defect of
Chinese philosophy which has already exerted a negative impact on it,
and brought about a lot of problems and troubles in the everyday life
of Chinese people in their following the Tao in the past and now, making
it, including the ideal modality of taking every action for every purpose
in every dimension of human life advocated by modem Chinese phi-
losophy, fall into a certain finitude and narrowness, even though its
ultimate telos is of undeniably distinctive value and significance. That
is why we also need a new critique of practice as a primary prerequi-
site for contemporary Chinese philosophy, by which it can overcome
its own one-sidedness through integrating its practical spirit with the
rational one of Western philosophy.
IV
Although sharply distinguishing between the practical and the theoret-

ical attitudes, and even looking down on the practical one in a certain
one-sidedness, Husserl still definitely points out the possibility and neces-
sity of synthesizing the theoretical and the practical life, or the life of
the Logos and the life of the Tao. He even thinks of the synthesis as
the third form of universal attitude, in which "theoria (the universal
science), whose growth has manifested a tight unity through an epoche
from all practical considerations, is called upon (and even proves in
a theoretical insight that it is called upon) to serve humanity in a
new way, first of all in its concrete existence as it continues to live
naturally." 40 This seems to be a point of view running through the devel-
opment of Husserl's philosophy, because he already indicates that "the
'theoretical' or 'doxological truth,' or self-evidence, has its parallels in
'axiological and practical truth or self-evidence,' whereby the 'truths'
of this last heading come to be expressed and known in the form of
doxological truths, namely, in the specifically logical or apophantic," and
that "all axiological and practical rationality is converted ... into doxic
rationality," when he talks about "the highly difficult and far-reaching
problems of the reason in the sphere of the theses of feeling and will,
as also their interlacing with the 'theoretical,' i.e., doxic reason" in Jdeen
/. 41 If we take the fact of the theoretical truth itself coming from human
practical activities as its prerequisite, the idea is perhaps one of the

most profound and essential insights of Husserl 's philosophy, for it is
the very crux of both overcoming the crisis of the Western life of the
Logos and solving the problems of the Chinese life of the Tao.
Husserl seems to hold that there was already such a synthesis early
in Greek philosophy. Though we might recognize that many Western
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Hegel and others
always attempted to apply rational principles to the practical life in
various ways, with the spiritual telos of European man thereby becoming
necessarily practical as a goal of the will, yet it is clear enough that
these applications did not really overcome but eventually resulted in
the crisis of European rational culture, because they overlooked the fact
that the principles have their own roots exactly in human practice, which
contains a lot of elements that cannot be simply reduced to and negated
by the rational at the same time. In fact, an authentic synthesis between
the rational and the practical is possible only in a great era in which
50 LIU QINGPING
not only can human reason prove its mighty powers to technically trans-
form Nature, to practically influence human life as a whole, but also
human practice can fully develop its abundant content to such a high
level that it can provide the solid foundations for the existence and sig-
nificance of both the rational and the irrational in human soul-life.
Therefore, such a synthesis is neither the mere application of rational
principles to the practical life, nor the simple reduction of rational prin-
ciples to a practical basis, but a genuine interconnection, interaction
and interfusion between the practical and the rational, so that both of
them can become an organic whole in an omnibearing integration.
In this synthesis, on the one hand, human reason will essentially
expand itself and transcend its own limitations as mere reason so that
it no longer remains only within the abstract and speculative field of
science and of pure consciousness nor sticks to the tensions with such
elements in the human mind and soul as the perceptual, the sensual,
emotion, feeling, will, instinct and desires. As the normative principles
of "a new kind of practical outlook, a universal critique of all life and
of its goals, of all the forms and systems of culture that have already
grown up in the life of mankind," and even of "a critique of mankind
itself," 42 it will no longer suppress and conquer but interfuse and pene-
trate through all of those elements and constitute with them together a
harmonious and integrative entirety, in which Logos as the center will
be reconstructed in the deconstruction. Thereby will there emerge a
new form of the rational spirit, i.e., the "overall" reason for the whole
of human existence, or "existential" reason in the full sense. Only such
overall reason can be the very positive result of a new authentic critique
of reason by which the one-sided shortcomings and defects of human
reason are overcome and sublated, and can save rational culture from
crisis and collapse, can make human reason come to itself, can become
"the phoenix of a new inner life of the spirit ... as the underpinning
of a great and distant human nature," 43 can become the authentically
infinite telos of human reason in its immanently teleological develop-
ment. Compared with such an infinitude, those infinite ideas- the infinite
tasks, goals, verifications, truths, true values, genuine goods, absolutely
valid norms - striven toward by European philosophy in the past are
merely finite in essence, and only approaches oriented toward the
authentic infinite horizon of the rational spirit.
Correspondingly, on the other hand, "there results at the same time
an all-embracing change in the practical order of human existence and
thus of cultural life in its entirety," for, in this synthesis, human practice
will "no longer take its norms from naive everyday experience and from
tradition but from the objective truth" acquired through the overall reason
itself, which reveals the most profound secrets both of Nature and of
humankind itself with its full soul-life, and thus "becomes an absolute
value" and "affects all traditional norms, those of right, of beauty, of
purpose, of dominant values in persons, values having a personal char-
acter, etc." 44 Under overall reason's normative guidance; humankind
can in practice not only take every action for every purpose in every
sphere of Nature, of society and of the individual life, but furthermore
also make the artificial results of all of human purposeful action seem
to be the spontaneous results of Nature itself in its own process of
taking no purposeful action and yet purposefully making all things done,
because every purpose of mankind in practice will accord with the
necessary laws of Nature and of man himself. Only in such a harmonious
unity between man and Nature realized at a higher level can man resolve
the critical tensions between himself and Nature, the ecological crisis,
the pollution of the environment and other troubles confronted by himself,
which result mainly from the human purposeful and artificial activities
of "mastering" and "conquering" Nature in the "modem age" that has for
centuries been so proud of its successes in theory and practice, and
rationalize his existence not only in his social and individual life-world,
but also in Nature. Thus man will no longer be a purely theoretical
spectator and overseer of the world, nor a mere practical conqueror and
ruler of Nature, but an organic, harmonious and indispensable factor
within Nature itself, though retaining his distinctive essence as practico-
rational living being. Thereby will also emerge a new form of the
practical spirit, or, a new modality of human life in practice, in which
the Tao as its center will be reconstructed in the deconstruction. Such
a modality of human life in practice, as the very positive result of a
new authentic critique of practice by which the one-sided shortcom-
ings and defects of human practice are overcome and sublated, will
become the authentically infinite telos of human practice in its imma-
nently teleological development. Compared with such an infinitude, those
infinite tasks and goals striven toward by Chinese philosophy in the
past are merely finite in essence, and only approaches oriented toward
the authentic infinite horizon of the practical spirit.
It is obvious that, through the unity and integration of Logos and
Tao, of the rational and the practical spirit, the distinctive forms of the
52 LIU QINGPING
teleological historicity of Western and Chinese philosophies will inter-

fuse with each other and merge into one and the same immanent
teleology, "which, if we consider mankind in general, manifests itself
as a new human epoch emerging and beginning to grow, in the free
fashioning of its being and its historical life out of" 45 the ideas of both
the radically new rational spirit and the radically new practical spirit with
their ultimate telos and infinite tasks, and whose aim is to elevate
mankind through an overall reason and thus to transform it into a radi-
cally new humanity in practical existence. Under the influence of a certain
Eurocentric prejudice, Husserl submits that, only in Europe, "lies some-
thing unique, which all other human groups, too, feel with regard to
us, something that, apart from all considerations of expediency, becomes
a motivation for them - despite their determination to retain their
spiritual autonomy - constantly to Europeanize themselves, whereas
we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example,
Indianize ourselves," and that "philosophy has constantly to exercise
through European man its role of leadership for the whole of mankind.'>46
In fact, however, it is not at all a question of whether the Indian nation
should Europeanize itself or the European nations should Indianize them-
selves (Europeanization is still a limit to human existence in essence);
it is even meaningless to dispute whether the Greek nation was ever
Egyptianized or Babylonized when it did in fact learn much from the
wise Egyptians and Babylonians. Perhaps no nation needs to follow
and obey the modalities of other nations to change and transform its
own existence. The crux of the matter does lie in such a necessary and
inevitable demand that, if there is indeed something universally and
authentically human in the existence of any nation, of any human group,
such as the rational spirit of Western man, the practical spirit of Chinese
man, or some other spirit of any nation, humankind as a whole should
actively and with initiative learn it, assimilate it and carry it forward
without exception, so that not only the European nations, but all nations
in the world, no matter how inimical they have been toward each other,
will constitute a new and intimate community, will have "a special inner
affinity of spirit that permeates all of them and transcends their national
differences. It is a sort of fraternal relationship that gives us the con-
sciousness of being at home in this circle." 47 No matter how remote
and difficult the ideal may be to fulfill, still it is the ultimate ideal of
mankind as a whole in its infinite teleological historicity. Only this
ideal can really overcome and avoid the potential and actual clashes
among different traditions of civilization, of culture, and eliminate and

resolve the finitude, the opposition and tensions among the different
nations. What is more, only this ideal really means "a progressive trans-
formation that ultimately draws into its orbit all ideas proper to finitude
and with them the entire spiritual culture of mankind"; it means "a
revolutionizing of all culture, a revolution that affects man's whole
manner of being as a creator of culture." "It means also a revolution-
izing of historicity, which is now the history of finite humanity's
disappearance, to the extent that it grows into a humanity with infinite
tasks." 48 Of course, as an infinitude, the ideal itself is a dynamic process,
not a given, static end or outcome, because "humanity has never been
a finished product, nor will it be, nor can it ever repeat itself." 49
Finally, if we would try to locate the position of Husserl's own
phenomenology in the teleological historicity, not only of European
philosophy, but of human philosophy as an infinite whole, it might be
said that, as a Western rationalist theory, it still lays almost all stress upon
the significance and role of reason within the sphere of the sciences
and consciousness, not paying attention enough to the practical and
irrational aspects of human life. That is why, though having a sober "con-
sciousness-of" the "crisis of European existence" and correctly affirming
the necessity of synthesizing the "opposing interests that occur in the
transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude," Husserl neither
puts forward an effective way of resolving the crisis of so-called "exis-
tence" nor really of integrating the rational spirit with human practical
life. What is most important is that, though Husserl often censures
naturalistic and objectivistic philosophies and sciences for forgetting
"the working subject" as the scientist, he himself does exactly forget
man as the genuinely infinite subjectivity, as a subject leading a gen-
uinely infinite and all-around life, who not only has reason, philosophy,
science and pure consciousness as his "functioning brain," but also has
practical creativity, emotion, feelings, will, instinct and desires as his
functioning body, blood and flesh, in his all-embracing and full devel-
oping entirety of human existence. Strictly speaking, "philosophical
and scientific man," the subject of pure consciousness and the purely
theoretical spectator as the transcendental ego shed light upon by inten-
tional phenomenology, is still a one-sided, abstract and pale man, because
his spirituality and soul-lifeness are not based on the human physis and
"the bodies of the individual human beings," his existence is short of
sensual, contingent, individual and practical aspects. It is in this sense
54 LIU QINGPING
that the third phase of phenomenology since the mid-sixties of the twen-
tieth century is of special significance and value for its own development,
because it attempts to introduce into itself a series of new conceptions
and ideas about the "body," "the pre-conscious," "the contingent reality,"
"the real individual within the context of actual existence," "the human
individual within his life and his social world," "the creative function
of man," "the human being in action," "phenomenology as the cross-
cultural philosophy of man," and so on, and thereby develops a grand
phenomenological "re-construction" of the human spirit. 50
On the other hand, Husserl's phenomenology as a field for the new
critique of reason still makes its non-fungible contribution to the devel-
opment of human philosophy. In the final analysis, it is not only one
among the few philosophical theories that try to overcome the defects
of old rationalism, to establish a new kind of rationalism by maintaining
the rational spirit of mankind, by enlarging and revising its scope and
connotations and by carrying it through to the end in human existence
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a time of crisis for rational
culture, but also the sole theory of radical rationalism that tries to resolve
the tensions between the empirical and the rational, and to restore the
authority of reason in the sphere of scientific knowledge by putting
forward "a doctrine of essences in the framework of pure intuition,"
by advocating an "immediate 'seeing' ... in general as primordial dator
consciousness of any kind whatsoever" as "the ultimate source of jus-
tification for all rational statements" and "the first basic form of the
rational consciousness,"51 by thus rationalizing experience, by finding the
Logos of experience itself, by affirming the complete rationality of
being in the highest form of consciousness, by providing a rational
approach to reveal the secrets of human consciousness in the phenom-
enological reduction, and even by rendering possible "from an ethico-
religious point of view a life regulated by pure rational forms," by
emphasizing "humanity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute
knowledge" and "its demand for pure and absolute valuing and willing"
that is inseparable from the former, 52 though not fully realizing all of
these goals. That is why its theory and method, especially its spirit of
reason, have indeed made an extensive and profound impact on the
philosophy of the twentieth century. While it would be questionable
whether transcendental phenomenology alone becomes the apodictic
foundations for all the sciences and for the philosophy as a rigorous
science, Husserl's philosophical endeavor is still very valuable, signifi-
cant and essential, not only for contemporary Western philosophy, which
is still witnessing the downfall of the rational culture to some degree, and
contemporary Chinese philosophy, which is still in want of the rational
spirit, but also for the mutual communication, supplementation and inte-
gration between the two kinds of philosophy, of cultural tradition, of
human life respectively following Logos and Tao, during a time that needs
to construct an overall reason as its spiritual support or its center of
Logos. Therefore, just like other great thinkers in its history, Husser}
will occupy an eternal place of his own in the infinite teleological devel-
opment of human philosophy.
Wuhan University
NOTES
1 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Theme: The Phenomenology of Man and of the
Human Condition- The Human Individual, Nature, and the Possible Worlds," Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition, Analecta
Husserliana, Vol. XIV (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), pp. xviii-xix.
2 Edmund Husser!, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 164-165, 168-171.

3 I have discussed the difference in some papers written in Chinese; in a certain sense
this essay just tries to do the same thing further at the angle of Husserl's viewpoints.
4 Husser!, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
s Ibid., pp. 165-166.

6 Ibid., pp. 165-166, 179.
7 Ibid., pp. 159, 172.
8 Ibid., p. 161.
9 Ibid., pp. 158-159, 162, 173, 177.
10 Ibid., p. 191.
11 Ibid., pp. 158-159, 179.
12 Cf. Plato, Meno, 87b-88c.
13 Husser!, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
14 Ibid., p. 179.
15 Ibid., p. 186.
16 Ibid., p. 191.
17 Ibid., p. 180.
18 Ibid., p. 150.
19 Ibid., p. 179.
20 Ibid., p. 180.
21 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 167-168, 180.
22 Ibid., p. 168.
23 Ibid., pp. 182, 185.
56 LIU QINGPING
24 Ibid., pp. 172-173, 183.

25 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, op. cit., pp. xvi-xvii.
26 Husser!; op. cit., p. 150.
27 Ibid., p. 150.
28 Cf. Tymieniecka, pp. xv-xviii.
29 Husser!; op. cit., p. 171.
30 Ibid., pp. 160, 163.
31 Ibid., p. 172.
32 Ibid., p. 166.
33 Lao Zi, Ch. 37, Ch. 64, Ch. 3, Ch. 7. Concerning the literature of ancient Chinese
philosophy in English, cf. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, trans. and comp. Wing-
tsit Chan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
34 Lun Yu, 2:1, 12:1.
35 Cf. Mo Zi, Ch. 15, Ch. 20.
36 Zhuang Zi, Ch. 28.
37 Cf. The Platform Scripture, Ch. 19.
38 Lun Yu, 14:41, 7:6, 6:18.
39 The Platform Scripture, Ch. 48.
40 Husserl; op. cit., pp. 168-169.
41 Edmund Husser!, Ideas - General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans.
W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 359, 376.
42 Husser!, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 169.
43 Ibid., p. 192.
44 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
45 Ibid., p. 156.
46 Ibid., pp. 157, 178.
47 Ibid., p. 157.
48 Ibid., pp. 163-164.
49 Ibid., p. 158.
5 Cf. Tymieniecka, op. cit., pp. xi-xii, xv-xxii.
51 Husser!, Ideas- Genera/Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, op. cit., pp. 75-76,
124, 350.
52 Husser!, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
DEBABRAT A SINHA
LOGOS, TELOS AND THE LIVED WORLD

A View in Phenomenological Reflection
Human subjectivity, on the one end, and the supposed Divine or Absolute
Mind, on the other end - within this broad conceptual range logos moves.
Be it the former or the latter, the demand of thought or reason is to
find structures in the objects of experience, things and events that con-
stitute the world of experience - and putatively beyond. In this swing
between, or across, the conceptual polarity - i.e., that between human
experience and the projected cosmic - logos lets itself be redefined in
the transcendental-phenomenological perspective.
Evidence, the most universal methodological concept in the phe-
nomenological Erfahrungskritik, is spelt out in Husserl 's Ideas Pertaining
to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First
Book (henceforth referred to as Ideas/) in the context of the "phenom-
enology of Reason". The originarily presentative "seeing" (Sehen) is
indicated as the first fundamental form of rational consciousness
(Vernunftsbewusstsein)- in other words, the ultimate legitimizing source
of all rational assertions. The "rational" character pertaining to cogni-
tive insight is derived not postulationally or formally-deductively, but
essentially on the basis of a "fulfilled" sense that is originarily presented.
Insight or evidence of any kind is accordingly defined in its core as
"the unity of a rational position with that which essentially 'motivates'
that position". The whole situation is understood in terms of noetic-
noematic correlativity - in other words, the relation between the noetic
positing and the noematic position in its mode of intentive fulfilled-
ness. The generic concept of evidence is more specifically formulated
as 'apodictic evidence' (contradistinguished from the assertory) in order
to bring out the essential phenomenological identity of any instance of
rational consciousness. Every rational position thus lends itself to being
translated in terms of a motivational relation to the originarily given.
Following upon such an intuitionistic exploration of the consciousness
of reason, phenomenology seeks to legitimize its claim to be "First
Philosophy" (Erste Philosophie); for the latter offers a possible critique
57

58 DEBABRATA SINHA
of reason ideally combining freedom from presuppositions with absolute

reflective insight.
For Husserl rationality, in the last analysis, is equivalent to intelligi-
bility; and the latter again, as discussed above, is the translation into
the terms of the originary evidence of essence-intuition. This new type
of intuitionism that emerges leads as a natural sequel to a revised, and
phenomenologically justified, model of the a priori. The phenomeno-
logical possibility of obtaining pure universals through essence-intuition,
or the intuition of universals, is effected through a methodological
widening of the notion of intuition itself. As Husserl points out, the
expression "viewing" (Erschauen) in the context of the said "viewing
of universals" or "viewing of essence" is used in the wide sense of
"self-given". More directly he recommends a necessary widening of
our use of the word "seeing". The universals in their turn are also
regarded not as bare concepts of thought or as just symbolically meant,
but as having their concrete mode of presentation to noetic conscious-
ness.
This, of course, brings us to a dimension of apriority, which is to be
understood entirely in experiential context. Universality and necessity are
not to be regarded as privileges of thought or understanding stereo-
typed into forms of categories. The very world of experience, on the
contrary, reveals a kind of necessity in the shape of immanent style
("world-style" Husserl also calls it) within its continuum.
II
Now methodologically committed as it is to the descriptive analysis of

the noetic-noematic structure of the world of experience, phenomeno-
logical rationality nonetheless turns to the world as lived, i.e., the world
of lived experience (Lebenswelt). The introduction of the concept of "life"
at this phase of the Husserlian programme of "scientific" philosophy, and
its acclaimed assimilation to the phenomenological critique of experi-
ence, may be an intriguing theme by itself. But without going into the
question of a possible historical influence on HusserI 's thought in this
regard - perhaps most conspicuously that of Dilthey - it could at least
be pointed out that the said "life" (or the lived) in this context is not
just equivalent to the notion of "Bios". It is rather to be understood as
the lived-experienced (erlebt) world as felt innerly - and not simply in
terms of outwardly directed object experience. It might be called "vital";
LOGOS, TELOS AND THE LIVED WORLD 59
but to regard it as just "biological" would be to be too naturalistically

predisposed in a phenomenological context.
To view the situation from the other side, the essential point is to
indicate that dimension in our noetic experience where the superseding
of the epistemic dichotomy inherent in a cognitive situation is sought
in an originary moment of immediacy. For the latter alone could provide
that meeting ground for subjectivity and the objective to coalesce. We
return to this crucial point towards the conclusion of this essay.
For the present, however, let us for a moment consider Husserl's
posing of the task of historical-critical reflection on the map of European
thought. In his last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology (henceforth referred to as Crisis), Husser!
characterizes this task as one of "radical self-understanding". What it
means here is a meta-philosophical reflection backwards on the originary
source of philosophical motivation itself by way of "questioning back"
(Riickfrage). Such movement, critical as it has to be, is directed to the
ultimate origin of philosophy in all its authenticity.
In Husser! 's theoretic philosophy or experience-critique, apodicticity
is a running strain. But it does not signify a simple conformity to an
abstract paradigm of formal postulation, totally unrelated to human sub-
jectivity, though regulating it by way of formal rules of operation. Husser!
ends up by referring to a "life in apodicticity", which indicates for him
the highest paradigm towards which all our commitment in self-under-
standing should be directed. This is not the notion of science in an
abstract and generalized sense, but of concrete being in 'apodictic
freedom' (as Husser! prefers to characterize the dynamics of evidence-
oriented analysis). Without going here into the exact content of the said
"self-understanding", one could still observe a teleological direction in
late Husserlian thought: "Ratio" as the universal "Telos" signifies the
ideal fulfillment of our cognitive life, rooted as it is in "theoretic praxis"
(theoretische Praxis), to use the characteristic Husserlian term.
It is not my objective here to spell out the nature and scope of tele-
ologically-oriented self-understanding in terms of the framework of late
Husserlian thought. In the present discourse I would rather pose the
question from the other end, i.e., that of the originary grounds. Thus,
the question would be: how far could the said self-understanding be
grounded in the development of descriptive-analytical phenomenology
up to its transcendental phase? In this regard, at the very outset, a twofold
difficulty may arise.
60 DEBABRAT A SINHA
(a) On the one hand, could the intentional analysis of noematic

meaning (Sinn) of objects provide as such a sufficient matrix for self-
understanding? The legitimacy of the question that lies in intentional
analysis is, after all, directed entirely to the object qua intended- its Sinn
(whether it be considered strictly equivalent to noema or not). 1 Even in
Gurwitsch's "phenomenalistic" equation of noema with the intentional
object, for example, the accent is understandably still on the side of
the object. And the latter as such could hardly be expected to offer an
adequate and legitimate ground for self-understanding.
(b) On the other hand, the epistemological "Cartesianism" present
in the Husserlian critique of knowledge and experience - in Ideas I in
particular - that is, the indubitable givenness of the pure ego, could
well promise a sure ground for self-understanding around which the entire
inquiry could and should be centered. But at the same time two con-
siderations may come in the way of such a position:
(1) The strict reductive methodology shows an admitted constraint
with regard to the asserted pure I or subject: namely, that it is to be
considered, on final analysis, as nothing but the "phenomenological
residuum" (a term which Husserl reserves for characterizing pure con-
sciousness). But it may legitimately be asked if a "residuum" could
provide the necessary ontic basis for the supposed self-understanding. (2)
Arguing from a reverse direction, as one proceeds from Ideas I to Crisis,
one could be impressed by a "departure from Cartesianism" (as Ludwig
Landgrebe, for example, characterizes it) - particularly at the stage of
Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and Judgment), and later on in the
Crisis, with its entire problematic of Lebenswelt. Were the !-subject
pole to get somewhat diffused in the surrounding world of lived expe-
rience (Lebensumwelt), where, then, to look for the appropriate focus
of self-understanding?
One way of facing the entire question posed above would be, of
course, to accentuate the "idealistic" reading of the transcendental-phe-
nomenological standpoint itself. Gadamer, for example, maintains that
the concept of self-understanding is "an heirloom of transcendental
idealism", of which Husserl, as he maintains, is conspicuously repre-
sentative. Apart from the risk of ambiguity involved in the very concept
of idealism (or even "transcendental idealism"), an exclusively ideal-
istic affiliation seems otherwise to be preempted by the evidently broader
Husserlian conception of self-understanding as movement towards the
origin of philosophy. On the other hand, a question might emerge from
the seemingly dilemmatic situation over the ambiguity of the subject

principle per se. It is whether the resulting network of noematic meaning-
essences, "anonymously" grounded in transcendental subjectivity (a point
discussed in the sequel), would be tantamount to signifying what might
be called a "centreless view", as Thomas Nagel, to take a conspicuous
example, advocates. 2 In a "perspectiveless" conception of the world, taken
ideally "from nowhere", could the entire task of self-understanding- with
all its possible ethical consequence, as Husserl projects it - meet with
a meaningful justification? What is intended by posing the question
here is not a comparison of any sort between Husserlian phenome-
nology and Nagel's particular thought. The reference to the latter,
otherwise casual in the present context, should be taken only heuristi-
cally, in an attempt to focus on certain problematic areas in the
interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology.
III
In search of an answer to the puzzling question just posed, we have

to take a fresh revised look at the question of the relation between the
empirical-mundane and the transcendental as it emerges in the phe-
nomenological perspective. This, of course, translates into the problematic
of the empirical ego vis-a-vis the pure ego as transcendental subject.
As early as Logical Investigations (V, 8), Husserl observes:
The conscious intentional relation of the ego to its objects means for us simply that
intentional experiences whose intentional objects are the egobody (lchleib), the personal
ego-mind and therefore the entire empirical ego-subject or human person (lch, der Mensch),
are included in the total phenomenological being of a unity of consciousness, and that
such intentional experiences also constitute an essential phenomenological kernel in the
phenomenal ego.
Here certainly one does not see an affirmation of the typical Cartesian
ego- one that appears rather expressly in Ideas I in the affirmation of
the pure ego as indubitably absolutely given. That seems to contrast
sharply with Husserl's sceptical reservation regarding what he calls
"corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic", while confessing his inability "to find
this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of relations". It almost seems
to be the contrary model in the analysis of the noetic-noematic struc-
ture of experience (perceptual experience, to the more specific) where
Husserl indicates the epistemological status of the Ego in relation to
its positing function (das Setzen) thus: " ... the Ego does not live in
62 DEBABRATA SINHA
the positings as passively dwelling in them; 'the positings' are instead

radiations from the 'pure Ego' as from a primal source of generations"
(122).
So there is the Cartesian-Kantian idea of the pure Ego, in contradis-
tinction from the cogito, as "something essentially necessary and
absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental
processes". And this epistemologically crystalized conception of the pure
Ego is re-echoed in the form of the notion of "non-participating observer"
as in the Crisis. In a way, such a conception of the transcendental observer
marks the logical limit of what could possibly be reached by way of
excluding all references and associations of the individual ego in
interpreting the world of experience in terms of phenomenological con-
stitution. This might look in a certain respect close to what Nagel
characterizes as the "objective self" - one that, according to him, marks
"the last stage of the detaching subject before it shrinks to an exten-
sionless point". The transcendental ego, qua transcendental, indicates the
ideal terminus of methodological progression in epoche-neutralization,
and as such could be regarded as signifying the high water mark of a
"neutralized" view of the world- perhaps perilously close to the "cen-
treless" view of the world for which all irreducibly first-person facts
are banished.
However, the seed of heterogeneity (if not ambiguity) in this line of
thinking is embedded within the very frame of reference in which
analytic-descriptive phenomenology develops into genetic transcendental
phenomenology. Already in Ideas I, and further in Ideas II, the question
of relating "1-man" (Jch-Mensch) to the "pure I" appears in a hermeneutic
dimension - one can even trace this moment of interpretation back into
Logische Untersuchungen. The formulation of the "paradox of human
subjectivity" in Crisis seems to be an explicit recognition of this lingering
problem of more precisely identifying the status as well as the locus of
subjectivity in its overriding transcendental "world-constituting" role vis-
a-vis the mundane or factual subjectivity of the natural 1-man.
The crux of the problem seems to lie in that subjectivity, in order to
be meaningfully used, must have its psychological-anthropological
validity rooted in the human person. At the same time, transcendental
or pure consciousness proves to be the limiting point of phenomeno-
logical reduction, or the "phenomenological residuum". Would that not
lead inevitably to a de-individualized de-personalized concept of con-
sciousness - an abstraction removed from concrete subjectivity? Fully
aware of this predicament, Husser} seeks to find a way out in his recog-
nition of "a peculiar transcendence in and through immanence", as
pertaining to the pure I in relation to the world and to empirical sub-
jectivity. In Crisis he finally admits a kind of built-in ambiguity in the
paradigmatic "Ur-I". (How far Husser} himself could have felt at ease
with such finality in a conundrum would be anybody's guess.)
IV
Even recognizing the said direction towards a final "anonymity", a

"second" movement in Husserl's investigations could be indicated -
not as an independent line, but rather as one which severally crosses into,
nay even converges on, the former. I prefer to call this direction "mundane
phenomenology" - an expression ("mundane Phaenomenologie") which
Husserl perhaps hardly used but which nevertheless can possibly tie up
the underlying direction of phenomenology, particularly in its lingering
focus on the empirical-transcendental problematic. An undue attention
on the prior Cartesianism and the departure therefrom, and an overem-
phasis on the distinction of empirical-factual subjectivity and the
transcendental ego are apt to divert our attention from the essential recog-
nition and integration of the mundane within the total framework of
phenomenological reflexion.
Two considerations were crucial in Husserl's encounter with the dual-
istic model, while holding on to the basic evidence of ego cogito as
the apodeictic foundation for all evidential analysis of objectivity:
(a) Firstly, the problem of reciprocity between the world of the mind,
of consciousness and that of the material body intrigued Husser! no
less than it did Descartes himself. Only the fact (or facticity) of the
unity between the two is not sought to be solved by recourse to plain
"interactionism", as with Descartes, but through a search for a nexus
between the psychic and the physical spheres, and thus by way of intro-
ducing a concept of involvement as being between the body lived (i.e.,
Leib) and the world outside.
(b) Secondly, the earlier Cartesianism of Husser! already exhibits a
turn, though implicit, to the surrounding world of lived experience -
one that subsequently crystallizes in the theme of Lebenswelt (or
Lebenswelt). An acknowledgment of the "personal world" or "commu-
nicative world around us", though not quite thematically developed in
the earlier phase, might still offer some kind of a complementarity
64 DEBABRAT A SINHA
between the pure Cartesian standpoint of the apodictic "ego cogito"

and the concept of Lebenswelt- a point aptly noticed by some recent
commentators.
The combined effect of these two currents within Husserl's phenom-
enological thinking, mutually allied and intersecting in a certain way,
could be formulated under one broad heading of what might be
designated - at least as an "operative concept" - as "mundane phe-
nomenology". In the development of Husserlian phenomenology we do
not have to postpone such a "mundane phenomenology" till the expo-
sition of the Lebenswelt-problematic in the Crisis. Thus in its first
methodic step of a necessary epoche towards grasping the essence and
structures of the world of pre-scientific experience and praxis, a delib-
erate suspension of objective science is prescribed as a kind of first
reduction. Although the question of the antic meaning (Seinssinn) of
the life-world for the humans living in it was not thematically posed
earlier (as it was in Crisis), the background was already laid down in
analytic-descriptive phenomenology. At least in retrospect one could
see the significant role that this so-called "mundane phenomenology"
was destined to play in exploring the areas of logic and formal ontology,
ethics, psychology, anthropology, etc.
v
Leaving aside for the moment the theme of the life-world, let us con-
centrate on the key concept of body, or rather the lived body - the Leib
rather than the Korper. What plays a crucial role in the orientation of
"mundane phenomenology" is the notion of "entanglement" or "involve-
ment" (Verjlichtung or Verjlochtenheit) as it obtains between the two
ends of the body and the world, in relation to subjectivity. What such
a phenomenon could possibly entail is a kind of intermediate position
(Zwischenstellung) of the human body within the phenomenological
spectrum, standing in between the material or physical body on the one
end and the pure ego or subject supposedly on the other. Viewed in the
context of such a mediating role within the framework of a phenome-
nological critique of experience, the body can exclusively neither be
categorized as physical object, nor fully identified with the subject pole
as such.
The phenomenological rationale for such an affirmation of the "inter-
mediate position" of the human body has to be found in its evidential
grounding in terms of intentional analysis. It is the involvement of the

ego-subject not merely in the body that is in question, but beyond that
in the very world around us. In introducing (in Logical Investigations)
the category of "occasional expressions" (vis-a-vis "objective expres-
sions"), Husserl acknowledges an opening in our cognitive expressions
to "the practical demands of common life" -almost in a way anticipating
the distinctive notion of Lebenspraxis (lived practice) of which he speaks
in Crisis.
In a purely phenomenological description of sense-perception, Husserl
already raises in Logical Investigations the question of relating subjec-
tive sensations to the corresponding objective qualities as "a real part
of our experience". This relation is to be obtained through what Husserl
terms an "objectifying 'interpretation' " in perception - for example, in
the appearance of the objects' objective colouring, besides the colour sen-
sation as such in our perception of colour. To sum up the situation:
"The appearing of the things does not itself appear to us, they are lived
through (erlebt)". The hermeneutic moment in phenomenological descrip-
tion is sought to be combined with the element of lived experience in
the "animating interpretation of sensation".
Further, and most significantly, another kind of experience is to be
taken into account besides the plain sensations which eventually repre-
sent things through "objective interpretation". That is the area of
kinaesthetic sensations - those, unlike qualitative sensations, in need
of a body as their carrier. Bodily experience, phenomenologically con-
sidered, is primarily identified with this subtle group of sensations. In
the phenomenological attitude (vis-a-vis the natural), sensations of
movement are not viewed just as being psycho-physically caused phys-
iological-mental events, but as pure "phenomena". "Kinaesthese" denotes
the various ways in which humans function, with an elementary degree
of spontaneity, in and through their bodily organs; and the perceiving
consciousness of body movements is always accompanied by some kind
of an awareness of "I as moving", or "I as being able to move" (i.e.,
in the form of "I move", "I can", "I do" etc.). However, even prior to
linguistic expression, a pre-reflective level of kinaesthetic experience can
be indicated as in a child's immediate experience ofunverbalised acquain-
tance with his/her own bodily-organic performance. Such elementary
forms of kinaesthetic experience could even provide the first theme of
"genetic phenomenology".
Now, the peculiar modus operandi of kinaesthetic sensations, in
66 DEBABRAT A SINHA
relation to the body, has to be closely examined. In one word, as Husserl

almost metaphorically expresses it, there is "insertion" (Einlegung) of
such sensations into the human body (see Husserliana XVI: Ding und
Raum). There is a significant sense in which we could meaningfully speak
of the bodily ego or "1-body" (lchleib), in so far as the body is the carrier
of the "I". It is the "I" which has the sensations, and these sensations
are localized in the body .,- partly as immediate appearance, partly as
imagined or thought. On the other side, however- that is, for all external
observation - the body is also a thing, a physical thing among other
things, in so far as it has its spatial location and configuration, and is
filled with appropriate material content. This translates into the "double
conception" of the body- i.e., appearing as physical thing, and as sensing
or the carrier of sensations (and of the sensing body, to that extent).
Husserl possibly did not proceed far enough, it may be presumed, with
actual explorations in the region of bodily phenomena, those centred
around the basic phenomenon of being embodied (etre-incarne') in all
its actual and possible ramifications of noematic meaningfulness. That
would be a step which is otherwise consistent with the regional consti-
tution of the body as pertaining to the "animal" subject. In that respect
Max Scheler seems to have investigated more intensively the phenomena
related to the body, recognized to be in a way "neutral" (i.e., as between
the purely physical and the purely mental). And certainly Merleau-
Ponty carries the investigations into the question of embodiment and
the phenomenological centrality of the body in systematic thorough-
ness. But rather than grounding his phenomenology of bodiliness as
functioning (jungierende) intentionality, Merleau-Ponty, in an existential-
ontological slant, characterizes the perceived world, in which we live
with our body, as ambiguous. In that respect the lack of transparent
knowledge and the ambiguity of being are to be accepted as our only
existential possibility - a result though, which may not be, as we will
just now see, too far from the final Husserlian predicament.
However, as to the Husserlian theme of a phenomenology of bodili-
ness, in spite of the incomplete treatment of the subject matter of
embodiment, the ulterior objective of providing a bridge between the
empirical-factual and the transcendental dimension of experience by way
of "mundane phenomenology" has basically been served. What one could
find in this regard is not, however, a thorough mapping of the areas
and sectors of bodily and kinaesthetic experience in its many-faceted
totality. There is, nonetheless, a significant affirmation and indication
of the level of bodily experience as an essential link in the phenome-

nological continuum that the world of lived experience (Erlebnis)
presents.
The inevitable problematic as to how consciousness, so to speak,
"enters into the real world", has lingered to intrigue Husserl's investi-
gations at various points. This is the issue of immanence vis-a-vis
transcendence, phenomenologically speaking - with recognition, at the
same time, of the need for "participation in transcendence" in the
originary sense. The situation in view can be summed up in Husserl's
words: "Only through the experienced relation (Erfahrungsbeziehung)
to the organic body does consciousness become really human and animal,
and only thereby does it obtain a place in the space of Nature and in
the time of Nature". 3 The said enabling relation, however, is grounded
in the phenomenological role of the organic or lived body as a kind of
incarnated intentionality, i.e., intentionality itself in concrete form.
VI
In conclusion, we turn again to the question heuristically posed in the

first section: namely, that of how far the notion of transcendental sub-
jectivity really implies a "centreless" conception of the world, affecting
the ideal of self-understanding. The hard logic of "transcendentality"
or transcendental reflection, terminating consistently in the transcendental
ego as the ultimate point of the non-participating neutral observer, might
appear to coincide in a way with the idea of the "objective self" (a la
Nagel) offering a "centreless" conception of the world. To quote Nagel
in this context: "The objective self is the last stage of the detaching
subject before it shrinks to an extensionless point". 4
Now mundane phenomenology, as already suggested, demonstrates
the range of possible noema-essences in the concrete regions of phe-
nomenological experience as a continuum. The world as lived on the
primitive level of pre-predicative pre-reflective experience is not totally
set apart from the constituted world of irreal essences that the "phe-
nomenologizing ego" distinguishes and interprets at shifting levels of
reflection. Whether at the psychological or psycho-physical level, or at
the organic-kinaesthetic level, the range of lived experience, of life-
worldly experience, does not stand to be excluded by transcendental
subjectivity, bestowing meaning to and constituting the world, but rather
to be integrated with it.
68 DEBABRAT A SINHA
Consequently, phenomenological reflection turns out to be as much

a pursuit of objectivity as a deepening of self-understanding into one's
own experience(s). The very movement of mundane phenomenology in
depth could possibly lead to a point marking the fulfillment of objectivity
and subjectivity as well. It might still be relevant to cite a parallel -
with a serious qualification though- in Nagel's observation pertaining
to what he calls the "objective self": "While we can't free it entirely
of infection with a particular human view and a particular historical stage,
it represents a direction of possible development toward a universal
conception and away from a parochial one". In the perspective of
Husserlian phenomenology, of course, it is not so much a question of
conceding such anthropological "infection"; the point is rather to assim-
ilate or integrate the transcendental with the human and the historical.
Yet, interestingly enough, the guiding aim or the "telos" in both cases
might be similar - that is, a progression towards a universal concep-
tion, away from a parochial one. Even the tacit recommendation of a kind
of "askesis" is not unlikely to coincide in the two views - the centre-
less and the transcendental.
Thus, even though exhibiting a tendency to move in the two seem-
ingly opposed directions of an ego-centred metaphysics and an I-less
consciousness respectively, Husserl nevertheless settles for the phe-
nomenological median in all its methodological legitimacy. Strictly in
terms of noetic-noematic correlativity, the intuitionistic fusion of the
two phases of subjectivity - i.e., bodily-mundane-factual and transcen-
dental - need not pose a serious contradiction. It is only when the
metaphysical consideration tends to prevail over the purely phenome-
nological-methodological - the question as to the nature and structure
of being (or Being) rather than the meaning of being in the structure
of experience - that paradoxes show themselves. Be it the recognition
of the body as natural and non-natural at the same time and yet being
a fact or be it the subsequent formulation of the "paradox of human
subjectivity" (in Crisis, 53) or simply the acknowledgment of the
"anonymity" of the epoche-making phenomenologizing "I", it is no
doubt a challenge to interpretive phenomenology. But the recognition
of puzzlement on the level of description does not mean conceptual
negation. Ambiguity pertains to the facticity of the human condition itself,
and phenomenology accepts that, and thereby the theoretic possibility
of a philosophical anthropology.
Now to tum, again, to the other end of the spectrum of phenomena-
logical investigation - theoretically infinite though it may appear - we

come up with the emerging horizon of the absolutistic "Telos" (pro-
jected particularly in the Crisis), in the context of "World-accomplishing
Subjectivity". The question that at once challenges us is: does the said
"Telos" imply, in a way, a methodological compromise, on the part of
a strictly phenomenological philosopher, in favour of a rationalistic-
teleological demand for a World-ground? To pose the problematic from
another side, how far would the thrust for the Universal Telos find its
originary legitimation in a phenomenology of consciousness, all theo-
retic-metaphysical hypostatization being suspended?
A possible clue towards a resolution of this aporia might be suggested.
What could be proposed is a move beyond the epistemic dichotomy
otherwise inherent in an egology as pertains to the "ego-cogito-cogitata"
model. However, in keeping with the general phenomenological modus
operandi of "questioning back" (Ruckfrage), the move would most likely
be in the direction of the pre-thetic level of consciousness. For on the
latter alone, it seems, the natural fusion of the inner-subjective and the
outer-objective could possibly be obtained. To cite an example, with
reference to Merleau-Ponty,5 the "body-subject" can provide an index for
such supposed identification (i.e., between the subject-pole and the objec-
tive reality).
Pure phenomenology, be it admitted, operates essentially within the
parameter of human consciousness. At the same time the highest Telos
is sought to be projected, but as framed on a rationalistic model. In
other words, this Telos is posited as the terminal point of extension of
the ego-cogito-cogitata model. But the essentially dualistic nature of
the model - i.e., oriented to the irreducible dichotomy of the ego-pole
and the object manifold - could render the putative Telos "abstract",
rather than concretely grounded in being. But were we to look for a Telos
which could embody the fulfillment of being, and thereby of con-
sciousness, the originary unity inherent in human experience, particularly
in its pretheoretic life-worldly stratum, might offer a possible clue in
the eventual projection of a universal Telos. Perhaps such unity (or
Identity), conceived as the all-inclusive reality source, has to be recog-
nized as an ultimate "demand" of evidencing consciousness (one that
is self-evidencing too). However, the legitimacy of such a move (almost
a "leap") could only be ontologically grounded in the moment of Being
(Sein) within and through the region of pure intentive consciousness.
Even Lebenswelt could go only halfway in bringing about this paradig-
70 DEBABRATA SINHA
matic equation. But as the ultimate paradigm, the Telos qua Telos would
still be self-transcending, if not self-annihilating.
Brock University
Canada
NOTES
1 For our purpose here we prefer to leave aside the competing models of Gurwitsch
and F0llesdal on the interpretation of the noema-object relation.

2 Cf. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
3 Edmund Husser!, Ideas I (New York: Humanities Press, 1931 ), 53.
4 Ibid., p. 62.
5 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities
Press, 1965), Part I, Chap. 2.

HORST MATTHAI
THE PSEUDO-CONCEPTS PHENOMENON AND AOrO~
IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHIES

A Viable Alternative
LAMBERT
It was Lambert who, in his Neues Organon, first introduced the term
phenomenology in philosophy. Under this name he understands a theory
of appearances and their influence on human knowledge. We must make
it clear, however, that the words appearance and appear, translations of
the German Schein and scheinen, 1 employed by Lambert, do not explic-
itly show the subjacent meaning of luminosity and appearance to the eye,
such as this philosopher suggests through his interpretation of phenom-
enology as transcendental optics. Therefore, far from seeing phenomena
as a source of knowledge, Lambert conceives appearances as some-
thing intermediate between the true and the false, 2 for which reason
he sees phenomenology as a science that investigates appearances, their
species, their influence on human knowledge, and offers means of elim-
inating their influence on the search for truth.
KANT
Kant, who through letters had been in contact with Lambert, also
occupied himself with phenomenology, eventually incorporating it in
his critical philosophy. Though it seems, at first sight, that for the philoso-
pher from Konigsberg, phenomenology, in his analysis of the structure
of understanding, occupies only one area among others - alongside
phoronomy, dynamics and mechanics3 - at the end, however, he puts it
in first place, in as much as phenomenology determines the modality
of appearances and, for that matter, their temporality. The table of Kantian
categories contains as concepts a priori of modality these three: possi-
bility, the be-there or Dasein and necessity. Here we should also notice
the difficulty of adequately interpreting the second of these categories,
usually translated as existence, 4 a question that we shall deal with later
on. In the meantime let us note that for Kant these three modalities appear
in the form of representations, which he names transcendental schemes.
71
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Lll, 71-98.

72 HORST MATTHAI
According to this we should see (a) in the modality of possibility the

scheme of time in general, as the condition for the concordance of the
synthesis of a diversity of representations, as, for example, the oppo-
sites in a thing that cannot be simultaneous but are successive, (b) in
the modality of be-there - Kant uses the word Wirklichkeit, only trans-
latable as reality, 5 an English term inadmissible here, however, since it
clashes with the German Realitiit, the term that Kant uses as the first
of the categories of quality - the scheme of a determinate time and,
finally, (c) in the modality of necessity the scheme of the be-there of
an object in all time, it being for us to note the imprecision of the Kantian
language when using, in the form of an analogy, thing and object, 6 impre-
cision also visible in the confusion of Dasein (be-there) and Wirklichkeit
already mentioned. We insist on this matter due to its relevance later
in our paper.
But Kant not only connects the terms of appearance (Erscheinung) and
scheme, he also identifies them. Due to the importance of this, we quote
the following text from his Metaphysics:
The connection between reason and phenomena, with which it should [in no way} be in
commerce, can in no way (M 277) be understood (8 they are heterogenea). The true function
of reason and its effect pertains to the intelligible world. That is why we also do not know,
in what measure we must impute [assign responsibility]. However, we do know this
much of the inherent power of reason, that she is not determined nor necessitated by
phenomena, but is free, and we judge the action only by rational Jaws (during the impu-
tation). Actions here in the world are mere schemes of the intelligible [world]; however,
these appearances (this word already signifies scheme) are connected according to empir-
ical Jaws, if one looks at reason itself according to its manifestations as a phenomenon
(of the character). 7
Here we find ourselves before the distinction which Kant makes

between the intelligible world and the sensible world. However, he
himself admits to not knowing what measure to assign the act of elab-
orating a scheme, that is an appearance, to reason, although, immediately
afterwards, he himself admits that it is phenomenon, as long as we see
it in conformity with its manifestations. Now there would be nobody who
would object to the assertion that all that we apprehend of reason is its
manifestations. This means, according to Kant, that reason is phenom-
enon. The aforesaid is in accordance with what is said in A 248-249,
where Kant distinguishes between phenomena and noumena, sustaining
that of these latter we can know nothing. 8 Then, for Kant (B 299), our
knowledge consists, in its entirety, of representations coming from empir-
THE PSEUDO-CONCEPTS PHENOMENON AND AOrm: 73
ical intuitions (Anschauungen). Thus a concept, once formed, must

become sensible,9 that is, change into a phenomenon.
But, behind the phenomenon there is that something, the thing-in-itself
or thing-per-se, sustained by Kant in order to avoid the, to him, incon-
gruous assertion that an appearance was some-thing without that which
appears. 10 But Kant, and not only regarding the thing-per-se, left a
legacy in the form of an insoluble problem, that was to occupy many
later thinkers, especially those of the Marburg School, for his very notion
of phenomenon, appearance and scheme merit a careful reconsidera-
tion also.
HEGEL
Among the numerous Hegelian writings there stands out, in a special

way, the Phenomenology of Spirit, a work that was published for the
first time in 1807 and should be considered the most explicit exposi-
tion of Hegelian dialectics and, in contrast to his Logic, the most dynamic
among the works of this thinker. Even though in the said work the concept
of appearance (Erscheinung) takes the place of the term phenomenon,
we feel justified in asserting that, as its title implies, the entire text is
composed of the coming-to-be in phenomenal form of what Hegel calls
spirit. Among the translators of the Phenomenology there are those
who translated Erscheinung, sometimes as manifestation, sometimes
as phenomenon, 11 this term only being found in Chapter III, "Force
and Understanding, Phenomenon and Suprasensible World" of "Con-
sciousness," in Section 2, "The Interior." Of a total of eighteen instances
of Erscheinung in the section mentioned, we found eleven translations
as manifestation and eight as phenomenon. To these we have to add
one instance of the German Schein (the brilliancy or the appearing), trans-
lated by appearance. Even though here it is the translator, but not
Hegel, who confuses, as Kant did, the terms of appearance, phenom-
enon and manifestation, Hegel himself excludes the word Erscheinung
from the rest of his work, following Self-consciousness, putting in its
place the dynamics of the dialectical figures or movements. These are
being-in-itself, being-for-itself and being-in-and-for-itself, 12 that is, the
constitutive moments of each of such figures. Of these moments it is
the first, being-in-itself, that corresponds to the Erscheinung, appearance,
manifestation or phenomenon, quoted above, so that the Erscheinung
or phenomenon, as we prefer to translate it, accompanies the long -
74 HORST MATTHAI
and, to be sure, infinite 13 - process of the coming-to-be of the Hegelian

spirit.
HUSSERL
Husserl starts from Brentano and Dilthey, for whom philosophy was,
essentially, phenomenality. But where for Dilthey this phenomenality was
limited to the consciousness of the human being, 14 serving as an expla-
nation of the historicist slant given to it by this philosopher, Husser}
sees in phenomenology the method that, starting with the premises of
contemporary science - "all scientific knowledge is based on experi-
ence"15 - can, however, take us to an authentic metaphysics and, with
her, philosophy. 16
Husserl does not deny the presence of the concept of phenomenon
in psychology and the other sciences of his time and even before his time,
but characterizes the concept employed by himself as a modification of
them. 17 Husserl sees the access to such modification in the attitude of
whomever apprehends the phenomena, an attitude which he calls simple
or ingenuous. It is this attitude that permits the apprehension of the
phenomenon in all its richness, to serve as the basis for the phenome-
nological reduction that results in the concept of the object in its essential
and necessary characteristics. Even so, however, to refer to something
transcendent, to even mention it in this or that manner is, for Husser},
the interior character of all phenomena. 18
HEIDEGGER
While Nicolai Hartmann distanced himself from Husserl reintroducing

the problem of being vs. phenomenon, since he sees in the phenom-
enon the road of access to being 19 - which still implies the recognition
of consciousness as bearer of the phenomenon - implying with it that
the phenomenon essentially transcends itself, inasmuch as it allows its
contents to appear as something supraphenomenal, 20 Heidegger sees the
phenomenon as the manifest, the apparent, that is to say, the showing
itself in itselP 1 With that he opens the area of the analysis of the be-
there, of the Da-sein, with all its ramifications, such as be-with, be-for,
be-in-the-world, and so forth. There is nothing behind the phenomena,
even though that which shall be phenomenon can be hidden, 22 the hidden
being, for Heidegger, being (das Sein).
Contrary to his forerunners, Heidegger extends his analysis to the

concept of A.oyo~, since he considers that the phenomenological concept
of phenomenon requires a prior and careful determination of its signif-
icance.23 Heidegger begins with a refutation of the interpretations of
A.oyo~ as reason, judgement, concept, definition, cause or relation -
versions common, in Heidegger's opinion, 24 in the philosophies after
Plato and Aristotle - in order to later show its original meaning of to
say and its connection with the Aristotelian concept of mto<j>mvt::crem,
of un-cover, show, bring to light or make visible. 25 For this Heidegger
sees in the to say the action of to make visible, 26 in accordance with
his notion of the aA.T)eEta. as truth qua state of not hidden. 27 But this
saying, that lets see, this philosopher interprets as the saying of that which
one says or of which one talks, a viewing for whomever is talking or
for those who are talking with one another. 28 The last seems to us sin-
gularly significant because Heidegger bases his interpretation of A.oyo~
on Fragment B 1 of Heraclitus (44b), which, however, mentions nothing
regarding talking with one another. We shall see that in this manner
Heidegger, by displacing himself towards the be-with (mit-sein) - one
of the most important aspects of his philosophy - isolates himself from
the road to an adequate interpretation of A.oyo~ in relation with the phe-
nomenon and, with it, to phenomenology.
THE ALTERNATIVE
It was Karl Popper who, in one of the last works in his life, called for
a return to the Presocratics. For him those ancient thinkers distinguished
themselves by the development of their theories of knowledge within
the framework of their cosmological visions, for which reason he con-
siders it urgent to first understand the world in which we live, in order
to later understand our own selves. He says:
For me, science as well as philosophy lose all their attraction when they renounce this
search - when they become specialties and no more see, and wonder at the marvels of,
the riddles of our world. The specialization may be a great temptation for the scientist.
For the philosopher it constitutes a mortal sin. 29
Here we have the opinion of a thinker, born in 1902, who was a

witness to the oscillations of contemporary philosophy, which has filled
thick volumes of obliging sheets of paper, but does not offer humans
the slightest glimmer of viable alternatives. Even so there are among
76 HORST MATTHAI
scientists some who are conscious of the radicalness of the human

problem, when they note that only a Copernican revolution of the mind
can avoid the human race's falling into a state of worthless existence. 30
Accepting the premises mentioned, we shall reformulate the question
of an authentic phenomenology, beginning with a careful revision of
the concept of phenomenon and that of A.oyoc;.
Our word phenomenon derives from the Greek (j>mVOJ.lVOV, participle
of the middle voice of the verb (j>mvw, which in the active voice
expresses, as a transitive verb, bring to light, make visible, make appear, 31
and as an intransitive verb, illuminate, 32 to shine, to glow, to glitter.
The meaning in the middle voice, however, offers a major problem,
related with what we shall call the corrosion or, coinciding with
Heidegger, 33 the dwindling of language during the last milleniums. It
might be asked, in what sense this notion of dwindling concerns artic-
ulate expression in general, however, it is precisely in this that we find
the roots of the problem, in other words, we have to look for such roots
in a phase of human speech that precedes all forms of expression in
any one of the known languages.
To start out with, and referring to some of the languages of the greatest
ancestry, 34 we find three forms of expressing an action in relation with
a subject, i.e. the active, middle and passive voices, quoting in the usual
order. Furthermore we should take into account that verbal expression
precedes the use of substantives and adjectives. In support of this we
refer to two eminent German philologists, 35 who sustain that the con-
stitutive parts most essential in an action, that is, the object of which
something is predicated, are that same predicate, which means, that which
is enunciated of the aforementioned subject, like in pooov eaA.A.et, the
rose flowers. Of those the subject is a substantival concept and the
predicate a verbal concept. But, these grammarians keep saying, the
subject can be included in the predicate, as in $11J.H, I say, from which
they infer, that we must see the original form of oration in the mere verb?6
We ourselves agree with these authors, although we prefer to take the
originality much further still.
For this purpose we shall invade a dimension largely ignored by lin-
guists up to now which is the dimension of the dual (as distinct from
the singular and the plural). The references concerning this, for us, most
important form of expression are extremely rare, being reduced to a
few lines in dictionaries and encyclopaedias, and there being cited as
the only relevant work on the subject that of Humboldt, On Dualis ( 1927).
THE PSEUDO-CONCEPTS PHENOMENON AND AOrm:: 77
But even this work is limited to an exposition of the presence of the

dual in time and space, showing the geographic areas and the ethnic
groups, where the dual, even though mostly in a reduced manner, 37 is
detectable in speech. To the languages, the entire structure of which
the dual penetrates, belong, according to Humboldt, what he calls the
Sanskritic, 38 the Maltese and North African Arabic, the Greenlandic,
the Araucanic and, to a lesser degree, the Lapponian or Sami languages.
Of these last languages only the Sanskritic, the Avestan and Ancient
Greek offer sufficient material for our research even though we find them
among the dead languages; as to the other languages, even though some
of the dual forms were alive in some of them, only a reduced number
of persons still articulate them.
Looking, then, at the three languages mentioned, we note immediately
the presence of the dual in the declensions and the conjugations. For
Kuhner and Holzweissig the concept of conjugation denotes the inflexion
of the verbs according to its forms of person, number, mode, time and
gender, 39 although, for these philologists, the use of this term is the result
of what they call a badly founded linguistic tradition. 40 The Real
Academia Espanola coincides with this definition, except the mention
of gender. 41 However, before commenting on such badly founded tradi-
tion, we shall have to examine the adequacy of the term conjugation
for the grammatical operations cited by the philologists quoted. Derived
from the verb coniugo, of the Latin con and iugum, a verb that denotes
to join under the yoke, to join a couple - as to join in matrimony 42 -
precisely because the component iugum, before it acquired the signifi-
cance of that of a yoke to which the defeated in war had to submit or
the crest that joined two or more mountains, was strictly limited to the
notion of some pair, like the wood that transversed a scale, that is, the
idea of duality. On the other hand, finding ourselves before the concept
of declension, we immediately run against the restriction of this term,
valid today, to the case inflexions, 43 like those of the nominative, genitive,
dative and accusative, singular or plural. But this was not always the case;
on the contrary, in very remote times, as Georges affirms, the term declen-
sion covered any alteration in the form of a word, be they those that
we encounter in a declension, be they those that we find in a conjuga-
tion, comparison or derivation. 44
Now, the word declension derives from the verb *clino, *clinare, to
double, to twist or to bend, which fell into disuse since remote times,
being preserved only in composites like declino, inclino and reclino.
78 HORST MATTHAI
In classical Greek, however, its homophone KA.LVOO, with an analogous

connotation, remained in usage, the grammarians employing, according
to Passow, this verb for all modifications, be they of conjugations, be
they of declensions. 45
When looking closer at the word decline, however, we should note the
almost pleonastic aspect implied by it, which means that KA.tvro in Greek,
like the vanished *clino in Latin, already by itself expressed a doubling,
a separation of him that exercised the action, while the particle de
in Latin, in composites, as in the case of de-clino, signifies distance,
separation, in the material sense as well as in the moral. 46 Testimony
of this we find in Cicero's writing De natura, deorum, where he expounds
the theory of Epicurus, who according to Cicero opposed Democritus
by presuming his theory of an atom invested with the principle of volition,
consisting in its capacity to decline its movement, to change its own direc-
tion.47 Here we find an important contribution towards a more profound
comprehension of what the dual was originally. Furthermore for archaic
Greeks the idea of the atom included the notions of infinity, indivisibility
and eternity, so that the declension or doubling of the atom represented
an infinite duality, which evokes in us the reminiscence of the infinite
dyad of the Pythagoreans. 48
On the basis of the aforesaid, then, we can draw a first conclusion:
all declension, and that includes as said before the verbal inflexions of
the conjugation, intrinsically expresses a separation into two and, with
that, a duality, for which reason the presence of the dual in conjuga-
tions as well as in the declensions of the already mentioned ancient
languages would merely be the primary reflex of this original function
of human speech. Regarding the use of the term of conjugation as a badly
founded tradition, we do not adhere to the criterion of Kuhner and
Holzweissig, since we see in said use the redemption - by whoever intro-
duced the term in the grammatical terminology - of precisely this primary
function. And we sustain the aforesaid notwithstanding the patent loss
of consciousness, among the users of speech in general, of the profound
significance of the term conjugation as con-iugum, it being the duty of
each new generation, and of course of each individual in the course of
his self-formation, to recreate for himself49 a cosmovision and, with same,
the language qua materialization of his thinking. 50 .
Returning to the already mentioned dwindling of language, manifest
in the disappearance of the dual, and which we can show in multiple other
areas of spoken expression (for example the loss of the ablative [the from
where], the locative [the where] and the instrumental [the through what
or with what] in the declensions), we note as singularly alarming the
disappearance of the middle voice, which, similarly to the dual, formed
part of the grammar of Sanskrit, of Avestan and of Ancient Greek. In
order to comprehend its seriousness, we must first jointly examine the
three voices - also called genera or ouxeeoet<;51 - of the verbs.
Firstly let us note certain discrepancies among the various grammar-
ians consulted, discrepancies that are understandable, however, in our
opinion, due to the atrophy in consciousness in the use of the languages,
even among the experts, as we can exemplify through the case of the
double negation - ou and Jlll - in the ancient Greek language, about
which Kuhner and Gerth make this comment: " ... belongs only to the
writers of the later Greek period, who no longer had clear conscious-
ness of the difference between J.Lll and ou."52 Analogously, we would
assert the existence of a similar ignorance among the experts as to the
profound significance of the active, middle and passive voices. 53
To start out with, the grammarians we consulted- Kuhner and Gerth, 54
Penagos,55 Frangos 56 and Gofii 57 - agree on the presence of the three
voices in Ancient Greek: the active, the middle and the passive. Frangos
adding a fourth one: the neuter. 58 For the Sanskrit language Macdonell
only gives the active and the middle, but admits that the middle takes
the place of the passive, except in the present and imperfect tenses, as
well as the third person singular of the aorist, where the passive has its
own terminations. Buhler subscribes to the opinion of Macdonell, citing
in addition other forms of the passive, such as the perfective passive
participle, the conditional and the precative, where the terminations of
the middle stand for the passive. 59 For the ancient Iranian or Avestan,
Reichelt names two voices, the active and the middle, recognizing,
however, the existence of a passive for the imperfect tense, as well as
the use of the middle for the passive occurring already in Indogermanic
times. 60
For the Latin language the school grammars only mention two voices:
the active and the passive, 61 while those of higher levels, such as that
of Kuhner and Holzweissig, still contain, apart from the active and
passive voices, the voice they call reflexive or middle, although the
verbs pertaining to this third form receive the name of deponentia. 62 This
is understandable, since, as these philologists say, the distinction in
significance that motivated the preferential use of the middle form
was no longer perceptible. And it is this that must have caused the
80 HORST MATTHAI
disappearance of the middle voice among the languages in general, and

the representing this disappearance only a hiatus - which we dare to
qualify as one of minor importance63 - in the macro-process of the already
mentioned linguistic atrophy.
A curious fact merits our attention: All the grammarians we con-
sulted cite the verbal voices as active, middle and passive - in this
order. They put the passive in last place due, as they say, to its taking
its terminations from the middle, 64 but giving the impression, as they
go along, that the active is the original among the three. And as far as
the middle is concerned, they agree, some with more emphasis than
others, that this form designates the expression of an action that starts
with a subject and again returns to it. 65 Thus Gofli cites as an example
A'UOJ.t<U tou~ l1t1tO'U~ and translates: I untie the horses or I untie my
horses or I untie for myself,66 however, when he inserts in his grammar
the synoptic plate of the verb A.uw in the middle voice, he translates:
A'UO!la.t I untie myself or I am untied, 67 interpreting A'UO!la.t as a reflexive
or passive verb. Only Frangos offers the correct rendering of for myself
for all the tenses and modes of the middle voice. 68
The subjacent problem in all this is, in our opinion, that of how must
we interpret the idea of an action or, in our case specifically, an action
for ourselves. As an example of this we quote from Homer: Kat !l'
e<j>aoav xpuoov t Ka.t apyupov otKa3' ayeo9a.t. 69 Odysseus, having
sailed from the island of Aeolia, receives from King Aeolus, as a present,
a leather bottle, with the strong winds enclosed inside it, in this manner
guaranteeing his quiet voyage over the seas towards his home. But, almost
in seeing distance of the anxiously desired Ithaca, Odysseus falls asleep;
his companions, envious of the suspected treasure of gold and silver
hidden in the leather bottle, decide to betray Odysseus and open the
bottle, releasing the winds which unleash a tremendous storm that again
removes Odysseus to a great distance from his home. The stanza quoted
refers to the treasure cited. Let us see some of the translations:
They thought that I was bringing home gold and silver. 70
"And said that I was bringing home for myself gold and silver. "71
Suspecting that I was bringing with me much gold and silver to my home. 72
Alluding to my bringing gold and silver. 73
Some were talking to the others about what I was bringing to my palace, suspecting it
to be gold and silver. 74
Of the five translators quoted, some of them of world renown, only

one, A. T. Murray, offers the correct rendering of for-me, that is, for
myself This is an illustration of what we called the atrophy of con-

sciousness in the use of languages, a fact that must not be underestimated,
as we shall see later, in view of the already mentioned crisis75 that
humanity lives in at present.
Now, in order to resolve the problem of the verbal voices we must
return to the disappearance of the dual, since, as we shall see, both
questions are intimately connected. The grammarians of Sanskrit, Avestan
and Ancient Greek include the dual in the synoptic plates of the three
voices, but with certain discrepancies among themselves. And it will
be precisely these that shall open for us the access to the solution of
such a thorny problem.
In Ancient Avestan the dual was used in expressions involving two
entities, says Reichelt/6 being replaced little by little afterwards, in
later Avestan, by the plural. 77 With this the process of its disappear-
ance was already advanced. In Sanskrit, Buhler and Macdonell confirm
the presence of the dual in the verbs in the three persons in the active
voice as well as in the middle and passive voices. In the Ancient Greek,
on the other hand, we note the discrepancies cited above. Thus, Frangos
and Penagos78 construct the synoptic tables of the verbs with the second
and third persons of the dual only, in all the tenses and modes; Gofii does
the same, except for the future tense of the verb ELJH, to be, in the second
aorist of that verb, formed with the participle ')'L'}'VOJ.HU, and in the middle
voice in general, where he includes a first person of the dual. 79 The last
is corroborated by Kuhner and Blass, who recognize in the conjugation
two forms of the dual for the active voice, but three for the middle. 80
Now, of the verb ELJH we know that the terminations of the present and
the imperfect tenses - ELJH, I am and TJV, I was - constitute the para-
digms for the active voice of Greek verbs, while those of the future
tense - E<JOJ.l<U, I shall be - are the paradigms for the middle voice.
We saw that the middle voice expresses an action that parts from
the subject but returns towards him. The grammarians call the verb ELJ.l.L
a defective or irregular verb. What they do not say, however, is that its
pretended defectiveness and irregularity is a manifestation of its being
a protoverb, we even would dare to say: the protoverb par excellence,
of which, to be certain, Kuhner and Gerth assert its significance as, I
breathe, I live, I am here. 81 But a be-here pregnant with life would not
be limited to an I am, that would always imply something concrete and,
therefore, finished, but rather an I shall be, a presence weighted with
the promise of a coming to be infinite in dimension. The Greeks were
82 HORST MATTHAI
right when, in the dawn of their culture and bursting with creativity,
they conceived the figure of the god Kronos, 82 a densification of time
as an eternal now, 83 nourishing itself and growing young again in each
instant through the incorporation of an infinite future. 84 The Bible as well,
if we see her beyond eschatological tendencies, transmits the idea of a
creative and dynamic God in the famous passage of Exodus 3: 14: "I shall
be that shall be. "85
With this we run against another problem, one rarely attended to by
the experts, as it is that of the pronouns. Kuhner and Gerth show that
the use of the personal pronouns with first and second persons pertains
to late periods in the history of the Greek language, 86 modem scholars
adding that the first person was the last to appear. 87 In consequence,
the significance of the absence of the I, in the enunciation <I>TJJ.LL, I say,
commented above, cannot, in our opinion, be overestimated: for, if we
were to enunciate it in the so-called first person singular of the dual in
the middle voice, we would express the absolute identity of that person
who speaks with the spoken -for himself, as we saw above. In other
words, the dual would no longer imply a relation between two entities,
which would presuppose the presence of an I in front of something that
is alien to it, but a relation of something with itself. With that it would
be clear, at the same time, that it is erroneous to speak of a first person
singular in the case of the dual, since this form of speech only materi-
alizes a dimension of human thought, in which the one - the individual
- doubles itself or himself in order to recover, immediately after, as
the infinite dyad of the Pythagoreans, the absolute unity.
Here we have, in the dual thus understood, the for-oneself infinite
in dimension and, consequently, absolute. In what the philologists call
the second and third persons of the dual, we meet with that one's
resigning from its character of absoluteness and granting the for-oneself
to another or others, that now join with that primary for-oneself- as
infinite and absolute - and emerging with them, and as a consequence
of them, the first person of the dual. That primary for-oneself, the one
as individual and infinite dyad, then comes-to-be I. But not an I as an
individual, but an I as a person, as something that represents a role,
who plays a part within a collective of others, all created by him as a
you and as a he. If we were to accept this- how should we call it? -
hypothesis, we would no longer have a difficulty in accepting the slippage
of the three persons of the dual towards the three persons of the singul~ 8
of the middle voice, which boast precisely, as we saw above, the for-
myself, the redemption of which in our consciousness now appears to

be of extraordinary importance, if we wish to understand the myste-
rious disappearance, since remote times, of the dual, and later of the
middle voice.
In addition to what has already been said, we shall now have to talk
about that other manifestation of the dual, the declension. Declension
serves to express the various relations into which a subject can enter,
through the predicate, with some object. This happens when the original
way of speaking constituted by the predicate with the subject being
implied, as seen above, is amplified. In our languages, these relations are
manifest through the cases, that is, through the accusative, the genitive
or the dative. Adding to these the nominative, which corresponds to
the subject, we find the usual four cases in a declension, be they in
singular, be they in plural, and in this manner the Ancient Greek also
has them, except in the dual where we find only two cases. Of these
two one, as the grammarians tell us, represents the nominative, accusative
and vocative - the vocative not being of major concern here - and the
other represents the genitive and dative. We must, however, object to
the manner in which these grammarians expose the function of the dual,
since they suppose, without any documentary support, that the five
cases are somehow implicit in those two forms of the declension, as if
the dual had been something like a species of simplified or contracted
declension. We, on the contrary, though equally devoid of documen-
tary support, but with strict adherence to logic, postulate that when the
dual was in operation, with its only two forms in the declension, it
did not have but one sole person - that is: the first person 89 of the dual
- in the conjugation. Because, being identical with what later was to
be designated nominative and accusative, we cannot speak of some-
thing that exercises the action as being separated from what receives
it, just as we can neither speak in the case of the second form, an
identity of genitive and dative, of a difference between the of and the
to or for, since to separate something from something is here equiva-
lent to granting it to or for that same something. Let this be an example:
if I wrest an apple from the branch of an apple tree, I already destine
it, qua nourishment, to or for me; as in a similar manner the plastic
surgeon cuts off a part of the skin of the leg of a person in order to
graft it, let us say on the face of said person, disfigured due to some
accident or lesion.
Now, seeing in the dual, in what we shall call the pseudo first person,
84 HORST MATTHAI
the articulation of absolute identity, we should see in the middle voice

a dimension of a weakened identity, precisely because of the creation
of the second and the third persons and, as a consequence of that, the
creation of the three persons of the singular and, more still, of the plural.
Through these the infinite dyad of the Pythagoreans converts itself into
a finite dyad among an infinity of other finite dyads, constituting itself
in this manner the middle voice 90 as a permanent challenge for the
acting subject, which, splitting itself into subject and object, has to
recover the lost unity by means of the for-itself implicit in it. The mech-
anism for the achievement of this task is offered by phenomenology,
in its phenomenal component as well as in the A.ayoc;.
Returning to ancient Greece, though we already find the idea of the
phenomenal in Homer, 91 it is in Protagoras that we see an expression
of it more compatible with our interpretation. In the last part of Fragment
B 1 this sophist expresses in a clear and distinct manner, as Descartes
would say, the radically subjective character of the phenomenon.
we; 0 OOl, tOlU\JtU
OlU !lV EKUOtU EJ.lOl cf><x,lVEtUl, tOlU\JtU !1V EO'tlV EJ.lOl, OlU
oE av oot avepwnoc; oE ov t (Such as each [thing] to me appears for me, also
KU')'W.
such it is to me, but such [as each thing] to you [appears for you], also such [it is] on
the contrary to you: since human [are] you as also 1.)
The pleonasm of the to me appears for me, supported also by Jowett

in his famous translation of the works of Plato, 92 is not reflected in the
common versions, including that of Schleiermacher, the famous German
Hellenist, 93 because the investigators do not perceive it any more.
Moreover, the contemporaries of Protagoras also did not remember the
subjacent significance of verbs in the middle voice, which must have
been the reason for which this sophist included it in his lectures. We
support our assertion with the fact, reported by Diogenes Laertius,94
that Protagoras was the first to teach the power of K<Upoc;. Now, K<Upoc;
was one of those concepts, the corrosion of which had motivated five
of the seven Wise Men to prominently present it in their enunciations,
this being a sympton of the profound crisis suffered during the archaic
Greek culture, a crisis that can also be seen in the schism that devel-
oped between Presocratic thought and subsequent philosophies. But this
schism was not a product of the sophists who historically separate one
from the others, not at least as far as Protagoras and Gorgias are con-
cerned, because they, following a tradition already established by
Xenophanes, humanized philosophy, by distancing it from the religious
THE PSEUDO-CONCEPTS PHENOMENON AND i\Orm: 85
superstitions foreign to the cosmogonic traditions95 that originated it. The

resulting monotheism of Plato and Aristotle 96 obstructs, up to the present,
access to the comprehension of the pristine humanistic thought. We
shall come back to this matter later.
Nor must we be surprised, then, by the incomprehension of the
absolute subjectivism of Protagoras. Let us note that, according to the
text quoted, the being human of the you as the same as that of the I
rests precisely on the difference of the being of things that are for one
and the other, in other words, to be human is, recurring also to the first
part of Fragment B 1, to create each one his world or, as Protagoras
says, to be the measure of all things, to give being and not-being to
them.
Here we have the dimension of the middle voice, where there is
nothing but the action of the individual for-himself- but the individual
as absolute indivisibility and concomitant totality - and, we might add
in Hegelian language, in-himself. That this were the case is supported
by our sophist having been a disciple of Democritus 97 who taught,
together with Leucippus, not only the idea of the atom as an indivis-
ible unity, but, more still, that of KVpLW~ or that of lordly being, as we
hear from Aristotle. 98 But this lordly being as an absolute fullness, 99
though it preserves its indivisibility, is not one, but an infinite multi-
plicity100 of atoms, that is, a cosmos. Of course here we separate ourselves
from the interpretation of the Stagirite, since in this theory of the atomists
we rather see an analogy to the Leibnizian monad which, as a monad
without windows, includes all the other monads and vice versa. 101
When Plato comments on Protagoras' saying in his Theaetetus, he
identifies the terms patVOfJ.at and atcrea.vecreat, I shine for myself
and I feel for myself, 102 that is, I perceive. But then he adds: om yap
atCJ9UVEtat EKUCJtO~, tOLa.Vta. EKUCJtWL Kat KLVOVVEVEL ELVa.L, intro-
ducing with the word KLVOVVEVEL an important element to the problem
of <!>atvecreat, one overlooked by the scholars. In support of this last
assertion we give two renderings of the comment by one of the most
famous translators:
For as each one perceives it, so it also seems to be for him. 103
For we must assume that they really are for each man such as he perceives them to
be.'04
The verb KLvovvevw, however, originally signifies to be in danger

- be it in war, be it in the courthouse - to expose oneself to danger, or
86 HORST MATTHAI
emerge successfully from a dangerous undertaking, 105 though, later on,

it acquired, on a more mitigated level, the connotation of running a risk
in the sense of to wager, 106 from whence the translation appear, as if
we were to say: maybe this were thus or it appears that you are right. 107
We, on the contrary, not only prefer to return to the pristine meaning
of KlVO'UVE'UW, but even to radicalize the most recent version of to lay
a wager, substituting for it to risk all for all. 108 What we wish to say is
that the individual, when feeling or perceiving, confronts two options, on
the one hand to place what has been perceived within parameters already
established - as is usually the case - and, on the other hand, to abandon
himself to the perceived. But this endangers or puts at risk the stability
and even the validity of all knowledge already achieved, provoking
with it a crisis of consciousness. As a means of illustration we make
reference to Norman Rockwell, the famous illustrator of the late North
American weekly Saturday Evening Post. Today his illustrations are con-
sidered classics, and are objects coveted by collectors of art. He drew
scenes of the everyday life of the people of North America, excelling
in one of them, that of a boy of some nine years of age who, alone at
home and with his parents away, and browsing among his parents'
belongings, suddenly stands petrified with an indescribable expression
of anguish and amazement - because he has just discovered, hidden at
the bottom of one of the drawers, the clothes of Santa Claus. The idea
of a collapse of a whole world in the consciousness of a human being,
masterly drawn by the artist, is what we wish to introduce at this point.
Quite possibly it corresponds to the notion of 9<X'UJ.L<l, consternation,
which for some of the ancient thinkers was the starting point of phi-
losophy, 109 although we prefer to see in said idea rather a crisis of
consciousness similar to the one experienced in ancient Greece by the
initiates in the minor and major mysteries, but in a special manner in
the major mysteries. In this connection we should recall the figure of
Triptolemos, symbol of the Eleusinian initiateno- leaving aside the absurd
interpretation of the one who shakes three times [the barley]; 1n - we
find in this personage the human being who, as initiate, had to confront
the horrors of the underworld, n2 and by means of surpassing them three
times, achieved the third and highest grade in the mysteries. But the
horrors of the underworld are but the states of consciousness of the
same individual who suffers the shock- for this is the sense of the word
1tOAEJ.LOs (in Ionic 1ttOAEJ.LOs). derived from 1tEAW, ll3 of perceiving his,
we might say, crude self and the conflict with himself implied in it. In
view of the aforesaid, the use of the word Ktvouvuw, by Plato, is no

longer surprising, especially, if we take into account its probable deriva-
tion from KtVW, as suggested by Menge and Giithling. 114 For, in order
to be a measure, in a Protagorean sense, of things in their being and in
their not-being, to create one's own world through consecutive percep-
tions, it is necessary, each time that one apprehends a new phenomenon,
each time that one perceives a new reality, to be uprooted from the
previous state of conscience. Of this Hegel was aware when he confronted
the problem of teaching philosophy in schools at the high school level,
where we aim to awaken the reflexive potential in juvenile minds; he
says in his Philosophische Propiideutik that firstly one must shake up
or confound youth (the literal translation of the text in German would
be: in youth hearing and seeing must first disappear). 115
We feel that what has been said so far is of great importance for an
adequate appreciation of what we call phenomenology, and we must
therefore present a, for us, adequate translation of the Platonic text
mentioned above:
for, as each one feels for himself the things, such is also for each one an inner
shake-up.
Now, Plato speaks here in the context of the Protagorean homo

mensura. But said human being is, in a radical sense, individual. To be
a human being consists, for the sophist, precisely, as said above, in his
being different from all the others, in so far as for each one things
appear as being different, so that said shake-up affects my seeing and
hearing, as Hegel asserted. However, such affection makes them disap-
pear, a condition which Hegel considered prerequisite to the beginning
of philosophical thought among the young, which must not be confounded
with Husserl's Einklammerung - the bracketing. 116 For Husserl the
Einklammerung or 1tOXll was equivalent to putting out of action 117 some-
thing that, however, still remained contained in my consciousness.
Husserl speaks in this context of a splitting of the ego in two: on one
hand that which belongs to that which was put in brackets, that is,
the I as plain observer - the schlicht Sehende - and, on the other
hand, that which practices pure self-consciousness - the das reine
Selbsterkenntnis Ubende. 118 With this, however, there appears again a
fundamental problem of man, one not resolved since antiquity, precisely
due to that tradition, and according to Heidegger perpetuated up to now,
the problem of interpreting philosophy according to the patterns estab-
88 HORST MATTHAI
lished by Plato and Aristotle. 119 To be concrete, we refer to what we

shall call the polytheism of the Presocratic thinkers.
We know that Thales (Fragment A 1.27) considered the cosmos full
of gods, and according to Aetios Anaximander (Fragment A 17) called
the infinite heavens gods, and for Heraclitus (Fragment A 1.7) all [the
worlds] were full of souls and gods. Now it is true, that Heraclitus himself
(Fragment B 5) ridiculed those who adored statues representing divini-
ties, but he affirmed, immediately after, that this was due to their lack
of knowledge as to what gods and heroes really are. This last assertion
of the philosopher of Ephesus is suggestive, since it prepares the way
for the comprehension of Fragment B 53, 120 where Heraclitus affirms
1tOAEJ.lO<;, war, as father and king of all, making some gods and others
men. It seems strange, at first sight, to see in the Presocratic polytheism
mentioned, that is, in the thesis of a multiplicity of gods, a theory of
knowledge, but this is what we emphatically assert. Of the philosophers
mentioned, Thales and Anaximander only mention the gods, but
Heraclitus explains their origin.
Starting with the pristine significance of 1tOAEJ.lO<; as a violent
movement or commotion (n. 113), we now see in what manner this
commotion makes - in the words of Heraclitus - gods of some and
men of others. Those who perceive phenomena, in Husserlian language,
as plain observers become men; on the other hand, those who achieve
pure self-knowledge become gods.
This acquires even more relevance, if we pay attention to the repeated
use by Heraclitus in this declaration of the expression J.lEV ... o, for
many of unmistakable meaning in ancient Greek. Kuhner and Gerth make
it clear that these particles express the mutual relation between a con-
cessive phrase and an adversative one. According to them this relation
expresses itself through the aggregation of the concessive part which is
J.lEV, showing beforehand the restrictive nature of the second part char-
acterized by o. 121 Immediately afterward, these philologists clarify,
however, that in the same way that the particle o can designate a
stricter opposition it can designate a weaker one, and thus the signifi-
cance of J.lEV is sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker. 122 It is worth
noting that in Fragment B 53 Heraclitus uses one as he also uses the other
of the two modalities mentioned, which, together with the two semantic
levels of the word 1tOAEJ.lO<; as a violent movement or commotion, ade-
quately interpreted, give our fragment a vastly more profound meaning,
than the one encountered in the usual translations.
THE PSEUDO-CONCEPTS PHENOMENON AND AOfOl: 89
Let us first see the three syntactic elements which characterize

and compose the fragment:
1tOAEJ.LO~
(l) 1tO.VtWV J.LEV 1tO.TTJP E<JtL, 1tO.V'tWV OE ~(l<JLAEV<;

(2) tovc; J.LEV 9Eovc; EOELsE tovc; OE a.vepwnov<;
(3) tovc; J.LEV &ovA.ovc; E1tOLTJOE tov<; OE EAEV9Epovc;
We shall not yet offer a translation of our own, since it is necessary
to first analyze the radically distinct manners in which Heraclitus uses
J.LEV ... OE. In (2) and (3) we see this pair of conjunctions with the
more strict or strong significance, such as had been shown by Passow,
translatable by on the one hand and on the other hand. This is sup-
ported by the mutual exclusion of the terms connected by these
conjunctions, i.e., gods and men, 9EO'U<; and a.vepwnovc;, in (2) and
slaves and freemen, &ovA.ovc; and EAEV9Epov<;, in (3). What we wish
to say with this, is that: one is either god, or one is man; one is either
slave, or one is free; this means that, for Heraclitus, in no way can one
be both at the same time. In contrast to the aforesaid there are the phrases
contained in (1), because in these we find what we called above a weaker
meaning of the pair J.LEV . . . OE. For the translation of this one we
choose the expression now ... now. 123 According to all this, then,
1tOAEJ.LO<; now is father of all, now king of all. This avoids our violating
the Heraclitean text as all the other interpreters did, who, by by-passing
the J.LEV ... OE in (1) in Heraclitus, translate father and king, confusing
what is radically distinct, even opposed, in the thought of the Ephesian.
The pairs of terms in (2) and (3) constitute what in formal logic we
would call a dichotomous classification of humans, these being either
gods or men, either slaves or freemen. On the other hand, in (1) we
do not have different entities, as we might call them, but one only,
i.e., 1tOAEJ.LO<;, the violent shake-up, which for all now is father, now is
king.
We must remember that since the times of Solon, that is, for at least
a century before Heraclitus, the magnificence of Eleusis had acquired
an importance without equal in ancient Greece. Among the grandiose
constructions, that Peisistratus and the same Solon realized in the sanc-
tuary, was the TEAEO'tTJptov in which the 9EOL E1tTJKOOL presented
themselves, the gods who embodied the vision of the occult truth as
the supreme metaphysical happiness. 124 Let us understand that these gods
were the same initiates who, as E1tTJKOOL, as listening gods, 125 achieved
90 HORST MATTHAI
the third and highest grade of initiation, the so-called E1t01t'tELa., from
E1t01t'tELOO, I achieve seership. 126
All these data permit an interpretation of the gods of Fragment B
53 in Heraclitus as the same as the gods in the philosophy of Thales,
Anaximander and Anaximenes, leaving aside religious conceptions that
glut our present world. 1tOAEJ1oc;, qua father, in the case of the three
times violent shake-up - in the intimacy of our consciousness - of a
Triptolemos, cited above, reveals us as gods, in accord also with Fragment
B 119: 119oc;127 a.v9pro1troL OO.LJLOOV, [his] being 128 for man is god. 129
But in the case of the violent shake-up imposed from outside, qua king,
according to Fragment B 11 - 1ta.v ya.p Ep1tE'tOV 1tA'Ill'llL VEJLE'ta.L, every
creature is driven to pasture with a blow, 130 - we shall be men. In the
first of these cases, then, the triple internal shake-up of those that became
gods, because of their manner of being in their interior, reveals them
as such; in the second case, on the other hand, the violent external shake-
up, perennial existential strife, reveals us as men, making some slaves,
some free.
Then, phenomenon and logos as components of phenomenology imply:
the logos - that Heideggerian saying and making visible (see the section
on Heidegger above)- but at the same time a logos in the Heraclitean
sense, i.e., a logos that lays open reality for me. This, Heraclitus says
clearly (iJl the middle voice) in Fragment B 1: OKOLOOV e:yro OL11J'EOJ1a.L
(such as I expose them for me). The term that the Ephesian employs,
OL'IlJ'EOJlO.L, however, though usually translated as to expose, to relate
or to explain, 131 has a more profound meaning than those revealed by
these terms. The verb 11J'EOJ1a.L - from a.-yro, to guide, to lead, to go before
- denotes to lead, but with the connotation of going before, showing
the way and, even, leading the army or the fleet into combat; in com-
position with the prefix OLa., it expresses, furthermore, extension to all
points or in all directions. The reality which Heraclitus exposes for
himself is, then, totality; this is his allusion, not the exposition of this
or that detail of the existent, but the inclusion of the totality and, with
that, a cosmovision. And it is this that this philosopher considers himself
destined to propose, this is the reality which he exposes for himself,
assuming at the same time the role of leader of humanity, the only
possible explanation of the act of a thinker who, having amply shown his
contempt for humanity, decides, notwithstanding, to bequeath his work
to this same humanity, depositing it in the temple of Artemis in his native
city.
With that the connection is sealed between this logos and the phe-
nomenon, which, being the middle voice of the verb <l>atVOJ.HU, as
discussed above, is but the appearance of reality extended to all its
points. Husser! was right when he closed his First Philosophy with
these words:
Thus phenomenology leads towards monadology, anticipated by Leibniz in a genial
aperr,:u. 132
Now, for Leibniz each monad is a living and perpetual mirror of the
universe, 133 and, in as much as said monad as thinking subject or,
according to Leibniz, elected spirie 34 demands, as Kant says, the con-
version of abstract concepts into sensible intuitions, in the manner of
mathematics, which meet this demand by means of the construction
of their figures, the philosophers do likewise, constructing, in their
writings, the figures of their genial ideas and creating, in this manner,
PHILOSOPHY AS PHENOMENON AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, PHE-
NOMENOLOGY.
Universidad Aut6noma de Baja California
NOTES
1 Langenscheidts Handworterbuch Spanisch, 8th ed. (Berlin: Langenscheidt, 1993).
2 Joachim Ritter et al., Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, 9 vols. (Darmstadt:
WB, 1971-1995): "Der Schein ist seinem We sen nach ein Mittleres zwischen dem Wahren
und dem Falschen" (appearance is, according to its essence, something intermediate
between the true and the false).
3 I. Kant, Akademie edition of Kant's Werke, Metaphys, Anfangs-griinde der
Naturwissenschaften, Berlin, 1786, lxxi, Vol. IV, p. 477.

4 Langenscheidt: "existence, life, being, presence."
5 Kant, Foundations ... , loc. cit.
6 Kant used Gegenstand where in the case of possibility he spoke of a thing (Ding).
7 I. Kant, Metaphysics, Ak. Ausg., Vol. XVIII, p. 253. "Der Zusammanhang der Vemunft
mit den phaenomenis, womit sie [gar nicht] in comercio stehen soli, kan garnicht M
277: verstanden werden (K es sind heterogenea), Die wahre Thatigkeit der Vernunft und
ihr effect gehort zum mundo intelligibili. Daher wissen wir auch nicht, in welchem
Maafie wir imputiren sollen. Gleichwohl wissen wir so vie/ von der einjliefienden Gewalt
der Vernunft, dafi sie durch keine phaenomena bestimt und necessitirt, sondern frey sey,
und beurtheilen die Handlung bios nach rationalen Gesetzen (bey der imputation). Die
Handlungen hier in der Welt sind blofie Schemata von der intelligiblen; indessen hiingen
diese Erscheinungen (dies wort bedeutet schon Schema) doch nach empirischen Gesetzen
zusammen, wenn man die Vernunft selbst nach ihren Aufierungen als ein phaenomen
(des Charakters) ansieht".
92 HORST MATTHAI
8 B 310: "Am Ende aber ist doch die Moglichkeit solcher Noumenorum gar nicht
einzusehen" (but at the end nothing can be understood of the possibility of such
Noumenorum).
9 B 299: "einen abgesonderten Begriff sinnlich zu machen, d.h. das ihm korre-
spondierende Objekt in der Anschauung darzulegen" (make a separate concept sensible,
that is, show in the form of an intuition the object that corresponds to it).
10 B XXVI: "daft Erscheinung ohne etwas ware, was da erscheint".
11 Wenceslao Roces, trans!., Fenomenologia del espiritu (Mexico City: FCE, 1966).
12 Ibid., p. 292.
13 Heidegger in Heraclitus Seminar 1966167, Charles H. Seibert, trans!. (University of
Alabama Press, 1979), p. 49: "Hegel does not first start out with the finite in order then
to reach infinity; rather, he begins in infinity."
14 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Stuttgart: Teubner, V, 1957), p. 90: "Der
oberste Satz der Philosophie ist der Satz der Phiinomenalitiit: nach diesem steht alles,
was fiir mich da ist, unter der allgemeinsten Bedingung, Tatsache meines Bewufttseins
zu sein" (the supreme sentence of philosophy is the sentence of phenomenality: according
to which all that, that is-there for me, is under the most general condition, to be a fact
of my consciousness).
15 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, cited by Chatelet, Historia
de lafilosofia, ideas, doctrinas, 5 vols. (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1982), IV, p. 364.
16 We shall show proof of this later.
17 Husserliana 3, p. 3.
18 Husserliana 2, p. 46.
19 Nicolai Hartmann, Der Aujbau der rea/en Welt, 3rd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1964),
p. 194: "Denn aller Zugang zum Seienden hat die Form des Phiinomens" (so all access
to being has the form of the phenomenon).
20 Idem, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, 4th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), p. 153:
"Es gehort also zum We sen des Phiinomens iiberhaupt, daft es sich selbst 'transzendiert',
seinen lnhalt als einen iiberphiinomenalen erscheinen liiftt" (it belongs to the essence of
the phenomenon in general, that it itself 'transcends' itself, that it lets appear its contents
as supraphenomenal).
21 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 7.A: "das Offenbare, das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende".
22 Ibid., 7.C: '"Hinter' den Phiinomenen der Phiinomenologie steht wesenhaft nichts
anderes, wohl aber kann das, was Phiinomen werden soli, verborgen sein". ('Behind'
the phenomena of the phenomenology essentially there is nothing more, but very well
that which shall be phenomenon, can be hidden.)
23 Ibid., 7.A, p. 31: " ... ist die Bedeutung von A.<Y)Qc; zu umgrenzen".
24 Ibid., p. 32: "A.<Y)Qc; wird 'iibersetzt' d.h. immer ausgelegt als Vernunft, Urteil, Begriff,
Definition, Grund, Verhiiltnis".
25 Franz Passow, Handworterbuch der griechischen Sprache, 4 vols. (Darmstadt: WB,
1983): "aufdecken, vorzeigen, ans Licht bringen, sichtbar machen".
26 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 32: "Die Rede 'liiftt sehen"' (the discourse 'lets' see).
27 Ibid., 44b.
28 Ibid., 7B: "Der A.o)Qc; liijJt etwas sehen (cpuLvt:o8m), niimlich das, woriiber die Rede
ist und zwar fiir den Redenden (Medium), bezw.fiir die miteinander Redenden" (the AO')Qc;
lets something be seen (cpuLvEo8m), which means that, about which one talks, that is
for the one who is talking (Middle), or rather for the ones who are talking with one
another).
29 Karl Popper, "Remontemonos a los presocraticos" in La Gaceta del Fondo de Cultura
Economica, num. 287 (November 1994), 51-53.
30 Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth. A Report for The Club of Rome's
Project on the Predicament of Mankind, 5th ed. (London: Pan Books, 1979), pp. 196-197.
31 Soph., Phil., 297.
32 Homer, Od. 7.102 and 19.25.
33 M. Heidegger, "Uber den Humanismus" in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern:
Francke, 1947), p. 60: "Der neuerdings vie/ und spiit beredete Sprachverfall ..." (the
dwindling of language, much discussed nowadays, though rather late ... ).
34 Sanskrit, Avestan and ancient Greek.
35 Raphael Kiihner and Bernhard Gerth.
36 Raphael Kiihner and Bernhard Gerth, Aufiihrliche Grammatik der griechischern
Sprache, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1966), 345.1.
37 Oriental Asia, Philipines, the South Pacific islands, the Totonacan.
38 Seen. 34.
39 Raphael Kiihner and Friedrich Holzweissig, Ausfiihrliche Grammatik der lateini-
schen Sprache, Erster Teil, reimpr. of the 2nd ed. of 1912 (Darmstadt: WB, 1989),
157.
40 Ibid., "Konjugation (Ubersetzung des griech. av-suyta) nennt man nach
eingewurzeltem, freilich schlecht begriindetem Sprachgebrauche die Flexion des Verbs
nach seinen Personal-, Zahl-, Modus-, Tempus- und Genusformen". (Conjugation (trans-
lation of the Greek ov-svyt.a), according to a firmly rooted, however, badly founded
linguistic tradition, is the term for the inflexion of the verbs as to their forms of person,
number, mode, time and gender.)
41 "Conjugacion. (Del lat. coniugatio, -onis.) Accion y efecto de conjugar. Serie ordenada
de todas las voces de varia inflexion con que el verbo expresa sus diferentes modos,
tiempos, numeros y personas". (Conjugation (from the Latin coniugatio, -onis.) action
and effect of conjugating. Ordered series of all the voices of variable inflexions through
which the verb expresses its different modes, times, numbers and persons.)
42 Heinrich Georges, Ausfiihrliches lateinisch-deutsches Handworterbuch, 2 vols., 11th
ed. (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1962): "zusammenjochen, zusammenpaaren,
gleichs. zu einem Paar verbinden. Insbes. ehelich verbinden, verheiraten" (join together,
pair together, similar to join as a pair. Especially to join in matrimony, to marry).
43 Real Academia Espanola: "Gram. En las lenguas con flexion casual, serie ordenada
de todas las formas que presenta una palabra para desempefiar las funciones corre-
spondientes a cada caso". (Grammatical: In the languages with case inflexions, ordered
series of all the forms that a word presents in order to comply with the functions corre-
sponding to each case.)
44 Georges, op. cit., "in der iiltern Gramm., jede mit der Form eines Wortes
vorgenommene Abiinderung, sowohl Deklination im engern Sinne als Konjugation,
Komparation, Derivation usw . ... in der spiit. Gramm., die Deklination im engern
Sinne" (in the ancient grammar, any change made in the form of a word, declension in
a strict sense as well as conjugation, comparison, derivation and so forth ... in the later
grammar, the declension in the strict sense).
94 HORST MATTHAI
45 Passow, op. cit., "b. den Gramm., biegen, abwandeln, sowohl decliniren als conju-
giren" (with the grammarians, bend, change, to decline as well as to conjugate).
46 Georges, op. cit., "In der Zusammensetzung bezeichnet de: a) Entfernung, Trennung,
im materiel/en und moralischen Sinne" (in composites it signalizes: a) distance, separa-
tion, in the material and moral sense).
47 Cicero, D.n.deor., 1,69.
48 Later on we shall touch on this subject in a more detailed manner.
49 We showed the importance of the for-itself- here for-himself - in connection with
the middle voice.
50 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie, 6th ed., en Werke
(Darmstadt: WB, 1988), III, p. 84: "Allein das tonende Wort ist gleichsam eine
Verkorperung des Gedankens". (However the sounding word is somehow a materializa-
tion of thought.)
51 Passow, op. cit., "lha9e<n~<;. bei Gramm., die genera des Verbum" (with the gram-
marians, the genera of the verb).
52 Kuhner-Gerth, op. cit., 511.3: " ... gehort nur den Schriftstellern der spiiteren
Griizitiit an, die sich des Unterschiedes zwischen l.l.ll und 0\J nicht mehr klar bewusst
waren".
53 Cf. Hans Reichelt, Awestisches Elementarbuch, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: WB, 1967), 613:
"Die Handschriften schwanken zwischen Aktiv- und Media/form. Fast jede Form auf -ti
hat neben sich eine Variante auf -te, ein Beweis, daft vielleicht schon bei den Diaskeuasten
das Verstiindnis fiir den Genusunterschied erloschen war". (The manuscripts oscillate
between active and middle forms. Almost every form with -ti has on its side a variant with
-te, proof that maybe already with the diaskeuasts the understanding of the difference
of genus had ceased.)
54 Op. cit.
55 Luis Penagos, S. J., Gramatica griega, 4th ed. (Santander: Editorial 'Sal Terrea', 1958),
p. 36.
56 Demetrio Frangos, Gramatica griega (Mexico City: s.e., 1957), 190.
57 Bias Goiii y Atienza, Gramatica griega, 15th ed. (Pamplona: Aramburu, 1964),
p. 61.
58 A term introduced by modem grammarians; cf. La Real Academia Espanola,
Gramatica de Ia lengua caste/lana, 9th ed. (Madrid: Perlado, Paez y Compaiiia, 1911),
p. 59: "Neutro o intransitivo es el verbo cuya acci6n no pasa de una persona o cosa a
otra; como NACER, MORIR, NEVAR". (Neuter or intransitive is the verb the action of which
does not pass from one person or thing to another, as in TO BE BORN, TO DIE, TO SNOW.)
59 Georg Buhler, Leitfaden fiir den Elementarkurs des Sanskrit, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt:
WB, 1968), pp. 64 ff and 130.
60 Op. cit., 614.
61 Augustin Mateos, Gramatica latina, 8th ed. (Mexico City: Esfinge, 1960), p. 85.
62 Kuhner and Holzweissig, op. cit., 152.3: "In der Tat sind die Deponentia eigentlich
Reflexiva". (Verily the deponentia are, in reality, reflectives.)
63 Since we consider this disappearance a mere consequence of the disappearance of
the dual.
64 Kuhner and Gerth, op. cit., 372.2: "Das Passiv aber entlehrnt fast aile seine Formen
von dem Medium". (The passive, however, borrows almost all its forms from the middle.)
65 Ibid., 374.1: "Die Media/form bezeichnet eine Thiitigkeitsiiusserung, welche von dem
Subjekt ausgeht und auf dasselbe wieder zuriickgeht". (The middle form designates the
expression of an act that starts from the subject and again returns to it.)
66 Gofii, op. cit., p. 71.
67 Ibid.
68 Frangos, op. cit., pp. 108-113.
69 Homer, Od. 10.35.
70 Anton Weiher, transl., Homer, Odyssee, 8th ed. (Munich: Artemis, 1986): "Meinten
dabei, ich briichte wohl Gold und Silber nachhause".
71 A. T. Murray, transl., Homer, The Odyssey, 2 vols., repr. (London: William
Heinemann, 1984).
72 Heinrich Voss, Homer,llias!Odyssee, repr. of the original edition of 1781 (Darmstadt:
WB, 1957): "Wiihnend, ich.fiihrte mit mir viel Gold und Silber zur Heimat".
73 Luis Santullano, transl., Homer, La odisea, 7th ed. (Mexico City: Compafiia General
de Ediciones, 1966): "aludiendo a que yo llevaba oro y plata".
74 Luis Segala y Estalella, transl., Homer, Odisea, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe,
1957): "hablaban los unos con los otros de lo que yo llevaba ami palacio,figurdndose
que era oro y plata".
75 Seen. 30.
76 Reichelt, op. cit., 422-424.
77 Ibid., p. 299: "Der Dual wird [im gAw.] iiberall zum Ausdruck der Zweizahl ver-
wendet" (the dual in the Avestan of the Gathas was generally employed for the expression
of the number two); p. 300: "lm jAw. werden die dualischen Formen allmiihlich durch
die pluralischen ersetzt" (in Avestan the dual forms are slowly replaced by the plural ones).
78 Frangos, op. cit., 244-347 and (the dual in the conjugation has only the second
and third persons); Penagos, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
79 Gofii, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
80 Raphael Kiihner and Friedrich Blass, Aus.fiihrliche Grammatik der griechischen
Sprache, Erster Teil, 3rd ed. (Darmstadt: WB, 1966), Y, 98.1: "das Griechische hat in
der Deklination zwei, in der Konjugation im Aktive gleichfalls nur zwei, im Medium
aber drei besondere Formen" (Greek has in the declension two, in the conjugation in
the active voice only two, but in the middle voice three special forms).
81 Kiihner and Gerth, op. cit., 345.3: "atme, lebe, bin vorhanden" (literal translation
of bin vorhanden: I am at hand - a very Heideggerian expression).
82 Hesiod, Works and Days, 109-111.
83 See the Pannenidean now: Horst Matthai, La teoria parmenidea del pensar (Mexicali:
UABC, 1990), p. 69 ff.
84 Plotinus, Enn. V, I, 7: "Cronos, le dieu tres sage qui reprend toujours en lui les
etres qu'il engendre" (Brehier translation).
85 Die Bibel oder die ganze Heilige Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Martin
Luther, transl. (Halle a.S.: Cansteinsche Bibelanstalt, 1892): "lch werde sein, der ich
sein werde" (I shall be that I shall be). Cf. The New English Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), footnote on p. 63: "I am ... I am: or I will be what I will
be."
86 Kiihner and Gerth, op. cit., 454.1 A3.
87 Margaret Schlauch, The Gift of Tongues (New York: Viking, 1952), pp. 11-12: "There
96 HORST MATTHAI
is reason to believe, indeed, that the first person pronoun (singular) was a comparatively
late development in some languages."
88 Their conversion into the three persons of the plural would only follow an inex-
orable logic.
89 Erroneously thus named, if we assume the original absence of the second and the third
persons.
90 Which is but the dual doubly weakened, in its absoluteness (the so-called first person
of the dual) first, and in its relativity (the second and the third persons of the dual) later.
91 Homer, II. 1.198 ~lVOJ.tV11: Pallas Athene appearing to herself and in this manner
making herself visible to Achilles, and 10.236 ~lVOJ.IVOOV: the heroes appearing for
themselves and in this manner making it possible for Diomedes to select the best among
them.
92 B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 4 vols., 4th ed. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press,
1953, iii, Theaet, 152 A): "Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear
to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?"
93 Plato, Siimtliche Werke, 6 vols. (Hamburg: Rowohlt}, IV, Friedrich Schleiermacher,
transl., Theaitetos, 152 A: "wie ein jedes Ding mir erscheint, ein solches ist es auch
mir" (such as each thing appears to me, such also it is to me).
94 Diogenes Laertius, De Vitis, IX, 52.
95 Oupavo~ and Kpovo~ as symbolizations of primordial space and time.
96 For some reason Augustinus of Tagaste would call the philosopher of the Academy
Divus Plato, and Aquinas the Stagirite precursor Christi.
97 Diogenes Laertius, IX, 50.
98 Aristotle, De Gen. et Cor., 325a28-29.
99 The Works of Aristotle, 12 vols., W. D. Ross, ed. {Oxford: At the Clarendon Press,
1949-1956): "an absolute plenum."
100 Loc. cit.
101 Monadology, 60.
102 152B: To & "f "~LVEtnl" mo9aVEo9m otLVL (is then "shines-for-himself" feel-
for oneself?).
103 Schleiermacher's translation. Plato, Theate., 152C: "Denn wie ein jeder es wahrn-
immt, so scheint es for ihn auch zu sein".
104 Jowett's translation. The Porr6a version (no translators cited) reads: "puesto que
parecen ser para cada uno tales como las siente" {since they seem to be for each one
such as he feels them).
105 Passow, op. cit., "in Gefahr seyn, sich in Gefahr begeben, eine gefiihrliche
Unternehmung bestehen". Henry George Liddel and Robert Scott, A Greek-English
Lexicon, 9th ed. repr. {Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1968): "to be daring, run risk,
to be in dire peril."
106 Passow, op. cit., "eine Sache wird aufs Spiel gesetzt" (a thing is put at risk).
107 Plato, Symp., 205D: "KLvlhJVUlc;; ai..119TJ Ae'Yf.LV" (you seem to be telling the
truth).
108 Real Academia Espaiiola: JUGAR el todo por el todo.
109 Plato, Theate., 155D: "to 9aUJl(l~lV" OU ')'UP nAATI apX'l cj)LAOOOcj)L~ 11 a\Jt'll"
(consternation: because nothing else is the beginning of philosophy, but this).
110 Marion Giebel, Das Geheimnis der Mysterien (Munich: Artemis, 1990}, p. 21: "der
/nitiand . .. Er ist hier in Eleusis zu Triptolemos geworden" (the initiate ... he has become
Triptolemos here in Eleusis).
111 Der Kleine Pauly, Lexikon der Antike, 5 vols., Miinchen, Deutscher Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1979, V, p. 965: "Der Name bedeutet wahl 'Dreimalschiittler"' (the name probably
denotes 'the three times shaker').
112 Giebel, op. cit., p. 27: "Die Schrecken der Unterwelt . . . eine Fiille von
Diimonengestalten, Gorgo, Medusa, bedrohliche wilde Tiere" (the horrors of the under-
world ... an abundance of demonic figures, Gorgon, Medusa, menacing wild animals).
Also see Pauly, op. cit., III, p. 1534: "Eingang in die Nacht des Todes und Erlebnis
unterweltl. Schrecken" (entrance to the night of death and experience of underworldly
horrors). Note that the Christian notion of hell is not applicable to the Hades, and even
less so to the archaic Greek Aides.
113 Hermann Menge and Otto Giithling, Enzyklopiidisches Worterbuch der griechi-
schen und deutschen Sprache, 2 vols., 15th ed. (Berlin: Schoneberg Langenscheidt, 1959):
"Von IIEAO verw. mit rtaA.A.w, ~aUw, m:l.f.1LsW, rtoA.ow, rtoAw (pella, bellum), also
eig. wilde Durcheinanderbewegung, Getiimmel" (from IIEAO connected with rtaA.A.w,
~aA.A.w, rtEAfltsw, rtoA.ow, rtoAw (pello, bellum), therefore, in a strict sense, a violent
entangling movement, confusion).
114 Ibid., KLVOUVEUW (KLVOUVO~); KLVOUVO~ [KLVEW?]; KLVEW "in Bewegung setzen
... 1. fortbewegen ... 2. schiitteln, erschiittern" (put in movement ... 1. displace ...
2. to shake, to jerk).
115 Letter to Immanuel Niethammer of 23 October 1812, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Siimtliche Werke. Jubiliiumsausgabe in zwanzig Biinden (Stuttgart: Frommann), III,
Philosophische Propiideutik, Gymnasialreden und Gutachten iiber den Philosophie =
Unterricht, 3rd ed., p. 313: "Der Jugend mufl zuerst das Sehen und Horen vergehen",
expression that alludes to what we might call a strong inner shake-up.
116 E. Husser!, ldeen I, Husserliana 3 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 66; 68 and Erste
Philosophie, Zweiter Teil, Husserliana 8 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 110, Ill.
117 Ibid. 3, p. 66.
118 Ibid. 8, p. 111.
119 M. Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander," in Holzwege (Frankfurt aiM: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1963), p. 297: "Das unausgesprochime Richtmafl fiir die Deutung und
Beurteilung der friihen Denker ist die Philosophie von Platon und Aristoteles. Beide gelten
als die nach vorwiirts und riickwiirts maflgebenden Philosophen der Griechen. Diese
Anschauung hat sich auf dem Wege iiber die Theologie des Christentums zu einer all-
gemeinen und his heute nicht erschiitterten Uberzeugung verfestigt". (The unspoken
measure for the interpretation and judgment of the early thinkers is the philosophy of Plato
and Aristotle. Both are accepted as the philosophers of the Greeks that mark the measure
forwards and backwards. This pattern has been consolidated into an unshakable convic-
tion up to this date along the road of the theology of Christendom.)
120 IlOI.flO~ 1tUVtWV flEV 1tUtTJp ECrtL, 1tUVtWV OE ~UOLAEU~, KUL tOU~ flEV 9EOU~
EOELsE tOU~ OE avepwrtouc;, tOU~ flEV OOUAOU~ E1t0LT)OE tOU~ OE EAU9Ep0~.
121 Kuhner and Gerth, op. cit., 527, l (cf. n. 446): "flEV ... OE. Die gegenseitige
Beziehung des Konzessiv- und des Adversativsatzes zu einander wird gemeiniglich durch
ein der Konzessive beigefiigtes flEV ausgedriickt, welches, indem es Einriiumung und
Zugestehung bezeichnet, schon im Voraus auf die im zweiten Gliede durh OE ausge-
98 HORST MATTHAI
sprochene Beschriinkung hinweist" (the mutual relation of the concessive and the adver-
sative sentences with one another is usually expressed through a f.iV added to the
concessive, which, in as much as it indicates concession and admission, shows in advance
the restriction expressed in the second member bE).
122 Idem, loc. cit.: "So wie bE sowohl einen strengeren als einen schwacheren Gegensatz
bezeichnen kann, so ist auch die Bedeutung von f.iV bald starker bald schwiicher".
123 Kuhner and Gerth, op. cit., 527, 3a: "bald ... bald".
124 Pauly, op. cit., III, p. 1534: "Schau (Elto1ttEl<l) der verborgenen Wahrheit als hochstes
metaphys. Gliick".
125 E1tTJKOO~, adjective derived from the verb ErtaKOl!W, listen with attention, espe-
cially employed in relation to the gods when these listen to the prayers of humans. See
Liddell and Scott, op. cit., "esp. of giving ear to one who prays, of God."
126 Passow: "E1t01t"tELW . . . den dritten und hochsten Grad in den eleusin. Mysterien
erlangen, Zur Schauung gelangen, Epopt seyn (... achieve the third and highest grade
in the Eleusinian Mysteries. To achieve the seership, to be an epopt).
127 Hesiod (Works 67) already employs it to express personal conduct.
128 Passow, along with the traditional significance, translates TJ90~ as "sittliche
Beschaffenheit, das innere Wesen" (moral character, the inner essence).
129 The Greeks, at that time, did not distinguish between demons and gods; quoting in
support of this the references to Thales of Miletus in Diogenes Laertius, I, 27: Kat "tOV
KO<Jf.IOV EJ.I.'Ifl!XOV Kat OOLf.IOVWV 1tATJPTJ (translation Hicks: "and that the world is animate
and full of divinities), and in Aristotle, De An., 4lla8: eaA.TJ~ WLTJ9TJ 1tavta 1tATJPTJ 9EWV
nvm (Thales thought that all were full of gods). Cf. Liddell and Scott: "baLJ.I.WV, god,
goddess."
130 The translation of Kathleen Freeman.
131 Passow: "auseinander setzen, erziihlen, erkliiren".
132 H usserliana 8, Erste Philosophie (1923124 ), II, p. 190: "So fiihrt die P hiinomenolog ie
auf die von Leibniz in genialem aperfu antizipierte Monadologie".
133 56: "un miroir vivant perpetuel de l'univers".
134 75, 82, and 87.
ALEXANDRU GIUCULESCU
THE LEIBNIZIAN DIMENSION OF

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
I. A TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
One of the major themes of the history of thinking is to explain the

genesis and circulation of philosophical ideas. On the other hand, the
philosophers are often grouped according to similarities and differences
between their systems, so that the history of philosophy becomes a
description of schools of thought. The analysis of a certain philosoph-
ical system has to combine description and explanation of its contents
distinguishing what is genuine from what is borrowed from other thinkers,
in order to place it equitably and accurately in the development of the
philosophical thinking. For that reason there has arisen a great interest
in research into more or less obvious sources or the hidden origins of
the philosophical ideas traceable in a philosopher's writings. In the
Gutenberg galaxy, the birth of which coincides with the dawn of the
modem philosophy, investigations of the historical aspects of thought
enjoy a strong backing from the educational system, and this explains the
profusion of monographical studies inquiring into the roots of certain
philosophical ideas and the development of influential streams of thinking
or of outstanding thinkers. There is a temptation to emphasize the con-
tribution of external factors in the origination of a philosophical work,
to sometimes explain the latter by its sources. The trend likens philo-
sophical works to biological entities that are created, grow up, and die
or survive owing to a surmised lot of internal forces conjugated with a
set of external detectable factors which can be discovered and measured
more easily. Let us call this interpretation of philosophical systems a
genealogical approach as it resembles a genealogical synopsis of family
ties construed from official documents rather than from tales or rumors.
The genealogical interpretation has unquestionably certain merits as it
describes the occurrence of foreign ideas in the individual's thinking
and in the thought of small or large communities, requiring a thorough
knowledge of the past. Nevertheless the genealogical approach has to
cope with two major pitfalls:
99

100 ALEXANDRU GIUCULESCU
(1) it may minimize or even obscure the originality of a thinker as it

deals with his work like a coroner with a corpse;
(2) it may lead regressively to an endless search starting from a source
and continuing to the source of the first source and so on, like a
genealogical tree that ends (or begins) with Adam.
The adherents of the genealogical interpretation find
its significant genesis in a twofold opening. There is the research opening toward the
sources on the part of the historian, employing all his resources and levels of interpre-
tation. This effort at understanding is encouraged and sustained by the originating opening
from the sources themselves. Out of this meeting springs that historical meaning which
is essentially confluential or chiasma): the-philosophical-sources-being-interpreted or,
reciprocally, the-interpretive-act -being -textually-grounded. 1
Some hints of an alternative to genealogical interpretation may be found

in describing Leibniz as
the exemplar of the originative philosopher who deliberately acts as a radical center for
many lines of communication with other thinkers. Fittingly, in his philosophy every
finite mind is regarded as a stella hians et radians, a Jiving star which opens forth and
radiates light from others and for others .... Hence a thinker in the Leibnizian spirit
must also exhibit the power of origination: he is a source of new departures and a provo-
cation for other men to make their own sightings and soundings. Such a radial center
is no inert, timeless, and vacuous point, but rather a living historical agency engaged
in receiving, reworking, and suggesting within the context of an open philosophical
tradition. 2
The image of a living star radiating light "from others and for others"
reminds one of the concept of the black box, the input and output of
which are the only identifiable data permitting classification. In the frame-
work of the genealogical interpretation a historian is tempted to study
two personalities comparatively focusing on similarities between their
systems, and in this way he can outline a type of philosophical thinking. 3
The concept of type can cover more than pairs of systems so that the
number of types may be decreasing and they become more and more
independent of genealogical interpretation. Let us call this manner of
studying the development of the philosophical thinking the typological
approach. If compared with the genealogical interpretation, the typo-
logical approach may seem less accurate and more arbitrary because it
depends on the personal choice of the user. In fact this kind of approach
may give some order, but it does not attempt to devise an overall clas-
sification that would be a Procrustean bed implying mutilations and
entailing uniformity. Discovering types of thought means only distin-
THE LEIBNIZIAN DIMENSION 101
guishing major patterns of thinking as criteria for grouping together

several philosophical systems with certain common traits. This viewpoint
is no novelty, since during Antiquity and the Middle Ages Plato and
Aristotle were considered representative for two different types of philo-
sophical doctrines, with neither exhausting the whole field of philosophy,
nor excluding other types of thought. A type is neither a result of induc-
tive generalizations nor a product of deductive procedures. It is, indeed,
a pattern used to mark non-standard delimitations based on subjacent
structures and surmised trends sometimes overlapping genealogical expla-
nations, as such delimitations do not lack all historical justification. In
modem philosophy the old types of Plato and Aristotle did not lose
any influence, but now two new types became prominent.
II. THE LEIBNIZIAN VERSUS KANTIAN TYPE OF PHILOSOPHY
In modern times philosophical thinking got a twofold relative emanci-

pation: from theology and from science, without breaking any ties with
them. Under the auspices of Leibniz and Kant, two types of philosoph-
ical systems enjoyed a general conspicuousness. The difference between
the Kantian and the Leibnizian types consists not only of differences
in the content of their systems, but also of differences in the inner struc-
ture of their thought. Kant's system has the aspect of a many-sided
solid with surfaces, edges, and vertices as constituents of a single unity,
and it is defined by a limited number of principles from which derives
a hard core of theses. Consequently, the Kantian type of philosophical
system possesses a hierarchical organization that depends on the position
given to the whole system by the author himself or by his reader, just
as a polyhedron receives a particular orientation according to the position
given to the solid by an observer and called by him "up", "down", "right",
"left", "back", "inside", "outside", etc. The variable hierarchy does not
impair the polyhedral structure of the system concerned even in the
case of a sectional cut. More than that, if the work of the same philoso-
pher contains non-philosophical writings, e.g., scientific treatises and
papers, political or literary works, they can belong to the same polyhe-
dral structure if these writings do not collide with the principles of the
system, as happens with Kant's pre-critical writings.
Quite distinct from the polyhedral structure of the Kantian system is
the Leibnizian philosophy known only from fragments during the author's
life and available almost completely in our days. Outstanding disciples
and scholars have tried to put order into the huge amount of printed
writings and manuscripts of Leibniz pursuant to reconstructing a system
with a polyhedral structure, but they have not been able to succeed.
The explication of this failure does not lie in the limited capacity of
the authors but in the very structure of the Leibnizian system which is
far from being polyhedral, and may be called a modular structure. The
term "module" has extensive use in the technological world, meaning
an independent entity belonging to a variable configuration of several
interconnected entities and working alone or together according to its
own properties and the rules of connectedness. The image of a modular
structure is neither incompatible nor coextensive with the existence of
a central unit of control. The relative independence and the absolute inter-
dependence of the modules belonging to the same structural configuration
have made of modularity a convenient concept for use in linguistics
and psychology as well as in the history of philosophy. 4 Modularity is
a form of pluralism corresponding to a decentralized organization, i.e.,
a structure without a rigid hierarchical order, while not being a loose
and fortuitous collection of different entities. The modules of a struc-
ture enjoy freedom to the extent that it is not incompatible with order.
Free order or orderly freedom inheres in any modular structure. Leibniz
was a multifaceted thinker and the perusal of his work gives the impres-
sion that his thinking was in continuous evolution going in several parallel
or convergent directions, it seeming that certain roads were abandoned
and yet afterwards taken again. He used to explain his behavior with
the illustration of a tiger who attacks its prey once, twice and abandons
it only after a third failure. The diversity of the topics Leibniz tackled
and the variety of solutions he proposed to the issues of controversial
matters remain an obstacle to a systematization of Leibniz's thought. Any
attempt at this has ended either in dogmaticism, as it occurred with
Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century, or in an alleged global outlook
proceeding in fact from a partial interpretation, as happened in our
century with Bertrand Russell in 1900 and Aron Gurwitsch in 1974.
The result of such endeavors is a lot of labels intended to summarize
the many-sidedness of the Leibnizian thinking such as: rationalism,
panmathematism, panlogicism, antiskepticism, optimism, eclecticism,
finalism, irenicism. For this reason the structure of this system may be
called modular, and it represents a type of philosophy quite different from
the polyhedral type illustrated by Kant's system.
Ill. HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM
From the genealogical point of view Husserl 's thinking was indebted
to Brentano's lectures on psychology from which he borrowed the
concept of intentionality, found by Brentano in scholastic philosophy,
which in tum inherited it from Aristotle, who possibly learnt it from
the writings (unfortunately lost forever) or from the lectures (again unfor-
tunately not recorded) of his teachers. Genealogists eager to, may find
many other sources ofHusserl's philosophy beside the names ofBolzano,
Burne, Kant, or Descartes, already mentioned by Husserl himself. The
name of Leibniz is rather sparsely mentioned - in connection with the
concepts of monad and mathesis universalis. Consequently, critical
genealogy cannot find many traces of Leibnizian sources in Husserl 's
writings; therefore a study ofLeibniz's influence on Husserl based mainly
on sources would have no chance of convincing. On the other hand,
Husserl's work has a particular structure, one which embarrasses any
commentator.
Husser! semble etre un personnage aux visages innombrables, a tel point qu'il parait impos-
sible d'y apercevoir une unite de pensee. 5
Husserl was in fact a convert to philosophy from mathematics and had

no real training in philosophical matters excepting Brentano's lectures
in Vienna. He began his research work on the foundations of arithmetic
using Brentano's teaching on "empirical" psychology. His first investi-
gations on logic bore the traceable influence of his teacher, but soon
afterwards he took his distance from Brentano and launched a consis-
tent campaign against psychologism pursuing a sound foundation of
knowledge beyond any empirical approach. To this purpose he devised
a new method baptized with the old name of phenomenology and during
his life he was fascinated by the idea of elucidating and elaborating more
thoroughly this method in order to make it capable of being applied in
every field of human life. The starting point of his endeavor was to go
beyond the natural, i.e., empirical, set of cognitions and to reach the tran-
scendental horizon in order to make it immanent. He was permanently
discontent with the state of things in the philosophy and science of his
time, he found no valid solutions in the past and was also dissatisfied
with his own performances (Leistungen). The result was an incessant
struggle with things and he was writing thousands of pages of sponta-
neous ideas that came to his mind just as Leibniz has done. The pos-
terity of both Leibniz and Husserl has the task of deciphering their
handwritten notes and after their interpretation, integrating them with
their work in order to improve the understanding of their systems. For
this aim the concept of modularity seems to be most appropriate when
outlining the major topics of their thinking. Let us focus on five modules
of Husserl's system and see whether they bear some traces of corre-
sponding Leibnizian modules or only mere similarities.
1. The Ontodicy of Mathematical and Logical Entities
Franz Brentano had undertaken to reshape psychological science from an

empirical point of view (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874),
where "empirisch" means descriptive, i.e., pure, non-physiological,
opposed to the genetic explanation, attempting to reinstate the objectivity
characteristic of Aristotle and some medieval thinkers. 6 In his Philosophy
of Arithmetic (1891) Husser} tried to derive the basic concept of arith-
metic, which he closely associated with logic, from psychological
principles. It seemed that Husser! was at that time a partisan of psy-
chologism, but this work already contains the germs of his future thinking
since he emphasizes here the concept of reflexion in criticizing Euclid's
definition of number as a manifold of units. He, on the contrary, defines
number as a reflexion on the relations of a collectivity. In Walter Biemel's
opinion this study of arithmetic contains the first trigger of Husserl's
phenomenology which consists in the concept of reflexion. 7 In a letter
to Carl Stumpf of 13 November 1890, Husser! said that arithmetica
universalis is a part of the formal logic which is an art of signs, i.e., a
theory of the art of knowledge. 8 The explanation of Husserl's shift to
logic may be found in the sketched preface to Logische Untersuchungen
published later by E. Fink. In this intended preface Husserl declares
that his break with psychologism had been prepared by his study of
Leibniz and accomplished under the double influence of Lotze and
Bolzano. 9 Among other possible sources explaining Husser! 's early
detachment from psychologism that have been cited are William James'
chapter on necessary truths in Principles of Psychology, where Mill
and Spencer are criticised, and Natorp's "The Objective and Subjective
Functions of Knowledge", in Philosophische H efte (1887). 10 As far as
mathematics is concerned, Husserl's reaction against psychologism was
assisted by Frege's critical review in Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und

philosophische Kritik. 11
Focusing on mathematical and logical entities and keeping them away
from any psychological interpretation, Husserl considered them as
standard idealities, i.e., something that exists without being real. Ever
since Antiquity such entities have enjoyed a controversial status for
both ontologists and epistemologists. Husserl devised phenomenology,
defining it in Cartesian Meditations as a supreme science capable of
performing the foundation of all apriori sciences, a current from the
universal Logos of all possible beings, an authentic universal ontology,
as well as a way towards the knowledge of the last foundation, towards
self-consciousness, first monadic and afterwards intermonadic. The being
which is prime in itself and founds all that is objective in the world is
defined by Husserl as the totality of monads linked reciprocally in several
forms of community and communion. Phenomenology could be defined
in Cartesian Meditations as a road with a Cartesian starting point and
a Leibnizian endpoint.
Husser! tried to eliminate any intrusion of psychologism, although
he used introspection and analysis of psychic states, and he constantly
warned against empiricism although he described an experience level
for reflexions on lived experiences. The scientific endeavor of phe-
nomenologists consists essentially in reaching objectivity in inner, i.e.,
most subjective, experience. Following up the roots of the Cartesian "ego
cogito", Husser! came upon Saint Augustine, whom he quotes at the
end of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation: "noli foras ire, in te redi, in inte-
riore homine habitat veritas".
Psychologism and empiricism were in Husserl's eyes serious sins
against the truth, and he was convinced that categorial intuition can
discover the noemata of each eidetic science. Like Leibniz, who in his
Theodicee pleaded for the existence of God and justified it while rejecting
objections forwarded by skeptics or atheists, Husser! argued for the
existence of mathematical and logical idealities against the disparaging
interpretations of psychologists and empiricists. If Husserl 's arguments
could not lead to the foundation of a phenomenological ontology, 12 his
arguments work in favor of the existence of idealities, inviting the reader
to epitomize the set of arguments as an ontodicy. As theodicy is not a
substitute for theology, so ontodicy is not a surrogate of ontology.
2. Eclecticism Is Inherent to Modular Structures
Generally speaking, any modular structure commits itself to optional

usage, i.e., use according to the interest of the user, who is to take into
account both the capacity of each module and the chances offered by
the connectivity rules.
There have been some attempts to systematize Husserlian thinking,
but they have failed to cover the whole work for the reason that it has
a modular structure. E. Fink aimed to defend Husserl's theses against
unjust interpretations and misunderstandings, but his paper, written
under the supervision of Husser! himself, expounds on only a phase of
Husserlian phenomenology. Alwin Diemer wrote his book before the pub-
lication of Husserl's manuscripts which reveal many aspects of a system
in the making. Marvin Farber had tried in the meantime to give a synoptic
outlook on phenomenology insisting on its sources and evolution towards
an influential movement in the world of ideas. Such works have a par-
ticular merit in helping to improve the understanding of Husserl's thought
and to elucidate obscure passages or connections in his texts. However,
such attempts are doomed to partiality and fragmentation since they are
dealing with a system having a modular structure. On the contrary,
exegeses and commentaries on certain modules of the system may
penetrate deeper in the subjacent system of thoughts and broaden the
initial horizon of system elaboration. And for the author himself, and also
for his commentators, there reigns an obvious eclecticism, since they can
choose freely among several modules of the system. The number and
the variety of schools and currents that have issued from Husserlian
phenomenology demonstrate the modularity of the system as well as
the fecundity of its ideas. Among the directions inspired by Husser! 's
phenomenology there may be cited in the more or less recent past one
that joins it to Kierkegaard's existentialism, another that emphasizes
realism or naturalism and rejects the transition to transcendental idealism;
or the focus is on Being, the perspectives of nature, the religious expe-
rience, hermeneutics, God, the invention and creativity or the language. 13
Eclecticism is, thus, hereditary. 14
3. Phaenomenologia Husserliana Sive Inquisitio Veritatis
The modular structure of a philosophical system results from the author's

searching attitude consisting of a continuous, endless process of elabo-
ration of the system. According to Saint Augustine, "plus loquitur inqui-

sitio veritatis quam inventio", which means that more is expressed in
seeking the truth than in finding it. If during the Middle Ages the scholars
believed that Aristotle's works contained the truth and, consequently, that
the search for truth is useless, Descartes, on the contrary, launched in
1637 a Projet d' une science universe lie for which he had already written
Regulae ad directionem ingenii and the famous Discours de Ia methode,
followed by two writings on mathematics and physics. Francis Bacon had
published some years before his Novum Organon scientiarum, which
dealt with the problem of methods for finding the truth. The method-
ological topic was, thus, a current issue in the seventeenth century and
Leibniz tackled it in various forms but particularly in his researches on
scientific theories. He distinguished between the search for the truth
that he called "ars inveniendi" and the exposition and verification of
the truth which was called "ars demonstrandi", the latter consisting of
a chain of definitions ("catena definitionum"). 15 The problem of method
arose from the need to seek the truth not in tradition but through direct
contact with reality. In the eighteenth century this problem received a
new aspect through the critical examination not only of scientific cog-
nitions but also of knowledge in general. The result was Kant's rejection
of metaphysics and the foundation of epistemology, which meant a shift
from ontology to the theory of knowledge. The problem of knowledge
almost ousted the problem of Being from philosophy. If in the nine-
teenth century the cry "Back to Kant!" was heard, at the beginning of
our century Husserl used to urge "Back to things!" and later on "Back
to Descartes!" The problem of method plays the major role in his
philosophy and the search for truth comes before the analysis of truth.
In other words, the "ars inveniendi" is for Husserl more important than
the "ars demonstrandi". If he didn't declare "expressis verbis" this option,
it may be conjectured from his attitude concerning the controversies over
the foundations of mathematics that opposed formalists to logicists and
intuitionists. The polemic began at the end of the last century and lasted
during the first decades of our century, that is, just in the years when
Husserl was lecturing and writing on mathematical and logical ideali-
ties. In spite of his thorough background in contemporary mathematics,
he had left the camp of mathematicians and preferred the companion-
ship of philosophers. Excepting sparse contacts with Frege who was, too,
an isolated mathematician at that time, Husserl did not enter into polemics
on foundational problems, nor was he stirred to enter the fray by any
protagonist of these controversies. However, his ideas had a certain

impact later on Hermann Weyl and Kurt GOdel. 16
In Philosophy ofArithmetic Husserl discussed the advantages of using
signs from the viewpoint of the human senses, given their economic
advantages in understanding mathematics. It seems that he had been
influenced in this by Leibniz, who had tried to build up ars inveniendi
using algorithmic methods. However, in his later years Husserl warned
against the use of purely symbolic procedures for handling our knowl-
edge of things.
After Husserl's death certain phenomenological theses correlated with
Hilbert's axiomatics became controversial in the light of Godel's
findingsY Husserl's ideas on the definiteness of a system of manifolds
proved to be a failure from this perspective. In his opinion the theory
of manifolds contains higher mathematical disciplines and represents
the highest theme of formal logic. In this theory Husserl saw the
Leibnizian idea of a mathesis universalis. Consequently, in speaking of
a definite manifold he meant that all its statements are derived within
it. Hilbert thought likewise for axiomatic systems, but according to
Godel's demonstration no axiomatic system is complete (or "definite"
in Husserl's terms). On this ground J. Cavailles 18 expressed doubts about
the correctness of Husserl's concept of definiteness. Dieter Lohmar dis-
tinguishes three meanings of the concept of definiteness: D 1 syntactically
complete, D2 decidable, and D 3 semantically complete. For Husserl,
D 1 = D2 = D 3 Hilbert thought like Husserl and at that time neither Husserl
nor Hilbert were aware of Godel's finding on the incompleteness of
any axiomatic system. After rejecting the Rosado-Haddock argument that
both Husserl and Hilbert believed in, the universality of the tertium
non datur principle, Lohmar advances the idea that Husserl became
convinced of the paramount importance of the ars inveniendi forwarded
by Descartes and Leibniz, according to whom all problems could be
solved by means of arithmetic methods ("Cum Deus calculat ... fit
mundus"). In our language: an algorithmic decision-making procedure
could solve any problem! It is well known that logicians, particularly
Frege, Hilbert and even GOdel, who arithmeticized metamathematics,
believed in the power of such a device. Afterwards it was universally
acknowledged that this belief was utopian. In Lohmar's opinion the
idea of definiteness, i.e., completeness, is outside the problem horizon
of demonstrability. In fact, Husserl framed his problems in a quite dif-
ferent language than Hilbert did and, consequently, the failure of the latter
cannot be ascribed also to the former. Complexes of statements like

elementary geometry, arithmetic or set theory are directly intuitive and
their validity is independent of any axiomatic requirements in a narrower
sense. Lohmar concludes that Husser! did not need to apply mathemat-
ical devices to definiteness, as he had to deal phenomenologically with
this concept.
On a related topic, J. Claude Piguet discusses the consequences of
a divergent interpretation of Husser! 's on the basis of a fundamental
Leibnizian concept. The reflexive analysis of Husserlian phenomenology
was inspired by Leibnizian reflexion, which is applied to perception
and leads to distinct and clear concepts. Husser} reversed the order and
applied reflexion to concepts and then to perceptions, going then from
perceptions to inner experiences. Phenomenology thus rejects abstraction
and Piguet asks whether it also rejects formalization, and he thinks that
Husserl did not solve this problem because he, like Hegel, ignored the
epistemological dualism: the distinction between the language used about
things (phenomena) and the language inherent to things (phenomena)
themselves. In Piguet's opinion, phenomenology lacks the epistemo-
logical rigor needed for a rigorous science. The formal concepts are
the result of a double process of disconnection from the real world and
of connection of the mind with itself, so that formalism is inherent to
the operating mind, not to the things upon which the mind is oper-
ating.19 Husserl's divergence from Leibnizian thinking in this case can
be explained by his overlooking the Leibnizian concept of "cogitatio
caeca" interpreted in the light of semiotics 20 and metamathematics. 21
4. A Teleological Perspective on Phenomenology

Chronologically, the last module of Husserl 's system consists of an
analysis of historical development, for which a method was to be devised
providing a retrospective account of and a prospective outlook on
the relations between transcendental consciousness, man, and world.
According to his former disciple and collaborator, Martin Heidegger,
Husser! 's endeavor to improve the phenomenological method failed to
analyse adequately the meaning of being and the mode of being of man. 22
After reading Dilthey's writings, Husserl published in Logos an article
on "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" ( 191 0) in which he tried to outline
a personalistic psychology, but his conception did not reach beyond the
traditional definition of man as rational animal. A basic disagreement
between Husserl and Heidegger broke out during their collaboration

in writing an article on phenomenology for Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Heidegger's radicalism would be illustrated by the theses of his Being
and Time (1927). In W. Biemel's opinion the separation of Heidegger
from Husser} began when the latter said in the article in Logos that phi-
losophy can become a rigorous science if it refuses to receive anything
from tradition, as Descartes had already advised, and to deal with the
depths which are the subject of sophia, i.e., wisdom, for the reason that
science means first of all clarity and conceptual evidence as a true
mathesis universalis. 23
Following this line, Husser} went further in the direction of the ratio-
nalism of Descartes and Leibniz; that rationalism inspired his Cartesian
Meditations wherein he intended to give the final version of the
phenomenology. The last chapter of this book, i.e., the Fifth Meditation,
could well be considered a Leibnizian meditation since it contains
mostly monadological ideas. Husserl~s last writing published during his
life dealt with The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, which appeared in 1936. The subjacent idea of his
critical views concerning the relation between European science and
modern philosophy was the conviction that behind the evolution of
mankind, life, and world, there is Telos, i.e., a final goal which consists
of self-comprehension as a being provided with the vocation to live in
apodicticity. W. Biemel sees in this belief an echo of the Enlightenment
Age. In an analysis of historicity, phenomenology is described by Husserl
as the acme of the Occidental culture on its way to attaining the Telos.
Many central concepts of Husserl's phenomenology bear a teleolog-
ical subjacency, as, for instance, the intentionality of consciousness in
its tendency to seek out the evidence or intersubjectivity in the history
of mankind as well as in the development of philosophy. 24 If the universe
of the objective sciences is without a subject, the phenomenological view
of this world makes it subjective, i.e., transforms the universe to be
known in the experience of the subject so that this very experience can
determine its own Telos through the aim of knowledge. 25
Husserl focuses on non-chaotic history dealing with sets of events
and postulates it as an eidetic science of the spirit from which he
derives the notion of the evolution of mankind. In Ideas for a Pure
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913), he spoke
about the eternal striving of mankind for truth as a Telos that abides in
all generations forever. Even the chaotic events that occur in empirical
THE LEIBNIZIAN DIMENSION Ill
history cannot disturb the evolution of mankind towards the Telos, since
such events may be compared to an ideal Telos which gives a certain
sense to history. 26
The prevalence of the teleological idea in Husserl's phenomenology
is in harmony with the premiss of his system, which intended primarily
to reform modem philosophy fundamentally. He dreamt to write a treatise
containing the principles of the reform and the project to be fulfilled
by which prejudices would be rejected and biases avoided in the search
for the truth in all fields of life. On the road of reform he met the great
minds of the seventeenth century and, particularly, Descartes and Leibniz.
If his sympathy for Descartes might have had some extra-philosophical
reasons besides, Leibniz was for Husserl rather an object of empathy
owing especially to the Monadology he esteemed as the next step of
phenomenology: "So fiihrt die Phanomenologie auf die von Leibniz in
genialem aper9u antizipierte Monadologie". 27
At the beginning of his posthumous book Nouveaux essais sur l' enten-
dement humain, Leibniz outlined the framework of ideas in which the
enlightened thinker was moving:
... je commen9ais a pencher du cote des Spinozistes qui ... meprisant Ia recherche
des causes finales, derivent tout d'une necessite brute. Mais ces nouvelles lumieres m'en
ont gueri; et depuis ce temps-Iii je prends quelquefois le nom de Theophile. 28
In a teleological perspective, Husser} 's phenomenology found in

Leibniz not only a brilliant forerunner but also a stimulating adviser.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two types of the modem philosophy represented by the systems of

Leibniz and Kant have different structures which may be explained by
their particular personalities, including style of work, propensities and
aversions, social and spiritual surroundings. There is another factor no
less important but which acts in the background coming in the course
of philosophical events, which may promote one or another type of
thinking. Some exceptional occurrences in the field of philosophy receive
a "fatalistic" explanation in this way, one that may collide with the
sobriety required from an allegedly objective chronicler of the philo-
sophical life. Nevertheless some coincidences are neither to be ignored
nor overlooked.
Leibniz arrived on the field of philosophy just after the Cartesianists
had won the victory against the traditionalists and had made from method-
ical doubt a weapon to attain the evidence of eternal truths. A new dogma
was born, that of the omnipotence of the human reason. Leibniz chose
arguments from everywhere to save both reason and feeling as facul-
ties of a being who has no doubts about his potentialities but has to
harmonize his power with divine omnipotence. Leibniz had to fight on
several battlefields, to seek allies, to rationally convince his opponents,
and to avoid irreversible defeats. His philosophy is a chain of thoughts
on ideas and actions or events, and his thinking is moulded by problems
issuing from life and requesting adequate solutions. He tried to give prac-
tical answers to every question but always looked for generalization in
a universal framework of thought. The fragmentation of his philosoph-
ical work was a consequence not only of his style of life, but also of
the nature and diversity of the themes he eagerly tackled.
The circumstances of Husserl's debut in philosophy were quite dif-
ferent, but some similarities are significant. In the nineteenth century
Kantianism under several banners still dominated in philosophy, and
the cry "Back to Kant!", i.e., to the true Kant!, was heard sooner by
certain mathematicians, like Hilbert or Brouwer, than by philosophers.
Husserl, who was a professional mathematician, began his philosophic
career in the field of the foundations of mathematics, one which he
soon left for the field of the problems of scientific knowledge where
he discovered that they need a method based on a particular kind of
intuition. He progressed slowly in the elaboration of this new method and
his road had many halting places and turning points. Husserl's philo-
sophical system has, like that of Leibniz, a fragmentary structure, so
that their performances belong to the modular type of thought quite
opposite to the type represented by Kant's system. We have this descrip-
tion of Husserl's work by Husser} himself in a hypothetical sixth
Cartesian meditation, published recently:
Aile unsere bisherigen Auslegungen verbleiben methodisch gesehen in der ersten Stufe
der regressiven Phlinomenologie. Zwar zeigt schon diese Stufe in sich selbst eine Vielfalt
von Schritten und Gliederungen, ist selbst kein sich gleichsam auf einer Ebene abspie-
lendes Durchforschen des durch die Reduktion eroberten Neulandes transzendentalen Seins,
sondem eine Stufenfolge methodischer Entfaltungen. 29
He had decided to close his system with a theory of the transcendental

method which he defines as a phenomenology of phenomenology. 30
***
The structural analogy found between Husserlian and Leibnizian systems

hints at a more comprehensive interpretation of their affinity. From a
genealogical perspective it would be no hard task to prove that Leibniz
had an influence on Husserl, since the latter used and even quoted certain
writings of the former. Similarly, from the same perspective, many other
sources of Husserlian phenomenology could inspire scholars to study
several "influences" undergone by phenomenology during its making.
Nevertheless the relations between Husserl and Leibniz were deeper than
the term "influence" may suggest. It seems that the syntagm "Leibnizian
dimension" instead of "influence of Leibniz" could state more properly
the nature of the relationship between these thinkers separated by two
centuries of modern philosophy.
Roumanian Academy (Committee for History and Philosophy of Science)

Bucharest
NOTES
1 James Collins, Interpreting Modern Philosophy (Princeton: 1972), p. 52.

2 Ibid., p. 157.
3 Cf. Eduard Spranger, Lebensformen, 7th ed. (Halle: 1930).
4 Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); Cf.
Encyclopedie philosophique universelle (ed. Andre Jacob), Les Notions philosophiques,
Dictionnaire, Tome 2, "Modularite", p. 1659 (Paris: 1990).
5 A. Kelkel, in Cahiers de Royaumont, "Husserl" (Paris: 1959), p. 168.
6 Cf. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1968), p. 176.
7 W. Biemel, in Cahiers de Royaumont, "Husser!" (Paris: 1959), p. 44.
8 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
9 Ibid., p. 44.
10 Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husser[ and the Quest
for a Vigorous Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 1943).
11 See Passmore, op. cit., p. 556.
12 Paul Ricoeur, Encyclopaedia Universalis, Vol. 13, pp. 514-515. According to Ricoeur
the foundation of a phenomenological ontology would suppose the reversal of the primacy
of the subject-object relation still inherent to Husserlian phenomenology. Cf. also Alwin
Diemer, "Von Sinn ontologischen Fragens", in R. Wisser (ed.), Sinn und Sein (Tiibingen:
1960); he defines ontology as a kind of axiomatics of possible metaphysics. Cf. Philosophia
Naturalis, Bd. VII, Heft I (1961), p. 115.
13 A-T. Tymieniecka, "Husserl", in Dictionnaire des philosophes (ed. Denis Huisman)
(Paris: 1984), pp. 1276-1281.
14 Arguments for this statement may be found in Dale Riepe (ed.), Phenomenology
and Natural Existence: Essays in Honor of Marvin Farber (New York: 1973).
15 Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (Paris: 1901), pp. 181-186.

16 Charles Parsons, Mathematical Intuition, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Vol. LVIII (1979-1980), p. 147.
17 Dieter Lohmar, Phiinomenologie der Mathematik. Elemente einer phiinomenologi-
schen Au.fkliirung der mathematischen Erkenntnis nach Husser/, Phaenomenologica 114
(Dordrecht: 1989), pp. 180-197.
18 J. Cavailles, Sur Ia logique et Ia theorie de Ia science (Paris: 1947), p. 70.
19 J. Claude Piguet, "La Phenomenologie refuse )'abstraction et Ia formalisation", in
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition
(Dordrecht: 1983), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XIV, pp. 427-439.
20 Marcelo Dascal, La Semiologie de Leibniz (Paris: 1978), pp. 207-208.
21 Alexandru Giuculescu, "Der Leibnizsche Begriff der symbolischen Erkenntnis
und seine formalistische Metamorphose", in Leibniz. Tradition und Aktualitiit, V.
Intemationaler Leibniz-Kongress Vortriige, Hannover, Nov. 1988, pp. 312-319.
22 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt: 1976),
p. 159; cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger and Science (Washington: 1985), p. 36.
23 Cf. Walter Biemel, Cahiers de Royaumont, "Husser!" (Paris: 1959), p. 53.
24 Paul Janssen, Edmund Husser/, Einfiihrung in seine Philosophie (Munich: 1976),
p. 92.
25 Ibid., p. 167.
26 Alexandre Metraux, "Person und Geschichte als phlinomenologische Probleme.
Untersuchungen zur Geschichtsphilosophischen Dimension im Schaffen Edmund Husserls
in der Zeit von 1910 bis 1925". Dissertation, Basel, 1978, pp. 202-211.
27 Edmund Husser), Erste Philosophie II, WW, Bd. VIII, p. 190 (last proposition of
the lecture). Cf. Rudolf Boehm, Von Gesichtspunkt der Phiinomenologie (The Hague:
1968), p. 234.
28 G. W. Leibniz, Nouveaux essays sur I' entendement humain (Paris: Gamier-
Fiammarion, 1966), p. 58.
29 Eugen Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Teil I. Die Idee einer transzendentalen
Methodenlehre. Texte aus dem An/ass Eugen Finks ( 1932) mit Anmerkungen und Beilagen
aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls 1933134, ed. H. Ebeling, J. Holl, G. van Kerckhoven
(Dordrecht: 1988), p. 5.
30 Ibid., p. 9; on Husserl's own opinions about his work, cf. Dorion Cairns, "My Own
Life", in F. Kersten and R. Zaner (eds.), Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism (The
Hague: 1973), pp. 10-11; Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl's Way into Phenomenology for
Americans: A Letter and its Sequel", ibid, pp. 177-181.
PART TWO
SELF-INDIVIDUALISATION OF LIFE:
INGATHERING AND OUTWARD RADIATION
Thomas Sprey, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Louis Houthakker in front of the UNIVA, the site of the Congress.
FRANS SOONTIENS
THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF LIFE AND

THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL TELEOLOGY
The European crisis has its root in a mistaken, one-sided

rationalism of seventeenth century science.
Husser!, 1934
ABSTRACT'
Our time is characterized as a period of cultural crisis, in which man

is alienated from "nature" and his own "nature". 2 This crisis has two
components:
1) a material component, which is manifested in the environmental
crisis, and
2) a moral crisis, which is expressed in the declared subjectivity of all
values, norms and rules. Both components have, in my view, the same
root: the change in the concept of nature since the Renaissance from
one having a normative, teleological meaning to one having a non-
normative, a non-teleological meaning.
A revaluation of a teleological philosophy of nature is necessary,
because
1) accepting teleology in nature is more in accord with the position of
- teleological and creative - man as a natural product of the natural
creative process of evolution and
2) because it would serve as a prerequisite for the formulation of an
adequate bio- and eco-ethics, which both stress the "intrinsic value"
of natural things, in particular living ob(sub)jects.
In this lecture, it will be argued that in Western thinking there is a fun-
damental misunderstanding about the concept of teleology, in particular
in relation to the theory of evolution. This misunderstanding is the result
of a radical transformation of the original Aristotelian concept of
"internal" teleology into a concept of "external" teleology by Christian
theology during the Middle Ages. The original meaning of teleology -
as elaborated extensively by Aristotle- is that it is a natural and internal
principle (arche) that specifies "for the sake of which" natural events
happen. Under the influence of Christian theology, teleology became
117
A-T. Tymienieclm (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Lll, 117-132.

118 FRANS SOONTIENS
confused with theology, with "the argument from design". As I shall

show, a revaluation of a teleological philosophy of nature is not opposed
to the modem theory of evolution.
THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY
Throughout the entire history of Western thinking -from the Greeks until
now - there has been a confrontation between two attempts to explain
the harmonic order of nature. These attempts have often been thought
to exclude each other:
The first attempt consists in the so-called "teleological" explanation,
and was formulated first by Plato and then elaborated by Aristotle who
referred to a final cause as an internal - within the natural thing itself
- principle3 "for the sake of which" natural events happen. For Aristotle
this teleological principle was a fundamental condition of the possi-
bility of all scientific investigation of the causes of nature (Aristotle,
Physics). 4
The second attempt to explain the harmony of nature constitutes the
so-called "mechanistic" explanation, which was first formulated by
Democritus. He banned all teleology from nature and appealed exclu-
sively to necessity ("ananke") and chance ("tyche") to explain natural
order.
Since the Renaissance, teleology and teleological explanation have
been considered with increasing scepticism. The so-called "mechaniza-
tion of nature" which took place as a result of the scientific revolution
(see Dijksterhuis, 1950)5 was matched by a rejection of final causality
which was considered the result of "anthropomorphism", hence scien-
tifically "useless" and "meaningless". In the words of Bacon, "the
inquisition of final causes is a barren thing and like a virgin conse-
crated to God produces nothing" (Bacon, 1974, p. 512). 6
Science was and is not interested anymore in the elucidation of the
reasons "why" things are as they are and events happen as they happen,
but only in the explanation of the "mechanisms", how they change in
time and space. As Galileo said: "I am not looking for the causes 'why'
stones fall, but only for a description of 'how' they fall." The essen-
tialistic/normative way of understanding nature, by referring to the
"essence" of natural things, was replaced by a functionalistic/descrip-
tive way of explaining natural happenings, expressed by mathematical
functions that show the regular relations between some parameters of the
THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF LIFE 119
natural events. As a result of this mathematization of nature, the causal

relation between events was considered more and more a formal logical
implication: an effect follows its causes with the same necessity as a con-
clusion its premisses. This modem project of scientific explanation
resulted in a reduction of the four causes, distinguished by Aristotle:
material, formal, efficient and final causes, into only one important for
science: the formal cause. 7 The rejection of teleology by modem science
seems to be one of the most fundamental reasons for our contemporary
moral and environmental crisis. 8 The concept of natural things as having
their own species-specific "nature" and "telos", became an obscure
notion. "Nature" lost its normative value and ethical thinking became
increasingly disqualified as being only "purely subjective". These trends
resulted finally in the contemporary confusion about the moral value
of the ends that our tremendous technical power to manipulate nature
ought to realize. However, just the tremendous power of our scientific
technique has made the formulation of general accepted norms and rules
more necessary than ever, in particular in relation to our handling of
nature in general (eco-ethics) and of living organisms in particular (bio-
ethics).
It is obvious that the contemporary moral and environmental crisis
demands a new attitude of Western (wo )man towards nature. This requires
a metaphysics and ethics in which nature is more than neutral "matter"
and "stuff" to be manipulated in order to realize human ends. We need
an ethical theory, in which natural things, and in particular living
ob(sub)jects are not regarded- in a utilitarian way - as being purely
instrumental, but which accepts the idea that they have an intrinsic
value of their own. Something has "intrinsic value" if it is - or has (the
possibility of) something that is- good or desirable as an end in itself. 9
To have intrinsic value means that the ob(sub)ject ought not to be used
as only a means for human ends (having then only instrumental value),
but that it has an end of its own. Now, in particular living ob(sub )jects
have such ends of their own: they have a specific interest in the real-
ization and satisfaction of their specific powers, potentials and needs. So,
living ob(sub)jects have intrinsic value, because they have a telos of their
own. 10 In other words an (environmental) ethics that recognizes the
intrinsic value of natural things, appeals to a teleological philosophy of
nature.
A prerequisite for the acceptance of such a teleological philosophy
of nature is that it is shown that modern biological theories, and in
120 FRANS SOONTIENS
particular the theory of evolution, are not in contradiction with a natural

teleology, even though that has often been said. An elucidation of the
concept of teleology in relation to evolution is therefore of great philo-
sophical and moral importance.
EVOLUTION
For most biologists, (Neo-)Darwinism crowned the mechanistic program

in explaining (living) nature. It appeals only to natural laws, natural prin-
ciples and chance, and rejects teleology or reference to final causes.
To prove this non-teleology, biologists often refer to the "opportunistic"
course of evolution. "Evolution does not follow a steady progression
toward a discernible goal" (Simpson, 1949, p. 70) 11 nor does it show
any evidence for a "persistence towards a predetermined goal" (Huxley,
197 4, p. 497). 12 On the contrary, evolution is characterized by "an odd
randomness and a lack of fixed plan" (Simpson, 1949, p. 51), and is
"devoid of purpose" (Stebbins, 1982, p. 4). 13 These arguments warrant,
for most biologists, the rejection of all teleology in evolution. Even those
biologists, such as Ernst Mayr, Ayala, Ruse and Hull, 14 who accept the
idea that the individual organism has a teleological structure, regard
this teleology as only an "apparent teleology" as a result of natural selec-
tion. Mayr called this apparent teleology "teleonomy", which is for him
a non-metaphysical, but scientific concept for the "apparent purpose-
fulness of organisms, operating on the basis of a program", the DNA-code
of the genome. This code is the result of natural selection and according
to Mayr a "pure chemical and thus material cause". So there is no need
for teleology anymore; the causa finalis as "the cause responsible for
the orderly reaching of a preconceived ultimate goal" can be under-
stood fully only in scientific terms. 15
A careful analysis of the relevant literature, however shows that the
problem of teleology in evolution is identified with the question of the
validity of orthogenesis, which was defined by Simpson as the "inherent
tendency for evolution to continue in a given direction towards a dis-
cernible goal" (Simpson, 1949, p. 32). Because the fossil record fails
to show any evidence that evolution follows a straight path towards a
specific goal, teleology is rejected. Teleology would stand in contrast
to the fundamental creativity of evolution. Obviously, teleology is for
these biologists identical with "orthogenesis" and implies for them pre-
formism and predictability.
The other major reason for the rejection of teleology is that it seems
to be excluded by the role of chance in evolution. The role of chance
at several levels compelled Monod to say: "Chance alone is at the source
of every evolutionary innovation" (Monod, 197 4, p. 11 0). 16 Because
teleology is considered to imply "predictability", because it would imply
a predetermined goal, and chance is supposed to imply "unpredictability",
it is concluded that chance must exclude the possibility of teleology. If
the course of evolution cannot be predicted, as the fossil-record shows,
it must be due to chance, and chance excludes teleology.
CRITICISM
However, the arguments leading to the rejection of any teleology of

and in evolution are not justified. These arguments are fallacious on
two counts:
1) The identification of teleology with orthogenesis is mistaken. The
(justified) rejection of orthogenesis does not justify the rejection of
teleology, because teleology should not be identified with a straight-
forward movement toward a pre-established goal:
a) Teleology does not require a straightforward progression towards
a goal. This is clearly illustrated by the games we play: soccer plays criss-
cross all over the field, yet they definitely have a goal. The same may
be said of any searching behavior which is often marked by "trial and
error", but which is nevertheless evidently driven by a goal.
b) Teleology does not require the existence of a predetermined goal.
The scientist's search for truth, our striving towards the Good, the lure
of beauty in the creative work of an artist, all these are examples of a
search for something, which is marked by the absence of a pre-estab-
lished goal. An artist often discovers what he really was striving for in
the course of his creative activity. Teleology does not even require that
the goal (e.g., winning the game) ever be reached or realized, as when
we lose a game. So, the randomness and the capricious, opportunistic
movements of evolutionary lines, so characteristic of the fossil record,
do not necessarily imply the absence of teleology.
2) Furthermore, chance does not exclude teleology. Games are good
examples of teleological behavior in which chance plays a fundamental
role. And any artist knows how "accidental" mistakes can sometimes help
him to unveil his purpose.
In short, teleology implies neither the straightforward progress to a
122 FRANS SOONTIENS
pre-established goal, nor the exclusion of chance. Neither the rejection

of orthogenesis nor the recognition of the fundamental role of chance
in evolution, necessarily imply that teleology must be absent in the evo-
lutionary process, as can easily be seen in sports and games! Of course,
this argument is no proof that teleology is present, but the scientific theory
of evolution cannot give a definite answer about this - philosophical -
problem.
TELEOLOGY AND INTENTIONALITY
The reason why teleology is often associated with orthogenesis, or with

preformism and predictability, is that it is conceived according to the
model of the behavior of a purposive agent, with (human) "intention-
ality", in which often there is a pre-established goal and an elimination
of chance happenings. Now, one of the strongest reasons why teleology
has become identified or strongly associated with intentionality is to
be found in positions that were elaborated as a result of the scholastic
disputes about the creation of the world by an intelligent Creator. Aristotle
maintained in the first place an "internal teleology", in which final causes
are active in nature itself: things strive to the actualization of their own
form ("eidos"), as in the acorn's striving to be an oak. 17 For him, tele-
ology in nature is a precondition to human teleology as manifested in
art and technique ("techne"). It is only because there is teleology in nature
that man can make his artifacts and fulfil nature in some way. "Techne"
imitates ("mimesis") the natural process:
If the ship-building art were in the wood it would produce the same result by nature. If
therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature. The best illustration is a
doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that. ... It is absurd to suppose that purpose is
not present, because we do not observe the agent deliberating. 18
Under the influence of Christian theology, this Aristotelian concept of

"internal teleology" was radically transformed. Nature came to be viewed
as the result of "external teleology": all natural order and all natural
processes were the outcome of God's plan and purpose. While for
Aristotle natural teleology was the precondition to the (human) teleology
of a subject, for the Middle Ages the teleology of a (divine) Subject
became the precondition to natural teleology. Although Aquinas wished
to make a clear distinction between the problem of natural teleology
and creative teleology, we can observe in his texts a strong suggestion

that all final causes are a result of an "agens ab intellectu".
We observed that natural things which lack knowledge work towards an end.[... ] [T]hings
which do not have knowledge do not tend to an end, except under the direction of someone
who knows and understands. [... ] There is therefore, an intelligent personal being by
whom everything in nature is ordered to its end. 19
So, intentionality became the presupposition for all teleology; internal

teleology was converted into external teleology. This conversion showed
itself to be of fundamental importance for the history of the concept of
teleology: criticism of the concept almost always starts from the sup-
position that intentionality is the precondition for teleology. Critics such
as John Buridan, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke and
others, all reject teleology in nature because they all suppose that it
implies "purposes of God". 20
This misunderstanding was revitalized in the eighteenth century by the
'natural theology' movement, which tried to show that the Newtonian
world-order could only be as it is, if one supposed the existence of a
divine Engineer. In particular, biological adaptations formed a strong
argument in favour of the existence of God: the "Argument from Design".
In this respect it is important to know that the theories of evolution
grew out of the problem of organic adaptation as it was stated by natural
theologians. Lamarck and Darwin attempted to give a natural, instead
of a super-natural explanation for the phenomena of biological adapta-
tion. In particular, Darwin - who had studied theology! - had very
carefully read the book Natural Theology, very popular in his days,
written by William Paley ( 1819), one of the great natural theologians
of that century. 21
"I do not think I hardly ever admired a book more than Paley's ...
I could almost formally have said it by heart," wrote Darwin to his friend
Sir John Lubbock. 22 It can be concluded that Darwin's rejection of tele-
ology in evolution was strongly influenced by the assumption of the
"argument from design" that natural teleology presupposes a divine
"Purposer".
In conclusion, the reason why teleology is associated with orthogen-
esis and predictability was and still is that teleology was considered as
(the result of) intentionality, of a planning and purposive agent, as
"external teleology".
124 FRANS SOONTIENS
This historical reversal from the primacy of natural teleology to the

primacy of conscious teleology strongly marked the historical develop-
ment of the concept. Since then any criticism of teleology has nearly
always been based on the assumption that teleology entails intentionality.
That explains why attacks on teleology were often attacks on its supposed
anthropomorphic character. But clearly, only teleology according to the
model of "external teleology" can be said to be "anthropomorphic", in
the sense of the attribution of specific human qualities to non-human
beings. However, not even human teleology always implies the con-
sciousness of a purpose. We are not always conscious of the goal we
are pursuing in our teleological activities such as speaking, creating,
searching. So, the ascription of teleology to nature does not necessarily
entail the position that natural entities have intentions, as Aristotle already
knew. 23
In short, the confused and confusing discussion of chance and tele-
ology in evolution is largely the result of a fundamental misunderstanding
of the meaning of "teleology", which has its source in the medieval
attempt to reconcile Greek philosophical notions with Christian teleology,
resulting in the identification of teleology with "external teleology"
which is but one form of teleology. So, one might say that the modem
discussion of teleology in respect to evolution, is in fact a discussion
about the "argument from design"; it is a discussion about theology rather
than teleology. By unmasking the suggestion of (Divine) intentionality,
the evolutionists erroneously eliminate every form of teleology from
nature and evolution (see for example Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker
[1985]).
TELEOLOGY AS A PRECONDITION FOR EVOLUTION?
So, neither the random behavior of fossil lines, nor the rejection of ortho-
genesis, nor the role of chance, imply the impossibility of teleology in
evolution. There may be, on the contrary, good reasons to believe that
teleology is a precondition for the possibility of evolution.
1) Epistemological reasons: Many concepts which are used in evo-
lutionary theory are implicitly (tacitly) teleological, that is to say that
these concepts can only be understood with reference to some goal,
such as program, fitness, adaptation, natural selection, the very concept
of evolution itself. For example the metaphor (!) of natural selection is
evidently teleological, because it can only be understood in analogy

with and reference to our own teleological selecting: giving preference
to something in the perspective of some goal. And the very concept of
evolution itself implies the recognition of some direction. Even the
concept of chance is implicitly teleological! Chance is only a relative
concept: an event can be called a chance event only in the perspective
of some expectation. 24 So, for the theory of evolution, as for biological
science in general, the idea of teleology is a necessary and inevitable
concept for understanding, as Kant already knew (1790). For him tele-
ology is a regulative principle for understanding biological phenomena.
In that way also the concept of a "program" functions. Program is a
concept that signifies in scientific language the character of "Naturzweck"
that an organism is, according to Kant. Every biologist implicitly agrees
with this at the very moment when he tries to explain the biological
phenomena of development, physiology and behavior in terms of a
program (see also notes 10 and 15). These then are our epistemolog-
ical, heuristic considerations.
2) If we accept a more realistic view of science - as many biolo-
gists do - then we could make some extrapolations to the ontological
level. Thus the principle of natural selection that is based on the "struggle
for life" presupposes the teleological character of needy organisms
striving for food, sex, etc. Their striving is the cause of their involve-
ment in the struggle for life. Furthermore, the concept of a program is,
according to most biologists, not only a concept for understanding, but
in reality there is such a program in every organism: the DNA code of
the genome, carrying the in-forma-tion, that guides and will guide the
development, functioning and behavior of organisms now and into the
future. So, translating teleology into terms of a program and/or natural
selection is a vicious circle: teleology is not allowed to enter at the
front door, but it slips in through the back (see also notes 10 and 15).
3) Finally, a more speculative reason. One of the most provocative
theses of the theory of evolution is that man is much more akin to other
living things than he had believed to be. This presupposes a continuity
between man and nature. This implies a paradox: how can there be tele-
ology in man, when he is the product of and part of a non-teleological
nature? If one does not accept that teleology is somehow in nature, then
one is obliged to conclude, either that human teleology stems from a non-
(extra-, super-) natural source, or that human teleology is only an illusion.
126 FRANS SOONTIENS
That is the fundamental choice we have to make. 25 Of course, this is

not a scientific decision, but one that is motivated by philosophical and
ethical concerns, in order to give meaning to one's life.
The analysis given in this article suggests, however, that the rejec-
tion of natural teleology by the theory of evolution is not justified. On
the contrary, evolution presupposes a fundamental, internal, natural tele-
ology. In this respect a comparison with human history could be
illuminating. One does not need to accept that human history has an
ultimate goal - in my opinion it does not - to recognize that teleology
in human history as a whole plays a fundamental role in the teleolog-
ical activities of individual human beings. Furthermore, in man - as a
natural product of the natural process of evolution - we have at least one
evident example of the operation of final causes within nature. Of course,
I am not advocating a naive return to Aristotle's philosophy, but a reval-
uation of a teleological philosophy of nature seems unavoidable, 1) in
order to do justice to the teleological nature of man, and 2) as a pre-
condition for the formulation of an ecological ethics, because such an
ethics calls for a recognition of the intrinsic value of organisms. 26
ANTHROPOCENTRISM OR ECOCENTRISM?
It is a popular view to create an antagonism between anthropocentrism

and ecocentrism. But anthropocentrism and ecocentrism are not as
contrary as suggested by the proponents of the ecological movement.
If anthropocentrism is to be regarded as something to be rejected, one
could ask why we should then worry about poverty, hunger and pollu-
tion. Let nature reign, and the strongest will survive! In the past,
numerous environmental catastrophes have happened in which millions
of species became extinct (about 99.9 percent of the sum of evolved
species!). 27 This is a very natural "natural process" which - if we wish
to think biocentrically - we should allow to take its own course. If
Australopithecus, Homo habilis, Homo erectus once became extinct, why
should Homo sapiens not be the next one to go? For a thoroughgoing
ecocentrism this is no problem: let hunger, war and criminality diminish
the numbers of the human species; it would be best for nature! I am afraid
that this kind of neo-social Darwinism - heard sometimes in the deep
ecology movement - will finally result in a new holocaust.
But, as I said before, there is no need for such an antagonism between
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. To oppose these views is to suppose
the same Cartesian dualism, which is so strongly rejected by many sup-

porters of ecological concern. Now, it has been the theory of evolution
that has indeed stressed the close and intimate relationship between
man and nature. It is precisely the theory of evolution that has shown
- or better, presupposes - that man (and everything he has achieved tech-
nically and has created in art) is a realization of natural possibilities!
As Professor Tymieniecka said yesterday: "the creativity of nature
proceeds in the creativity of man". In this view the Mona Lisa, the cathe-
dral of Chartres or a computer are in no way less natural than a rainforest.
As Schelling once said: "In man, nature comes to rational, moral and
aesthetical awareness". Man, as a natural product of the natural process
of evolution, is the realization of natural possibilities, already present
in nature before the very existence of the human being. 28
Since we take it for granted that man has an intrinsic value, we there-
fore should treat nature with respect, just because nature contains - and
has realized - the possibility of the realization of this intrinsic value
that man is with his aesthetic and moral consciousness. In the same
way that a human embryo deserves our respect because there inheres
in it the promise of becoming a human person with undeniable intrinsic
value, so nature deserves our respect because it has been shown to possess
the potentiality of evolving into mankind.
This argument is not to imply that mankind is the crown - or even
the goal - of evolution, but it certainly implies that we are an impor-
tant step towards a full realization of the rational, moral and aesthetic
self-consciousness of nature. In man, and only by him/her, we are aware
of an ideal of goodness that involves not only our own species, but
also every living creature in nature. To care not only for myself, not
only for my family, not only for my country, not only for my own species
but for all species: does this not involve a very important kind of progress
in moral concern? That is not to say that this care, this concern and
compassion have already been realized, but that these values have
been discovered as an ideal for moral practice, one which ought to be
realized.
The argument that, according to the theory of evolution, we cannot
speak of higher and lower in relation to different kinds of organisms,
because every organism is adapted in an optimal way to its environ-
ment, is not a valid argument. It only shows that "adaptation" is not an
adequate criterion for valuating progress in evolution. Natural selec-
tion is only a means by which natural possibilities are tested for viability
128 FRANS SOONTIENS
and reproductive success, leading to optimal adaptation to a specific envi-

ronment. But this optimal adaptation to a specific environment does
not say anything about the value of the realized possibilities. In art too,
we think of one piece of music or literature, one painting as being more
valuable than another, although every piece of art is a specific realiza-
tion of possibilities (in nature and in man, who is a part of nature).
So, nature deserves our respect, because it made man possible as a
being with moral and aesthetic awareness: man as a "dis-covery" and
as "discoverer" of natural possibilities. 29 The view that man has a unique
intrinsic value does not imply however, that we would have the per-
mission or the right to handle other natural ob-sub-jects30 as we like. But,
every attempt to minimalize the unique position of man will finally result
in, I think, a moral disaster. Not by minimizing the value of man, but
by maximizing the value of nature as the condition and possibility for
rational, moral and aesthetic awareness - as exemplified in human beings
- do we find the key to a new ecological ethics.
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen
NOTES
1 Dr. Frans Soontiens studied biology, anthropology and philosophy. He teaches phi-
losophy and ethics in relation to biology at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of the
University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands. An extended argument of this article can be
found in his book Evolution and Teleology (1988) and Natuurfilosojie en Milieu-ethiek
(1993). Correspondence: Dept. of Philosophy of Nature, Toemooiveld 1, Nijmegen, The
Netherlands.
2 Attention is drawn to the two meanings of "nature" here: "nature" as the collection
of natural things, and "nature" as the "essence", the real self.

3 "Arche" (principle) was later on, misleadingly, translated as "cause" (causa), which
term immediately has, for modem readers, the connotation of "a kind of force".
4 Aristotle, Collected Works (ed. Ross) (Oxford U.P., 1910). The so-called "unmoved
mover" in Aristotle's Metaphysics is never the source of teleology in natural things as

"God" is later in Christian theology.
5 E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanisation of the Worldpicture (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1965).
6 F. Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605) (London: Dent, 1974).
7 Science can only give the description (explanation?) of the relations between events
to be expressed in "formulas" and so-called "natural laws". All theories about matter,
energy, atoms, forces, fields etc. are in fact (philosophical) interpretations (metaphys-
ical speculation?) of these formal relationships in these "formulas". In a scrutinizing
analysis it can be shown that science appeals implicitly to all of the four causes (see
Soontiens, 1988). The confusion of the logical order with the causal order (logicism) is
one of the most important reasons for the belief in the necessity of causal laws (causal
determinism a Ia Laplace).
8 See F. J. K. Soontiens, Nature, Science and Alienation (Nijmegen: KUN-Press, 1983).
9 Such as "knowledge", "beauty", "happiness", "human being", "human embryo", "self-
realization". An important question is whether these intrinsic values are necessarily morally
relevant: do we have a moral obligation to them? Maybe we have to say, that having a
telos of their own, is only a fundamental condition for having intrinsic value, because,
perhaps, only entities - organisms - which are able to experience the realisation of their
telos in terms of pleasure, can have "intrinsic value". For me, this is still a point of dis-
cussion. Perhaps we could say that there is a continual gradation: from having a specific
structure (form) (the physical and the chemical), to having a specific program (form
and telos) (biological entities), to having intrinsic value (form, telos and value) in those
living organisms which feel and experience (higher animals), to having moral con-
sciousness in self-conscious man.
10 Every biologist recognizes this fact, at least implicitly, when he tries to explain the
development, the functions and the behavior of living organisms in terms of a "program"
(pre-scription of a goal to be reached). In fact the concept of a program, in-forma-tion
that "foresees the future" (Mayr), is an implicit teleological notion, which correlates
with the original Aristotelian concept of "entelechy" (possession of an internal goal).
To explain the meaning of the concept of "program" teleological language is inevitably
used. So, "program" is not- as Ernst Mayr proposed (1974)- a concept whereby the
notion of teleology in biology becomes superfluous. See Soontiens, 1988.
11 G. G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven: Yale UP, 1949).
12 J. Huxley, Evolution, the Modern Synthesis (London: Allen and Unwin (1942), 1974).
13 G. L. Stebbins, From DNA to Man (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).
14 M. E. Ruse, The Philosophy of Biology (Humanities Press, 1973); F. J. Ayala,
"Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology", Phil. Sci., 37, 1, 1970; D. Hull,
Philosophy of Biological Science (New Jersey, 1974); and E. Mayr, "Teleological and
Teleonomic, A New Analysis", Boston Stud. Phil. Sci., XIV, 91, 1974.
15 This of course is sheer nonsense. We can agree with Mayr that neither the concept
of a system (as in the general system theory of Bertalanffy (1968)), nor the concept of
feedback-control (Wiener [Rosenblueth eta[., 1943] in his theory of cybernetics) can
explain the teleological character of an organism: therefore you need the concept of a
"program". But we do not agree with Mayr when he suggests that this concept of
"program" makes the notion of "teleology" superfluous. Just the concept of a program
(pre-scription of a goal to be reached) is a thoroughly teleological concept, and in fact
the scientific translation of the original Aristotelian concept of "entelechy" (in posses-
sion of an internal goal), was both "causa formalis" and "causa finalis"; it was the "forma",
that toward which the developing organism was striving (see also note 10). All these
scientific concepts, such as "system", "feedback-regulation", "program", can explain the
mechanisms by which a goal can be reached, but they do not eliminate the need for
teleological explanation. See Soontiens, 1988 and 1990.
16 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity (Fontana, 1974). The use of the term "chance" within
the theory of evolution - and not only within this theory - is very confusing. A plenti-
tude of terms is compounded by the multiplicity of differents meanings. I refer to my book,
130 FRANS SOONTIENS
F. J. K. Soontiens, Evolution and Teleology (Nijmegen: KUN-Press, 1988) for a more

extensive survey.
17 With reference to the discussion after this lecture at Guadalajara with regard to the
internal teleology of Aristotle and the external teleology of Christian teleology, it is of
course a fact that Aristotle formulated a theory of the "Unmoved Mover" (Metaphysics),
which is a principle which must explain the overall harmonic order of the cosmos, because
every natural entity, in its striving to its telos, its own good, tries to imitate the full
actuality of the "Unmoved Mover" (methexis). It can only be understood as a moving prin-
ciple "by being an object of desire" ("kinei os eromenon"). The Unmoved Mover is in
no way a creating principle which is the source of the teleology in natural entities, such
as the Christian God is, who is the creating source of all natural things, and of their having
a telos. In fact, the cosmic model of Aristotle is that of a living organism, with its
internal teleology (natural program), while the cosmic model for Christian teleology is
that of a servomechanism or computer in which the program originates from outside in
the designer.
18 Aristotle, Physics, II, 199b, 20.
19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 2, Art. 3.
20 See the extensive argument in: Soontiens, 1988.
21 W. Paley, Natural Theology (London: 1819).
22 In F. Darwin (ed.), Life and Letters of Charles Darwin (London: Murray, 1887).
23 Teleology might be considered as an anthropomorphic concept, not because it would
presuppose a mind in nature, not because it would ascribe a special function or property
of man to sub-human things, but because it attempts to explain nature analogically by
referring to an aspect of human experience. Just the activity of a program within an
organism shows the possibility of non-conscious teleology in nature!
24 See Soontiens, 1993.
25 The appeal to a concept of "emergence" is not an intelligible one either: a sudden
qualitative change, a "transcendence" as Dobzhansky called it, is as inconceivable as an
intervention by a deity. It can be argued however that in inorganic nature there also
exists an elementary teleology, expressed in a natural tendency (direction) to behave in
a specific way and explained by "elementary programs" such as the "information" given
by the quantum-numbers of elementary particles, the information given by the structure
of the electronic configuration of atoms and ions, leading finally to the information
given by the structure of the DNA-program in living organisms. So, there are reasons
to believe in a continuum of more ever manifested teleology in nature, culminating in
the information processing of the neural structure of the brain in animals and finally in
the self-consciousness of purpose in the human mind (see also note 9). Furthermore,
also in physics and chemistry you can use teleological explanations such as the so-called
minimum and maximum principles and the anthropological principles (see Barrow and
Tipler, 1986).
26 Philosophers such as Schelling, Whitehead and more recently Hans Jonas tried to
formulate a philosophy of nature in which natural teleology gets fair treatment.
27 See D. Raup, Extinction, Bad Genes or Bad Luck? (Norton, 1991).
28 In this respect it might tum out to be philosophically very important to note that
the contemporary computerization of our world is in some way the expression of a rec-
onciliation of a Cartesian view of nature - nature as a machine - with a Hegelian view
of nature- nature as the manifestation and "Entfremdung" of "Geist" (article forthcoming).
29 Of course, he has also discovered and will discover unvaluable things, but should
we not judge man - and nature! - not by his worst results, but by his best ones? In the
same way as we should judge an artist by his best (perhaps only one!) works?
30 To recognize "subjectivity" in natural objects other than human beings was the
inspiring insight in Whitehead's philosophy of nature, which demands scrutinizing analysis
in relation to the formulation of an adequate eco- and bio-ethics. The same is true for
the philosophical biologies of Plessner, Portmann and Buytendijk.
LITERATURE
Aristoteles, Collected Works (ed. D. Ross) (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1910).

Ayala, F. J., "Teleological Explanations in Biology", Philosophy of Science 37(1) (1970).
Bacon, F., The Advancement of Learning (1605) (London: Dent, 1974).
Barrow, J.D. and Tipler, F. J., The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
Bertalanffy, L. von, General System Theory (New York: Braziller, 1968).
Brooks, D. R. and Wiley, E. 0., Evolution as Entropy (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1986).
Darwin, C., On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859) (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1968).
Darwin, F. (ed.), Life and Letters of Charles Darwin (London: Murray, 1887).
Dawkins, R., The Blind Watchmaker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985).
Dijksterhuis, E. J., The Mechanisation of the Worldpicture (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1965).
Dobzhansky, T., "On Some Fundamental Concepts of Darwinian Biology", Evol. Bioi.
2(1), 1968.
Dobzhansky, T. et al., Evolution (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977).
Futuyama, D., Evolutionary Biology (Sinauer, 1986).
Hull, D. L., Philosophy of Biological Science (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974).
Husser!, E., Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man (1937) (New York: Harper, 1965).
Huxley, J., Evolution, the Modern Synthesis (1942) (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974).
Jonas, H., Daz Prinzip Verantwortung (Frankfurt/M: Insel Verlag, 1979).
Kant, I., Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979).
Maynard Smith, J., The Theory of Evolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
Mayr, E., "Teleological and Teleonomic, A New Analysis", Boston Stud. Phil. Sci.
XIV(91) (1974) and also in: Toward a New Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 1988).
Melsen, A. G. M. van, Evolutie en Wijsbegeerte (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1964).
Monod, J., Le Hasard et Ia necessite (Paris: Seuil, 1970).
Nagel, E., Structure of Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
Paley, W., Natural Theology (London: 1819).
Plessner, H., Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (Berlin: Gruyter, 1928).
Raup, D., Extinction, Bad Genes or Bad Luck (Norton, 1991).
Rosenberg, A., The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985).
Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N. and Bigelow, J. "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology",
Philosophy of Science 10(18) (1943).
Ruse, M. E., Philosophy of Biology Today (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988).
132 FRANS SOONTIENS
Schoffeniels, E., Antichance (Oxford: Pergamon, 1976).

Simpson, G. G., The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven: Yale UP, 1949).
Sober, E., The Nature of Selection (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).
Sober, E., Philosophy of Biology (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993).
Soontiens, F. J. K., Nature, Science and Alienation (Nijmegen: KUN-Press, 1983).
Soontiens, F. J. K., Evolution and Teleology Thesis (Nijmegen: KUN-Press, 1988).
Soontiens, F. J. K., "Biology and Teleology", Kennis en Methode XIV(l66) (1990).
Soontiens, F. J. K., "Evolution: Teleology or Chance?", J. Gen. Philosophy of Science
22(133), 1991.
Soontiens, F. J. K., "Evolution: Teleology and Theology", Bijdragen 53(194) (1992).
Soontiens, F. J. K., "Toeval", Wijsgerig Perspectief 3313(74) (1992193).
Soontiens, F. J. K., Natuur.filoso.fie en Milieu-ethiek (Meppel: Boom, 1993).
Stebbins, G. L., From DNA to Man (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Notre Dame: Notre Dame UP, 1975).
Whitehead, A. N., Process and Reality (MacMillan, 1929).
Wuketits, F., Kausalitiit und Evolution (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980).
CARLOS MINGUEZ
PREDETERMINATION AND CHANGE

IN LIVING BEINGS
A S!udy Based on Nicolai Hartmann's Contribution
Phenomenology constitutes a movement which unfolds in different direc-

tions: some are nearer to Edmund Husserl's thoughts (1859-1938), as the
orthodox manifestation of the movement; others are further afield, as
would be the case of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950): his thoughts are
considered to be outside the scope of phenomenology, whereas others see
him as a heterodox manifestation of the movement. In any case, Hartmann
uses phenomenology in order to purify philosophical problems, without
disregarding the scientific contribution. This dependence on the sciences
is more obvious in his last works, and especially in his Ontology, and
this paper will focus on one of its aspects.
The position of Hartmann with regard to the structure of the real world
is well-known. This world is shaped - insofar as it is the object of the
ontological analysis - by the description of categories as "the fundamental
determinations of the entities" (1940, p. 2). "Every ontology deals with
fundamental affirmations of the entity as such. Affirmations of this type
are basically categories of being" (1942, p. 87). In this sense, the term
"category" keeps its significance as predicament, i.e., that which is
predicated or something referred to, "the supreme genera of being".
Categorical analysis is not limited to the universal determinations of
the entities, it also establishes the specific categories corresponding to
each of the strata of reality: inorganic, organic, psychic and spiritual
(cultural). Life emerges from one of these strata, the organic stratum. 1
The categories in this stratum must provide the most general features
concerning living beings, in the way that they shape their specific level
of reality. Their explicit establishment requires the illumination of the
aspect which appears as a "novum", that is, life in itself; this aspect is
partly rooted in the lower categories (the inorganic) and it also consti-
tutes their continuation. We also find it in the foundations of the upper
categories, in the psychic and cultural spheres.
The new emerging features of life have been studied parallel to bio-
133

134 CARLOS MINGUEZ
logical research, in trying to detect the most general aspects (as required
by a categorial analysis); these features are in line with other phenom-
enologically "orthodox" analyses. The lability which, together with
organic pre-determination, is found in all natural processes of life, is
increased in upper strata, adopting a project form in man, as observed
by Heidegger, Ortega and Sartre, from different perspectives. In his latest
work, El Animal Cultural, Carlos Paris explores this process, insisting
on the biological roots of culture and the projects planned by humanity:
"The rational hypothesis of culture as a development of biology will
guide us; culture not only innovates the resources of biology but it also
completes them and rests on them" (Paris, 1994, p. 71). This author inves-
tigates the last phase of a process which leads from Biology to Culture.
From this perspective, the peculiar features of man are made patent -
a cultural being, employing technology, information and having a capacity
to project. The last aspect requires freedom and also shapes the spiri-
tual world in which man - as a conscious being compelled to action -
knows and creates.
This paper will only focus on the first step in this deployment which
leads to the human project, that is, the coincidental presence of prede-
termination and lability 2 in living beings which initiates an opening
towards random trajectories and concludes in the conditioned human
project. This will be achieved by taking Hartmann's work as a model
for further research, it having the power necessary for combining science
and phenomenology.
II
The characteristic features of living beings are shaped from their con-
stituting categories; these are integrated into three large blocks corre-
sponding to the organic individual, the species, and phylogenesis. Yet,
this is not enough to set the boundaries of life. In order to overcome
this limitation, Hartmann refers to a category group which he names
"Organic Pre-determination". This category group covers all the features
previously mentioned, and thus shapes the individual, the species and the
production of forms - phylogenesis - through the characteristic aspects
of living beings. This is the most fundamental determination group in the
organic stratum and shows the constants on which the previous cate-
goric determinations are built; consequently, this stratum corresponding
to the living being gains clarity.
PREDETERMINATION AND CHANGE 135
A fundamental problem arises when investigating organic nature: What

is Life? All the determinations established by Hartmann in Philosophie
der Natur aim at setting the boundaries of this concept, but none of
them tackle the problem directly when trying to approach the meaning
of life. The determinations show an attempt to break away from mechani-
cist reductionism, since organic nature has its own categories, as well
as from vitalism, since this implies the introduction of an aprioristic
element, an entelechy that would break the links among the strata. 3
The effort made in establishing the features of the categories men-
tioned is directed towards two aspects which concern all reality (even
in organic nature): pre-determination and change. 4 The way in which both
manifest themselves and combine determines the nature of the organic
stratum. The first one sets the causes and limits of the natural action
established by the relatively permanent states which are apprehended
by knowledge as units. The second one, as the lability which enables
the change, also sets limits, the collection of variables which can be
unfolded. Beings - in the special forms adopted by these two condi-
tions - are able to create the organic stratum, and reveal peculiar ways
of being an individual, of producing and originating new species.
III
What particular features are adopted by predetermination in living beings?

Hartmann answers this question by studying how the organic nexus is
produced.
The first approach to the subject leads us to think that organic com-
plexity emerges in areas where the inorganic determining forces are more
lax, giving way to spaces where secondary formations arise, in which
inorganic processes perform in a fragmented way, thus permitting the
appearance of a new type of nexus. As the causal relation is one of the
more accessible categories in nature, from which we derive scientific
knowledge of nature, the determination of such a relation would provide
us with one of the defining features of the type of nexus in which it is
manifested, at the same time defining the remaining relations which
appear at that stage. However, we cannot establish causation with pre-
cision in the context of life, since it is located in an intermediate zone,
between mechanical causation and the rejected final causation. 5 There-
fore, the only plausible way to reach a higher degree of complexity would
start with the mechanical causation (all the upper categories are founded
136 CARLOS MINGUEZ
on the lower ones and not vice versa). However, we cannot add any
new peculiar features; yet we might be able to do so from a negative
perspective: the irrationality following from the growing complexity; and
also from a positive one: the linked or joint action of all the types of
predetermination which affect the living being, showing the common
direction which emanates from their activity.
In the determination of causes, once finality has been rejected, natural
selection constitutes the typically organic feature. 6 However, this category
"which in a way is at the midpoint between simple causation and the
more complicated final nexus" (Ph.N. 63b) belongs to phylogenesis, to
the formation of the species and to its relation to a common nucleus in
the development of life. Is this selection principle also found in the lower
stages of morphogenesis? Hartmann understands it as an intraselection:
"a selection of already differentiated and specialized cells, but also a
selection of the different functional possibilities of a single cell species,
both selections being dependent on the place they occupy in the dispo-
sition of space" (N. P. 62d). 7
Hartmann gives interselection a great value but - as we will see -
he can only consider it a "hypothesis", since reproduction is determined
by the form of the whole, the form of the individual, and by the dispo-
sition system. The enigma of life is inserted into the predetermination
made by the totality which, ultimately, also conditions natural selec-
tion itself, since the different degrees of organic being (assimilation,
reproduction, species formation) cannot exist independently.
Is it possible to find an explanatory principle for organic predeter-
mination (basically present in reproduction) with a function similar to
that of selection (the natural concurrence of individuals and survival chal-
lenges) in phylogenesis? In order to answer this essential question,
Hartmann goes back to the analysis of predetermination in natural
processes. As a primordial difference between life and inorganic nature,
he states that life constitutes a closed process which external condi-
tions have an effect on but do not actually characterise.
Hartman's vision of inorganic nature - despite the passing of time
and its progressive character - constitutes a relatively static configura-
tion. The being of the continuous producing of the causal nexus is limited
in its legality to reciprocal action. Dynamic natural formations are created
out of their core predetermination and also out of the dynamic prede-
termination of the totality. As the surrounding irrationality prevents a
fixed determination of the spheres of influence, the upshot is the estab-
lishment of an intermediate situation in which a set of forces interfere

with each other and balance (Ph.N. Sec. IV).
This image is transferred to organic nature. Here, however, the process
character is much clearer. All the categories show - in all their stages
- a balance which is bound to break. For the human knowledge, the
progressing character of the organic is patent and manifests itself in
the constantly being born and perishing typical of living beings. On the
other hand, the fact that life arises where the inorganic predetermina-
tion loses its rigidity shows the explosion of complex units endowed with
a basically different "tempus", having an evidently more rapid flow, as
they constitute themselves and disappear, the dynamic determinations
remaining relative. The organic nexuses are structured with a partic-
ular constitution different from the inorganic context around them. The
dynamic influences mark but do not constitute. The feature which char-
acterises organic nature is that of growing interiority, which turns into
intimacy in men. The impermeability of these processes typically con-
ditions the causative process; it is constituted in such a way that all the
causes are given in their origin or development. In fact, the causative
order - turned into an organic nexus - acts as if it were constituting a
microcosm. 8 The necessity demanded by modal analysis as to all that
is effective and real constitutes the foundation of organic becoming. In
reproduction, all the possibilities of development are transmitted, and
they gradually come true in the formation of all the tissues and organs.
Even the organic selection (the characteristic trait of the phylogenesis)
is affected by the core predetermination. "The predetermination which
flows from the genes continuously contributes to determining the selec-
tion of those external causative moments which may play in the process,
given the predetermination of the totality of each development stage
and the reciprocal action of it with the surrounding world" (Ph.N. 63e).
The conditions of selectivity are determined from the genes, in a way
that the feasible variations do not trespass on the possibilities offered
by the living being itself. A transgressing external influence does not
modify, but kills.
The predetermination function is not limited to the aspects previ-
ously mentioned. "The predeterminations of the germinal plasm do not
directly determine the form of the organism originated ... , but only
the constitution and functioning of the cells. The cellular nucleus
assembly also determines the reiterated cellular division as well as the
successive differentiation of its function" (Ph.N. 63f). Therefore, the
138 CARLOS MINGUEZ
stages of development condition the formation of the whole, the func-

tioning of position acts as a total predetermination, "as a solid life
community of plasm cells linked through their lineage by the germinal
plasm. But a living community as such is just a multicellular organism"
(idem).
Consequently, the "nexus organicus" is determined by a set of pre-
determinations, each one of them supposing the others. Hartmann
establishes a core predetermination which rests on a predetermination
of totality (intermediate position in the development of tissues and
organs), which is at the same time ruled by a higher order predetermi-
nation of totality (the total form of the individual), which is, in tum, ruled
by the selection principle. However, the selection principle is based on
the reproduction of the individuals, on the primogenital core predeter-
mination of the plasm, and so we are immersed in a set of mutually
supposed predeterminations. The link of all the predeterminations con-
stitutes the "nexus organicus", which is ultimately reduced to an
assemblage of fundamental scientific theories, which is called a "hypo-
thetical consideration".
IV
The most general trait which characterises life and all that is real is the
constitution of a peculiar process. However, life should not be under-
stood as a substrate which accompanies all processes which have life,
but in the way of being of such substrates. Their status, the permanence
or the balance is a result of consisting, not of subsisting under sub-
strates. That is to say, all this follows from a special way of arranging
relationships within nature, it is not the result of a radically different sub-
stance working at each of the strata of reality. "The process of life has
to be understood as the true fundamental essence of organic nature; all
forms, organizations, and all the degrees of the organic complex are mere
determinations of the essence" (Ph.N. 62b).
The distinctive traits of the process are constituted through organic
categories (life and death of the individuals, union and preservation of
the life of the species, reproduction, modification of the species ... ),
which aim to merely describe the most general features of this stratum
of reality and point out the unknowable spaces presented in them.
However, in contrast to the energetic process (typical of inorganic nature),
properties arise which are particular to organic nature. Some of them
are included in the categories previously mentioned, such as reproduc-

tion and phylogenesis; others are especially emphasized by Hartmann
to clarify the process of life: the ascending direction and the conserva-
tion of possibilities not accomplished.
Ascending direction appears in the phylogenesis as the route followed
by the mutation of the species. 9 The problem stems from the applicability
of the ascension to the lower processes, such as assimilation and repro-
duction, and therefore this applicability would belong to categories which
pertain to the organic stratum. The support of this feature is the lability
of all organic balances and the complete unity of the process of life.
This unity imposes the total form of the process over the different levels
at which the organic complex is manifest. Thus, the superior forms
(species, sets of species) lean on the individuals and without them, they
would not exist, while the lower forms are also conditioned from the
higher positions, which direct them as if they were their finality. The
species prevails to the detriment of the individual, and then the exis-
tence of the species is ensured through reproduction; similarly, the same
applies to the individuals, together with the processes which integrate
them, and to the species in relation to their total life~ Consequently,
there is a unity in the total process of life and a double conditioning is
produced within this unity; the inferior side constitutes a structure of a
higher degree, but at the same time it shows an outstanding tendency
towards higher forms, being conditioned by them. Lability, as we have
seen, makes this change possible and requires predetermination from
totality in order to keep the organic balance.
The second aspect of the organic that sets it apart from inorganic nature
is even more striking, i.e., the conservation of the possibilities not accom-
plished. The importance of this differentiating feature is increased given
its analogousness to the problems posed by modal analysis. 10 This implies
a divergence in organic beings which is linked to the way reality becomes
manifest and which can be expressed in the following terms: among
possibilities, there is only one which becomes effective, the rest are
ineffective and belong to the set of possibilities which are not accom-
plished. In inorganic nature, this modal aspect is wholly accomplished,
as the "modes of the being" (effectiveness, possibility and necessity)
affect all the entities and therefore all non-accomplished possibilities dis-
appear from the horizon of reality. In organic nature, the laws which
rule the modes of being are also accomplished, as required by the per-
sistence of the fundamental categories, and adopt a different specific
140 CARLOS MINGUEZ
peculiarity: the continuity of the germinal plasm through the individ-

uals who carry it permits the conservation of the non-accomplished
possibilities in a way that the possibilities for transformation are not
limited to the types or species reached. The process of life follows a route
from the lower species to the higher species, but keeps the multiple
differences permitted by the lability of the plasm - unviable ways in
principle - since they cannot adapt to the selection which rules the
process. 11
The problem especially affects the model of the organic process, where
the conservation of possibilities seems non-existent, as these do not
concur: in the reproduction of the individuals, in ontogenesis, one of
the most important chapters in life. Reproduction means the procre-
ation of new individuals, that is, the emergence of forms from other forms
which already existed, the old and the new forms being equal (inasmuch
as they are individuals). This similarity, this reproduction, seems to cancel
the existence of possibilities which differ from the repetition of the unique
form. The predetermination from the previous form seems to be total,
and the disposition system rigid.
However, it does not turn out quite like this. In the analysis of the
reproduction of individuals, when dealing with the system of predispo-
sition, Hartmann indicates that "in the reproduction of the total form,
there are other multiple factors which have to be received by the process
from the outside" (Ph.N. 52d); consequently, such factors would differ
from one stage to another. On the other hand, the multi-potentiality of
the parts of the individual permits the understanding that the determi-
nation by the disposition system is not unequivocal, since it enables
one part to develop functions corresponding to those of another one. "The
simpler the organism, the simpler the predisposition system, and there-
fore each part involved in a development stage is more able to play the
role of the other parts" (idem). We can then state that in the embryonic
stages "the potentiality of each cell contains here more possibilities
than that which is implemented at the regular pace of development"
(Ph.N. 62d); in lower organisms, this multiplicity of possibilities is shown
in the regeneration of parts of the body which have been extirpated, which
indicates the multipotentiality in the cells.
Indeed, it is obvious that there is a multiplicity of possibilities
in the organic process, even in places where predetermination by the
disposition system seems more rigid, for instance, in reproduction. We
have also observed that in its continuity the germinal plasm has to
conserve all the possibilities, even those which have not been accom-
plished, and even to a greater extent those which have been accomplished
but were truncated in their beginning due to their lack of finality. The
problem then facing us is that of the reasons why the organic process
takes a specific direction.
The solution is not simple and - according to Hartmann - it is not
satisfactory either, given the complexity of the phenomena; however, it
is the only light available in the current state of science. Here, the answer
is directed to the natural selection, which constitutes a categorical moment
more similar to a type of finality in organic nature. The categorial analysis
refers - in the vital process - to a natural selection built on the unity
and similarity of all life: "If the living units which concur are gener-
ally subject to selection, how could this be different in the cells within
the developing organism?" (Ph.N. 62e). The selection principle which
ruled phylogenesis is also dominant in ontogenesis. However, the selec-
tive differences between phylogenesis and ontogenesis have caused the
selection in this second process to receive the name of intra-selection,
since - in this particular moment of vital development - a decisive pre-
determination is carried out by the plasm and by the mutual conditioning
of the partial processes which lead to the permanence of the total form.
Yet, a free space - although it may be restricted - appears especially
in the embryonic forms of living beings, and therefore the selection
can become manifest: "a selection of differentiated cells, but also a selec-
tion of the different functional possibilities of a cell species, both
selections depending on the place occupied in space disposition" (idem).
This opening is displayed in the adaptation of the possibilities which
could be played out by one cell group.
Given the insufficient "facts" on which his theory could be based,
Hartmann, in a cautious way, extends the intra-selection principle to
the cell itself, in a section rightly titled "Hypothetical Perspectives".
The organic process has been shaped like a tree with many branches in
which the central trunk survives due to better adaptation to the envi-
ronment, to the fight for survival, for constituting the solution finally
arrived at, although assuming the non-accomplished finished possibili-
ties. If the selection processes were also produced within the cell,
Hartmann could then enclose the organic system within a complex unit.
In this unit, a single principle would rule from the simplest element to
the most totalising one. That is to say, the organic process implies a series
of selections which are meshed from bottom to top while at the same
142 CARLOS MING UEZ
time the selection of individuals has an effect in the opposite direction

on the formation of the species. In the process of life, the moments of
selection rule through reciprocal action.
v
The process character of all nature, which is manifest in a constant
flow, reaches a higher stage in living beings, because not even here
does the diffuse category of "substance" (prominent in the explanation
of inorganic formation) 12 have a place. The permanence of life is depen-
dent on an equilibrium, as is already apparent in the stratum of inorganic
nature, on which it rests and without which it cannot live. Therefore,
the determination of the features which characterise this special form
of equilibrium in organic nature will also shape our problem. This is
also to be seen in the permanence of both individuals and species.
What sets organic balance apart is its lability, its tension, directed
toward continually breaking the balance. This is its manifestation in
the self-conservation processes, although this is clearer in reproduc-
tion; through reproduction, the loss of balance in the organic complex
does not represent the cancellation of life but its configuration on a higher
level, in a way that the relationship between balance and imbalance
ultimately maintains life itself. Indeed, balance is a category designed for
conservation, but in living beings it is not to be explained by positing
an automatic regulation akin to that of inorganic nature; therefore, we
could say that the balance is kept stable as long as alien forces do not
break it. The forces that break it down - in our case - are found in the
living being itself, in the way in which balance is provided. The reason
this is so stems from life's "finality". In the process of life, all the
balances tend to be in continuous transformation. The lack of consistency,
the lability, is part of the way in which these balances are manifest.
The lability itself rests on the balance, as life is preserved in indi-
viduals and species which live in harmony. Their equilibrium is mobile,
though. Consequently, we find the simultaneous presence of two cate-
gories which are essential but antithetical: equilibrium and lability.
The transformations cannot take place in the individuals if there is not
an adjustment between the preserving equilibriums and the new equi-
libriums towards which they tend; that is, the equilibriums outlive
the transformations, and there would not be any life without them;
without equilibrium there are no complexes (neither dynamic nor
organic). However, life is also a process and therefore requires lability,

"the imbalance element is by nature that which forces life to advance
to higher levels and orders. All lability of a given level in the process
of life requires this advance, as it can only be compensated on a higher
and immediate level" (Ph.N. 62d). Lability goes together with equilib-
rium, and when that is unable to maintain its balance, it pushes (a negative
condition) the process towards a new equilibrium which is not on the
same level of life, but on a higher one. That is to say, there is a pressure
towards continuous destruction in all organic complexes which puts them
in an ascension mode, given its finality.
The set of predeterminations which constitutes the organic nexus
makes us think of a strictly fixed process. This situation seems to be
the "aftermath" of the set of predeterminations which define a living
being. However, we have the naive scientific experience which warns
us about the reality of change and has also entered into our category
analysis on several occasions.
Firstly, when studying organic equilibrium, lability seemed to be the
characteristic feature that was allowing and provoking change, because
it constantly tended to break down the balance. This lack of consis-
tency is displayed both in individuals and in the species which shift
from one stable status to another one, life consisting of that stability's
being in continuous transformation. Secondly, the organic processes orig-
inated in those zones where the rigid inorganic categories were weakened.
Thus, new secondary formations arise in which more complex processes
appear, the inorganic categories becoming more relaxed.
But in particular, the way in which the natural lawfulness is shown
indicates the presence of change in the essential moments in the organic
process. A law of nature on the level of the inorganic dynamic processes
acts as a real category, underlies and conditions the way of being of
the process. In organic nature, the law only verifies the relative perma-
nence of features. This permanence originates in phylogenesis, and has
in itself the reason for its temporality.
The characteristic feature of the organic law, as in the case of life itself,
is that consistency goes together with the "persistence" and the variability
of the living beings. "The organic lawfulness of the species changes
with the form and the complex of processes which sustains it. This law-
fulness is phylogenetically originated under the pressure of natural
selection, to which its own dispersion in individuals offers the entry
point" (Ph.N. 64d). This is where we find the "novum" acquired by
144 CARLOS MINGUEZ
lawfulness in the organic stratum. Under it, there is no lawfulness in

movement, as this derives from the way of being of the organic complex,
defined by a progressive complexity whose balance - which is further
and further from the "persistence" of substance and the laws of nature
- loses density, quantitative traits, and the larger part of the law disap-
pears, i.e., its lending itself to mathematization. The study of the organic
world and species analysis in particular require incomplete inductive
methods: the law is imagined but not apprehended too rigourously.
This typical character of law which arises in living beings continues
in the upper strata, in a way that - from the "novum" which defines
the regularity of the organic side - one of the most remarkable aspects
of psychic and cultural being is shaped, i.e., the loss of rigidity in deter-
minations and the growing opening of possibilities to be accomplished.
"The existence of this lawfulness is, and will be, something remark-
able, an object of a greater reach. Somewhere higher, in the psychic
and spiritual worlds, essence lies in the constant change of the special
laws in time. All consistency becomes - when compared to it - a mere
interim" (Ph.N. 64c).
University of Valencia
NOTES
1 We shall not forget that "life" is understood by Husser! as consciousness of subjec-
tivity. In Meditation Cartesienne, this author refers to the comprehension of "life of

consciousness" (8) or the flow of consciousness (14). This conception is maintained
in Die Krisis (26 and other works). A more detailed exposition can be found in Montero
(1994, pp. 11-12). In contrast, Hartmann uses "life" as the term which characterises the
stratum of organic reality, that which is studied by Biology in the field of sciences.
2 The problem introduced here by Hartmann coincides with that of the fundamental ques-
tions of modern Biology. It is in line with expressions such as "copy and error" or
"necessity and randomness" used by F. Jacob and J. Monod, respectively. Ultimately,
this is related to a problem which has been dragging its war through history and which
may be rooted in the problem of "the same" and "the other" present in Plato's Timaeus.
3 At the beginning of the 20th century, an old question concerning Biology was taken
up again, given its implications: the opposition between mechanicism and vitalism. The
latter had been re-approached in philosophy by Bergson (1859-1941) and in biology by
Hans Driesch (1867-1919). The mechanicism adopted different positions, from Max
Verworn (1863-1921), one of Haeckel's (1834-1919) disciples, whose materialistic
monism persists although with some differences, to the Neo-Darwinist mechanism of
August Weismann (1834--1919), Wilhelm Roux (1850--1924) or the strongly combatant
attitude of Jacques Leob ( 1859-1924). Awareness of the need to surpass both conceptions,
vitalism and materialism, prevails after the First World War.
4 Today's Biology - evolutionist - defends the use of the term "transformation".
"Transformation is better than 'change', as it implies that the production of several dif-
ferent changes does not permit the transformed population to revert completely to their
previous situation. In this way, evolution can be distinguished from the cyclic changes
which repeat in populations year after year" (Dobzhansky et al., 1977, p. 10).
5 In Hartmann's account, there are some "new" elements in the processes character-
istic of the living beings which cause certain natural processes to be organic. This novelty
is constituted by three factors: a) the "prospective power" (prospektive Potenz), by which
one of the most obscure elements in predetermination is expressed (this element can
only be taken into account in a descriptive sense, meaning "the set of morphogenetic
possibilities for all the later states in the processes" (Ph.N. 52c); b) the function of position
within the whole", which points out the influence of the neighbouring cells and the tissues;
c) extrinsic causes, such as temperature, water, light, etc. (Minguez, 1984, II, p. 176).
In any case, finality as a cause (an Aristotelian reminiscence) is ruled out by Hartmann,
as stated in Teologisches Denken (manuscript 1944).
6 For Hartmann, the selection represents "the first serious attempt to reduce organic
finality to a constitutive idea" (Ph.H. 58d), in Kantian terms.

7 Hartmann explicitly refers toW. Roux (1850-1924) although we could possibly add
as well A. Weismann's name (1834-1914).
8 In this regard, Hartmann would be conceptually nearer the notion of the "vital cycle",
which, for instance, can be found in Bonner (1993): organisms are constituted by vital
cycles with different stages, not only by adult individuals.
9 According to Hartmann, the analysis of life on Earth, that is, the whole of the species,
points to the ascending direction of the species as a "general tendency" or "norm" in

the body of known species. The ascending creation implies the retention or banking in
the superior conformation of that which is old or has been surpassed. Despite regressive
formations which can only be considered exceptions (Ph.N. 56b), today's Biology rejects
the idea of progress understood as "orthogenesis" (a natural force which rules evolu-
tion). In this way, he admits an increment in size and complexity through natural selection
(Bonner, 1993, pp. 114 and 133).
10 The different modes of being (necessity, effectiveness and possibility, together with
their opposites) appear in Hartmann's Ontology as the most general determinations which
can be formulated about the entities, apart from the moments of being (Moglichkeit und
Wirklichkeit, 1937).
11 Hartmann's position reminds us of the recapitulation theory expounded by Darwin,
and also of the more recent "bioenetic principle" formulated by Haecknel in 1986: onto-
genesis is a brief and quick recapitulation of phylogenesis. This principle has been
argued and reshaped from different perspectives.
12 Hartmann gives a relevant increased value to the relation category, which in Western
thought gradually substitutes the substance category. Ortega y Gasset stated in Addn y
el Paraiso (1910): "This is the deepest meaning of evolution in human thought from
the Renaissance until today: the dissolution of the substance category into the relation
category". See Minguez (1972-1973).
146 CARLOS MINGUEZ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bonner, John Tyler, Life Cycles: Reflections of an Evolutionary Biologist (Princeton Univ.
Press, 1993). Spanish edition, Madrid: Alianza, 1995, cited here.
Dobzhansky, T., Ayala, F. J., Stebbins, G. L. and Valentine, J. W., Evolution (San
Francisco, 1977). Spanish edition, Barcelona: Ed. Omega, 1980, cited here.
Hartmann, Nicolai, Der Aujbau der rea/en Welt (Berlin: Gruyter & Co., 1940), 3rd ed.
1964. Spanish translation by Jose Gaos, Mexico City: F. C. E. 1959.
Hartmann, Nicolai, "Neue Wege der Ontologie", in Systematische Philosophie, ed. N.
Hartmann (Stuttgart-Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1942), pp. 199-311. Published as a booklet
in 1949. Spanish translation by Emilio Estiu, Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 1954,
cited here.
Hartmann, Nicolai, Philosophie der Natur. Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1950). Spanish translation by Jose Gaos, Mexico City: F.C.E.
1960 and 1964. Cited as Ph.N.
Hartmann, Nicolai, Teleologisches Denken (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 195 1).
Spanish translation by Jose Gaos, Mexico City: F. C. E. 1964.
Jahn, I., Lother, R. and Senglaub, K. Geschichte der Biologie (Jena: VEB Gustav Fischer,
1985). Spanish translation, Barcelona: Ed. Labor, 1989.
Minguez, Carlos, "La relaci6n: planteamiento hist6rico", studios de Metafisica (Univ. de
Valencia, 1972-1973), pp. 97-115.
Minguez, Carlos, "La finalidad en los organismos. N. Hartmann", inActas delll Congreso
de Teoria y Metodologia de las Ciencias (Oviedo: Biblioteca Asturiana de Filosofia,
Vol. II, 1984), pp. 173-178.
Montero, Fernando, Mundo y vida en lafenomenologia de Husser[ (Valencia: Universitat
de Valencia, 1994).
Paris, Carlos, El animal cultural. Biologia y cultura en Ia realidad humana (Barcelona:
Ed. Critica, 1994).
Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 6th
ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
THOMAS E. SPREY
THE SELF-INDIVIDUALIZATION OF LIFE

Parallels Between the Generative Principles in
Psychological and Biological Development
INTRODUCTION
The relation between the words Self and individual is not immediately
self-evident and probably depends on the local tradition in which one
is brought up. As a biologist* my tradition is that plants and animals
are seen as individuals and that they are themselves. Who else? They can
only be the ones they are. For men it is more of a problem, and the
self is more an aim which can be approached on a lifelong journey than
that which coincides with the physical manifestation of our beings. But
biologists seldom study man, probably due to his consciousness and its
difficult psychosomatic interactions. Therefore, in their tradition indi-
vidualization simply means the process of embryogenesis by which the
primary individual, the fertilized egg cell, develops into a full-grown indi-
vidual and so becomes itself. Self-individualization then almost sounds
like a pleonasm.
However, to me the Self in Self-individualization is not at all
redundant. I see Self-individualization as the process in which the all-
embracing Self unfolds into an infinite number of different entities
small and big, plant and animal, woman and man. For me the relation
between what we call matter and psyche is what is most relevant to
this study.
The process of Self-individualization, evolution, has been character-
ized as a tendency towards increasing complexity in physical manifesta-
tions, and an increasing awareness, culminating in self-consciousness
in man. 1 This process is very nicely summarized in a metaphor used
by Fa Tsang (643-712 A. D.) when he explains to Empress Wu of China
the totalistic view of the universe. 2 The interrelatedness between the
One and the Many is expressed as a source of light, around which mirrors
arise, each mirroring the source in its own way. By this the source of
light gradually becomes aware of its own identity. The function of indi-
viduals then is to facilitate the process of awakening and becoming
self-conscious. The individuals experience other parts of the whole and
147
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Ll/, 147-165.

148 THOMAS E. SPREY
enfold this into their being so that it can unfold again, 3 with finer dif-
ferentiation at the next step. So the Self first has to divide, to become
manifest and to differentiate into multiple entities so that it can become
conscious of all its aspects and possibilities. This may lead to a new
wholeness of a higher order.
In this process individualization, interpreted in the usual scientific way,
means the local appearance of additional mirrors, oriented at a slightly
different angle. Although the description of this step in the process might
be entirely correct, it is incomplete as long as it takes into account only
local physico-chemical interactions. It is wrong where it denies the
existence of downward causation by spiritual dimensions, or non-local
interactions. The difference with Self-individualization is that in that case
the new mirrors are added "by the Self". I do not mean as spontaneous
new creations, but under the influence of the Whole, resulting from
local and non-local, material and non-material interactions.
So, Self-individualization is what most interests us; simple individu-
alization, however, is what has been studied most. In order to get
information about self-individualization, we need to look more care-
fully at developmental processes, but we may also use existing data
and reinterpret them in a more holistic way. Secondly, we need to widen
our scope to take in the study of both matter and psyche, since the Self
expresses itself on both levels. This causes a problem because each
scientific discipline has developed its own language game for expressing
the results of that level. It is here that phenomenology comes in. It is a
methodology which helps us understand the different phenomena by
focusing on their essence and intentionality. Reading phenomena in a
phenomenological way makes them mutually comparable, irrespective of
whether the basic phenomena are found at the physico-chemical level
of manifestation or at the psychic level. The use of phenomenology
may help to develop a new language game encompassing different levels
of manifestation of the Self: physico-chemical patterns, behavioural
patterns and mental patterns. This is a dialectical methodology, com-
prising objective and subjective aspects of the Self and the inner dialogue
between them. It is also based on the dialogue between ourselves and
the selves of the phenomena, by which it becomes possible for them to
speak out freely, and not as forced to by our hypotheses or theory-
guided experiments.
In this contribution I would like to present my ideas about parallels
between individualization processes as studied in biology and in psy-
SELF-INDIVIDUALIZATION OF LIFE 149
chology, and show that they tell us something about the process of
Self-individualization. The data on which these ideas are based, are sum-
marized according to two general models, each mirroring the general
aspects of the developmental processes in its area. Of course the original
language game is entirely different in these two fields of research, and
so we will have to make a phenomenological translation of each in
order to see the parallels in the underlying generative principles in each
field.
The question remains then as to what extent these principles indeed
reflect the inner structure of the Self or only characterize aspects of
the individuals arising in a field. For this I want to compare the outcome
of research in these two fields with a third model, one which in a way
represents the undivided Self. This is the cosmogonic model of Jacob
Boehme (1620), based on his visionary experiences. It can be inter-
preted as a direct reflection of the inner principles of the Self. 4 Paralleling
it with the generative principles of simple individualization indicates that
it is indeed Self-individualization.
l. EXPRESSION OF THE SELF IN

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
As indicated above, for men, being an individual means more than having
an individual body. The development of an individual mind takes more
than nine months and is a journey from the prepersonal through the
personal to the transpersonal state of consciousness. 5 Individualization
on this level means a search for transparency, an "enlightenment, in
which the individual loses its individuality and at the same time sees it
to its ultimate (?) completion, [which] is at the base of all religious
experience". 6
It was one of the great discoveries of C. G. Jung that the Self is an
archetypal factor that both forms the middle of the personality on which
all developmental processes are centred and is the integrative force which
keeps all the different aspects of the personality together. 7 Jung discov-
ered that the Self expresses itself autonomously in dreams or spontaneous
drawings, in circular images. They are now called Mandalas and are
regarded as the expression of forces which bring about a new inner
structure in periods of mental instability and disorientation, or in situa-
tions in which a person suffers from conflicting interests in his personal
life.
150 THOMAS E. SPREY
Jung called the inner forces that constitute the Self archetypes. The
forces themselves are of course invisible, but we can meet them in
manifestations as patterns of vision, dream images or spontaneous
drawings, or as patterns of behaviour. No sharp borders exist between
different archetypal manifestations but it is possible to characterize dif-
ferent archetypes based on distinct sets of characteristics. They are just
like colours in the rainbow, which do have their own characteristics, such
as red, orange, or yellow, without there being a sharp border between
them. Jung discovered that although the spontaneous Mandalas may
vary enormously in appearance, they are yet characterized by a number
of general features. These are not always present but occur often in
different combinations. An idealized Mandala shows a duality of con-
flicting opposites, which results in a central paradox. Further, a quaternity
occurs in the pattern, either as four identical units or more abstractly
as the shapes of a cross, a square or a four-pointed star. Moreover, this
quaternity may be present doubled or tripled in an eight- or twelve-folded
structure.
In general Mandalas must be regarded as cross-sections through the
process of individuation. This implies that some of the general aspects
may be expressed more clearly than others.
To illustrate the process of individuation, I have chosen a Mandala
made by "Mrs. X" (Figure 1). Mrs. X was an American woman who con-
sulted Jung because of problems in her individuation process. She made
a series of paintings during the consultation period and discussed these
with Jung. This one is her third painting, thus made in an early phase
of the individuation process. Jung has published this Mandala and many
others together with an extensive description of their symbolism. 8
The Mandala shows a blue-red globe, "a planet in the making", as
Mrs. X described it. This means that she identified her own develop-
ment with that of the sphere, indicating that the circular domain represents
the self, a wholeness, but one still characterized by the oppositions of
a duality.
This duality was expressed in the colours blue and red - blue sym-
bolizing the cool, objective, rational aspects of the personality, and red
representing the warm, subjective, emotional side.
At the upper side of the painting we see a golden snakelike figure.
This can be seen as the transformation of a golden flash of lightning
(present in her second painting), symbolizing the sudden flash of insight
which started her on her developmental process. In alchemical litera-
Fig. I. Mandala of "Mrs. X", after Jung (1988).
ture the snake, according to Jung, is regarded as the representation of

Mercury. Famous of course is the Ouroboros, the snake which bites its
own tail and so forms a circle. Mercury was the god who brought
messages from the gods to man and so had a heavenly and an earthly
form of appearance. He was often called Mercurius duplex, the god
with the two faces. In this painting we can find both forms, the golden
snake, which expresses the heavenly form, and the silver undulating band
surrounding the globe, which must be regarded as the earthly form.
This band was described by Mrs X. as: "a band of similar but opposing
forces, keeping the sphere balanced". The wave-like form of the band
she explained as: "the undulation of Mercury, the messenger of gods";
the silver as "Mercury".
So here we meet again the duality as golden snake and silver band,
not yet integrated. These symbols represent the force which causes a con-
tinuous going up and down like "Mercury" between the two poles that
152 THOMAS E. SPREY
characterize all life: earth and cosmos, matter and spirit, dark and light.
It is this dynamic which results when the Ouroboric circle opens and
the seed starts its development.
A further characteristic of the silver band is its wave-like form. If
we assume a symmetrical form in the band, taking into account that it
surrounds the sphere, there will be four widenings of the band, placed
in two pairs of opposites, perpendicular to each other. This is the qua-
ternity, albeit still somewhat hidden as a trinity in the actual painting.
In Jungian psychology the quaternity is known as a complex of the
four main archetypes that constitute the personality. They are: the I,
the centre of the conscious part of the person; the shadow (the dark side),
the Animus or -rna (the complement of the opposite sex) and the Old
Man, or Great Mother, as unconscious parts. They form the further dif-
ferentiation of the primary duality and try to realize a further unfolding
of the possibilities that are enfolded in the personality. These arche-
types set the so-called axes of the field which the ongoing individuation
process makes accessible.
Mrs. X has put the number twelve in the central widening of the
band. She explained to Jung that she took this symbol from a dream
she had had long before, during the narcosis at a severe operation. In that
dream she saw the globe surrounded by a silver band, slowly turning
around the equator. The band displayed zones of dilution and conden-
sation and within the condensed areas the numbers one to three appeared.
However she knew that the series would extend to twelve. The number
corresponded to culmination points in her development, or important per-
sonalities that could play a crucial role in her development. The number
twelve would be the most important man, determining the turning point
in history. So far this was Mrs. X's dream.
The number twelve seems to be connected with the temporal aspects
of the actual developmental process, once the spatial possibilities for
unfolding are specified by the quaternity mentioned before. The series
of numbers that appeared in Mrs. X's dream shows that development goes
through a distinct number of relatively stable stages, before reaching
its final form. During each stage the personality is structured around a
specific centre, which is used as a point of reference for relating all
the experiences needed for further development. So development is not
a long period of chaotic undeterminedness, followed by a sudden appear-
ance of the fullgrown individual. No, it is a stepwise process through a
number of stages that has each its own "face" - archetypal faces, as
Pearson9 describes them, or just personal faces, as Campbell describes

it in The Hero with a Thousand Faces. 10
The fact that the Self of Mrs. X puts the number twelve in the centre
of the sphere means that already before the individuation process clearly
started, a strong orientation towards the final stage of that process was
there. Such a "being oriented to the future" must be regarded as an
inherent feature of the Self. 11 This is intentionality, the intention to
experience transpersonal wholeness.
The twelvefoldedness, according to Jung, may result from the qua-
temity through tripling. This relation, therefore, seems to have its roots
in the transitions from the prepersonal to the personal and again to the
transpersonal stage, each stage having its own specific manifestations
of the four archetypal forces. They all have to be realized during the indi-
viduation process.
In summary: The Self is represented as the One (circular domain,
globe). It becomes manifest as an individual (planet in the making), which
is kept balanced by the two opposing forces (red-blue, emotion-reason,
unconsciousness-consciousness, silver band-golden snake). These unfold
into the Four main archetypes (1, Shadow, Anima, Old Man), which
specify the basic possibilities of the personality (spatial aspects of the
inner structure, four standing waves). Under the influence of the dynamic
of bi-polarity, this leads to the development that finally results in the har-
monious, integrated person (the Twelfth unfolding).
2. EXPRESSION OF THE SELF IN BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The term Self as a substantive is not much used in biology and mostly
refers to an individual in the context of behaviour, not in relation to devel-
opment. Developmental processes in relation to the Self are indicated
by words like self-organization, self-assembling, mostly used when
describing events at the molecular level. 12 They refer to a spontaneous
process which is an expression of characteristics of organizing or assem-
bling subsystems or substances and their context. However, the latter
is often not explicitly mentioned. In such a case it is suggested that the
process is the result of the subsystems only, which is a misleading sim-
plification similar to the reduction of Self-individualization to simple
individualization.
The only clear reference to the Self and the process of individual-
ization is, to my knowledge, found in the work of Portmann. He uses
154 THOMAS E. SPREY
the word Self-expression (Selbstdarstellung) and by it refers to the

expression of an inner Self in outward appearance. 13 The outward appear-
ance of an individual is the result of a large number of processes and,
according to Portmann, is not only a functional adaptation to the envi-
ronment. In part outward features reflect the inner Self of the species.
Let us have a closer look at the processes that bring about outward
appearance and see how the inner Self expresses itself. For this I choose
a summarizing model, published by French, Bryant and Bryant. 14 It
integrates the results of a large number of studies dealing with the
question of how the cells of the tissues that form the adult appearance
get the appropriate information about their role. How do they know
what they have to become, hair cells, pigment cells, sense cells and so
on? How does the inner Self specify the multitude of differentiated "indi-
viduals" at the right place in the tissue?
The studies were based on experiments with insects and amphibians.
The fact that the results found with these quite different groups of animals
were so similar, suggested a general validity of the rules found. This view
was supported by later experiments on birds and mammals. I do not want
to deal with all the different experiments but want to focus on the sum-
marizing model which presents the ideas of the authors about the
developmental processes.
The visual presentation of the model is quite simple (Figure 2) and
does not display much resemblance with the painting of Mrs. X. Yet a
phenomenologic interpretation of this figure and the accompanying infor-
mation in the article, may bring the two together.
We see a circular domain, twelve spokes coming together in the centre
and four concentric circles. The domain represents in a schematic way
the embryonic tissue in which cells will receive specific information with
regard to their final destination. The embryonic tissue, for example an
embryonic leg, is a clearly delineated part of the total organism and
may be regarded as an "individual" at a lower level of organization. It
should be stressed that the real tissues are not at all circular. Thus the
relation between this circular domain and the "individual" can be seen
as a spontaneous expression of the Self, through the unconscious choice
of the authors.
The authors assume in their modality a system of numbers and letters
by which each point of the domain can be uniquely specified. Such a
combinational code, SA or 9C, was thought to correspond to a distinct
metabolic cell state, that would specify the appropriate information for
6
Fig. 2. The clock-face model.
further development into adult structures, the outward appearance of

the Self.
The fact that the value of the number does not change if we go along
the radius: 5A-5B-5C-5D-5E, means that the centre would have twelve
different values at the same time. So here a paradox is generated. The
authors do mention a way out, but in appearance the centre of the model
presents a paradox, as a place where conflicting opposites meet: 12-6,
9-3, et cetera.
The resemblance with the painting of Mrs. X, where we also saw a
circular domain with conflicting opposites (red-blue, intuition-reason,
et cetera) is remarkable.
In the text accompanying the model it is explained that the meta-
bolic state corresponding to the codes gradually changes over the fabric
of the tissue. In order to specify each point uniquely, one needs, according
to the authors, "two different double gradient systems oriented at an angle
to each other". In other words: four gradients specifying the main axes
of the domain, extending in four directions. Each double gradient system
is based on a fundamental duality with an activator and an inhibitor,
two components of a set of biochemical pathways, in which one com-
156 THOMAS E. SPREY
ponent activates and the other inhibits the flow of metabolites through
the system. It is this fundamental duality of opposites, the activator and
the inhibitor, which creates the paradox in the centre. Depending on
the metabolic condition of the whole, the outcome of the opposing effects
can be 1) stable concentration gradients with one or more high points (cf.
the standing waves of the silver band surrounding the globe in Mrs.
X's painting); 2) running concentration waves (cf. the process of undu-
lation in the band); and 3) oscillations in concentration of some involved
metabolites. So periodicity again is a phenomenon closely associated with
the duality of opposing forces, as we saw with Mercury. These phe-
nomena show that in the actual integration of these forces (activator
and inhibitor), they do not cancel each other out, but cause new arche-
typal manifestations: gradients, oscillations and running waves. In the
first they balance each other in space, in the second in time, and in the
third both in space and time. Thus, the central paradox in the model is
only an apparent opposition.
The four basic gradients, resulting from the duality, are the quater-
nity which specifies the information within the domain and so determines
the developmental processes leading to the formation of adult struc-
tures. This is quite similar to the quatemity specifying the four main axes
of the psychic domain leading to the unfolding of a full-grown person-
ality. In the visual representation of the model, the quatemity is indicated
by the four concentric circles. They suggest a widening of the domain
in all directions (cf. the four directions of the wind), like expanding
circular waves on a water surface. Therefore, I take the quatemity as
the representation of the spatial aspects of the development. The spatial
aspect is of course closely interwoven with the temporal aspect. Similarly
the four concentric circles in the model are interwoven with the twelve
spokes. Only together do they specify the different codes that deter-
mine the development.
That time plays a role is of course trivial. Therefore, the way in
which the course of time can be characterized may be more significant.
The appearance of the model as a clock-face gives a phenomenological
indication of this: The most characteristic feature of the clock-face is that
the continuous flow of time is quantified by reference to distinct hours
over a certain period of time. Sometimes the whole hours are taken: a
quarter to twelve, ten past twelve, twelve forty. In other traditions, half
hours are taken, which doubles the number of reference points. However,
twelvefoldedness in relation to time is the most common measure (twelve

hours, twelve months, twelve zodiac signs).
French, Bryant and Bryant do not mention such "reference points"
in relation to the development of adult structures. Although they tried
to bring the temporal aspect into the model (French's personal comment),
they only realized a symbolic reference to a clock-face with twelve spokes
and numbers as its visual expression!
Yet, for a number of such embryonic tissues, transient metabolic
patterns with a temporal stability have been described. 15- 19 They could
very well be seen as metabolic reference points, crucial for the deter-
mination of further developmental steps.
In spite of the close association between chronology and the number
twelve, it is unclear whether the developmental process occurs exactly
twelve steps, or whether twelve has to be interpreted in a symbolic
way, as the result of three different phases in which information is spec-
ified in four directions.
Again, the resemblance with the twelve steps of the individuation
process as indicated in the painting of Mrs. X and with the twelve-
foldedness in Mandalas in general, is very remarkable and indicates a
similar generative principle.
In summary: The One, the Self (circular domain) manifests itself as
an individual embryonic tissue. This comprises a dynamic equilibrium
of two opposing metabolic forces (activator and inhibitor) which give
rise to four basic gradients, specifying the spatial aspects of development
(four concentric circles). The dynamic interactions of the bi-polarity lead
through a stepwise process of "twelve" metabolic transformations to
the unfolding of the adult structures (twelve spokes). In the centre a
paradox is generated, which is dynamically transcended in the actual
situation, and solved as the outward appearance of the Self.
3. A VISIONARY VIEW OF THE

INNER STRUCTURE OF THE SELF
The third model (Figure 3) is a figure which was originally published

in the book: Forty Questions Concerning the Soul, by Jacob Boehme
(1620). This book was not available to me, but the figure has also been
published and interpreted in Jung's book on Mandalas. 20 The model
was based on a spontaneous vision of expressions of the self. Its symbols
158 THOMAS E. SPREY
Fig. 3. "The Philosophic globe", of Jacob Boehme.
can be regarded as representations of cosmic forces, which would express

themselves in space and time as the manifest macro- and microcosmos,
in the process of Self-individualization.
The name of the picture is: "The philosophic Globe or Eye of the
window of Eternity or Looking glass of wisdom". This relates to the
circular domain in the picture, which therefore can be seen as a repre-
sentation of the undivided Self, before individualization began. The circle
expresses the wholeness, the all-embracing wholeness, having within
itself the implicit principles for development.
In the centre of the domain we see a heart. It is the symbol of love
and expresses the "central force" of creation. The heart forms the con-
nection between the two sets of semicircles, enclosing a black and a white
area. They are indicated as the first and the second principle, representing
the realm of darkness and that of light respectively. The semicircles stand
with their backs to each other and that expresses that these principles
stand in opposition. Conjunction would make the circles whole, but

then the two principles first have to interpenetrate each other. They
must integrate. This is also an indication that the picture represents the
undivided Self, because in this world the actual appearance of the forces
is integrated: neither pure Light, nor pure Darkness occurs. This means
that the central paradox, as meeting point of conflicting opposites, is
an inherent character of the Self. However, in the actualization the
opposites do not cancel each other out, as we saw before in the bio-
logical or psychological expression of the Self, but cause an ongoing
unfolding, of more and more differentiated manifestations. How that
integration is realized remains a mystery, the mystery of love. Love is
an excellent description of a force which enables the integration of
opposing elements into a higher order organization in such a way that
their individuality is both kept and transcended.
Further we see a cross in the centre, both separating and connecting
the semi-circles. At three ends of the cross we see the indications of
the Holy Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Along the lower axis of
the cross we see indications for the other part of this field of tension:
four elements, earth and earthly man. The cross therefore must be seen
as the connection between earth and heaven, a symbol not at all strange
within the Christian tradition. At the same time the cross also forms
the connection between the dark and the light areas. It is described as
the symbol for a flash of lightning, causing the sudden and mysterious
integration of these two principles. In Boehme's text this has been indi-
cated by the symbol e, in which we can easily recognize the two
semi-circles (the two principles) now fused under the influence of the
e
cross. is the alchemical sign for Cinnabar, a mercury salt, but also
used to indicate mercury in general. Here we see again a clear indica-
tion for the influence of "Mercury", from which the word mercury has
been derived. In the case of the painting of Mrs. X it was the symbolic
representation of the dynamic undulation, the periodic change of influ-
ence of the two basic forces. Here it is the symbol of the initiator of
the integration. So the driving force of the development is already present
in the undivided Self, but now as initiator, which is close to creator. It
symbolizes creativity as a central aspect of the Self. 21
It would be the easiest to interpret the cross, the connection between
the two principles, Light and Darkness, and heaven and earth, as the indi-
cation of a quatemity. And in a sense it is. However, it is not a full
quatemity. It is just like the four standing waves in the painting of Mrs.
160 THOMAS E. SPREY
X, of which we actually saw only three and had to assume the fourth
on the basis of symmetry. In Boehme's picture trinity also dominates.
There it is present as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, written in capitals.
Remarkably the fourth place, at the lower end of the cross, is empty. This
is the place of the earth (written in small letters), and of the four
Elements. Jung speaks of the dilemma between three and four, a trinity
which actually should be a quatemity, and which becomes a full qua-
temity only after the process of Self-individualization starts, once Mother
Earth becomes an equivalent partner of heaven (Jung's axiom of Mary).
At that moment the four Elements, the earth and the earthly man come
(gradually) into existence.
The four Elements (Earth, Water, Air and Fire), are often represented
as a circle with four interpenetrating gradients, in such a way that each
point of the domain can be characterized by a unique combination of
forces. So this image of the quatemity, which becomes manifest in the
actual developmental processes, is indicated here as an inherent feature
of the undivided Self.
No indications are found in the model which point to a further devel-
opment. This is understandable since the figure is part of the answer to
the very first question in Boehme's book, that concerning the origin of
the Soul, and not its development. Yet, if in an individual manifesta-
tion, each of the four spatial directions is specifically influenced by
each of the three faces of the Trinity, twelve developmental aspects are
created. Like the signs of the zodiac, which are also attributed to the
four Elements, in such a way that this quatemity is three times repeated,
each time with a different aspect. So in a hidden way twelve could be
thought to be present in the Self.
In summary: The undivided Self is represented by a circular domain.
The One both comprises the two opposing forces (Darkness and Light)
and connects them by means of the heart and cross (love, passion). The
cross symbolizes the initiation of the integration of the two (Mercury),
and so the creativity of the Self. It represents both a trinity (Heaven)
and a quatemity (cosmos and earth in their actualized form; four Elements
specifying the spatial directions). No visual indications are present for
a development. The twelve can be indirectly derived from the dilemma
between three and four.
4. CONCLUSIONS
When we compare the three models, their correspondence is obvious:

They show the same working principles, irrespective of the manner of
their manifestation.
In all three cases, undivided, as a small subunit of an embryo or as
the complex personality of a human being, the Self is symbolized as a
circular domain. The circle or sphere as a representation of an infinite
number of points all having the same relation to the invisible centre, is
the old symbol for a god or an archetypal force. 22 It symbolizes the
principle of connection and integration, which orients the infinite number
of processes going on in a cell, a tissue or any living entity towards
a single aim: to bring about, to keep or to restore the integrate whole-
ness of living entities on as many levels as possible. It is characterized
both by the centre and the all-embracing circumference. This integra-
tive force is the basis of the statement that the whole is more than the
sum of its parts. On the higher level of manifestation we experience
that force as love.
The inner Self of the One is characterized by a fundamental bi-polarity
of opposing principles. The inherent character of the two is annihi-
lating, but once manifest in this world it becomes dynamic and results
in a periodic, rhythmic change in the expression of the two. This creative
process of mutual activation and inhibition, is the result of the integra-
tive aspect of the One. The periodic change in influence can be best
described as compensation, the activator compensates the effect of the
inhibitor and vice versa. At the same time the effect on the manifesta-
tion is totally different and in this sense the two must be described as
complementing each other. So together they form the generative principle
of complementarity and compensation.
This is not a new principle, but one which was described long ago
as yin and yang in Eastern traditional science, 23- 25 which has always been
based on a holistic principle. What is new is that we are starting to
recognize it in our own data.
The quatemity is a further unfolding of the Self in the explicate
order, a step also known to the East: "The Supreme pole (t'ai-ch'i)
produces the Two Instruments; the Two Instruments produce the four
Emblems" (Hsi-tz'u). 26 If we indicate the duality with+ and-, this means
that four different combinations arise: ++, +-, -+, and --. Apparently
+1- and-/+ are seen as having different qualities. This means that it is
162 THOMAS E. SPREY
not just the sum which counts, but that the sequence is also important.
Thus this sequential asymmetry is related to our space-time concept.
Without that relation, i.e. without a manifestation in this visible world,
the quatemity would remain a trinity: ++, +1- (= -/+), and --, as we
saw in Boehme's model. The realization of Self-individualization starts
with the realization of space-time and the appearance of this manifest
world. The journey of thousand miles starts with the first step, other-
wise it remains a concept only, a plan to be worked out later.
That first step is an extension in space, a spatial event. It is the devel-
opment of a primary structure having relative stability, so that the axis
of the domain for further development can be set up. The quatemity,
therefore, can be indicated as the enstructuring principle.
Thereafter the four Emblems, i.e., the four Elements, or the four
basic archetypes in the personality, cooperatively bring about the further
unfolding of the individual: the second step, the third step, and so on.
Now it is an individual that is on its way! And with this the temporal
aspect of Self-individualization becomes evident. It is important to realize
that in this process the four has changed into a five. That is to say: the
manifestation of the primary structure now has become a force of its own,
beside the four Elements that realized its appearance. It is the reaction
in response to the action. The fifth Element thus forms the quintes-
sence of the former four. It has no perdurance, because at each moment
it is renewed by new experiences induced by the surrounding life-world.
However, within this elusive stream of essence a number of dynami-
cally stable stages can be distinguished, up to "twelve".
The way the quintessence changes during development is specific
for each individual entity. This is the most personal gesture which it
can make in this world, and by which it contributes to a further step in
the process of Self-individualization on a higher level of organization.
I speak then of the principle of gesture.
One may think that a periodic change of equal and opposing forces
will lead to cyclic processes, whereas development is characterized by
its non-cyclic aspect. However, the already existing diversity in the inter-
acting systems, causes interference between small systems with short
cycles and larger systems with more mass and longer cycles.
The idea of the sum of different periodic functions as a source of infor-
mation has been proposed by Goodwin and Kauffman 27 for the spatial
component of embryonic development. But it could also be used to
SELF -INDIVIDUALIZATION OF LIFE 163
describe the temporal aspect of Self-individualization. Figure 4 shows

how such a sum as a pattern of interference may lead to a develop-
mental trend. If we assume that the fundamental trend and the harmonics
are wave functions representing energy fields of different frequencies,
they could symbolize the cooperative effect of the four Elements or basic
archetypes on the development.
However, whatever we say of a thing, it is not so. The reality is ever
more and ever different from that. 28 Thus the actual process of Self-
individualization will be different, and much more complex and
mysterious than indicated here with these metaphors. Yet, these ideas
might serve as a "primary structure" of a holistic language game upon
which further developmental processes may act, so that (I hope) a new
scientific gesture becomes visible.
Air Wise oldman
Harmonics Animus
Fire
Water Shadow
Anima
Fundamental Earth Great mother
Sum of
harmonics and
fundamental
Time -
Fig. 4. Different wave functions (the fundamental wave and harmonics) (upper part)
can be added in such a way that a developmental trend occurs in which a number of
transiently stable states can be distinguished (lower part).
164 THOMAS E. SPREY
SUMMARY
Self-individualization has been interpreted as the process in which the

all-embracing Self unfolds into an infinite variety of different individ-
uals, plants, animals and men. A comparison of the different ways in
which the Self manifests itself in the biological and psychological devel-
opmental processes, or in a visionary image of the undivided Self, reveals
the same basic structure of expression. The Self, the one, is represented
by a circular domain, and comprises a basic inner duality, the two,
creating a paradox of conflicting opposites. In the undivided Self the two
give rise to a trinity in which, however, a quatemity is hidden. The
latter expresses itself in this world as the four basic forces, the four
Elements or the four main archetypes, specifying the possibilities or
development in space and time. Self-individualization starts with the first
appearance of a primary structure of an individual sub-Self. This is the
fifth basic force, the fifth Element. Further development is character-
ized by four generative principles: 1st, the principle of wholeness:
connection and integration (being oriented to remaining whole or
restoring wholeness); 2nd, the principle of complementarity and com-
pensation (a periodic shift between opposing influences); 3rd, the
enstructuring principle (causing the relative stability of the spatial appear-
ance of the manifest structure), and 4th, the principle of gesture (resulting
in a gradual stepwise development of that structure into a full-grown
individual).
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden
NOTES
* Correspondence: Institute of Evolutionary and Ecological Sciences, Kaiserstraat 63,

P. 0. Box 9516, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands.
1 P. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959).
2 F. Franck, The Book of Angelus Silesius (Santa Fe: Bear & Company, 1985), p. 35.
3 D. Bohm and F. D. Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987).
4 L. Van der Hammen, Unpublished essay on evolution with a paragraph on the work
of Jacob Boehme, kindly presented to me by the author (1994).
5 K. Wilber, Eye to Eye. The Quest for the New Paradigm, Chapter 7: "The pre/trans
fallacy" (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983), pp. 201-246.
6 K. Kortmulder and T. E. Sprey, "The Connectedness of All That Is Alive and the
Grounds of Congenership. Beyond a Mechanistic Interpretation of Life", Riv. di Biologia
83 (1990), pp. 107-127.
7 C. G. Jung, "Ik en Zelf", trans. P. de Vries-Ek, 1982; see Collected Works (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), Bollingen Series XX, Vol. 9111: Aion: Researches
into the Phenomenology of the Self.
8 C. G. Jung, Symboliek van de Mandala, trans. P. de Vries-Ek, 1988; See Collected
Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), Bollingen Series XX, Vol. 9/1:
The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.
9 C. S. Pearson, The Hero Within- Six Archetypes We Live By (San Francisco: Harper
& Row, 1989).

10 J. Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).
11 C. P. Jung (1982), op. cit., pp. 25-27.
12 C. W. Kilmister, Disequilibrium and Self-organization (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
13 A. Portmann, An den Grenzen des Wissens. Vom Breitag der Biologie zu einem
neuen Weltbild (Vienna, DUsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1974), p. 138.
14 V. French, P. J. Bryant, and S. V. Bryant, "Pattern Regulation in Epimorphic Fields",
Science 193 (1976), pp. 969-981.
15 T. E. Sprey, "Morphological and Histochemical Changes During the Development
of Some of the Imaginal Disks of Calliphora Erythrocephala", Neth. J. Zool. 20 (1970),
pp. 253-275.
16 T. E. Sprey, "Localization of 5'-Nucleotidase and Its Possible Significance in Some
of the Imaginal Disks of Calliphora Erythrocephata", Neth. J. Zool. 20 (1970), pp. 419-432.
17 T. E. Sprey, "Cell Death During the Development of the Imaginal Disks of Calliphora
Erythrocephala", Neth. J. Zool. 21 (1971), pp. 221-264.
18 T. E. Sprey, "Aldehyde Oxidase Distribution in the Imaginal Discs of Some Diptera",
W. Roux's Arch. 183 (1977), pp. 1-15.
19 T. E. Sprey, A. A. C. Eskens and D. T. Kuhn, "Enzyme Distribution Patterns in the
Imaginal Wing Disc of Drosophila Melanogaster and Other Diptera. A Subdivision of
Compartments into Territories", W. Roux's Arch. 191 (1982), pp. 301-308.
2 C. G. Jung (1988), op. cit., pp. 17-20.
21 Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism (New York: Press, 1963). This book
gives an excellent presentation of the relation between creativity and the Self.
22 E. Neumann, Die grosse Mutter. Eine Phiinomenologie der weibliche Gestaltungen
des Unbewussten (Oiten: Walter-Verlag, 1989), p. 20.
23 M. Granet, Das Chinesisches Denken (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989).
24 M. Porkert, "Wissenschaftliches Denken im alten China: Das System der ener-
getischen Beziehungen", Antaios 2(6) (1961).
25 M. Porkert, Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Medicine (Cambridge, MA, London:
MIT Press, 1974).
26 Quoted by M. Porkert in ibid., p. 13.
27 B. C. Goodwin and S. A. Kauffman, "Bifurcations, Harmonics and the Four Colour
Wheel Model of Drosophila Development", in: Cell to Cell: From Experiments to
Theoretical Models (London: Academic Press, 1989), pp. 213-227.
28 A. Korzybski, Science and Sanity (Lakeville, Conn.: Int. Nee-Aristotelian Publ. Comp.,
1950).
CHRISTEN A. BLOM-DAHL
EMANUEL SWEDENBORG'S PHYSICAL AND

METAPHYSICAL REVELATION
As you know, every theory that is new is declared to

be absurd; then it is recognized to be true but useless
and trivial; finally, it is thought to be so relevant that
its very opponents claim its discovery.
- William James
REVELATION OF PHYSICAL MATTERS?*
In March 17 44 a peculiar crisis put an end to what promised to be -

and actually was - the brilliant scientific career of the Swedish citizen
of the Age of Enlightenment, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772). Ever
since then, it has been granted that his contributions to science had
come to a standstill, he started writing about spirits, angels, the after-
life, the Lord.... A physical revelation? Wasn't everything metaphysical?
- or pretending to be?
As I was to discover with the most overwhelming feeling of amaze-
ment in the spring of 1973, the seemingly metaphysical subjects referred
to by Swedenborg as "the wisdom of angels" and recorded in a very
specific part of his post-crisis production, 1 resolve themselves into neat,
sharp and spectacular images at the very level of physical reality, mainly
within the fields of modem knowledge about the physiology, pathology
and microanatomy of the human body. This extraordinary discovery
accidentally made in the spring of 1973 revolutionizes our ideas about
the processes of acquisition of innovatory knowledge (heuristic pro-
cesses), and mightily expands the currently accepted frontiers of reality.
I can still sense the shock-waves this claim created when recently
launched in certain circles. No wonder that prior to any scrutiny of the
methodology applied and the evidence obtained, any stringent reader
would feel that this is typical yellow-press kind of stuff. Reactions have
bifurcated, but even among enthusiastic partisans a complication has
arisen: these seem to be waiting for an expert to make some authorita-
tive statement. Let me put this quite clearly right from the start: my theory
is not about scientific facts known today. It is about the way these are
167

168 CHRISTEN A. BLOM-DAHL
concordant with Swedenborg's descriptions as shown by means of very

elementary comparative operations. Thus any cultivated reader is a
fully competent "specialist" for checking these operations.
CONTRAST ANALYSIS
It is a well-known fact amongst Swedenborg scholars that Swedenborg's

investigations finally concentrated on the physiology and anatomy of
the human body. Then came the crisis, and after that, he introduced a
very central concept: the Homo Maximus or Grand Man, together with
the doctrine of correspondences. 2
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF AlL MAN'S ORGANS AND MEMBERS, BOTH INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR,
WITH THE GRAND MAN, WHICH IS HEAVEN. It is now allowed to relate and describe
wonderful things, which, so far as I know, have never as yet been known to anyone,
nor even entered into his mind, namely, that the universal heaven is so formed that it
corresponds to the Lord, as to His Divine Human; and that, as to all things in general
and particular in him, he corresponds to heaven, and by means of heaven to the Lord.
This is a great mystery, which is now to be revealed, and which is to be treated of here
and at the close of the subsequent chapters. (AC 3.624) It is from this ground that it
has been occasionally stated in the preceeding pages, where speaking of heaven and angelic
societies, that they belonged to some province of the body, as to that of the head, or of
the breast, or of the abdomen, or of some particular member or organ; and this by reason
of the said correspondence. (AC 3625)
This allows for the introduction of an extremely interesting analyt-

ical tool: systematic contrast analysis of homologous pre- and post-crisis
texts; i.e., of texts bearing reference to the same anatomical organs or
systems dealt with by Swedenborg prior to, and after, the crisis. As will
be discussed later on, this operation has never before been performed.
Its results are quite astonishing, as may be seen from the fragment
anticipated below (Table 1, to be shown later in its full-blown format).
I imagine readers must have commenced to grasp that something quite
unusual is at issue. To start with, the continuity thesis (the thesis that
Swedenborg was saying the same things about scientific topics he had
already developed during the first stage of his life) is wrong. 3 But the
true amazement arises from the fact that whilst pre-critical opinions
appear at the average and quite often wrong or trivial eighteenth-century
level of insight, post-crisis descriptions are incredibly advanced and tech-
nically correct!
Often Swedenborg's post-crisis experiences were visual and took place
during twilight states of consciousness (between sleep and waking). As
EMANUEL SWEDENBORG 169
Table 1. From wrong eighteenth-century speculations (A) to right and modern scien-
tific knowledge (B = C): a dazzling piece of scientific anticipation.
Common (A) (B) (C)

anatomical Pre-crisis text* Post-crisis text Scientific elements
reference revealed**
Pituitary Transmission of the Correspondence (sic) of Functional link

gland genuine fluids of the pituitary glands: between the pituitary
the cerebrum . . . The [urine] discharge gland/urine
gives quality to the was completely stopped. discharge/uterine
blood . . . expels . . . Others not so contractions
the phlegm of the active caused a painful (anti-diuretic action
cerebrum contraction or cramp in of vasopressin;
(Cer., 1124). the lower belly (Index uterine contraction
of AC & AC 5387-5388). of oxytocin).
* An erroneous doctrine.
** Concordance between (B) and (C) can be checked in any encyclopedia.
every potentially explanatory possibility had to be explored, I turned

my attention to some hypothetically parallel cases in the domains of
normal science.
HYPNOGOGIC VISIONS IN TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE
Transcendence of technological or scientific barriers on the cognitive

horizon often takes place during dreamlike (hypnogogic) experiences
which frequently take on an air of pretematurality. The first point at issue
refers to the imagery associated with these experiences. The images in
question have been virtually classified by historians of science as curious
but inessential objects. Yet, their relevance is fundamental. A couple
of examples will suffice to illustrate this fact from an unexpected and
quite thrilling angle. The first case refers to Fredrich August Kekule
von Stradonitz.
Kekule's providential encounter with Justus von Liebig at the
University of Giessen made him change his mind and study chemistry,
instead of following his original project to become an architect. However,
structures continued to fascinate him so intensely that he pioneered the
system of structural formulas for chemical substances still profitably used
today in organic chemistry. For seven years Kekule arrived at satisfac-
tory formulations of a series of hydrocarbons by means of his system,
and using a linear configuration paradigm for the atoms. However, in

1865 he found himself facing a tricky problem when the benzene
molecule refused to fit into that model. At long last the answer to that
problem came to him in a very peculiar manner. Explains Kekule:
I put my armchair in front of the fireplace and dozed off. Suddenly, atoms revolved in
front of me [... ] moving like serpents. But - what is this? One of the serpents was
biting its own tail, dancing teasingly in front of my eyes! I woke up as struck by light-
ning, and worked the rest of the night on the consequences of the hypothesis thus
created. 4
His experience was crucial and elucidative, the structure of the benzene
molecule is actually like a ring- the very ring allegorized by the serpent
that bit its own tail.
My second example refers to the domain of technology. Elias Howe,
a young American engineer, had gotten stuck with a problem which
might seem ridiculous nowadays. Namely, the location of the eye in a
sewing-machine needle. However, over millennia that tiny little hole
had remained located close to the needle's butt end. Consequently, per-
muting this location to the tip to solve certain mechanical problems
the machine posed, required a certain amount of imaginative power.
According to Michele Masson, the solution to the problem the standard
multimillennial needle presented struck the mind of the young American
engineer in the course of an experience similar to Kekule's, and just as
queer:
When the inventor Elias Howe was attempting to create one of the first sewing-machines,
he dreamt of jumbled spears suddenly pointing downwards. Trifling or erotic symbols
to anyone but himself, those spears gave him the idea of placing the needle-eye in the
tip, not at the top. 5
Howe's machine was a total success. It competed against five pro-

fessional seamstresses with ample superiority in 1845 at the premises
of the Quincy Hall Manufacturing Company in Boston.
Where did the respective elucidative crepuscular dreams of Kekule
and Howe originate? The answer would seem quite obvious: they must
have arisen through some sort of pre-conscious process not at all mys-
terious, but taking place in the brain and then suddenly popping up at
a conscious level. However, this may not be the correct answer to this
question.
UNEXPECTED HEURISTIC SIGNIFICATIONS IN

SWEDENBORG'S POST-CRISIS TEXTS
After the crisis suffered in 1744, which transformed Swedenborg from

scientist to revelator, a retrospective entry in his diary dated August 27th,
1748, refers to "Many visions when my eyes were closed, and light mirac-
ulously given" (SD 2951). When publicly disclosing his experiences at
a later stage, he wrote:
I have been further informed that the men of the Most Ancient Church had most delightful
dreams, and also visions, and that it was insinuated into them at the same time what
they signified. (AC 1122)
For Sigmund Freud, who certainly mistrusted whatever claim of meta-

physical inspiration might be alleged (e.g.: the insinuation of the
signification of dreams induced), the problem of signification was the
very master element of all his analytical endeavours. And yet, there is
a veritable hiatus in his doctrine of symbolic significations when it comes
to the analysis of experiences of a heuristic nature: indeed, Freudian
psychoanalysis is totally unoperative in cases such as exemplified by
Kekule and Howe. Why should it apply to Swedenborg's?
What is being discussed is not the fact that dreams may be instruc-
tive or significant. Psychoanalytic theory takes this for granted. Indeed,
this is the very foundation of its operative function, both clinical and
theoretical. The essential point is: taking hypothetically for granted that
Swedenborg's was a heuristic case, perhaps peculiarly advanced but still
along the lines of Kekule's and Howe's - what signification or what
instructive contents are supposed to be derived from his post-crisis
texts, and what analytical tools might be considered appropriate? This
sounds like some crazy hypothesis - but it worked.
INTERPRETATION KEYS
In contradistinction to Kekule and Howe's flashlike experiences, probably

lasting no more than a fraction of a second, the "representative" images
Swedenborg saw appeared in extended series - even for hours on end.
I could follow these representations by a kind of sight which I can never describe, and
this in a long series from beginning to end and even for an hour or two hours until the
several scenes were completed. Thus, if only it were allowed to make public a single
one of them, to wit, the representation concerning the pyramid which was so marvel-
lously constructed and adorned [... ] if this should be described, it would fill many
pages. (WE 4917)
This is an exciting but purely anecdotal statement. It hardly needs

further analysis. But this circumstance changes when contents are
specific. Then the essential question arises: whether the contents make
sense, and in what manner this sense may be elicited.
Explains Swedenborg:
It is worthy of mention that when after waking I related what I had seen in a dream,
and this in a long series, certain angelic spirits [... ] said that what I related wholly
coincided, and was identical with the subjects they had been conversing about, and that
there was absolutely no difference; but still that they were not the very things they had
discoursed about, but were representatives of the same things into which their ideas
were thus turned and changed in the world of spirits. [... ] They said, further, that the
same discourse could be turned into other representatives, nay, into both similar and
dissimilar ones, with unlimited variety. The reason they were turned into such as have
been described, was that it took place in accordance [... ] with my own state at the
time. (AC 1980)
Supposing those "very things" were not sheer fantasy, but still, that
they were "things" that crystallize as ever-changing representative images
"with unlimited variety" - how might they be recognized? Kekule and
Howe were perfectly familiar with "the very thing" to which their
dreamlike experiences referred (atoms, needles). But what is our situa-
tion in respect to Swedenborg? The whole problem boils down to the
subject of the reference keys. How were reference keys conveyed to
Swedenborg? My answer to this question is so incredible that I must
perforce start with its background. That is, with my earliest discovery
which took place accidentally in the spring of 1973.
I was at that time firmly convinced that the crisis Swedenborg
experienced in 1744 was the initial symptom of some serious mental
trouble. Yet, something completely irregular took place while I was
reading some post-crisis passages about the adrenal glands, the glands
which produce the hormone called adrenalin. I suddenly realized that they
contain the very terms which describe the psychosomatic effects of an
adrenalin discharge: fear, tremor, distress, anxiety (Table 2).
The case of adrenalin implied an astounding anticipation in relation
to Sir Walter Bradford Cannon's discovery of the effects of this hormone
in 1914. And I was yet to become increasingly perplexed as I gradu-
ally learned that this was no isolated case of random coincidence. The
accuracy and anticipatory nature of Swedenborg's post-crisis organic
and functional descriptions, were a steady general rule.
In Swedenborg's retrospective annotation of the full scope of the
Table 2. Effects of adrenalin recorded by Swedenborg 166 years in advance- an aston-

ishing fact nobody had previously noticed.
1914
Psychosomatic effects of adrenalin
secreted by the adrenal glands
according to Cannon:
Tremor, fear, anxiety, palpitations,

sweating, distress.
1748
Swedenborg's post-crisis statements
in relation to the adrenal
glands:
Prone to anxieties . . . fearful of being

disturbed ... anxious ... distressed ...
anxious feelings . . . tremor.
(AC 5391, SD 970)
Effects of adrenalin
strange experiences he went through during the post-crisis stage of his

life, we find that after his statement mentioning "many visions, when
my eyes were closed, and light miraculously given", he adds:
Fiery lights were seen. Speech [was heard] in morning time (loquelae matutino tempore),
besides many other things; until a certain spirit addressed me in a few words. I was greatly
astonished that he should perceive my thoughts, and afterwards wondered greatly when
[my mind] was opened so that I could converse with spirits. (SD 2951)
What is a true wonder is the striking contents - the very topics - of

that "speech" which was heard by Swedenborg "in morning time", that
is, in a twilight state of consciousness. Those verbal statements do fall
outside the sphere of any matters we ordinarily would imagine would
be the topic of conversation of allegedly discarnate creatures. They are
very physical and very tangible. For instance, my present example is a
statement that served to convert images of Swedenborg's visions very

precisely into a virus. And not just an unspecific virus, but one positively
known to be related to a very specific type of cancers, the Epstein-Barr
virus (EBV). And, wow! -this is what Swedenborg heard:
It was said that such contribute to the formation of cancers (dicebant quod tales ad cancrum
contribuant). (SD 4348)
Really striking! Of course, the "such" referred to ("hypocritical

spirits") have not been identified as Epstein-Barr viruses on so meager
a foundation as the paragraph shown above, but on the basis of lengthy
annotations to which, also, some highly interesting statistical criteria
apply (see Table 3. Cf. also La Tercera Fuente, ch. 11-14).
AN ORIENTATING INFLUX
Disease-generating sources pointed out by Swedenborg prior to his crisis,

were aseptic (devoid of germs): "dews, pestilential fumes, sulphureous
effuvia, ignis fatuus [will-o' -the-wisp]"! 6 And what is still more flagrant:
he has denied the existence of bacteria. And this he did to no less a person
than the world-famous Dutch seventeenth-century microscopist, Antony
van Leeuwenhoek. Swedenborg maintained Leeuwenhoek's observations
of actual bacteria in human saliva were fallacious. He terms them
"particles", and states:
... when examined in water by the microscope, [these particles] appear oblong and
branching. Leeuwenhoek describes them as like little worms, with heads, tails, and tortuous
bodies, and swimming about with great agility. But what do we gain in point of under-
standing, from this chemical analysis, when we consider that similar liquids, spirits/
oils, and residua may be elicited by distillation from all the subjects of both the animal
and vegetable kingdoms. [... ] Nothing, in fact, is more common than for forms in a
state of quick motion, to appear in all those parts where the afflux of spirits is abundant,
as in the epididymes, the vasa deferentia, the vesiculae seminales, and the semen itself.
And also, according to Leeuwenhoek, even in the saliva of the mouth. So that it seems
as if the substance called animal spirit, were in the constant desire and endeavor, wherever
an opportunity is offered, of clothing itself with a body, but which body easily relapses
back into its constituent principles or spirits. (AK I, 81, nn. m and o)
Swedenborg mixed up into an indiscriminate lot bacteria and sper-

matozoa. And, obviously, this idea of ephemeral, transitory and unstable
forms participating in a process that builds up and dissolves living matter
perpetually, utterly opposes the very notion of microbes that can be
EMANUELSWEDENBORG 175
Table 3. Global probability of alleatory assemblage of these data, which are fully
concordant with the characteristics of Epstein-Barr viruses and their pathological action, .
amounts virtually to zero. In other words, Swedenborg could not have collected and
compiled these data by chance: hypocritical spirits are not fanciful creatures, but
veritable Epstein-Barr viruses.
Data derived from Swedenborg's SD 4348-3466 series by which the Chance

so-called hypocritical spirits have been identified as Epstein-Barr viruses probability
Maxillary localization (cancerous tumor) 1:12

Equality of the material of the viral and cellular genomes (ADN) 1:2
"Selfish" nature of the cancerous mutation 1:8
"Contribution" to the formation of cancers 1:20
Penetration 1:6
Decapsidation 1:5
Return to a germinal stage 1:10
"Discrete" nature of the "series" of genes of the viral genome 1:10
Eclipse (transitory stage of indetectability) 1:2
Penetration into the nucleus (adoption of an "interior nature") 1:2
Replication in "triple series" (three virionic components) 1:20
Packaging of the DNA prior to encapsidation 1:5
"Black gullet" 1:10
"White teeth" 1:10
* "Woolly" and "course" filaments 1:10
Structure
Bidimensional elements of the capsid: triangles 1:10
Tridimensional elements of the capsid: pyramids 1:10
Encapsidation of the genome in a "pyramidal sack" 1:10
Presence of the virus in the saliva and its spreading by this medium 1:10
Encapsidation** 1:20
Expulsion from the cells 1:2
Penetration, decapsidation, access to the nucleus, }
*** replication, assembly of bidimensional elements (triangles),
1:40,320
Chronology encapsidation (packaging inside capsomers), contagious
stage through saliva, liberation (expulsion). Total: 8 items
* All of them being reciprocally consistent, the structural data have been rated equally and
with a very low index of probability by chance.
** Swedenborg presents in this case a highly improbable operation: the re-introduction
of a serpent in its exuviae, a procedure never observed in ophidians but (in a metaphoric
sense) common to viruses.
*** Data are not just relevant by themselves but also according to their chronological
sequence. Swedenborg might have presented the 8 items here listed in 40,320 different
manners (permutations of 8 elements). He did it, however, according to the only seriated
order which is in full accord with the chronological sequence of the physical process
theorized. The probability that this could happen by chance is= 1:40,320.
The global probability for an aleatory assemblage of the data listed in this
table amounts to (1:12 X 1:2 X 1:8 X X 1:40,320) = 1.34557 X 10-23
0.000000000000000134557
individualized according to constant and specific shapes. This is what

makes Swedenborg's post-crisis reorientation so extremely striking as
to the correct sources of disease, a reorientation we will now discuss.
Of the various examples that might serve to illustrate the reorientation
process, the one I have chosen is particularly fascinating. It refers to a
certain type of "infernal" creature. How? Well, Swedenborg started all
of a sudden to assert that "all the infernals induce diseases" (AC 5713
et passim). This evidently contradicts his theory about dews, fumes and
sulphurous effluvia, and might have been just a matter of a regressive
return to old spiritualistic doctrines. However, the true circumstance is
quite a different one. In quite the same anticipative category as the
startling findings which I have turned up since the spring of 1973, the
"infernals" fit neatly into the frames of modern parasitology and micro-
biology.
The only example given so far concerns a virus (Epstein-Barr). The
one now selected for further illustration is a bacterial microbe: the
Rickettsia prowazekii, the causative agent of typhus (spotted fever).
Swedenborg terms this kind of germ "cruel and adulterine spirits". Indeed
fittingly! Its noxiousness is so high that it killed the two researchers
who pioneered in its investigation: Stanislas von Prowazek and Howard
T. Ricketts. It should also be remarked that names are important. Evidence
obtained shows that Swedenborg makes as taxonomically a systematic
and regular a use of them as microbiologists do when they classify the
germs they discover. The identification of the "cruel and adulterine
spirits" as a rickettsiae is thoroughly solid, being supported by a full
set of criteria: clinical (type of fever), cytologic (presence of the germ
inside infected cells), parasitologic (transmission by lice), prophylactic
(capillary hygienics, baths, hot water), and the ways of the microbe's
penetration into the human organism (transcutaneous, respiratory).
The topic I am specifically to deal with now, refers to the reorienta-
tion of Swedenborg's attention, which shifted markedly from aseptic foci
(exhalations, dews, fumes ... ) to foci that are positively septic and
characteristic of the germs involved. It is therefore quite essential that
the following points be stressed: 1) that the germ discussed mainly
propagates through the excrement of lice; 2) that this insect prolifer-
ates where filth accumulates (where cleanliness slackens); 3) that the
germ in question was first discovered in 1916 by H. da Rocha-Lima in
the intestines of that very insect. These three elements were exactly the
elements pointed to and stressed in Swedenborg's experiences.
[... ] when I walked in the street, they carried away my eyes to all such things; wherever
there was filth, excrement and intestines (sordes, excrementa et intestina), thither they
directed my eyes, although I was ignorant of where were such things in the street. (SO
2843)
Midway between this and the description of that very germ,

Swedenborg had just as startling an experience. To wit, a twilight vision
in the course of which the bacterial nature of this disease-generating
agent was unveiled in much the same manner as the one that made
Louis Pasteur conceive many years later his general theory of infec-
tious germs.
The fermentation of milk- this is a historically well-known fact- was
one of the phenomena that put the great French researcher on the track
to the discovery of insalubrious bacteria. It is also a fact that teeth offer
bacteria perfect conditions for proliferation. In the light of this couple
of facts, Swedenborg's vision becomes highly significant:
CONCERNING AN IDEAL REPRESENTATION. In a state intermediate between sleeping and
waking (in statum medio inter somnum et vigiliam), but verging nearer to sleep, there
was remarkably represented a tooth. When in the waking state I could not know, still
less express, what it was, but simply that a tooth was perceived, which, according as
the desire was (sicut desiderium erat), was turned into something resembling coagu-
lated milk (quasi coagulatum lacteum). (SD 3791)
Milk coagulates by the action of bacteria and this "ideal" tooth appears
once more exactly when Swedenborg resumes the topic of the "cruel
and adulterine spirits" identified as bacteria of the rickettsia genus. In
this way an "ideal" link was evidently and prodigiously established
between bacteria that spoil milk and bacteria that "spoil" humans
(remember Prowazek and Ricketts!), amounting to a cognitive leap of
130 years in relation to Pasteur's theory. 8
On this occasion Swedeborg additionally terms the "cruel and adul-
terine spirits" as "mucus-spirits". This makes perfect sense. One of this
germ's habitual ways of penetration is the mucous membrane of the
respiratory tract. Into this tract the germ enters, conveyed by the powdery
residua of the excrement of its specific transmitter: the louse (this was
probably how Prowazek and Ricketts got infected). Swedenborg's new
experience is most outstanding not just because the "ideal" connecting
element- a tooth- is indicated once more, but because quite an essen-
tial "character" comes upon stage: the very transmitter of the Rickettsia
prowazekii, - the louse. Indeed, if there is any passage amongst those
genuinely sensational which truly deserves being termed revolutionary
in the eyes of philosophy and science, the one I am now to quote must
be one of them.
This time the "tooth" pointed at is "putrid"; i. e., decayed, septic. It
could hardly have been intimated more clearly that the bacterium now
involved coagulates no milk but kills!
Wrote Swedenborg:
When those mucus-spirits flowed in, it was perceived that they moved my tongue towards
a putrid tooth (moverent linguam versus dentem putridum). There was then also at the
back of the neck a sense of biting as of lice (sensus morsus sicut pedicu/orum); then an
itching in the nates (tum in natibus titilatio). All of which was from them. (SD 4035)
That "itching in the nates" is also quite significant. The louse

defecates as it bites, and inoculates an irritative saliva. Scratching and
excoriation become unavoidable, and this facilitates the germ's pene-
tration through the skin.
The respiratory way of penetration was also indicated in just as
peculiar a manner: "They farther spake with me also as if in the throat
or trachea (sicut in gutture seu trachea)". (SD 4035 1/ 2)
There is very obviously a great difference between this, and mere
mental automatism, delirium or psychopathological ideas of influx.
Swedeborg's case clearly demands new analytical criteria, unexpect-
edly offers insight into one part of reality negated by modern philosophy,
and challenges current research.
THE CONTINUITY THESIS
The crisis experienced by Swedenborg in 17 44 split his life two stages,

one scientific and one religious. Nevertheless, a thesis of an essential
continuity has prevailed even amongst the most heterogenous scholars.
For instance, Prof. Martin Ramstrom said in 191 0: "In these works
[Regnum animate and De cerebro] Swedenborg reached the summit of
his scientific career, and they afterwards served as the foundation of
the religious edifice to which he devoted the remainder of his life". 9
Fifty-nine years later and with reference to that very "edifice", Dr.
Inge Jonsson asserted: "The anatomical and physiological parallelisms
show the existence of the closest thinkable link with his works about
biology" .10
Like Ramstrom, Jonsson thought the topics Swedenborg addressed
EMANUELSWEDENBORG 179
during the first stage became the basis for his production during the
second stage. Seven years later he reaffirmed this viewpoint:
It is evident that Swedenborg, for the most part, didn't see the spirits materialized in
external space but experienced their presence as a sort of personalized, internal thought
[... ] and it is quite obvious, also, that whatever the information was, that the angels
communicated, it confirmed his opinions and not the opposite. And also, that their behavior
in the highest degree coincides with his knowledge about anatomy and physiology. 11
And yet by then, the phenomenon that my entirely antithetical dis-

covery reveals had become a reality, to wit: that far from confirming
Swedenborg's viewpoints, those angelic communicators he mentions had
transmitted information that was totally different. And not just different,
but incredibly correct!
I shall soon return to the continuity thesis, but room must now be made
to allow for a very essential discussion. "Scientific Elements Revealed"
(items tabulated in the last column) are fairly self-evident in Table 4,
but this is certainly not the case in Table 5. Indeed, I was recently
prompted by a most valuable correspondent:
I believe that your greatest challenge [... ] is convincing them [other scientists] that
your last column titled "Scientific Elements Revealed" [Table 5, column C) is contained
in the "Post-crisis Topics" [Table 5, Column B). I mean, it is quite a bit of a leap from
"Protection of the skin [and] fighting antagonists- SD 1743" on the one hand, and on
the other, "Keratinocytes and T-cells". I wonder how you can make this connection, which
is seen by your mind, more explicit for others to see. 12
Well, this has been made quite explicit in my main manuscript

intended for a book titled La Tercera Fuente (references to specific
chapters are given in both tables: Tables 4 and 5, see n. **). But my
correspondent - as indeed any exacting reader would also do - cannot
imagine how that "quite a bit of a leap" between columns (B) and (C)
can be convincingly bridged (or even bridged at all!) whilst no specific
examples are given. So, I have decided to incorporate into this synopsis
one short and abridged piece of evidence, 13 to illustrate how the
seemingly unbridgeable gap is filled by very specific material not simply
"seen by my mind".
Let us concentrate on T-cells (thymus-dependent cells). How on earth
can cells so peculiar be "detected" and identified in Swedenborg's post-
crisis texts? The first point to be taken into consideration refers to these
cells' specific role: the discrimination of "self" and "not-self"; i. e., of
00
0
-
Table 4. A dramatic change (in the digestive and endocrinological fields) (A) -7 (B = C): from 18th to 19th and 20th century
standards of knowledge.
(')
Common (A) (B) (C)
::r:
anatomical Pre-crisis text Post-crisis text Scientific elements ;;o
,__.
revealed** (/)
reference* -l
tT1
Adrenal A brownish liquor of sweetish taste ... their use Prone to anxieties ... fearful of Physical and emotional z
glands [informs L. Heister] is not certainly ascertained. being disturbed ... distressed ... effects of adrenalin >-
[They] divert the abundant stream of serum ... anxiety ... anxious feelings t:J:I
[and] prevent the kidneys from seizing this ... (AC 5391). r
0
innocuous and nourishing serum from embryonic 3::
life (AK I, 276). [They] snatch it away from the Their anxiety, which now is also '
0
spermatic syphons and testicles ... hinder and communicated to me ... was a >-
prohibit the immoderate influx, downpour and kind of ... tremor ::r:
r
seizure of the flower of the blood, into those (SD 970).
wanton and voracious organs (AK I, 277).
Pituary Transmission of the genuine fluids of the Correspondence (sic) of the Functional link between
gland cerebrum ... gives quality to the blood ... pituitary glands: The [urine] the gland/urine discharge/
expels the phlegm of the cerebrum (Cer., 1124). discharge was completely stopped. uterine contractions
... Others not so active caused (anti-diuretic action of
a painful contraction or cramp in vasopressin; uterine
the lower belly (Index of AC & contraction induced by
AC 5387-5388). oxytocin)
Pancreas A kind of infinity ... of each variety [of They act by a kind of sawing or Cleavage of molecules
secretion of the pancreas can be predicated] trituration to and fro, with a by the pancreatic
with respect of quality and quantity ... further murmur like that of sawing enzymes
multiplied by the commixtion (AK I, 234, n. q). (SD 1009).
[According to H. Boerhaave] it produces no
sensible fermentation.
Liver General laboratory for the defecation of the chyle The gyres into which their Glucose H glycogen
. . . lustration . . . regeneration of the blood operation flows are diverse, but cycles in the liver
(AK I, 204). Sifts and divides the muddy current usually orbicular (AC 5180,
[of blood and chyle] (AK I, 206). SD 1008). tr1
:::::
Gall-
>
The pori bilarii work, knead, grind, rectify, purify, There came agitating spirits ... Emulsion by agitation in z
bladder correct, divide ... the hard, heavy and resisting it was granted me to observe one the presence of biliaxy
c::
tr1
blood ... the residue ... is the bile (AK I, 210). kind of agitation ... the slow salts, accelerating t""'
~
The gall-bladder is the ultimate asylum of the are initiated into a quicker mode breaking up of slowly
unclean and obsolete blood (AK I, 215, n. v). [of action] (AC 5187). digested lipidic molecules ~
tr1
0
ttl
* The central post-crisis concept of the Homo Maximus (see the paragraph about CoNTRAST ANALYSIS above) allows us to establish ztXl
the existence of homologous pre- and post-critical texts. Although stemming respectively from so different stages, both textual
categories share common anatomical references admitting comparative analysis. 0
::0
** Concordance between (B) and (C) can be checked in any Encyclopedia. Otherwise, reference is made to La Tercera Fuente, 0
chs. I, 1 and II -4.
00
--
Table 5. A dramatic change (in the immunologic field) (A) -t (B = C): from erroneous, trivial or mechanistic ideas to the real
defensive functions proper to the organs and systems mentioned. 00
N
-
Common anatomical (A) (B) (C)
reference* Pre-crisis topics Post-crisis topics Scientific elements revealed**
Lymphatic system Tempering, Infections. Inspection. Lymphocytes

edulcoration, digestion. Detection of potential noxiousness.
(AK I, 168 & n. u) (SO 1128-1129, 1132-1133, 1136)
Skin Sense of touch. Protection of the skin, Keratinocytes and T -cells
Excretion of sweat. fighting antagonists. (')
(AK II, Part III, Ch. I) (SO 1743-1747) :I:
:;l:l
Spleen Mechanical purification, Vigilance. Warding off Immune defensive barrier Cll
-
"rectification" of blood. of intruders. -3
m
(AK I, 246, n. i) (SO 4663, AC 9582-9583) z
Thymus gland Lubrication of adjoining organs. Protective action. T-cells >
Preparation of the blood Detection of benignity/malignity. tll
for its blending with Progressive maturation of detection capacity. r
0
the chyle. Protection and defence against the malign. 3:::
(AK II, 434, 441) (SO 1048-1049) '
0
Peritoneum Mechanical functions and Exploration. Swelling. Plasmocyte*** >
:I:
properties: elasticity, Defence. Attack by "those of (B-cell) r
extensility, contractility. the province of the colon".
(AK I, 323, 324, n. q) (SO 989-991, 993; AC 5378)
Colon Maceration. Mortal infection. Bacillus coli****
Fermentation. (SO 1063)
(AK I, 139, n. e)
* See Table 4, note*.

** See my paradigmatic discussion ofT-cells. Otherwise, reference is made to La Tercera Fuente, chs. Il-5 to Il-10.
*** Cell which increases its size when activated for antibacterial action.
**** Bacterial germ which dwells in the colon but can accidentally cause peritonitis and puerperal fever.
foreign tissues, substances, germs and native but abnormal (tumoral)

cells. Says Swedenborg:
There are certain very upright spirits who feel the quality of things ... and they declare
quickly enough, "That is not good"; "That is not well"; "That is well"; and frequently
that "It ought not to be so".... (SD 1048)
T-cells acquire this ability through a process of "education"; mainly,

through encounters with viral germs in early infancy. Adds Swedenborg:
In their infancy they had been dull and difficult to teach (hebetes et indomitus); but as
they progressed in life, they became sufficiently instructed from themselves and their
own disposition concerning the goodness of a thing (bonitate rei) . ... (Ibid.)
Then comes a most essential statement, a tangible reference key, to

wit: "That these spirits pertain to the province of the thymus gland was
indicated to me ... " (SD 1049).
Indeed! Immunologists even term T-cells' acquisition of the self/not-
self, good/not-good discriminative ability a thymic "education". The
thymus gland contributes so essentially to this process that if surgically
removed in the new-born animal, its capacity to reject foreign tissues
disappears (even plumes may then be grafted onto the skin of mammals
-a celebrated experiment that was made by J. F. Miller in 1961). Yet,
readers might be asking: where is the clinching piece of evidence, -
the one that links Swedenborg's descriptions so far quoted: 1) to humans,
2) to a protective immunological action; and 3) to "infernals" (in con-
cordance with the hypothesis that infernals = germs)? Well, here it is:
"The same spirits are also in great crowds [with little children] and defend
them while they are being tormented [by 'infemals']". (Ibid.)
There are many more and very fascinating details about those "very
upright spirits" Swedenborg describes that correspond very neatly to those
about T-cells, but there is no room for all this in an abridged commu-
nication like this one. Just let me add that there is a peculiar co-operation
between certain cells of the immune system, that was likewise recorded
by Swedenborg: "spirits" performing defensive roles individually iden-
tified as specific types of lymphocytes (cells of the immune system),
additionally appear in coordinated joint actions which truly correspond
to them, and linked to organs and tissues that are real components of the
defensive system (spleen, lymphatic system, Pecquet's cystem, [cisterna
chyli in Swedenborg's old-fashioned terminology], the peritoneum, and
so on). Clearly, this amounts to a double-checking of the analytical
operations performed and duplicates the weight of the evidence obtained.
I now resume the topic of the continuity thesis. It should be only

too evident that if any person had carried out a comparative analysis
of homologous pre- and post-crisis texts as shown in Tables 4 and 5,
the conclusion would very decidedly have been that the continuity thesis
is wrong. To put it differently: it can be firmly asserted that neither
Ramstrom nor Jonsson nor anyone else had previously carried out any
truly systematic collation of homologous pre- and post-crisis texts.
BIPARTITE COMPOSITION OF SWEDENBORG'S

MAIN POST-CRISIS WORK: ARCANA CAELESTIA
Swedenborg composed his Arcana Caelestia (his first and greatest post-
crisis work, anonymously published in London in eight volumes)
according to a bipartite structure. Its main and considerably more exten-
sive contents constitute as esoteric interpretation of the spiritual sense
of the Word. This might be defined as a metaphysical revelation. As a
second textual element Swedenborg extracted from the Diarium spiri-
tuale, the journal in which he recorded the main part of his peculiar
experiences of dreams, visions, "conversations with angels, spirits ... "
and sensorial and motor influxes, this kind of material, and appended
it "following instructions from heaven" to the chapters of exegesis meant
to unveil the internal or spiritual sense of the Word. It is this appended
material which, in outright opposition to all previous assumptions, has
been found to refer primordially to a physical reality. And now comes
yet another surprise.
What this material was actually intended for, constitutes another
finding at least as baffling as the earliest discovery about adrenalin made
in the spring of 1973. The role the physical revelation is meant to play
appears faithfully recorded by Swedenborg in a series of notes -but notes
which he himself did not understand! This is very queer indeed. Actually,
their contents have only become evident now that we are in a position
to contemplate them in retrospect, from the angle of our present state
of knowledge. This is so noteworthy and fascinating a matter that I
shall dwell upon it at some length.
In his frank and critical letter dated March 8th, 1769, Johan Christian
Cuno confessed to his good friend, Swedenborg:
I have industriously searched into the principles of your System. Its main authority is
your own sight. From things seen and heard, you tell marvels. You desire to make
the world assured that it has been granted you to be with angels in the spirit world and
at the same time with men in the natural world. You proclaim great things which an
unbelieving world dislikes. Your readers, little solicitous of their eternal salvation, laugh
at their latest teacher, as this an amphibian whom no one endowed with sound reason
can imagine to himself as possible, nor can wish or is able to give assent to his novel-
ties. [... ] One eyewitness is of more avail than ten earwitnesses. But that you are truly
and actually such - as to this, the world will deservedly retain its right to require some
other testimony than from you alone .... Until you have proven your ocular testimony,
and made it convincing by surer witnesses, neither the theologian nor the logician will
take pen against you. 14
Cuno did not know - nobody knew! - that such witnesses would
become available in the future, for instance, when Sir Walter Bradford
Cannon discovered the effects of adrenalin in 1914. As I have previ-
ously explained, equipped with this knowledge I suddenly realized in
the spring of 1973, although quite accidentally, that Swedenborg, when
referring in his post-crisis texts to the adrenal glands which secrete that
very substance, had used precisely the very terms with which Cannon
was to describe those effects 166 years later (fear, tremor, distress,
anxiety). Unexpectedly, that British physicist and physiologist had turned
all of a sudden into one of those "surer witnesses" Cuno had demanded
two centuries earlier. As my findings progressed, such "witnesses" turned
up by the hundreds.
Cuno's "witnesses" are all of them scientists of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. In other words: it was the science of the future that
came to validate Swedenborg's claim that the angels he said he had
been in touch with, had made him the depository of a "wisdom from
heaven". Whether that wisdom is angelic remains to be discussed, but
at least three points had become obvious: 1) what has been presented
as wisdom is authentic wisdom, 2) can be validated and 3) cannot be
referred to Swedenborg nor to any one of his contemporaries, because
it was only to become detectable and verifiable in the future. Yet, in spite
of this, Swedenborg wrote towards the end of the summer of 1749: "I
received letters [informing me] that not more than four copies [of Arcana
Caelestia] had been sold in two months". (SD 4422)
The fact that Swedenborg should expect immediate results when these
necessarily had to be the sequel of a future evolution proves that he
himself was ignorant that part of his revelation was anticipating knowl-
edge about physical reality that had not yet been attained by means of
the science practised by ordinary mortals.
Indeed, no remark about the role or physical nature and future
detectability of one part of the recorded revelations is found anywhere
amongst Swedenborg's own comments or the texts he gave to the press.

He presented everything as "metaphysical" and never hinted at any phys-
ically testable reality. This is very queer indeed, because, just imagine
how extremely striking such an announcement would have been, and how
strong an argument against all those who pronounced him to be out of
his wits, once its veracity could be fully established in the course of time.
But actually, such an announcement was made in a series of notes,
although he never published them himself, which obviously means that
his Source of inspiration knew about it! Take for instance the future
detectability and testability of the physical revelations. The most para-
digmatic passages about this subject were recorded by Swedenborg when
he was nearing the day of his death. He then returned to the subject of
the meager attention paid to his works by prospective readers, but this
time in a decidedly inspired context which I have termed The Allegory
of the Shooting Star. In those passages he starts by enumerating the
various types of revelation conveyed through him. The first ten points
are clearly religious, moral, metaphysical. But then comes:
[... ] moreover, concerning the inhabitants of the planets and the earths in the universe;
besides many memorable and wonderful things from the spiritual world, which have
been the means of revealing from heaven much wisdom. (TCR 846)
The physical revelations to which nobody had paid heed! - that is,
on the one hand, concerning physical beings from physical worlds; and
on the other hand, a wisdom "from the spiritual world", which is obvi-
ously a reference to the "things heard and seen" that have turned out
to deal with subjects of an advanced nature related to physical reality.
At its start, the allegory pictures some angels being commanded to
write down on a piece of paper all truths revealed so far, and let it drop
unto the earth. Whilst that paper traversed the spiritual sphere, it shone
like a star, only to fade away when it gradually plummeted into our world.
Finally, it fell amongst a group of "learned and erudite men" and these
responded with the greatest disconcert: obviously, a very faithful picture
of our own reactions! Then comes the next stage. It is very essential. The
angels questioned themselves as to how long this state of affairs would
last, and a reply came from on high, which refers to the future detect-
ability and comprehension of the physical revelation: a feature we
positively know Swedenborg was not aware of. It was worded thus:
"[ ... ] a voice was heard saying: 'For a time, and times, and half a
time' [Rev. 12:14]". (TCR 848)
Subsequently, Swedenborg states, he perceived a rumor ex inferis

(from hell) requesting: "Perform miracles and we will believe!" (TCR
849).
On December 9th, 1748, Swedenborg recorded yet another truly
spectacular fact related to these questions we are discussing. The note
in question, which is worthy of being printed in golden characters, reads
as follows:
CONCERNING THINGS REVEALED (De revelatis). There are spirits who are averse to anything
being said concerning the things revealed (de revelatis), but it was said (sed iis dictum)
that they are instead of miracles (ea loco miraculorum sint) and that without them men
would not know the character of the book (quod talis liber sit), nor would they buy it,
or read it, or understand it, or be affected by it (non afficiuntur), or believe in it [... ]
nor would they wish to hear anything respecting the interiors of the Word, which they
regard as mere fantasies (quae ut phantasias putant). Such as are simply men of learning
(aliqui docti solum) will for the most part reject them (qui maxima pars rejiciunt). SD
4123.
In short, we are told about a book (Arcana Caelestia) dealing with

the internal sense of the Word, whose credibility depends on certain
"things" which have to strike our minds. This being very evidently a
reference to the things discovered since the spring of 1973; things which
are certainly shaking our minds (minds that had espoused too limited
an idea about reality) with a power of conviction equivalent to that of
the biblical miracles, but tuned to the present-time requirements of
rationality. And this is why "ea in loco miraculorum sint". In other words,
they act as a substitute for miracles of biblical proportions capable of
impinging upon our minds and shaking our consciousness.
On August 27th, 1748, Swedenborg recorded in yet another note state-
ments, just as singular, about the foreseen ways of reception of this
revelation:
HOW MY WRITINGS SEEM TO BE RECEIVED BY MEN (Quomodo scripta videntur recipi ab
hominibus). I spoke with spirits as to how my writings concerning these things ["things
heard and seen"] seem to be received when they become public; for evil spirits some-
times infused that no one would perceive these things (quod nullus ea perciperet), but
that [men] would reject them. Now, while in the street and talking with spirits, it was given
to perceive that there are five kinds of reception (genera receptionis). First, [those] who
wholly reject, who are in another persuasion (qui in alia persuasinoe sint), and are enemies
of the faith. These reject; for it cannot be received by them, since it cannot penetrate
their minds (quia in mentes eorum non penetrare [possunt]). Another class (genus) who
receive these things as scientifica 15 and as such (et ut scientificis), and consequently as
curious things, they are delighted (tum ut curiosis delectantur). A third class, which
receives intellectually so that they receive with sufficient alacrity, but still remain [in
respect to life] as before. A fourth class [which receives] persuasively, so that it pene-
trates to the improvement of their lives; they recur to these in certain states (obveniant
eis in quibusdam statibus), and make use of them. And a fifth class who receive with
joy, and are confirmed. (SD 2955) 16
The expression "scientifica" and that we should receive this partic-

ular material as curious things and be delighted with them is most
striking. How could Swedenborg presume that certain persons would
receive as scientifica what he systematically presented and understood
as metaphysica? This is quite sensational. He could not have invented
it. Furthermore, it fully coincides with the findings made in the spring
of 1973 and thenceforth.
THE USE OF THE MICROSCOPE: "THINGS WHICH CONVINCE"
The microscope as a key to discovery and conviction was also announced.

Again, Swedenborg never took advantage of this fact. He never published
himself the notes containing this information.
As was previously discussed, a fascinating world appeared before
my eyes when I discovered that the "infemals" responded marvellously
to a reversal of the optics, from metaphysical to physical; more con-
cretely: to microscope optics even beyond the range of the power of
electronic magnification! By this procedure the "infernals" suddenly
resolved themselves into clear pictures of specifically recognizable germs
through a series of morphological details. Germs which had previously
been pinned down with extraordinary accuracy by means of the clinical,
parasitological, prophylactic, cytological and genetic information pro-
fusely contained in Swedenborg's descriptions.
This topic of the microorganisms detected and recognized in
Swedenborg's post-crisis texts is undoubtedly one of the most impres-
sive aspects of the physical revelation. This is probably why it is stated
in one of the series of notes about the nature and aims of the physical
revelation that, "by holding the idea on the objects of the microscope"
one becomes absolutely "obstupefactus": stupefied. 17 Furthermore, that:
[... ] when it was granted to represent experience by means of the microscope (cum
experientiam repraesentare daretur per microscopium), the spirits resisted, and did not
wish to allow it (nee admittere valebant), saying that they do not wish to admit those
things which convince, for they fear to be convinced (dicentes quod non velint admit-
tere ea, quae convincunt, nam timent convinci). (SD 2898)
Indeed, these are things which convince, things that are very obviously
foreshadowing the astonishing findings made in the field ofmicrobiology
(Figure 1. Cf. La Tercera Fuente, cbs. 11-12, 11-13 and 11-14).
SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
To what situation has my search-and-compare exercises brought us to?

In fact, a multifarious array of arguments supports the solidity of my
claims of the existence of physical revelations. Individually considered,
identification of the "things seen" relies on tangible indications (verbal
and motor) and the concordance of the descriptions with physical objects
and phenomena (microbes, effects of hormones, physiological processes,
etc.). References (clues) are very straightly formulated in Swedenborg's
texts and quite to the point; e.g. adrenal glands, spleen, Pecquet's cystem,
colon, scaly skin (keratinocytes), brothels, filth, intestines, excrements,
spinal cord, semen, saliva, lice, bed-bugs, etc.
Additionally, when individual proofs are globally contemplated, new
arguments arise which strongly enhance their credibility. To wit: the
microbiological consistency of morphological details, the firm coherence
of cross-references, taxonomic uniformity (regular use of names and
expressions, such as "cruel and adulterine spirits", "Hypocritical spirits",
and so on), the number and variety of the proofs obtained, 18 and the ruling
out of trivial random coincidence as an explication on the ground of very
obvious computational odds. In this latter respect it should also be men-
tioned that in each and every case, details appear sequenced according
to the true chronological order of the real process being described.
These facts I have just mentioned thoroughly discard chance as an
intervening factor and firmly substantiate the legitimacy of my claims
of the discovery of physical revelations in Swedenborg. Then we arrive
at next point at issue. The "miraculous" nature of that revelation leads
to a brand new understanding of the series of notes that were discussed
in the preceding section. Although unheeded and uncomprehended since
they were penned by Swedenborg more than two centuries ago, those
notes have all of a sudden acquired a fascinating significance because
they testify to the existence of a second revelation of a decidedly meta-
physical nature.
As far as metaphysical issues are concerned, Swedenborg has become
the first man in history whose claims ofprophetic endowments have been
"physically" tested, which claims lend rational credibility to metaphys-
Epstein-Barr
Vacclnla and variola
Rabies
Fig. I . Morphology of some of the "infernals" described by Swedenborg. It fittingly

coinc ides with the true shape of the germs involved in the specific diseases they are
described to cause. This can be no random coincidence.
ical revelation. This is an outright and supreme novelty, even though I

am not the only person who has found that the obtention of anticipa-
tory (but strictly physical?) information of unknown origin is possible.
For instance, a preliminary draft about some aspects of my findings
was not long ago despatched to Princeton University, addressed to Drs.
Robert G. Jahn and Brenda J. Dunne. This was their reaction:
We have at last had an opportunity to read your fascinating manuscript. [... ] Although
at the superficial level it appears to deal with phenomena well removed from our own
areas of study, there are nonetheless several points of potential overlap that would be worth
considering. At the very least, any extended model of reality must be able to accommo-
date a full range of such consciousness-related anomalies if it has any hope of being
complete. We suspect that ultimately Swedenborg's works will prove far more prophetic
than most people have recognized. 19
So in the eyes of these researchers I have not been making unheard-

of statements.
How can persons willingly accept as normal what seems nonsensical
to others? The answer is that it all depends on the type of material one
has access to, and the theories about reality this material might give
rise to. 20 Actually, the paradoxes modern physicists are faced with,
thoroughly indicate that matter does not conform to the axioms of mate-
rialism, which is quite an ironical fact. Materialism has become a useless
doctrine even if this fact seems only to be familiar to a limited circle
of researchers cavalierly ignored by the greater part of the scientific
establishment. Such a situation seems highly ridiculous; but it is no novel
situation at all. When Copernicus published his De revolutionibus orbium
coelestium, the majority was still espousing the geocentric theory. And
it is highly convenient to bear in mind that the Copernican hypothesis
was revolutionary not just because planetary orbits now fitted elegantly
into a neater, homogenous system (and it was, indeed, closer to the
truth than the Ptolemaic doctrine), but also because it made us realize
that things can be just the opposite of what seems very decidedly obvious
at a given moment.
Matters I am now discussing may belong to quite another area- a field
which is closely related to the so-called mind-body problem. But most
probably, the situation is exactly the same as exemplified by my dis-
cussion of the Copernican hypothesis. Indeed, Swedenborg's case
definitely confirms that the ordinary paradigm about reality we are
massively committed to and operating with, must be wrong. Its degree
of inaccuracy must necessarily be proportional to the very extent that
his case bewilders, staggers, generates skepticism and was never antic-
ipated.
Summing up: the world is not as we have generally been told. My
findings challenge the prevalent view nowadays advocated by outstanding
materialist neuroscientists, and formulated by Richard Rorty in the intro-
duction to his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature as follows: "The
mind-body problem [... ] was merely a result of Locke's unfortunate
mistake about how words get meaning combined with his and Plato's
muddled attempt to talk about adjectives as if they were nouns". In the
light of the findings made since the spring of 1973, this is fallacious.
Swedenborg's angels deserve serious consideration: 1) their wisdom
cannot have been kindled by his mind; 2) his source of inspiration is very
decidedly not an adjective. His case is not an "anomalous" case either.
It is a case that foreshadows the necessity of a radical shift of the pre-
vailing paradigm about the frontiers of reality. It is this paradigm which
is anomalous. A shift away from it is becoming an imperative necessity
because wrong paradigms foster warped judgments and the derivative
risk of a perilous handling of human affairs. Indeed, signs that mankind
has been pushed along a false trail are not lacking. This is why
Swedenborg is becoming highly pertinent. There is now every reason
to believe that his texts, now glowing in the dark, contain cardinal clues
for shedding light upon some of our gravest problems.
Finally, there is one more point I would like to stress. Jahn and
Dunne's opinion in relation to my findings has already been mentioned.
Their laboratory experiences at Princeton University under the Project of
Engineering Anomalies Research offer - I quote - some "potential
overlap that would be worth considering". Also, quite a number of very
able physicists would be fully prepared to back my claims fundamen-
tally. It is very encouraging not to be entirely alone when announcing
news as controversial as mine. Yet, it seems that Swedenborg's case is
the antechamber to stronger and still more startling surprises than any
preceding experiments or systematic theoretical speculations have jointly
produced so far. In fact, this is the first time a Source has been detected,
that cannot be referred to laboratory conditions nor to any tests with
humans. At least, not in any ordinary sense - or perhaps in no sense
at all. Under these circumstances, can Swedenborg's own claims be
distrusted? Swedenborg refers to angels as communicators and asserts
these were guided by the Lord so that he was actually to become the
depository of the Lord's tidings. There may certainly be divergencies
of viewpoint, but Swedenborgian believers are fully entitled to feel and

argue that both the "classical", and now quite unexpectedly and most
strikingly the "new" post-1973 Swedenborg, strengthens their faith -
indeed: any believer's faith.
Consul General of Norway, Valencia
NOTES
* For bibliographic references and the symbols of the works of Swedenborg quoted
here, see the Index in pp. 194-195.
(*) Drawing by Sylvia Treadgold, reproduced by courtesy of Dr. A. Stuart Mason.
1 Some parts of the JD, the indented paragraphs in WE, the totality of SD and some
aspects of the Memorabilia (Memorable relations) are incorporated in his late produc-
tion (AR, CL and TCR).
2 Strictly speaking, forerunners of the doctrine of correspondences are found in EAK and
in Clavis hieroglyphica arcanorum naturalium et spiritualium, per viam repraesentationum

et correspondentiarum, published posthumously (London: R. Hindmarsh, 1784).
3 Yet, it has been consistently sustained by first rank scholars.
4 Quoted by A. Feldman and P. Ford in Grandes cientificos e inventores (Barcelona:
Hymsa, 1979), Vol. II, p. 22.
5 M. Masson, La segunda ciencia de sueno, in the collective work Los extrasensori-
ales (Barcelona: Ediciones 29, 1977), pp. 205-206.

6 Cf. Fib., 393, 467 and 561, and AK I, 157, n. L.
7 In the eighteenth century, the term spirit signified humour: a fluid state of matter. As
theory went, the expression animal spirit used in one of the next passages, refers to the
subtlest and most vital of all these substances.
8 L. Pasteur, La Thiorie des germes et ses applications a Ia chirurgie (1878).
Swedenborg's note (SD 3791) is dated November 1, 1748.

9 M. Ramstrom, Emanuel Swedenborg' s Investigation in National Science and the Basis
for His Statements concerning the Functions of the Brain (Upsala: University of Upsala,
1910), p. 23.
10 I. Jonsson, Swedenborgs korrespondensliira (Lund: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969),
p. 272. My translation.
11 I. Jonsson, Vetenskaparen och diktaren, in the collective book, Swedenborg:
sokaren i naturens och andens viirldar (Stockhom: Proprius Vorlag, 1976), p. 24. My
translation.
12 Letter to the author by Prof. Leon James, dated February 3, 1995.
13 Six lengthy chapters of my main work, La Tercera Fuente are dedicated to covering
matters mentioned in Table 5. Obviously, there is no room for that material in this highly
abridged report. La Tercera Fuente is programmed for publication in the nearest future
by Grupo Libro, Madrid.
14 Letter from J. C. Cuno to Swedenborg dated March 8, 1769, in Letters and Memorials
of Emanuel Swedenborg, collected and annotated by A. Acton (Bryn Athyn, Pa.:
Swedenberg Scientific Association, 1949), pp. 650--51 and 653-54.
15 I have chosen to keep Swedenborg's original Latin term and convey to the reader
the peculiar and highly significant meaning he assigned to it. To wit: any kind of empir-
ical or experimental information; i. e.: "[any data] procured from earthly and wordly things
by means of sensuous impressions .... All things which are learnt and stored up in the
memory, and which can be called forth from it for the use of the sight of the mind"
(AC 1846 and 9394). Consequently, this expression neatly matches the theoretical
requisites for positive science as stipulated by empiricists like David Hume, Auguste
Comte, the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle, etc. And indeed, it is to empirical
science that Swedenborg's physical revelations can be and have been collated.
16 It should be stressed that C. 0. Sigstedt's book, The Swedenborg Epic, marvellous and
most accurate in all other respects, contains in this case a seriously mutilated version in
which no less than the extremely important term, scientifica, has been omitted. This defec-
tive version reads as follows: "Another class are delighted with the new things as
curiosities" (The Swedenborg Epic [London: The Swedenborg Society, 1981], p. 234). The
original text reads quite clearly: Alterum genus, qui recipiunt ea ut scientifica, et ut
scientificis, tum ut curiosis delectantur (see Emanuelis Swedenborgii Diarium Spirituale,
ed. Tiibingen and London: J. Fr. I. Tafel, 1843-46, SD 2955).
17 See series SD 2896-98.
18 A selection of twenty-two extensive monographic and fully documented cases is
thoroughly discussed in my main manuscript, La Tercera Fuente. Evidently, this may
be reckoned to amount to quite a substantial body of research evidence.
19 Letter to the author dated Princeton, December 4, 1991.
20 In this connection it ought to be mentioned that some laboratory experiments about
consciousness-related phenomena and the paradoxes of quantum mechanics are at least
as perplexing as my findings. Cf. for instance R. G. Jahn's and Brenda J. Dunne's excel-
lent book, Margins of Reality: the Role of Consciousness in the Physical World (Orlando:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), and John Horgan's "Filosofia cuantica" (Quantic
philosophy) in lnvestigacion y Ciencia (Spanish ed. of Scientific American), September
1992, pp. ?Off.
INDEX OF SWEDENBORG WORKS CITED
AK Regnum animale anatomice, physice, et philosophice perlustratum (Vols. I and

II). The Hague: 1744 (Vol. III, London: 1745). Transl. into English by J. J. G.
Wilkinson: The Animal Kingdom Considered Anatomically, Physically and
Philosophically, London: 1843. Abridged tit.: Regnum anima/e.
Fib. Emanuelis Swedenborgii Oeconomia regni anima/is in transactiones divisa Ill.
Posth. publ. by J. J. G. Wilkinson, London: 1847. Transl. into English by A.
Acton: The Medullary Fibre of the Brain and the Nerve Fibre of the Body. The
Arachnoid Tunic. Disease of the Fibre. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 1918. Abridged
tit.: Fibre.
JD The Journal of Dreams (Dromboken), English version by J. J. G. Wilkinson, revised
by W. R. Woofenden, ed. by The Swedenborg Foundation Inc., New York: 1977.
WE Emanuelis Swedenborgii Adversaria in libros Veteris Testamenti. Posth. publ. by
Dr. J. Fr. Immanuel Tafel, Tiibingen and London: 1847-1854. Transl. into English
by A. Acton: The Word of the Old Testament Explained. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania:
1927-1948. Abridged tit.: Adversaria.
SD The Spiritual Diary. Transl. into English of Swedenborg's Diarium spirituale by
A. W. Acton (Vol. I), G. Bush and J. H. Smithson (Vols. II-III), G. Bush and
J. F. Buss (Vol. IV), and J. F. Buss (Vol. V), publ. by The Swedenborg Foundation
Inc., New York: 1971-1978. Swedenborg himself didn't publish or put any title
to this diary. This was done for the first time by Dr. J. Fr. Immanuel Tafel of
Tiibingen University. In 1843-1846, Tafel transcribed and published the original
Latin manuscript, which is kept at the Royal Academy of Sciences of Stockholm.
The passages I have reproduced, have been collated with the Latin version.
AC Arcana Caelestia quae in Scriptura Sacra seu Verbo Domini sunt detecta; hie
primum quae in Genesi; una cum mirabilibus quae visa sunt in mundo spirituum,
et in coelo angelorum. London: 1749-1756. Transl. into English by J. F. Potts et
al. as Heavenly Arcana Contained in the Holy Scripture or Word of the Lord,
Unfolded, Beginning with the Book of Genesis, Together with Wonderful Things
Seen in the World of Spirits and the Heaven of Angels. The Swedenborg Society,
various eds. and reprintings, London: 1916-1978.
AR Apocalypsis revelata in qua deteguntur arcana quae ibi praedicta sunt, et hactenus
recondita latuerunt, Amsterdam, 1766. Transl. into English by F. F. Coulson, The
Swedenberg Society, London: 1970.
CL Deliciae sapientiae de amore conjugial; post quas sequuntur voluptates insaniae de
amore scortatorio, Amsterdam: 1768. Transl. into English by A. H. Searle: The
Delights of Wisdom Relating to Conjugal Love, after which Follow the Pleasures
of Insanity Relating to Scortatory Love, The Swedenborg Society, London: 1891.
TCR Vera christiana religio continens universam theologiam Novae Ecclesiae,
Amsterdam: 1771. Transl. into English by Wm. C. Dick with the collaboration of
E. A. Sutton: The True Christian Religion, The Swedenborg Society, London: 1975.
SPAS SPASSOV
METAPHYSICS AND VITALISM IN

HENRI BERGSON'S BIOPHILOSOPHY
A New Look
At this time in the progress of molecular biology and its more than
successful analytical approach, dealing with such vitalistic theories as
Bergson's biophilosophical system looks perhaps like an occupation of
a purely historical interest. Vitalism today is indeed nothing but history,
and that is that. Bergson's biophilosophical ideas, which in his time
enjoyed large popularity and influence, have ever since been subject to
numerous critiques showing their misleading vitalistic character. As a
result, the whole of Bergson's biophilosophical theory looks completely
discredited today and is rejected as futile philosophical speculation of
no value for a knowledge of life.
It is this complete rejection of Bergson's biophilosophical theory that
seems to me unjustified. We can hardly expect the rehabilitation of
some of the main ideas of that theory, such as the famous elan vital,
or the concrete ideas on the mechanisms and paths of evolution. The
whole theory, however, is much richer than these concrete ideas, and
far more interesting as a general approach to the always intriguing
problem of the nature of life. Bergson's general approach, based on the
main principles of his philosophy and metaphysics, has some real con-
temporary value and continues to influence some present-day philosophers
of biology.
This last statement may look more convincing when we think about
some of the basic ideas of Bergson's metaphysics, such as the irre-
versibility of development, the essential unforeseeability of the emergence
of new features in evolution, the creative character of time, the role of
chance as an agent of the creativity of evolution (see Pichot, 1987). These
ideas, which underlie Bergson's biophilosophical theory, deserve more
attention than his concrete model of life. It is curious to note that one
of the founders of molecular biology and an eminent adversary of
Bergsonism, the French biologist Jacques Monod, has admitted the
identity of his own ideas on the creativity of evolution, based on the inter-
pretation of molecular biology, with the similar thinking of Bergson,
based on deep metaphysical reasons (cf. Monod, 1970, 130). It is true
197
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LJ/, 197-206.

198 SPAS SPASSOV
that in Bergson's theory of evolution itself there is postulated a "prin-

ciple of life", which is completely contrary to Monod's views. This
postulate, however, does not follow with necessity from the metaphys-
ical premises of Bergsonism. We can find more examples showing not
a fortuitous similarity, but rather an identity, in some points, between
more recent biophilosophical ideas and certain aspects of Bergson's
thought. This is not, of course, evidence for any direct influence. It
only shows that some of Bergson's metaphysical ideas have real con-
temporary value and are still present, at least implicitly, in contemporary
biophilosophy.
Our purpose here is not to make explicit the contemporary value of
Bergson's metaphysical ideas, but rather to show that the postulation
of the vitalistic principle in his biophilosophical theory is not a neces-
sary implication of his metaphysics. Making a distinction between the
concrete vitalistic model of life and its metaphysical foundation in
Bergson's theory is a necessary condition for understanding and justi-
fying the contemporary meaning and influence of that theory. This
distinction, in tum, will become clearer, if we show that the vitalistic
principle is not only insufficiently justified within Bergsonism, but is
indeed completely fortuitous as a postulate from the point of view of
the metaphysical ideas and intuitions which underlie the model.
We can view the whole of Bergson's philosophy as the result of an
original effort to develop some fundamental intuitions, the most impor-
tant of which is, doubtless, the intuition of duration. It is this effort
that underlies all of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology, as well
as his biophilosophy. On this basis, all aspects of Bergsonism are unified
in a coherent whole. This coherence; in spite of Bergson's metaphor-
ical and poetical style, which suggests his views rather than convincing
through analytical reason, allows us to see the internal logic in the devel-
opment of his ideas. In particular, we can and we indeed have to examine
his biophilosophy as a substantial part of his general philosophical ideas
and as their further development and application in a specific area.
Consequently, in order to understand how Bergson's theoretical model of
life is justified in his theory, we have to analyse his biophilosophy in
the context of his more general metaphysical ideas. This analysis will
make clear the distinction between the concrete model of life and the
metaphysical premisses underlying its conceptual basis.
The central question of every theory of life is that of determining
the differentia specifica of the living, or of specifying the fundamental
HENRI BERGSON'S BIOPHILOSOPHY 199
difference between life and non-life, in case such a difference is postu-

lated. In Bergson's biophilosophical theory, this differentiation is made
in a clear and explicit way. It is well known that the fundamental prin-
ciple underlying Bergson's evolutionist theory, as well as his concept
of the tflan vital, is the intuition of duration. We can say that the tran-
sition from the idea of "life in general" to the notion of a substance of
life, and finally to the concept of the elan vital, in Bergson's biophi-
losophy, follows directly from the substantiation of the idea of motion
in his ontology. In a similar way, the absolutisation of continuity in
Bergson's metaphysics leads to the idea of totality in his biophilosophy.
The main aspect of this idea is, as we know, the attribution of a real onto-
logical status to totality or, using his own terms, to a higher degree of
reality, to the whole rather than to the particular. This idea underlies
the notion of the simple and undivided act of creation of complex forms,
as well as the model of evolution of life wherein the emergence of the
multiple is the result of a dissociation of what is by its nature indivis-
ible. Similarly, the whole of Bergson's model of life and especially the
idea of the essential distinction between life and non-life, rests ultimately
on the main principles of his metaphysics. It is this context that we
have to examine in order to see how the model is justified.
The essential difference between living beings and non-living objects,
according to Bergson's theory, results from their different ontological
status. In Bergson's metaphysics, material reality is a continuous whole
characterised by duration. It is artificially divided in isolated systems
by our minds and by science, which can see only some aspects of totality.
Material non-organized bodies and their interactions are in fact cre-
ations of the mind, are abstracted from the totality of the universe. This
activity of mind, however, is not completely fortuitous. It is made possible
by the fact that material reality itself is characterised by its own tendency
to isolate and form natural systems. Thanks to this tendency, we can
define and treat material objects geometrically. This important idea of
Bergson's metaphysics is very explicit (see Bergson, 1957, 10). The
natural tendency to isolate is only a tendency which does not go further.
From an ontological point of view the isolation is never complete. It is
completed only by science. In reality, material systems are subject to
certain external influences which unify them in a continuous whole.
Material bodies and non-organised systems are rather abstractions of mind
and, therefore, do not possess an independent existence.
Living systems, by contrast, are isolated and closed by nature itself,
200 SPAS SPASSOV
which means that, from an ontological point of view, they exist as

independent and individual objects. Living beings are formed by het-
erogenous parts functioning in a complementary way. Thus, they are
the only objects that can be characterised as individuals. On that point,
however, Bergson admits that it is difficult to define the notion of indi-
viduality. The living organism can never be completely isolated from
its surroundings. This is because every individual organism is nothing
but a point of interruption of the original stream of life. No living being
has complete and absolute individuality. Living properties are more ten-
dencies than accomplished phenomena, and organisms possess different
levels of individuality. Yet, inspite of these difficulties, Bergson insists
that individuality is indeed a distinctive characteristic of living systems
(see Bergson, 1957, 15). Even though it is never perfect and complete,
life is always in search of individuality, and by this trend living beings
differ essentially from non-living objects.
If the only specific characteristic of life is a tendency to constitute
naturally isolated and closed systems, however, the difference between
life and non-life appears less rigorous. As we mentioned above, according
to Bergon's theory, mind and science are able to isolate and define
material systems only because nature itself possesses a similar tendency
to constitute isolated and closed systems (on the ontological level). This
tendency is indeed never absolute and complete, and it is completed only
by science. It follows that unorganized systems, as well as living beings,
are subject to certain external influences which unify them in a totality.
Thus, if it is a tendency to individuality that distinguishes living from
non-living beings, we have to conclude that this distinction is not one
involving a principle but is instead a matter of degree of isolation and
organization. This is ultimately a quantitative criterion, something very
contrary to the spirit of Bergsonism.
From this difference between living organisms and non-living systems
follows another, more important one. At the same time, however, the
fundamental characteristics of life and non-life become closer as, in other
terms, the postulation of an essential difference between them becomes
less justified. The living organism is an individual and has an ontolog-
ical status different from that of non-organized bodies. As such, it is
comparable to the whole of the universe, as well as to consciousness,
since according to Bergson they all exist in pure duration. In other words,
all the past of a living organism exists effectively and actively in its
present moment. The living being has its own history, where the con-
tinualness and the irreversibility of duration are signs of the real and effi-
cient presence of time. Since the evolution of life advances in real time
and pure duration, living beings cannot be treated mathematically. The
present moment of an organism is not determined by the moment imme-
diately prior to it, because to describe its present state one needs to
introduce its entire history (see Bergson, 1957, 20).
The present state of a non-living system, on the contrary, depends
exclusively on its state in the moment immediately prior to it. As a result,
it is possible to define the laws of non-living matter by differential
equations wherein time is not real but mathematical. Thus, it is possible
to describe some aspects of the present state of a non-organized system,
studied by science, as a function of its immediate past (ibid., 19). In other
words, all moments of the existence of a non-organized system are iden-
tical, and consequently their states are reversible and their development
is strictly deterministic. Living organisms, in contrast, are historical
beings whose evolution is a continuous, irreversible, and unforeseeable
creation of new forms.
These statements, however, again raise some questions. Non-living
systems defined by science are, from an ontological point of view, only
partially isolated and closed. In reality, they are linked to one another
in the whole of the universe. Thus, as far as they can be reintegrated
in this whole, they can as well be characterised by duration (see Bergson,
1957, 11). The question is then to what exactly do such characteristics
as the reversibility and identity of time refer. Do they describe material
non-organized bodies as ontological phenomena, or rather some of their
aspects as isolated and studied by science? This question is legitimate
in the context of Bergsonism, since Bergson admits the real existence
of material objects, even though he ascribes to them a lower degree of
reality or a lower degree of ontological isolation. In that case, we have
to distinguish between, on the one hand, the material non-living systems
which exist in reality and are, from the ontological point of view, par-
tially isolated from the whole, and, on the other hand, their different
aspects, artificially isolated and enclosed by science in systems existing
as such only in the epistemological sense.
Because of Bergson's metaphorical style, it is difficult to say to what
extent he makes this distinction. In most cases, he uses as synonyms
the terms "material or unorganized objects", and "systems, artificially
isolated by science". This distinction, however, is completely coherent
in the context of Bergson's metaphysics, as it preserves its fundamental
202 SPAS SPASSOV
ideas. In addition, it is grounded on obvious reasons. In fact, there are

many sciences, or points of view of mind - which isolate and observe
different aspects of real objects. None of them, however, nor all of them
together, are able to give a whole and complete description of reality
or of the totality of the relations and interactions of a real object. The
opposite claims, which are more proper to philosophy than to science,
have always been rejected, given time.
This distinction is very important with regard to the problem of life
in Bergson's biophilosophy. It is indeed necessary to specify to what
the postulated essential difference between living and non-living beings
refers when we speak of the non-living- to material unorganized objects
in their ontological existence (with stipulations made regarding their
incomplete isolation), or to the systems, artificially isolated by science.
If the criterion for the differentiation between living and non-living bodies
is the notion of duration, with all the characteristics it involves (such
as the historical character of organisms, the essential irreversibility and
unforeseeability of evolution), we have to acknowledge that only the
second hypothesis can maintain the distinction. In that case, however, the
difference between living and non-living beings again becomes a dif-
ference far from involving a life principle. It is simply true that the
present moment of an organism is not determined solely by the moment
immediately prior to it, as we have to add all of its past. This is, however,
true as well for every unorganized material object which, in its real
totality and not from the point of view of its partial isolation by science,
is just as historical a being as any living being. Its evolution, in this sense,
is similarly irreversible and unforeseeable as a whole. The reversibility
and identity of movements, which allow its mathematical treatment and
make possible the strong determinism of its states, refer only to some
of its aspects as studied by the mind and science. Biological and even
psychological phenomena, in tum, possess these aspects too, which means
that they can also be viewed, from a certain point of view, as being
reversible and so be treated mathematically. This is precisely the kind
of point of view adopted by the different branches of the biological
sciences. In that case, it is similarly true that the sum of all these aspects
is not identical to the whole organism in its totality and real evolution.
All these considerations are completely legitimate in the context of
Bergson's metaphysics. They suggest that we can equally characterise
living beings and non-organized material objects by duration. Since the
latter are related to the whole of the universe, they can be reintegrated,
at least in principle, into that totality. The fact that science is unable to
accomplish their reintegration is equally true for living organisms. It is
worth noting that Bergson's thought is completely coherent on this point
in denying to science the possibility of attaining real knowledge of life
and biological evolution. If, however, this knowledge is more acces-
sible to intuition, that intuition should be able in a similar way to reach
the ultimate essence (the duration) of non-living objects.
If we accept that duration characterises living beings as well as non-
living bodies, it cannot serve as a basis for defining the essential
difference between life and non-life. The concept of duration can be used
as a basis for another distinction between, on the one hand, the scien-
tific method or, more generally, the rationality which studies only
different aspects of objects, and, on the other hand, the ability of a dif-
ferent cognitive faculty to reach the object in its totality. In that case,
if we admit with Bergson that this special capacity is intuition, then
the notion of duration will ground the distinction between an evolutionist
and intuitivist metaphysics like Bergson's and scientific or, more gen-
erally, rational knowledge. Otherwise, if we accept that intuition, as
well as mind, is a product of human historical activity and that its cog-
nitive capacity is as limited as that of mind, then the notion of duration
will only translate the well-known fact that all real knowledge is
inevitably limited.
Finally, a third essential difference between life and non-life in
Bergson's biophilosophy refers to the opposite directions of evolution
in the living and non-living worlds. Life manifests itself, according to
his theory, as an absolute tendency to creation of new forms of organi-
zation. This tendency never takes the form of a pure creative activity,
since it encounters on its way the resistance of unorganized material
which is subject to an opposite movement toward degradation and
disorder. For that reason, the creative stream of life manifests itself rather
as an effort to overcome the resistance of unorganized matter. In other
words, life is possible in any case where the stream of energy has a direc-
tion opposite to that prescribed by the law of entropy, and where some
force is able to check the tendency to degradation (see Bergson, 1957,
246-247). The opposition of life to the Second Law of Thermodynamics
shows that there exists, in the universe, a movement toward creation
and organization, a stream advancing toward creation akin to con-
sciousness. Unorganized matter, which is necessity, and consciousness,
which is liberty, are in opposition to one another, but life, which is an
204 SPAS SPASSOV
intrusion of liberty into necessity, unifies them. Life emerges where the
strong determinism of unorganized matter relates its rigidity (see Bergson,
1982, 13). The living organism is the outcome of the collision between
these two antagonistic tendencies.
The opposition between these two tendencies of evolution in the living
and non-living worlds is the most important basis for the distinction
between life and non-life in Bergson's biophilosophy. If we are precise,
however, this is not a distinction involving principle, but one involving
the direction or the orientation of movement. Bergson's metaphysics is
a dynamist theory wherein the only primary and absolute fact is the
existence of two opposite movements - descending and ascending. It
has been shown, especially by Jankelevitch, that the duality in
Bergsonism is not essentialist. There is an opposition between opposite
tendencies or directions rather than between principles (see Jankelevitch,
1975, 173). The real fact of the existence of opposite directions of
movement in the living and non-living worlds makes possible the pos-
tulation of a special life force of elan vital, or some vitalist principle,
but this is not a necessity. We know today that this possibility is pure
speculation. At the time of Bergson, it is true, the idea of self-organi-
zation as a natural process characterising non-living matter would have
appeared as speculative as the vitalist principle itself. The adoption of
such a principle seems normal then, in addition to being possible. This
normal possibility, however, does not change the fact that the vitalist prin-
ciple in Bergson's biophilosophical theory is not justified and necessary,
but is a superfluous postulation.
An original aspect of Bergson's vitalism is the absence in it of any
assumptions of finality. His theory is free from such essential elements
of the idea of finality as the predetermination of development, orienta-
tion to a goal, the absence of creation and the foreseeability of evolution.
In the theory of elan vital, development is not oriented to any goal or
end. It only implies any finality retrospectively, which means that
harmony may be postulated only with regard to the past, and never to
the future. The lack of finality characterising Bergson's biophilosophy
is grounded in deep metaphysical reasons. It follows directly from the
idea that evolution takes place in real time and is characterised by
duration, from which ensue its creative nature and the essential role of
chance. Chance has indeed an essential place in Bergson's evolutionism.
Since the creation of concrete living forms results from the actual division
of the totality of the original stream of life, life is contingent with regard
to the obstacles encountered at the moment of creation. Thus, life's forms

may never emerge, and their existence is always uncertain.
It is important to note that Bergson allows one exception in this essen-
tial unforeseeability of evolution, which makes his theory less coherent.
The evolution of life is the unfolding of an original trend to introduce
more liberty, consciousness, and creation into the universe, and man is
the highest manifestation of this original stream. Although the stream
of life (elan vital) is not guided by any specific goal, it seems oriented
to some end, which is the human being. It is true that Bergson explic-
itly insists that the emergence of man as he actually appears is by no
means predetermined by the original conditions of life. Yet, his state-
ments maintaining that human beings are the reason for the existence
of all evolution of life and that their emergence is in principle inevitable,
are in contradiction with the non-finality characterising his theory. These
statements are based on the idea that there is a kind of consciousness
(or supraconsciousness) that underlies the origin of life or, ultimately,
on the vitalist postulate in Bergson's biophilosophy.
In spite of these internal contradictions, however, Bergson's evolu-
tionism essentially knows no finality. The original tendency of life which
orients the stream of evolution toward creation and liberty is an intrinsic
characteristic of life, which means that it is a natural orientation in
evolution in the same way that the tendency toward entropy is an inherent
characteristic of non-living matter. The absence of any finality in
Bergson's vitalist theory, which is one of its important and original
features, follows logically from the metaphysical ideas underlying that
theory. This feature, however, instead of supporting the vitalist postulate,
can serve rather as a basis for further reducing the gap between living
and non-living beings. In other words, it actually shows, once again,
the really peculiar character of Bergson's vitalism.
If we return now to the question stated at the beginning of this paper,
we can say that this analysis leads to the conclusion that the vitalist
postulate in Bergson's biophilosophical theory is not a necessary part
of it, is not logically consistent with its metaphysical and methodolog-
ical premisses. The vitalist postulate is not grounded on any essential
distinction between life and non-life, since the only real difference
between them is the opposite direction of their respective evolutions. This
duality of tendencies makes possible the postulation of a vitalist prin-
ciple, but does not require it. We know today that the reverse movement
oriented toward organisation is an inherent characteristic of matter, one
206 SPAS SPASSOV
which does not transgress the Second Law of Thermodynamics. That

means that the adoption of a special principle, such as the famous elan
vital, which has to take into account this fact, is at best useless specu-
lation. Our contemporary knowledge, however, rejects only the concrete
vitalist model of life in Bergson's biophilosophy, not the metaphysical
ideas and intuitions on which it is based. This concrete model, as we have
shown, is relatively independent from the metaphysical and method-
ological context of Bergsonism, since it does not follow necessarily from
its philosophical premisses. As a result, the abandonment of the vitalist
postulate does not lead automatically to the rejection of all of Bergson's
biophilosophical theory.
Bergson's biophilosophy and its concrete model of life and evolu-
tion were never very popular among scientists, not even in his time,
except among some American and English biologists who showed a
certain interest in his ideas. As stated by one of his critics, for most
scientists the theory of the elan vital was nothing but a vague romantic
story told in the field of science (see Barlow, 1966, 71). Yet, it is far more
difficult to estimate the indirect influence of Bergson's ideas and their
value from a larger methodological point of view. A necessary condi-
tion for making that judgement is recognition of the relative independence
of the vitalist model of life, now completely discredited, from the meta-
physical ideas and intuitions which ground Bergson's biophilosophy.
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
REFERENCES
Barlow, M., Henri Bergson (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1966).

Bergson, H., L'Evolution crtiatrice (Paris: P.U.F., 1957).
Bergson, H., L' Energie spirituelle. Paris: P.U.F., 1982.
Jankelevitch, V., Henri Bergson (Paris: P.U.F., 1975).
Monod, J., Le Hasard et Ia m?cessite (Paris: Seuil, 1970).
Pichot, A., "The Strange Object of Biology," Fundamenta Scientiae 8(1) (1987).
PART THREE
THE EGO, SUBJECTIVITY,

AND THE INCARNATED SUBJECT
Louis Houthakker, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Robert Wise at the book exhibit of the Congress.
FERNANDO MONTERO MOLlNER t
EL MITO DE LA SUBJETIVIDAD
Los mitos han sido creaciones imaginativas que, con vistoso reves-
timiento literario, han acompafiado al pensamiento 16gico sin que haya
sido facil fijar una frontera nitida entre ambos dominios, por mas que
muchos autores cientificos o filos6ficos hayan pretendido independizarse
de las fantasias miticas y de Ia irracionalidad que con elias parecia
introducirse en el campo de Ia raz6n. Ahora bien, Ia frecuente simbiosis
entre el mito y el logos a lo largo de Ia historia despierta Ia sospecha
de que no se encuentran tan distantes y de que el segundo, el logos,
encierra una problematicidad afin a Ia mitica, latente en las construc-
ciones racionales como un screto impulso de sus andanzas. 0, dicho
de otra manera, hace pensar que Ia raz6n no puede operar con una estricta
pureza, sin mantener vivos los enigmas que provocan sus indagaciones.
Y que esos enigmas subsisten como un subsuelo sobre el que se elevan
las construcciones te6ricas. El punto de partida de cualquier investigaci6n
es siempre, como decia Ortega y Gasset, un "mundo vital" o, dicho con
formulaci6n husserliana, el "mundo de la vida" en el que se dan cita
las teorias y los engimas que las despiertan, sin que su colisi6n se resuelva
nunca en favor de uno de los dos contendientes. Y, si nos hace falta un
precedente estimulante, bien se puede recordar que en el Timeo (29 d)
Plat6n reconocia que "en estas materias concernientes a los dioses y al
nacimiento del mundo nos basta con aceptar un mito veros{mil y que
no debemos buscar mas lejos". Es dudoso que sea legitimo considerar
Ia subjetividad como cuesti6n divina, pero al menos hay que reconocer
que tiene que ver con el origen cognoscitivo de las cosas que forman
el mundo que vivimos y que constituimos en virtud de lo que John L.
Austin llam6 en How to Do Things with Words Ia funci6n "performa-
tiva" de nuestro lenguaje. Y cuya eficacia "realizadora" se centra en
una idea de subjetividad que funciona como centro aglutinador de las
diversas actividades mentales que, a su vez, condicionan Ia presencia
de su mundo.
Por tanto, a lo largo del recorrido que voy a intentar realizar, quisiera
sugerir que las doctrinas sobre Ia subjetividad que han poblado Ia filosofia
moderna presentan frecuentes elementos que podria calificar como
209

210 FERNANDO MONTERO MOLlNER
"miticos", al menos si se toma este termino con cierta amplitud. Es decir,

significando que la subjetividad encierra una problematicidad, sobre la
que se eleva la eficacia "performativa" dellenguaje, que, en nuestro caso
pretende construir una idea de mente que disimule el fondo problematico
de la identidad que dicha idea reclama de acuerdo con intereses
axiologicos o estimativos que exaltan la unidad del sujeto.
He de advertir, por otra parte, que estas reflexiones, sugiriendo un
"mito" agazapado en el lenguaje de la subjetividad, cuenta con el prece-
dente de la obra de Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind, que se inicia
con la denuncia del "mito cartesiano" centrado en la concepcion de
la res cogitans. Segiin Ryle, ese "mito" es consecuencia de un "error
categorial"' del que solo es posible escapar mediante el anal isis del
lenguaje. Por mi parte intentare rehuir ese "error categorial" cartesiano
apelando a otros motivos de los que aduce Ryle. Lo cual me llevara a
un examen del rechazo de la teoria de Descartes realizado por Kant y
los fenomenologos. Bien entendido que no se tratara de realizar algo
asi como una historia de las discusiones que se han desplegado en pos
de la antropologia de Descartes, sino de una reconstruccion de la teoria
de la subjetividad que, arrancando de la tesis cartesiana, la contraste
con la concepcion de la "intencionalidad" husserliana, pero que con-
ducira a la Idea de "mente" (Gemiit) de Kant. Y con todo ello, no se
pretende exponer unas teorias sobre la subjetividad que sean plausibles
en tanto que se han liberado de todo mito. Pues no se excluye que este
persista de modo latente en doctrinas que hacen gala de una presunta
racionalidad y de que en elias subsista un factor enigmaico que se
disimula en el uso normal del lenguaje o se adorna con argumentos
racionales en muchas de las teorias filosoficas que versan sobre la
subjetividad.
Contando con la escasa relevancia que tuvo el problema del sujeto
en la filosofia griega y con el fuerte ingrediente teologico que perturbo
su planteamiento en la Edad Media, convendni iniciar su estudio mediante
la obra de Descartes. Pues, si es cierto que la teoria cartesiana ha sido
objeto de un rechazo muy generalizado, ello no impide que, como dice
Gilbert Ryle, haya constituido "Ia doctrina oficial" que ha dominado
en buena parte de la filosofia moderna. En efecto, es sorprendente que
un autor tan alejado de Descartes, como fue Henri Bergson, inicie
L' Evolution creatrice con unas consideraciones de fuerte sabor carte-
siano, diciendo que nuestra propia existencia nos ofrece una maxima
certeza, puesto que es la que mejor conocemos. Y tambien Franz
EL MITO DE LA SUBJETIVIDAD 211
Brentano 1 interpreta la "intencionalidad" como una "inherencia" mental

del objeto intencional, pues "todo fen6meno psiquico contiene en sf
algo como su objeto, si bien no todos del mismo modo".
Pero, antes que perdemos en el balance de los autores que se podria
considerar como herederos del cartesianismo, parece que es preciso
indagar lo que sea fundamental en la doctrina de la subjetividad que se
expresa primariamente con el ego cogito cartesiano. Pues de su esclare-
cimiento dependera la caracterizacion de los sistemas que se enfrentan
con su teoria, oponiendole otras altemativas doctrinales. Y, en defini-
tiva, todo ello nos permitira ponderar la justificacion que puedan
arrogarse las que proponen otros modelos de la subjetividad que, en prin-
cipio, estan libres de los defectos de la teoria cartesiana. Y que, de
forma matizada o mas cauta, respondan al motivo central de la bUsqueda
cartesiana, a saber, la justificacion de un ideal racionalista que, como
diria Edmund Husserl, constituye "el vital presentimiento" de la cultura
europea. Pues, en cualquiera de sus formulaciones, la subjetividad ha sido
siempre planteada como el fundamento de la racionalidad que pueda
desplegarse en la conducta teorica o practica del hombre.
Volviendo ala teoria de Descartes, es manifiesto que, como dice Ryle,
el "error cateorial" que cometio consiste en interpretar el ego como
una sustancia, es decir, como una res cogitans. Pero el motivo de esa
confusion sustancialista es mas profundo que el propuesto por Ryle,
que sugiere un simple intento de equiparar el conocimiento de lo mental
con el de las cosas fisicas realizado con exito por Galileo. En realidad,
la teoria cartesiana constituye una rigurosa aplicacion del principio
metodologico de la intuici6n que Descartes habia definido desde las
Reg las para la direcci6n del ingenio como "un concepto de la mente pura
y atenta, tan facil y distinto que no deja ninguna duda en absoluto
sobre aquello que entendemos; o, lo que es igual, un concepto no dudoso
de la mente pura y atenta que nace de la sola luz de la raz6n". 2
Evidentemente esta indicacion sobre el valor indudable de la intuici6n,
asi como la advertencia de que esta nace de la sola luz de la razon, es
decir, que no es el testimonio de los sentidos ni un juicio falaz real-
izado por un torpe entendimiento, nos llevan al centro del sistema
cartesiano. Pero, con vistas a su interpretacion de la mente, interesa
que se precise lo que significa su advertencia de que un concepto intu-
itivo es "distinto". En efecto, en los Principios de Filosofia confirma que
la intuici6n es un "concepto distinto que no deja ninguna duda en
absoluto sobre aquello que entendemos". Pero un texto decisivo se halla
en el apartado 45 de la Primera parte de los Principios, cuando dice

que "distinta es aquella [percepci6n] que, siendo clara, esta tan recor-
tada [sejuncta] y deslindada [praecisa] de todas las otras que no
contiene en s mas que lo que es claro".
Ahora bien, este recorte y deslide o precision de los conceptos
intuitivos no es un mero recurso metodol6gico que valga para diferen-
ciarlos de los conceptos confusos. En el sistema cartesiano la "distinci6n"
posee un valor ontol6gico, pues, cuando responde a las objeciones que
le hizo el P. Bourdin, 3 afirma: "a nosse ad esse consequentia valet".
En el "Resumen de las seis meditaciones siguientes", que precede a las
Meditaciones metaflsicas, desarrolla dicho principia: Pues, si es cierto
que "las cosas que concebimos clara y distintamente son verdaderas
tal y como las concebimos [. . .], debe concluirse de ello que las cosas
que concebimos clara y distintamente como sustancias diferentes - as
el esp{ritu y el cuerpo - son, en efecto, sustancias diversas y realmente
distintas entre s". 4 En las "Respuestas a Arnauld"5 lo confirma diciendo
que "esta es la noci6n de sustancia, lo que puede existir por sf, es
decir, sin el recurso de ninguna otra sustancia; y nunca ha habido quien,
percibiendo dos sustancias por medio de dos conceptos distintos, no
juzgue que son realmente distintas". 6 Por consiguiente, si el "sujeto
pensante", el que tiene conciencia de si mismo como un ego cogitans,
es radicalmente distinto (sejunctus atque praecisus) de cualquier otra
cosa, se podn'l creer que constituye una sustancia espiritual que existe
junto a las cosas materiales que le rodean.
Como es bien sabido, el criterio que adopt6 Descartes para poner de
manifiesto Ia distinci6n sustancial de Ia res cogitans fue su indu-
bitabilidad frente al caracter dudoso que tiene 0 puede tener cualquier
objeto, sea material o sensible, ideal o meramente imaginario. Pues,
sea Ia que se quiera Ia incertidumbre que puede pesar sobre una situaci6n
empirica cualquiera, sobre un objeto real o abstracto, las dudas que asi
se experimentaran no impedirian que, en todo caso, el sujeto por elias
afectado realizase actos de pensamiento, de imaginaci6n o de aparentes
experiencias. La duda se detenia, por tanto, ante Ia actividad consciente
que Ia viviese y s6lo afectaba Ia presunta objetividad de las cosas.
Por supuesto, no voy a entrar en Ia serie interminable de argumentos
que se han levantado en pro o en contra de esta teoria. Muchos de ellos
se enfrentan con el supuesto de que se pudiera dudar de Ia totalidad de
los objetos, dejando inc6lume Ia existencia de pensamiento que los
representase. Pues, en rigor, s6lo se puede dudar de la existencia de un
EL MITO DE LA S UBJETIVIDAD 213
objeto, de una situacion objetiva determinada o de la peculiaridad de

su configuracion cuando son contrastadas con otras situaciones que
merecen mas confianza. Lo cual supone una conexion entre distintos
objetos, cuya coherencia justifique su validez objetiva o la incertidumbre
de los que discrepan de ella. Pues en el caso de que esa coherencia
falle, sobreviene la duda que afecta a los que rompen la logica del
conjunto. Pero en ningun caso tiene sentido una duda universal que anule
la validez de la totalidad de los objectos que Henan el mundo o que
constituyen sus esferas ideales y que excluiria, sin el contraste de ninguna
region ontica la totalidad de los seres. Por consiguiente, cualquier duda
solo puede afectar a una region limitada de objetos, cuya falta de certeza
se tendria que apoyar en la evidencia de que gozan otras zonas del mundo
mas afortunadas.
Una duda universal careceria de los motivos que pueden hacer dudoso
un objeto cuando se advierte su incoherencia con los que forman su
totalidad mundana. Dicho brevemente, solo se puede despertar la duda
en relacion con una objetividad determinada cuando se tiene certeza de
la validez de las otras objetividades que forman su horizonte mundano.
Apelando a la teoria de Husserl sobre el "mundo circundante", que depara
el pun to de partida de la investigacion fenomenologica, 7 "ninguna duda
o rechazo de los datos del mundo natural altera en nada la tesis general
de esa actitud natural. 'El' mundo esta ahi siempre como realidad, a lo
sumo, aqui o alii es 'distinto' de lo que se suponia; esto o aquello puede
ser borrado de el, por decirlo asi, a titulo de 'apariencia', de 'alucinacion',
etc.; [pero] el es, 'en el sentido de la tesis general', un mundo que
existe siempre".
Con otras palabras, una duda que afectase al mundo que vivimos (al
Lebenswelt), entendido como universo de todos los seres reales e ideales,
seria contradictoria pues careceria del contraste de una veracidad que,
centrada en determinados objetos, ofreciera el contrapunto de su certeza,
frente a la cual todo lo demas seria dudoso. En definitiva, careceria de
sentido un mundo que fuese victima de una duda universal, puesto que
toda duda requiere la validez de alguna certeza. Y si esta existe para
contrastar la existencia de lo dudoso, la duda no puede ser universal. Con
otras palabras, no se puede oponer un universo radical y totalmente
dudoso, frente a la evidencia o certeza del sujeto que lo piensa como
un ego reflexivo.
Sin embargo, las argucias que han intervenido en la discusion de la
duda metodica universal como motivo inicial de la teoria cartesiana
han hecho que se pasara por alto el argumento fundamental de que se

vali6 la teoria de la res cogitans es decir, que el sujeto pensante era
una sustancia porque era radical mente distinto (sejunctus atque prae-
cisus) de las otras sustancias que Henan el mundo. Y su distinction
consistia en una absoluta indubitalidad del pensamiento, frente a las dudas
que pudieran afectar a sus objetos. Pero, si se tiene en cuenta que la
misma actividad pensante, el "cogito", esta esencialmente vinculado
con los objetos pensados, sin los cuales careceria de sentido, ;,se puede
mantener la distinci6n que avalaba su indole sustancial? Pues todo
pensamiento lo es necesariamente de un objeto pensado. Es de temer que
si se suprime este mediante un proceso dubitativo universal, que tachara
la vigencia de los objetos reales y de los ideales, incluso de las fic-
ciones de la fantasia que ya son dudosas por su propia indole imaginativa,
el sujeto quedase reducido a una pura actividad carente de toda consis-
tencia. ;,No seria contradictorio un pensamiento que careciera de objetos
o que los conviertiese en entidades radicalmente dudosas, de una con-
sistencia absolutamente negativa? Por tanto, el panorama de las diversas
situaciones objetivas no puede ser anulado dentro de una duda universal
sin que se anule ipso facto el sentido del pensamiento que da testi-
monio de su objetividad.
Estas ultimas consideraciones, rechazando la teoria cartesiana de la
subjetividad, es decir, de la res cogitans concebida como una sustancia
a partir de la presunta distinci6n decidida por su indubitabilidad frente
a cualquier objeto, plantea directamente la teoria fenomenol6gica de la
intencionalidad o de la indole ex-sistencial del sujeto humano. Pues,
en definitiva, la indole intencional de la subjetividad significa su radical
proyecci6n sobre todo objeto que se le haga presente y cuya presencia
se funde con la actividad del sujeto que lo objetiva.
Sin embargo, el concepto de intencionalidad esta muy lejos de ofrecer
una soluci6n facil y c6moda al problema de la subjetividad. Sus for-
mulaciones mas satisfactorias distan mucho de ofrecer un concepto
riguroso de la subjetividad intencional que la acredite como centro y
fundamento de la racionalidad que pueda dominar en el conocimiento
de las cosas o en la conducta practica del hombre. La situaci6n se
complica parad6jicamente si se tiene en cuenta que las versiones de la
intencionalidad que derivan de la defendida por Brentano y que se
extendieron por la filosofia anglosjona a partir de estudio de R. M.
Chisholm "Sentences about Believing,"8 constituyeron una extrafia reposi-
ci6n del subjetivismo cartesiano. Pero lo mas sorprendente es que
este nuevo cartesianismo pudo recoger elementos doctrinales de Ia

sem{mtica de Gottlob Frege y que desemboco en Ia teoria de Ia
"intencionalidad'' de John Searle9 que, de modo inverosimil, sustuvo que
"las significaciones estan en la vasija del cerebro". Es una afirmacion
que hubiera horrorizado al propio Descartes.
Quisiera advertir de entrada que estas discrepancias y las correspon-
dientes dificultades arrancan de la misma problematicidad de Ia
intencionalidad. Es decir, la crisis que haya podido sufrir el concepto
de subjetividad y Ia racionalidad que de ella derive se debe a una com-
plejidad intrinseca de la misma intencionalidad que tal vez sea inevitable.
En todo caso, intentare dejar al desnudo su indole aporetica en lo que
tenga de insoslayable. Y, con objeto de respaldar mis recelos, quisiera
advertir que el propio Husserl dice en la Logica formal y trascendental 10
que, mientras opera Ia intencionalidad haciendo que aparezcan "objeti-
vamente" sus realizaciones, "mientras transcurre asi como vida operante
y objetivante [... ], convierte en tema su objeto, mas, justamente por esto,
ella misma no es por esencia un tema de reflexion. Esta oculta [ver-
borgen] [... ]". Con mas dramatismo dice Teodoro Celms, 11 al afirmar
que Ia intencionalidad, que "es precisamente Ia cualidad fundamental
de Ia conciencia", es "el prodigio de los prodigios".
Lo que hace "prodigiosa" a la intencionalidad es que con ella se dan
cita el sujeto y el objeto, pero de forma que su intima fusion es tal que
carece de sentido hablar de un objeto sin tener en cuenta su presencia
subjetiva; lo mismo que no se puede considerar un sujeto o cualquiera
de sus vivencias sin constatar los objetos o las situaciones objetivas
que con ellas se hacen presentes. Seria absurdo hablar de un "amor"
sin considerar, con mayor o menor precision, que lo es de una persona
o de una cosa amada, lo mismo que carece de sentido considerar un
ser amado sin constatar la subjetividad de quien asi lo experimenta. La
"presencia" de los actos subjetivos y de los respectivos objetos (lo que
Heidegger llamo en el Ser y tiempo Ia "patencia" [die Erschlossenheit]),
en que acaece el "ser en el mundo", constituye el medio en el que se
perfilan unos y otros, sin cuya mediacion carecerian de toda entidad. Hay
que advertir que esta correlacion entre el sujeto y sus objetos inten-
cionales no excluye, en principio, que unos y otros abran los horizontes
intemos y extemos de posibles determinaciones que estan latentes en
su presencia actual y que la trascienden. La exploracion de esa posibi-
lidad va a ocupar parte de nuestro quehacer venidero, tanto en lo que
concieme a las funciones mentales implicitas en la identidad reclamada
por Ia idea de sujeto, como en lo referente a Ia correlativa identidad

del munto que viva cada sujeto como suyo propio. Se podria adelantar,
por tanto, que Ia "trascendencia" va a constituir uno de los problemas
centrales de Ia subjetividad y de su mundo intencional, en tanto que
uno y otro, cada cual a su manera, trascienden su presencia fenomenica.
Ahuyentando los fantasmas que, como advirti6 Gilbert Ryle, han
constituido ese "mito cartesiano" que ha frecuentado Ia filosofia modema,
convendria precisar Ia actitud de Husserl enfrentandola con Ia de Franz
Brentano que, como se recordara, mantenia que "todo fenomeno psiquico
contiene en si algo como su objeto, si bien no todos del mismo modo". 12
La posibilidad de atribuir asi a Ia subjetividad el caracter de un recep-
taculo que, como Ia res cogitans cartesiana, encerrase qua cogitata los
objetos que conoce, es desechada por Husserl en el paragrafo 11 de Ia
quinta de las Investigaciones l6gicas diciendo: "Es en todo caso arries-
gado y con bastante frecuencia erroneo, hablar de que los objetos
percibidos, fantaseados, juzgados, deseados, etc. en forma respectiva-
menta perceptiva, representativa, etc., entran en relacion con ellos de
este o aquel modo, y de que son recibidos en la conciencia de este o
aquel modo, etc.; y asimismo hablar de que las vivencias intencionales
contienen en si algo como objeto, etc. Semejantes expresiones nos
empujan bacia dos malentendidos: primero, que se trata de un proceso
real o de una referenda real que tiene Iugar entre la conciencia y la
cosa 'consciente'; segundo, que se trata de una relaci6n entre dos cosas
que se encuentran por igual realmente en la conciencia, un acto y un
objeto intencional; algo asi como dos contenidos psiquicos encajados
el uno en el otro".
Lo que con ello se rechaza es, por consiguiente, la tentaci6n de
interpretar las vivencias intencionales como entidades que revoloteasen
en el interior de la conciencia y que contuviesen de modo variado el
objeto representado, el cual, por su parte, mantendria una relaci6n real
con la conciencia en Ia que produciria la afecci6n cognoscitiva.
Pero este rechazo de Ia cosificaci6n de la subjetividad a Ia manera
cartesiana, como una entidad que fuese receptaculo de las ideas que
representan su contenido objetivo, desemboca en una valoraci6n del
objeto como motivo fundamental para el conocimiento de una vivencia.
Con otras palabras, Ia fusion que se produce entre esta y el objeto que
con ella se hace presente decide que sea este mismo objeto intencional
el que de Ia clave para el conocimiento de dicha vivencia. De otra
forma, privada de la presencia de los objetos intencionales, en el supuesto
EL MITO DE LA S UBJETIVIDAD 217
de que se pudiera hacer abstracci6n de ellos, la conciencia quedaria

anulada por aquella "esquivez" (elusiveness) que Gilbert Ryle le atribuy6
cuando se prescinde de su revestimiento lingiiistico. 13
Pero en el caso de la fenomenologia husserliana el mismo objeto inten-
cional, es decir, el objeto en tanto que consciente, viene a salvar a la
subjetivividad de esa inquietante vaciedad. Uno de los textos mas
sugestivos de Husser! se halla en el paragrafo 21 de las Meditaciones
cartesianas: "El objeto intencional que esta del lado del cogitatum es
el que desempefia el papel de hilo conductor trascendental para el
descubrimiento de los multipes tipos de cogitationes que en una sintesis
posible llevan en si conscientemente ese objeto como mentado en su
identidad. El punto de partida, en efecto, es necesariamente el objeto dado
en cada caso de modo directo, a partir del cual la reflexi6n retrocede
al correspondiente modo de conciencia y a los modos de conciencia
implicitos en el primero como sus horizontes [... ]" 14
Por consiguiente, el objeto intencional, en su estricta presencia, eli-
minando toda presunci6n sobre su realidad absoluta o prescindiendo de
cualquier forma de especulaci6n que pretendiese alcanzar sus dimen-
siones como una entidad que existiese en si, es el que constituye ahora
el fundamento de toda fenomenologia de la subjetividad. Los modos
de conciencia que le correspondan se deberan manifestar ante todo en
su misma objetividad intencional. Los elementos sensibles que ofrezca
seran el indicio primario de que es un objeto percibido. Asi como el
lenguaje que en el se haya grabado manifestara la inteligibilidad, la indole
noematica que permita su comprensi6n. 0 los valores, los motivos
"ilocucionarios" que revistan su aprehensi6n seran el fundamento de
su contribuci6n a la vida estimativa o practica del sujeto que los viva.
Finalmente, esta presencia polifacetica de los objetos intencionales ofrece
en su misma aparici6n grados de tensi6n o de resistencia que son el
indicio de la actividad o iniciativa subjetiva que ha desplegado el sujeto
que ha hecho posible su presencia objetiva.
Es evidente que con estas sugerencias se abre una problematica que
merece un tratamiento mucho mas riguroso y detenido del que les he
dado. La inmensa variedad de las formas de manifestaci6n te6rica que
adquieren los objetos cuando sus estructuras han sido constituidas por un
lenguaje cientifico corre paralela a las configuraciones que revisten por
obra del lenguaje cotidiano elaborado dentro de diversos circulos cul-
turales o hist6ricos. Pero, en todo caso, ese repertorio de objetividades
intencionales no pretende poner al descubierto dimensiones radicales
de las cosas que causen diversas formas de representaci6n en la intimidad

de una conciencia. Ni, por otra parte, revelan procesos psiquicos que
reproduzcan en esa intimidad Ia peculiaridad de sus objetos o que les
afiadan elementos mentales de tipo representativo que funcionen como
formas sustitutorias (''formae vicariae" de su autentica entidad, decian
los escoh1sticos medievales).
Pero, eliminadas las interpretaciones que pretendan rebasar Ia estricta
presencia del fen6meno, Ia dificultad del objeto intencional reside en
su misma simplicidad: hay que tomarlo en su misma aparici6n consciente,
sin dejamos llevar por presunciones que dependan de metodologias cien-
tificas o filos6ficas mas sofisticadas. Hay que registrar sus estructuras
inteligibles, especialmente las que se ofrecen en lo que tienen de hablados
los objetos de acuerdo con tradiciones, costumbres, etc. que cooperan
en su objetivaci6n. Lo mismo que hay que resefiar las formas empiricas
que Henan su experiencia o los motivos axiol6gicos que presiden su
tratamiento practico. Pero todo ello cuenta con Ia asistencia de Ia
iniciativa o de Ia actividad que, como el "yo profundo" de que hablaba
Ortega y Gasset, actua promoviendo toda presencia objetiva. Pues
cualquier percepci6n se ejerce en virtud de Ia expectaci6n que, de formas
muy variadas, nos enfrenta con el mundo empirico, lo mismo que en
el ejercicio dellenguaje o de cualquier expresi6n simb6lica se hace visible
Ia iniciativa que los pone en juego. Mucho mas ostentosa es Ia pre-
sencia de esa actividad en Ia realizaci6n de Ia vida pasional o en Ia
actividad motriz que nuestro soma realiza en el ejercicio de las experi-
encias o en Ia emisi6n de cualquier forma de lenguaje. Sin embargo,
es decisivo constatar que todas esas actividades carecerian de sentido
si no determinasen Ia presencia de los objetos intencionales, en Ia que
queda inscrita Ia misma tensi6n de Ia iniciativa que les da vida junto
con las peculiaridades empiricas o inteligibles que dichos objetos revisten.
A estas alturas, se podria temer que Ia "intencionalidad" se exceda
en su enfrentamiento con el subjetivismo cartesiano. Frente a Ia "res
cogitans" cerrada en si misma, atrincherada en el esplendido aislamiento
de su radical evidencia como recinto de seres ideales que se consumen
en su vida reflexiva, Ia "intencionalidad" parece proponer Ia disper-
si6n de Ia conciencia en ambitos objetivos empiricos o racionales, que
s6lo retienen de su ser subjetivo Ia huella de Ia iniciativa que ha
promovido su presencia o que se ha visto sorprendida por el asalto de
Ia experiencia. Apenas Ia salva de esa desintegraci6n en Ia infinidad de
los objetos intencionales que vive conscientemente el que su actividad,
esa iniciativa que constituye el centro radical de la vida de todo subjeto,

posea un caracter fundamentalmente individual, osea, que cada cual
realiza originariamente su propia iniciativa, aunque preste su cooperacion
ala de otras gentes, o se oponga a las actividades que estas realiceno Pero,
en cualquier caso, la iniciativa que pone a la luz el propio mundo
empirico o ideal y que les inyecta un impulso dinamico como mundos
que imponen tareas o resistencias para su ejecucion, es de suyo una
actividad que no tiene otro contenido que el de los objetos intencionales
que forman esos mundos en que se dispersa como conciencia activao
Ni siquiera basta para salvarla de esa dispersion el que funcione
como una actividad somaticao Precisamente en sus ultimos escritos,
especialmente en las Meditaciones cartesianas, Husser! ha destacado
la importancia que tiene el "soma", es decir, el "cuerpo vivo" en la
constitucion del sujeto humanoo Entre los cuerpos que forman la "natu-
raleza que me es propia", dice, "encuentro mi soma [meinen Leib] con
una preeminencia unica, a saber, como el unico que no es un mero cuerpo
[Korper], sino justamente soma, el unico objeto [o o] al que atribuyo,
0
conforme a la experiencia, campos de sensacion [o 0 0], el unico en el

que mando y actuo [schalte und waite] de modo inmediato, gobemando
particularmente en cada uno de sus organos" 15 Y, si se tiene en cuenta
0
que el soma agrupa el repertorio de actividades por las que vive cada
sujeto su "mundo primordial", es decir, el mundo de las experiencias
originarias que tiene de las cosas, es importante destacar tambien que ese
mundo es el campo de las "referencias" mutuas que se cruzan entre si
las experiencias, estableciendo la red de "remisiones" (Verweisungen) que
cruzan entre si esas experiencias, constituyendo un espacio y un tiempo
originarioso Pues todo espacio se extiende desde el "aqui'' marcado por
el propio soma, lo mismo que todo tiempo se dilata desde el "ahara"
que vive el soma de cada individuoo Nose puede negar la importancia
que tiene esa somaticidad temporal y espacial originarias para la dilu-
cidacion de lo que sea la mundanidad que es propia de cada sujetoo Desde
ella se constituye la presencia del "alter ego" como un sujeto que, en
la medida en que opera en otro soma, que el vive con su propia inmedia-
tez, se presenta como extraiio, solo cognoscible mediante una impatfa
[eine Einfiihlung] que, en el caso de la teoria husserliana, pondera la
alteridad del otroo Ello supone, sin embargo, que su existencia acaece
en un mundo que vale fundamentalmente como "el mismo" que es vivido
por todos los sujetos que se conocen como afines y que realizan activi-
dades comunicativas dentro de su inevitable extrafiezao
Se puede advertir que con la intrusi6n del mundo se ha restringido

la dispersi6n de la subjetividad de cada individuo que parecia estar
impuesta por la teoria de la intencionalidad. En efecto, en cualquiera
de los tres niveles mundanos que Husserl estudia (el del mundo de Ia
vida concreto, el del mundo de Ia vida originario y el del mundo
primordial) tienen una especial relevancia las relaciones de "cumpli-
miento" o de "referencia" que se cruzan entre los diversos fen6menos
que los integran y que hacen que cada uno de los objetos no se halle
nunca aislado, sino que remita a los que forman con el una situaci6n
objetiva y, en definitiva, el mundo. El mundo de Ia vida concreto, estu-
diando especialmente en las Meditaciones cartesianas y en La crisis
de las ciencias europeas, esta constituido por las situaciones que vivimos
en nuestra conducta espontanea dentro de un determinado ambito cultural
y que forman campos objetivos que se completan mutuamente o que,
en ocasiones, se enfrentan mediante contrastes que tienen tambien su
regularidad. En el tienen una especial importancia las noticias cienti-
ficas que se han popularizado y que son decisivas en las actividades
tecnicas que dominan en nuestro tiempo. Pero en ese mismo mundo de
Ia vida concreto se han depositado con una coordinaci6n variada las
creencias religiosas, las valoraciones esteticas, politicas o juridicas, etc.
que prevalecen en nuestra cultura y que nos hacen herederos de un pasado
remoto o que nos abren bacia horizontes previsibles. Aunque Husserl
insista en que este mundo de Ia vida concreto es s6lo el "punto de
partida" para la bUsqueda de las funciones de la conciencia o de las
experiencias que lo han suscitado, no cabe duda de que constituye un
panorama de objetivaciones de gran riqueza, sometido a las formas
16gicas que rigen el conocimiento cientifico o que evitan el contrasen-
tido en sus realizaciones mas elementales. Su planteamiento en La crisis
de las ciencias europeas - como destino de nuestra historia europea,
que proviene del legado racionalista helenico - alcanza un evidente
patetismo, bien comprensible si se tiene en cuenta los momentos politicos
en que dicha obra fue escrita, en una Europa agitada por exultantes
nacionalismos, por enfrentamientos sociales 0 etnicos.
Con toda su fuerza seductora, el mundo de Ia vida concreto es solo
el punto de partida para el retroceso bacia las funciones de la subjetividad
trascendental que hayan colaborado en su construcci6n con la experiencia
que subyace a las ideas o los productos estrictamente racionales. En
este nivel basico se halla el mundo de Ia vida originario estudiado en
Experiencia y juicio. Su exposici6n constituye el mas sorprendente
despliegue de estructuras empiricas que se agrupan y diferencian segun

"tipos" diversos de objetividad empirica, en los que se anticipan, en su
estricta indole sensible, las "objetividades inteligibles" que corresponden
a las que rigen la licitud logica de pensamiento, asi como los "juicios
de experiencia" que cumplen el sentido noematico formado par los
juicios. Pero todo ella forma una trama mundana en la que el "ahara
viviente", que es propio de cada sujeto o colectividad, establece un centro
de referencia que agrupa a los fenomenos en la triple dimension de su
presente, pasado y futuro. Finalmente, la unidad del mundo se acentua
cuando entra en juego el mundo primordial estudiado especialmente en
las Meditaciones cartesianas y que pone de manifiesto la funcion del
soma de cada individuo como centro de la espacialidad originaria que
agrupa todos los fenomenos en tomo al "aquf" propio del sujeto que
los experiments. Pues, una vez mas, cada objeto dista mucho de ser un
ente aislado: su aparicion en el contomo que descubre el soma acaece
vinculandolo con una multitud de experiencias, a las que remite su pres-
encia.
Es evidente que la fenomenologia del mundo de Ia vida husserliano,
al destacar la unidad que ofrece en cualquiera de sus dimensiones y
formas historicas de realizacion, depara una excelente motivacion para
establecer la unidad de la subjetividad y recuperarla en cierta medida
frente a la dispersion a que parecia someterla la intencionalidad, volcada
en los objetos intencionales que constituian el "hila conductor" para el
hallazgo de las respectivas funciones subjetivas. Ahara ya no se trata
de objetos aislados 0 dispersos, cuya pertenencia al mismo sujeto solo
dependia de una evanescente actividad o iniciativa que, par su mero flujo,
parecia incapaz de introducir ninguna unidad o identidad propias de la
conciencia; pues nos hallamos ante una subjetividad trascendental, es
decir, determinante de la constitucion logica del mundo, en el que domina
la unidad de estructuras objetivas que delata la sintesis de las funciones
cognoscitivas o practicas que cooperan en la expresion del mundo.
Sin embargo, me temo que seria precipitado dar par terminado nuestro
recorrido y considerar salvada una subjetividad que disfrutara de una
racionalidad cuasi-cartesiana, como si la consciencia que en ella luce
diese cuenta rigurosa, no solo de los fundamentos racionales de su unidad,
sinto tambien de la racionalidad a priori que pudiese gobemar sus
funciones cognoscitivas o axiologicas y que se reflejase en la constitu-
cion intencional de su mundo. Es posible que se introduzca una viva
desconfianza ante el aparente optimismo de esta conclusion si realizamos
un elemental repaso de las situaciones catastr6ficas (guerras, fanatismos,

revoluciones) con que Ia cultura europea se ha enfrentado a partir del
momento en que asumi6 Ia herencia del legado racionalista helenico.
0 si consideramos el cumulo de problemas sin resolver, de enigmas
inquietantes, que nos asaltan desde unas ciencias que sin duda han
realizado portentosos avances, pero que est{m muy lejos de dar una
respuesta cabal a todos los interrogantes que las acosan. Y, en defini-
tiva, no son menos los problemas que ofrece Ia comprensi6n de Ia misma
vida concreta de las gentes. El recurso a las secreciones hormonales o
a las claves geneticas esta muy lejos de resolver el problema de Ia iden-
tidad de cada sujeto que ofrece formas de conducta incoherentes. Y
mucho me temo que los progresos de Ia ciencia modema estan lejos de
dar una respuesta definitiva a lo que sea en ultima instancia Ia raciona-
lidad que el sujeto humano pone en juego. l,Podemos garantizar que el
Logos que hoy dirige Ia marcha de las investigaciones o que permite
una compresi6n culta del universo seguira vigente en los tiempos
venideros como fruto de una subjetividad que hemos valorado como
fundamento de Ia racionalidad?
No se que respuesta hubiera dado Husserl a estos interrogantes. Es
cierto que en buena parte de su obra domin6 un apriorismo que le llev6
a combatir ampliamente el "psicologismo" en los Prolegomenos a Ia
Logica pura que inician las Investigaciones lOgicas, afirmando que seria
"un contrasentido el pensamiento de que/ el curso del mundo pudiera
negar alguna vez las /eyes lOgicas - aquellas /eyes analiticas del pen-
samiento [ . . .] o de que Ia experiencia, Ia matter of fact de Ia
sensibilidad, deberia y podr{a ser Ia que fundase esas /eyes y prescri-
biese los limites de su validez". 16
Sin embargo, esta actitud pudo adoptarla Husserl cuando lanzaba en
el afio 1910, en "Lafilosofia como ciencia rigurosa", una viva diatriba
contra el historicismo de Dilthey. No obstante, a partir del afio 1925 cabi6
profundamente su valoraci6n de la Historia al introducirla como elemento
positivo en la constituci6n de los mundos de Ia vida concretos de que
arranca el analisis fenomenol6gico. En el Apendice XXVIII de La crisis
de las ciencias europeas aparecen dos frases que son inquietantes. En
sus primeras lineas 17 advierte que "la filosofia como ciencia, autentica,
rigurosa, apodicticamente rigurosa: ese sueno se ha desvanecido". Pero
si queda alguna duda sobre cual pueda ser la filosofia a la que se refiere
(l,la racionalista de tiempos pasados? l,la suya propia que fue calificada
como "ciencia rigurosa" en el afio 1911 ?), en las ultimas lineas del mismo
Apendice XXVIII 18 afiade algo que parece dirigir esos recelos bacia el
propio pensamiento: "i,Que pensador independiente [Selbstdenker] ha
quedado jamas satisfecho con su 'saber', para quien Ia 'filosofla' ha
dejado de ser un enigma [Riitsel] a lo largo de su vida filos6fica
[...]?".
Pero en Iugar de dejarme arrastrar por discusiones bizantinas que
apelasen, no s6lo a los escritos publicados por Husser!, sino tambien a
los testimonios de sus amigos y discipulos y a su voluminosa corre-
spondencia, quisiera recurrir al apoyo retrospectivo de Manuel Kant, pues
creo hallar en el una valiosa aportaci6n fenomeno16gica en relaci6n con
el problema de la subjetividad. Se trata de lo que Kant expone en los
dos Apendices ("El uso regulador de las ideas de la raz6n pura" y "El
objetivo final de la dialectica natural de la raz6n humana") que siguen
a "La dialectica trascendental" en Ia Crit{ca de la raz6n pura. Lo que
perturba su lectura es que estos Apendices no se dedican a rechazar el
uso dogmatico y especulativo que Ia metaflsica tradicional habia hecho
de las Ideas trascendentales del alma o de Ia mente, del mundo y de Dios,
sino que propone un "uso regulador" de las mismas, es decir, un "uso
apropiado" que no s6lo respete los limites del conocimiento empirico,
sino que ademas pueda completarlo introduciendo una sistematizaci6n
arquitect6nica en todo el campo de la raz6n.
Pero, como no es el momento de hacer un amplio panegirico del uso
legitimo de las Ideas trascendentales, me limitare a considerar la que
nos concieme mas de cerca: Ia Idea de "mente" (Gemiit). Es el nombre
que Kant le da con mas frecuencia, aunque en ocasiones la denomine
tambien "alma" o "sujeto pensante". Creo que su preferencia por aquel
primer nombre se debe a que estaba menos comprometido con las
psicologias racionales de que Kant queria distanciarse. En el Opus
postumum precisa en dos ocasiones que esa "Gemiit" era tambien la
"mens" o el "animus".
Pues bien, el acceso a ese "uso regulador" de Ia "mente" lo realiza
Kant despues de haber desechado los "paralogismos" cartesianos que
habian pretendido fundamentar el conocimiento de la res cogitans en una
supuesta intuici6n intelectual inserta en el principio de la apercepci6n
transcendental, segun el cual "el yo pienso tiene que poder acompaiiar
todas mis representaciones" (B 132). Sin embargo, segun Kant, esa
deducci6n de la sustancialidad del yo pienso es insostenible pues no
disponemos de ninguna intuici6n de la mente como un sustrato perma-
nente de sus acciones. La intuici6n, que segun Descartes habia sido el
acceso metodologico a Ia res cogitans, habia quedado restringida, segun

Kant, a los fenomenos empiricos. Y de Ia mente solo tenemos Ia confusa
experiencia que facilita un sentido interno que representa el flujo de
los fenomenos, su curso temporal.
Desechado asi, como un "paralogismo", el concimiento intuitivo de
Ia mente o de Ia res cogitans cartesiana, Kant se enfrenta con el problema
de Ia justificacion del uso regulador que le atribuye. Desde un comienzo,
en el Apendice "El uso regulador de las Ideas de Ia razon pura", ya
apunta que el ejercicio de Ia razon consiste en el intento de lograr una
sistematizacion del conocimiento, aunque para ello se valga de una Idea
que opere solo de forma problematica o hipotetica. Pues bien, como
ejemplo de lo que sea esa sistematizacion ideal que persigue Ia unidad
de las actividades cognoscitivas humanas, Kant se enfrenta con el caso
de Ia superacion de Ia diversidad de las facultades que se atribuye a Ia
mente humana, como son "Ia sensacion, Ia conciencia, Ia imaginacion,
Ia memoria, el ingenio, el discernimiento, el placer, el deseo, etc." (A
649/B 677). Pues "de entrada, una maxima logica exige que reduz-
camos lo mas posible esa diversidad descubriendo por comparacion su
identidad oculta [versteckte Jdentitiit] y que examinemos si Ia imagi-
nacion, asociada a Ia conciencia, no equivaldra al recuerdo, al ingenio,
al discernimiento o acaso incluso al entendimiento y a Ia razon. Aunque
Ia logica no pueda comprobar Ia idea de una facultad basica
[Grundkraft], esta constituye al menos el problema de una representacion
sistematica de Ia diversidad de las facultades. El principia logico de Ia
razon exige que consigamos tal unidad en Ia medida de lo posible y,
cuanta mas identidad se descubra entre los fenomenos de unas y otras
facultades, tanto mas probable sera que constituyan diferentes mani-
festaciones de una misma facultad que podemos llamar, desde un punto
de vista relativo, su facultad basica".
Entre las diversas indicaciones que aparecen en este texto se destaca,
sin duda, Ia indole "oculta" que Kant atribuye a Ia "identidad" en que
consiste Ia mente y que sintoniza con Ia advertencia de que las Ideas
trascendentales solo funcionan de modo hipotetico o problematico, es
decir, como ideas heuristicas que guian Ia investigacion, pero que carecen
de una absoluta evidencia de su objeto. En el caso de Ia mente, dice
Kant (A 647/B 675), se trata de Ia idea de una "unidad proyectada"
que "hay que considerar como un problema, no como una unidad dada
en si''. 0, con otros terminos, se trata de una idea puramente hipotetica
(A649/B677) que postula Ia unidad de las multiples y variadas activi-
dades humanas, como si procediesen de una "facultad basica" que fuese

su origen comun.
Esta indole originaria de la mente ha tenido su aparicion en varios
momentos anteriores, aunque desperdigados, de la Crftica de Ia raz6n
pura. En efecto, al iniciar la "L6gica trascendental", dice Kant que
"nuestro conocimiento surge de dos fuentes fundamentales de la mente
(des Gemuts): la primera es la facultad de recibir representaciones
(receptividad de las impresiones); la segunda es la facultad de conocer
un objeto por medio de tales representaciones (espontaneidad de los
conceptos). Por medio de la primera se nos da un objeto; por medio de
la segunda lo pensamos en relacion con la representacion (como simple
determinacion de la mente)" (A50/B74). Esta alusion ala "mente" como
origen de las dos fuentes fundamentales del conocimiento coincide con
la ape lac ion a una "raiz comun, desconocida para nosotros", de la que
proceden los "dos troncos del conocimiento humano", o sea, "la sensi-
bilidad y el entendimiento", que es aludida en la "Introducci6n" de la
Crftica de la raz6n pura (A15/B29).
No se puede negar que esta apelacion a la mente como identidad oculta
subyacente a la diversidad de los actos de la razon y que, como facultad
basica es la raiz comun, desconocida para nosotros, de la que proceden
los dos troncos del conocimiento humano, introduce una cierta perple-
jidad en la teoria kantiana de la subjetividad humana. Es cierto que,
eliminando todo residuo de la teoria cartesiana de una res cogitans
cerrada en su intima clausura, abre paso a la concepcion husserliana de
la intencionalidad, que estudia las actividades de la conciencia en virtud
del analisis de los respectivos objetos intencionales. Pero, subrayando
que esas actividades racionales deben unificarse como funciones de una
mente unitaria, cuya unidad se refuerza con la que tenga su mundo
intencional, es importante subrayar el aire enigmatico que la teoria
kantiana ha introducido, o la problematicidad con que plantea esa unidad
del sujeto. Bien entendido que se trata de una problematicidad positiva
en tanto que es "heurfstica", es decir, en cuanto constituye un problema
siempre abierto a indagaciones que deben reforzar al maximo los vinculos
que unen a las distintas actividades mentales o a las correspondientes
secciones del mundo de Ia vida que son siempre el "hilo conductor"
que deparan los materiales para conocer aquellas actividades.
Como colofon de esta problematicidad que pesa sobre el concepto
kantiano de mente, es interesante destacar un texto que queda perdido
en las ultimas lineas del paragrafo 21 de la "Deducci6n de los con-
ceptos puros del entendimiento" y que de modo dramatico viene a

destacol las consecuencias que tiene la indole problematica de la Idea
de mente. En efecto, despues de estudiar como las categorias condicionan
las intuiciones sensibles para constituir la objetividad de las cosas
conocidas, afiade: "Sin embargo, no se puede indicar un fundamento
(Grund) de la peculiaridad que posee nuestro entendimiento - y que
consiste en realizar a priori la unidad de la apercepcion solo por medio
de categorias y solo por media de este tipo y de este m1mero de cate-
gorias - [asi] como no se puede sefialar par que tenemos precisamente
estas y no otras funciones del juicio o par que el tiempo y el espacio
son las unicas formas de nuestra intuicion posible" (B 145-146).
Evidentemente, estas preguntas solo tendrian respuesta si nuestra razon
hubiera podido calar en lo que fuese la mente como facultad basica de
las funciones cognoscitivas. Pero su problematicidad, su indole mera-
mente hipotetica, cerraba el paso a una posible dilucidacion de lo que
fuese la intrinseca racionalidad de la subjetividad que esa mente poseyera.
Con otras palabras, el sujeto trascendental quedaba tambien inmerso
en la problematicidad de Ia mente, pues seria un contrasentido que, como
estructura fundamental de la misma, expresiva de su vinculacion inten-
cional con los objetos, gozara de una racionalidad que se ausentaba
cuando se planteaba la identidad de la mente o la fundamentaci6n de
sus facultades.
Para terminar solo quisiera destacar que la crisis de la subjetividad,
es decir, la crisis del supuesto de que el sujeto humano es el portador
de una tarea racional que se realiza en el dominio de la ciencia, en el
de la etica, en su vida social, en la creacion artistica, etc. parece estar
implicita, como tal crisis, en los sistemas filosoficos de dos de los autores
mas caracteristicos del racionalismo europeo.
Esa crisis de la subjetividad racional esta presente en Ia obra de Kant
desde el momenta en que plantea el sujeto pensante o Ia mente como
el fundamento de la actividad racional que, sin embargo, rehuye una
rigurosa intuicion intelectual y se pierde en las brumas de lo que solo
es conjetural. En el caso de Husser!, cabe preguntar si la misma inten-
cionalidad que proyecta las vivencias en sus objetos intencionales no
acaba por desintegrar Ia unidad de la subjetividad transcendental que vive
el mundo polifacetico formado par esos objetos y cuyas mutuas refer-
encias o nexos no logran superar la diversidad de las funciones humanas
que los viven. Mas aun, si Ia historia quedo incrustada en el mundo de
Ia vida concreto, como acontece en las ultimas obras de Husser! (en
las Meditaciones cartesianas y en La crisis de las ciencias europeas),

l,COn que garantias se puede mantener el valor a priori, estrictamente
racional, de las actividades subjetivas que habian determinado la con-
creci6n de esos mundos, que habian sostenido las 16gicas formales que
habian formulado sus principios racionales supremos?
Es decir, cabe indagar si los dos sistemas que han ponderado con
mas enfasis la subjetividad racional que constituye la objetividad de
las cosas o que rige la conducta humana, los sistemas de Kant y Husserl,
encierran el reconocimiento de que la racionalidad de la subjetividad
humana incluye enigmas y limitaciones, que se proyectan en las estruc-
turas mundanas que el hombre vive te6rica y practicamente. l,La crisis
de las ciencias europeas no significa en rigor la crisis de una subjetividad
que no ha podido mantener la vigencia del a prior te6rico y practico
por encima de las vicisitudes de la historia concreta que debe ser recono-
cida como ingrediente del mundo concreto que todos vivimos y del que
arranca toda indagaci6n sobre lo que es racional? Husserl apelaba al
legado de la racionalidad griega como telos de la tarea que los europeos
hemos de realizar. Pero el espectaculo de las guerras brutales, de la
intolerancia que ha cruzado la historia y que se acenrua en nuestro siglo,
l,no es motivo suficiente para poner en duda la vigencia de una raciona-
lidad protagonizada por la subejetividad humana? Y, en definitiva, j,es
que cualquiera de los sistemas que han apelado a la racionalidad como
protagonista de la subjetividad humana ha estado en condiciones de
garantizar sus derechos? El concepto de una subjetividad que genera
racionalidad, l,nO ha sido uno de los mitos que han movido la historia
de Europa? 0, apelando a la formula de Husserl, l,no sera un "vital
presentimiento" del que afortunadamente no podemos prescindir, pues
mantiene vivo el ideal de una racionalidad que, ciertamente, no ha dejado
de seducir desde el momento en que se vislumbr6 en Grecia?
Universidad de Valencia
NOTES
t This is the last work of the eminent Spanish thinker who left us a short time before
the Congress.
1 Psicologia desde un punto de vista empirico (Libro II, Capitulo 1~ . parrafo 5).
2 Regulae ad directionem ingenii, III' (Ed. Adam et Tannery, vol. X, pp. 368-369).
3 "Septimas objeciones" (ed. Adam et Tannery, vol. VII, pp. 519-520).
4 Meditationes de prima philosophia, "Synopsis sex sequentium meditationum" (ed.

Adam et Tannery, vol. VII, p. 13).
s "Respuestas a Arnauld. Cuartas objeciones" (Ed. Adam et Tannery, vol VII, p. 226).
6 Ibid.
7 Ideas para unafenomenologia pura, partgr. 30 (HUA. III, p. 63/9).
8 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1955-56).
9 Intentionality, cap. 8, p. 197.

10 Formate und transzendentale Logik, Paragr. 8 (HUA. XVII, p. 38).
11 El idealismo fenomenol6gico de Husser/, p. 44 (Ed. Rev. de Occ.).
12 Cf. supra p. 211.
13 Cf. H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind.
14 Meditaciones cartesianas, paragr. 21 (HUA. vol. I, p. 8717).
IS Meditaciones cartesianas, 51 ., paragr. 44 (HUA. I, p. 127/27).
16 Investigaciones 16gicas, 6". (HUA. vol. XIX/2, p. 728/13).
17 La crisis ... , Apendice XVJII (HUA, vol. VI, p. 508/5).
18 Ibid., p. 512136.
FRANCISCO LOPEZ-FRIAS
ORTEGA Y GASSET'S EXECUTIVE I AND HIS

CRITICISM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEALISM
1. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
During the first third of the 20th century, a vast intellectual movement
- aware that epochs truly fecund and creative in philosophy are also
periods of the flourishing of metaphysics - made a comeback after a brief
but intense positivist parenthesis. 1 Since Fichte, a certain need to link
thought to life, in the concrete sense of the latter's having primacy over
the former, had been intuited; but the return would not be to any earlier
metaphysics, either traditional or modem. The Occidental philosoph-
ical panorama found itself in the position of having to tackle one of
the most serious questions of its historical journey, that is, the possi-
bility of abandoning idealism and, as a consequence, putting an end to
the modem age. 2
The Logical Investigations of Husserl (1900-1901), originally con-
ceived as a philosophical explanation of pure mathematics, were in reality
the beginning of phenomenology, a philosophical movement which would
exert a powerful influence on European thought until the middle of the
century. But its content, as well as that of Husserl 's lectures at Gottingen
(1907), went unnoticed, as did also an article, Philosophy as a Strict
Science (1911), and a book, Ideas (1913). This made it possible, within
philosophies of life, for some, such as Ortega, to develop their thought
outside of its influence. The second edition of Logical Investigations
(1913), nonetheless, found in Ortega an avid reader- his was the first
serious reading of phenomenology outside of Germany - although at
this point his thought already went against the grain of idealist inertia.
This work denounced the insufficiency of the conceptual categories in
vogue not, as later in Ortega, in order to justify the surmounting of
idealism but rather to intensify it and endow it with the rigor and neatness
which it lacked. 3
In 1913 Ortega dedicated a conference 4 and an article 5 to phenome-
nology. The first is built on a brief allusion to the phenomenological
notion of intuition, while the second is one of the first clear and precise
visions of the very new phenomenological movement. It consists of com-
229
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LJJ, 229-248.

230 FRANCISCO LOPEZ-FRIAS
mentaries on three articles by Heinrich Hoffmann; in the commentary the

concept of executiveness, as the opposite of the phenomenological reduc-
tion, already appears (four times). This is a text which has been
considered, along with others of the same year, as "the first Ortegian sur-
mounting of phenomenology".6 In it appears the first incipient version
of the circular method. 7 Although there is almost no criticism, but rather
an interpretation of phenomenology, his distance from the doctrine is
evident. It became even clearer in Meditations on Quijote, his first
book, which he wrote in 1913 and published in 1914.8 Another more
explicit text will appear that same year as the prologue to a book of
poems, and to it we will return below. 9
Philosophy as a way of life, as well as a way of theorizing, has never
been alien to philosophers and had already been glimpsed in various
moments of history. 10 But the clear and express awareness that that which
the theory should be build upon is precisely life itself was reserved for
an epoch which, like ours, could be the culmination and synthesis of
the two great metaphysical experiences. In 1914 the European mind
was at the point of turning to such philosophy because it found itself
in the final span of idealism, the surmounting of which brought with
it, nonetheless, extraordinary difficulty, not only for Ortega, but also
for Germans like Hartmann and Heimsoeth, co-disciples in Marburg. The
later Husserl (of the "lifeworld") and some of his disciples put in the
hands of this and following generations a valuable instrument with which
to carry out the task."
2. SOME KEYS TO A THOUGHT NOT AT ALL "MODERN"
An objectivist stage (1902-1313) in Ortega's work 12 has been spoken

of, as well as a phenomenological one after 1913. 13 But both the supposed
objectivism- rather a sort of Platonized realism according to Rodriguez
Huescar- (op. cit., p. 39) and the phenomenology- the rigor and neatness
of which made him see with more clarity that "it committed ... the
same errors as the old idealism" (C. W. VIII, 47-48) - were no more than
fecund culture broths which fostered rapid evolution in the embryonic
situation of a clearly outlined original thought. 14 The encounter with phe-
nomenology gave Ortega, on the one hand, the decisive clue which would
lead him to the surmounting of idealism and, on the other, the well-
founded suspicion that his incipient philosophical ramble was on the right
road. When Ortega read Husserl he understood immediately that the
ORTEGA Y GASSET'S EXECUTIVE I 231
formula which in the last instance condensed his philosophical thought

("I am I and my circumstances and if I don't save them I can't save
myself," C. W. I, 322) expresses the executiveness of the irreducible action
which is human life, the exactly opposite of the phenomenological reduc-
tion which consists in staying with the essence of the sense data "putting
between parenthesis" (Einklammerung) the empirical reality of the world
and momentarily suspending the conscious act of living.
Ortega was defining himself in 1916 as not at all "modern" (C. W.
II, 22-24), a condition with which an idealist would never identify, and
a phenomenologist only with great difficulty. There is a lot to the phrase
because our most notable supporter of European unity spent his life
demanding the modernization of Spain - the pending subject - just at
the moment when modernity had entered decisively into crisis and it
became necessary to prepare to abandon it, although retaining its splendid
cultural baggage which would be indispensable as background for the
new times. 15 What Ortega tried to do was to avoid staying anchored in
modernity as others had been in traditional thought. His goal was to be
not only of the past and not only modem but both at once in one new
framework. For him the philosophical project of the twentieth century
consisted in this surmounting of the modem and the past, conceived as
a third navigation of the History of Philosophy which might integrate
- retaining and abolishing at the same time, in the purest tradition of
the Hegelian Ausjhebung - the two great stages of Occidental thought.
In surmounting history, there is assimilating, carrying within that which
has been abandoned. A new philosophy, to the extent which it aspires
to be one, must include the entire previous philosophical legacy. 16
The main obstacle to be removed in order to arrive at this proposi-
tion was idealism, which had to be changed to a mere ingredient of the
new stage, a problematical task of difficult execution. Modem idealism
had already served a critical function with regard to traditional thought
with little understanding, and was, of course, rejected in tum by the latter.
Both movements respond to interpretations of reality from antagonistic
perspectives, which had complete sense in their respective historical
moments. Ortega thought that the criticism of traditional thought had
been sufficiently made by idealism itself, and therefore hardly bothered
with it, except for concrete questions. Instead, he concentrated all his
critical efforts on idealism, globally identified (not only in philosophy
but also in politics) with the nineteenth century ("our greatest and most
urgent enemy") in which "the grape, already all sugar, will soon be
alcohol" (C. W. IV, 26). The effective criticism of idealism cannot be

done only from within and with its own weapons. It was necessary -
as Ortega did with one foot already in the next ~tage of thought - to
philosophize against the grain of modem thought, above all with regard
to the powerful intellectual inertia of those whom Ortega called "untimely
Kantians". 17
3. THE BEGINNING OF THE CRITICISM:

THE EXECUTIVE I AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LIFE
The discovery of the executive I as the opposite of the phenomenolog-

ically reduced I, was a practical case of this critical operation of idealism
which can be explained by Ortega's already having at his disposal a well-
outlined thought with regard to the executiveness of the irreducible action
in which living consists. From the radicalness of life, the realism-idealism
duality - or that of objectivity-subjectivity, to use the terminology of
the moment - appeared as a badly stated problem, since they are per-
fectly reconcilable. The philosophy of life recovers the realistic
(traditional) and the idealistic (modem) legacies; but not to tarry in one
or return to the other - not even to try to synthesize them - seeking rather
to integrate them. The classical Ortegan formula has both ingredients:
the idealistic I and the realistic circumstance. Life, philosophically
speaking, is a critical moment which obliges the idealistic I - that
prodigious modem discovery - to newly confront the world, now as
circumstance, to concern itself with it, although in a different way than
the ancients did. The executive I is realistic and idealistic at the same
time because in it the two functions which belonged to the two great
stages of thought vie; it is equally distant from both, it encompasses them,
it includes them and makes possible a non-ontological metaphysics which
is the metaphysics of life.
A metaphysics of life, which shows its radical difference from the
metaphysical models of the past, not only seemed inconceivable for
traditional thought, but was also a great leap for the modem mind,
including for some, like Heidegger, who wandered near it but were
impeded by the fatal baggage of their ontological obstinacy. 18 Philosophy,
the idea of reality changes so drastically that not only the content of
the categories has to be modified but also the ultimate sense of the
categorical, that is to say, not only do the concepts change, but also
their function. 19 The new radical datum of philosophy is neither I nor
things but rather I with things, a new datum which unlike that of idealism
or realism is not given except as a problem. That the new radical datum
of philosophy should have the peculiarity of being a problem adds com-
plexity to the task, but it leads us to a new, more fecund, path where
our knowledge reflects the complexity of life itself, which is thus under-
stood in the first person, without intermediary interpretations which
adulterate it. This, as we shall see in the next section, is of great impor-
tance in the total knowledge of reality. The coherence of human life is
capable of generating the rationality of its own functioning - vital reason
- which does not depend solely on itself as pure reason does, but on a
balance of relationships between the subject and its surroundings. This
relationship between the I and its circumstance is not totally determined
but rather open to a repertory of limited possibilities. In order for there
to be a decision, there must be limitation and leeway at the same time,
a relative determination because man does not live in a generalized world
where nothing matters; man wants certain things which he must wrench
from this relative fatality (destiny) which constitutes the things which
happen to him. In order for him to confront these happenings he is obliged
to exercise his constitutionally free condition (C. W. VII, 430--431 ff.).
Rational vitalism recovers, within some currents of thought which turn
on phenomenology, but against the background of the essential dis-
crepancy between the executive I and the phenomenological reduction,
a means of practical knowledge which is of course given, but which
philosophically had been not only displaced but even supplanted with
theoretical knowledge. 20
4. THE EXECUTIVE I AS THE SURMOUNTING OF IDEALISM
As we have seen, one of the first clear and precise visions of the new
phenomenology is the commentary which Ortega made on a study of
Hoffmann (cf. notes 4 and 5) where he already distinguished between
a natural posture belonging to an executive I and a spectator posture
belonging to a seeing I. At that time, as he later explained, he already
had the sensation of having embarked on a philosophical enterprise which
took him away from idealism and left no possibility of return. He did
not have "positive concrete reasons for knowing that idealism was no
longer the truth [but] the impression of the new idea, its outline, as in
a mosaic, the missing piece is most evident for its absence". 21 It was a
year later that he developed - in the surprising but not fortuitous context
of a "prologue" to a book of poetry - (cf. note 9) the notion of execu-

tiveness in the peculiar and innovating metaphysical meaning which
would be his own. The basic aporia of the new approach was more and
more clear, that is, "the question of whether (the idea of life) was ratio-
nally possible and of how it will be possible to manage to make the object
of our contemplation that which seems condemned to never be an
object",22 but not yet having sufficient mental tools to fully realize his
intuition, he did not approach the theme directly ("that would take us -
he said - too deeply into metaphysical territory" not yet sufficiently
explored) but rather by a circular route (cf. note 7), which was not com-
pleted until 1924 as the culmination of the first stage of his thought. 23
This exploration of these new metaphysical territories - the pioneer elab-
oration of the method of vital reason - takes place in the prologue of
Moreno Villa's El Pasajero [The Traveler], and also in Ortega's first book
Meditations on Quijote, an exposition, he has said, of "what my spon-
taneous reaction was to what was received in Germany, which was,
essentially, neo-Kantianism, idealism". His reaction was radical and
unequivocal: he opted for individual life, that of everyone, life in its imme-
diacy, which does not consist in consciousness (Bewusstsein) but in the
dynamic dialogue between the I and its circumstances (C. W. VIII, 43).
Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology were for Ortega "learned" philoso-
phies with which he never identified, although they served him well
for taking on a reliable criticism of idealism. His reception of phenom-
enology was as early as his reaction against it was immediate, since he
saw it as the latest and most purified form of idealism.
Using the concept of the executive, he then began a decision criti-
cism of realism and idealism. Ortega touches life which is prior not
only to all intellectual interpretation of it (idealism) but to all that is in
it, things, that which is other than I (realism). Executiveness is a point
of view prior to the distinction between the I and things. It is applic-
able to both because it comprehends the two sides of reality. The object
in view of the executive is as much that of the idealistic I as it is that
of realistic things. Idealism and realism are distinct points of view which
the executive I assumes so indistinctly as to make them indissoluble.
To the extent which it emphasizes its idealistic component, the execu-
tive I would feel the "deficiency" of realism, the need to go back to
things; and, vice versa, an extreme realism would trigger the need for
idealism. The idea of the world has changed and not only in Ortega. 24
The world is no longer only the real and objective world of the things
which are, as the ancients believed; nor is it merely the creation of the
I, as the modems claimed. If there is a world - which is evident - it
should not be selectively interpreted either realistically or idealistically.
There is no reality without things, but neither is there a reality of only
things; there is no reality without I but the world is not an exclusive
construction of the mind. The new reality is radical and irreducible to
each one of its parts and consists in the event /-with-things.
In his prologue to El Pasajero Ortega thoroughly tested these new
ideas by means of the concept of sameness. Both the sameness of the I
and the sameness of things result in an amputated vision of reality. It
is only the sameness of the executive I which sees the two sides: the I
is not this man but all - "men, things, situations" (VI, 252). It is not
something isolated and defined in opposition to things (unless we are
speaking of the idealistic I) but rather verifying itself, being, executing.
Idealism sameness ("everything seen from within oneself is F'), (VI, 252)
is strictly speaking inexact "because we cannot place ourselves in a
utilitarian position before the 'I', simply because we cannot place our-
selves before it, because the state of perfect compenetration with
something is indissoluble, because it is total intimacy" (VI, 252). Realistic
sameness, the realistic point of view, needs the I in order to be a point
of view: the sameness of things is postulated or supposed by the I.
There is the form I in every thing, and, in the same way that things
isolated or disengaged cannot think themselves without the postulate
of I, the sameness of the thing postulated implies its necessity to the I.
There is no I without things. 25
The decisive argument against idealism (especially phenomenolog-
ical idealism) would be to aim directly against the false supposition
that the closest thing to me is I. This was "the original sin of the modem
age ... subjectivism ... the mental illness of the Age which began
with the Renaissance" (C. W. VI, 253). On it has been built the meta-
physical privilege which, in any case, corresponds not only to the
idealistic I but also to the other "I's" and even to things. Ortega no
longer wanted any metaphysical privilege: that of things (realism) had
already been taken care of by idealistic criticism. The moment for the
idealistic I had now arrived: "1, [as executive] has no information less
direct than I myself of other men [other I's] and of things" (C. W. VI,
253). The executive I is realistic and idealistic at the same time and
the closest thing to me, then, is not I but my life, the only thing with
which we have an intimate relationship and where "true intimacy which
exists by dint of execution, is equidistant from the external and the
internal". 26
The use of the first person which Husser} introduced when he was
explaining the peculiarity of the phenomenological method 27 is taken
up by Ortega in order to emphasize that in certain verbs - desire, hate,
feel pain - the original meaning is that which they have in the first person
singular (C. W. VI, 251 ). This is interesting because it makes the distance
which there is between the I and all other things, be it an object or a
you or a he, stand out. In the case of feeling pain it is easy to see that
the pain that makes me suffer (my pain) and the image which I have
of an exterior pain, no matter how hard I try to understand it, are not
the same. The difference between a pain felt and one imagined is not only
one of degree (more or less pain) but one of order. For Ortega- and
in this consists the central argument of his criticism of the phenomeno-
logical reduction (to keep the essence of the sense data suspending the
empirical reality of the world) - the pain causing suffering and its image
are not only different but "are mutually exclusive: the image of a pain
doesn't hurt, furthermore, it removes the pain, replacing it within its
idealized shadow" (C. W. VI, 252, emphasis mine). The way in which
we live external pain today - think of the attitudes which events in former
Yugoslavia generate in the Occidental world - shows to what extremes
we have falsified reality in the manner of the idealists. It is pertinent
to point out that at the core of it all pulses a simple philosophical question
like the one we are dealing with. The question is an old one: Kant, by
rejecting Cartesian idealism and distinguishing between a phenomenal
world and a noumenous world, had destroyed the objectivity of the
world beyond his own thinking. Husser} takes up the heritage with an
absolute capable of bringing to his bosom all effective or presumed reality
(later the "lifeworld"), and his criticism of the metaphysical coincides
with Kant's as far as identifying being with consciousness is concerned.
For Husserl, intentionality, the capital concept of phenomenology, is
the life of the non-empirical consciousness although it also includes
personal experiences, both those of "primary content" and those "which
bear within them the specificity of intentionality", (Ideas #84-85 pp.
198-207). It consists in not dealing with things directly but extracting
their essence (eidos). In this way a degree of objective validity is obtained
which shapes the world. All intentional personal experience is noetic and
the noesis passed through consciousness is the world which did not
previously exist (in this it can be distinguished from the realist's world
of objects) but intentionally constructed (ibid., pp. 10 ff). The phenom-
enological reduction, the phenomenologically reduced, consists in
retaining the essence of the sense data while suspending the empirical
reality of the world. But this meticulously elaborated operation, as Ortega
explained in 1914, is incompatible with the executive I and cannot be
done except by leaving life.
Ortega's recourse to poetry in order to explain these things was not
accidental, nor was his choice of the book of one of those poets "who
bring a new style, who are a style [and] who enrich the world" (C. W.
VI, 247). Face to face with the old physical idea that "things are always
the same [and] we can make no expansion whatsoever of their material",
exists the poet - also the philosopher and (why not?), the scientist -
capable of giving to things a virtual dynamism in which they "acquire
a new meaning and become other new things" 28 which enrich the world
and increase it not because they invent it but because they discover it. 29
Ortega tells elsewhere how the discovery of the metaphysics of life came
about, the motives for it not, finally, coinciding with the Heideggerian
'philosophy of existence' and the particular importance which phenom-
enology had in its consolidation (C. W. VIII, 45). Neither Dilthey nor
Kierkegaard influenced him, but rather "the interpretation of phenome-
nology in a sense opposed to idealism" (ibid., p. 53).
5. THE CRITICISM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL

IDEALISM: HISTORICAL REASON
The executive I soon became synonymous in Ortega with life (implic-

itly as execution), and the term practically disappeared from his writings,
although not from his course, some of which dealt with it explicitly. 30
Before beginning to describe his criticism of phenomenological idealism,
it would be convenient to briefly point out a second stage of his criti-
cism of idealism, one which he began in 1924 with an essay on Kant
and took up again five years later with piquant commentaries (C. W.
IV, 25-46 and 48-59). Between those two writings the government
closure of the University had occurred, and Ortega took his teaching
out of the classroom, first to the Revista de Occidente, precisely to
speak of the executive I, and later to a cinema (then to a theater, to
find room for the growing audience), where he offered lectures with a
very explicit title: What Is Philosophy? The first of the three courses
independently taught directly focused on the criticism of idealism in a
strict and direct sense. 31 Phenomenology is hardly mentioned in them,
although in the first the criticism of idealism and the meticulous search
for the new radical datum of philosophy, led to the discovery (for him
a rediscovery) of human life, which reclaims its executive character in
the face of the "antinatural torsion" of that "strange reality that is con-
sciousness ... with its back to life ... completely opposed to what is
a natural way of living for us" (C. W. VII, 373-374). In the second
course, the strategy for his exposition is the reverse: the surmounting
of idealism and realism is a consequence of the discovery of life, before
which they show their insufficiencies. And in the third course, some
points are developed which show the insufficient radicality of Descartes
in the search for the first principle, with some delving into the suppo-
sitions of Cartesian doubt, that highly purified form of idealism on which,
according to Ortega, rests the phenomenology of Husser!.
Ortega's criticism of phenomenologic idealism closes with a golden
clasp the extensive battle which the executive I had waged in order to
assume with dignity the philosophical legacy of realism and idealism.
It is our good luck that Ortega felt the necessity - at the time of the
third edition in German of his The Theme of Our Time - to explain
himself to his readers in Germany (C. W. VIII 20-21 ), because within
the explanation, among many other things, a little anthology of the texts
of this criticism is found. 32 The work serves not only to reestablish the
dates of his writings on phenomenology (C. W. VIII, 57), but also gives
us an overview of their complex content and shows the coherency of
the whole process at the same time. Antonio Rodriguez Huescar, with
reason, has pointed out, on one hand, the clear Ortegan attitude in the
face of phenomenology, referring not only to this work but also to the
early criticisms of 1913 in Madrid and those made in 1916 in Buenos
Aires, and, on the other hand, the difficulty which a rigorous study of
this Ortegan criticism involved with the texts in hand (cf. note 10).
Philosophically, the leap from Husser! to Ortega - cordially so close -
is of such magnitude that it would oblige the elaboration of a sort of cross
reference dictionary which would make it possible to compare two
thoughts installed in very distinct categorial conceptions. Rodriguez
Huescar confesses to not completely knowing what the epoche and the
phenomenological reduction consist of, key concepts of the whole
doctrine which would be the object of Ortegan criticism, and he thinks
that relying on interpretation is problematic because of the danger of

departing from the exact words of Husserl. His recourse to the inter-
pretation of Zubiri, 33 which he considers "more favorable to Husserl",
is right on center.
Ortega emphasizes again, with, if possible, even more force and pre-
cision, the instrumental role that phenomenology had for him in attaining
his basic objective of surmounting idealism: "Phenomenology," he writes,
"specifies for the first time what consciousness and its contents are
[and] it seems to me that it commits the same errors on a microscopic
level as the old idealism had committed on a macroscopic one" (C. W.
VIII, 47-48). "The immense advantage of phenomenology is that it
took the question to such precision that it is possible to pinpoint the
instant and the point where idealism commits its offense and does its
disappearing trick with reality, converting it into consciousness" (ibid.,
p. 50). "The analysis of consciousness allowed phenomenology to correct
idealism and bring it to perfection, that perfection which is the symptom
of the agony of death, just as the peak is the proof that the mountain is
at least beneath our feet" (ibid., pp. 53-54). The metaphor in this last
citation harmonizes perfectly with the character of the Hegelian
Aujhbung, to which we referred in the second section of this paper.
All philosophy- according to Ortega- if it be truly philosophy, places
under suspicion any subjective position (including its own), and because
of this it searches, not a supposed datum, as would a scientist, knowing
that once used one hypothesis is exchanged for another, but an imposed
datum, that is to say, one that imposes itself, and therefore cannot be
changed like those of science which are pure working hypotheses. The
philosophical datum is radical because it is not interested, as is science,
in partial certainty, but rather in absolute certainty. It is a lasting datum,
in reality a metaphysical principle, and this is why the long history of
Occidental thought can be reduced to two stages - realism and idealism
- characterized by the primacy of objective reality or subjectivity. The
case of Husserl is special because he is just on the threshold of a change
of epoch and has opted for continuity, for staying on the side which is
still idealism. Therefore, when he looks for a firm principle on which
he can base all others, he believes to have found it in pure conscious-
ness. Ortega has before him all that Husserl and phenomenology have
been accumulating since 1913 when he synthesizes this consciousness
in an I which realizes everything with radicality: this consciousness
does not want, but rather limits itself to realizing that it wants; it does
not feel, but rather sees or realizes that it feels. It does not think but rather
observes, realizes that it thinks. "It is", Ortega concludes, "pure eye, pure
impassible mirror, contemplation and nothing more" (C. W. VIII, 48).
Idealism carried to such a pure form is rather impressive and the spec-
tacle of pure consciousness (Bewusstsein), making a specter of the world
and transforming it into mere sensation recalls the dangerous king, Midas,
reducing all the fabulous wealth of the world to gold, that is, making
unreal everything else it contains. Absolute reality which is "pure con-
sciousness" makes unreal whatever is in it. Idealism not only moors itself
to a world of ideas but also wants to impose it as the only reality. The
idealistic intellectual adventure can be defined by the extravagant hopes
that modem man has been forging in all areas of reason, liberty, human
rights, etc. As an ideal aspiration it is formidably attractive, and being
so, it rebels against accepting any kind of reduction. Its peculiar reac-
tionary condition is rooted in this obstinacy of asking the impossible,
which justifies its eternal discontent and its decision to continue being
idealist as long as things are not arranged to its liking. From its birth
the modern mind was very poor at exercising humility, because since
Descartes it had considered man as a self-sufficient being. But man is
not so; far from this fallacious pretension man knows himself to be
needy and indigent (C. W. VII, 410 ff). All of Ortega's work goes against
the grain of the idealistic inertia, which he was convinced had been,
on the one hand, "a condition of no few virtues and triumphs", but which,
on the other hand, had generated subjectivism, "the original sin of the
modem age ... its mental illness". It had completed a splendid epoch
"in which men had succeeded in existing over country with incomparable
impetuousness and enthusiasm" but not it had become the greatest
obstacle to life's progress (cf. note 17).
Ortega now also outlined the central arguments of this criticism of
phenomenology in his prologue to El Pasajero of 1914 (cf. note 26). Pure
consciousness must be obtained by a "manipulation" of philosophy
("instead of finding a reality it fabricates one") which is the phenome-
nological reduction, characterized by the suspension of the executive. 34
Idealistic philosophy deceives itself when it believes it has found in
pure consciousness (its own fabrication, pure fiction) the datum for which
it searched; it has exchanged "primary consciousness" for "suspended
consciousness", chloroformed and "put in parentheses". Ortega is ironic
about the quantity of things which can freely be done with conscious-
ness after making it unreal (analyze it, observe it, describe its consistency,
etc.). On the other hand, the reality that was lost when the phenome-
nological reduction of it was effected cannot be recovered: "How can
you make unreal now what is real? How can you "suspend" the execu-
tion of a reality which is already executed and is not being executed
now because there is now only the execution of remembering what was
executed? It would be like suspending now the beginning of the execu-
tion of the Edict of Nantes" (C. W. VIII, 49-50). He here mentions
executive action a half dozen times but not once does it harmonize exactly
with the Ortegian executive I, although the webbed repetition of "exe-
cutions" has created for it a space. It is the same as back in 1914, but
now his thought has been conceptually enriched and he has sharpened
his prose to unimagined extremes, making great use of that "indispens-
able mental instrument ... supplement to our intellective arm" (C. W.
II 387 and 391) which is metaphor in philosophy. He accedes to the exec-
utive I interpreting phenomenology in the sense opposite to that of
idealism (ibid., p. 53). He considers unnecessary "the term 'conscious-
ness' [which] should be sent to a leper's hospital. ... What there truly
is is not 'consciousness' and in it the 'ideas' of things, rather there is a
man who exists surrounded by things, in circumstances which also exist"
(ibid., p. 51). What there truly is and what is given is "my coexistence
with things, this absolute event: an I in its circumstances. The world
and I, face to face, with fusion and separation both impossible, like the
Cabiri and the Dioscuri [Geminis], like all those pairs of divinities who,
according to the Greeks and Romans, had to be born and die together,
and to whom they gave the beautiful name of Dii consentes, the gods
of one mind". 35 Realism and idealism, together but not scrambled, without
needing to stop being what each one is, without confrontation, adding
instead of subtracting. All of this was there already, not developed, but
to be easily made out in the theory of the all-embracing connection in
Meditations on Quijote (1914) 36 and in the prologue to El Pasajero of
that same year, when he speaks, with regard to the executive I as a sur-
mounting of idealism, of the sameness not only of I but of the other
"I's" and also of things. 37 My coexistence with things "does not consist
in that this paper on which I write and the chair in which I sit are
objects for me, but that before objects for me, this paper is to me paper
and this chair is to me a chair. Vice versa, things would not be what
each one is if I were not to them who I am, that is, he who needs to write,
he who needs to sit" (C. W. VIII, 51). All of this affects the subordi-
nate role which the old idea of being will have in the new philosophical
era that is being announced. Realism interpreted it as substance: idealism

as spirit, force, activity; now "it will have to dematerialize even more
and be reduced to pure event" (ibid., p. 51). Coexistence does not mean
a static rest of the world and I side by side with it in a neutral ontological
ambit: in the metaphysics of life this ambit is made up of the pure and
mutual dynamism of an event.
The criticism which Ortega was making of phenomenological idealism
- except for the eulogies and the gratitude expressed to both Husser}
and phenomenology - is inevitably radical. Whether or not the later
Husserl had managed to surmount his own idealism after the publica-
tion of his Formal and Transcendental Logic, and the text of some
conferences in Prague in 1935 published in the review Philosophy, has
been discussed, especially after the publication of the Husserliana series.
The answer is clearly no for Ortega. 38 Nor was he convinced by the
content of the conference texts, not written by Husserl, but by Dr. Fink,
with whom "phenomenology jumps to that which never could have
emerged from it [although]", he adds, "for me this leap of the phenom-
enological doctrine has been highly satisfying because it consists of no
less than recourse to ... 'historical reason' " (C. W. V, 547). Ortega's
attitude had not changed since 1941, although now the criticism was
much more exact. He had not only coined for philosophy, but also created
for the everyday language the word "vivencia" (personal experience), and
he didn't want it contaminated with other concepts. For this reason he
proposed "eliminating from the word 'Erleben' (personal experience)
[at other times he used more appropriately the noun Erlebnis] all residue
of intellectualist meaning, 'idealism', mental immanence or conscious-
ness, and leaving its terrible original meaning". Living is not only a
contemplative activity, but an event (which also includes contemplation);
Man is not a res cogitans as had been thought since Descartes - who
wanted to distinguish him from res extensa - but a res dramatica.
Personal experiences are the things which happen to Man. Very well,
who is the subject - agent and patient, he who does and to whom things
happen - of living? The realistic I who lives materially inserted into
the reality of things without noticing more than his surroundings
and for whom only the cosmic world exists? The idealistic I capable
of consciously focusing on the world and ignoring life? It is clear that
for Ortega the subject of living must join the two conditions that have
been historically accumulated. It is the executive I, a modified idealist
who exists for himself but in cosmic surroundings outside of him which
are circumstances. "The 'modem' thinker", counsels Ortega, "has to give

himself a kick which forces him to go out to the absolute Outside". 39
In this consists his dramatic existence in having to make his life in cir-
cumstances which he must confront. What happens to man is that he
"exists outside of thought, in metaphysical exile from himself, surren-
dered to the essential foreigner which is the Universe". 40
Ortega was very interested in historical changes, especially those
which have constituted the great crossroads of thought. He felt himself
to be living in one of them and he wanted to understand it by extracting
from earlier examples the common ingredient which underlay all of them.
The most transcendental change, the first of all of them, that which
constituted the status nascens of philosophy, was that exemplary event
which gave place to the origin of philosophy itself making possible the
step from nothing to being. 41 It should not seem strange, then, that Ortega
might particularly identify with this leap of the pre-Socrates who to his
judgement developed, in a germinal but complete manner, a historical
cycle analogous to that which would later bind realism and idealism
together.
His radical anti-Eleaticism evolved in a very special way taking the
hand of Heraclitus, friend of solitude and enemy of the herd of citizens
who consented to the expulsion of Hermodorus, who was the best of
all, from the polis. H eraclitean becoming was totally physical but Ortega
thought that the moment had come when, falling on different ground,
it might yield its greatest harvest. This influence was decisive in the
context of his investigations of historic reason, and the fruit could be
no other than the discovery of the future, the projective condition of
life, the new radical datum of metaphysics. His feeling for Heraclitus
- to be more exact, for the attitude which that Ephesian maintained in
the face of the ideas in vogue in his time - is eminently cordial since
he also saw him as a critic and surpasser of the modern beliefs of his
time. 42 Heraclitus is the historical exponent of an epoch already
overcome. The new times cannot now harbor a naturalistic view of
becoming, but they can illuminate that self-making which is the way
human reality becomes. In this Ortegan genealogical tree of thought,
the heritage of this old concept can be recognized, although totally un-
naturalized because it consists in the total abandonment of the stasis
notion of reality. 43 In the new metaphysics of life, the "nature" of the
executive I is not similar to that of things because here is a nature in
expansion, which continually transforms itself. Man is not entirely subject
to the laws of nature, he is not subject to reality and he must (not simply
can) do something with it because in this doing is his life. Man does
not have a nature, but rather a history. 44
University of Barcelona
NOTES
1 Represented are philosophies of life (Bergson, Oilthey, Simmel) existentialism (Jaspers,
Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre ), philosophies of the spirit (Lavelle, Le Semme ), phenomenology

(Scheler, Hartmann) and others more difficult to classify such as the Spaniards Unamuno,
Ortega y Gasset and Zubiri.
2 Ortega did not hesitate to identify this task as "The Theme of Our Time", Collected
Works, VII, 388-406. (Henceforth C.W. = Collected Works.) "To abandon idealism",
he later wrote, "is, without a doubt, the most serious, the most radical thing that the
European can do today. Everything else is but an anecdote beside it. With it we abandon
not only a space but an entire time: the 'Modem Age'". C.W. VIII, 41.
3 "The deeper I penetrated with my analysis", wrote Husser!, "the more I became con-
scious that the logic of our time is not sufficient to explain the present science, this
being, nonetheless, one of its main incumbencies". E. Husser!, Logical Investigations I
(Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1967), pp. 19-20. See also Ortega, C.W. VIII, 47.
4 "Sensation, Construction and Intuition", Talk at the IV Congress of the Associaci6n
Espanola para el Progreso de las Ciencias, June 1913. C.W. XII, 487-499.
5 "On the Concept of Sensation", C.W. I, 244-260.
6 J. Marias, Obras, V. (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1956) pp. 433-439; and (J. Marias,
1960 and 1973) Ortega, Circunstancia y Vocaci6n 2 (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1960,
1973) pp. 187-205.
7 For Ortega the traditional method of knowing (what he calls in other places in modo
recto as opposed to in modo obliquo, C.W. II, 388) is inadequate to go in entry to certain
"fortresses" of knowledge. It is necessary to use the circular method, known also as the
method of the dialectic series of Jericho, referred to twice with regard to the reading of
the Quijote and of Kant, using the same rhetorical figure: situate the positions in wide
turns, in concentric circles, as the Israelites did to take Jericho. C.W. I, 327 and C.W.
IV, 44.
8 Meditations on Quijote (1914) in C.W. I, 311-400. Of special interest are the three
editions of Julian Marias because of his exhaustive Commentary (University of Puerto
Rico, 1957) (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1966); and (Madrid: Catedra, 1984 and 1990).
The last is to be recommended due to the placement of the commentaries at the foot of
the Ortegan text.
9 "Aesthetic Essay in the Manner of a Prologue", Prologue to the book El Pasajero
(The Traveler) by Jose Moreno Villa (Madrid: Imp. Clasica Espanola, Canos, 1914), I
dup. pp. ix-xlvi. Collected in C.W. VI, 247-264.
10 A. Rodriguez Huescar, La innovaci6n metafisica de Ortega. Critica y superaci6n
del idealismo (Madrid: MEC, 1982), p. 19. English version by Jorge Garcia-G6mez:
Jose Ortega y Gasset's Metaphysical Innovation (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1995). One of the most important on the subject.
11 "Great success", wrote Ortega, "was improbable. Nonetheless fortune had given us
a prodigious tool: phenomenology". "Prologue for Germans", C.W. VIII, 42.
12 J. Ferrater Mora, Ortega y Gasset. Etapas de una filosofia (Barcelona: Seix Barra!,
1973), pp. 27-44. Translation of the original English: Ortega y Gasset: An Outline of
his Philosophy (London: Bowes & Bowes).
13 P. W. Silver, Phenomenology and Vital Reason (Madrid: Alianza, 1978), J. San Martin,
Essays on Ortega (Madrid: UNED, 1994).
14 Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, Renan (1909) and Adan en el paraiso (1910). C.W. I, 443-493.
15 See F. L6pez-Frias, "Europe as a Solution", in The Spanish Constitution and the
Ordering of the European Community (I) (Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia, 1995), pp.
1565-1579 (at press).
16 "In the life of this spirit", he will say in 1929, "you only surmount what you retain
(... ) as the third step surmounts the first two because it retains them below it. Should
these disappear the third step would fall to be only the first.( ... ) Contrary to life in bodies,
in the life of the spirit the new ideas (the daughters) are those which carry in their bellies
their mothers", What Is Philosophy? C.W. VII, 370 ff.
17 C.W. IV, 25.
18 Ortega hopefully hailed Heidegger after the appearance of Sein und Zeit (C.W. IV,
57) but soon vindicated his own discovery of the philosophical idea of life (C.W. IV,
403-404 and 541). In 1940 he made a splendid synthesis of the concept of Existenz remem-
bering that Heidegger represented the last of the four great attempts, after Dilthey (l ),
Ortega himself (2), and Jaspers (3), to found philosophy on the new idea of life, "the
great idea of life that, like it or not", he said, "will be that which humanity will live on
in the next stage" (C.W. XII, 192). Later he criticized the existential mode of anguish
and the Heideggerian exposition of death (C.W. VII, 495-496), new radical discrepan-
cies concerning the theme of being (C.W. VIII, 270-316) and finally a certain
reconciliation within the discrepancies (C.W. IX, 617-663).
19 The celebrated Copernican turn of Kant inverted the Aristotelian order but not the
ultimate sense of the categorical. What differentiates them are their respective gnoseo-
logical or ontological structures. In Ortega being and entity are replaced by living and life;
strictly speaking it is more fitting to speak of primalities than categories. The categor-
ical notion of being is replaced by that of doing. Cf. A. Rodriguez Huescar, op. cit., pp.
105-109.
20 Ortega, as well as other philosophers (Dilthey, Heidegger, Jaspers and Merleau-Ponty)
distinguish these two forms of knowledge as far as the relationship of I with things is
concerned: 1) An immediate knowledge belonging to a primary or transcendental rela-
tionship characteristic of non-theoretical knowledge and which corresponds to the practical
world. Heidegger coins a new word, Bezug, and Ortega - in a more complicated con-
ception - uses pairs of reconcilable concepts such as the executive I (as opposed to the
seeing 1); human life (as opposed to culture); ideas (as opposed to beliefs); and doing
metaphysics (as opposed to simply studying it). 2) A mediate knowledge belonging to a
secondary or predicamental relationship characteristic of theoretical know ledge, and which
belongs to the cultural and scientific world. Heidegger employs the term Beziehung, which
in German means precisely relationship, and Ortega the same pairs of reconcilable concepts
in reverse, that is, the seeing I (as opposed to the executive [); culture (as opposed to
human life); beliefs (as opposed to ideas); studying metaphysics (as opposed to doing
it). Cf. in Heidegger Sein und Zeit, #12. In Ortega "Culture-Security", C.W. I, 354-355;
"Ideas and Beliefs", C.W. V, 381-394; "On Historical Reason", C.W. XII, 154-158; "Some
Metaphysical Lessons", C.W. XII, 15-128; "On the Concept of Sensation", C.W. I,
244-260; and "The 'I' as the Executive", C.W. VI, 250-252.
21 "Prologue for Germans", C.W. VIII, 42.
22 "Aesthetic Essay in the Manner of a Prologue", C.W. VI, 254.
23 A. Rodriguez Huescar, "Advance Notes of Criticism", in his La innovaci6n, op. cit.,
pp. 103-109 and J. Ortega y Gasset, "The Two Great Metaphors", C.W. 387-400.
24 Cf. esp. W. Biemel, Le Concept de monde chez Heidegger (Paris: J. Vrin, 1950)
and J. V. Uexkiill, Ideas para una concepcion biol6gica del mundo (Ideas for a Biological
Conception of the World). Prologue by J. Ortega y Gasset (Madrid: Calpe, 1922).
25 At the beginning of Chapter II Ortega relates the question to the categorical imper-
ative of Kant - within his known ethical postulate that men should not be treated as
means but as ends - to the effect of showing that the I is the only thing which, although
we might want to, we cannot change into thing. The executive I need not have recourse
to any moral imperative to postulate personal dignity. "This dignity of the person", says
Ortega, "supervenes when we fulfill the immortal maxim of the Gospel: do unto others
as you would have them do unto you. To make something I myself is the only way for
it to stop being a thing. Much more than it seems, is it given to us to choose, before another
man, before another subject, between treating it like a thing, using it, or treating it as
'I'. There is here margin for free will, margin which would not be possible if other
human individuals were really 'I'". C.W. VI, 250.
26 The embryo of the argument is the following: "When I feel pain, when I love or
hate, I do not see my pain, or see myself loving or hating. In order for me to see my
pain it is necessary for me to interrupt my painful situation and become an observing I.
This I which sees the other suffering I, is now the true I, the executive, the present. The
suffering I, to be precise, was, and now is, only an image, a thing or object which I
have before me". C.W. VI, 254.
27 E. Husser!, Ideas (Madrid: F.C.E., 1985), pp. 145-168.
28 C.W. VI, 247. Ortega proposes a theory of metaphor: a form of scientific thinking
which it is necessary to use adequately and which is not exclusive to poetry but belongs
also to science and philosophy. It is an intellectual process conceiving of certain diffi-
cult realities which one approaches not in modo recto but in modo obliquo. C.W. II,
387-402 and C.W. VIII, 53, footnote. On the subject cf. J. Marias, Ortega, Circumstance
and Vocation (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1960), in Obras Works), IX, 408-432.
29 The selection of poetic ground for planting the seed of the concept of executiveness
is not accidental. It is creative ground, as unreal and problematic as life itself, which
does not give us solutions, but rather problems to be solved, the only ground it is fitting
to step upon as long as the concepts of the new philosophy have not been sufficiently
illuminated. For the first time he uses the expression - "The '/' as Executive" - as the
heading of a chapter, the second. The fifth, entitled "The Metaphor", flows into unre-
ality ... pure poetry. Poetry, like the new philosophy it announces, creates- imagining
- the fictitious space which it later makes real. In any case the man-philosopher-as-
executive-/ is not given to being as excessively metaphoric as the man-poet ... only as
necessary. Cf. also the "The Idea of the Theater", C.W. VII, 443-496.
3 Cf. iQue es conociento? (What is Knowledge?) (Madrid: Revista de Occidente in

Alianza Editoria). Not included in the Complete Works. Part I- Life as Execution (the
Executive I)- was a course given in the Revista de Occidente from December, 1929 to
March, 1930 and continued in April after the reopening of the University. Parts III and
IV correspond to the 1930-1931 course.
31 The other two courses are "Some Lessons in Metaphysis" (1932-1933) given at the
University of Madrid and "On Historical Reason" (1940) given in Buenos Aires. There
was a continuation with the same title in Lisbon (1944). All are in C.W. XII, 15-318.
32 "Prologue for Germans", C.W. VIII, 15-58, especially 47-54.
33 X. Zubiri, Cinco lecciones de filosofia (Five Lessons in Philosophy) (Madrid: Alianza,
1980), pp. 217-218.
34 "In order for there to be consciousness" says Ortega, "it is necessary that I stop
living immediately, primarily, what I have been living and, turning my attention behind,
remember what has just happened to me". C.W. VIII, 49.
35 Ortega uses the same reference to the Dii consentes two other times: in a lesson entitled
"The Three Great Metaphors" (1916), in Anales de Ia Institucion Cultural Espanola, I,
(Buenos Aires, 1947), and in Historic Reason (Buenos Aires, 1940) in C.W. XII, 181.
36 "There is in love an amplification of the individual which absorbs other things into
it, which fuses them with us ... and makes us penetrate into the properties of the
beloved [and] it reveals to us all of its value [telling us] that the beloved is, in turn,
part of something else . . . that it is linked to something else that is also indispensable
to us .... Love is a divine architect which comes down to the world - according to
Plato- so that everything in the universe might live connected". C.W. I, 312-313. This
all-embracing connection leads him to consider "that philosophy is the general science
of love". Ibid., p. 316.
37 Cf. section 4 of this paper "The Executive I as the Surmounting of Idealism".
38 "It's too late", wrote Ortega, "The Orb of absolute reality, which is for Husser) what
he calls 'pure experiences' has nothing to do- in spite of its delicious name- with life:
it is, strictly speaking, the opposite of life. The phenomenological attitude is precisely
the contrary of what I call 'vital reason'". C.W. V, 545.
39 Ortega attributes this capacity to self-catapult to some pure types of modern volun-
tarism. He is here referring to the Bar6n von Miinchhausen (C.W. VIII, 52) but on
another occasion he gives many more - and juicier - illustrations with regard to the
Baron de Ia Castana. Cf. C.W. V, 504.
40 C.W. VIII, 52.
41 The first sign of the identity of philosophy takes place in the pure and primarily aletheic
moment which Parmenides and Heraclitus represented. Cf. Origin and Epilogue of
Philosophy. C.W. IX, 349-434.
42 Origin and Epilogue of Philosophy. C.W. IX, 399-412.
43 "This obliges us", writes Ortega, "to 'un-naturalize' all the concepts referring to the
integral phenomenon of human life and subject them to a radical 'historizing'. Nothing
that man has been, is, or will be, has he been, is he, or will he be forever. Rather, he
has come to be it one fine day and another fine day he will stop being it". Notes on
Thought. C.W. V, 538.
44 Cf. Ideas and Beliefs, C.W. V, 379-408. He returns to the theme in "Historical
Reason", C.W. XII, 154 ff. The best development is in History as System, C.W. VI, 13-50.
MASA YUKI HAKOISHI
BECOMING OF EGO AND

THE INCARNATED SUBJECT
Sophie stands in front of a mirror, and she asks the girl in the mirror,
"Who are you?"* For a moment, it seems to Sophie that she enters into
a fog: Which person asks? Herself or the girl in the mirror? Then Sophie
points with her finger to the face in the middle of the mirror, and she
says, "You are 1." But the girl does not give any answer. So, in return,
Sophie says, "I am you. " 1
In this story, the essential points of egology may all be comprehended.
They are given as follows.
(1) "I" do not exist, before I reflect upon myself in a mirror. Namely,
in the realm of pre-reflective experience in itself, there is neither any
ego nor alter ego. There is not "I" nor "others" in the experience
in itself, from the beginning.
(2) We begin to speak of "1," when we capture ourselves and objec-
tify ourselves through a mirror, namely when we reflect on ourselves
and seize ourselves, and when we indicate ourselves for others. In
this case, a mirror plays the role of the action of reflection. When
I reflect my pre-reflective experience and I seize myself so, then
an ego comes into being. In other words, when an experience in itself
- which is not yet differentiated into ego and alter ego - is objec-
tified by reflection, then an ego comes into being. The appearance
of ego means, at the same time, the appearance of alter ego.
(3) "I" must be visible, namely, have a corporeal existence, so that I can
look around for myself in the mirror, and so that "I" can be reflected
in the mirror. Therefore, an ego must be an incarnated subject, not
a pure mind without any body.
In this way, "I" comes into being, when I become conscious of myself;
and "I" do not exist, when I am not conscious of myself. Specifically,
"an ego does not 'exist,' but something 'becomes' an ego." 2 We can
also say this with other words, namely, "an ego exists only in self-con-
sciousness. Self-consciousness is a manner of existence of ego. Then,
one's self-consciousness is not a mere state, but an action. In self-con-
sciousness, an ego does not exist merely as existant, but an ego is
always that by which something has become an ego." 3
249

250 MASA YUKI HAKOISHI
I. EXPERIENCE AND EGO
There are two points of view concerning the existence of the ego. The
first is that the assertion that "an ego exists" is absolutely exact. The
second is that, on the contrary, no ego exists materially and formally. And
among the points of view which deny the existence of the ego, we can
find that which denies the material presence of the ego, approving only
its formal existence. And the clearest among the positions taking the
second point of view is that which denies the existence of the ego in
the double sense. In particular, this point of view denies not only the
assertion that an ego is materially present, but also the assertion that it
is necessary to suppose (my) ego formally in order to explain the unity
of (my) consciousness.
The former assertion is representative of the thought of Descartes. It
is said that he has demonstrated the existence of ego as mind or reason.
Certainly, there is no philosopher who insists on the existence of the
ego more than Descartes. The similar thought is found in Locke. Among
the contemporary philosophers, Husserl approves the existence of the
ego.
We can say that the latter assertion is represented by Hume, the English
philosopher of empiricism. It is well known that he denies the exis-
tence of the ego. Among modem philosophers, Wittgenstein subscribes
to this point of view.
However, how can we state that an ego does not exist? We, all of
us, are convinced that we exist, aren't we? If an ego does not exist,
then, how can we understand, for instance, the existence of the person
who suffers for lack of the actual feeling that he himself really exists (for
example, a patient with depersonalization neurosis).
Does an ego exist, or does an ego not exist? Maybe this manner of
putting the question is not valid. Because, for this question, we have
perhaps only two answers, as follows: namely, that first we are able to
answer that an ego exists, or, that second we may be able to answer
that an ego does not exist. In this manner of putting forth the question
of the existence of ego, it seems to us, there is a certain opinion as its
assumption. If an ego exists, then the ego is always conscious of itself,
the ego exists and the ego continues to exist. This is the assumption.
Nevertheless, the ego or the "I" does not constantly exist just as a thing
does. We use the expression "to forget oneself(= to go out of oneself)"
and "to come to oneself (= to recover one's senses)," and "in spite of
BECOMING OF EGO 251
oneself' and so on. If we are able to use these expressions in their

literal senses, then, should we think that for myself, at a certain time,
(my) ego exists, but, at another time, (my) ego does not exist?
We use the words "I" and "myself' as a subject in a sentence.
However, it is clear that everyone can use those words. For example,
we, all of us, everyone can state "I think" or "I see." Therefore we can
say that the word "I" does not indicate a certain particular person. And
we cannot say that the "I" exists constantly as a thing does.
For this reason, it is certain that all of us, every one of us, is convinced
of his own existence, but, moreover, it is not certain at all that all of
us, every last one of us, is always and clearly conscious of his own
existence. For example, Taro (this is a representative name for a Japanese
male) does not live his life ever conscious that "I am really Taro." If Taro
keeps in mind that he is really Taro, and if he lives his own daily life
in saying frequently that he is Taro, then Taro must surely encounter a
certain identity crisis.
When we are doing something, then we are not clearly conscious of
our own existences. And it is at times when we comprehend our action
reflectively that we can comprehend the existence of "1."
Therefore, for example, A. Gehlen begins from "action," when he
researches the manner of existence of the human being. 4 This is because
he believes that we have to start our research on human existence from
the point of view that a human existence is one whole existence, and
that the research must be free from mind and body dualism, whether
the dualism be metaphysical or empirical.
Gehlen begins his research from the point of view of "action," because
he believes that a human existence is unified (or, is incorporated) in
one existence, and that when a human being is doing some action, his
mind and body are unified in one existence, in other words, his mind
and body are not yet differentiated.
In such a manner, the existence of "I" appears at a time when we come
to be conscious of our own action or of our own experience, specifi-
cally, at the time when we reflect on our own existence and comprehend
our own existence. In other words, it is on our own reflective horizon
that the "I" appears. There are occasions which make us reflect on our
own existence. Such are, for example, times when our actions have
broken down, at times when we reflect our own existence in a mirror
as Sophie Amundsen does, at times when we encounter practical orders
such as Socrates' proposition "Know yourself!", or at times when we
ourselves are reflected in a mirror (or in another person). At such times,

we reflect upon ourselves, namely, we grasp ourselves in the manner
of reflection, and we become to the conscious of ourselves.
In this way, when we reflect upon our own actions and speak about
the actions, the "I" begins to say something, for example, "I think" and
"I am reading a book," and so on. Namely, it is on the level of reflec-
tive consciousness that the "I" is called into question. This means that
the existence of "I" is assured by the consciousness of "1." Namely,
the ego is existing, in so far as the ego is conscious of itself. 5
Of course, it goes without saying that there exist some schools of
thought which deny the existence of the ego, and also without saying that
there are various types of such thought. We can find in them the thought
which confuses the level of reflective consciousness and that of non-
reflective consciousness, and that which does not divide clearly the
differences between the horizons of these two consciousnesses.
As is generally known, Hume denies clearly the existence of the ego.
He states his reasons as follows, "For my part, when I enter most inti-
mately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain
or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception,
and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my percep-
tions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist."6
If we grasp our very existence (our experience as it is) just as Hume
describes, then there must not be constant and unchangeable impressions,
and we find only the fact that passions and sensations (pleasure, pain,
grief and joy, etc.) occur successively one after another. In these impres-
sions there does not exist the ego or the self. And the impressions do
not occur from the ego or the self. Namely, as Hume says, "But setting
aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the
rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of dif-
ferent perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable
rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement." 7
As we have seen, it is clear that Hume denies the existence of ego
or self. Nevertheless, that which he intends to make clear is the fact
that we cannot find the ego or the self in our real experience (our
experience just as it is). We have now used the expression "our real expe-
rience." This means the experience in which various perceptions occur
successively one after another. Therefore, real experience exists on the
BECOMING OF EGO 253
level of pre-reflective consciousness. That which Hume elucidates, is

nothing but the fact that the ego does not exist in the pre-reflective
experience in itself.
The thought which Hume criticizes is, for instance, that of "some
philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of
what we call our SELF."8 In other words, it is the thought "that we feel
its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the
evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity."9
However, these thoughts are those which stand on the level of reflec-
tive consciousness. Therefore, it is natural that the ego or the "I" or
the self is found there.
In this way, the ego does not exist in the raw pre-reflective experi-
ence. When we objectify this pre-reflective experience and we grasp it,
then the ego comes into being. When we are doing something, then
there is neither ego nor its "1." It is on the level of reflective con-
sciousness that the "I" or the ego appears. When we transfer ourselves
from the pre-reflective level to the reflective level, then, the ego appears,
namely the ego comes into being. And it seems to us that these facts have
already been shown in the meditations of Descartes.
II. THINKING AND EGO
It is said that the proposition of Descartes "I think, therefore I am"

demonstrates the existence of the ego from the existence of thinking.
However, can we say so? If we can say that it is certain, then how can
we demonstrate the existence of the ego from the existence of thinking?
After the example of Descartes, I try to research the problem to
arrive at an ab.solute certainty. Researching the absolutely doubtless or
the absolutely certain, I try to doubt all that is open to my doubt. After
I examine all of these doubts, if I can find something which I can never
doubt, then it must be the first principle of philosophy. And it is from
this principle that we have to start philosophical investigations. Therefore,
in order to reach the first principle, I have to doubt all that is open to
my doubt. In this way, I am thinking of everything. Namely, "I" who
am doubting and thinking, this "I" must necessarily be something. That
is to say, it is necessary that this "I" exist. In other words, the fact of
that "I am thinking" means nothing but the fact of that "It is I who am
thinking, this 'I' necessarily exists."
If we can understand in this way the proposition of Descartes, "I
think, therefore I am," then we have to divide it between the two states;
namely, between the state of pre-reflective "thinking" and that of the
reflective "thinking." Reflective consciousness posits pre-reflective con-
sciousness as its object and grasps it objectively. "Cogito" means "(I) am
thinking." And we can say that here exists "thinking" or "the fact that
I think." But "cogito" does not mean that "'I' think." Namely, it does
not mean that this "I" thinks in the reflective manner. It seems to us
that we have to interpret the "cogito" in this sense. If we can seize the
meaning of "cogito" in this way, we have to say that there exists a
difference in the level of being between "cogito ([I] think)" and "sum
(I am)."
What we want to insist on here is that there exists the difference
between the level of "cogito" and that of "sum." That is to say, the
"cogito" exists on the level of non-reflective or pre-reflective con-
sciousness; on the other hand, the "sum" exists on that of reflective
consciousness.
Properly speaking, the ego is not found on the level of non-reflec-
tive or pre-reflective consciousness. It is on the level of reflective
consciousness that the ego is found. In our real experience, the ego
does not exist from the beginning. It is not so. At the time when we grasp
our very experience in the manner of reflection, the ego emerges, and
then, the self comes into being.
If the argument of Descartes is valid for demonstrating the existence
of the "I" or the ego, we have to indicate that there exists the act of reflec-
tion, and that Descartes does reflect on his thinking (on his cogitatio).
And he says, "I think, therefore I am." However, in this case, the fact
of that "I think" is an occurrence in the realm of the pre-reflective con-
sciousness of "(I) think." Therefore, the "I" cannot be found there. For
this reason, we have to pay attention to the manner of inscription.
When we inscribe "cogito" in English, we have to write it as "(I) think."
Because, when "I am thinking of something," there does not exist
any "I."
It may be certain that the "(I) think" follows from the thinking
"I" and its necessarily being something, so that the "I" exists. But, can
we truly say so? If we can, then this "I" reflects on the fact of that
"I think," that is to say, the "I" makes the fact of that "I think" an
object of the reflective consciousness; in other words, there exists an
action of reflection. In this way, Descartes was able to seize the "truth"
that "I exist" in the manner of reflection, through the method of reflec-
BECOMING OF EGO 255
tion, namely, by reflecting on that "(I) think" in the realm of pre-

consciousness.
Therefore, when we consider the existence of the ego in terms of
the proposition "Cogito, ergo sum," then, we have to divide it into two
sentences; namely, that of "cogito" and that of "sum." The former is
"(I) think" in the realm of pre-reflective consciousness, and the latter
is "I am" in the realm of reflective consciousness. Descartes makes "(I)
think" an object of his consciousness, namely, he makes himself con-
scious, and he grasps himself consciously. In this way, he reaches the
first principle of philosophy, "I think, therefore I am," and he demon-
strates the existence of ego.
To execute this reflection, then, is to do none other than to look around
for oneself and to make oneself an object. The subject of his reflection
is that which is able to look around for itself, namely, to perform the
gestures of looking around for oneself. In this way, the subject is nothing
else than the body. Therefore, the subject which is able to reflect must
be a corporeal one. However, Descartes says, in this train of methodic
doubt, that he can imagine that he himself has no body. 10 If
this is so, we have to say that the subject of which Descartes speaks,
is a subject which exists independently of any body. However, pro-
perly speaking, how can this subject of which Descartes speaks look
around for itself? How can the subject comprehend itself in the manner
of reflection?
It is also said that Descartes has demonstrated the existence of the ego.
But, is it true? In order to examine this problem, we have to recollect
the definition of substance in the philosophy of Descartes. Substance
is defined as that which does not depend upon any other being, or that
which does not need any other being in order to exist. According to
this definition of substance, the ego must exist without dependence
upon any other being. If the ego exists in such a manner of existence,
then what is the "I"?
Descartes states: "therefore I concluded that I was a substance whose
whole essence or nature was only to think, and which, to exist, has no
need of space nor of any material thing. Thus it follows that this ego,
this soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body
and is easier to know than the latter, and that even if the body were
not, the soul would not cease to be all that it now is.""
In this way, according to Descartes, the ego, in order to exist, has
no need of any body. If the ego exists with no body, without depen-
dence upon any body, then, how is it possible that the ego reflects on
itself? Or, how can the ego look around for itself? We have to say that
"I" must be corporeal (bodily) existence, so as "I" am able to look around
for myself, "I" am able to reflect myself, and so "I" am able to perform
the gesture of looking around for myself.
Descartes is convinced that he has demonstrated the existence of the
ego. But the ego which he has demonstrated does not depend upon any
other being, does not depend upon any bodily existence, and so, the
ego in the philosophy of Descartes is, so to speak, a pure soul like an
angel. We have to say that such an ego as Descartes discusses cannot
look back at itself, and cannot reflect on itself, because the ego is not
unified with any bodily existence. In the first place, it is impossible
that the Cartesian ego reflect on itself, look around for itself, and perform
the gesture of looking around for itself.
Ill. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EGO
We have elucidated above some essential points of egology. They are

as follows: When I am acting, there does not exist an "I" or an ego.
And it is in the realm of the reflective consciousness that the "I" or the
ego does emerge. In this way, the "I" or the "ego" is not found in our
real experience from the beginning. It is on the occasion of the looking
around for oneself, namely, on the occasion of reflection on oneself,
that the "I" or the ego comes into being.
We have no intention of asserting that these are our own original
thoughts. If we intend to attempt our own philosophical investigations
on the ego, then it may be necessary to examine, to master, for example,
the philosophy of ego in Fichte. In this case, we will take up Sartre's
article entitled "The Transcendence of the Ego," and try to examine its
content, because he has made clear the relationship of the conscious-
ness to the ego, and his thought on this problem has something in
common with what we have elucidated above.
What is it that Sartre intends to demonstrate in his article? It is this:
"We would want to demonstrate here that the Ego is neither formally
nor materially in the consciousness: it is outside, in the world; it is a
being of the world, like the Ego of the other." 12
This is what he intends to clarify through his phenomenological
descriptions on the ego and consciousness. He gives the following three
points in conclusion. First, the two regions are divided clearly. Namely,
BECOMING OF EGO 257
one is the region which psychology can approach. This is the region
of empirical consciousness. And the other is the region which only
phenomenology can approach. This is the region of transcendental con-
sciousness, in which the ego does not exist. Therefore, transcendental
consciousness is nothing more than the region of impersonal and pure
spontaneity. 13
Secondly, this grasp of the ego is the sole idea that is able to overcome
solipsism, because as long as the ego is a transcendent object for
consciousness, it is impossible for my ego to be more certain for con-
sciousness than the ego of the other person. We can say only that my
ego is intimate with consciousness. 14
And thirdly, this phenomenological egology is realistic thought,
because this theory of the ego does not assert that the world has created
the ego, nor that the ego has created the world, because it is not so. But
both the ego and the world are two objects for absolute and impersonal
consciousness, and these two beings are unified through consciousness. 15
If that is the case, then how does Sartre certify that the ego is a tran-
scendent object for consciousness, and that the ego does not exist in
consciousness?
In the first place, Sartre takes up the thought of Kant as a theory
of the formal presence of the "ego." Kant states, as we well know, that
the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations. Even
if we agree with his assertion, however, can we say that the "I think"
in fact accompanies all my representations? There must be another
question. Namely, even if we agree with Kant concerning the quid juris,
there remains the examination of the quid facti. That is to say, we have
to examine whether the ego in fact accompanies all my representations.
In this way, Sartre takes up the thought of Husserl as a theory of
the material presence of the "ego," because it is phenomenology that
examines whether the ego in fact exists in consciousness or not. Phe-
nomenology is a scientific study of consciousness, and its essential
method is nothing but intuition. Husserl has found again the transcen-
dental consciousness of Kant, through applying his epoche; he captures
transcendental consciousness again. This consciousness is the actual con-
sciousness which everyone can grasp immediately, on condition that he
executes the phenomenological reduction. This transcendental con-
sciousness, being confined in itself, constitutes its world. Nevertheless,
Sartre asserts that not only is the ego unnecessary for the unity of this
transcendental consciousness, but that the ego does not exist as a matter
of fact. Consciousness is defined only by its intentionality, and the

"ego" which unifies consciousness does not exist. That which unifies
the actions of consciousness is precisely the transcendent object.
Consciousness transcends itself by its intentionality, and the conscious-
ness, in getting away from itself, unifies itself.
Sartre states,
The transcendental 'I' is the death of the consciousness. In fact, the existence of con-
sciousness is an absolute, because the consciousness is conscious of itself. That is to
say, the manner of existence of consciousness is to be conscious of itself. And it is con-
scious of itself as far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object. Therefore, all is
clear and lucid in the consciousness: the object, with its characteristic opacity, is in the
fact of consciousness, but as for consciousness, it is purely and simply the conscious-
ness of being the consciousness of this object; that is the law of the existence. 16
As we have seen above, the "I think" of Kant is a condition of pos-

sibility, and, on the contrary, the "cogito" in the philosophy of Descartes
and of Husser! is confirmation of fact. In the philosophy of Descartes
or in that of Husser!, in either case, we cannot deny that the "cogito"
is personal. This is because Descartes thinks that the "ego" which thinks
exists in the "I think," and because Husser} thinks that the ego exists
in transcendental consciousness.
However, Sartre does not confirm the doctrine which asserts that the
ego exists in consciousness, not even the doctrine of the formal presence
only of the ego or that of the material presence of the ego, because
each time I grasp my thinking I am the very "ego" of the grasped
thinking, and, furthermore, I grasp the "ego" which is given as tran-
scendent to my thinking and to all other thinking.
We have to take particular note that, whether in the philosophy
of Descartes or in that of Husser}, the cogito is shown as reflective
action, namely, secondary action. This "cogito" is executed by the con-
sciousness which objectifies consciousness in itself, that is, by the
consciousness which is directed to consciousness. The cogito is absolutely
certain, because the reflective consciousness and the reflected con-
sciousness are both indivisibly unified, or to put it more correctly, because
these two consciousnesses are really the same single consciousness.
Here, it is necessary to make clear the fact that the consciousness
which talks about the "cogito" is not the very consciousness which is
actually thinking. That which consciousness of the "cogito" posits by
its action of positing, is not its thinking itself. The consciousness which
executes the action of reflection, this consciousness itself, is non-reflec-
BECOMING OF EGO 259
tive. A new action of consciousness is then needed, so that non-

reflective consciousness can come to be posited as an object. However,
consciousness is not needed for consciousness to become conscious of
itself. To put it more simply, the consciousness never posits itself as
its object.
For this reason, it is reflective action that calls the ego into being in
reflected consciousness. When the non-reflected thinking is brought as
an object to reflective consciousness, then the consciousness suffers a
radical modification. What is this modification? It is nothing but the
emergence of the ego. For example, I am now reading a book. What is
found at this time is only consciousness of the book, or the conscious-
ness of the hero in the novel. There, the ego does not settle in the
consciousness. This consciousness is simply consciousness of its object,
and at the same time non-positional consciousness so far as it itself is
concerned. That is all that we can say concerning the manner of exis-
tence of consciousness. As we have seen, the ego does not exist in the
non-reflective consciousness. 17
Therefore, it is certain, as Sartre asserts, that the ego cannot be found
in the non-reflective consciousness. However, should we then say that
the ego does not exist in any manner? No, that is never so. When I am
reading a book, someone asks me, "What are you doing now?" At that
time, I answer him, "I am now reading this interesting book." In this way,
when a reflective action is executed, then the ego is constituted as an
object of reflective consciousness.
Thus Sartre has analyzed the phenomena of consciousness by the phe-
nomenological method, and he has described the manner of existence
of the ego and of consciousness. He has elucidated the relationship of
the ego to the consciousness as follows: The ego does not exist in the
consciousness, the ego emerges as the occasion of reflection, and the ego
is then constituted as an object of reflective consciousness. These ideas
of Sartre accord with what we have clarified above, namely that the
ego does not exist in consciousness from the beginning, and that the
ego comes into being at the occasion of reflection.
IV. PURE EXPERIENCE
The ego does not exist in our real experience. It is not that the "I" or
the ego posits something as its object. In fact, in the realm of our expe-
rience itself, we can never find the duality of subject and object. This
is our thought and that of Sartre, which we have seen in the preceding
section. Thinking similar to ours (namely, that which we can not find
the subject-object duality in our real experience) as such, is found in
the conception of pure experience in the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida
(1870-1945), 18 who is one of the representative philosophers of modern
Japan. Therefore, we will take up the conception of Nishida, and try to
analyze and examine it.
The reality, which can be called so, is, according to Nishida, imme-
diate experience or pure experience only. He states, "Seen on the basis
of immediate knowledge without any presumption, reality is nothing
but our conscious phenomenon, namely, the fact of our immediate expe-
rience only. The so-called reality which is supposed to exist besides
this is nothing but an assumption which is raised from the requirement
of thought." 19
What does this mean, then, the immediate phenomenon or pure expe-
rience? Nishida says as follows, "To experience means to know a fact
as it is. It means to know a fact itself by getting rid of our preposses-
sions entirely, and in being true to the fact itself. 'Pure' means 'the
state of the experience as it is truly, without adding any thought or any
judgement in the least, although the experience in the ordinary sense,
in point of fact, contains some thought. " 20
For example, at the time when I am seeing a colour, or I am lis-
tening to a sound, there is nothing but the fact that a colour is seen (by
me), and the fact that a sound is heard (by me). And there does not
exist any such thought as follows: for example, the thought that this is
an action of an object existing in the exterior world, or the thought that
the ego or the "I" is sensing this sound or this colour. This is not the
case at all. Moreover, the judgements - what this colour is, or what
this sound is, etc. - are not added to pure experience.
For this reason, Nishida states as follows: "In this way, pure experi-
ence is the same as immediate experience. When we experience
intuitively our own state of consciousness as it is, there does not yet exist
either subject or object. There knowledge and its object are completely
unified. This is the most well-blended of experiences." 21 Therefore,
knowledge and science cannot be called experience in the authentic sense,
because they are brought forth by reasoning based on experiences. W. M.
Wundt comprehends know ledges and the sciences as science of indirect
experience; he understands physics and chemistry as science in that sense.
However Nishida rejects this thought.
BECOMING OF EGO 261
Pure experience is, therefore, experience which exists in a state yet

to be differentiated into subject and object: experience in a state of the
complete unity of consciousness. "Even if it should be a phenomenon
of consciousness, it is impossible for myself to experience the con-
sciousness of the other person; even if it should be the consciousness
of myself, the recollection of its past or the representation of it, when
I have judged this, it is not the pure experience. True 'pure experience'
is nothing but the actual consciousness of the fact itself, with no
meaning." 22
In this way, pure experience is a state of indivisibility between subject
and object, and is the continuity of perceptions themselves. This is
based on examples which Nishida adduces, for instance, the continuity
of those perceptions I have when I am scaling a cliff in fear of my life,
or when a musician is playing his practiced music. In these phenomena
of "consciousness" at those times, the perceptions hold their strict concord
and interlinkage. Whenever consciousness diverts its attention from a
certain object to another, the attention of the consciousness is always
directed to an object in the outer world. If it is, for example, an expe-
rience of auditory sense or an experience of visual sense, when the
consciousness is in a strictly unified state, the experience is called a
pure experience.
In contrast, when this unification of pure experience is broken down,
specifically, when pure experience has come to have links to another
object, then some meanings of this experience are realized, and some
judgements of the experience are called into being. Then, what on earth
is it which breaks down the unification of pure experience? It is nothing
but reflection itself. And then, on what occasion do we reflect on our-
selves? In the philosophy of Nishida, consciousness is essentially one
system. Namely, consciousness makes itself grow by itself, and makes
itself complete by itself. This is the natural state of the consciousness.
Nevertheless, in the course of its growth and development, contradictions
and collisions between a great variety of systems occur. That is when
reflective thinking appears.
In this way, when we try to grasp our pure experience in a reflec-
tive manner, the differentiation between subject and object arises. And
at that time, meaning-giving and judgement are executed. Namely, a sense
is bestowed on the pure experience, and a judgement is given on the pure
experience. Therefore, a meaning and a judgement are each a manner
of being in the relation of consciousness to pure experience. For this
reason, the fact of pure experience always exists, behind the con-
sciousness of relations, such as meaning and judgement. It is because
of this consciousness of relations that the liaison between the two
representations - that of subject and that of object - becomes possible.
It is not that we unify the two independent representations into a judge-
ment; on the contrary, it is that we analyse a certain representation
which is entirely one existence. For example, when we analyse a rep-
resentation of "a running horse," then we make the judgement "a horse
is running" from the representation. 23
Thus, in pure experience, subject and object are not yet differenti-
ated, and it is on the occasion of reflection that pure experience is
differentiated into subject and object. For this reason, the ego does not
exist in the pure experience itself, and when the pure experience is
grasped by reflection, it is on that occasion that the ego comes into
being.
We have analysed and considered the conception of pure experience
above. Through these analyses and considerations, it has become clear
that the conception of consciousness and of the ego in Nishida share
themes with that of Sartre in his phenomenological egology.
V. BODY AND SUBJECT
When we look around for our experience itself in reflective action, the
ego is raised up into being at precisely that time. The ego is called into
being at the time when the reflection is executed. It is not the case that
the ego exists in the experience itself from the beginning.
Consequently, the subject which executes reflection must be corpo-
real, have bodily existence. In other words, the subject which is able
to look around for itself is nothing but that which is able to make itself
an object of the reflection. It is impossible for this subject to be a pure
spirit without any predicate of space or place. What is more, in order
to reflect myself in a mirror so that I can see my own face in the mirror,
I must have a visible existence.
We are also able to understand these points concerning the existence
of the ego when we consider the achievement of personal perception
in children. According to what developmental psychology teaches us, for
every child there comes a period when he or she is interested in reflected
images in a mirror. It is said that a child comes to be able to under-
stand the meanings of the reflected images in a mirror. This means that
BECOMING OF EGO 263
a child is able to execute a reflection via the mirror, and that he is able
to look around for himself through it. The fact that a child grasps his own
image in a mirror as himself means that he is already able to discern
himself by the manner of reflection.
Now, Merleau-Ponty has elucidated "Relations with Others in the
Infant" by analyzing precisely the psychological study of Henri Wallon,
"The Origins of Character in the Infant." The work of Merleau-Ponty
promotes our considerations of the ego. 24
In our early infancy, "I" and others are not yet differentiated. From
the beginning, an infant does not grasp the "I" and the others by dis-
tinguishing between "I" and the others. At the first stage, an infant lives
in a syncretic sociality of "I" and the others. However, when an infant
reaches approximately six months of age, he comes to be interested in
images reflected in a mirror. This is what is called the stage of the mirror-
image.
Entering this stage of the mirror-image, an infant comes to play with
mirror-images. And he gradually is able to understand their meanings.
Moreover, he comes to be able to understand his own image reflected
in the mirror as himself. This phenomenon means that he understands
himself as an object, in that he understands himself in the manner of
reflection. We may be able to say that a mirror in this case is propor-
tionate to the appearance of reflective consciousness. That is to say, a
mirror makes reflective action possible.
In this way, it is through the medium of the mirror-image that the grasp
of self in the infant comes into being. That is to say, an infant first
lives in a syncretic sociality in which the ego is not yet differentiated
from the alter ego. Secondly, he enters the stage of the mirror-image.
He passes through this stage, and third, reaches the stage of the differ-
entiation of the ego from the alter ego. Thus, we cannot say that each
of us has an ego by nature. In a certain sense, we are able to say that
the ego comes into existence in us through our comprehension of the
mirror-image. In other words, we may say that we acquire the ego through
the comprehension of the meaning of the mirror-image.
In the stage of mirror-image, it is therefore important that I grasp
the "I" reflected in the mirror as myself. "I" must be such an existence
that can be reflected in the mirror so that I may understand the "I"
reflected in the mirror as being myself. If "I" am a pure spirit such as
an angel, and if "I" have no body, then it becomes impossible that "I"
be reflected in the mirror. For this reason, "I" must have my body, "I"
must be possessed by my body. To say it exactly, it must be that I exist

my body.
We use this crude expression "I exist my body," because we want to
express what is called the unification of mind with body. Namely, the
"I" is, at the same time, mind and body. It seems to us that hitherto
the expression "I have my body" has been current. But, then, we can
interpret that as follows, namely, that "I" and "body" are combined by
a relation of possession. If we adopt this interpretation, then we take
the position of mind and body dualism.
As we have seen above, an infant in its early period lives in a syn-
cretic sociality of the ego and the alter ego. Starting out from this stage,
and proceeding through the stage of the mirror-image, an infant reaches
the stage when he can distinguish the self from the others. In this way,
the difference between the self and the others comes into being. Thus,
the distinction between "I" and others is established in the mental life
of an adult, and this distinction established the relationship of self to
others. Therefore, we cannot say that we have an ego by nature; rather,
we have to say that the ego comes into existence out of the syncretic
sociality of infancy.
However, it is not the case that the syncretic sociality of infancy dis-
appears in the mental life of the adult. This syncretic sociality continues
to exist potentially in the adult. This is the reason why the anomalous
experience of being in love becomes possible in the adult. For example,
when I love somebody else and the object of my love loves me, then I
live the same single life with the object of my love. At that time, there
does not exist any distinction between my life and the life of the object
of my love. Then, we cannot say, "This is my life and that is yours. There
is the distinction between mine and yours." Specifically, my life is mixed
with the life of the object of love in "our" unified life.
The distinction between the self and others is certainly established
in the mental life of the adult, but, in so far as we are concerned with
the pure experience, the subject and the object are not yet differenti-
ated. And as we have said in the above, it is on the occasion of reflection
on pure experience that the subject and the object come to be differen-
tiated. In this way, the self and the others arise out of a pre-reflective
and indivisible experience. The ego comes into being and does not exist
in experience from the beginning. Therefore, for reflection to be possible,
"I" must be a bodily existence, I must exist my body.
What is this body? Merleau-Ponty states, "This subject, which expe-
BECOMING OF EGO 265
riences (eprouver) itself as constituted at the moment when it functions

as constituting, it is my body." 25
What is the meaning of this sentence? Takiura elucidates what
Merleau-Ponty wants to say, in the following words, "'Constituting'
is, as a matter of course, nothing but the subject which functions as
meaning-giving; and 'constituted' suffers the meanings given by the
subject, and it is the object which lives in the middle of the meaning.
In this form of being, that which is, at the same time, the subject and
the object, in other words, that which holds both of the two moments
of activity and passivity, it is the body; so says Merleau-Ponty."26
Reflection is possible to human being. This is due to the body in the
sense we have developed in the above. And it is due to the body that time
also is brought into being. For this reason, we have to say that a body
as such makes reflection possible. It is due to the existence of time that
reflection comes to be possible. The non-reflective consciousness which
executes a reflective action, and the consciousness which is the object
of this reflection, are nothing but one and the same consciousness. There
exists the interval which has no spatial distance, namely, an interval in
time. It is because of the existence of my body that the interval in time
comes to be possible. And reflection is nothing, but one's action when
one looks around for oneself. Therefore, it is "my" body that makes
reflection possible.
lwate University, Morioka, Japan
NOTES
* The Japanese version of this paper will be appearing in Vol. 55, No. 2, 1995 (February,
1996) of The Annual Report of the Faculty of Education, lwate University (Morioka,
Japan).
1 Jostein Gaarder, Sophie's World, A Novel about the History of Philosophy, trans.
Paulette Moller (London: Phoenix House, 1995), pp. 4-5.

2 Shizuo Takiura, How to See 'Self and 'Others' -Introduction to a New Philosophy
(in Japanese) (Tokyo: Association of Japan Broadcasting, 1990), p. 202. (At present avail-
able only in Japanese.) This work treats the problems of the self and the alter ego, or
the "I'' and "the other person." The author of the work has clarified the problem areas
of egology, and he intends to resolve and transcend the problems by adopting the two
methods of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The author of the present paper takes
this occasion to say that, for the present paper, the author is much indebted to the views
and the suggestions of this work.
266 MASAYUKI HAKOISHI
3 Yl>kichi Yajima, The Logic of the Buddhist Vanity- Beyond Nihilism (in Japanese)
(Kyoto: Hl>zl>kan, 1989), p. 112. (At present available only in Japanese.)
4 Arnnold Gehlen, "Zur Systematik der Anthropologie" in Studien zur Anthropologie und
Soziologie, Soziologische Texte Bd. 17, ed. H. Maus und F. Furstenberg (Neuwien und
Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1963), pp. 19-20.
s Yajima, op. cit., p. 82.
6 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
Part IV, Sect. VI. Of Personal Identity (Reprint of the New Edition, London, 1886,
Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), Volume I, p. 534.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 533.
9 Ibid.
10 Rene Descartes, Discours de Ia Methode, Texte et Commentaire par Etienne Gilson
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1967), p. 32; English translation: R. Descartes,
Discourse on Method, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956),
p.21.
11 Ibid., p. 33 (English translation, ibid., p. 21).
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, La Transcendance de /'ego (Paris: Libraire Philosophique, J. Vrin,
1966), p. 13 (English translation is by the author of the present article).
13 Ibid., p. 77.
14 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
IS Ibid., pp. 85-87.
16 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
17 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
18 Masayuki Hakoishi, "Die Phlinomenologie in Japan" (Nach dem franzosischen
Manuskript bearbeitet von Karl Schuhmann [Utrecht]), in, Zeitscrift fiir Philosophische
Forschung, Band 37, Heft 2, April-June 1983, pp. 302-303.
19 Kitarl> Nishida, A Study on the Good (in Japanese) (Tokyo: lwamnami Shoten, 1979),
p. 66.
20 Ibid., p. 13.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 14.
23 Ibid., p. 24.
24 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Les Relations avec autrui chez I' enfant (Paris: Centre de
Documentation Universitaire, 1969), pp. 16-60.
2s Idem, "Sur Ia phenomenologie du langage," in Signe (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p.
117 (English translation is by the author of the present article).
26 S. Takiura, Time- Its Philosophical Considerations (in Japanese) (Tokyo: lwanami
Shoten, 1976), p. 200. (At present, available only in Japanese.)
JESUS CONILL
REASON IN VITAL EXPERIENCE IN

ORTEGA Y GASSET
Ortega nourished himself from two intellectual sources, Marburg's Neo

Kantianism and Husserl 's Phenomenology. He confesses his link with
Kantianism, when he says that for ten years he lived inside Kantian
thought. But his thought evolved through the influence of various philo-
sophical trends from the realm of pure philosophy to others nearer to life.
In his search for the roots of reason, he passed from pure reason to an
impure (vital and historical) form of reason, which we will name globally
"the reason of vital experience" in our context.
We will see that in this changing process of taking reason towards
the discovery of its background in vital experience, phenomenology did
not satisfy him either and therefore he had to pass from the phenome-
nological "intuition of essences" to a new conception of reality, one which
gave birth to a peculiar transmodem metaphysics. 1
The "radical reality", which Ortega leads us to, is human life itself:
it is no longer the Cartesian cogito and similar cogitos but is the "I
live" which is the radical reality wherein lie all forms of my experi-
ence of the real. From this new Ortegian perspective, reason can only
be considered as a life function and be based on vital beliefs and expe-
riences. Only from that subsoil can ideas be produced by the reason which
is their vital and historical root.
THE DISCOVERY OF REASON
Reason is a historical product; it has not always existed: "one day, in

the small squares of Athens, Socrates discovered reason" which became
"the objective pole of life". 2
With Socrates, "the attempt to abandon spontaneous life in order to
attain the place of pure reason" is produced. But then a duality is intro-
duced into human life, that which exists between spontaneity and
reflexion. As spontaneity cannot be cancelled out, it is only possible to
restrain and cover it with the reflexive mechanisms by which rationality
is made. Thus the spontaneous evidence and reflexive convictions that
reason provides us with complement one another.
267

268 JESUS CONILL
Socratism or Rationalism begets a double life, in which what we are not spontaneously
- pure reason- comes to take the place of what we really are - spontaneity. Such is
the sense of Socratic irony. Every act in which one primary movement takes the place
of another secondary one is ironic, for instead of saying what we think, we pretend to
think what we say .... Rationalism is a gigantic attempt to speak ironically of sponta-
neous life looking at it from the point of view of pure reason. 3
But is this possible? Can Reason be self-sufficient and abandon the

rest of life because it is irrational? The attempt to explore the suppos-
edly unlimited possibilities of reason led to a review of dogmatic
Rationalism, until dogmatic Rationalism was made self-critical through
the study of the "limits of reason", such as was carried out by the modem
projects of Critical Philosophy.
But, despite the modem critical development and the undeniable value
of many of the contributions of reason, the present perspective makes
us more than critics (transcritics?). Our use of all that reason has con-
tributed to in its history should not induce us to naively surrender to
its unlimited pretensions.
Pure reason cannot take the place of life: the culture of the abstract intellect is not, as
opposed to the spontaneous, another life that can be self-sufficient and which can take
the place of that one. It is only a brief island floating over the sea of primary vitality.
Far from substituting this one, it has to base itself on it, feed from it as every one of
the limbs lives from the whole organism.
So then, although the discovery of reason constitutes a great "acqui-

sition" for the development of human life, we can no longer ignore its
limits or its roots: "Reason is only a form and function of life".
So, according to Ortega, in the same way as "Socrates's issue of
time" was "the attempt to abandon spontaneous life to attain the place
of pure reason",
the issue of our time consists in submitting reason to vitality, finding it inside the bio-
logical, subordinating it to the spontaneous. (... ) The mission of the new time is to
show that it is culture, reason, art, ethics which have to serve life. 5
LOSS OF FAITH IN REASON?
Ortega shares the worry over the "crisis of fundamentals" and the dis-
orientation felt in his time, but he corrects and specifies the despairing
Husserlian reflexion about the loss of faith in reason, 6 pointing out that
"it would be false to say that man has lost his faith in reason".
VITAL EXPERIENCE IN ORTEGA Y GASSET 269
What happens is that in the XVIIth century the leading European minorities started to
feel a radical trust in the absolute power of intelligence as the only and universal instru-
ment to find the solution to the problems of life (... ). But one fine day it was made
clear that while intelligence and reason perfectly resolved countless problems all the
time, especially the material kind, they had failed in all their efforts to resolve others,
mainly the moral and social ones, among them the problems that man feels as his ultimate
and most decisive. 7
The "consciousness of failure" and the "lack of confidence" have

changed the attitude to reason and "an ambivalent situation" is being
lived through: one of having to "continue believing in the effective-
ness of intelligence", while seeing that it is impossible to give it a blank
check without borders or limitations. Because reason, "from being the
great solution (... ) has become the great problem". We have discov-
ered that rational action, which was thought to be liberating, has turned
out to be, at the same time, hopelessly dehumanizing. The presumed
humanism of a form of reason has degenerated into sociopolitical bar-
barism and personal despair.
Before the failure of modem dominant reason and the serious danger
of lack of faith in reason, a "new method" has to be found or a "new
reason" has to be discovered. Ortega made the decision to follow this
latter way: not a new method, but a new way of understanding reason. 8
For that reason, although important scholars of the subject have talked
about "vital reason as method", in my opinion it would be better to
consider Ortega's stand as a defense of a new form of reason, the reason
of vital experience (something similar to what has happened in con-
temporary hermeneutics).
Therefore, in Ortega's opinion, the issue of our time consists in
reducing pure reason to 'vital reason'. This is the programme of "ratio-
vitalism", a type of "critique of vital reason". 9
"THE CRITIQUE OF VITAL REASON"
The Ortegian protocritique of vital reason makes us see that, although

we might lack definite references and we have come to doubt reason
itself, we still feel called to "having to be rational beings". 10 What
happens is that it is no longer possible to continue holding an "enclosed
and final" idea of reason, but that the only thing to do is to recognize
the plurality of forms of reason and to trust in a new "dawn", that of
vital, historical, perspectivist and narrative reason. Because "it was not
270 JESUS CONILL
all reason" which was to blame for cultural failure, but a way of under-
standing it, which was inadequate at the heart of human life.
Where, then, should we become resolute? In "personal living", in
the "experience of life". Because life is "radical reality" (to it we have
to refer all other things) and "action" (to do something to exist). In it a
vital knowledge, the wisdom of life is established. "Life" - in the
Ortegian sense- means, at the same time, reality and knowledge (without
reducing its enormous and enigmatic character). And only from the expe-
rience of life is a reason always in via, on the way, of vital experience
formed, since "life is essentially the experience of life". 11
Now, any "vitalistic" reductionism in the understanding of human
life has to be avoided. It has a rather biological sense, like Aristotelian
bios. Living is dealing intelligently with the world, a dramatic incident,
what happens to us, the coming about of a world that allows itself to
be driven by desire (out of the radical wanting to live). Human life means
having to make it; it is a gerund, a faciendum, not a factum.
In order to live it is always important to do something and to make
decisions, which are impossible unless there is some belief. We live from
beliefs; in them we "move, live and have our being". Beliefs and con-
victions are the subsoil of our life. They exercise a "function of living
as such, the function of guiding behaviour, action", 12 because in order
to live we need to know what to expect.
To live is to find ourselves already forced to interpret our lives. 13 In every single moment,
in every circumstance, even the greatest sceptic already lives by certain convictions and
beliefs, in a world of meaning, in an interpretation. There is no life without definite
convictions. Our lives always give an interpretation of themselves. We even now find our-
selves prisoners of given solutions: the language itself in which we think is already an
interpretation of life.
"Every life is a point of view about the universe". 14 What is seen by

one cannot be seen by another; the experience of each one is irreplace-
able in reaching the truth, which this way "acquires a vital dimension".
The "doctrine of the point of view", that is to say, a certain perspec-
tivity between rationality and relativism, shows that "perspective is one
of the components of reality. Far from being its distortion, it is its orga-
nization". Therefore, the perspectivist doctrine of the point of view
demands that vital perspectives be joined together and that pure reason
be replaced by impure reason (that of vital experience), that include,
and join together, not only the vital and historical dimension, but also the
perspectivist one.
That reason is vital and historical is due, in the last analysis, to man's
not having "a nature" (a fixed and static being, previously given), one
that "makes himself from his experiences". Because of this, man has
no nature but has a history. This is the new "revelation" of historical
reason. If in other conceptions what there was of reason could not be his-
torical and what there was of history could not be rational, Ortega's
ratio-vitalism allows reason and life, reason and history to be brought
togethel\ (in a similar way to what is happening in the hermeneutic phi-
losophy). In my opinion, this is due to the fact that he has been able to
unravel the heart of the reason of vital experience in his vital and his-
torical dynamism.
"Life only becomes a bit transparent before historical reason". 15
Thereby, vital reason is, at the same time, historical reason and narra-
tive reason; and even rhetorical reason. So in order to understand what
is human, it is necessary to relate individual and collective life histo-
ries. And rhetoric gives to thought the characteristic of happening, gives
life, vitality and substance to the word; it elevates the word beyond the
idea. Through the figures of expression, especially the metaphor, the
Ortegian idea of vital reason, vitality and embodiment of expression
are strengthened. An alive and vital philosophy uses rhetoric because
it revitalizes language.
This new variety of vital and historical reason also has to serve to
demythologize logic, which is one of the ways of hiding true thought.
Because "Logic replaces the infinite morphology of thought with only
one of its forms: logical thought". Because of this, "when it has been
tried seriously to logically build Logic (... ) it has been seen to be impos-
sible ... ", 16 because Logic is supported by a field of beliefs and is
submitted to the ups and downs of history. "Logical Reason" is subor-
dinate to "Historical Reason" and depends on the enigmatic flow of
life. Logic takes on the vice of "utopianism", since "everything we do,
we do in view of circumstances".
Man "forms and unforms his being through living". He amasses being- the past-: he
is becoming a being in the dialectical series of his experiences. This dialectic does not
belong to logical reason, but precisely to the historical. 17
What historical reason expresses is the non-logical link of the coming

about of vital experience, since "man does not have a nature, but has
... history". 18 And history is "the system of human experience ... ". 19
"Experience", if we pay attention to the etymology, expresses an "ancient
272 JESUS CONILL
experience", a peculiar vital situation. It means something like "proved

by the events of life". It involves the idea of proof and trial, danger
and risk; it is like travelling, travelling through the world taking risks,
without a previous guide or method. The reason of vital experience is
that which establishes its knowledge, travelling, going directly to things,
with the danger that that entails, and looking for the way.
At the heart of this reason of vital experience we find the following
declaration: "all life is unconditional and unconditioned''. 20 This affir-
mation of Ortega leads him to think on whether "vital reason" is not
the background of "practical reason", and to ask himself: "will it tum out
now that from 'pure reason' Kant discovers vital reason?". The answer
was left pending until his work Sobre la razon vital [On Vital Reason].
But in the final paragraphs of his article "Pure Philosophy", attached
to his pamphlet "Kant" (1929}, there is clear consciousness of the close-
ness between pure practical Kantian thought and Ortegian vital reason,
especially because of what is referred to as maintaining an uncondi-
tional (absolute) moment in reason, due to the capacity for self-
determination of the moral and vital subject.
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE VITAL EXPERIENCE

OF REASON: THE FANTASTIC ANIMAL
"Man is a fantastic animal; born of fantasy (... ). What we call reason

is but fantasy in form. Is there something in the world more fantastic than
the most rational?" 21
The fantastic animal is the figure in which is embodied the reason
of vital experience, from which arise the most diverse fictions forming
human life (science, technology, morality, law, etc.). That, for Ortega,
Man is a fantastic animal does not stop him from considering him, at
the same time, a "truth-eater"; he does not consider, then, that the world
of perspective and of fiction, because it enjoys vital effectiveness, should
be at odds with truth.
In the fantastic animal the unknown impulses and the creative sources
of existence are expressed within the original experience of the "loss"
that reality produces in us. Human life reveals thus its unlimited capacity
to create fictions and new experiences, full of possibilities and projects.
But "the enigma that is man" and his characteristic "mystery" is insu-
perable, due to the teleological structure (without telos!) of human life.
The reason for which, in this vital situation, man has to pretend and
invent, is because he is forced to act and make himself, to create himself

("facere" = fiction as action): "he has to earn his living" metaphysi-
cally speaking, according to Ortega. What is left is but the experimentum
hominis to recreate a personal self" what is left is but vital experience.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

AND VITAL REASON
The purpose of Ortega's philosophy was to find a way out of the failure
of modernity and of the vital crisis that accompanied it. The idealistic
and subjectivist form of facing up to life, backed by modern reason,
had to be overcome.
How to get out of the "tragic condition of modern subjectivity"? If
idealistic and subjective reason remained detached from reality, enclosed
in the field of consciousness, it was necessary to find a way of gaining
access to reality in a more profound setting than that of consciousness,
given that modern idealism "snatches away reality, turning it into con-
sciousness". 22
To carry forward his project, Ortega inquired into the roots of reason
and thought he had found an ally in the phenomenological method.
Nevertheless, in accordance with an observation of his, Ortega abandoned
phenomenology at the moment he found it, because it did not answer
his expectations, due above all to its persistent idealism. Phenomenology
is still out of reality; it "does not carry out" and "makes the world ghostly,
it transforms it into mere sense" intelligibly. The phenomenologist
"instead of finding a reality, fabricates it".
On the other hand, according to Ortega, we already find ourselves
feeling limitless, because "nothing is only an object, but all is reality".
"But what there is really (... ) is reality. It supports and is the world
and is Man". Phenomenology has to be turned into another form of the
"analytical method" which, instead of making reality vanish by turning
it into consciousness, analyses the facti city or the basic fact of the imme-
diate encounter with reality.
What there really is, is not consciousness, but a man who exists in
a circumstance: the coexistence of the I and the world, the "mutual
dynamism of an event". The "primary reality" comes determined by "that
reciprocal incident" of experience.
This was the road that led me to the Idea of Life as radical reality. What made it decisive
- the interpretation of phenomenology in a sense opposite to idealism. 23
274 JESUS CONILL
The Ortegian transformation of phenomenology led, in the first place,

to an analytical phenomenology in the form of noology, understood as
an essential philosophy which inquires into the assumptions of reason.
But the sense of noology varied. In the first instance it seems to be
born in relation with the problem of truth and later it presents itself as
a phenomenological science that takes shape in the "system of vital
reason". What endures is the initial aim of noology, its pretension to
be first philosophy, as when Ortega refers to the publication of a book
called Sobre Ia razon viviente [About Living Reason] rating it as an
"essay of a prima philosophia". 24
Already in Investigaciones psicologicas [Psychological Investigations]
he admits that the order of truth is not fundamental, because "we still
have somewhere to rely on beyond truth"; and that is where noology turns
into a philosophy of the limits of sense. Nevertheless, an even more
radically transforming shift in his thinking became evident in 1929-30.
Now, Ortega affirmed that phenomenology leaves out the executive char-
acteristic of human action, which is alive in each action. The upshot is
that his "method" is now "contrary to that of Phenomenology", since this
reduces the executive aspect of human actions: "The phenomenolog-
ical attitude is strictly the reverse of the attitude which I call 'vital
reason' ". 25
According to Ortega, phenomenology has not arrived at the pre-the-
oretical, vital, roots of reason. "The great problem of the 'genesis of
Reason' is still pending".
Therefore, in my opinion, Ortega transforms phenomenology in the
direction of a noology and/or hermeneutic phenomenology of vital and
historical reason, an analysis of our factual executive approach to action.
Here there is not even "pure reception", or "construction", but the dis-
covery of an "immediacy", in which already, through the senses, we open
to reality. In opposition to the "original sin of modem subjectivism",
Ortega declares that the senses are not mere subjective states.
What is decisive about this transformation is the passage from con-
sciousness and sense to reality, in short, an overcoming of idealism.
The philosopher starts by searching a primary reality (... ) a reference as opposed to all
subjective stands. (... ) This reference will have to consist of something that he does
not posit, but that (... ) has become imposed on him. 26
Instead of consciousness and reflexion, what is most radical is the

reality of experience. And so, "the description of the phenomenon 'con-
sciousness' is resolved in the description of the 'real human life' phe-

nomenon", because "there is no consciousness as a primary form of
relation", but "human living", the experience of life, living without
limitation, uncompromising experiences. Not consciousness, but life,
the lived reality (which is expressed in the famous phrase: "I am myself
and my circumstance"), is the source of all eventual reflexion: "all
metaphysical problems have their roots in the study of life, in vital
reason". 27
Life as radical reality is the basic fact and phenomenon, "the absolute
point of view", that of reality as executive self-determination, on the basis
of which Ortega develops a very fine criticism of the "to be for oneself"
of idealism, since the executive approach (the lived reality) is a point
of view different from that of objectivization. "The most fundamental
distinction that can possibly be made is that of being objective and
being executive". 28
In this way, in my opinion, Ortega contributes something very sig-
nificant to the hermeneutic analysis of experience, which deals mainly
with the linguistic and historical character of the reason of vital expe-
rience. Then, within the way of thinking of vital experience, Ortega
follows a road that does not lead to nihilism, being able to adjust reason
to radical reality and take it back again to a new metaphysics.
The repercussions on ethics of this reason of vital experience offered
by Ortega are of great originality and transcendence for he suggests
the possibility of an ethic or vital plenitude starting from a sense of
the "moral" which is anchored in life. This does not mean that reason
has to be denied, but does repress its pretensions of absolute sover-
eignty. Reason has to appear before a new court, before "the infallible
judge Dionysius" (says Ortega suggestively); one has to pass from
Socrates' irony to Don Juan's, which
turns against morality, because morality had previously rebelled against life. Only when
an ethic exists that relies, as its first rule, on the vital plenitude, will Don Juan be able
to submit himself. But that means a new culture: a biological culture. Pure reason has
to give up its empire to vital reason. 29
And since, as we know, Ortega has not renounced it in favour of the

unconditional moment in vital reason, Kant's ethical humanism can renew
itself by means of the Ortegian contribution in a fresh ratio-vital
humanism (in the same way that it is upheld in hermeneutic philos-
ophy).
276 JESUS CONILL
Something similar also happens in the field of politics. Vital reason

needs institutions that increase vitality, because "politics is just an instru-
mental order and an adjunct of life". If this vital order is reversed, politics
will end up by drying up the sources of human life. This is something
on which the perspective of the Ortegian reason of vital experience
already gave warning when Ortega expounded on some of the serious
dangers that "liberal democracy" embodies, despite its being "the highest
type of public life known until now ... ". It must not be forgotten that
an exasperating and beside itself democracy, democracy in religion and art, democracy
in thought and in gesture, democracy in the heart and in customs is the most dangerous,
unhealthy fastidiousness that a society can suffer from. 30
The new order of vital reason demands facing this serious danger to
our societies, since "what today is called democracy is a degeneration
of hearts" and a corruption of thought, because
to think politically is not, then, to think the truth, but, rather, to produce ideas that stir
the hearts of the people in one sense or another, suitable and strategic ideas whose values
do not lie in themselves, but in their external and mechanical effects. (... ) But in the
long run the mind acquires the most serious vice imaginable: the tendency to lie. But
what else is lying but to think in a utilitarian way, in view of gaining an advantage, of
obtaining the desired effect? 31
University of Valencia
NOTES
1 J. Conill, El crepusculo de Ia metaftsica (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1988), Ch. 9;
"Phenomenological Paths to Metaphysics", in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Husser/'s Legacy

in Phenomenological Philosophies, Analecta Husserliana XXXVI (1991), pp. 259-267.
2 J. Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas (= O.C.) (Madrid: Alianza Revista de Occidente,
1983), III, p. 175.

3 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
4 Ibid., p. 177.
5 Ibid., p. 178.
6 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929).
7 J. Ortega y Gasset, O.C., V, pp. 523 and 524.
8 O.C., XII, p. 312; cf. J. Marias, La Escuela de Madrid (Buenos Aires: Emece, 1959);
H. Carpintero, "Estudios sobre el metodo en Ortega", Revista de Occidente 22 (1968);

N. Orringer, "Reducci6n fenomenol6gica y raz6n vital", en Ortega y Ia fenomenologia,
J. San Martin (ed.) (Madrid: UNED, 1992).
9 O.C., IV, p. 404.
10 O.C., XII, p. 324.
11 O.C., VI, p. 37. Cf. VII, pp. 311 and 318; XII, pp. 296 and 298.
12 O.C., VI, p. 14 and XII, p. 327.
13 O.C., V, p. 24 and V, p. 25.
14 O.C., III, pp. 197, 199, 200, 201.
15 O.C., VI, p. 40; cf. also XII, p. 237; J. L. Aranguren, "Ortega y Ia literatura", in
San Martin (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15-25.
16 O.C., V, p. 528 and 527; cf. VI, p. 348.
17 O.C., VI, p. 41.
18 O.C., VI, p. 41; IX, p. 646; XII, p. 329.
19 O.C., VI, p. 43 and IV, p. 136; VIII, pp. 174-177.
20 O.C., IV, p. 59.
21 O.C., IX, p. 190 and V, p. 366; cf. J. Conill, El enigma del animalfantdstico (Madrid:
Tecnos, 1991).
22 J. Ortega y Gasset, Investigaciones psico/Ogicas ( IP) (Madrid: Revista de
Occidente/Aiianza, 1981), p. 78; cf. O.C., VIII, pp. 48-49 and 50.
23 O.C., VIII, p. 53; IP, p. 85.
24 O.C., VI, p. 38; cf. IP, p. 85.
25 Ibid., V, p. 545 and 546; cf. IP, pp. 124, 129 and 158; also iQue es conocimiento?
(= QC) (Madrid: Revista de Occidente!Aiianza, 1984), pp. 14 and 15.
26 O.C., VIII, p. 48f.
27 QC, p. 158.
28 QC, p. 37 and 51; cf. also pp. 14, 127 and 119.
29 O.C., III, p. 178; cf. J. L. Aranguren, "La ~tica de Ortega", in Obras completas,
Vol. II (Madrid: Trotta, 1994), pp. 503ff.
30 O.C., II, p. 135 and 136; cf. XI, p. 61 and IV, pp. 173-174.
31 O.C., X, p. 186 and II, p. 136.
PART FOUR
HUMAN CREATIVE VIRTUALITIES

RADIATING AT THEIR PEAK
Marlies Kronegger, Robert Wise and Louis Houthakker visiting Guadalajara
MARLIES KRONEGGER
THE CREATIVE SOURCE: RODIN
Human Creativity lies at the juncture of all the great

philosophical issues. 1
INTRODUCTION
The complex process by which the artist transforms the act of seeing into
a vision of the world is one of the mysteries of creativity, and one of
the reasons why art is inseparable from philosophy and literature.
Merleau-Ponty describes the common sources of creative artists and
writers as being the expression of both sensibility and the spirit of man
recreated in colors, notes or words:
By using words as the painter uses color, the musician notes, we are trying to constitute
out of a spectacle or an emotion, or even an abstract idea, a kind of equivalent or specie
soluble in the mind. Here the expression becomes the principal thing. We mould and
animate the reader, we cause him to participate in our creative and poetic action, putting
into the hidden mouth of his mind the message of a certain object or certain feeling. 2
Art is a way of seeing. Rodin's goal of art is to manifest the inner universe
that man holds in his depths: "Art shows man his raison d' etre. It reveals
to him the meaning of life, it enlightens him upon his destiny." 3 Art,
for Rodin, the creator, is a force of nature, and as such it is as detached
from constituted laws, codes, prejudices and conventions as Nature
herself. Art is the language and expression of the human spirit, of our
feeling as well as our thinking nature, and foremost, of our nature as a
whole in all its complexity.
As the title of this study implies, we are concerned here with two
quests: a) the critique of convention which, in Rodin's creativity, is a
critique of academic art based on the rational codes of constituted laws,
and b) the antithesis of constituted law, the source of creativity.
While Rodin was aflame to restore life to sculpture, it is Tymieniecka
who restores life to phenomenology. Both depict love and passion, the
movements of the soul, its sublime expression, its pain and effort of awak-
ening, because these are the most emphatic expressions of life: in longing
and sorrow, in madness and fear, in loss and gain, in gestures of giving
281

282 MARLIES KRONEGGER
and receiving. In Rodin's and Tymieniecka's creative orchestration of

human potential we encounter Humanity's thirst to transcend the profane
world, reaching out beyond itself, and stretching out hands towards
eternity. Art and philosophy move our deepest chords with Rodin's sculp-
tures and Tymieniecka 's phenomenology of life. Both the artist Rodin
and the philosopher Tymieniecka glorify life and therewith celebrate
its eternal cause and purpose. The passion and love, the anxiety and
heroic inspiration of the modem soul take form in Rodin's marbles and
bronzes- and relate in their intention to Tymieniecka's phenomenology
of life. Rodin and Tymieniecka do not reproduce academic theories and
conventions.
Both begin with the seed, a seed which grew downwards, struck many
roots and anchored firmly, before the first small shoot rose upward and
developed a bud, a bud that unfolded slowly in various directions always
enveloped by the atmosphere of its place. In their vision, a bud expresses
itself, and each leaf, always different from the next and even from what
it was itself a moment ago, expresses its individual music. Rodin creates
a world in which life is constantly unfolding and reshaping itself. Both
good and bad moments can be the flower of the seeds he has planted.
His sculptures contain the inexplicable and irrational essence of life
constantly born anew that speaks to us.
For Tymieniecka, "the polyphonic game of life," is a life of crea-
tivity, the vocation of the spirit to confront the world, and then to trans-
form it. 4 This applies directly to Rodin. The vocation of Tymieniecka's
phenomenology of life is
to make philosophical inquiry attentive to all the voices of sense; ... to be open to all
the avenues of life's constructive meandering; courageous enough to oppose all the
traditional prejudices, codes, established patterns of argumentation, rhetorics, etc. - all the
paraphernalia of the rational limitations of our mind - and to use all the means at our
disposal in order to elucidate this gigantic game of human creation. 5
With Tymieniecka we are convinced that truly great art always expands
our range of seeing, feeling, being and insight, and that it awakens "the
creative orchestration of man's self-interpretation-in-existence,"6 "the
creative orchestration of the specifically human existence. "7 Tymieniecka,
explaining man's creativity, insists on the orchestration of all our
resources, to experience their harmony in our own depths:
[man's] creativity springs from the entire range of the involvement he entertains in his
beingness through his whole functioning .... It means man's aspiration to give exis-
THE CREATIVE SOURCE: RODIN 283
Rodin, The Prodigal Son.

tence to a new fonn of life-significance and to establish it as an "object" ... it means

the fresh vigorous sap bursting forth within him, making the old fonns explode; it means
his essential need to "transgress" their dominion. 8
This applies directly to Rodin who addresses himself to the secret of a

great power hidden in all things. It is not only the living force of art,
the intimate relationships between art and life, thought and soul, what
Baudelaire called l'intime du cerveau (the innermost part of the brain),
the je-ne-sais-quoi of Pascal in his Pensees and Father Bouhours in his
Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugene (1671) that cries out for expression,
but what Rodin, in his conversations with Paul Gsell, sees as his major
accomplishment, "the light of spiritual truth" and "the passion for truth" 9
in his artistic expression of mankind's hopes and fears, desires and
passions.
Here is Tymieniecka's philosophical quest in trying to "understand the
truth" not in the life-world assumed as the ultimate ground, following
Merleau-Ponty, but within the creative context of the complex notions
of experience, love, passion, denial, suffering, etc., in a "polyphonic
wealth of insights" since "Life is full: discrete, disharmonious, seemingly
inconsequential, and, nevertheless, it is an ever-expanding creative coher-
ence that surpasses itself at every instant." 10 Life throws the real man into
the real world: he acts and reacts. Life alone gives Rodin reality in his
confrontation with the world. For him, reality is the expression of both
inner and exterior truth:
Our eyes plunge beneath the surface to the meaning of things, and when afterwards we
reproduce the fonn, we endow it with the spiritual meaning which it covers. An artist
worthy of the name should express all the truth of nature, not only the exterior truth,
but also, and above all, the inner truth .... The body always expresses the spirit whose
envelope it is .... The artist, in representing the universe as he imagines it, fonnulates
his own dreams. In nature he celebrates his own soul. And so he enriches the soul of
humanity."
I. THE WORLD IS WHAT WE PERCEIVE WITH THE BODY:

A REVELATION OF LIFE IN TRANSITION
The language of the body expresses life and movement. The act of per-
ception is not a process of cognition of the object, but an identification
of the self with the object. The object which appears as a phenomenon
of expression communicates to the person experiencing it a state of
feeling at the moment of perception. There is a suspension of the normal
distance between the perceiving subject and the object of his percep-
tion. Proust's Marcel, Jean-Louis Barrault in Phaedra, and Rilke's Rodin
studies, Ovid's Metamorphoses, Tymieniecka's and Merleau-Ponty's trea-
tises on perception, reveal the body as an expression of the genesis of
Life in a given context. Marcel, in Proust's Swann's Way, observes the
transition of the concrete actress, La Berma interpreting Racine's Phaedra
as she becomes invisible, and how it is Phaedra who appears. Jean-
Louis Barrault, the actor, when interpreting Phaedra, identifies the
tragedy with a feeling of the cosmos, when Phaedra expresses experience
in space metaphors, mingling the voices of a stormy day with the tumult
of her blood, as her character seems to be half in nature and half in
herself. Merleau-Ponty and Tymieniecka see the body's expression in
all the arts, especially in music and dance, an expression of all human
synergies in a perfect fusion of stasis and kinesis, repose and motion,
in a convergence of temporal and spatial perception. Rilke celebrates
Rodin's aesthetic expression as it bursts forth in the rhythmic transi-
tion from one attitude to another: In Man of Early Times, Rilke observes
the birth of gesture emerging like the waters of a spring, always in the
context of a larger whole and to such proportion and power that the
gesture creates its own space, and expresses a dynamic space through
its capacity to expand space:
The language of his (Rodin's) art is the body. He sees only innumerable living surfaces,
only life. The means of expression which he had formed for himself were directed to
... this aliveness .... There was not one part of the human body that was insignificant
or unimportant: it was alive. The life that was expressed in faces was easily readable.
Life manifested in bodies was more dispersed, greater, more mysterious and everlasting
than reason could ever preconceive .... It awoke in the darkness of primeval times and
seems, as it grows to flow through the spaciousness of his work as through the ages, passing
far beyond us to those who are yet to come ... movement has cast off sleep and is
gathering force .... One might describe this movement ... that it rests enclosed in a
tight bud. Let thought be set on fire, let the will be swept by tempest, and it will open. 12
In the following pages we shall see that while Rodin knew that the first
indispensable factor was the knowledge of the human body, Tymieniecka,
exploring, like Rodin, moved from elemental passions to sacred ways
of transcending profane reality in order to find the truth.
In Rodin's relationship to the genesis of life, we can distinguish at
least three artistic aspirations:
1. the Human (the balance of antithetical values, of opposites, on
the one hand, vibrant energy, devotion, love, joy, serenity, solitude,
sacrifice, and, on the other hand, despair, sorrow, rage, suffering

and violence);
2. the Demonic (Sadism and excess in indulging in one's passions and
upsetting the equilibrium within oneself, or between oneself and
the other);
3. the impulse toward the Eternal, the Infinite, Nature and the Divine
(the aspiration to express the invisible, the ineffable, the inexplicable)
as he knows that God is closer to him in art than in other people.
In the Human, genius finds the strength to assert itself in the tri-
umphant creation with the vibrant energy of a Bernard Shaw, Balzac,
Victor Hugo, Dante. The men passing before us belong to all the world
and all times. Creation itself becomes the reward for the enactment of
the transgression of the boundaries between two worlds, the visible and
the invisible, as Tymieniecka and Merleau-Ponty put it. And Tymieniecka
asks the eminent question: "Is it enough for man to go beyond the
boundaries of the life-world (Lebenswelt) in its present preestablished
phase, surpassing himself by self-explication within a work unique
and original in relation to this world, in order to satisfy his primitive
yeaming?" 13
In the Demonic, we see a twisted, almost tormented expression of
the psyche in harsh, restless lines and fragmented, throbbing, frantic,
chaotic curves and arabesques, the unrest of living things. In Mirbeau's
Le Jardin des supplices (The Torture Garden), Rodin expressed in his
lithographs the psychosexual perversity of human nature. In Dante's
Inferno, he discovered the suffering bodies of another generation that
passed before him. He sculpted couples against the backdrop of Hell,
acknowledging in art a life that was unsusceptible to enduring passion.
Bound to rocks with very rough surfaces, they struggle fruitlessly to break
free. In his transpositions of Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du mal, 14 Rodin
described poetic flights of the imagination following man's simultaneous
postulate to do good or evil. He exercized the power of imagination in
so tumultuous a way that he transcended common humanity. In his
transfiguring of life, so close to the nature of good or evil, he unleashed
his visionary power in vibrant and luminous modeling. Rodin addresses
himself to the unwritten inner law alive in his sculptures that any
movement must return to the marble, in order to close the circle of
solitude in which a work of art exists. His sculptures carry the envi-
ronment in which they were imagined within themselves: they have
absorbed it and radiate it. In many of Rodin's sculptures, form seems
The Burghers of Calais, detail.

to struggle against a stifling pressure. This is true for his L' Aurore, the
face of Camille Claudel emerging from the uncut marble, as if she were
emerging from the stifling pressure of night; or La Convalescente,
Camille ClaudeI, emerging from the confinement of sickness; these sculp-
tures are all the more expressive for their not being completed. He
animates form and space in the transitional movement, when form seems
to struggle against dark experiences.
In the Divine is for Rodin the meaning of all that is unexplained
and doubtless inexplicable in the world. He felt a link between reli-
gious exaltation, artistic creativity and sensuality. In sum, it is Rodin
and Tymieniecka who see in man's creative acts the possibility of tran-
scending the constraints of life's network, when we come into possession
of all our latent possibilities in an upsurge of freedom, the major con-
dition of our participation in the world. In their commitment to the
creative life, both Rodin and Tymieniecka perceive things in a flash,
by a kind of intuition, the meshes of logic alone not being fine enough
to catch and hold their insights.
II. THE SOURCE OF CREATIVITY: THE SPIRIT OF MAN

AND THE HUMAN CONDITION
For Rodin, a sculpture is a dramatic text to be read, revealing its creator's

character by its content and simultaneously by its graphism (drawing,
color, modeling). It is a dramatic text which becomes a theatrical text,
when interpreted by the onlooker. Rodin distinguishes in sculpture plastic
form from expression. Plastic form procures a specific pleasure, often
called delectation, by pictorial means alone, by combination of modeling
and color, and expression, which transmits the artist's inner experiences
to the soul of the viewer. Rodin explains to Paul Gsell, how the dynamism
of Rude's La Marseillaise, is the incarnation of the martial spirit as
seen on one of the piers of the Arc de Triomphe in Paris: both fleeting
gestures and a long action in four phases evoke the scenic succession and
metamorphosis of the dramatic text into a theatrical text in a way a
play by Comeille changes from text to performance, when vital moments
are rendered in transitions and contrasts:
Liberty, in a breastplate of brass, cleaving the air with unfolded wings, roars in a mighty
voice, "Aux armes citoyens!" She raises her left arm to rally all the brave to her side,
and, with the other hand, she points her sword towards the enemy. It is she, beyond
question, whom you first see, for she dominates all the work and her legs, which are
wide apart as if she were running, seem like an accent placed above this sublime war
epic. It seems as though one must hear her - for her mouth of stone shrieks as though
to burst your eardrum. But no sooner has she given the call than you see the warriors
rush forward. This is the second phase of the action. A Gaul with the mane of a lion shakes
aloft his helmet as though one must to salute the goddess, and here, at his side, is his
young son, who begs the right to go with him - "I am strong enough, I am a man, I
want to go!" he seems to say, grasping the hilt of a sword. "Come," says the father,
regarding him with tender pride.
Third phase of the action: a veteran bowed beneath the weight of his equipment
strives to join them - for all who have strength enough must march to battle. Another
old man, bowed with age, follows the soldiers with his prayers, and the gesture of his hand
seems to repeat the counsels that he has given them from his own experience.
Fourth phase: an archer bends his muscular back to bind on his arms. A trumpet
blares its frenzied appeal to the troops. The wind flaps the standards, the lances point
forward. The signal is given, and already the strife begins. 15
The dramatic relief as exemplified in Rude's sculpture is the perma-

nent record of all the creative acts that went into its making. When Rodin
created his Call to Arms (1879), commemorating the Franco-Prussian war
of 1870, he found the humiliating defeat of France as a symptom of a
disintegrating civilization. The sculpture is a condensation of lived expe-
rience, a manifestation and communication of horror and defeat in
distorted, frantic movements expressing solitude and death, and the inten-
sity of a dark experience with depth of sensibility. This intensity is
diffused in the rapidity of the line with obscures hollows in which dwell
silence and the ineffable. The shadows here and there evoke pathos and
doom.
Rodin's compassionate understanding of the human condition is
inherent in The Burghers of Calais in their walk toward their doom,
when he gives life to each of these men in the final gesture of their
lives. Their heroic sacrifice is spiritual nourishment that bursts into a
triumph, a plenitude of emotion for the common onlooker. In this sculp-
ture Rodin seems to ask himself, What is man? Is he a magnetic center
moving in space? Which are the relations of the individual with the other?
He lives and sees himself living. He exists and knows he is dying. He
is at one and the same time actor and spectator. Rodin insists on the moral
sense of Eustache de Saint-Pierre who is not afraid and who inspires
the others in his spirit of independence and greatness:
It is he who offered himself first as one of the six notables whose death . . . should
save their fellow-townsmen from massacre.
The burgher beside him is not less brave, but if he does not mourn for his own fate,
the capitulation of the city causes him terrible sorrow. Holding in his hand the key which
he must deliver to the English, he stiffens his whole body in order to find the strength
to bear the inevitable humiliation.
On the same place with these two, to the left, you see a man who is less courageous,
for he walks almost too fast: you would say that, having made up his mind to the sacri-
fice, he longs to shorten the time which separates him from his martyrdom.
And behind these comes a burgher who, holding his head in his hands, abandons
himself to violent despair. Perhaps he thinks of his wife, of his children, of those who
are dear to him, of those whom his going will leave without support.
A fifth notable passes his hand before his eyes, as if to dissipate. 16
Here is the essence of Rodin's perception in words, and a truth of faith

made visible in his sculpture, The Burghers of Calais. As much as
Tymieniecka, he insists on the ultimate reality, the vital function of the
soul complex to reclaim man in his fundamental humanity. The body,
the soul, the conscious intentionality, and the moral sense come here
together in the unified expression and creative orchestration of life's func-
tions. Rodin's creative perception shows the "workings of the network
of the stream of life and man's creative act" 17 as Tymieniecka visual-
izes it. By rising toward the creative task as a telos, the individual being
is transposed to a higher level of existence and fulfillment - "our spir-
itual existence. " 18 And to share in the meaning of his sculpture we must
feel what we are seeing, for that is the creative aspect of vision. Implicit
in that vision is the metaphor, if not the mystic reality, of knowing
things by turning into them. The political failure of having to surrender
the key of the city to the English, becomes a moral triumph for the
defeated burghers. The onlooker is elevated above the political con-
flicts in aesthetic enchantment before this particular work of art. It is a
sculpture about war and art, the relation of art to history, and irrational
violence as the artist is the seismologist of the spiritual situation in
which he lives. The artist's vocation cannot be corrupted by politics.
His spiritual and artistic reaction to the human condition of a given period
is an essential basis for our lives. Rodin conveys the authentic reality
of man - which is the reality of artists, philosophers, religious thinkers
alike, the reality which is in Tymieniecka's words: "life, birth, suf-
fering, fulfillment, death, friendship, love, etc." 19 The dynamics of
Rodin's sculpture expresses the significance of art to cope with human
values in a turbulent and violent world. Here again Rodin balances
lyricism and sadness, creation of both moral and artistic grandeur and
loss of physical freedom, transcended by the unspeakable revelation of
a spiritual experience: each burgher, perceived in the natural beauty of
the soul with a tragic sense of the human condition threatened by war,
violence, death and disorder, is lifted into a transcendent and spiritual

world: Rodin enacts the magic of his artistic and poetic vision in the
creative sublimation of both the moral and aesthetic sense of the burghers'
tragic struggle with destiny. Their expression makes no appeal to the
world; it seems to carry within itself its own justice, the reconciliation
of all its contradictions. In a living synthesis, they express pride,
renouncement, contempt, the pain of living their last moments in a
paroxysm of silence. Their will, judgment and choice is to break with the
constituted conventional order that they defy. Their bodies are the mirror
of the soul and from the soul comes the greatest beauty as it is the
inner flame which shines from within and illuminates their gestures
and attitudes. Rodin views these burghers with his mind's eye, and not
with the eye as a camera. His mind's eye consummates everything he
knows, imagines, feels, conceives, perceives, and dreams in his con-
templation of the pathos he is creating in marble. Rodin's sculptures
and Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life give us new faith in the true
vocation of humanity and the vital significance of life so often and easily
destroyed. With the artist's and the philosopher's creativity, a novel
message on the significance of life emerges.
III. THE DEMONIC OF HUMAN CONDITION OR

THE GATE OF HELL
It is I that saw the fall of the rebel legions;

It is I that saw the guilty races pass;
It is through me that they go to everlasting sorrows.
The hand that made the heavens laid my foundations:
My birth was before men or days,
And I shall remain longer than time,
Enter, whoever you may be, and leave hope. 20
Gestures of loss, of suffering, of resignation in Dante's vision find a

rebirth in Rodin's The Gate of Hell (La Porte de l'Enfer), where Man's
pathos is diffused in 186 figures. Rilke, in his book, Rodin, realizes
that no other artist of the nineteenth century had so profound a knowl-
edge of the body and creative imagination in bringing forth memories
of Dante's Inferno.
The vision of the poet who belonged to another age awakened the artist who made them
rise again to the knowledge of a thousand other gestures; gestures of seizing, losing,
suffering and abandoning, and his tireless hands stretched out farther and farther beyond
the Florentine to ever new fonns and revelations. . .. His chisel penetrated through all
the dramas of life ... faces were extinguished and bodies were supreme. With senses
at white heat he sought life in the great chaos of this wrestling, and what he saw was
Life. 21
The tragedy depicted here is the reversal of the spirit of Lorenzo

Ghiberti's Gates of Paradise and infects the onlooker with pity and
fear. La Porte de l' Enfer suggests the substance of Hell in the physical
and philosophical sense. Like Dante, in Inferno, Michelangelo, in The
Last Judgment, Baudelaire, in Les Fleurs du mal, Rodin presents both
physical suffering and spiritual elevation, despair and the ecstatic pleasure
of artistic self-exaltation. The essence of the tragic situation itself is in
the questioning of this meditation. Rodin explores the impossibility of
meditation by accepting the contradiction between these basic polari-
ties that human existence confronts. Rodin feels, sees, understands
through antithesis. While Ghiberti realized that there are no saints without
contradictory emotions (when spiritual devotion transcends physical
suffering), Rodin focuses on human suffering and devotion to other
humans. He has replaced the pediment of Gates of Paradise, representing
St. John Baptizing Christ in the presence of an angel with the sculp-
ture of the group The Three Shades. Did these figures ever find reason
for existence? Do they grieve over things lost? Is our thirst for the beyond
frustrated? Is their grief superior to that of The Thinker beneath? One
objective expression of his unconscious struggle is his fascination with
the theme of Love unfulfilled, of despair and sorrow: Paolo and
Francesca and the lovers of Fugit Amor enact their grief in a desparate
attempt to free themselves from the stifling pressure of Hell, yet all
hope of recapturing their souls is vain. They rise for an instant, but the
women in these dramatic scenes slip away from their lovers' grasp. These
souls in torment describe eternal humanity - their hopes, sufferings,
passions as they still belong to the realm of chaos and disorder.
We recognize figures that appear as individual sculptures elsewhere:
Avarice and Lust, the Fallen Man, Fragments of Hands, the Prodigal Son
etc. Contorted limbs, straining muscles express their despair with
dramatic expression and after a vain flight of illusions, we see Icarus with
broken wings, like a Fallen Angel, returning to chaos. There is a tumul-
tuous, chaotic cascade of figures who emerge from and disappear into
chaos, in The Gate of Hell, as Rilke described:
He has endowed hundreds, and hundreds of figures that were only a little larger than
his hand with the life of all passions, the blossoming of all delights and the burden of
all vices. He has created bodies that touch each other all over and cling together like
animals bitten into each other, that fall into the depth of oneness like a single organism;
bodies that listen like faces and lift themselves like arms; chains of bodies, ... bodies
that listen like faces and lift tendrils and heavy clusters of bodies into which sin's sweet-
ness rises out of the roots of pain. . ..
Here hands stretch out for eternity. Here eyes open, see Death and do not fear him.
Here a hopeless heroism reveals itself whose glory dawns and vanishes like a smile,
blossoms and withers like a rose. Here are the storms of desire and the calms of expec-
tation. Here are dreams that become deeds and deeds that fade into dreams. Here, as at
a gigantic gambling table, great fortunes are lost or won. 22
The transition from the reality of Fallen Man, as known from the context
of his daily life, and from the Bible, from Baudelaire's and Dante's vision,
which Rodin uses as his point of departure, incites him to dream and con-
template a world into which he escapes; he suggests what he only feels,
and what he tries to express visually is the invisible, the intangible. There
is a pervading feeling of equilibrium, of balance between all these living
surfaces, when all factors of disturbance come to rest within the gate
itself. External reality is no longer Rodin's ultimate goal, but his point
of departure, as the work of art is to create a bridge between souls and
evoke the human condition:
Artists and thinkers are like lyres, infinitely delicate and sonorous, whose vibrations,
awakened by the circumstances of each epoch, are prolonged to the ears of all other
mortals .... It is like a spiritual stream, like a spring pouring forth in many cascades,
which finally meet to form the great moving river which represents the mentality of an
era. 23
His goal of art is thus to manifest the inner universe that The Thinker
- the creator Rodin, the poet Dante - holds in his depths: to brood over
all his creations; his art of light and shades, of concavities and convex-
ities, of depth and expressiveness describes emotional states and reflects
them as they dissolve into the penumbra, into silence, into a myste-
rious fusion which alone can give us the physical sensation of the Present
filled with the progression of silence and nothingness. Here, the notion
of sin, and deeper still, the need for transcendence of the temporal and
spatial situation, seem to be two realities even more fundamentally
embedded than faith itself. He appeals to obscure and vital powers that
lie beyond reason, and Tymieniecka's words apply here as Rodin is
"breaking instantly into the totality of generations at the cross-section
of the temporal and the etemal."24 For Rodin, spirituality can be asso-
ciated with the body as it elevates facts to the artistic and philosophical
plane. With the danse macabre, Rodin suggests a spiritual body in which
spirit and flesh are unified. Dance is a unique expressive art in which,
more than any other, there is immediacy and a perfect unity of thought
and feeling. It is the breath of life made visible. All the numerous little
figures and gestures are associated with the breathing of the living
cosmos. There is a visible motion of the power that invests everything
in existence, an existence threatened both by scientific progress and com-
mercial endeavors, by manufacturers in search of utility and the material
improvement of existence, but saved by the vital energy of faith in the
transcendence of art. The consciousness of his contemporaries seems
to be detached from being, and concerned only with itself, concen-
trating primarily on their existence in economic, sociological, and
political situations with Rodin rejects.
With Dante, the creator and poet, the artist Rodin judges his epoch
and exalts the spiritual freedom of the artist to be himself and speak
the truth: he tries to awaken us and situate us in creation. Rodin gloried
in his creative synergies, and it seemed inconceivable to him that he
and mankind in general should not have been intended to develop to
the fullest their specifically human potential. He expressed his anguish
as he saw his life blighted by the injustice and corruption of his times.
Rodin, like Dante, was surrounded by opportunists, those souls who in
life were neither for good nor evil but only for themselves. All under-
standing of self is an understanding of their own misery and despair,
and in their blind state their miserable lives have sunk so very low that
Mercy and Justice deny them even a name. To escape from this despair,
there is but one issue: to pass from passive existence to that of creator.
He is convinced that man should seek earthly immortality in creativity
rather than reject spiritual values by yielding to bestial appetites or
violence. Man is spirit, and the situation of man as man is a spiritual
situation.
IV. FRAGMENTS AND THE INCOMPLETE
His The Gate of Hell makes Transcendence perceptible even in incom-

plete sculptures which seem to be unfinished, and yet these fragments,
broken or disjunct pieces of a larger whole, belong as much as fallen
leaves to the larger entity, a tree. We view the fragment as an activator
of meaning. Recall Gabriele D' Annunzio's Duse, who left alone, attempts
to give an armless embrace, and to hold without hands. In Avarice and
Lust, the stirring erotic expression is rendered with absolute sincerity,

so that not all parts of the body are necessary in the fragment, nothing
essential is lacking, and it is a masterpiece in its incomplete form. The
lateral movement of Lust from right to left expands a sense of space
that seems to expand far beyond the sculpture's space. The moment of
fixity in stone is transcended in successive movements which render a
deeply felt emotion which is complete. The wave of movement here is
like that of a fountain, rising from the marble and returning to it, filling
it with ripples. It creates a unity of the formless with the essential
elements of a complete sensation. Life arises out of truth, and Rodin
deploys the urge of sexuality, the erotic, against convention. Thus, the
fragment of Avarice and Lust is the very embodiment of eros. He realizes
too that we can only know parcels of truth and that there are unknown
forces within nature.
Fragments allow a concise statement of a major truth. A hand laid
on the shoulder or limb of another body is the source of the depen-
dence of the figures on one another, as for Rodin "everything is related,
and the slightest element of truth calls forth the whole truth." 25 Radiance
emanates like a wave from the physical contact of bodies. There is visible
the rhythmical ebb and flow of waves. Likewise, a fragment of a hand
is not a thing in itself, defined by the subject, but seems poised in lim-
itless space and is an aspect of eternity. His fragments of hands stir the
viewer's imagination to recover their intentions entirely. One can view
fragments from the angle of totality in the dialogue between creation
and reception, the artist and the viewer who motivate all their creative
synergies to attain a total vision and reflecting, as Tymieniecka holds,
the resources of sensibility and the mind. The fragment is the supreme
embodiment of the creator's quest to express life and deeply felt
emotions, and to express visually the invisible, the intangible; to envelop
a living detail and melt it into the whole. The fragment is a spring-
board to an inner universe, situated within ourselves. In Rodin's words,
"The inner truth seems to blossom from within to the outside, like life
itself."26 It is the creator's own spirit that the work of art attempts to com~
municate to the viewer and to add to his experience. The fragment
expresses a general truth beyond space and time. Rodin deliberately
avoids a complete statement because he knows that we can never know
everything, that what we can describe or complete cannot be true except
in a very limited sense. Both the action and theme of fragments origi-
nate in the creative emotion of the creator, poet or artist. The Hand of
the Devil Holding a Woman (1903), is a sadistic dream of possession,

"tending toward the annihilation of the object."27 The Hand from the Tomb
(191 0) expresses oblivion, solitude, and hidden splendor; the Hand of
Rodin Holding a Torso (1917), is pointing to the creator's freedom to
transform natural instinct into eros. In Tymieniecka's words, "Eros arises
creator."28 Eros is no longer the slave of finality but its vital forces find
transformation in the creator's sensibility in a yet undefined form. In The
Cathedral, it is the celebration of the free creativity of the spirit and
the intuitive knowledge through emotion which transcend and permeate
the hands pointing to a transcendent unity: this confirms Tymieniecka's
vision of creative imagination: "Taking its impetus from features only
vaguely outlined, imagination is stimulated by this vagueness to unfold
its wings toward the crystallization of a novel 'reality' ." 29 Every element
of his composition converges towards the summit to transcend the visible.
Views on the meaning of The Cathedra diverge. The critic too has the
creative freedom to unfold his creative imagination in a subjective way. 30
This fragment is not an end, but the opening of a door to creativity, a
quest to expand our creative imagination toward the unknown, to take
us out of ourselves and learn to see a mysterious flash of reality grasped
beyond the visible. For Rodin, the sculptural whole did not need to
coincide with the completely known object, but he showed new values,
proportions and balances as they originate within the fragments. Rilke
carefully observes of these fragments of hands:
There are among the works of Rodin hands, single, small hands which, without belonging
to a body, are alive. Hands that rise, irritated and in wrath; hands whose five bristling
fingers seem to bark like the five jaws of a dog of Hell. Hands that walk, sleeping hands,
and hands that are awakening; criminal hands, tainted with hereditary disease; ... there
is a history of hands; they have their own culture, their particular beauty .... 31
In sum, any part of the body is for Rodin a vibrating surface with the
independence and completeness of a whole.
V. MOVEMENT AND EXTENSION: NIJINSKY
While life can be viewed as a tightrope dancer making his way along
the rope and in continual danger of losing his balance, in continual danger
of death, as J. L. Barrault envisions it, we can see in Nijinsky's Paris
performance of 1912, The Afternoon of a Faun, that the dancer is born
out of the whirlwind of music. The ballet seemed to be more real than
life itself, and one could no longer distinguish reality from fairy tale.
Nijinsky treated movement as the poet deals with words, and the musician
with notes. The world of Nijinsky is given to us in the experience of
presence, and not in representation. He alone wished to inspire, and be
the energy who set creativity in motion.
Paul Claudel, who saw Nijinsky in Paris and in Brazil, was deeply
impressed by the way Nijinsky's movements rise up, like a source of light
and energy, freeing his self from its exiguousness, and being reborn in
the form of half man, half animal, expressing the faun's rapacious,
primitive, potency. His first movement is like the emission of a wave,
propagating itself with expansive force. Both duration and space open up
to realize his inherence in the world.
Nijinsky .... apportait le bond, c'esH\-dire Ia victoire de Ia respiration sur le poids. Comme
le chanteur ou l'acteur ne fait qu'amplifier par le mouvement de ses bras !'ascension de
Ia poitrine soulevee qui s'emplit d'air, ainsi !'inspiration du danseur et cet elan de notre
desir vers Ia vie est assez forte pour le detacher du sol, ce n'est plus qu'un tremplin
qu'il foule triomphalement sous ses pieds! c'est Ia possession du corps par !'esprit et
l'emploi de !'animal par !'arne, encore, et encore, et de nouveau, et encore une fois, elance-
toi, grand oiseau, a Ia recontre d'une sublime defaite! II retombe, a Ia maniere d'un roi
qui descend, et de nouveau il s'elance comme un aigle et comme une fleche decochee
par sa propre arbalete. L'ame pour une seconde porte le corps, ce v~tement est devenu
flamme et Ia matiere est passee transport et cri! II parcourt Ia scene comme !'eclair eta
peine s'est-il detoume, qu'il revient sur nous comme Ia foudre. C'est Ia grande creature
humaine a l'etat lyrique.... II repeint nos passions sur Ia toile de l'etemite, il reprend
chacun de nos mouvements les plus profanes, comme Virgile fait de nos vocables et de
nos images, et le transpose dans le monde bienheureux de )'intelligence, de Ia puisance
de I'ether. 32
His movement is the transition from one attitude to another. The ego
of the man Nijinsky has disappeared in the creative Self of the dancer,
and the dancer has achieved the eternity of his countenance in Rodin's
sculptures. Infinitely many movements, the undulations of light upon
his body seemed to flow into one another and have brought forward
this aliveness and lightness of a bird as visualized in Claudel's descrip-
tion above. We have moved far away from the Cartesian mechanization
of man and a universe without purpose and spiritual significance so
well determined in Descartes' famous statement: "Give me motion and
extension, and I'll construct the universe." We do not need cognitive
judgment to govern our imagination and to enjoy Nijinsky's performance.
The way Nijinsky is born out of the movement of dance on stage is a
genesis. He establishes a relation to the world, being in the same flesh
both subject and object, he reaches the heart of the visible. The spec-
tator requires time to achieve a genesis of vision. Nijinsky offers us a
world in a nascent state to be seen, raising itself to appearing, and
expanding its expression so far that it escapes vision, but stirs our imag-
ination to visualize the unseen. We are at a loss to conceptualize this
world as we can only feel it. What appears to us is an aurora, a sunrise,
to be seen, inviting us to feel beyond seeing the dancer. Vision does
not involve the eye alone, but summons all our synergetic energies, when
focusing on the enigma of Nijinsky's act of appearing. We experience
the free play of his and our faculties and their harmony, orchestrated
and enjoyed in a new creative reality. It seems that the state of our sub-
jectivity is attested to by aesthetic enjoyment.
CONCLUSION
Rodin gives us acute insights into the crisis of modem man, in his insis-
tence on the limits of reason: logic alone cannot account for the dread,
anxiety, alienation, and latent meaninglessness of life; on the contrary,
Rodin opposes the divorce of mind from life. While no concept or system
of concepts lies at the center of his discussions, he focuses like
Tymieniecka on the individual human personality itself, struggling for
self-realization, and creating sculptures that testify to the uniqueness
and totality of the human person. We share Rilke's view that Rodin
"raised the immense arc of his world above us and made it a part of
Nature.'m With both Rodin and Tymieniecka we have rediscovered the
life-significance of the creator for modem man as illustrated in some
of Rodin's masterpieces. Man, for Tymieniecka and Rodin, is a contra-
dictory and complex being, yet living in the dynamic tensions of his
contradictions, he turns creator: This true man is an authentic person who
folds, who progresses in the bursting forth of ecstatic visions. These
actions stem not from the dramas of life but from the ultimate vocation
of man: to transcend and relate to everything there is alive. 34 With
Tymieniecka, the central point of all life is creativity, to unfold one's
creative imagination. In both Rodin and Tymieniecka, art has the regen-
erative power to recapture a lost sympathy between man and nature, a
lost harmony between intellect and feeling, in a garden where the tree
of life and flowers in many colors unfold and where love and creativity
can coexist in dynamic rhythmical growth. Their work stresses the orches-
tration of love and art in creative sublimation. With them it is possible
to place ourselves in the central place of all life, and our co-naissance
or rebirth in relation to everything-there-is-alive makes us transcend
the boundaries of a petrified world. The philosopher's poetic intuition
can come into play in the aesthetics of Rodin, in the fine arts and liter-
ature, in philosophy, the social sciences, as her mastermind challenges
man's creative synergies. The orchestration of Tymieniecka's poetic
intuition and the life-fostering function of Rodin's art, tend to unite
mankind in brotherhood.
Michigan State University
NOTES
1 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Creative Experience and the Critique
of Reason (Dordrecht, London, Boston, Tokyo: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989),
p. 121.
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 389. Mary Ann Caws, The Eye in the Text. Essays on Perception,
Mannerist to Modern (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 ), p. 199: " ... cannot
the written page be seen to include the image also, joining sign to text, and serving both
as threshold and as dwelling for a well-versed eye?"
3 Auguste Rodin, Rodin on Art and Artists. Conversations with Paul Gsell, trans. Romilly
Fedden (New York: Dover Publications, 1983), p. 113.
4 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Book II: The Three Movements of the
Soul (Dordrecht, Boston, London, Tokyo: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 35.
5 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Book I: Creative Experience and the
Critique of Reason (Dordrecht, Boston, London, Tokyo: Kluwer Academic Publishers,

1988), p. 15.
6 Ibid., p. 17.
7 Tymieniecka, The Three Movements of the Soul, op. cit., p. 160.
8 Tymieniecka, Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason, op. cit., p. 160.
9 Rodin, op. cit., p. 20.
11 Rodin, op. cit., pp. 80 and 70, 71.
12 Rainer Maria Rilke, Rodin and Other Prose Pieces, trans. G. Craig Houston (London,
Melbourne, New York: Quartet Encounters, 1986), p. II. Siegfried Mandel. Rainer Maria
Rilke, The Poetic Instinct (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1965): "I (Rilke) am no critic ... I measure a work of art by the happiness it
gives me."
13 Tymieniecka, Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason, op. cit., p. 28; Ruth
Butler, Rodin. The Shape of Genius (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1993), p. 223: Gustave Geffroy found more Baudelaire than Dante in La Porte d' enfer,
an "assemblage of action, instinct, destiny, desire, desperation, everything that cries and
groans in man.... He was not an illustrator of Dante, Baudelaire or Flaubert, but a

man 'wrestling with the powers of nature.'" Judith Cladel, Rodin the Man and His Art
(New York: The Century, 1917), xiii, xx, and xxii, clarifies: "It is not Balzac the writer,
but Balzac the prophet, the seer, the enormous natural force that was Balzac" for Rodin
which finds expression. "His marbles do not represent, but present, emotion; they are
the evocation of emotion itself; as in music, form and substance coalesce ... he can
summon from the vastly deep the spirits of love, hate, pain, sin, despair, beauty, ecstasy;
above all ecstasy.' ... Love and life, and bitterness and death rule the themes of his
marbles."
14 Rodin et les ecrivains de son temps: Sculptures, dessins, lettres et livres du fonds
Rodin, Musee Rodin, 23 juin-8 octobre 1976; Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal,
illustrated by Rodin (Paris: J. Dumoulin, 1948) with an introduction by C. Mauclair,
p. xii: Camille Mauclair insists on the fact that Rodin did not wish to illustrate Baudelaire's
work and that for Rodin this work "was one of the expressions of the genius of humanity
which touched him most deeply, and he gave us other Fleurs du Mal which Rodin had
dreamed of but not plucked. The sketches ... show us the kinship between two great souls
for whom the world was nothing but the background of human will, and sorrow but the
pretext for creation." See also The World of Rodin 1840-1917, ed. William Harlan Hale
and the Editors of Time-Life Books, pp. 85-112; Albert E. Elsen, "The Relation to
Dante and Baudelaire," Rodin's Gates of Hell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1960), pp. 14-63; Correspondance de Rodin, II, 1900-1907 (Paris: Editions du musee
Rodin), 165, letter toR. M. Rilke, Paris, 17 July 1905: "J'ecris pour vous dire toute
mon amitie et toute l'admiration que je porte a l'homme, a l'ecrivain travailleur qui a
deja tant d'influence partout par son travail et son talent."
15 Rodin, Rodin on Art and Artists, op. cit., p. 35.
16 Ibid., p. 36.
18 Ibid., p. 140.
19 Ibid., p. 144; "Rodin's Reflections on Art" (Entretiens avec Rodin) recorded by Henri
Charles Etienne du Jardin-Beaumets in Albert Elsen, Auguste Rodin, Readings on His
Life and Work (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 159: "Is not nature the source
of all beauty? . . . it is only in relying upon nature that the artist finds and reveals the
beautiful within the truth"; ibid., p. 161: "The art of the sculptor is made of strength, exac-
titude and will. In order to express life, to render nature, one must will and will with all
strength of heart and brain; nature exceeds - and greatly - human genius; she is superior
in everything.... We know only parcels of truth. There are unknown forces within nature;
when we give ourselves wholly to her, without reserve, she lends them to us; she shows
us these forms that our watching eyes do not see, which our intelligence does not under-
stand or suspect. In art, to admit only what one understands leads to impotence"; ibid.,
p. 167: "There is no living being who, copied without any change, could not be the
source of a masterpiece. Nature comprehends all, dominates all, explains all. What is beau-
tiful in her is life. Art is the reproduction of life ..."; ibid., p. 168: "Everything that
has life is beautiful"; ibid., p. 172: "It is only in life that one must seek life."
20 Dante Alighieri, Inferno (III). The Divine Comedy, trans. Rivarol in Elsen, Auguste
Rodin. Readings on His Life and Art, op. cit., p. 70, who quotes this translation as
Rodin's favorite version of Dante. The Goncourt Journal, ed. Robert Baldick (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 319: The Goncourt brothers distinguish two kinds of
humanity in the marbles of Rodin at their visit with Rodin on 22 April 1886: "The
Boulevard de Vaugirard studio contains a wholly realistic humanity; the studio of the
lie des Cygnes is as it were the home of a poetic humanity."
21 Rilke, Rodin, op. cit., pp. 28, 29; Elsen, Auguste Rodin. Readings on His Life and
Work, op. cit. "Dante is more profound and has more fire than I have been able to
present. He is a literary sculptor. He speaks in gestures as well as in words; is precise
and comprehensive not only in sentiment and idea, but in the movement of the body,"
Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke, 1909-1926, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London:
Macmillan, 1947), p. 107; Rilke agrees with Rodin: " ... the Inferno. What a com-
pendium of Life! What discernment, invocation, judgment! What reality, what nice
appraisal even of the darkest darkness; what re-encounter of the world! From this it
does not follow that suffering is more right than happiness, or the surrender to it, or the
expression and allowance of it; only that till now humanity has not attained the depth,
the fervour, the necessity in the realms of bliss which have been made accessible to it
in suffering."
22 Ibid., pp. 31-32; 30.
25 Camille Mauclair in Baudelaire, op. cit., p. 126.
28 Ibid., p. 90.
29 Ibid., p. 128.
30 Rainer Crone and Siegfried Salzmann (eds.), Eros and Creativity (Munich: Prestel,
1992), p. 199: My view is totally opposed by the words of the art historian Ginger Danto
who in "Rodin: Erotic Inspiration in Nature" offers the following interpretation: "theme
of attracting and repelling in the dance of would-be lovers attains its most abstract
representation in both the title and the form of the Cathedral in which two freestanding
right hands form a concave space, as in a nave, above which the fingers do not actually
touch. The lovers here are invisible, but in these isolated appendages we see all their
hesitance and desire. The hands do not meet palm to palm, so the bodies are not merged
skin to skin; but we imagine them very close, allowing for the heat and the draw of the
erotically interminable moment of approach."
31 Rilke, Rodin, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
32 Paul Claude!, "Nijinsky," L'Oeil ecoute, Oeuvres en Prose (Paris: Pleiade, 1965),
p. 386.
33 Rilke, Rodin, op. cit., p. 69.
34 Tymieniecka, The Three Movements of the Soul, p. 155.
PATRICIA TR UTTY -COO HILL
VISUALIZING TYMIENIECKA'S POETICA NOVA
This study was prepared to be heard and seen. It works most effectively
in that way. In the medium of the illustrated lecture, images appear, as
it were, before the mind - seen illuminations of what is heard. The
following is merely the text of the lecture with annotations that indicate
the images used in slides. In order to preserve, as much as possible,
the quality of "performance" piece in an unillustrated text, a separate
list of images, annotated with references to high quality reproduction,
is included in an appendix.
Five months ago, in Cambridge, I discussed giving a paper at this con-

ference with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. We had several thoughts, because
I wanted to present something that spoke directly to phenomenological
interests. I wanted to show images that exemplified the artists' aware-
ness of existence/being and the artists's ability to awaken that awareness
in the beholder. My first thought was of George Caleb Bingham's 1844
Fur Traders Descending the Missouri (Visualization 1), a painting in
the Metropolitan Museum in New York. It shows what was once a com-
monplace scene - two fur traders going down a river. This image came
to mind because the first time I taught art history, I team-taught a course
in nineteenth-century culture with a philosopher, Ronald Nash, who
although patient with my inexperience, must have been rather bored.
He perked up considerably when he saw this slide. He asked if other
artists were as aware of the human condition as was Bingham. And I
had already covered Romanticism! And so, The Fur Traders seems like
a good place to start the personal consideration presented here.
Thomas Hart Benton wrote that Bingham "painted for the living world
and painted what that world could understand - its own life .... Instead
of fitting life into his process, he fitted these to his life, and made thereby
a unique and original series of forms." 1 In the Fur Traders, Bingham
has eliminated all unnecessary detail, so that we meet the situation
directly, without distraction. Stillness pervades. The boat is in perfect
focus, its world is fogged in, though a brilliant morning light will clear
the view in a while. The oarsman holds his paddle at rest. All willed
movement has stopped. The boat - a vehicle which had previously
303

304 PATRICIA TRUTTY -COOHILL
responded to an agent who caused it to move independently of the flow

of the river- the boat is now released, allowed to rest on the river. 2
The boatmen drift along, just being in the stream. The lounging youth 3
just gazes at us, satisfied with where and what he is, realizing that we
are the same - no matter how and where we are. The traders are satis-
fied merely to exist and that satisfaction expresses an awareness of their
own being. By reducing activity to the zero point they dwell on what
is most basic - existence and existence in the world. They share their
experience of what is most real as they float past us - we who gave
them pause. We are the cause of their awareness. And their awareness
will be the cause of ours. Thus Bingham has involved us absolutely in
the "action" of the work. Without us, the fur traders would not have
paused. And so, rather than being mere observers, we become partici-
pants. Even more, we are the instigators of the action. Bingham has turned
the tables, making the existence of the viewer a necessity, an obvious
necessity. Allied to the viewer's response is our awareness that the
entire situation is set up by our presence. Rather than merely effecting
a Pavlovian reader response, he has us realize that our presence initi-
ated the action. We read all this backwards, as it were, for the cause
existed before we realized what it was. Bingham builds the past into
the present and puts the future on hold. In the fictive world he has created,
who will first break the contract, who will first resume his course in
the stream of life? 4
There were other examples of paintings which have an ontological
impact, but I was not content to show example after example with
analysis after analysis, without an integrating structure. I wanted to show
what Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka calls the "cipher": "the means by which
the human being ... reaches deep down into the fountain of life itself,
and by his own means, endows the elemental stuff with a significance
uniquely his own. " 5 One thinks immediately of the potter, spinning the
wheel, reaching down and pulling up to make a form out of the material
of the earth, a form that is uniquely hers. Indeed, images spring to mind
frequently when reading Tymieniecka's Poetica Nova, the Creative
Crucibles of Human Existence and of Art, a Treatise in the Metaphysics
of the Human Condition and of Art, Part I, The Poetics of Literature.
Even the sound of the title has cadence which makes the words seem
visible, solid, tangible. And so I decided to present some of the images
I recalled while reading her text.
TYMIENIECKA'S POETICA NOVA 305
I will limit my remarks to portions of the second chapter, "The

Subterranean Quest of the "Real" and the "Lasting" in the Human
Condition: The Examination of the Creative Groundwork of Man's
Existential Meaningfulness and Historicity." We will visualize three of
her terms, with examples that make the symbiosis of text and image most
obvious: the "Radical Self-Examination" with Manet's Bar at the Folies-
Bergeres, "Life Crises" with a series of Durer's early self-portraits, and
the "Present Instant" with paintings by Edward Hopper. Further devel-
opments in the text will be imaged with a Shiva Nataraja. The paper
concludes with a final visualization. The first and third discussions are
the most involved; the second and the final are short because the refer-
ences are straightforward. Since it is her text that calls the images forth,
I will read from it directly whenever possible, without paraphrase, but
with elisions. The images will "come up" in the same way they arose
to my mind. I must emphasize that my purpose here is merely to suggest
suitable illustrations to accompany Tymieniecka's text- to project images
that visualize the text.
THE RADICAL SELF-EXAMINATION
In the section entitled "The Radical Self-Examination and the Current

of Man's Life," Professor Tymieniecka writes:
It has been said that man can be defined as the being who interrogates himself about
himself (Visualization 2). But how is it possible that in the flow of his occupation (so
strictly and faultlessly bound one to the other by concrete logic), even though every-
thing appears "natural" in the established order of things, one could begin to doubt
everything and to wonder - "and afterwards, what is there ... ?" 6
Edouard Manet's Bar at the Folies-Bergeres, painted in 1881, was his

last major work, his "swan's song."7 His illness was such that he could
paint only with the greatest difficulty. There are a number of positivist
interpretations of this work, interpretations that emphasize that the
barmaid is also a prostitute and that the man reflected at the right is
one of her clients as well as a customer at the bar. 8 Even if this is the
case, the girl may also be interpreted, at another level, as a human
being, come to the awareness described by Tymieniecka. Surely a barmaid
cum prostitute might have reason to consider "and afterwards, what is
there?"
Manet has managed to present a picture that can be read on a number

of levels. The ambiguity of the space and the relationship between the
major figures allows, indeed invites, just such freedom. 9
In this, his final great painting, Manet makes a composition that at
first glance seems quite natural. On one level, as George Mauner
observes, "we are struck at once by the glitter of this work, by the sheer
brilliance of the variegated spots of color and the world they create."
It is a tour de force of paint. At another level it seems to recreate the
world of sight - Tymieniecka's "according to the established order of
things." Yet at third level, as Mauner points out, "simultaneously we
submit to the strangeness of the gaze of the central and static barmaid.
The picture is a fusion of carefully planned studio arrangement and the
spontaneous jottings after nature, freely distributed .... the theme of
the homo duplex." 10
The central barmaid leans against the bar, resting on her hands, so that
her body makes an acute triangle. Her head is only slightly tilted, her
eyes somewhat downcast, her gaze withdrawn. Before her, on the marble
bar, are bottles, a compote of fruit, two roses, all painted with breath-
taking immediacy. That immediacy is contrasted with the background
which is all reflection. The barmaid seen from the back, involved in
her daily activities - whatever they are - is less distinct, much softened.
At the left the background opens to the interior of the nightclub, filled
with, "half defined, half suggested, in merging and intermingling shapes
that coalesce here and there into a gesture, and attitude, a hat.... " 11
All the liveliness, all the gaiety of the customers shrinks in the "unsub-
stantiality" of its reflection. Tymieniecka's words resound. "Even though
everything appears 'natural' in the established order of things, one could
begin to doubt everything and to wonder - 'and afterwards, what is
there ... ?'"
Tymieniecka's text continues:
From this question arises sua sponte the irresistible desire to examine the individual
and universal condition of our personal life, a life apparently so well-organized, so sure
and untroubled. This desire moves manifestly in the inverse direction, against the ongoing
structures of life, springing as they do from a natural spontaneity. The inverse desire sheds
doubt on Jaws and forms. We used to adhere unreservedly to our actions; they carried
us with them along the stream of life. Now a self becomes detached and departs from
the current. 12 This self no longer identifies with its own acts, instead, it endures them.
The self subjects all our paths and customary involvements to critical examination, and
they are all found to be narrow, futile, and banal.
This impulse to question ourselves about life, the world, and ourselves is manifestly
one of the most profound acts, because it brings into play all our faculties, and our
entire being concentrates there. . . .
This quest for the meaning of existence (is) a quest in which intellectual reflection
is subservient to the intuition of lived experience .... (Such an) urgent desire to pene-
trate the depth of our natural existence indicates a need to find a mode of living in
which something else would be expressed .... (It) calls for a radical examination ...
(that) rises up against life. It happens at the precise moment when we distance ourselves
from familiarity with world and self. It happens at a sudden moment when our total
adhesion to our own acts weakens; that is, when we sense ourselves no longer absorbed
by our current life-course, and solidarity with this life-course breaks." 13
Manet puns on reflections (Tymieniecka's inverse direction). 14 The

girl's reflective distancing "from the world and herself" is the reality
of the frontal plane, made emphatic by the way her weight is pressed
against the tabletop, her arms forming a solid triangle (Visualization
3), like Christ in Leonardo's Last Supper. In both cases, the existential
state is ciphered by the triangle form, the rigidity of which is loosened
by the hands that form its base leading out toward objects on the table.
Active figures are at the sides, a theatrical perspective behind. The
central, symmetrical figure is a cipher for substance. The activities at
the sides are ciphers for passing states.
Manet uses a trope. What seems most physically real is the central girl
in the state of existential reflection. What is least substantial - the
reflection in the mirror - is the activity of life. Tymieniecka expresses
the same idea. When doubts arise about what is important, and lead to
a desire for a radical self-examination, that desire "moves manifestly
in the inverse direction, against the ongoing structures of life, springing
as they do from a natural spontaneity." The girl is a cipher for the "intu-
ition of lived experience" as opposed to "intellectual reflection."
Manet wanted to paint his own time, so he depicts Parisian life in
the glittering background, but, as Mauner points out, the foreground is
the studio- another aspect of Manet's daily life. And from the model's
studio pose and expression, Manet extracted an image of the questioning
of existence. 15 for according to Baudelaire, modernity constitutes only
half of art, while the other half belongs to the eternal. 16
LIFE CRISES
A much simpler visualization is related to Tymieniecka's discussion of

life crises. To paraphrase: doubt and the critical examination the doubt
provokes are instruments of practical reflection, set in motion by "life-
308 PATRICIA TRUTTY-COOHILL
crises." Man becomes disoriented. Such disorientation is part and parcel

of all growth, e.g. when as teenagers we are faced with values and
conduct, which might be very different from those of our secure world
of childhood. Durer's early self-portraits illustrate the point. In 1484,
at the age of thirteen, he drew himself in three-quarter view (Visualization
4). There is no sense of doubt at this stage; rather we experience as
sense of confidence in his situation and his skills. Seven years later, using
a convex mirror and placing his hand very close to the forehead to
avoid distortion, he records the self-doubt typical of his age -or perhaps
the doubts of injury and recovery, if his head is bandaged as Streider
suggests (Visualization 5). Panofsky notes that during this period, Durer
was high-strung and in an excited state of mind. Tymieniecka describes
such a period as
a profound "sounding" of ourselves ... at the moment of adolescence, when we must
find some "sense of direction" in our lives. We ask. "Who am I?" and "Where am I
headed?" ... Its purpose is to allow ourselves to choose what we wish to be or even
what we are without being aware of it (Visualization 6). This conscientious grasp of
ourselves as agents of selection, so that we are alone responsible for our existence,
marks a crucial state in our development. It is a stage in which man ceases to be simply
an individual, distinguished from others only by tendency, capacity, and particular social
development (Visualization 7). At the new stage each of us rushes to form himself in a
unique way as a 'unique person' because personhood involves deliberated choices. 17
Durer's Self Portrait of 1500 at the Alte Pinakothek in Munich, 18 with

its deliberate, iconic quality, makes Tymieniecka's point.
THE "PRESENT INSTANT"
The third set of visualizations develops from Tymieniecka's notion of the

"present instant." In "The Irreversibility of Formative Advancement" she
examines how man's reflections on himself and on "the lived world"
create new stages of development or sometimes, they just "clear the
path for new development." In focusing on the "temporal coordinates"
of those developments she coins a potent phrase, the "present instant,"
that moment of self-examination in which
we adhere to this instant perfectly with our whole being, while actively concentrating there
all our strengths .... The "present instant" of existence is at once a vital state and a
privileged mode. It is privileged because it enjoys our complete adhesion: we are, we exist
(Visualization 8) in the present instant.... The present instant is likewise that of our
lived experience which, ranging over the whole of our lucidity, makes us conscious of
ourselves as identical with our acts, our feelings, and our thoughts. 19
Edward Hopper's lucid paintings exude the "present instant" in their

stillness and unnatural silence. J. A. Ward describes them thus: "The
silence is more active than passive, mainly because it suggests little of
the calmness, tranquility, or placidity associated with it. Hopper's silences
are tense- hushed decorums maintained with terrific strain. In most of
his work noise would be a welcome relaxing of tension." 20 When, late
in life, Hopper was asked if he was a pessimist, he responded: "A
pessimist. I guess so. I'm not proud of it. At my age don't you get to
be?" 21 In his 1959 Excursion into Philosophy, we see a man with a
troubled expression resting on the edge of an unforgivingly hard bed
while a woman sleeps, turned away from him. He has just put down a
book. Hopper's explanation: "He has been reading Plato rather late in
life.'m
Critics have also noted that time is important to Hopper, who entitled
a number of his works with an hour or a time of day - such as, Seven
A.M. (1948, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York), Early
Sunday Morning (Visualization 9. 1930, Whitney Museum of American
Art, New York). Light conditions are also a recurrent theme (e.g., Sunlight
on Brownstones, 1956, Wichita Art Museum). To depict a situation in
a certain light is to depict only an instant. He halts time by depicting a
single light, light which changes at every moment. It was just such a
stilled moment that he appreciated when he translated Goethe's
"Wanderer's Nightsong":
Over all the hills is quite

Over all the dells you can hardly hear a sound
All the birds are quiet in the woods
Soon you will rest too. (Emphasis added) 23
By awakening the reader's sense of hearing to the space and the silence,
Goethe would share with the reader the privilege of his sensitivity to
the moment. In the same way, Hopper evokes the consciousness of the
viewer who becomes a direct participant in the work of art, much as
we saw how it occurs in Bingham's Fur Traders. It is the viewer who
experiences the present instant. It is the viewer whose gaze is caught
and stilled. 24
The experience of the present instant before nature is well under-
stood by all, but Hopper is able to bring experience of the present instant
to the most banal scenes, such as the Hirshhorn's Hotel by a Railroad
310 PATRICIA TRUTTY -COGHILL
(Visualization 10. 1952, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.).

While the man and woman may participate in the experience, it is the
viewer who is caught and stilled.
In the Two Comedians (Visualization 11. 1965, private collection), one
of Hopper's last paintings, he painted himself and his wife gracefully
bowing out. His wife Jo described the scene as "a dark stage (and what
a stage, strong as the deck of a ship) and two small figures out of pan-
tomime. Poignant." 25 The mood is evoked by the scale of the figures, and
their contrast with the thick darkness of the stage. Raised above us, the
"poor players" are isolated from the world - "in it, but not of it" - self-
subsistent and resigned. The viewer experiences, but this time surely
along with the characters, that "present instant" when even the applause
is silenced as we concentrate on their "moment." All that is vital is
present at the instant, all lucidity, making us "conscious of ourselves
as identical with our acts, our feelings, and our thoughts." Might not
the poignancy that Jo Hopper associated with this painting, lie in the con-
sciousness of the nearing the end of their series of "present instances."
Tymieniecka describes being in time in this way:
Although the present instant of our existence is itself without continuity or duration, it
is through the topical states of our entire being (always new and always renewing them-
selves) that this being shows itself as distinct and identical and conscious of itself acting .
. . . (Linking) to the self-identical image constituted by a succession of cinematographic
images. 26
I would propose that the extension of "present instants" might be imaged

by the dance. I would have liked to show you a dance to watch as I
read Tymieniecka's description of moving to the future, but circumstances
do not allow. I will instead show you Shiva Nataraja, the Lord of the
Dance (Visualization 12) -the god of creation and destruction - in the
cosmic dance in which the universe becomes a manifestation of the
light reflected from his limbs as he moves within the orb of the sun. 27
Tymieniecka continues:
... Each present moment is a manifestation of our whole being, which monopolizes
our attention in a manner so exclusive, so dominating, that we behave as if only it
existed. Nevertheless, this very attention, with all the vivacity that Locke suggests,
passes from one luminous moment to another, and shapes a perfect continuity. The
reality that such continuity establishes is seamless, ongoing and unified. There is thus a
functional oneness and an operational continuity whereby man "in process" forms his
universe around him.
All this shows that movement, and the time which measures it, are coextensive and
are patterned and brought into play by initial spontaneity. . . . The Lived experience
... is inserted into a network of progressive development in which each particular state
bursts forth while transfiguring the field of lucidity. [The image of the dancer's delib-
erate movements is most apt to the following passage.] Having fulfilled its role in the
process, each present stage gives way to the subsequent one which it has already heralded .
. . . While fading in their vivacity and their associative value ... the present states
linger like the tail of a comet (so) that each new present moment ... drags behind it
irreversibly .... Every state resides in the background of what we call "the past." ...
The current of existence produced never stops; it advances in instlintaneous states, one
following the other in an inalterable and irreplaceable way.... Actuality takes on an
absolute value in relation to the wide-open vista of its forward impetus, the future toward
which it tends. 28
THE UNFATHOMABLE
The last visualization calls for nothing more than reading a passage
and juxtaposing an image without comment. Tymieniecka offers us the
following consolation.
We, because of our nature, are bound to question ourselves, espe-
cially since "our life-course always advances by means of an infinite
series, and through successive exploits which provoke new critical
moments. Our existence refines the moments, specifies them and renders
them more universal. The doubt which accompanies our life-course,
becomes as it were, an integral part of this current," but this doubt is
beneficial because it "causes us to reflect and to become conscious of
our life's course.'m We need only to "take hold of what we are doing
during 'crisis' occasions" so that "unknown capacities" can be revealed.
Yet in reality our concrete, empirical, and real being - as well as the donnees in which
the current of fragmented life flows - always escapes from being grasped [Visualization
13] with some certitude. We must satisfy ourselves with conjectures while admitting
that in the final tally, concrete man remains unfathomable, and concrete reality shuns
conclusive analysis.30
NOTES
1 As cited by Albert Christ-Janer, George Caleb Bingham, Frontier Painter of Missouri
(New York: Abrams, 1975), p. 49.

2 Christ-Janer notes that "the Missouri is, of course, a whimsical force and, had it not
been somewhat tamed by the engineers, a dangerous one" (op. cit., p. 22).
3 The original title of the painting, Fur Trader and His Half-Breed Son, was less lyrical.
It identifies the figures as characters in an implied historico-sociological narrative. Nancy

Rash takes a sociological approach, pointing out that the Fur Traders should be paired
312 PATRICIA TRUTTY-COOHILL
with The Concealed Enemy (Orange, Texas, Stark Museum) which shows an Osage Indian
hiding in ambush. Bingham plays on a popular longing for the lost world of the late
eighteenth century when French voyageurs canoed American rivers. The "calm atmos-
phere, the Claudian mode" of the painting for her is the result of nostalgia (The Paintings
and Politics of George Caleb Bingham (New Haven and London: Yale, 1991 ), p. 49).
To my eye, the sensibility of the Fur Traders is far above mere nostalgia. Such emotion
would be better served by the 1851 copy, Trapper's Return (Detroit Institute of Arts),
in which he is much concerned to make the details accurate: the figures are more clearly
expressed, the animal is clearly a bear cub (symbol of the state of Missouri on a state
seal of 1822), as is the French pirogue, dug-out canoe. "Missouri" is an Indian word
meaning "the people who use wooden canoes." The 1851 version was executed in his New
York studio and carries none of the mood of the original. The change in mood is even
evident in a comparison of the preparatory drawings for the two compositions. The
earlier drawing for the trapper is as evocative as the original. When he used it for the
later painting, the mood is transformed so that it shares that of the preparatory drawing
for the half-breed son in the 1851 painting. See Maurice E. Bloch, The Drawings of George
Caleb Bingham, with Catalogue Raissone (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975),
nos. 2 and 77.
For further sociological discussions, see Francoise Forster-Hahn, "Inventing the Myth
of the American Frontier: Bingham's Images of Fur Traders and Flatboatmen as Symbol
of the Expanding Nation", pp. 118-145 in American Icons: Transatlantic Perspective
on Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century American Art, ed. Thomas Gaehtgens and Heinz
Ickstadt: Santa Monica, Getty Center for History of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992); and David Lubin, Picturing a Nation: Art and Social Change in Nineteenth
Century America (New Haven, London: Yale, 1994).
4 Rath notes that "the viewer, like them also on a river, shares the calm of their journey
for one brief moment" (op. cit., p. 49). This effect is directly opposed to contempora-
neous continental convention, as Michael Fried has recently pointed out. Under the
influence of Denis Diderot, French painting from the n.iddle of the eighteenth century
until the first half of the 1860s was "anti-theatrical,' that is, the figures in a painting
were to be so absorbed in their own world that they are obvious to the beholder. "The
representation of absorption emerged as the privileged vehicle for seeking to establish
the metaphysical illusion that the beholder did not exist, that there was no one standing
before the canvas .... [This denies what Fried thinks] of as the primordial convention
-almost transcendental condition- that all paintings are made to be beheld." ("Between
Realisms: From Derrida to Manet", Critical Inquiry 21(1) (Autumn 1994), pp. 5-6; see
also Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).) Fried's discussion is a response to Jacques
Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins (Chicago, University
of Chicago, 1993).
5 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Poetica Nova (D. Reidel Publishing, 1982), p. 29. Full
title in text of this paper.

6 Ibid., p. 30.
7 Albert Boime emphasizes Manet's physical condition, pointing out that the man in
the mirror in Manet's study for the painting (1881, Amsterdam, Stedilijk Museum) might
be identified with Manet who had to sit to paint. He suffered from locomotor ataxia in
his left leg due to syphilis. Boime further has Manet "identify with her subjectivity because
of his physical condition that has essentially terminated his career as a stroller", a flaneur.
See "Manet's Un bar aux Folies-Bergere as an Allegory of Nostalgia", Zeitschrift fiir
Kunstgeschichte 56(2) (1993), 234-248, esp. p. 238.
8 Most recently Ruth E. Iskin, "Selling, Seduction, and Soliciting the Eye: Manet' s
Bar the Folies-Bergere", Art Bulletin LXXVII(1) (March 1995), pp. 25-44, in which
the painting is related to discourses of mass consumption, the development of depart-
ment stores, and the expanded visual culture of illustrations and advertising posters. The
girl in Manet's painting is an example in Hallis Clayson, Painted Love: Prostitution in
French Art of the Impressionist Era (New Haven: Yale, 1991).
9 George Mauner, Manet, Peintre-Philosophe (University Park: Penn State, 1975), pp.
161-162. In 1994, James H. Rubin wrote that in Manet's Bar at the Folies-Bergere "the
aesthetic of the detached gaze (is) as surgical operation ... it seems as if the displaced
eye concentrates us wholly on the signs of art" (Manet' s Silence and the Poetics of
Bouquets (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1994), pp. 88-89).
10 Mauner, op. cit., p. 161.
11 John Canaday, Mainstreams of Modem Art (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1959), p. 179.
12 For T.J. Clark and the bannaid "is detached: that is the best description. She looks
out steadily at some thing or somebody, the various things which constrain and deter-
mine her, and finds that they float by ..."See The Painting of Modem Life: Paris in
the Art of Manet and His Followers (New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 254.
13 Tymieniecka, op. cit. p. 30 and pp. 33-34. Boime also notes the dichotomy in Manet's
painting, but his conclusions are at the other end of the spectrum: "she has allowed her
private world to obtrude on her public persona." Her "private world" is a dream of "owning
her own establishment instead of working for someone else. Her fantasies would include
relationships that might bring her into sudden wealth to finance her scheme." Boime,
op. cit., pp. 244 and 242.
14 Ibid., p. 30.
15 See Gunter Busch, Edouard Manet- UnBar aux Folies- Bergere (Stuttgart, 1956),
pp. 11-12, as cited by Mauner, op. cit., p. 162. Manet complained to Antonin Proust about
models for portraits:
That's always been my principal concern, to make sure of getting regular sittings.
Whenever I start something, I'm always afraid the model will let me down.... They
come, they pose, then away they go, telling themselves that he can finish it off on his own.
Well no, one can't finish anything on one's own, particularly since one only finishes on
the day one starts, and that means starting often and having plenty of days available.
See Manet by Himself: Correspondence & Conversation, Paintings, Posters, Prints &
Drawings, ed. Juliet Wilson-Bareau (Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown, 1991),
p. 184.
16 J.-L. Vaudolyer, E. Manet, Paris: Ed. du Dimanche, 1955, Introduction ("Manet,
magicien du reel"), unpaginated, as cited by Manner, op. cit. Proust recorded Manet as
saying in 1878-1879: "The truth is that our only obligation should be to distill what we
can from our own epoch, though without belittling what earlier periods have achieved.
But to try and mix them into what bannen call a cocktail is plain stupid." See Manner,
op. cit., p. 187.
17 Tymieniecka, op. cit., p. 36.
18 Much has been made of Diirer' s appropriation of the type, but James Snyder considers
it doubtful that Diirer identifies outright with the sacred icon. It may be an example of
imitatio Christi, pious devotion population in northern Europe. See Snyder, Northern
Renaissance Art (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 326. See also Charles Cuttler,
"Undercurrents in Diirer's 1500 Self-Portrait", Pantheon 50(1) (1992), pp. 24-27; George
Didi-Huberrnan, "L'autre miroir: autoportrait et melancolie Christique selon Albrecht
Diirer", pp. 207-240, in Ritratto e Ia memoria: materiali 2, ed. Augusto Genti et al., Rome:
Bulzoni, 1993.
19 Tymieniecka, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
20 J. A. Ward, American Silences (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985),
p. 169.
21 Gail Levin, Edward Hopper, the Art and the Artist (New York: Norton, 1980),
p. 60.
22 Ibid.
23 As quoted in Brian O'Doherty, "Portrait: Edward Hopper", Art in America 52
(December 1964), p. 80. Even if the scenes are artificially lit, the sense of the present
moment pervades.
24 This quality has been recognized, but is referred to as voyeurism, a sneaked peek
into a private world. See Ward, op. cit., p. 171. Levin (op. cit., p. 61) counts "Times of
Day," as one of the themes of Hopper's work.
25 See Levin, op. cit., p. 55.
26 Tymieniecka, op. cit., p. 39.
27 Ananda Coomarswamy gives a lyric account of the myth in The Dance of Shiva
(New Delhi: Sagar, 1968).
28 Tymieniecka, op. cit., pp. 39-49.
29 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
30 Ibid.
LIST OF VISUALIZATIONS FOR

VISUALIZING TYMIENIECKA'S POETICA NOVA
INTRODUCTION
[!.] George Caleb Bingham, Fur Traders on the Missouri (New York: Metropolitan
Museum, 1844). See Albert Christ-Janer, George Caleb Bingham: Frontier Painter
of Missouri (New York: Abrams, 1975).
THE RADICAL SELF-EXAMINATION
[2.] Edouard Manet, Bar at the Folies-Bergere (London, Courtauld Institute Galleries,
1882). See Anne Coffin Hanson, Manet and the Modern Tradition (New Haven
and London: Yale, 1977).
[3.] Leonardo da Vinci, The Last Supper (Milan, Sta. Maria delle Grazie, 1495-1498).
For Leonardo, see Martin Kemp, Leonardo da Vinci: the Marvelous Works of
Nature and of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1981).
LIFE CRISIS
[4.] Albrecht Durer, Self-Portrait at the Age of Thirteen, Silverpoint on prepared paper
275 x 196 mm (Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, 1484). Inscribed "This
I drew, using a mirror; it is my own likeness, in the year 1484. When I was still
a child/Albrecht DUrer." For all the DUrer self-portraits, see Peter Streider, Albrecht
Durer: Paintings, Prints Drawings (New York: Abaris, 1982).
[5.] Durer, Self-Portrait with Bandage, Pen and ink on paper, 204 x 208. Erlingen:
University Library, 1491) (Inscribed Martin SchOn Conterfait). John Pope-Hennessy
thought DUrer employed a convex mirror which necessitated that the hand be placed
very close to the forehead to avoid distortion. Streider suggests he might be ill.
Date per Walter Strauss, The Complete Drawings of Albrecht Durer (New York:
Abaris, 1974).
[6.] Durer, Self-Portrait with Sea Holly, Oil, transferred from vellum to linen. 56.5 x
44.5 em (Paris, Louvre, 1493). Inscribed "My sach die gat/Als es oben schat"
[Things with me fare/as ordained from above]. Some have said that the sea holly
indicates Durer is advertizing for a bride, but Steider points out that the sym-
bolism is many-sided, including religious connotations.
[7.] Durer, Self-Portrait in a Fur-Trimmed Coat, Oil on limewood, 67 x 49 em.
Inscribed "Albertus Dureus Noricus/ipsum me proprijs sic effin/gebam coloribus
aetatis/anno XXVIII" [Thus I, Albrecht DUrer from Nuremberg, painted myself with
indelible colors at the age of 28 years].
THE "PRESENT INSTANT"
[8.] Edward Hopper, Excursion into Philosophy, Oil on canvas, 30 x 40 in. (New
York: Kennedy Galleries, 1959). For all Hopper images, see Gail Levin. Edward
Hopper: The Art and the Artist (New York: Norton, 1980).
[9.] Hopper, Early Sunday Morning, Oil on canvas, 35 x 60 in. (New York, Whitney
Museum of American Art, 1930).
[10.] Hopper, Hotel by a Railroad, Oil on canvas, 31 x 40 in. (Washington, D.C.:
Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, Smithsonian Institution, 1952).
[11.] Hopper, Two Comedians, 1965, Oil on canvas, 29 x 40 in. Private collection.
[12.] Shiva Nataraja, Lord of Dance, 11th century A.D. Copper, h. 111.4 em. Cleveland
Museum. See Sherman E. Lee, A History of Far Eastern Art (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall and Harry N. Abrams, 1994).
THE UNFATHOMABLE
[13.] Leonardo da Vinci, Mona Lisa, Wood panel, 77 x 53 em (Pairs: Louvre, c.

1505-1514). Well reproduced in Lawrence Gowing, Paintings in the Louvre (New
York: Stewart, Tabori & Change, 1987).
V. C. THOMAS
AUTHENTICITY AND CREATIVITY

An Existentialist Perspective
The theme of this paper is lived time and in it we will examine how lived
time is crucial to the various modes of human existence. The elucida-
tion of lived time herein terms of its essential characteristics and our
examination of the pivotal role it plays in relation to the various modes
of existing assume, in one way or the other, what has been said about
lived time by Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre in their existentialist
writings.
What clearly and distinctly stands out in the existentialist treatment
of time is the claim that the human experience of time is in terms of
the unity of retention of the past and expectation of the future, and their
both intersecting in the present. This is an extended present, a spacious
present, a present which gnaws both into the past and the future. Man
lives time because of consciousness, i.e., only a conscious self can
experience lived time. Consciousness and time exist and can exist
only simultaneously and interdependently such that consciousness is
always a temporal consciousness. Lived time is conscious temporality.
Temporality which has been constituted as the core of human reality is
lived time. It is time lived through by man. It is man who is the source
of his time; it is man in his temporalizing functions. It is man in terms
of his creativity. Because lived time is self-creativity, lived time is owned.
But it need not be the case that man always owns his time, for man
can passively undergo experiences. When he is a victim of events
happening in and around him, he experiences unowned time. Time
experienced by the "crowd" (Kierkegaard) or Das Man (Heidegger)
exemplifies unowned time. In so far as human time is lived, it must be
remarked that chronometric measurable time in which moments follow
one another in terms of a continuous and endless succession where
some moments are gone, some yet to come and the former and the latter
are separated by means of a fleeting thin edge present, cannot be a part
of the human experience of time.
From the examples of the "crowd" and Das Man, it can be made out
that man does not always enjoy the fulness of consciousness. If the
fullness of consciousness is regarded as authenticity, it can also be said
317

318 V. C. THOMAS
that there is the possibility of falling short of this. While the aesthetic
self of Kierkegaard or Heidegger's Das Man has low levels of con-
sciousness, Dasein, insofar as it is Being-towards-death, has a very
high intensity of consciousness. Insofar as one can differentiate between
intensities of consciousness, one can envisage the possibility of grades
of lived experience and growth in lived time. Though Sartre does not
refer explicitly to the development of lived time in his philosophical
works, this idea can be detected in his literary writings. It appears to
me, for example, that this is the only apt interpretation that can be
given to the transformation that takes place in Orestes in The Flies.
However, with Kierkegaard, it emerges clearly in his notion of stages
of existence. While the aesthete experiences the minimum grade of
consciousness, the religious self enjoys the maximum degree of con-
sciousness and the fulness of lived time. The reason why the aesthetic
self experiences a low grade of lived time is that it is not the creator
of its own time; it is a victim of its experiences. This is because such
a self is dispersed and scattered; it is not unified within itself. Reference
to grades in the experience of lived time points towards the open-
endedness of human reality within the temporal domain. That which
determines each grade of lived time is the degree of self-constitution
which is directly dependent on self-consciousness, i.e., the more self-
consciousness, the higher the grade of experience of lived time, for
only a very high intensity of self-consciousness can account for inten-
sity in the experience of lived time. The existentialists, in other words,
in their treatment of lived time, do evaluate it, but it is an evaluation
made in terms not of principles but of their understanding of creativity.
Lived time, it has been pointed out, is man in terms of his creative
existing. That means that lived time is the sphere of creativity of the self.
The existential self on account of its very structure cannot exist in an
inert and stagnant fashion but rather exists dynamically and creatively.
Its creativity shines forth in its ability to constitute a world and in its
capacity to discover personal and subjective meanings. For human reality
the world is not the cosmos, nor a collection of objects standing in
opposition to consciousness; rather, the world is the sphere of signifi-
cant situations, a set of meaningful relations. The world is the fabric
of meaningfulness which man constitutes as well as discovers for himself.
It is in the lived world that one's activities have sense and a signifi-
cance. For that is a world which is ego-oriented. It is a world which
extends to the fringes of one's horizon. It is the world consisting of spatial
AUTHENTICITY AND CREATIVITY 319
and emotional characteristics such as above and below, far and near, home
and foreign, familiar and strange. It is a world brought into existence
by intentionality and purposiveness. It is constituted by the exercise of
one's free choices. Moreover, the lived world is not to be found already
existing concretely (like a thing). Rather, it needs to be brought into exis-
tence by the constitutive powers and creative activities of the human self.
Due to the ego-centredness of the world, the temporal self by transmit-
ting itself into its world, makes the world temporal. The ego is active and
relational and this is what enables it to move to and fro so that it makes
the world its own, not only by way of appropriation but also by way
of self-transmission.
We notice here also the existentialists' departure from the kind of
idealism in which the lived time of individuals is swallowed up in the
stream of cosmic process.
Human reality which is constantly engaged in the process of discov-
ering meaning discovers personal and subjective meanings. This is
because man constitutes meaning and he does so because he is the source
of meaningfulness. That man is constantly engaged in discovering
meaning is because meaning is not given to man as a finished product.
The ability of man to discover meaning expresses itself most acutely
when he encounters apparently meaningless situations. In fact, situa-
tions in themselves are neither meaningful nor meaningless. Man assigns
meanings to situations making them meaningful. This being so, as
Heidegger correctly points out in his hermeneutic phenomenology, man
cannot, strictly speaking, encounter any inherently meaningless situa-
tions. While encountering situations, man makes them meaningful. Man
does not undergo his experience passively nor does he remain a spectator
of events occurring around him, rather he actively participates in them,
determining how they should be in relation to him. But an important claim
which the existentialists make in this context is that the human search
for meaning is within the confines of time. That meaning is temporal
stems from the temporality of human existence. Lived time as the domain
of creativity of the human self predominantly manifests itself in relation
to the discovery of meaning.
The way in which human reality unifies the three phases of time:
the past, present and future, making them the modes of its Being, further
exemplifies the creativity of the self. By unifying the three phases of
time, self diffuses itself into the three modes, making them "mine"
(owned). It must also be mentioned here that apart from appropriating
320 V. C. THOMAS
the three dimensions of time, the self unifies each dimension of time with
the others by means of decisions and activities. In the context of deci-
sions the self determines in the present how a past event should stand
in relation to the future. The present is ingrained in the past and in the
future in such a way that the past is always a past of a present self
whose future is yet to be actualized in the present. Similarly, an action
is performed in the present on the basis of one's past experiences in
view of the future. By interrelating the three dimensions of time, what
the self does is to move to and fro from one dimension to the other,
thereby eliminating atomic succession. This is possible precisely because
the self, according to the existentialists, is neither a Cartesian substance
nor a Kantian formal fixity.
The creativity of the self which manifests itself in the domain of
lived time is not an accidental quality attached to the self. This cre-
ativity is an outward expression of its internal dynamism. The existential
self is never inert but active and dynamic, and the _self reveals itself in
and through its dynamism and creativity. Creativity is the medium
through which the self extends itself to its horizons, beyond its imme-
diate surroundings. Creativity does not imply that the self creates
something ex nihilo. Its creativity discloses itself in its ability to discover
meanings, in its capacity to establish something as "mine," and in its
efficacy in bringing about the unity of the modes of time.
What this creativity reveals is that there is a close relationship between
self and time. It is this relationship which is manifested in the asser-
tion that lived time is man himself in his temporalizing functioning.
This being so, one can experience the mode of temporality of the self
by being aware of the mode of existence of the self, and by being con-
scious of the state of existence of the self, one can grasp the kind of
temporality which the self has. Kierkegaard recognises this integral
relationship between self and time when he asserts: "the significance
attached to time is in general decisive for every stand-point up to the
paradox which paradoxically accentuates time. In the same degree time
is accentuated, in the same degree we go forward from the aesthetic,
the metaphysical to the ethical, to the religious and Christian religious." 1
In this way Kierkegaard considers time to be a movement which brings
about the development of the self from one stage to the next. As far as
Heidegger is concerned, he also recognises the relation between self
(Dasein) and time by conceiving care, the Being of Dasein, as ahead-
of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (entities
encountered within the world),2 that is to say, exclusively in temporal

terms. It is only because of the link between self (Dasein) and time
that Dasein is in a position to unify and appropriate the three modes of
time. This relationship can be expressed by stating that the three dimen-
sions of time are modes of the Being of Dasein. One can very well locate
in Sartre's writings this relationship especially in his assertion that to
be (to exist) is to be temporal which means that being for-itself is possible
only as temporal being. Again, Sartre's elucidation of the for-itself (it
is not what it is, rather it is what it is not) clearly manifests this rela-
tionship between the self and time.
Because of the intimate relationship between self and time, the kind
of time experienced by the self indicates the mode of existence of the
self, and the self manifests its temporality. What this means is that the
religious self of Kierkegaard or the owned self of Heidegger (Dasein)
are paradigm cases revealing lived time. The dispersed and scattered state
of existence of the self indicates the least unified and inauthentic time
of the aesthete or Das Man. In other words, owned temporality leads
one to authentic selfhood, and unowned temporality can indicate only the
inauthentic self.
The creativity of the self reveals not only the relationship between self
and time but also manifests the fact that the creative self is finite. The
ground of the finitude of lived time is the finiteness of human reality.
It is because of its finiteness that human reality begins to exist, under-
goes changes, develops and finally dies. Finitude is the core of human
reality. Because finiteness constitutes human existence, its modes of
existing are also finite. Again, in so far as human existence is finite, tem-
porality, which is the essence of man, is also finite. What this shows is
that the open-endedness of human reality which springs from its future
and possibilities does not lead to infinitude. It must be remarked here
that the term finite is used in the present context in its etymological sense,
namely finis. Lived time is not an unending flow of now moments, but
it is ego-oriented in such a way that lived time comes to an end when
human existence ends.
What is to be understood from the finitude of human existence and
hence, of human time is this: as man has a beginning and an end, human
time also has an end. Time must have a stop. Because of the phenom-
enological emphasis on the primacy of the future, existentialists declare
that the end is more important than the beginning. This means that the
appropriation of the end is crucial to human existence, for it is this
322 V. C. THOMAS
which makes human existence meaningful or meaningless. For the reli-

gious self of Kierkegaard, on account of its Christian faith, death is
only a passage to the next life. Appropriation is brought about through
hope. For the mundane self of Heidegger (Dasein), the appropriation
of the end, namely of death, transforms life into a meaningful whole. But
from Sartre's point of view, it is the end that makes life a useless passion
infusing meaninglessness into human existence. In each case tempo-
rality is the hinge.
In whatever way we look at death: as the embodiment of meaning-
fulness (Heidegger) or as the most meaningless phenomenon (Sartre),
one is certain that death is a scandalon. In Kierkegaard's writings too
there appears a scandal which is different from that of both Heidegger
and Sartre. In Kierkegaard's view the scandal is God becoming man
thanks to which spiritualized lived time is made possible and by which
alone it is possible for man to come into relation with God. In Heidegger
and Sartre the scandal consists in this: why should human existence come
to an end at all? While Heidegger conceives coming to an end as the most
important ingredient inbuilt in the very structure of human existence,
as the source of all meaningfulness and authenticity, Sartre considers it
the most unexpected event occurring to human existence, eliminating
all its meaningfulness and transf<;>rming it into a useless passion. It should
be remarked that Sartre is not quite justified in rejecting the aspect of
possibility which Heidegger attaches to death despite his recognizing
the absolute certainty of death.
Even if death is a very peculiar possibility, in the sense that it is the
possibility of the impossibility of being a self any longer, that it is a
kind of possibility is undeniable. Every human being is aware of death
and to be aware of death is to be aware of it as one's own possibility
of ending. It should also be pointed out here that, in spite of death, human
reality is meaningful. But the meaningfulness of human existence cannot
be found exclusively in terms of its orientation towards death (i.e., Being-
towards-death) as Heidegger claims. Human reality is meaningful in
terms of its future, on account of its goals, on the basis of that for the
sake of which it lives. Human existence turns out to be absurd not because
of death but because it has no goals to achieve, no future to realize. 3
Had there been no death at all and had human existence been set up as
a reenactment of the role of Sisyphus, it would have been even more
absurd. In other words, what is needed is an intense and efficacious
life, not an unending life.
While comparing Sartre's interpretation of the scandal with that of

Kierkegaard and Heidegger, what stands out is this: Both Kierkegaard
and Heidegger accept the scandal wholeheartedly. It has a positive content
and it is meaningful. The human self has a willing and active partici-
pation in the scandal. But from Sartre's point of view the for-itself
endeavours to overcome it although it is fully aware that its attempts
to overcome it are futile.
From the point of view of both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, human
existence directed toward the scandal (the God-man or Being-towards-
death) is authentic. This is the meaning of the assertion that lived
time is the medium of conversion from the present state of existence
to another. Although the term conversion has a religious significance
for Kierkegaard, it does not have any such connotations in Heidegger and
Sartre. What conversion means is to turn round, to be transformed. It
designates a voluntary change from one mode of existence to another.
The assertion that time is the medium of conversion suggests that
temporal existence is that which enables one to transform oneself from
one state of existence to another. It needs to be remarked here that the
conversion from one state of existence to another is not smooth or auto-
matic, rather it is based upon personal crisis and catastrophe.
From Kierkegaard 's point of view, conversion consists in turning away
from the aesthetic to the ethical and finally from the ethical to the reli-
gious state of existence. For him conversion is the most genuine sense
occurs in the religious sphere of existence. The mundane aesthete's expe-
rience of despair transforms him into an ethical personality, and, finally
by encountering the God-man, he attains religious consciousness. As
for Heidegger, ordinary everyday existence is mediocre and as such
offers no ground for authenticity. Something momentous has to occur
to transform everyday mediocre existence into authentic or owned. This
element of the momentous is the scandal of Dasein's Being-towards-
death. This means that by conversion Das Man becomes Dasein.
Conversion, thus, consists in attaining an owned state of existence, a
state of existence in which the self (Dasein) is no longer scattered and
dissipated as Das Man but becomes an existence which is focussed on
listening to Being and through which Dasein gains a sense of fulfillment.
In other words, from Heidegger's point of view conversion is brought
about by a response to the summons of Being which Dasein under-
stands as the "call of conscience." Sartre, on the other hand, shuns a
discussion of both conversion and authenticity in his philosophy. And yet
324 V. C. THOMAS
the scandal, at which Heidegger and Kierkegaard arrive as the culmi-

nation of temporal existence, does have a place in Sartre's reflections.
From Sartre's point of view, death is the scandal par excellence. It is
the most meaningless event that can occur to the for-itself in so far as
it terminates human existence altogether. Human existence is a cease-
less endeavour to overcome this scandal. But it is not possible to conquer
it. That is why Sartre declares that human existence is a total failure, a
useless passion.
Despite Sartre 's refusal to explicitly discuss the possibility of con-
version and authenticity (or inauthenticity) in his philosophical works,
one may be able to discern something of the notion of conversion in
his literary writings. Consider Mathieu, for instance, Sartre's principal
character in his trilogy Roads to Freedom. In The Age of Reason Mathieu
leads an uncommitted life, a life for the sake of nobody and for no
cause. There is no aim, no purpose, no ambition in his life. But Mathieu
undergoes a total change in Iron in the Soul. Mathieu now is committed;
his aim, his ambition, is the liberation of his country. Can we not consider
such a change conversion? Another good example of conversion is had
in Orestes in The Flies. In the early stages of the play Orestes sees himself
from the other's point of view as a noble man. Then he sees himself
as Electra imagines how he should have been. In this sense Orestes
does not have an identity of his own, or rather he is what others have
made of him. His passion is to save himself for he feels alienated from
everything in Argos. But shortly afterwards a conversion takes place, a
sea change occurs in him. He finds his "path," a sense of "mineness"
descends upon him, he is ready to be the "guilt stealer" and is prepared
to heap upon himself the "remorses of the people."
Both in Kierkegaard and Heidegger conversion consists in attaining
a state of authenticity. It has a reference to something beyond oneself,
namely, responding to the God-man or to Being respectively. In Sartre
the counterpart of the God-man or Being is the experience of one's
freedom; it consists in discovering and encountering one's subjectivity.
In a certain sense what Sartre offers in terms of conversion also has a
reference to something beyond oneself, i.e., something which is yet to
be achieved fully. (Freedom is an actuality as well as a possibility for
the for-itself.) But all this is very different from what we find in
Kierkegaard and Heidegger even though both Kierkegaard and Heidegger
recognise human freedom, as Sartre does, as being primordial. But for
them it is a requirement for responding to the God-man or to Being.
But here a question can be asked. Although Sartre rejects the dichotomy
between authenticity and inauthenticity, 4 can it not be said that the state
of existence arrived at by the exercise of freedom, i.e., by way of con-
version, is none but that of authenticity? In fact, one is compelled to
say that although Sartre may not accept the term authenticity, what is
meant by this term is not alien to Sartre's writings.
It has been pointed out that lived time is the medium of conversion.
This consideration leads one to suggest that lived time is the ontolog-
ical foundation of the development of the self from inauthenticity to
the state of being owned. What does this mean? The awakening of the
dormant self, from Kierkegaard's point of view, is by means of decision.
Its growth to the ethical stage, and finally its attaining religious con-
sciousness, is by means of lived time. 5 It is lived time that enables the
individual to have an experience of the fulness of selfhood at the Christian
stage of existence by encountering the God-man in the "moment."
Similarly, from Heidegger's point of view the growth of the self (Dasein)
from the everydayness in which it is submerged to the owned state of
existence experienced in Being-towards-death comes about thanks to
the experience of lived time. Although Sartre's notion of the for-itself
is temporal, apparently, he does not discuss the development of the for-
itself towards its horizons in Being and Nothingness. But we surely do
notice the development of Mathieu (Roads to Freedom) and Orestes (The
Flies), for both of them experience a meaningful growth. From being a
wayward man who felt that he is free for nothing, that his freedom is a
curse upon him, Mathieu becomes passionately committed to revolu-
tionary action and to the cause of liberation. Similarly, Orestes declares
in the early part of the drama that he is "as free as air," "freedom being
gloriously aloof," but he grows into the state of being a "guilt-stealer"
- a man of commitment and action. Even if Sartre denies the possi-
bility of authenticity here one cannot overlook the metamorphosis (as
well as growth) of these characters. It was Kierkegaard who said: "the
more consciousness, the more self."6 In the present context Sartre might
say: the more commitment, the more action, the more self.
While elucidating the notion of lived time, it has been noticed that
the sheer succession of the temporal phases is alien to lived time. Rather,
lived time stresses the unity of temporal phases. Although the existen-
tialists totally reject the atomic succession of temporal moments, it must
be conceded that the phenomenon of the successiveness of temporal
phases cannot be ignored. The source of the successiveness of temporal
326 V. C. THOMAS
phases is the very passage of time. Time as experienced by human beings

is not a static quantity but a dynamic process. It is because of the inbuilt
dynamism of temporal phases that there is a passage of time and we expe-
rience the successiveness of the temporal phases. The successiveness
of the temporal phases can be illustrated a Ia G. E. Moore by recalling
that we have lunch after breakfast, and many hours before dinner. In other
words, our breakfast, lunch and dinner depend on the passage of time
and it is this passage of time that enables us to experience the succes-
siveness of temporal phases. When we say time passes we are witnessing
to something that is generally passed through by us, that is to say, an
experience lived through.
In the course of this elucidation lived time has been contrasted with
measurable time, which amounts to unending succession. On the basis
of the distinction made between lived time and measurable time, it
could be said that lived time is the experience of the privileged moment.
Moments here are not continuously fleeting instances but rather refer
directly to one's experiences. Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, each
in their own way, introduce the notion of the privileged moment in their
respective study of temporality. In a sense the privileged moment is an
ecstasy or rapture. It is the peak in the experience of lived time. To under-
stand the nuances of the privileged moment, it could profitably be
compared with ordinary everyday life. In the words of Antoine Roquentin
(Nausea) everyday life is "barren," "inefficacious" and "de trop."
Moreover, it is "superfluous" and "redundant." Roquentin cannot dis-
tinguish between one day and another. Instead, what he sees is a jumble
of days. In everyday life things encountered are devoid of significance
for they are contingent and gratuitous. It could even be said that
Roquentin gets an insight into his ordinary everyday life only on the basis
of his experience of the privileged moment. This suggests that things
experienced in everyday life can be said to be barren, superfluous or con-
tingent only in comparison to their being experienced in the privileged
moment. When ordinary everyday existence is illumined by the privi-
leged moment, Roquentin points out, "life seems to be full of adventures,"
"one reaches a summit of happiness" and "one feels like the victorious
hero of the novel." Things experienced in the privileged moment assume
a kind of meaning which they did not hitherto have. In other words,
everyday meanings get transformed by the experience of the privileged
moment. As a result of this change, meaning can no longer be expressed
in conceptual vocabulary and through rational structures. Thanks to the
disappearance of the conceptual framework in the privileged moment,

the subject-object dichotomy vanishes and, instead, things are grasped
by way of active human participation. They are recognised intuitively.
In the privileged moment things get interiorized and they manifest
qualities of inwardness. In the privileged moment the human self enjoys
a high degree of awareness and an intensification of consciousness.
Because human reality does not always enjoy privileged moments, time
experienced in the latter must be distinguished from the experience of
measured time where there is no integration of the various temporal
phases. In the temporality of the privileged moment there is an inte-
gration of the past, present and future, and this is brought about by the
creativity of human self.
From Kierkegaard's point of view, the privileged moment has a reli-
gious dimension, something which is conspicuously absent in both
Heidegger and Sartre. The privileged moment, Kierkegaard points out,
appears in its fulness in the "moment." For Heidegger, while Dasein
enjoys the privileged moment, Das Man does not experience it. Dasein's
experience of the privileged moment reaches its culmination in its Being-
towards-death, i.e., in encountering the momentous. Because Heidegger
elucidates the privileged moment in relation to Dasein's Being-towards-
death, he seems to envisage a close relationship between privileged
moments and Dasein's finitude. From Sartre's point of view the for-itself
experiences the privileged moment when engaged in creative activities.
For Sartre, after all, in many ways the artist is a paradigm figure for
creativity. It is by means of creative activities that the for-itself creates
meanings. Sartre's notion of the creation of meanings directly relates him
to Nietzsche's teaching about the creation of values. For Sartre it is
because death puts a stop to the experience of the privileged moment that
it is absurd.
What privileged moments point up is the possibility of enjoying the
trans-temporal character of temporal experiences. This refers to the
possibility of experiencing the a-temporal dimension of temporality.
But what does this mean? It seems correct to say that the trans-temporal
character of temporality consists in the experience of the momentous.
This is the "moment" in Kierkegaard, and it is Dasein's Being-towards-
death according to Heidegger. In one case it is a moment and in the
other a whole life-orientation. On the basis of the role assigned to the
"moment" and Being-towards-death by Kierkegaard and Heidegger
respectively, it would not be incorrect to suggest that they are the keys
328 V. C. THOMAS
to the understanding of temporal experiences. It is on the basis of these

key experiences that one assesses temporal experiences. They enable
an experiencing of the gravity of time, the ontological weight of time.
On the basis of the trans-temporal character of temporal experiences, it
could be said that rooted in time as man is, he gets an opportunity to
step outside the temporal domain or glance at the domain which appears
as the very ground of the meaningfulness of temporal experience.
Kierkegaard conceives such a domain in terms of religious categories
(the "moment" is the religious category par excellence) and for Heidegger
it is his secular orientation which forms the backdrop of his position
regarding trans-temporality, the accessibility of Being here and now.
One thing that stands out in the existentialist treatment of time is
the excessive ego-orientation of lived time. No doubt, Kierkegaard,
Heidegger and Sartre recognise the problem of intersubjectivity although
it receives only a very inadequate treatment in their works. While
Kierkegaard considers the other under the category of the "crowd,"
Heidegger characterizes the other as Das Man. Sartre looks upon the other
from the point of view of reciprocally alienating relationships. The fun-
damental reason why the elucidation of intersubjectivity is inadequately
treated by many existentialists (Marcel and Buber being notable excep-
tions) is due to their strong emphasis on the freedom of the human self.
A positive treatment of interpersonal relations demands that the indi-
vidual must curtail his freedom considerably in order to accommodate
the freedom of the other. But an inordinate delimitation of one's freedom
with the sole purpose of accommodating the other is not envisaged in
a work like Being and Nothingness. If the individual is structurally
incapable of curtailing his freedom then it becomes impossible for
him to integrate himself with others in order to create an atmosphere
wherein a genuine positive interpersonal relationship can originate and
flourish.
In Kierkegaard, however, the "individual" can have an intimate relation
with the God-man (i.e., a vertical relation) while avoiding the other
(i.e., a horizontal relation) in so far as possible. The horizontal relation
takes the form of one with the "crowd." Though Being-with is existen-
tial in Heidegger's philosophy, the other is considered as "Das Man" who
appears as an occasion for Dasein's falling into inauthenticity. In so
far as Heidegger concerns himself with the authenticity of Dasein, he
virtually urges Dasein to avoid Das Man. In Sartre, and we are discussing
only the Sartre of Being and Nothingness, we find open hostility to the
other and this is what becomes crystallized in his assertion: hell is other
people. The absolute freedom of the for-itself is a "wall" which cannot
be overcome to reach the other. But in his Critique of Dialectical Reason
Sartre did make an attempt to reconcile the for-itself with the other.
But thanks to the boundless freedom of the for-itself, such an attempt
could scarcely succeed.
But it must be noted that in Marcel there is a genuine concern for
the other. To establish a domain where there is an interpersonal rela-
tionship, Marcel finds an interpenetrable sphere founded on proemial
cordiality, sympathy and conjugal love which are allied forms of creative
fidelity. That which is assumed in Marcel's treatment of intersubjec-
tivity is the absolute thou (namely, God) which (who) is conspicuously
absent both in Heidegger and in Sartre. Moreover, it needs to be men-
tioned that such a genuine and sincere concern is confined only to the
family circle and intimate dyadic relationships.
On account of the prominence of the self in existentialism, lived
time is necessarily egocentric, and because the existentialists recognize
the problem of intersubjectivity, one could ask whether anything like a
common or shared lived time is possible within the confines of exis-
tentialism. Sartre's short story The Wall makes a sincere attempt to
come to grips with this problem. In this story everyone in a prison is
awaiting death. Each does have an experience of lived time in his own
manner. Each one is concerned with his own end. Each one appears to
be an island in a group of islands. They have, in fact, no desire to com-
municate with fellow prisoners meaningfully. Occasionally, we even find
among them hostility and reciprocally alienating relationships. Although
they all share the same fate (being condemned to death), there is no
mutual and person-to-person sharing of each one's concerns, feelings and
attitudes toward the common fate. Instead, each individual separately
undergoes the common fate. There is no unity of persons sharing the end.
All in the cell remain as individuals, and as individuals they partici-
pate in the common end. All these revolutionaries worked together for
a common cause and are now together in the prison awaiting the same
end. This reveals the possibility at least of a common shared lived time.
At any rate this is the nearest Sartre comes to it.
What is to be understood from the story appears to be this: It is
possible to speak of the sharing of lived time on two levels. Though it
is not possible to speak meaningfully of mutual and person-to-person
sharing, it is possible, from the Sartrean existentialist viewpoint, to speak
330 V. C. THOMAS
of common lived time in so far as a number of individuals as individ-

uals (not as integrated group) share a common end. In other words,
what is shared is the end common to each individual. But how this end
is shared is peculiar to each individual. There is no person-to-person rela-
tionship among the individuals sharing the end; but there is a relationship
between the end and the individuals sharing the end. It could be remarked
in criticism that, in order to have a genuine common shared lived time,
there would have to be sharing not only among the individuals and the
end but also between the individuals themselves.
As has been noted, the absolute freedom of the individual has been
a stumbling block in the way of a meaningful consideration of inter-
subjectivity. It could also be pointed out that the same absolute freedom
of the individual compels both Heidegger and Sartre to reject destiny 7
in any sense. Once this is done, temporality no longer appears as a vehicle
of liberation as in Kierkegaard but as a kind of trap. This can be illus-
trated by comparing Heidegger and Sartre with Kierkegaard.
Like Heidegger and Sartre, Kierkegaard affirms the freedom of human
reality. In spite of its freedom, holds Kierkegaard, the self depends
ontologically on God. God directs and guides creatures, i.e., creatures are
within the network of divine providence which guides human destiny.
From Kierkegaard's point of view human freedom and divine guidance
(through providence) are never incompatible, rather, human reality is free,
he would assert, only because it is guided by divine providence. Because
of divine guidance, human reality is never a slave of time and tempo-
rality never appears as a trap, but is rather the vehicle of salvation.
But this is not the case in Heidegger and Sartre. Heidegger's uncom-
promising secularism and Sartre's militant atheism reject divine
intervention and providence. Their emphasis on transcendence does not
lead them beyond the mundane realm. Because the human self finds itself
always confined to temporality, it appears always to be trapped in time
without there being any way of overcoming it. In fact, from the point
of view of both Heidegger and Sartre this is precisely what the total
finitude of man amounts to. Finitude is a phenomenon which no one
can subjugate.
To conclude, lived time is time lived through by man, it is the kind
of time in which the present gnaws both the past and the future and which,
in turn, implies the unity of past, present and future. It is the kind of
time which, while admitting successiveness to its fold, rejects totally
notions of a succession of temporal moments. It is the sort of time owned
by man. Lived time is man in terms of his creative existing, and his
creativity shines forth most brilliantly in constituting the world. In fact,
it is the same creativity of the human self which reveals itself in estab-
lishing the unity of the three modes of temporality. This creative self
is finite to such an extent that finitude is the very core of human reality.
Yet, it implies, from the phenomenological and existentialist viewpoint,
the primordiality of the future (end) and the appropriation of the future
that makes human reality authentic or owned: creativity is crucial to
human existence for it can make human existence meaningful or mean-
ingless. The end which, in fact, is death is a scandal from the viewpoint
of both Heidegger and Sartre. While Sartre elucidates the meaningless-
ness of human existence on account of the scandal, both Heidegger and
Kierkegaard take pains to show how the scandal is meaning-giving. In
terms of the appropriation of the meaning-giving scandal, both Heidegger
and Kierkegaard speak of conversion (from inauthentic existence to
authenticity). The owned state of existence is the experience of the
privileged moment which, in turn, demonstrates the possibility of expe-
riencing the trans-temporal or the a-temporal character of temporal
experiences. Owing to the prominent role they assign to the ego and
its total freedom, the existentialists have been able to treat only very
inadequately both intersubjectivity and shared lived time. Because the
total freedom of the self precludes divine providence and guidance from
the viewpoint of both Heidegger and Sartre, the self appears to them
to be trapped in time and a slave to temporality. In contrast the possi-
bility of the intervention and guidance of the divine, from the point of
view of Kierkegaard, makes temporality a vehicle of salvation.
Sri Aurobindo School of Eastern & Western Thought

Pondicherry University
India
NOTES
1 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 6-7.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 41, p. 237.
3 Vide my paper "Death and the Meaning of Human Existence," Indian Philosophical
Quarterly XVI(2) (April 1989).

4 To understand the significance of this claim one needs to read together two texts of
Sartre in Being and Nothingness. The first is footnote no. 9, p. 116 and the second is
on p. 275.
332 V. C. THOMAS
5 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 6-7.

6 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 126.
7 It is, indeed, true that Heidegger in Being and Time (Section 74) uses the expression
destiny in the sense of co-historicalization. But here in this essay it is used to mean a
destiny guided by the divine. Hence, it is used in the Kierkegaardian sense with an over-
whelming theistic undertone.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962).
Kierkegaard, Soren, Sickness Unto Death (with Fear and Trembling) (New York:
Doubleday, 1954).
Kierkegaard, Soren, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1974).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, "Flies," in No Exit and Three Other Plays. Trans. Stuart Gilbert (New
York: Vintage Books, 1949).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington
Square Press Edition, Pocket Books, 1972).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Nausea. Trans. Robert Ba1dick (Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, "The Wall," in Intimacy. Trans. Lloyd Alexander (St. Albans, England:
Panther, 1977).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, The Age of Reason. Trans. Eric Sutton (Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books,
1981).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Iron and the Soul. Trans. Gemard Hopkins (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1981 ).
N. A. KORMINE
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTISTIC TIME AND

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL
The phenomenology of Husserl is methodologically significant for sub-

stantiating artistic time, the ontology of time, for exposing inner time
- consciousness as the fundamental structures of the aesthetic subject.
It permits us to construct the ontology of the aesthetic as a regional
ontology, as a region of "entire concrete ontology", whose coordinates
are determined on the basis of the teleology of constituting the aes-
thetic kind of being, on the basis of analysis of the correlativeness of
the essence of an aesthetic object, including the work of art with its
entirety and originality, to the meaning structures with the help of which
the aesthetical-objective is given in consciousness, on the basis of analysis
of intentional acts coming from the transcendental Ego. As M. Foucault
stressed:
... phenomenology has effected a union between the Cartesian theme of the cogito and
the transcendental motif that Kant has derived from Hume~s critique; ... Husser! has
revived the deepest vocation of the Western ratio, bending it back upon itself in a reflec-
tion which is a radicalization of pure philosophy and a basis for the possibility of its
own history. In fact, Husser! was able to effect this union only in so far as transcen-
dental analysis had changed its point of application (the latter has shifted from the
possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for man to conceive of himself)
and in so far as the cogito had modified its function (which is no longer to lead to an
apodictic existence, starting from a thought that affirms itself wherever it thinks, but to
show how thought can elude itself and thus lead to a many-sided and proliferating inter-
rogation concerning being). 1
It is the structures of interrogation thus understood that create the

possibility of the ontological substantiation of the aesthetic. The aim
of creating aesthetics as this kind of ontology is evident not only in
Western European but in Russian thought as well. But we must bear in
mind that a certain dramatic misunderstanding concerning Kantian-
Husserlian transcendentalism makes itself felt. So Pavel Florensky, while
substantiating the idea that icon painting is a graphic ontology, constructs
his argumentation revealing the discrepancy between the perspectives'
correlations in icon painting and the rules of lineal perspective. The latter
is considered to be an artistic equivalent to the Weltanschauungen of
333
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LIJ, 333-338.

334 N. A. KORMINE
Leonardo-Descartes-Kant. Emphasizing the fact that the understanding

of perspectivity in the fine arts is correlated with a life orientation,
Florensky considers that the premises of this understanding are world
perception according to Kant, the substitution in his Weltanschauung
of the ontological cleverness of things with their phenomenological sen-
suality, and the claim that ontologically self-conscious man legislated the
Universe. But, say, the Kantian theme of legislating reason, what is
ascribed to nature, is the theme of modality of experience, and this
modality is a world law, a law of the world as the individual, permit-
ting this experience. This subtle facet of the philosophy of Kant, which
was subjected to criticism by Florensky, who constructed his aesthetic
ontology upon it, still remained unnoticed by the Russian philosopher.
In his works Reverse Perspective and Iconostasis he tried to reveal the
possibilities of thinking for comprehension of icon ontology as the
ontology of light, stating that "icon is painted in light and thus ... the
entire ontology of icon painting is expressed". 2 But in these ontolog-
ical judgments he comes very close to the results which were the kernel
of the system that he criticized - that of Kant's transcendentalism. In
Iconostasis he writes that an icon keeps in equilibrium two principles
- those of the face and the world, "assigning the first place to the tzar
and the bridegroom of nature - to the face - and the second place to
nature as kingdom and bride". 3 True, for Kant what would have been
of interest is not the ontology of light but rather the ontology of real-
izing light or the ontology of what Husserl terms "light creation" in
his intentional or transcendental phenomenology. Here is an ontology
which is similar to what Florensky called "spiritual, unspoken light".
Further, the Russian philosopher in his lectures for VHUTEMAS
(The Higher Artistic and Technical Workshops) developed ideas which
were in their spirit similar to some structures of Husserl's philosophy,
e.g., to the examined conception of inner time-consciousness. I mean
Florensky's judgements about inner time, about the artistic forming of
time, about how the inner motion of a personality is conveyed in a
portrait, about the idea of a rhythm as a personality constructed in time.
The Russian philosopher seeks to understand how "time is being built
through the activity of consciousness". The order to a pictorial work,
Florensky says, "makes the appearance of elements before the spec-
tator in a definite time order aesthetically compulsory. The work of art
unfolds itself before the spectator in definite succession aesthetically,
forcibly, i.e., according to definite lines which form a certain scheme
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTISTIC TIME 335
of a pictorial work and, when contemplating, gives it a certain rhythm". 4

Rhythm as pulsation, as time thickening, its leaps, thickenings and stops
in rhythm formation, the timelessness of the unobservable elements
of a leap and of the observable elements of rest which give rhythm
being are combined and thus form time, and drew his attention. The
same structures which are so fundamentally analysed by Husserl in his
phenomenology of time-consciousness are of interest for Florensky.
The ontological substantiation of the aesthetic presupposes searching
for the sources of the aestheticity of the world in constitutional activity
(which is realized first of all through grasping the "sensible scheme"
of an aesthetic thing, comprehending an "emotional apriori"- the "pure"
act of intentional feeling and experience, by means of which occurs the
revelation of the aesthetic in its essential-semantic fulfillment) of a
spiritual subject, finding the horizon of the meaning of an aesthetic object,
the horizon perceptible by consciousness. Every step of this substantia-
tion presents the aesthetic as a result of the constituting self-activity of
consciousness, of the ontological power of spirit. From this point of view,
an ontology of the aesthetic which is not rooted in investigation into
the composition of consciousness is unthinkable; an ontology of art
which does not retain the idea of its eternity and uncreatedness is unthink-
able as well. So the question arises about the ontological layer of the
aesthetic, of the artistic consciousness which is not dependent on anthro-
pological modalities, on human feelings, impressions, fantasies, tastes
and goals.
The above substantiation is complex not only because aesthetics cannot
yet operate with an ontological loaded, elusive and implying meaning
which so redundantly manifests itself in all the registers and orders of
the aesthetically experienced world, in the artistic forming of the world.
This aesthetics does not yet possess sufficient theoretical instruments
for constituting the form of the artistic worlds within the framework of
all the possible forms of being which the subjectivity implies and which
fold and unfold themselves, which flash and die out maintaining its
flow, i.e., it does not possess what is necessary for penetrating into the
aesthetic Logos of all the possible worlds in general. As Husserl wrote:
"The world can exist only in so far as it is evolving constituently, in
so far as the absolute subjectivity is evolving, in so far as it develops
the world to the degree that the world is developing towards the human
form of self-consciousness"5 and then towards artistic self-consciousness.
Paraphrasing Husserl, we can say that there is no true being without
336 N. A. KORMINE
the development of the truth of art. If we are aiming at - somewhere

on the far horizon - creating an aesthetics that is a universal ontology
of this kind, there appears the great problem, as Husser! showed con-
vincingly, of time-consciousness, or as Merleau-Ponty put it, the problem
of the existence of the universal temporal style of the world, the presence
of a certain look in the very heart of time.
In the phenomenology of time there is the inner nerve of the most
important problems of aesthetic ontology; operating with the meaning
of time the mode of rapprochement and scattering of the aesthetic worlds,
of the worlds of art can be comprehended. Elucidating and comple-
menting Husser! 's analysis of temporality, Merleau-Ponty puts the
question of the method of describing consciousness from the viewpoint
of how deep it is rooted in being and time. He perceived conscious-
ness as some global project of time and of the world. Consciousness
thus understood to be manifest needs to unfold itself to multiplicity.
Illustrating these statements through the plot lines of Proust's epic, the
history of Swann's love for Odette, Merleau-Ponty concludes:
The set of psychic facts and causal relationships is merely an outward manifestation of
a certain view that Swann takes of Odette, a certain way of belonging to another. Swann's
jealous love ought, moreover, to be related to the rest of his behaviour, in which case it
might well appear as itself a manifestation of an even more general existential struc-
ture, which would be Swann's whole personality. Conversely all consciousness as a
comprehensive project is outlined or made manifest to itself in those acts, experiences
and "psychic facts" in which it is recognized. 6
Here is where temporality throws light on subjectivity.

If we consider the essence of the aesthetic as something which is
an integral part of human existence, for the discussion of this problem
to be methodologically competent the Husserlian approach is very
important because it permits the bringing together of such structures
fundamental for aesthetic meaning-formation as time and subjectivity,
temporality and creative work. Each of these phenomena possesses the
binding power of uniting the present, the past and the future. Saint
Augustine framed this determining vector which was unrealized in the
history of the aesthetic thought; according to the logic of his discourse
it is impossible to understand the meaning of the aesthetic without com-
prehending that the temporal image of the world becomes dim as soon
as we exclude the structures of subjectivity from it: the past has already
disappeared, the future has not yet come, so the world as such is in the
gap between the "already not" and the "not yet", in the gap of the present,
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTISTIC TIME 337
which is irrespective of all these "already nots" and "not yets", that is,
in Husserl's terms, being irrespective of the intentions of the past and
of the future, the world is devoid of any temporal quality.
When ascertaining the relationship between time and subjectivity it
should be taken into consideration that the latter, from the viewpoint
of Merleau-Ponty, is the most adequate to the essence of living time.
What Kant termed the soul (the main faculty of which is the tran-
scendental power of imagination), i.e., the "affecting of self by self",
Heidegger used to express the essence of time. The German existentialist
reckoned that time and transcendental apperception coincide. Such mutual
reflection, the openness of subjectivity and temporality to each other,
their correlation facilitates understanding of the transcendental char-
acter of the aesthetic. Subjectivity, as Merleau-Ponty noted, does not
come to the act of identification, it is in its nature, as well as in the nature
of time to be able to transcend. The subjectivity unfolds itself in the struc-
tures of temporality.
The transcendental ideality of time directly relates to the question
of shaping the world, the question of how the world has become aes-
thetically shaped, of what structures in the aesthetic order it was given
and how they correlate with the state of chaos. Temporality is such a
universal act which hinders the re-production of the settled order and
so needs a faculty of changing and evolving. It is the archetype of rela-
tionships linking time, order and chaos that varies in different cultures.
In the oriental cultures the moment of unity of time and order prevails.
We can cite the words of a hero of Herbert Rosendorfer 's novel Letters
to Ancient China, who wrote in a letter that the civilization of the "big
noses" ("Grossnasen") has lost the genuine sense of order. "True order",
he writes,
is awareness of one's place in the harmony of reality. The big noses might object that
reality is far from being harmonious. Yes, they considered this conclusion to be indis-
putable. But it must be clear for a noble man that reality is always harmonious; one
needs only to take the trouble of listening to this harmony, of understanding it, and that
is possible only when man doesn't try always to go constantly forward, away from himself.
This is what the big noses do not want to understand. They cannot jump over their shadow.
They have lost the very sense of order/
In Western culture the field of relationships of temporality to these

structures looks quite different. Kant stressed that the ontology of time
set the theoretical vector of movement towards chaos and the erosion
of form. But it must be said that this contraposition of the Eastern and
338 N. A. KORMINE
the Western schemes of time vision has its limits. Thus, if we remember
some verses which written by the captured princesses from the Chen
dynasty, analogy with the Kantian thesis inevitably comes to mind:
Glamour and glory will die in time

Tower and pond will become equally even
and smooth.
The transcendental ideality of time permits us to understand what

happened at the point when the world drama began to unfold itself in
sight of a new principle- the anthropic principle, i.e., when creative work
became the world event, the act in which the world became irreversibly
individualized.
Institute of Philosophy
Russian Academy of Sciences
NOTES
1 M. Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London:

1970), p. 325.
2 P. A. Florensky, Philosophy of Russian Religious Art (Moscow: 1993}, Vol. I, p. 272
(in Russian).
3 Ibidem.
4 P. A. Florensky, Analysis of Spatiality and Time in Pictorial Works (Moscow: 1993),
p. 230 (in Russian).
5 E. Husser!, Husserliana. Bd. 14, p. 136.
6 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: 1962), p. 425.
7 H. Rosendorfer, Briefe in die chinesische Vergangenheit (Munich: 1986), p. 277.
PART FIVE
LIFE TIMING ITSELF CREATIVELY

THROUGHOUT AND BEYOND
The national holiday of Mexican lndependence.
JORGE GARCIA-GOMEZ
A BRIDGE TO TEMPORALITY
Phenomenological Reflections on the Presence of Things Past
and Future According to St. Augustine's Confessions
The basis of St. Augustine's examination of temporality was a certain

matter of fact, namely, his perception and measurement of time.' A
question nonetheless immediately suggests itself, for one may wonder
about the nature of the setting in which such events do come to pass. I
would say that, for Augustine, perceiving and measuring are not processes
that, ultimately speaking, take place in the world but in the soul or
mind, for, however they happen to originate in relation to worldly affairs,
they are primarily forms of awareness. Yet they are not occurrences
that just transpire in the soul or mind; rather, they essentially are of it,
or belong to it. 2
To be sure, these acknowledgments are necessary to produce an
account of time, but they are hardly sufficient to arrive at it, inasmuch
as their articulation and justification are still to be worked out. This is
the reason why Paul Ricoeur was able to point out that the formula giving
expression to Augustine's position, namely, that " ... [w]hen ... time
is passing [praeteruntia], it can be perceived and measured .. .'' 3 is "at
once an anticipation of the solution and a temporary impasse ... ,'"' since,
as Augustine himself added immediately, " ... when [time] ... has
passed, it cannot [be measured], since it is not." 5 This is the reason
why Augustine eventually raised the following question:" ... how is that
future diminished or consumed which as yet is not? Or how doth the past,
which is no longer, increase ... ?"6 His own reply went directly to the
heart of the matter, for, in keeping with his experiential approach, he
spoke of such facts as the result of self-enactment, which is effected in
such a way that" ... there are three things done [in the soul] ... ,"7 a
point he proceeded to specify by saying that it
... both expects, and considers [or pays attention to], and remembers, that that which
it expecteth, through that which it considereth, may pass into that which it remembereth. 8
According to Augustine, then, one's perception and measurement of time

are rendered possible by the unity of one's experience. However, what
is being unified therein is not self-abolishing and punctual, but rather
341

342 JORGE GARciA-GOMEZ
continuous and concrete, manifesting itself as it does, at every turn, by

means of the "density" of a synthesis of three dimensions, to wit: the
future, given actually through expectation; the present, given actually
in attention or consideration; and the past, given actually by way of
memory. 9 Nonetheless, in his effort to be faithful to experience, Augustine
did not speak of the three dimensions in question as if they were actually
in succession but at once. If the term "instantaneous" is assigned at
this point the meaning of "fleeting" or "momentary," as distinct from
the note of "passing and unextended" which is also part of the clas-
sical sense of the word "present," then one could use it to say that
Augustine's innovation consists in describing such an "instantaneous"
cognitive awareness as the synthesis of expectation, consideration, and
remembrance. In keeping with this notion, I would assert that what I
am presently considering is - to some extent or other - the fulfillment
of what I was expecting a moment ago and will be remembering a
moment later, and that my immediate memory is of that which I had
just considered as having been previously expected. But as Augustine
himself saw, such a manner of experience and its organization are not
imposed on the mind from without, for it is the soul which expounds
itself in that fashion. 10
MEMORY AND THE PAST
The problem to be resolved in an account of time is this: whether that

which, at face value, is a non-being can nevertheless be endowed with
being. In the present, one is certainly aware of that which is past or future,
but it seems that one possesses such forms of consciousness when that
which is past or future is no longer so. In other words, I am conscious
of things past and future but only in the present, and that seems to
imply not only a relationship between them and the present, but also
that their existence proper lies elsewhere, namely, in what Augustine
called "secret places." But this is, no doubt, a paradox, which he for-
mulated as follows:
... when from future it becometh present, cometh it forth from some secret place [occulto],
and when from the present it becometh past, doth it retire into anything secret [occulrum]? 11
The ruling principle here is, in Augustine's words, that "that which is not
cannot be seen ... [or in any] wise discerned." 12 The past (as that
which literally is no longer) and the future (as that which literally is
A BRIDGE TO TEMPORALITY 343
not yet) are particular cases of "that which is not." And yet it is possible
for them to have a measure of being, if only they are given in the
present of the mind. 13 Any actual stretch of the Lebenstrom is indeed
laden and thick with past and future virtualities, which are precisely
the given present's. What remains unclear, however, is the status such
things would possess (in) animo, for they could exist therein either as
real parts (i.e., as performances or their determinants) or as the objec-
tual correlates thereof. I would argue that they exist in both respects, that
is to say, that they at once exist noetically, as the past and future dimen-
sions of present consciousness and, noematically, as things past qua
remembered and things future qua anticipated.
To put it in Augustine's terms: the secret places of which he spoke
exist only in animo. In other words, the mind is not only constituted
by that which is endowed with being, but also, at least, by two forms
of non-being. Yet, as Augustine will point out later,
... although past things are related as true, they are drawn out from the memory,- not
the things themselves, which have passed, but the words conceived from the images which
they have formed in the mind as footprints [vestigia] in their passage through the senses.l 4
As one can readily see, Augustine was here entertaining a hypothesis,

namely, that words are activated by (and serve as intermediaries for)
the images of things, which in turn are, as it were, the "footprints" left
behind in the mind by the "passage" of things through the senses. This
opinion is not only highly questionable, but is also unnecessary to the
conduct of Augustine's analysis. Even more damaging: it is incompat-
ible with an assertion he was about to make, to wit: " ... when I call
to mind ... [the] image [of my childhood], and speak of it, I behold it
in the present [in praesenti tempore intueor], because it is as yet in my
memory." 15 For it is in the now that I intuit the past, i.e., that I grasp it
without mediation, face to face, as if it were really occurring, though
all the while knowing - as though what is thus appearing were suitably
indexed - that it is just an actual presentation of the past in the present.
And this means that my memory, whether immediate (as in this case)
or remote (as in the case of recollection), is a modification of my con-
temporary attention. Now then, one is not required, in order to take this
view as true, to accept or even contemplate the risky hypothesis advanced
by Augustine, if by "image" he meant to present a copy or reproduc-
tion of things past. 16 On the contrary, descriptively and essentially
speaking, it would be sufficient to speak of the actual presentation, in
344 JORGE GARCIA-GOMEZ
the now, of a thing past qua past. Of this there is no doubt, for things
past are not endowed with any actual being of their own. 17 Moreover, one
could correctly speak, as well, of grasping future things or events in
the present, for they also arise from causes or signs which" ... perhaps
are seen, those which already are .... " 18 There is, however, a differ-
ence between the case of things future and that of things past, for, when
one remembers them, it is their "images" we have, and these are the
effects of those things that were once, while the anticipations are caused
or signified by things or events not yet in being, at least so far as the
performance of those roles is concerned. 19 Yet things past and future,
whatever their origin, are comparable to one another in that they are
presently given in the mind. 20 This, I believe, is the sense of saying
with Augustine that " ... [f]uture things, therefore, are not as yet, and
if they are not as yet, they are not. And if they are not, they cannot be
seen at all; but they can be foretold from things present, which now
are, and are seen ... :m namely, in the "images" which are our pre-
meditations of them, or even, as it happens often enough, just in our
bare anticipations of them. But one can say as much, mutatis mutandis,
of things past. In other words, one has things future or past in the now,
and does so insofar as they are future or past, "aufgrund von
Erfahrung. " 22
Apparently there is no contradiction in saying, with Augustine, that
things future are not (yet), while the expectation thereof already is (in
the mind). Nor is there any either, or so it seems, in saying too, again
with Augustine, that things past are not (any longer), while the memory
thereof still is (once more, in the mind). 23 But, having made such
assertions, he proposed the following view which, at face value, is self-
contradictory:
... time present wants [or lacks] space, because it passeth away in a moment .... But
yet our consideration [or attention] endureth, through which that which may be present
may proceed to become absent. 24
Yet the contradiction is only apparent, resulting as it does from employing

the word "present" ambiguously, for Augustine used it in the sense of
a property (i.e., the instantaneousness of something which "passeth away
in a moment"), as well as in that of a state (i.e., the condition of being
a stretch, for therein "our consideration endureth"). Nonetheless, if one
carefully distinguishes between these two acceptations of the word, the
contradiction disappears at once. One could therefore say that, no matter
how fleeting the present may be, it nonetheless has some duration,
namely, that through which "our consideration endureth." Now then,
this is hardly sufficient for the purposes of developing a general account
of time, which is what Augustine was aiming to do, among other things.
Looking at what he said more closely, one finds him affirming of the
present that "it passeth away in a moment" or, more forcefully and
tellingly, in the original Latin: "in puncto praeterit."25 A point is some-
thing unextended, but nothing unextended is perceivable, be it spatial
or temporal. It is, in fact, non-existent as a being, since a self-abol-
ishing entity is impossible, for it would and would not be at once and
in the same respect (namely, in that of its reality). By contrast, consider
the concept "zero": it is certainly not impossible, for it is not meant to
signify any entity whatever (whether actual or possible); rather, it is
just the equivalent of "absence of magnitude," or expressive of the feature
"devoid of quantity." Likewise, the notion of now qua point does not
stand here for any entity, being as it is the equivalent of "absence of
temporal permanence," or expressive of the feature "instantaneousness."
Hence, neither can one say that on these grounds did Augustine really
contradict himself, but it cannot be denied that, had this been all that
Augustine had to say, his position would have remained correct but
unproductive. However, he overcame this shortcoming by adding the
qualification "yet our consideration endureth," his justification there-
fore having been that the now is the medium "through which that which
may be present [i.e., the thing intended in anticipation] may proceed to
become absent [i.e., the thing intended in remembrance]." 26 But it was
precisely the introduction of this limitation which permitted Augustine
to progress from an inadequate to an apt formulation of the essential
description of the present. The present is not point-like for it endures,
and it endures by means of consideration, of which anticipation and
remembrance are the outer fringes and modifications. As such, therefore,
the latter are grounded in the actuality of the former. The "expectation
of things future" is real in my mind, that is to say, it is a real or present
part of my mind, and so is the "memory of things past." Moreover, if
the things anticipated are to become things considered on their way to
being absent, then the medium of passage, i.e., the present sub-stretch
or present strictissimo sensu, must itself be endowed with duration, as
Augustine himself recognized. The various dimensions of the present -
the anticipation, the enduring consideration, and the remembrance - are
possible and real insofar as they are unified by the same principle,
namely, their intentional reference to one and the same object, for the
thing anticipated, the thing considered, and the thing remembered are one
and the same thing, whether possible or actual, internal or external, real
or irreal, just as the subject engaged in grasping them is likewise essen-
tially one and the same, though, no doubt, on other grounds and in various
respects. Accordingly, one must say that temporality (as the passing from
the future through the present into the past) is mediated by the compo-
nent acts of anticipation, consideration, and remembrance - all events
in me or in the soul or mind - which intend things future, present, and
past, respectively. Hence, as Augustine proceeded to indicate, " ...
[f]uture time, which is not, is not therefore long; but a 'long future' is
'a long expectation of the future.' Nor is time past, which is now no
longer, long; but a long past is 'a long memory of the past. ..m
In his interpretation of this passage, James J. O'Donnell remarks that
" ... [w]hat is missing is obvious: a 'long present.' There is no such
thing." 28 He is certainly right if he means any one of two things, namely,
either a "long interval" (which the present sub-stretch is not and cannot
grow into) or the "atomic now," which is its opposite but which Augustine
did not have in mind. 29 Moreover, if for the purposes of making sense
of the text, O'Donnell contends that Augustine is correct, in the sense
of being consistent, for he would have had to reject the expression
"long present" as self-contradictory, inasmuch as he meant thereby "fleet-
ingness" or "instantaneousness," then the commentator would have been
again on target. Nonetheless, it seems to me that O'Donnell should
have taken a further step to indicate that such a thing involves a category
mistake, for a "long present" is the description of a condition, while
"instantaneousness" is a feature (which Augustine would have unwit-
tingly reified). 30 Whether one is thinking of consideration, anticipation,
or remembrance (or, for that matter, of any other event or act of the mind),
one would have to say that it is certainly fleeting but not unextended. 31
Descriptively speaking, therefore, the correct sense assignable to the
expression "a long present" is that given by Augustine himself: it endures
or lasts, however shortly.
Finally, as O'Donnell points out, Augustine's assertion that "our con-
sideration endureth," or "perdurat attentio," 32 suggests that the "human
experience of the present in this way anticipates eternity - 'attention'
endures through a sequence of presents: what is required is the cessa-
tion of temporality, which inflicts distraction upon attention.'m To clarify
this point, which in its complexity I could not begin to unravel here,
especially in connection with the notions of "cessation" and "distraction,"

O'Donnell quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that" ... [i]f we take eternity
to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal
life belongs to those who live in the present. " 34 Now, this citation is
most instructive by virtue of its inappropriateness, despite all appearances
to the contrary. For one thing, two concepts of eternity are mentioned
in the passage, to wit: "infinite temporal duration" and "timelessness."
But, on the one hand, the former applies neither to man's Lebenstrom35
nor to God's being. Its uselessness in the case of man is evident, for
the anticipation of death as a permanent boundary of our lives appears
to be an implicit dimension of every lived present of ours, 36 and it is
not relevant to God either, unless one were prepared to defend, on the
assumption that God exists, that His life is endless but successive, which
is quite a dubious thesis. On the other hand, the concept "timelessness,"37
as understood here by Wittgenstein, seems to be predicated on man
alone, 38 in the sense that a man's life may become "timeless," should
he make a .fundamental and abiding decision about his existence, namely,
to live exclusively for the present, so as to be free of the influence of
desire and remorse, which would only breed hope or fear and thus con-
stitute the cradle of possible unhappiness. 39 Such a decision would be
tantamount to sticking to what is actually given at every tum, namely,
the lived present, for, as Wittgenstein added in the same context, " ...
[o]ur life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no
limits," and, in this sense, " ... [d]eath is not an event in life: we do
not live to experience death." 40 Of course, this is true if one takes "limit"
to mean "an actually experienced boundary," which is, in this nexus, a
notion expressive of a commitment to actuality, as opposed to possi-
bility (including an actually lived one). But it need not signify that, nor
does it in fact do so when one employs it in the case of death or, for
that matter, in that of the limits of our visual field, since, for a limit to
be perceived, or at least to play the role of a boundary to which our
perceptions, thoughts, and actions would conform themselves, it is not
in fact necessary to undergo the experience of coming "physically" to
meet the boundary in question. For example, if an enemy, whether in fact
real or imaginary, is anticipated by me as waiting behind the door that
I contemplate opening for the sake of implementing some plan of action
of mine, in a sequence of articulations of some life project, be it global
or local, then such a plan would contain an intrinsic structural modifi-
cation 41 by means of which I would prepare in thought - and eventually
in action- to deal with such an enemy. 42 Accordingly, the enemy would

presently play the role of a future limit which would definitely qualify
the actually lived now. 43 But this approach would be valid too, mutatis
mutandis, in the analysis of the role played in the present by remembered
events and decisions (say, through the agency of actual remorse).
My point is therefore twofold. On the one hand, the self-contained
present to which Wittgenstein addressed himself is not identical with
the originally lived present, which it would presuppose, and from which
it would derive, assuming it to be possible, as a result of the work of
the will. The originally lived present is, by contrast, hardly self-contained,
inasmuch as it intrinsically refers to the future and past things and
events it mediates, for, to use Augustine's own words, it is that "through
which that which may be present may proceed to become absent." 44 On
the other hand, the self-contained present of which Wittgenstein spoke
is neither a matter of direct experience nor a concept about it, but rather
a notion prescribing the possible annihilation of a matter of direct expe-
rience, namely, the actually and originarily lived present. In this sense,
it is like the concepts "zero," "geometrical point," and the "sheer now."
As such, it is a valid notion, and yet it is here surreptitiously and ille-
gitimately introduced as if it were a matter of direct experience or the
concept thereof, but it is not and cannot possibly be any such thing,
for the reasons already adduced. This is why Augustine, eager to be
faithful to his life as actually lived, said that, on the contrary,
... [as] I am about to repeat a psalm I know ... attention [expectatio] is extended to
the whole [of the psalm before I begin]; but when I have begun, as much of it as by
my saying it is extended by my memory, on account of what I have repeated, and my
expectation, on account of what I am about to repeat; yet my consideration [attentio] is
present with me, through which (per quam] that which was future may be carried over
so that it may become past. Which the more it is done and repeated by so much (expec-
tation being shortened) the memory is enlarged, until the whole expectation be exhausted,
when that whole action being ended shall have passed into memory. 45
Augustine's description is also valid for "actions" shorter or longer than

those consisting in reciting a certain psalm or given portions thereof;
indeed ". . . the same holds in the whole life of man, of which all the
actions of man are parts; the same holds in the whole age of the sons
of men, of which all the lives of men are parts."46 Here one notes
Augustine's fidelity to actually lived experience (as evinced by his
accurate and essential description of temporality), as well as his power
of bold metaphysical contention (inasmuch as he spoke of the whole
of one's life and of the age, which- like death or the world-horizon -
cannot be experienced as such by anyone). And yet the said contention
is only exercised - as is to be expected for the sake of legitimacy - on
the basis of the former. My present, as actually lived, is a
transitive (and not just a transient) part that intrinsically and neces-
sarily points to my entire life, which is - in some essential sense -
included therein, and so felt. Moreover, the whole of my life and that
of the "other sons of men" somehow point to - and in some essential
sense include - the whole of their age "of which all the lives of men
are parts." But if teleological component and totality are involved,
and fundamentally and determinately so, both in individual and social
history, why wouldn't the same be true too in respect of the "whole of
all ages" in terms of the provident governance exercised, as telos, by
the eternal, transcendent God? This seems to be an inchoate possibility,
indeed an ideal virtuality of Augustine's position in his Confessions,
but one which is, in the given context of personal temporality, only tacitly
at work. 47
MEMORY AND THE SELF
Augustine was engaged in an effort to do justice to the passage of time

as it is actually given. To succeed in such a venture, he of course had
no choice but to resort to memorative experience. This led him to expand
the concepts of self and memory well beyond one's everyday under-
standing of them, and he seemingly had good reasons for it. To be sure,
he began of necessity with the usual sense assigned to "memory" as
the power of rendering something past available in the present, though
as done or concluded. For Augustine, memory involved both the preser-
vation of one's factual encounters with things of the world 48 and the
abiding possession of intelligible realities. 49 No matter how different these
two dimensions may be, they nonetheless have something in common,
namely, their orientation toward that which is, in some sense, already
available. 50 But the memory's regard is not limited to that, as can be
seen in Augustine's Confessions. 5 1 As Gilson has pointed out, Augustine
himself came to suggest in his De Trinitate that" ... there is [also] a
memory of the present which is even more vast than the memory of
the past ... [for e]verything we know without being [explicitly] aware
of it can be ascribed to the memory ... so that here too, with greater
reason, the soul finds itself unable to sound its own depths." 52 In other
words, this power of the mind appears also to include those "images
... in which I find myself, in which I remember those things I have done,
the moment and place [of their occurrence], as well as the feelings I
had when I did them .... "53 This is, of course, mediated by self-con-
sciousness, for, as Plotinus had already contended, "consciousness is
nothing but the memory one has of oneself,"54 although this does not
mean that such a consciousness is a purely cognitive affair, for the
memory in question is constituted in the context of desire. 55 Using
Courcelle's words, this self-reference of the soul can be explained as
follows:
While the eye cannot see itself except in a mirror, the soul can become aware of itself
by means of cogitatio. Thereby it does not grasp a part of itself by means of another, as
the Skeptics would have liked us to believe [for, if it did, self-consciousness would be
impossible, inasmuch as it would involve an infinite regress] .... Against them, St.
Augustine mentions a small group of philosophers, that is, practically Plotinus [alone].
He compares the implicit knowledge man has of himself to the memory which contains
even the remembrances we are not endeavoring to bring back .... 56
The last step in Augustine's enlargement of the concept of memory

consists in thinking of it as somehow capable of containing God. It is
obvious that the memory - viewed as a conjunction of experiential and
intellective aspects - can do this by preserving some notion of God,
for" ... [a]s soon as a man knows of the existence of God, whether taught
by the faith or demonstrated by reason, this knowledge becomes part
of his memory.... " 57 Yet if one takes a further step and asks whether
or not God Himself may be part of one's memory, the question becomes
all the more difficult to answer, since it is hard to see how He could
find a place therein. There seems to be no room for Him in the various
reservoirs of memory identified so far, for one would then be in pos-
session of the memory of a living, incorporeal, infinite being, rather
than that of a body, or of oneself, or of something one would have learnt.58
Nonetheless, it may very well be that God is present in me as one of
"those memories of the present," since "He is the teaching Master and
the illuminating light even when the soul does not listen to His teaching
nor tum to see His light. ... " 59 It is in this sense that God would be
immanent in us, for
... [i]n order to find ... [God], it is necessary for me to have sought after Him, but in
order to have done so, isn't it necessary for me [already] to have Him somehow? [Isn't
it true that] one cannot recognize [something] unless one entertains a memory of it? But
would one recognize God, if one does not entertain a memory of Him? 60
As is evident, then, this "quite paradoxical form of memory"61 is proposed

as a metaphysical and religious foundation of the self, even perhaps as
the most decisive and originative kernel thereof; however, " ... [o]ne
cannot call it memory in the modern sense [of the word], since it is
not the past that it attains to, but the depths of the present. Nonetheless,
according to St. Augustine, [one's] knowledge of God is more memory
than it is sight. " 62 In fact, were one to carry out the mental experiment
consisting in ideatively stripping memory of any image resulting from
the influence thereon of the sense-perceptual world, memory "would
appear in Uust] two of its forms, namely, memoria sui and memoria
Dei."63 Yet, even then, memory would be, according to Augustine, some-
thing far from simple, which would give itself to us non-straightforwardly
by means of various multiplicities. 64 Bluntly stated, the memory, as the
abidingly mysterious and ongoingly constituted sense of the self, presents
itself at once as being both many and one, for, despite its multiplicity,
it is "always completely present to itself, though this presence is [in
the form of] a quest."65 It was precisely this constitutive state of affairs
that determined the sense of Augustine's endeavor, which consisted in
coming to terms with all aspects of his memory, especially those having
a greater bearing on his personallife.66
Throughout Augustine's Confessions, but particularly in those parts
having to do with the evaluation of his life and ultimately showing the
way to his conversion to orthodox Christianity, it is apparent that the
examination of his memory was of paramount importance to him, insofar
as it involved an assessment of the moral and spiritual value of his
past deeds of commission and omission, and thus of the temporal import
thereof for the securing of salvation, or the highest degree of meaning-
fulness in human life. In this respect, there is both a significant similarity
and a profound difference between Plotinus and Augustine, indeed a sim-
ilarity and a difference which are of the greatest consequence for the
formulation of the latter's conception of time. According to Guitton,
the problem nexus in question can be formulated as follows:
... [If the soul] is rewarded and punished according to its merits, it is necessary for its
identity always to be given to the soul itself, and, beyond that, for it to preserve, in one
fashion or another, its own awareness of what it is and the memory of what it was. Plotinus
would have granted [this point, but would also have introduced the following caveat:] were
you to consider the fall [of the soul] for a moment, you would be immediately led
to see in it a weakening of contemplation, as you would too in the production of things .
. . . If you now were to look for time in consciousness and memory, after having thought
that you had caught a glimpse of it, you would witness its disappearance. Your history
unfolds beneath you, and it is altogether of no significance to your life. Time is an
illusion resulting from an insufficient examination of the mechanism of Nature. 67
Augustine's estimation of the value of time and memory, however, is

precisely the opposite, as it had to be once he had - for the purpose of
analyzing such phenomena- adopted a personal and internal standpoint,
which is antithetical to the cosmic and external one that was still
Plotinus'. Indeed, that on the basis of which Augustine proceeded, in
his Confessions, was precisely the perception and measurement of inner
time, that is to say, his own personal experience of time, and of time
accrued or memory. It was in light of such things that he sought to
identify the sense of his life. As his own time was certainly no illusion
for him as it was a matter of experience rather than a conceptual con-
struction, his history could hardly have been of little or no consequence
to him. 68
Augustine summarized the multifarious dialectical relationships
between memory and the self as follows:
Yet ... [the memory] is a power of mine, and appertains unto my nature; nor do I
myself grasp all that I am. Therefore is the mind too narrow to contain itself. And where
should that be which it doth not contain of itself? Is it outside and not in itself? How is
it, then, that it doth not grasp itself?69
At every turn, then, my self-awareness is manifest in terms of the expe-

rienced dephasement between my mind, or myself as I am and know
myself to be in the present, and myself as a great deep or margin of
excess. 70 This form of consciousness of self is, to put it negatively, the
sense of my failure to grasp 71 myself which is the permanent backdrop
of my life, and, to express it positively, the feeling of "being more" which
is given to the soul as it perceives its own narrowness. One could then
say that the soul is at once perceptio (of this so-and-so that I actually am)
and percepturitio (or sense of one's own being as exceeding itself). 72
Whether considered in itself or in light of Augustine's words, the
memory appears to be the place where the self is given as exceeding itself
into the past. What is not so obvious is the location to which one is to
assign the soul's excess into the future. I would venture the opinion
that such excess resides in the imagination, as a power and activity rooted
in the present. I myself wonder, however, about the reasons why it is
that I am catapulted into the future precisely in the now. I would say
that what was previously beheld in the fantasy-modification of my present
is preserved in the memory-modification of the now. Yet it is not avail-

able to me therein as sheer information, or as a sort of objective past
that could just belong to any one of my contemporaries, but as the ful-
fillment or cancellation- partial or total- of a self-image that I proposed
to myself formerly as a means to know and carry myself into effect.
That image would be actually found as such in my memory at any given
now, be it as positively valued (in which case it would correspond to
my having known and become myself truly) or as negatively assessed (in
which alternative it would signify my failure to know and become myself
to a significant extent). If this is so, then the memory is no mere passive
repository, 13 but a cauldron of (possible) excitement, for it is not just
the treasury of the past of the self and the world, but as well that which
contains the seeds and instigations of excess for the self. The great
deep which the soul is to itself at every juncture is thus neither a ready-
made whole nor is it something simply imposed on it from without,
but rather that which would result from an interplay between inward ques-
tions and responses framed in terms of a self-solicitation coming from
the future of the soul. In fact, functioning in that fashion, it serves as
the means in terms of which I would assess my past. The soul qua
memory therefore takes an active part in the constitution of the self,
and, accordingly, it is one of the origins - the responsive and respon-
sible one - of the self's restlessness. 14 Thus I would contend that what
the soul, as such, does not contain of itself is nonetheless in itself in
the form of a solicitation and an echo (which could possibly require some
form of redress). Both the solicitation and the echo, constituted as they
are in the present by way of the imagination and the memory, respec-
tively, appear as that which is to be either accepted or rejected (and
thus as possible bearers of positively or negatively charged memories). 75
According to Augustine, the presence of an excess of being in the
soul's own memory is similar to the mental availability of what one
has learnt in the study of the liberal disciplines, but quite different from
the awareness one still has of those things and events in the world that
once existed and were then part of one's experience, for of the former
one keeps the res ipsas, but of the latter just the images. 76 Analogously,
the excess constituting the "deep of my soul" is "retained [gero ]" in
the memory or "inner place, which is not a place,'m and yet not as an
image of something else, but as the thing itself, namely, the excess of
the soul which is being elicited. As Augustine put it, this effort "is nothing
else but by meditation as it were to concentrate"18 on oneself and gather,
with some cogency, all those clues and instigations which, like the many
notions constituting one's intelligible fund, "before lay concealed, scat-
tered and neglected ... " in the memory, so that they would be "laid
up at hand, as it were, in that same memory ... and so the more easily
present themselves to the mind well accustomed to observe them." 79
But this makes it quite clear that the soul qua memory is not just a
reservoir, or even one resulting from the exercise of an intrinsic conatus,
but something capable of maturing - for the sake of self-knowledge
and self-establishment - into the active embodiment of a tekhne or art
of living.
All the distinctions pertinent to memory which have been made thus
far rest on a twofold presupposition, namely, that the one considering
memory not only is endowed with a distinct power of that sort, but also
that he knows and remembers the fact. In short, memory is considered
to be self-reflective. Or as Augustine succinctly formulated this descrip-
tive requisite: "I name memory, and I know what I name. But where
do I know it, except in the memory itself?"80 This point, however, was
not sufficiently clear to him, for the reasons already indicated; so it is
no wonder that he himself proceeded immediately to raise this further
question: "Is it also present to itself by its image, and not by itself?"81
O'Donnell reports that Gibb and Montgomery reproved Augustine
in this connection, for, even though memory was here being put to use
by him, what is being remembered is not this act of remembering but
a general concept of memory. 82 But, as O'Donnell proceeds to remark,
in raising that objection, they are" ... at risk of missing ... [Augustine's]
stratagem, which is to delineate between images and things-in-themselves
that reside in the memory.... " 83 The point is well taken, but I wonder
whether it is not possible too for the memory to remember the "thing-
in-itself" which the memory proper is to itself, as opposed to a derivative
and generalized concept thereof which would be based on the accrued
memorative knowledge gained through repeated use of the power. This
is especially relevant since, for that purpose, the mediation of the image
of an act of remembering would not be required, inasmuch as it would
be sufficient, to that end, for the act in question essentially to involve
- as descriptively it does - the presentation in actu exercito of the
memory to itself, both as to the negative and positive dimensions thereof,
that is to say, the conjoint givenness to itself of its limitation and excess
of being. Of course, no objectivation would take place, since it is both
unnecessary therefor and outside the scope of any finite mental power,
including the intellect, unless reflection has occurred. In fact, reflec-

tion is rendered possible on the basis of a pre-objectual constitution,84
inasmuch as any finite mind must first be set in motion, i.e., live in
and through the forms it produces, in order to reflect on itself and on
what it does. 85 But Augustine went further by stressing even the short-
comings of reflection, for, as he pointed out, "I am not able to comprehend
the force of my own memory, though I cannot name myself without
it."86 In other words, the self-aware exercise of my memory is both
necessary and sufficient for the constitution of my soul as a being that
is distinctive, one, and identical, and it thus renders me capable of
reflecting on myself and, consequently, of naming myself as this one.
And yet it falls short of the task of forming the general concepts of
memory and soul and the unique notion of my own personal self, for
which purposes the self-aware exercise of my memory (and my eventual
reflection thereupon) are necessary but inadequate. 87
Augustine came to identify and formulate the requirements to be met
by the acts of remembering when he considered the following example:
For the woman who lost her drachma, and searched for it with a lamp [lucerna), unless
she had remembered it, would never have found it. For when it was found, whence
could she know whether it were the same, had she not remembered it? ... Nor do we
say that we have found what we had lost unless we recognize it; nor can we recognize
it unless we remember it. But this, though lost to the sight, was retained in memory. 88
One cannot find anything unless one looks for it, but one would not be
prompted to do so, unless, at least, 89 one remembers having had it and
discovers, on that basis, that one has lost it. But the usefulness of the
memory of the thing lost is not exhausted thereby, for it also proves
decisive in enabling one to determine, when one comes across something
in one's search, whether or not it is the thing that had been lost. In
other words, the memory of the thing in question is the "instrument"
of its re-cognition, for the thing may have been "lost to the sight," but
it is nonetheless already found in the memory. 90
Now then, it is possible by analogy, as Augustine seems to have
done in these passages, to extend his analysis to the search for the
memory itself, as opposed to the things lost and remembered thereby. For
that purpose, one would likewise be in need of "something" playing
the role of a lamp or lucerna, except that, in this case, such a function
would be assigned not so much to the memory of a particular thing -
which must nonetheless remain of necessity "on the horizon," despite
its being out of focus - as it is by the memory proper. Yet, as in the

case of the memory of a particular thing, the illuminating capacity of
the power in question would remain unproductive, unless it is directed
and focused. However, the "instrument" needed for that cannot be any
particular memory or even the memory as some general capacity of the
mind, but the memory that the power to remember has of itself on the
grounds of its ongoing self-awareness in actu. This is indeed the bridge
to the mind, and thereby to the self and to my whole life, precisely in
that order. 91 On this basis, one may point - but just point - in the direc-
tion of a thesis which can be formulated - as O'Donnell does - in the
following terms: " ... there is an imago of God already there in the
self: when, and only when, it is found (authentic self-knowledge), God
can also be found." 92 But this is precisely the nexus where the analogy
between remembering something and the self-remembrance of the
memory breaks down, for, while something once experienced can be
lost to the memory and not just to the sight, the self-awareness of the
memory (and thus of the self and one's whole life) cannot be dissolved
as long as one exists humanly. This, I believe, is the reason why
Augustine remarked most perceptively that
... [g]reat is the power of memory; very wonderful is it, 0 my God, a profound and
infinite manifoldness, and this thing is the mind, and this I myself am. What then am I,
0 my God? Of what nature am I? A life various and manifold, and exceeding vast. 93
And yet the life in question - my own life - is even vaster than this
context may suggest, for the deep of the soul is, as we have seen, by
excess - that is to say, it transcends the multiplicity of contents, acts,
powers, and affections and reaches into unity, a unity which, while in
the making, nonetheless beckons me in the direction of myself. 94 It is
in fact a unity which is always operative in the memory, and is in this
sense accessible to it, but not as a thing remembered, which I can in prin-
ciple recall once I have perceived it, nor as a performance, which as
such is fleeting. Rather it is present and available in the memory, to
use Augustine's own analogy, very much like a happy life, which as
such has never been experienced or lived by me. As he explained, a happy
life
... is not visible to the eye, because it is not a body. Is it, then, as we remember
numbers? No. For he that hath these in his knowledge strives not to attain further; but a
happy life we have in our knowledge, and, therefore do we love it, while yet we wish
[volumus] further to attain it that we may be happy. 95
As it happens with a happy life, one can have knowledge of the memory
and of the fullness of the self, without however having attained it in
fact, or even grasped it explicitly. In the memory, one is already oneself,
yet not completely. And one knows this without mediation. The
"presence" in question, which is both ontological and cognitive, is suf-
ficient for one to be able to re-cognize it as one's essential good and
therefore to love it, and on that basis, as in the case of a happy life, to
"wish further to attain it that ... [one] may ... " achieve and be such
a thing. For this reason, a happy life - and the memory and the fullness
of the self too - is in me, as joy is in me, for, as Augustine put it,
" ... my joy (gaudium) I remember even when sad, ... as I do a happy
life when miserable." 96 All of these- a happy life, joy, the memory,
the fullness of the self - I do have, and have them in me in the manner
indicated, and yet I do not perceive any of them through the senses.
Yet, unlike joy and other feelings and passions, the self-awareness of
the memory and my consciousness of the fullness of the self are abiding, 97
for they may grow and develop, both cognitively and ontologically, but
they do not simply arise and come to an end, however apparent or con-
cealed they may become. Accordingly, if the analogy between a happy
life, on the one hand, and the self-awareness of the memory and the
consciousness of the fullness of the self, on the other, is to hold signif-
icantly, then one would have to assert that the self - according to St.
Augustine - is at every turn already unified and endowed with perma-
nence on the grounds of a lived telos. 98 But this immanent or intrinsic
end of my life is, it seems to me, no other than the fullness of the self,
to which the self at any given point- both in terms of its accomplish-
ments and failures - is just the necessary means, not the sufficient
foundation.
Long Island University, Southampton, United States
NOTES
1 St. Augustine, Confessions 11.22.36 in James J. O'Donnell's edition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), I, p. 162. Volume I contains the text of the work, to which I will refer
henceforth as Conf, mentioning the volume and page number. Volumes II and III contain
O'Donnell's commentary on Augustine's Conf I will refer to it hereafter as Commentary,
indicating as well the volume and page numbers.
2 Ibid. Cf. M. C. D' Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," A Monument to Saint
Augustine (New York: Lincoln MacVeagh/The Dial Press, 1930), p. 176.

3 Ibid., 11.16.21; I, p. 156; The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. J. G. Pilkington (New
York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1943), p. 288. I will refer henceforth to this English version
of the Conf as trans. Cf. ibid., 21.27; I, p. 157; trans., p. 292: " ... we measure times
as they pass ....., To place this assenion in context, and to do so by way of anticipa-
tion, I would say that it is in the memory, as a dimension of the lived present, that one
re-actualizes both the measurement (which took place in the present sub-stretch) and
the resulting measure, and that it is in the expectation that one pre-actualizes both the mea-
surement that would eventually take place (were it to be actualized in the present
sub-stretch) and the resulting measure.
4 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. K. McLaughlin eta/. (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1984), I, p. 9; cf. p. 10. According to Ricoeur, the solution antici-
pated in Augustine's words is the "idea of the distended relation between expectation,
memory, and anticipation .... " (Ibid. The emphasis is mine.) This will eventually become
apparent in The Confessions (cf., e.g., 11.23.30). This "elegant solution" consists, as
Ricoeur puts it, in " ... includ[ing] ... memory and expectation in an extended dialec-
tical present which itself is none of the terms rejected previously: neither the past [as
that which exists no longer], nor the future [as that which does not exist yet], nor the point-
like present, not even the passing of the present ... " (op. cit., p. 11. The emphasis is
mine.) In this citation, the word "dialectical" seems to refer not only to that which results
from the dialectical testing of what is descriptively made available by reflecting on what
is directly given in experience, but also to that which results from the dynamic interac-
tion between the future and the past sub-stretches of the present by way of reciprocal,
internal modification.
5 Augustine, ibid., 11.16.21; I, p. 156; trans., p. 288.
6 Ibid., 11.23.37; I, p. 162; trans., p. 301.
7 Ibid. This is supponed by Ricoeur's critical summary of Augustine's procedure thus
far. As he puts it," ... (w]e begin with the question 'how' [do we measure the past and
the future]? We continue [Conf 11.18.23] by way of the question 'where' [are they]?
The question is not naive. It consists in finding a location for future and past things insofar
as they are recounted and predicted. All of the argumentation that follows will be con-
tained within the boundaries of this question, and will end up by situating 'within' the soul
the temporal qualities implied by narration and prediction." (P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 10.
The emphasis is mine.)
8 Augustine, op. cit., 11.23.37; I, p. 162; trans., p. 301.
9 I employ words like "actually" to express the ongoingness of the cognitive synthesis
occurring in the soul by virtue of its self-enactment. Accordingly, I use such terms to
refer to something as self-generated and mobile, not to that which is factually and stat-
ically given. It is in this way, I believe, that one correctly understands Meijering's
remark, to the effect that " ... Zukunft und Vergangenheit in der Seele tatslichlich
sind." (E. P. Meijering, Augustin iiber Schopfung, Ewigkeit und Zeit. Das elfte Buch der
BEKENNTNISSE [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979], p. 98.) Even though one does not have to
be convinced of the existence of three times - Augustine himself stressed the fact that
one knows that since childhood (cf. op. cit., 11.17.22) -,it is nonetheless improper to char-
acterize them as if they were extant, in the sense of being endowed with separate existence,
which is what one normally does in everyday speech. Availing oneself of the peninent
grammatical distinctions, it would be more accurate to speak of the "present of things
past" (praesens de praeteritis), which is the time of memory; the "present of things present"
(praesens de praesentibus), which is the time of sight, attention, or consideration (con-
tuitus); and the "present of things future" (praesens de futuris), which is the time of
expectation. (Cf. Augustine, op. cit., 11.20.26; I, p. 157; trans., p. 291. Vide Jean Guitton,
Le temps et I' eremite chez Plotin et saint Augustin, 2nd. ed (1955) in Oeuvres Completes
[Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1978]. IV, pp. 271-272.) This way of expressing oneself
not only has the advantage of being exact, but it already points as well in the direction
of the required solution, as three forms of time are thus gathered as modalities of the
present. Cf. supra, n. 4.
10 For the relevant notions of protention and retention, cf. Edmund Husser!, Lectures
on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, ii, in On the Phenomenology
of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1 893-1917 ), trans. J. B. Brough (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1991), 40 and 43, and Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to
a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. General Introduction to a Pure
Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 77.
11 Augustine, op. cit., 11.17.22; I, p. 156; trans., p. 289.
12 Ibid. Cf. 18.24; I, p. 157. (Vide Nicolas Malebranche, De Ia Recherche de Ia Write
III, Part II, c. I in Oeuvres Completes [Paris: J. Vrin, 1962], I, p. 415 and Sara F. Garcia-
G6mez, The Problem of Objective Knowledge in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld
(Ph.D. Dissertation; The Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New
School for Social Research, 1979), p. 102 (cf. infra, p. 344). Even though I am here
focusing on memory, it is in principle impossible to divorce it from expectation, not
only in terms of Augustine's exposition, but in idea and experience as well. Matters are
further complicated by virtue of Augustine's expansion of expectation to include
"prophecy," which can only be done legitimately on the grounds of revelation, as is no
doubt the case at that point. (Cf. Augustine, op. cit., 11.19.25; vide J. J. O'Donnell,
"Commentary," III, p. 280.) Yet, without causing a distortion of the basic phenomeno-
logical data, one may leave "prophecy" out of consideration and limit the signification
of "expectation" to "anticipation in general" (as when one depicts what the more or less
remote future may hold in store) or even, more restrictedly, to "imaginative anticipa-
tion" (as when one is "contemplating" the immediate virtualities of the present). It seems
that, in the given context, Augustine's analysis is nonetheless devoted to the latter, which
he calls praemeditatio (cf. Augustine, op. cit., 18.23; I, p. 156).
13 Cf. E. P. Meijering, op. cit., p. 66.
14 Augustine, op. cit., ll.l8.23; I, p. 156; trans., p. 289. For the possible separation of
feeling felt from feeling remembered, cf. Augustine, ibid., 10.14.22 and J. Guitton, op.
cit., p. 295. Vide J. Guitton, p. 301 for a further elaboration in terms of the contiguity
of the past and the present and its supportive role in one's ever-functioning will to recall;
see pp. 351-352 for the distinction between genuine memory (as the present of the past,
which as such contains uncertainties, disorder, and fringes) and "retrospective" memory
(which is an ordering totality and is suffused with intelligence). For the related problem
of the two dimensions of memory, namely, forgetfulness and remembrance, cf. Augustine,
op. cit., 10, cc. 16-17 and J. Guitton, op. cit., pp. 290 and 299-300, where, referring to
the mystery of memory as that of the "presence of an absence" and the "absence of a
presence," he speaks as follows: "To be able to recognize [something], says ... [Augustine
in his Confessions], it is indeed necessary for us to have preserved a memory of it, since
the image recognized does not appear to us as novel. Therefore, there is in us a memory
of having forgotten, a latent memory which does not vanish with [successive acts in which
one becomes] aware [of it], for it is [our] consciousness which is seeking after it ..."
(p. 300. The emphasis is mine).
15 Augustine,op. cit., 11.18.23; I, p. 156; trans., p. 289.
16 Cf. Augustine, ibid., 10.8, 12-14.
17 Cf. ibid., 11.17.22 and 18.23 (beginning).
18 Ibid., 24; I, p. 157, trans., p. 290: " ... eorum causae vel signa forsitan videntur,
quae iam sunt."
19 Cf. J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 312: "Le fait [de Ia vision de l'avenir] n'est pas con-
testable. Mais il est rappele sans cesse que I'ame ne voit pas l'avenir meme, mais seulement
des symboles qui le representent." Here I am taking into consideration only the simpler
case, namely, that in which the cognitive presence of the thing past or future coincides
with its non-existence in re.
2 Cf. E. P. Meijering, op. cit., p. 69.
21 Augustine, ibid., 24; I, p. 157; trans., p. 290.

22 E. P. Meijering, op. cit., p. 71. Meijering, however, is using this formula in respect
of things future, while I am enlarging its scope to encompass things past as well. This
would involve, or so it seems, some kind of "harmony between the changeable and the
unchangeable." This question concerned Augustine before The Confessions: in De musica,
for example, he took this discipline to be the "science of movement". In keeping with
this understanding, "sound could be defined as the passage of order through time" and
"musical perception ... [taken as] as latent assessment and unconscious calculation." This
is consistent with Augustine's interest in number. In fact, it appears that he "subsumed
every reality under number", and yet he conceived of number in a special way, namely,
"as a progress .... Like time, ... number is an indivisible [whole] essentially involving
a before, a later, and a middle. Conversely, if Augustine tended to represent the soul as
a flux, it was always as one which is subject to number. Perception, like reason, is fash-
ioned so as somehow to grasp the indefinite, and therein to discern the order, proportion,
[or] measure which is its fund. It appears that such is the role of memory, of numbering,
of the art of versification." (J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 213. The emphasis is mine.) In fact,
already in his Soliloquies, he conceived of memory as that which "underlies thought
... , as the stock consisting of that which has not been swallowed up by oblivion and
can serve as matter for the imagination." (Ibid., p. 294. The emphasis is mine.) If one
sets aside Augustine's mathematical concerns at that point, what seems to remain is the
sense of orderliness through time. As Guitton finally puts it, " ... [w]e are thus led to
study the very perception of time or, more precisely, this prolongation of sensation
which is a sort of immediate memory." (Ibid., p. 195. The emphasis is mine.) But this is
precisely the nexus which permitted Augustine in his Confessions to overcome his clas-
sical presuppositions and produce his novel account of time, especially when he placed
the perception in question in the context of its experienced preservation, for" ... [w]e
are incapable, without the aid of memory, of appreciating the intervals of time .... No
matter how short the interval may be, the [sounding] syllable [seems to] stretch out in
it ... ."(Ibid., p. 198. The emphasis is mine.)
23 Cf. Augustine, Conf 11.28.37; I. p. 162.
24 Ibid., I, pp. 162-163; trans., p. 301. Cf. P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 19.
25 Ibid., I, p. 162. For Aristotle's comparison of the "now" with a "point" (stigme), cf.
Physics, IV, 11, 220 a 9ff. Meijering makes the important assertion that "Augustin
gebraucht wohl das Wort 'Punkt', aber nicht die von Aristoteles darin verbundenen
Gedanken, namentlich nicht die Ausfiihrungen zum Jetzt, das als Grenze Zeit und
wiederum nicht Zeit is." (Op. cit., p. 99) Vide J. Guitton, op. cit., pp. 276-277.
26 Augustine, Conf 11.28.38; I, p. 163.
27 Ibid., 37; trans., p. 301.
28 J. J. O'Donnell, Commentary, Ill, p. 294.
29 Cf. supra, n. 25.
3 Cf. supra, p. 344.
31 One could perhaps formulate an a posteriori principle rooted in the reciprocal con-
junction of temporality and intentionality, namely, that of temporal isomorphism, which
could be explicated as follows: subjective and objective times are not the same, since
the former is of the soul and the latter of things, and yet they correspond to each other,
inasmuch as subjective time is the time of mental events which are essentially inten-
tional (or originarily disclosive of things in the world). This allows for the "measure"
of objective times by means of subjective times. Derivatively, one may also speak of
the measure of objective times by means of things and processes in the world, namely,
by way of the reading of clocks of one sort or another, though no doubt that would involve
subjective time too, i.e., the time of the interpretive acts having to do with the reading.
Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions. Outline of a Theory, trans. B. Frechtman (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 53 ff.; Alfred Schiitz, "On Multiple Realities,"
Collected Papers, I, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 214 f.,
230-231 and 252 f.; and Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1964), pp. 384 ff. and 389 ff.
33 J. J. O'Donnell, op. cit. The emphasis is mine.
34 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosopohicus, German-English ed., trans.
P. F. Pears et al. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 6.4311, p. 147.
35 Unless, of course, one assigns the sense "indeterminate" or "indefinite" to the word
"infinite," but such a move would not be helpful at all.
36 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, lOth. ed. (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963),
49-51.
37 The concept "timelessness" cannot be used to refer to God, for He is not so charac-
terizable, as a number or the formal concept "object," by contrast, would be. Cf. David
Keyt, "Wittgenstein's Notion of an Object" in Essays on Wittgenstien's TRACTATUS,
ed. l.M. Copi et al. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 293. Cf. St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q-7, a-4, ad 4 for the dubiousness, nay, the impossibility
of applying to God - conceived as pure actuality - the just-mentioned predicate of
infinity qua "endless successive life."
38 Cf. Henry Le Roy Finch, Wittgenstein - The Early Philosophy. An Exposition of
the "Tractatus" (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 176.
39 This may very well be the ethico-psychological motivation to see man's life as open
to an "infinite temporal duration." Cf. Eddy Zenach, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of the
Mystical" in Essays on Wittgenstein's TRACTATUS, pp. 372-373. However, the decision
to abide by the present may amount to an evasion, and may therefore be expressive of
bad faith and inauthenticity and thus prove incompatible with the intended goal of life,
namely, happiness. Accordingly, the sense of Augustine's assertion, "perdurat attentio,"
cannot be taken in that sense, given his avowed concern with self-knowledge and salva-
tion (Cf. H. L. Finch, op. cit., p. 173). I would say, instead, that the genuine avoidance
of unhappiness involves the positive and willful cultivation of desire through expecta-
tion, consideration, and remembrance. For the concept of bad faith, cf. Jean-Paul Sartre,
L' P.tre et le neant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), Part I, c. 2, pp. 85 ff.; for the relevant dis-
tinction between the analytical and the empirical structure of human life and the concept
of death as part of the said empirical structure, cf. Julian Marias, Antropologia metafisica,
2nd. ed. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983), c. 10, pp. 71, 72, and 75; c. 28, pp. 202 ff.,
and cc. 29-30, pp. 210 ff.; for the concept of happiness, see also J. Marias, La felicidad
humana (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987) and Antonio Rodriguez Huescar, "Sobre Ia
felicidad", Revista de Occidente No. 168 (May 1995), pp. 122 ff.
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein, op. cit.
41 If it originally does not contain it, it would eventually come to be so altered on the
basis of the emerging anticipation.
42 That is to say, before I actually meet him, if I ever do, for the event may never
come to pass, because, say, I change my plan accordingly, abandon it altogether, or
meet my death beforehand.
43 I grant, of course, that the analogy with the expectation of an enemy ultimately
breaks down as a means to clarify the anticipated role of death as a boundary, for death
is inexorable and my enemy's expected presence behind the door is contingent. And
yet, in reality, this point is no objection; in fact, it strengthens my argument by showing
that death is an essentially anticipated limit of present experience which, however, can
never be "physically" met. It is therefore wrong to construe it as a sort of invisible thing
or inaccessible event. This is the reason why to argue - as Wittgenstein did according
to Keyt's interpretation (loc. cit., p. 299)- that " ... [m)y world ... consists solely of
the facts with which I am personally acquainted ... " (cf. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., 1 f.)
is beside the point, even if true, for my "world" or "totality of facts" is colored (and in
this sense bounded) by anticipated facts which presently are not in evidence (and, for all
that I know, may never be). Indeed, the "world" itself, in Wittgenstein's sense of the word,
is never given as such, and yet, as a totality of placement and valuation, it nevertheless
reverberates in every item experienced and in every encounter in which I live.
44 Augustine, Conf 11.28.37; I, p. 163; trans., p. 301.
45 Ibid., 38; I, p. 163; trans., pp. 301-302. (The emphasis is mine.) Cf. E. P. Meijering,
op. cit., p. 100: " ... [das Lied ist] zunachst ganz in der Erwartung .... "
46 Augustine, Conf 11.28.38; I, p. 163; trans., p. 302. The emphasis is mine.
47 This will be developed in Augustine's De civitate Dei. Cf. E. P. Meijering, op. cit.,
p. 100 and, apud Meijering, U. Duchrow, "Der sogennante psychologische Zeitbegriff
Augustins," Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche LXIII (1966), p. 269. For the concept
of "transitive part," see William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1890), I, pp. 243 f., 246, 253, 255, and 252; Aron Gurwitsch, "William
James's Theory of the 'Transitive Parts' of the Stream of Consciousness," Studies in
Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 301
ff. and The Field of Consciousness, pp. 129 ff.; David Lapoujade, "Le flux intensif de
Ia conscience chez William James," Philosophie, No. 46 (June, 1995), pp. 55 ff.
48 This is accomplished, as is obvious, by means of sounds, smells, tastes, and other

sensations. Cf. J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 294.
49 For Augustine these seem to constitute an a priori or pre-experiential fund or pos-
session, wherein one may find, for example, "the perception of relations, laws, and
measures" (J. Guitton, ibid.).
50 Cf. J. Guitton, ibid., p. 290, n. 7. Vide G. W. Leibniz's notion of "consecutiveness"
in his Monadology, 26 in Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed., and trans. L. E. Loemker,
2nd ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), p. 645.
51 Cf. supra, n. 9.
52 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch
(New York: Random House, 1960), p. 102. Cf. De Trinitate 15.21.40 (apud E. Gilson,
op. cit., p. 300, n. 116); Conf. 10.8.15 and cc. 9-16 and Epistola 7.1.1 (apud E. Gilson,
op. cit., n. 117); De Trinitate 15.11.14 and 6.8 and Conf. 10.25.36 (apud E Gilson, op.
cit., n. 118).
53 J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 294. Referring to feelings and passions (e.g., desire, joy, fear,
and sorrow), or what he called perturbationes animi, Augustine remarked that "before I
recollected and reviewed them, they were ... [in the memory]; wherefore by remembrance
could they be brought thence." (Conf 10.14.22; I, p. 127; trans., p. 234.) This allows
for the possibility of experiencing (and eventually remembering) "things" which are of
the mind and self, and not just that which is other than the mind and self (e.g., bodies,
the intelligibles, and God), and yet to have them not as affections, which is the way in
which the mind grasps and holds them "when it suffers them" (ibid., 21; I, p. 126;
trans., p. 233), but more "according to a peculiar power of memory" (ibid.), namely,
the power of self-perception found in the memory proper insofar as it contains the ultimate
directional seeds of animus as potentia vitae. But, as Augustine himself added, " ... we
could never speak of [any of the perturbations of the mind, not presently undergone by
us] ... , did we not find in our memory not merely the sounds of the names according
to the images imprinted on it by the senses of the body, but the notions of the things
themselves, which we never perceived by any door of the flesh, but which the mind
itself, recognizing by the experience of its own passions, entrusted to the memory, or
else which the memory itself retained without their being entrusted to it ... " (ibid.,
22; trans., p. 235), presumably in the many events and things one experiences in the
praesens praesentibus (cf. supra, n. 9) without being explicitly aware of them, or even
deliberately turning away from them. This capacity of the memory to retain "something"
without its having been entrusted to it seems to be appropriate to the solicitations that con-
stitute a significant part of the deep of the soul, at least when they are given in us ab
origine.
54 J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 141.
55 Ibid., p. 159.
56 Pierre Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-meme de Socrate a Saint Bernard (Paris: Etudes
augustiniennes, 1974), I, p. 161. For the conflict with the Skeptics, cf. Augustine, De
Trinitate 14.6.11 and 25; vide Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos vii, 310 (Against
the Logicians, i, in Sextus Empiricus, Greek-English ed., trans. R. G. Bury [Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press/The Loeb Classical Library, 1960], II, pp. 163 f.);
Plotinus, The Enneads, IV, 7.10.30; V, 3.1.1, 3.4.24, 3.5.7 and 43, 3.6.31 and 39, 3.7.30,
and 3.12.7. For the question of the "remembrances we are not endeavoring to bring
back," cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 15.6.29. Vide E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 75: "In Augustinism,
thought (cogitatio) is merely the movement by which the soul gathers, assembles and
collects all the hidden knowledge it possesses and has not yet discovered, in order to
be able to fix its gaze upon it . ... Really, therefore, thinking, learning and remembering
are all one to the soul." (The emphasis is mine.) Cf. Augustine, Conf 10.11.18 and De
Trinitate 14.6.8 (apud E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 286-287, n. 28).
57 E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 103. Cf. Augustine, Conf 10.24.35 and 25.36 (apud E. Gilson,
op. cit., p. 300, n. 119.).
58 Cf. E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 103. Moreover, even if thought, by contrast, "assures us
... that we are in God, the experience is there to witness to the contrary ... " (J. Guitton,
op. cit., p. 171; cf. pp. 289-290), not only because I do not actually recall having encoun-
tered God face to face, but also by virtue of the fact that God is "unchanging and eternal
... [and thus] has no part in our temporality ... " (ibid., p. 297).
59 E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 103. It is clear that this argument involves more than philo-
sophically ascertainable theses. Cf. Augustine, Conf, 10.24.36; I, p. 134.
60 J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 296.
61 Ibid., p. 297.
62 Ibid., p. 293. The emphasis is mine.
63 Ibid., p. 301. The "intellective" memory would have to belong, if this point is correct,
to one of these two facets of memory, very likely to memoria Dei, inasmuch as the
intellective memory is an unchanging fund in the soul. Cf. Augustine, Conf, 10.8.15
and cc. 9-16; Epistola 7 .1.1.
64 For the manifold sense of the trinitarian nexus of remembrance, cf. J. Guitton, op.
cit., pp. 301-302 and E. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 214-216 and 218-223. Cf., e.g., Augustine,
De Trinitate 9. 2, 2-5, and 8; 10.11, 17-12 and 19; 11.2.5, 5.9, 7.12; 14.8, 11-12 and
16 (apud E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 352, nn. 26, 27, and 29 and p. 354, n. II).
65 Ibid., p. 302. Cf. p. 296.
66 Vide Augustine, Conf, 10.8.12; I, p. 123. As O'Donnell remarks in his Commentary,
III, p. 173 (the emphasis is mine): "Memory in Conf is an active force (1.8.13, 'prensa-
bam memoria'), a repository of images (4.1.1, 6.9.14) and already by implication a place
where God is found (7.17.23 ... )."But it is also passive as a "storehouse of images,"
as O'Donnell also indicates (op. cit., p. 174). The memory, however, is not just a power
among many in the soul. In fact, it is the "locus of the self (10.8.14, 'ibi mihi et ipse
occurro meque recolo'), the force that links present with past and gives identity." (1. J.
O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 175.) In fact, " ... [u]nderlying A's view of memory and its
importance is his belief in the transience of the present ... it may almost be said that
we do not know the present ... , for as soon as we can know it, it is our memory of
the present that we know .... " (Ibid.)
67 J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 170. The emphasis is mine.
68 For the connection between a sense of sin and the consciousness of the past, cf.
ibid., pp. 333-334.
69 Augustine, Conf 10.8.15; I, p. 124; trans., p. 229. (The emphasis is mine.) Cf. De
ordine 1.1.3 in Obras de San Agustin, Latin-Spanish ed., ed. F. Garcia (Madrid: Biblioteca
de Autores Cristianos, 1957), I, ed. and trans. V. Capanaga, p. 682: "And the chief cause
of error [2: i.e., that some men who experience that which exceeds their comprehen-
sion nonetheless take it, for want of learning, as something foul] is the fact that man is
unknown to himself." (The emphasis is mine.) In this connection, O'Donnell (Commentary,

III, p. 180) quotes Nietzsche's relevant words: "Wir bleiben uns eben notwendig fremd"
(Zur Genealogie der Moral, Praef. I) and adds: "For A. no less than for Nietzsche, the
idea [that we do not know ourselves] cuts against the received philosophical tradition. The
opacity of the self to the self ... runs poignantly through A's works...."(The emphasis
is mine.) Cf.: Augustine, De Trinitate 1.10.16 and N. Malebranche, De Ia Recherche de
Ia Write, III, Part I, C.I (Oeuvres Completes, I, pp. 381, 2, 3-4, and 389) and Part II,
C.2 (op. cit., I, pp. 451-52); IV, C.l2 (op. cit., II, p. 13); VI, Part II, C.6 (op. cit., II,
p. 369); De Ia Recherche de Ia Verite. Eclaircissements, I (op. cit., III, pp. 23, 27, and
142); Meditations chreriennes et metaphysiques, I (op. cit., X, p. 17). Vide also Sara F.
Garcia-G6mez, "Arnauld's Theory of ldeative Knowledge: A Proto-Phenomenological
Account", The Monist, Vol. 71, No. 4, Oct., 1988 (Descartes and his Contemporaries),
pp. 551 and 556.
7 Cf. Augustine, Conf 4.14.22; I, p. 41: "Grande profundum est ipse homo.... "= "Man
himself is a great deep ..." (trans., p. 76).
71 I am taking "grasp" in the Augustinian sense of capere and habere, or contain and
hold.
72 Cf. G. W. Leibniz, Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff, ed. C. I.
Gerhardt (1st. ed., 1860; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), p. 56: " ... expressionem
praesentis externorum status, Animae convenietem secundum corpus suum; et tenden-
tiam ad novam expressionem, quae tendentiam corporum (seu rerum extemarum) ad statum
futurum repraesentat, verbo: perceptionem et percepturitionem. Nam ut in externis, ita
et in anima duo sunt: status et tendentiam ad alium statum." (The emphasis is mine.) In
the text, I am stressing the noetic signification of perceptio and percepturitio, the sense
of the latter concept thus serving to express a certain tendency to new perceptions.
Obviously, there is a reference to the future which is inherent in such a notion and in
the experience on which it rests. Cf. also J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 315: "Metaphysiquement,
Ia connaissance de l'avenir met en jeu un pouvoir infiniment superieur a !'esprit de
l'homme, le pouvoir m~me de Dieu pour qui tousles temps son presents." Vide Augustine,
Conf 11.19.25; I, p. 157; trans., p. 291: "What is that way by which Thou, to whom nothing
is future, dost teach future things; or rather of future things dost teach present? For what
is not, of a certainty cannot be taught. Too far is this way from my view; it is too mighty
for me, I cannot attain unto it; but by Thee I shall be enabled, when Thou shalt have
granted it, sweet light of my hidden eyes." The emphasis is mine. (For the notion of "sweet
light," cf. Ecclesiastes 11:8; for the concept of the "light of my hidden eyes," see Ps.
37 (38): 11, as per Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam Clementinam, ed. A. Colunga et al. [Madrid:
Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1965], p. 481, Conf 7.7.11 and 12.18.27; apud J. I.
O'Donnell, Commentary, III, p. 283.) In his critical edition of The Confessions, Angel
C. Vega connects the latter part of Augustine's text with another passage of his, namely,
the Tratatus in Evangelium Joannis 13, 3: "Est alius oculus, est interior oculus .... Isti
oculi in intelligentia sunt, isti oculi in mente sunt" (Tratados sobre el Evangelio de San
Juan, ed. and trans. T. Prieto in Obras de San Agustin XIII [1955], pp. 358 and 360;
cf. Las Confesiones, ed. and trans. A. C. Vega in Obras de San Agustin II [1955], pp.
585 and 608, n. 27; vide J. J. O'Donnell, op. cit.). The important thing here is the
employment of the notion of the inner eye, as opposed to that of the external eyes (or
eyes of flesh). The inner eye is the mind lato sensu, which is interpreted by Vega as
being one's heart and by O'Donnell as signifying the homo interior. (Cf. Conf cc. 8-9;
vide my paper, "Poetry as a Worldly Vocation: Home and Homelessness in Rilke's Das
Stunden-Buch" in Analecta Husserliana XLIV [1995], pp. 176 ff.) Therefore, the refer-
ence to intelligence should not be constructed narrowly to mean "intellect," although at
times that "faculty" is at play and in focus. It is enough to take it in the sense of the
threefold self-aware consciousness with which Augustine was primarily working (i.e.,
expectation, consideration, and remembrance). Finally, even though Augustine spoke of
the "prophets" in Conf 11.19.25, he was not there basically interested in accounting for
"prophecy" stricto sensu, but in dealing with "expectation" or anticipation broadly under-
stood (a notion that could in principle accommodate the phenomena of "prophecy").
74 Cf. Augustine, Conf 1.1.1; I, p. 3: " ... fecisti nos ad teet inquietum est cor nostrum
donee requiescat in te."
75 The instigative sense of the experience of self-excess could thus be interpreted as
the dimension of memory "where God is found." (Cf. supra, n. 66 and p. 351.) Let me
set aside the question of the placement of objets in the memory, when viewed in terms
of their nature and existence, be they given indirectly, i.e., by way of images (cf. Augustine,
Conf 10.9.16) or directly, as is the case with intelligible objects (cf. Augustine, De
Trinitate 9.3.3.; vide J. J. O'Donnell, Commentary, III, p. 181: " ... the importance of
A's [un-Piotinian] insistence that some res ipsae enter the memory.") Once that is done,
it is possible to say, in my opinion, that the excess of the self is to be located in the
self itself, because self-excess and self are, numerically and specifically, one and the same,
except in modality, for the excess in question is not merely what I was, am, or will be,
or at any time factually fail to be, but what I should or should not be. Accordingly, such
a sense of excess would appear to be in the nature of a glimpse into what I should or
should not be in God's eyes, one indeed which I actually am and may come to know.
This helps to explain why I am conscious of self and other in a temporal fashion, and
why I am nonetheless a unity, that is to say, a unity in via which consists in imitating
the eternal and transcendent unity of God.
76 Vide Augustine, Conf 10.9.16 and 10.12.19. Cf. ibid. 10.17.26; I, p. 129; trans.,
p. 238 for the "classification" of memorative presence on the basis of the sort of thing
being remembered: bodies "per imagines" or "through images," the intelligible truths of
the liberal arts "per praesentiam" or "by the presence of the things themselves," and the
affection of the mind "per nescio quas notiones vel notationes" or "by some notion or
observation."
77 Ibid., 10.9.16; I, p. 125; trans., p. 229.
78 Ibid., 10.11.18; I, p. 126; trans., p. 231.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 10.15.23; I, p. 128; trans., p. 236.
81 Ibid. Cf. supra n. 75.
82 The reference is to J. Gibb's and W. Montgomery's second edition of The Confessions
(Cambridge: 1927; re-issued: New York, 1979). Cf. J. J. O'Donnell, Commentary, III,
p. 185.
83 J. J. O'Donnell, ibid.
84 Cf. Antonio MiiUm-Puelles, The Theory of the Pure Object, ed. and trans. J. Garda-
Gomez (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996), Part I, Section 2, c. 10.
85 Cf. Augustine, Conf 10.16.24; I, p. 128.

86 Ibid. 10.16.25; I, p. 128; trans., p. 237. The emphasis is mine.
87 Cf. 1. Guitton, op. cit., p. 296: "The mystery of memory is none other than the
mystery of the spiritual person (ego animus), or, rather, it is the mystery born of the
existence of the person in time." (The emphasis is mine.) The experiential sense of this
acknowledgment is later formulated by Guitton when he says that " ... (t]he soul knows
that it does not know itself, and yet it does not fail to know itself altogether, since
knowledge of that failure in knowledge is already self-knowledge." (Ibid., p. 302.)
88 Augustine, Conf 10.18.27; I, pp. 129-130; trans., p. 239. Cf. Luke 15:8.
89 I say "at least," for the actual search would not in fact be triggered if other factors
are not at work (e.g., my need for it and the opportunity to seek after it. Cf. Plato,
Symposium, 200a-201c).
90 Cf. Augustine, Conf 10.19.28; I, p. 130. One cannot remember something unless it
has not completely "slipped [exciderat] our memory ... " (ibid.; trans. p. 240). The
thing past, which was once experienced but still remains in the memory, is the instru-
ment at one's disposal to reach it in the present. Augustine put it this way: " ... but by
the part by which we had hold [tenebatur] was the other part sought for [quaerebatur]"
(ibid.). The rhetorical and dialectical interplay between tenebatur and quaerebatur conveys
the impression that the part remaining is not static and merely transient, but dynamic
and transitive. In keeping with this sense, Augustine offered us a splendid essential-descrip-
tive analysis of the process of remembering, when he said that the memory at that point
"perceived that it did not revolve [things] together as much as it was accustomed to do
[solebat], and halting [claudicans], as if from the mutilation of its old habit [detruncata
consuetudine], demanded the restoration of that which was wanting." (Ibid. The emphasis
is mine.) As Augustine's text suggests, but does not declare, the whole of the object remem-
bered, and of the memory itself (and, through it, of one's self and life), is never given
as such all at once; rather, any such totalities are being constituted, so to speak, "on the
go." Hence, memory is not enough, for, containing as it does the seeds of future clues
and instigations, it becomes a power seeking consistently to complete the habit of the
object perceived and remembered in correlation with that of the self and life engaged in
perceiving and remembering (among other things). To use Husserl's terminology, the
present is the locus of an interplay between retentions and protentions. If therefore one
applies these notions to the fact of self-excess as given in the memory, one could say
that the soul seeks to complete itself in terms of the habits it forms and develops. The
soul would then experience itself as a habit of self, which presents the soul to itself
only in glimpses at any given moment of remembrance. This is what I mean when I say
that it is true - for Augustine but also as such - that the memory is neither static nor
blind but partly dynamic and sighted. It is precisely the nexus of conatus and faulty
vision that moves the soul memoratively to seek not only contents (corresponding to things
once perceived but forgotten), but itself as well, so as to be completed or achieved.
91 Cf. infra, n. 93.
92 1. 1. O'Donnell, Commentary, III, p. 189.
93 Augustine, Conf 10.17.26; I, p. 129; trans., p. 238. (The emphasis is mine.) This
statement is most complex, involving as it does three equations (but not their recipro-
cals), to wit: memory is (of) the mind, the mind is (of) self, and the self is (of) my life,
which is "various and manifold, and exceeding vast."
94 Cf. supra, pp. 352 ff. (Vide Aristotle, De anima, 417 a22-b!6; Jose Ortega y Gasset,
"[Pr6logo] A 'Historia de Ia Filosofia', de Emile Brehier," Obras Completas [Madrid:
Alianza Editorial!Revista de Occidente, 1983], VI, pp. 409 ff.; and my papers, "Hopkins
on Self and Freedom: On the Possibility of Mystical Union" in Mystics of the Book.
Themes, Topics, and Typologies, ed. R. A. Herrera [New York: Peter Lang, 1993]. pp.
262-263 and 268 and "Interpretacion mundanal e identidad propia. Critica del experimento
mental de Bergson y de Schiitz en tomo a Ia naturaleza y los limites de Ia conciencia,"
Revista de Filosofia [Madrid], 3a. epoca, III [ 1990]. No. 4, pp. 111 ff.). Unity lies
already in the soul (anima), as the ground and origin of multiplicity, and so does multi-
plicity, as the set of events and the field in which unity is discovered and achieved as
the Idea of my self, provided that the multiplicity be lived as anticipated in self-
percepturitio (cf. supra, n. 72), and the Idea be pursued as no asymptote, but as a deter-
mination inherent in my life, according to Augustine's principle that" ... whatsoever is
in the memory is also in the mind .... " (Conf 10.17.26; I, p. 129; trans., p. 238.)
95 Augustine, ibid. 10.21.30; I, p. 131; trans., p. 242.
96 Ibid., pp. 242-243.
97 Cf. ibid., p. 243. Vide J. J. O'Donnell, Commentary, III, p. 192: "In considering the
possibility that the beata vita [and, I would add, that the memory itself and thus, ulti-
mately, that the fullness of the self] may be like one of the perturbationes animi [cf.
Conf 10.21.22 and supra, n. 53], he finds himself considering that the perturbationes
are variable, even when the source is the same (sadness at remembering the things that
used to make him glad). The more closely the beata vita is associated with his immutable
God, the less such a resemblance to gaudium is possible."
98 I use the word "permanence" to refer to the closest analogue of immutability of
which human life seems to be capable, provided, of course, that both "permanence" and
"immutability" be taken non-statically when applied to man and God, respectively.
ANTONIO CALCAGNO
ACTIO, PASS/0 ET CREAT/0 IN THE ENDLICHE

UND EWIGE PHILOSOPHIE OF EDITH STEIN
A Poetico-Personal Response to the Challenges of Postmodernity
Nous sommes dans un moment de reHichement, je parle

de Ia couleur du temps ...
Sous Ia demande generale de reHichement et d'apaise-
ment, nous entendons marmonner le desir de recom-
mencer Ia terreur, d'accomplir le fantasme d'etreindre
Ia realite. La reponse est: guerre au tout, temoignons
de l'impresentable, actuons les differends, sauvons
l'honneur du nom.
Jean-Fran..ois Lyotard, Le Postmoderne explique aux
enfants, Editions Galilee, Paris, 1988, pp. 9-27.
What Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard essentially expresses about the phenomenon

called postmodernity is a temporal sense of "loosening". This "loosening"
or "slackening" is liberating in that it frees the individual from rigid
pre-established rules governing various forms of thinking. There is a
sense that human thinking is transcendent, a sort of iterabilite, in that
it cannot be contained by the contrived universal categories of critical
judgement of the Academy. "Un artiste, un ecrivain postmoderne est
dans la situation d'un philosophe: le texte qu'il ecrit, !'oeuvre qu'il
accomplit ne sont pas en principe gouvernes par des regles deja etablies,
et ils ne peuvent pas etre juges au moyen d'un jugement determinant, par
1' application a ce texte, a cette oeuvre de categories connues". 1 With
the rejection of rigid systems of determination, the subject is free to
actualise its unique difference. Concomitant with this loosening of the
rules of subjective determination, there is also the loss or slackening
of the possibility of any foundational ground in which one can root
one's common experience of subjectivity. Lyotard expresses this reality
when he proclaims the death of all grand narratives. In phenomenolog-
ical terms, Lyotard's insights render the grounding of Einfiihlung (a
common feeling of oneness) a near impossibility. The subject, in his or
her difference, is rendered isolated or cut off from the larger commu-
nity, despite Lyotard's appeal for smaller communities of difference.
Postmodernity, in emphasising difference, has rendered difference a
369

370 ANTONIO CALCAGNO
universal logical category which has eclipsed the grand narrative of the
being of the human person.
Since her cruel and untimely death in 1942, Edith Stein has been
a somewhat forgotten phenomenologist. The first assistant to Edmund
Husserl, Stein contributed significantly to the phenomenological move-
ment by elaborating and developing her own personalist phenomenology.
Esteemed by her colleagues, Max Scheler, Hedwig Conrad-Martius,
Theodore Lipps, Roman Ingarden, and Adolf Reinach, Stein continued
to pursue her phenomenological investigations despite her philosphical
differences with HusserI. Drawing on Husserl 's insistence on the pos-
sibility of knowing the Wesen der Sache, Stein believed in the full
coincidence of a radically differentiated individual and a community of
individuals. She did not isolate difference, but tried to incorporate it in
a vision of the human person rooted in the "grand narrative" of being.
It is our contention that Stein's insights can be employed to address
the challenges and Weltanschauung of postmodem philosophy in that she
retains the possibility of a coincidence of universality and radical dif-
ferentiation. For Stein, universality and differentiation are not mere
logical categories, but fundamental existential realities incarnated within
the life of the human person. The existential reality invoked by Stein
is one of poetic and agapeic becoming. It lies in contrast to the angst-
ridden and stark task of Heidegger's Sein-konnen. This paper will have
as its focus a Steinian-inspired response to the Postmodem problematic
of relachement.
We propose the following schemata of investigation. The first part
of this paper will present what we see to be the general symptoms of
the postmodem relachement. The second part will consist of a Steinian
response to the postmodem condition. It will have as its focus the essen-
tial being of the person, and will explore the principal modes of the being
of the person: act, potency and creative poiesis [from a phenomeno-
logical perspective]. Ultimately, what we hope to draw from Stein's
philosophical reflections is the genuine possibility of both universality
and radical difference simultaneously and existentially coinciding in a
veritable coincidenias oppositorum. The final section of this paper will
consist of an evaluation of both the insights of Stein and Postmodemity.
We hope to offer some relevant philosophical insights concerning the
nature of unity and multiplicity or universality and difference.
THE ENDLICHE UND EWIGE PHILOSOPHIE OF EDITH STEIN 371
I. THE PHENOMENON OF POSTMODERNITY
The discussion of postmodemity is not merely confined within the walls

of various institutes of philosophy. It has met with great success in
social sciences like sociology and psychoanalysis, and within human
sciences like literature and the fine arts. We too, along with thinkers
like Vattimo and Lyotard, must pose the question: What is postmoder-
nity?
We see three main points which typify the postmodem Bewegung:
Difference, dis-incarnation and de-creation. 2 In contemporary continental
philosophy there is no more common catch-word than difference. Its
derivatives include such variations as differance, difference, differends,
alterity and the other. Postmodemity seeks to preserve that which dis-
tinguishes one individual from another by demonstrating that a founda-
tional universal or unifying ground is only an idealistic, constructed
or mythical delusion. Implicit in postmodem anti-foundationalism is a
critique of the Kantian trancendental subject and the Hegelian Idea.
Ultimately, the desire is to preserve what is radically unique about the
human subject by eliminating the possibility of its possible usurpation
into an over-arching or undifferentiated unity. If the "grand narrative"
of a foundational unity is dismissed, then we are left with isolated indi-
viduals, or in the vocabulary of Lyotard, "jeux de langage", we are all
disjunct archipelagos of meaning. We can no longer speak of one common
significative Ubergang, but of many Ubergange. 3 On one hand, the
postmodem condition is cogniscent of the fact that there is something
unique and different about every individual which cannot be reduced
to an all-encompassing philosophical or religious unity. Not everyone
is the same. On the other hand, one runs the risk of falling into a vicious
philosophical solipsism or relativism, as we can speak of no common
foundation. We see the results of such a thinking of isolated differen-
tialism primarily reflected in the concrete realms of ethics and politics.
If the human subject or the smaller human community is completely
unique and different unto itself, then any ethical disposition towards
the world can be philosophically justified in the name of difference or
alterity. Lyotard recognises the possibility of the terrorism implicit in
an idealisation of difference as witnessed in his reflections on Auschwitz
and Budapest. If difference is to be preserved, then who is to judge
what is ethically acceptable or not for the larger "community"? How is
dialogue possible? Or, why is it necessary at all? We believe that an
emphasis on difference concomitant with the dismissal of a unifying

ground only leads to a state of homo homini lupus. In other words, the
common good becomes sacrificed for the individual good. A Nietzschean
master-slave dialectic rooted in ressentiment will eventually emerge.
We ultimately view the postmodem notion of difference, despite its
noble intention to restore and preserve the individuality of the human
subject, as severely lacking for several reasons. First, difference is abso-
lutised and is no longer conceived as relational. If we are to preserve
difference, then difference by its very nature cannot relate to no other
than itself, as it is unique unto itself. In order for there to be difference
it must be counter-distinguished against something radically other - a
profound unity. If we are to actualise difference in an absolute sense, then
we run the risk of what Levinas calls: reducing the other to the same.
Difference must be conceived in a more relational sense if we wish to
preserve the possibility of a human community and the full sense of
the individual.
Second, the postmodem notion of difference must be conceived as a
relation ab alio, that aliud being a radical unity. Difference has to be con-
ceived not only as relational, but as defined per se. It is our contention
that postmodem thinking has generally tended to define difference in
negative terms, that is, in so far as it lies opposed to the myth of the foun-
dation - an apophatic or private definition. It becomes a Gegenstand.
If everything is rubricised under the significative umbrella of the gegen-
standlich, the uniquely different loses its essential alterity. The question
we must ask is, "What constitutes difference or radical individuation?"
In other words, how can we describe difference cataphatically as well
as apophatically? Finally, we wish to offer a critique which can be both
applicable to our treatment of difference and unity as well as to those
of the leading postmodem thinkers. Thus far, we have only spoken in
logical categories, making what seems to be an endless array of quodli-
betical distinctions. The question we must ask ourselves is: How does
this discussion incarnate itself into the reality of the human person? A
discussion revolving around unity and difference is of little value if it
remains purely on the theoretical level. The discussions undertaken by
thinkers of postmodem difference such as Derrida, Lyotard and Vattimo
have concentrated on language and have tried to stamp their differenti-
ated linguistic insights onto the human flesh. They have tried to read
the human person through the particularised spectacles of language. If
we are to understand difference, then we must elevate difference to a
THE ENDLICH UND EWIGE PH/LOSOPHIE OF EDITH STEIN 373
more encompassing discussion which is not only logical, but is consti-

tuted de chair et d'os. The emphasis must be not on difference, but on
difference within the life of the human person and her or his Lebenswelt.
The focus should be on a relatio realis as opposed to a relatio secundum
dici.
The preceding discussion concerning the necessity of incarnating the
logos within the realm of the discussion of postmodern difference leads
us to our second characteristic of postmodernity, that of dis-incarna-
tion. Prior to examining what we intend by the term dis-incarnation, it
would be best to describe what we understand by incarnation. Incarnation
is that event or development wherein that which is intellectually for-
malised becomes concrete either in the material or spiritual world.
Perhaps another way to describe this development is to call it a becoming
- a becoming which moves from a potential relativity to an actualised
reality. In other words, potentia is actualised in actus. In the incarnational
move from potency to act, ideas become externalised, words take on
meaning, and the humanly ideal or "essentially personal" 4 becomes en-
fleshed.
It could be argued that everything which exists is by nature incarna-
tional in so far as it is imbued with some grade of consciousness and
some kind of flesh, be it material or spiritual. 5 Teilhard de Chardin held
something of a similar position. If everything by nature is already incar-
nate, it would appear rather pointless to speak of dis-incarnation, as we
cannot help but be constantly faced with this naturally occurring incar-
national drive to actualise potencies. We concede that there is a naturally
occurring incarnational process taking place. Human beings are examples
of this every time we enact a desire or fulfil a wish. We do, however,
want to move beyond this natural level of incarnation and make appeal
to a higher level of incarnation. This higher level of incarnation we
call poetic incarnation. Here, the emphasis is not on a simple living
(natural) or everyday kind of incarnation, but on one that is creative.
To create is not merely to reproduce something, like baking a cake, or
execute something to which we are naturally disposed, like eating. We
are not concerned here with actualising various Beschaftigungen. Creative
incarnation is a poiesis (poion). It is a distinctively onto-personal
becoming wherein the human person actualises existential potentiali-
ties which may enable the person to be fulfilled in a new and meaningful
way. An example of this personal onto-creativity would be the creation
of a new togetherness or community in the coming together of new lovers.
Love has the potential to further create and extend the person in his or
her existential comportment to self, other and the world. A new reality
can emerge. For example, a family is created when partners decide to
make some kind of life commitment to one another.
Postmodemity provides no genuine onto-personal space wherein the
human person can incamationally create itself. By this claim, we do
not wish to suggest that postmodemity has no room for the radicality
of the subject. What we wish to infer is that, by appealing to differ-
ence, a new universal category becomes established through which we
define what is genuinely creative and what is not. Wissen und Urteilen
become defined by the universal category called "difference". Human
freedom becomes curtailed by the need to be different. In fact, contem-
porary advertising is an example of this need to be different. Fashion
houses, restaurants and car manufacturers all appeal to the individual
by enticing her or him to be different by purchasing and employing
their respective products. The appeal is to the uniqueness of the person,
but in fact the person is rendered the same as all other persons in so
far as he/she is being enticed to purchase the same object. The idea behind
such advertising is to ensure the difference of the person via the pos-
session or use of a certain product or service. What is even more tragic
is the manipulation of the content of the category difference. Supposedly,
one would think, at least theoretically, that difference would be an empty
concept waiting for its Gehalt from the human person. What we have,
in fact though, is the category of difference already being prefixed by
those in an influential power structure, for example, media and adver-
tising conglomerates. The contemporary person finds it hard to create
in the sense that he or she does not know what or how to create, as this
is not encouraged in our highly technological and generally unreflec-
tive Western societies. 6 Postmodem thinking appeals to difference and
wishes it to remain an empty category, but in identifying difference as
opposed to the "mythical ideal unity", the person defines himself or
herself according to this overarching category, thereby rendering it more
difficult to actualise any real radical onto-personal poetic potentialities
other than "difference". In order for there to exist a true difference, we
must ask ourselves what is other than difference. It is our belief that a
coincidence of unity and difference is "other" to the postmodem dif-
ference. This theme will be elaborated later.
Ultimately, the human person is diverted from creating reality and
is called to invent differences which are ultimately unpresentable. Lyotard
THE ENDLICH UND EWIGE PHILOSOPHIE OF EDITH STEIN 375
remarks: "II faut enfin qu'il soit clair qu'il ne nous appartient pas de
fournir de la realite, mais d'inventer des allusions au concevable qui
ne peut etre presente". 7 Postmodernity is calling us to invent elusive
unpresentable differends, but it hesitates in affirming the possibility of
furnishing a reality of which the human person is central, for in furnishing
reality the human person poetically realises potentialities which passively
lie in the depth of her or his personal being. In this sense, post moder-
nity is dis-incarnational, for it does not fully realise the profundity of
what it means to be radically different as enacted and incarnated in
one's own personal poetic becoming. Postmodern difference is not about
poetic personal development, but about a logical relation which lies
external to the human person, yet which has the capability of defining
the individual person. In other words, the postmodern source of creativity
lies in an empty category called difference. The emphasis is not on
radically incarnated and created difference to be found and freely
expressed in the being of the human person, that is, without reference
to this definitive logical category called "difference".
This notion of dis-incarnation is intimately connected with our final
characterising quality of postmodernity, namely that of de-creation.
Earlier, we saw that creation was an incamational activity of personal
poiesis. De-creation does not so much refer to our personal difficulty
to create ourselves without referring to the "logos" of difference, rather
de-creation has to do more with a general attitude that one finds preva-
lent in western societies. This attitude can be described as one of
pessimistic a-realism. The term "pessimistic" is used to denote the under-
lying sense of hopelessness or cynicism which characterises the
contemporary mindset. Nietzsche recognised this general attitude when
he tragically pronounced the "death of God". There is a general sense
that the present state of affairs is not changeable and that the human
person can do nothing to really influence any kind of significant change.
We have become convinced of our im-potentiality, and therefore impo-
tence, to concretely effectuate any creative change. This attitude is
particularly prevalent among young people today. The "X" Generation
is an example of this sense of impotence. This nameless generation has
no name to distinguish itself from any other generation that has preceded
itself. It lacks an identity, despite the appeals for difference.
The term "a-realism" refers to the prevalent trend to run away from
reality. Nietzsche's and Vattimo's appeals to art as "salvific" are proof
of this move to a-realism. Rather than confront and change reality,
Nietzsche takes refuge in "tragedy", as it somehow tempers the painful

reality of existence. Being for Nietzsche is dark and painful - destruc-
tive in the full sense of the word. We are helpless and cannot change
this dark origin, but we can flee from its wrath in the guise of a rhap-
sodic Dionysian art. Postmodem thinking tends to emphasise this
Nietzschean vision of escaping the dark origin through some kind of aes-
thetic reprieve. (Vide Lyotard's newer works on Kant where ethical
judgements are aestheticised.) There is an attempt to escape or avoid a
painful reality - a-realism.
An example of this would be to examine again the messagers of
popular culture as concretised in the advertising world. The emphasis
is on beauty and youth. What is beautiful is being defined by a seem-
ingly eternal parade of youthful models and images. In a sense we are
running away from our own aging and mortality. What we will attempt
to do by exploring some of Stein's reflections is to face this finite reality
which confronts the human person, and make some sense of it. We hope
to counter the sense of pessimism with a genuine sense of hope.
Moreover, we wish to face reality, rather than avoid it. In summary,
pessimistic a-realism can be described as the contemporary propensity
to despair. In order to counter or remedy this despair, we find an ever
increasing move to avoid or flee reality as it confronts us in all of its
savage brutality. This pessimistic a-realism is de-creative in the sense
that it automatically and unreflectively assumes that which is given,
namely the created order, is something dark and negative (Nietzsche,
Heidegger). Why, we must ask, is that which is given in the created order
viewed as dark or destructive? Why is it not viewed as a plenitudo?
Hence, de-creation describes the contemporary attitude of viewing the
created order, or being, in a dark and negative light as opposed to a
fullness or a plenitudo.
II. EDITH STEIN REVISITED
In the foregoing section we described three prominent characteristics

of postmodemity: difference, dis-incarnation and de-creation. We now
tum our attention to a Steinian-inspired response to the~e three post-
modem attributes. We will draw our reflections principally from Stein's
Habilitationschrift, Endliches und ewiges Sein. Following in the foot-
steps of Augustine, Descartes and Husserl, Stein begins with the
undeniability of the living or being of the ego. Every time Stein expe-
riences something, every time the ego undergoes some experiential

change, every time I wish, desire, think, one cannot help but affirm the
existence of an ego - an ego which allows one to affirm the living con-
creteness of this very ego. Granted that the content of the experience
of the ego may be dubious, nevertheless one cannot deny the persis-
tence of an ego which lies behind that content, or in Kantian language,
that which makes that experience possible. 8 Concomitant with the cer-
tainty of the ego which lies behind all expressions or thoughts is the
certainty of the being of that being. This sense of being is non-reflexive
and posits itself before all reflexive thought. It is this given reality of
the certainty of the being of a non-reflexive ego which causes the ego
to investigate the being and nature of that ego which lies behind my expe-
riences, thoughts and acts. 9 There is a constant givenness of the being
of an ego which lies behind experience.
Besides analysing sensory, volitional and general acts to determine the
existence of the ego, Stein employs the insights of Hedwig Conrad-
Martius10 on the nature of time to show that what lies behind the
possibility of the ego is being itself. Stein affirms that every moment
in time, whether past, present or future has not come to enact itself,
for it is only projected or anticipated. The present is a moment which
we can never grasp, for when we try to seize it, it already is past. Time
considered in itself is always something which can never be grasped fully.
Despite this ever fleeing consciousness of time, there is still present a
continuum or unity (Erlebniseinheiten) of experiences rooted in time. We
are not completely free from the moments (past, present and future) of
time, yet we do not possess them in any concrete sense. Something
must underlie this temporal progression in order that it take on its con-
scious form as a unity of lived experiences. Paraphrasing Martius, Stein
remarks, "Die 'ontische Geburtsstatte der Zeit' liegt 'in der vollak-
tuellen Gegenwartigkeit'; darin, daB 'aktuelle Existenz ... eine bloBe
Beriihrung mitto dem Sein ... in einem Punkt' ist, ein Gegebenes und
zugleich 'als Gegebenes ein Genommenes', ein 'Hangen zwischen
Nichtsein und Sein' ... Im 'Existenzberiihrungspunkte ist Zeit' ". 11 That
point or nucleus wherein the unity of experiences of time conscious-
ness "take place" serves as a confirmation of an ego which lies behind
our experiences of time. An ego which exists and which is a unifying
centre of experience.
What is the nature of that "sense of being" which accompanies the
experience of the ego? Martin Heidegger maintains that Dasein comes
to have a sense of its being (ousia) when confronted with the possi-
bility of its non-being, an undeniable occasion for angst. Stein
acknowledges the validity of the early Heidegger's insight, however
she believes that his characterisation of the being of Dasein as angst-
ridden is an experience of Dasein which is not sustained as a constant.
Heidegger's analysis is too negative. 12 For Stein, we are not haphaz-
ardly thrown into Being, but Being is given to the human person - it
is a received being. The way in which we comport ourselves in our Being
is marked by a great sense of security in the sense that we are not respon-
sible for our Being, yet from moment to moment we are maintained or
preserved in our Being despite this possibility of not-Being. Stein pas-
sionately affirms a preservation in Being as opposed to a Sein zum Tode.
Denn der unleugbaren Tatsache, daB mein Sein ein fliichtiges, von Augenblick zu
Augenblick gefristetes und der Moglichkeit des Nichtseins ausgesetztes ist, entspricht
die andere ebenso unleugbare Tatsache, daB ich trotz dieser Fliichtigkeit bin und von
Augenblick zu Augenblick im Sein erhalten werde und in meinem fliichtigen Sein ein
dauemdes umfasse. Ich weiB mich gehalten und babe darin Rube und Sicherheit - nicht
die selbstgewisse Sicherheit des Mannes, der in eigener Kraft auf festem Boden steht, aber
die siiBe und selige Sicherheit des Kindes, das von einem starken Arm getragen wird -
eine, sachlich betrachtet, nicht weniger vemiinftige Sicherheit. Oder ware das Kind
"vemiinftig", das bestanding in der Angst lebte, die Mutter konnte es fallen lassen? 13
Stein described being by employing the metaphor of a child who is being

sustained by strong arms. The child has no fear of falling or being hurt.
There is a sense of peaceful security. What lies behind Stein's descrip-
tion is the full sense of being - a plenitudo omnitudinis. Heidegger has
chosen to see being in terms of a liberating authenticity through death.
As Arendt rightfully noted, Heidegger is the philosopher of death. Stein
wishes to affirms the experience of that which sustains life and for which
we have no control. This being is freely given to us - a gift.
Why this meditation on being? First, we hope to bring out a sense
of fullness or hope in the experience of our received being. Without
this sense of being preserved, it would be impossible to project any future
plans or anticipate any future goals. For example, most times when we
say good-bye to a very close friend, we are not grasped by a feeling of
dread or angst at the possibility of their non-being. On the contrary, there
is usually a great sense of joy and peace. Joy, at having seen and inter-
acted with this beloved friend. Peace, in that there is the expectation
that we shall see the person again. How do we know that this is not a
false or illusory sense of security in being? Our life experience tells us
that it is most likely that we will continue to live and be able to expe-
rience this peace and joy of the friendly encounter once again. There
is a sort of "sensible" or "experiential" guarantee that issues forth from
being itself. This guarantee cannot be dissected entirely by human reason,
but there is an ineffable sense of the continuity of being that tacitly
supports every one of our acts. This tacit sense of fullness lies in oppo-
sition to the de-creative spirit which has profoundly marked postmodern
societies. We can face and transfigure the darkness or absurdity of being,
especially death, but we must be willing to listen and respond to the
gentle and graceful invitations offered to us by that ultimate Being, the
Prime Being, who has given us and maintains our personal beings. We
must attune ourselves, in the fullness of our beings, to the support
(hypostasis) who has loved our personal existence into being. Because
we are supported and our beings given to us, we should not feel con-
stantly oppressed or overwhelmed at the possibility of our death. To
do so would be to deny the fact that "we live" and that "we are", first
and foremost. That this living and being are incarnations of divine love,
is, for Stein, of essential importance, for it is the genuine starting point
for any possible and meaningful personal poiesis. To the general de-
creativity or despair which marks postmodern thinking, Stein offers a ray
of hope- hope which is experienced daily, but to whose reality we are
often insensitive.
The second reason why we brought forward an analysis of Stein's
notion of "being kept in being" is to reintroduce the possibility of a
"grand narrative" or a foundational ground which is common to every
human person, namely the ground of personal being. Behind every dif-
ference lies the human person and it is the existence of the human person,
that is, the act of the person's being, which makes possible or distin-
guishable any difference. That which is radically other to difference
and serves as the background against which it can be perceived, is a
radical unity. We see this radical unity concretised in Stein's notion of
a universally and factually received datum called being. This unity called
being is not to be conceived of as a unity of identity, but as what the
Scholastics called a distributive unity, wherein there is a coincidence
of individuated entities and an inherent unity which bonds all of these
individua. The Scholastics spoke of the relation between genus and
species. The genus "tree" is composed of various species of trees like
oak, maple and pine. And so within this unifying context of being, we
too can speak of differentiated individuals whom are all simultaneously
being given or receiving their beings from a source other than themselves.
Accompanying this fact of our being is the tacit feeling or sense that
we are being preserved securely in our individual beings. In a sense, post-
modernity has forgotten the Seinsfrage which Heidegger so rightly saw
as essential to understanding the human condition.
Thus far, we have made two claims. First, that the general sense of
de-creative despair is counteracted by a Steinian sense of an existen-
tially securing support which maintains us in our being. Second, we have
shown that the postmodem notion of difference, as negatively defined
against the myth of a unifying ground, can be counteracted by the ground
of being which is characterized by that same sense of "being kept" in
being previously mentioned. Now we move on to consider the problem
of difference. It was argued previously that difference was too much of
a logical and unrelational category. It was not incarnate enough. How
does Stein resolve this problem of difference? Stein speaks of individ-
uation and makes reference to the Scholastic notion of the principium
individuations. For Thomas Aquinas, radical difference or individua-
tion had as its principle prime matter. Stein ultimately rejects this notion
of prime matter as differentiating or individualising things, for then that
would ultimately make everyone collapsible to a great unity of matter,
a great individual, something which certain Neo-Platonist Renaissance
thinkers, like Giordano Bruno, saw as tenable. Stein wants to prevent this
possibility of reducing or collapsing the personal individual to a great
individual called matter. Like the postmodems, Stein wishes to affirm the
irreducibility of the human person. Hence, she views the human person
as being essentially composed of body, soul and spirit. This is a universal
condition of the human person in so far as it is a reality in which all
human beings participate. Stein identifies the forma intellectualis as
the individuating principle which makes one human person both similar
and radically differentiated. This "intellectual form" is unitary in nature
in that it is given and received by all human persons by virtue of their
existence. Moreover, it has as its source, the Prime Being, namely, God.
What distinguishes each person as radically different or as an individual
is the ability to auto-determine one's actions and personal life freely;
second, there is an interiority (die Seele als "innere Burg") or space
wherein the human person can relate in a completely unique way with
God, the Creator. These are the propria which distinguish one person
from another, but more profoundly this is what allows the person to
develop as an individual. In other words, it is these two propria which
auto-define the person in his or her essence uniquely. Again there is a

unity posited in that these propria are given in being to all persons,
but each person is free to actualise this potentiality in a manner in
which she or he sees fit.
What does it mean to auto-determine oneself? In so far as each person
is free 14 to choose how to live or exact one's existence (the act of being),
one begins to create oneself in a uniquely personal way which cannot
be reduced to a relation of identity with another. Every free act, whether
rooted in desire, in the body or in the intellect, is a response to a solic-
itation and consists of seizing that which has been offered to the
individual. The way that individual actualises that which has been given
(potentiality) is unique to that individual.
Es wird damit nicht sein eigener Schopfer und nicht unbedingt frei: die Freiheit zur Selbst-
bestimmung ist ibm gegeben, und die "Lebendigkeit", die es in einer erwiihlten Richtung
entfaltert, ist ibm gegeben, und jede Tat ist Antwort auf eine Anregung und Ergreifen eines
Dargebotenen. Dennoch bleibt den freien Akten die Eigentiimlickeit des Sich-selbst-ein-
setzens, die die eigentlichst. Form personlichen Lebens ist. 15
Stein affirms that we do not fully actualise ourselves ab initio. This

possibility is given to us in the received gift of our personal being. The
way we choose to actualise this is what distinguishes one individual from
another while creating a personal identity.
Stein does not stop here. There is also something which is uniquely
personal which is essential to our being, but in no way is stagnant or one-
dimensional. She refers to the interior castle which lies within each
human being. She draws this metaphor from Teresa of Avila. There is
an inner sanctum or space where the individual can communicate with
the tri-personal God in a way which is both formative and supportive
- a space wherein love can come to enact or en-flesh itself ("in Fleisch
und Blut iibergeht"). This space is not empty, but is a space where we
can encounter, in a humanly personal form, the Prime Being - pleni-
tudo esse. This space is full, and to use the Biblical image of the Father's
House, it has many rooms wherein one can "personalise" with God,
that is, become more humanly personal. Quickly returning to our post-
modem discussion, Stein would respond that indeed we can speak of a
unique ground which unifies all things, namely the ground of being.
However, this unity is a differentiated unity which not only permits one
to be different from the other (ab alio ), but also allows this radical
individual to find a positive or cataphatic meaning to his or her personal
dwelling in the world. For Stein, unity and multiplicity are related and
coincidental. One cannot think of one without the other. In the post-
modern analysis, unity and multiplicity lie opposed to one another in
the sense of the aforementioned notion of the Gegenstand. Difference
becomes detached from what is 'other', namely unity.
We come now to the third and final characterising quality of post-
modernity: its tendency towards dis-incarnation. Dis-incarnation refers
to the difficulty in making concrete personal potentials without refer-
ence to the categorical logos we identified as difference. Unity and
difference are not only logical terms for Stein, but profoundly rooted and
enacted in both the human and divine worlds.
Act and potency were described by Stein as modes of our being. The
move from passio to actio is a creative move - a vertiable creatio. We
call this whole triadic process "incarnation". Every time we act, that
is, every time we respond to a certain calling or solicitation, whether
on the human or divine levels, we actualise our being. In other words,
we exist. The two aforementioned essential or "innermost" qualities we
described as rendering the human person uniquely personal are the keys
through which we auto-create or auto-personalise our being, that is,
give its unique form.
Und das lnnerste der Seele, ihr tigenstes und Geistigstes, ist kein farb- und gestaltloses,
sondern ein eigentiimlich geartetes: sie spiirt es, wenn sie "bei sich selbst", in "in sich
gesamelt" ist. Es lli6t sich nicht so fassen, daB man es mit einem allgemeinen Namen
nennen konnte, es ist auch nicht mit anderen vergleichbar. Es taBt sich nichy in
Eigenschaften, Charakterziigee u. dgl. zerlegen, wei! es tiefer liegt als sie: es ist das
Wie (poion) des Wesens selbst, das seiner seits jedem Charakterziig und jedem Verhalten
des Menschen seinen Stempel aufpliigt und den Schliissel zum Aufbau seines Charakters
bildet. 16
This creative or incarnational element is the way in which we express

our personal being. What is important to remember is the fact that this
auto-personalisation is in the process of becoming. We are not stagnant
beings, as our personal liberty gives us the possibility of not being fixed
in one unmoveable position. There is a freedom to choose the way in
which we want to be and become. Postmodernity has lost a sense of
this possibility to auto-personalise. Incarnation has become difficult,
given that there is this emphasis on difference which we see to be
defined in negative and logical terms. The emphasis is not on personal
being and becoming, but on something which we ought to make unpre-
sentable. Let us recall the words of Lyotard, "II faut enfin ... inventer
des allusions au concevable qui ne peut etre presente" . 17 The creative

possibility of incarnation, which defines the human person, has lost its
prominence within the Spielraum which is postmodemity.
If the emphasis is on actualising that which is uniquely personal about
us, then is it not conceivable that we need no interaction with the "other"?
Are we not in the same boat as the postmodems, a boat of radical dif-
ference? Certainly, we can posit a unitary ground called being, but we
still are all radically differentiated egos - the differentiated ego being
a more accessible or immediate reality to the person than this encom-
passing unity called "being". In other words, is it not easier for the person
to dwell in his or her own being, without respect to other differenti-
ated beings, that is, a distributive unity of differentiated individuals? Stein
would admit that this is a possibility given in freedom, but to exclusively
do so is selfish and would derive more from a choice not to follow, in
a sense, what one is naturally disposed to follow by means of grace;
hence, arises the problem of evil and the misdirection of the will which
it entails. Stein would respond to the postmodem challenge by refer-
ring the thinker to the ontological structure of the ego. This ego is not
to be conceived as a numeric unity, that is, as one person. Like Kant
who speaks of a "we" when he refers to the transcendental subject,
Stein makes a similar distinction. Stein says that the ego expresses an
opposition to itself in the form of a "you" which lies opposed to the
ego. What makes the experience of both egos possible as a unitary
experience of persons is an experience of the "we" underlying the indi-
vidual ego and the "you". Stein's insight is valid here in the sense that
she recognises as proper to the personal essence a community of egos. 18
There is no such thing as a pure isolated ego, but a community of egos
- a communitas personae. Postmodemity in its treatment of the individual
has dismembered the individual from the societal or communal context
within which she or he is en-fleshed. The emphasis is on an individuum
absolutum, the Nietzschean Ubermensch.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceding comments and reflections were designed to show three

basic points in counterdistinction to the described trends in postmodem
thought. First, that a unitary ground of being is possible while still pre-
serving radical personal difference. Difference cannot be conceived
without reference to this unitary foundation. Second, that a genuine and
personal creation (incarnation) is possible given the structures of the

aforementioned being, which is to be understood as an esse communis.
Third, that our being is sustained and received. This datum should give
us the possibility to hope and rest secure in our being as opposed to being
thwarted by the darkness, absurdity or the possibility of the non-being
of our being.
These aforementioned reflections are rooted in the philosophical reflec-
tions of Edith Stein. Stein was acutely aware of the fullness of being
which characterised her life and the life of the Lebenswelt. This fullness
is rooted in love which is profoundly intimate and personal, and is the
ultimate condition of possibility of all of the created order. Love is some-
thing which personalises the human being and makes him or her a
relational or communal creature. Like our personal being which is given,
sustained and created anew in freedom, so too must our relations with
others, divine and human, be received (passio), sustained (actio) and
created anew (creatio). This is what incarnation is about. In a sense,
this is what we have been called to do in our very personal creatureli-
ness. Postmodemity, with its emphasis on difference concomitant with
its absolutising propensities, makes it difficult for a genuine discussion
and enactment of personal love to occur, for this implies a certain mode
of being which includes action, passivity (a letting be - patior) and a
creative flow. For postmodemity, the emphasis is on a mode of being
called difference which tends to almost totally define the creative process
of personal becoming (poiesis) - a too-logical category. Postmodemity
has tended to collapse the ordo essendi to the ordo cognoscendi (i.e.,
logical difference). Stein reminds us that communal love (agape) is the
ultimate ground of our existence and makes our personal beings not
only possible, but calls them to be complete (perfect) .
. . . die Liebe tragt den Stempel der personlichen Eigenan. Und das macht es wiederum
verstandlich, daB Gott sich in jeder Menschenseele eine "eigene" Wohnung geschaffen
haben mag, damit die gottliche Liebesfiille durch die Mannigfaltigkeit verschiedengean-
eter Seelen einen weiteren Spielraum fiir ihre Mitteilung fande. 19
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Belgium
THE ENDLICH UND EWIGE PH/LOSOPHIE OF EDITH STEIN 385
NOTES
1 Lyotard, Le Postmoderne explique aux enfants, pp. 26-27. Hereafter referred to as
Lyotard. Paris: Editions Galilee, 1988.
2 It is not our intention to nominate and critique the more influential postmodern thinkers.
Such an enterprise would be beyond the time and space constraints of this paper. Rather,
our intention is to present what we see as the characteristic qualities of contemporary
continental postmodern philosophy, which claims to have drawn some of its principal
insights from phenomenology.
3 See Jean-Frant;ois Lyotard's L'Enthousiasme. Paris: Editions Galilee, 1986.
4 This is to be understood in the Steinian sense where each individual has a personal
essence which escapes a complete determinate and phenomenological reduction.
5 By spiritual flesh, we understand something which is not composed of physical matter.
For example, an intention to carry out some act out of charity, such as to pray for someone,
has no physical matter within which it can actualise itself. The intention (intellectual
idea) concretises or incarnates itself on the spiritual level- the flesh becomes spiritualised.
6 This lack of encouragement to self-poeticise can be seen in the ready and gross
number of self-help books found in most popular bookstores today. The source of our own
personal onto-genesis does not lie within the intimate being of our own persons, but is
being more and more determined by external forces, that is, by what other people think
we should be with respect to health, psychology and general well-being. This, in our
opinion, is a sign of the general unreflectivity which characterises our age.
7 Lyotard, p. 27.
8 " ich kann es dahingestelt sein lassen, ob das Ding, das ich mit meinen Sinnen
wahrnehme, wirk lich existiert oder nicht - aber die Wahrnehmung als sole he lliBt sich
nicht durchstreichen; ich kann bezweifeln, ob die ScluBfolgerung, die ich ziehe, richtig
ist - aber das scluBfolgernde Denken ist eine unbezweifelbare Tatsache; und so all mein
Wiinschen und Wollen, mein Trliumen und Hoffen, mein Freuen und Trauern- kurz
alles, worin ich lebe und bin, was sich als das Sein des sein(er) selbst bewuBten lch
selbst gibt".
Edith Stein,"Endliches und ewiges Sein", in Werke, vol. II, E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain,
1950, p. 35. Hereafter cited as EES.
9 "Diese Seinsgewillheit ist eine 'unreflektierte' GewiBheit, d.h. sie liegt vor allem 'riick-
gewandten' Denken, mit dem der Geist aus der urspriinglichen Haltung seines den
Gegenstlinden zugewandten Lebens heraustritt, urn auf sich selbst hinzublicken. Versenkt
sich aber der Geist in solcher Riickwendung in die einfache Tatsache seines Seins, so wird
sie ibm zu einer drei-fachen Frage: Was ist das Sein, dessen ich inne bin? Was ist das
lch, das seines Seins inne ist? Was ist die geistige Regung, in der ich bin und mir meiner
und ihrer bewuBt bin?" EES, p. 36.
10 "Die Zeit", Philosoph Anzeiger II, 2 u 4, 1927-28.
11 EES, p. 39.
12 "Die Angst ist freilich durchschnittlich nicht das beherrschende Lebensgefiihl. Sie wird
es in Flien, die wir als krankhaft bezeichnen, aber normalerweise wandeln wir in einer
groBen Sicherheit, als sei unser Sein ein fester Besitz". EES, pp. 55-56.
13 EES, pp. 56-57.
14 We must realise that freedom or liberty is not to be understood in the tradition of

German idealism as a fiir sich, but as conditioned by interior and exterior forces. Stein
is very conscious of the possibility of living under circumstances which inhibit the full
realisation to auto-determine oneself. Stein develops this idea in her treatment of the
state. For further information on this subject the reader is encouraged to consult Stein's
Uber den Staat in Jarbuch fiir Philosophie und phenomenologische Forschung 7 (1925),
1-117.
15 EES, pp. 313-314.
16 EES, p. 458.
17 Lyotard, pp. 26-27.
18 EES, pp. 328-329.
19 EES, p. 462.
IDDO LANDAU
MEISTER ECKHART ON TEMPORALITY

AND THE "NOW"
A Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Interpretation
The paradoxical nature of mystical theories, makes them difficult to

explain. Meister Eckhart's thinking is no exception. Various attempts have
been made to employ phenomenological-hermeneutical tools to make
sense of it. 1 Reliance on the direct data of consciousness, pre-under-
standing, empathy, or metaphor helps explain the mystical phenomenon
in ways in which non-hermeneutical-phenomenological accounts cannot.
My aim in this essay is twofold. First, to suggest a variant of the phe-
nomenological-hermenutical method which can render Meister Eckhart's
(and others') mystical teachings more understandable. Second, to explain
Meister Eckhart's teachings on the "now" - a theme which in many
phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretations of his theory has hitherto
been neglected. In Part 1 I present the characteristics of this method.
In Part 2 I exemplify its use by applying it to Meister Eckhart's teach-
ings on the "now".
Like other phenomenological and hermeneutical interpretations of Meister

Eckhart, the one suggested here is marked by understanding through
empathy rather than through reducing the phenomenon to another set
of terms (e.g., physiological, psychological) supposed to be more basic
or understandable. The mystical experience is taken to make sense in
itself, and its interpretation is intended to help readers understand by
bringing them closer to the mystic's state of mind. The interpretation
is meant, then, to enable readers to grasp the mystical experience by
arousing feelings analogous, in some ways, to those of the mystic.
Likewise, as with other hermeneutical interpretations, this interpre-
tation supposes some pre-understood intuition of the mystical experience
and sympathy towards it on the part of the reader. The interpretation elab-
orates some kind of pre-understanding of the mystical experience, even
if it be a very vague one, rather than providing new information. Because
the interpretation relies on this pre-understanding, it is somewhat circular.
387

388 IDDO LANDAU
Similarly, like other hermeneutical interpretations, it is not aimed at

everyone. The methodology is not intersubjective in the sense that it is
impossible for any rational being not to understand it. People with a
total disregard for the mystical experience cannot understand it. Those
who are left completely "cold" by mystical culture, then, will not find
the following discussion of any help.
The interpretation suggested here is, however, different from some
other phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretations in its emphasis
on the interrelations among the different characteristics of the interpreted
phenomenon. The issue under question is explained by showing how
its different characteristics cohere. Since each characteristic is both expli-
cans and explicandum, there is no one correct starting point for the
explanation; we can start off with any of the characteristics and show,
from that viewpoint, how it is related to the others. Then we can pick
another characteristic and discuss its relations to all the others, including
to the first. A complete explanation is one in which the interrelations
between all the characteristics are discussed. Graphically, such an expla-
nation would look like a collection of dots where all the dots are
connected by lines to all the others, so that there is no dot which is not
interrelated with all the other dots, both directly and indirectly.
To be sure, others also discuss to some extent this characteristic of
hermeneutical explanations. Dilthey, for example, observes the circu-
larity present in the fact that, on the one hand, in order to understand
the whole the parts must first be understood and, on the other, the parts
cannot be understood if the whole is not first understood. 2 This
whole/parts circularity exists (even if not as emphatically) in the method
of interpretation suggested here; Dilthey, however, does not put as much
emphasis on the circularity among the parts of the interpreted phenom-
enon as is suggested here.
Another point of difference between some other phenomenological-
hermeneutical methods and the one suggested here is that whereas they
(e.g., Heidegger's) do not provide a place for atemporal and non-lin-
guistic phenomena such as the mystical experience, the present approach
does. (Indeed, the very term used by Heidegger to refer to the three
dimensions of temporality, "ecstases", would in Meister Eckhart's teach-
ings denote an atemporal state.)3 Moreover, no elaborate terminology
is needed to employ the phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation
suggested here.
In what follows I shall give an example of how this hermeneutical
ECKHART ON TEMPORALITY 389
interpretation can be employed to clarify some of Meister Eckhart's

mystical teachings. I shall not be able, however, to present a complete
account of Eckhart's mystical theory. Instead, I shall limit myself to
discussing it only from the viewpoint of one of its characteristics - the
non-temporality in "nowness". 4 Thus, I shall not attempt here to show
how all the characteristics are interrelated, but only how nowness is
related to some of the most important of them.
II
Meister Eckhart says baffling things about the mystical experience. He

says that when we are in the sublime state we are in a perfect now and
time does not exist for us, 5 that this now is an unceasing now,6 and that
although nothing changes during the sublime state, every second of it
is new for us. 7 He typifies the mystical experience as being complete,
homogeneous, real and certain. 8 He tells us that if we want to achieve
the mystical experience we should not try to achieve it9 and that the
mystical experience is achieved at once and immediately. 10 Moreover,
he says, in effect, that the real self is no self, 11 and he sees rationality
and language as obstacles to the mystical experience. 12
These statements seem puzzling, if not completely nonsensical or
straightforwardly wrong. We feel that it is impossible, for example, that
time should cease to exist. Similarly, it seems to be a contradiction that
although nothing changes in the sublime state, every second will still
be new. Moreover, why in order to achieve the mystical experience should
we not try to achieve it? How can these and other expressions be
explained?
Let us start with what Meister Eckhart says about being in the now.
To understand his expressions about time we should remember that he
does not refer to objective time but to our phenomenological temporality,
i.e., our being in time. How are we phenomenologically in time? We
can be in our past, for example, when we regret that we did things the
way we did and wish we had done them otherwise. Or, we can be in
the past by having memories and being happy or sad because present
things are not the way they were. Similarly, we can be in the future
when we worry about what will happen. We are in the future when we
have ambitions, plan how to achieve them and speculate about different
possibilities.
Although I have brought up our being in the past and our being in
390 IDDO LANDAU
the future separately, they are, as Heidegger and others have shown so
elaborately, intermingled with each other. When we plan for the future,
for example, we rely on past experience, and what we remember is
usually relevant for our future activity. Moreover, past and future are also
intermingled with what is usually called our being in the present; we
are now doing things which are relevant for future possibilities and are
influenced by what has happened to us in the past. 13
We are always in the present in another way as well. When we are
in the past or the future we are aware that we are thinking about them
in the present. When we are conscious that the future will come and is
ahead of us, and that the past has gone and is behind us, we are neces-
sarily also conscious of the fact that we are conscious of them now. If
we did not know that we were conscious of them now, we could not know
that they are past and future. Our consciousness of the future or of the
past, then, is always relative to our consciousness of the now.
But when Meister Eckhart calls on us to be only and completely in
the now in the sublime state, he is not referring to the now or the present
in the regular sense. The present in the regular sense (the sense used
by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) is nothing more than that which has
just been in the very near past or is just starting to happen in the very
near future. Even if we try to narrow down what we usually call the
present, we shall find ourselves busy with what is actually the very
near past and future, and not the present. Further, Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty show us that when we are in this so-called "present", we are
never only in it; this "present" (or close past plus close future) is always
connected and experienced in view of the further future and past.
Thus, if by "being in the now" we mean being on the very "razor's
edge" second of what we are doing now, and not what we have just
done or are about to do, we are very rarely in the now. We are usually
also in the now, because we are always conscious that what we are
doing we are doing now; but we are not, in all these cases, only in the
now.
This complete nowness, moreover, does not change from one second
to another; every now is identical to the others before and after it, and
thus there are no changes when the I is in this state. Hence we have
the feeling of the "unceasing now", "unchanging now", or "eternal now"
of which Meister Eckhart speaks.
Notwithstanding the fact that the complete now is unchanging, it is
always new. In each and every second we are conscious only of the
thinking that happens in that very second, and of nothing else, including
the thinking occurring in the previous or coming seconds. Thus, the
nowness in every second cannot be compared to that in the previous
one. If there were comparability and continuity between these now-points,
we would not be thinking only about the thinking which is now thinking,
but also about previous thinking, and thus we would stop being in the
now and be in the future or in the past. Thus, every second in the
complete now is disconnected from all other seconds and nows, which
explains Meister Eckhart's saying that although there is no difference
between the nows, being in the now is always new.
The sublime state is also complete. Our regular future or past tem-
poralities are incomplete; when we are in the future, typified by our
ambitions and plans, we feel we lack something we hope to achieve.
Similarly, when we are in the past, typified by memories, we feel that
something is past and gone. These two temporalities of our everyday
life are characterised by feelings of striving and loss.
However, since in the nowness the only thing we are thinking about
- viz., the thinking itself - is fully present, we do not feel we lack
anything. To put it differently, when the subject and object of thinking
are not the same, the object can either exist or not exist, and when it does
not exist it can be missed. When the subject and object of thinking are
the same, the object is necessarily there, and thus cannot be missed.
Hence, the state of being-now is a state of non-striving.
For similar reasons, the experience of nowness is also an experience
of reality and certainty. Part of our consciousness of what will come -
our future - is awareness that in the present it is unreal and uncertain.
Similarly, part of our consciousness of what is gone and does not exist
any more- our past- is awareness that now, in the present, it is unreal.
We are also not completely free from doubt as to whether the past was
indeed exactly as we remember it. In the nowness, in contrast, it is impos-
sible for the object of thinking not to exist, since it is also the subject
of thinking. When we are in the future and in the past, when the subject
and object of thinking are different, there is the possibility that the object
will not be or has not been as we think it. But when the subject and object
are identical in nowness, the consciousness which happens now is com-
pletely present to itself. Thus, in nowness we experience reality and
certainty.
One of Meister Eckhart's most paradoxical sayings is that we should
not strive for the sublime state if we want to achieve it. 14 However, in
392 IDDO LANDAU
the light of what consideration of the characteristics of nowness previ-

ously considered tells us, this exhortation sounds less odd. The more
we strive, the more we have before us an object and thus the further
we are from the state in which the subject is its own object. To describe
the same thing in another way, the more we strive, the more we enter
the future and, thus, the less are we in the now; the more we try to achieve
something, the more we are in a state of incompleteness and thus the
further we are from the possibility of feeling the completeness of the
mystical experience.
Thus, if we want to achieve the state of complete nowness, we should
just let ourselves be and not strive for it; we should just let it happen.
We should not be or do for the sake of anything, but simply be or do
for the sake of being or doing. Hence, we cannot decide by any tech-
nical means when a mystical experience will happen to us and how
long it will last. All we can do is to avoid what we know would hinder
it, such as intending strongly to reach it or concentrating on its partic-
ulars. Reaching the mystical state and staying in it are accomplished with
complete effortlessness and acceptance, without intending to reach it and
without clinging to anything.
This also explains why entering the mystical experience can only be
done instantaneously, and not gradually and bit by bit. Since our expe-
rience in the state of nowness is one of completeness, experiencing
partiality will not bring us nearer to nowness but take us farther away.
In the sublime state we also experience homogeneity. Our awareness
in itself is taken by Eckhart to be simple. Thus, if there were any par-
ticulars before the mind, it would not be about itself, and hence also
not in the nowness. Once the most basic distinction there is, that of
subject and object, disappears, there is no more place for any distinctions
to remain in the mind.
Meister Eckhart also calls on those who want to attain mystical expe-
rience to let go of their ego, get rid of their phenomenal self and thus
reach their true self. In the nowness we can be seen as thinking about
ourselves. But this "self" is very different from the future-and-past self
which we experience in our daily life. While our everyday self is made
up of regrets and memories, plans and aspirations, the real self is com-
pletely homogeneous. None of the things that make up our normal
personal self and life exist in our real self. Thus it can be said that in
complete nowness, in the mystical experience, we have no self. Since
we experience reality in the nowness, we feel that there is more reality
in this "no-self" than in the regular future-and-past self. For this reason
Meister Eckhart thinks that our everyday self is one of lies and appear-
ances, and summons us to get rid of it. For the same reasons he
recommends the virtue of humility. 15
It should be noted that we do not know the self (or any other thing
in the complete nowness) in the third person, but only in the first. As
shown above, objects are connected with past and future conscious-
ness, not with now-consciousness. When we think about anything,
including the self, in the past or the future we "objectify" it, we think
of it in the third person. But in the now the self is known in the first
person. In nowness we are not aware of the self as an object, but rather
live it as a subject; we do not know the self, we are not even aware of
it, but it is our very awareness.
Like many other mystics, Meister Eckhart takes language and rational
thinking to be obstacles to the mystical experience and therefore
recommends that we try to free ourselves from what he sees as our obses-
sive habit of using them. The communication of the mystical experience,
to Meister Eckhart, can only distort it. There are several reasons for
this aversion to language and rational thinking, all of which have to do
with the difference between the nature of the mystical experience and
the nature of language. Rational thinking and language advance step
by step; they are discursive. But in this they are alien to the mystical
experience, which is achieved immediately and all at once. Further, the
discursiveness of language and rationality is connected with their
temporal character. Expression and thinking take time and are done in
time. Every sentence and every reasoning process (even 2 + 2 = 4) occurs
in time, and what has been and what will be are combined in it. Thus,
language and rationality can only be obstacles to achieving mystical expe-
rience. Besides, as shown above, there are no distinctions in the complete
nowness; it is completely homogeneous. Language and rational thinking,
on the other hand, are built on distinctions, comparisons and categories.
In all these ways language and rationality are inappropriate for
achieving, being in, conceiving of, and communicating the mystical expe-
rience. The mystical experience is irrational in its essence and if we want
to achieve it we must let go of our rational prejudice. For this reason
Meister Eckhart and other mystics use paradoxes, plain contradictions
and even nonsense when they discuss the mystical experience. 16 These
are meant to convey the nature of the experience and to help the audience
achieve it. 17
394 IDDO LANDAU
Partiality, dubitability, change and diversity- the characteristics of our

being in the future and the past - are associated with false or inferior
being in the philosophical and Christian tradition in which Meister
Eckhart lived and thought. Completeness, reality, and homogeneity, on
the other hand, are associated in this tradition with God and true being. 18
Hence, Meister Eckhart sees our being in the future and the past, which
seems - to the uninitiated - to be real being, as inferior being or non-
being. In complete nowness, in contrast, we have the characteristics of
true being or Being, which are also the characteristics of God. Thus,
through nowness, we find ourselves in God, and unio mystica with Him
is achieved.
University of Haifa
NOTES
1 Niklaus Largier, Zeit, Zeitlichkeit, Ewigkeit: Ein Aufriss des Zeitproblems bei Dietrich
von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart (Bern: Peter Lang, 1989); Donald F. Duclow,
"Hermeneutics and Meister Eckhart", Philosophy Today 28 (1984): 36-43; John D. Caputo,
The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1978); Reiner Schiinnann, Meister Eckhart, Mystic and Philosopher (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1978); Emil Winkler, Exegetische Methoden bei Meister Eckhart
(Tiibingen: Mohr, 1965); and J. Koch, "Sinn und Struktur der Schriftsauslegungen", in
Meister Eckhart der Predigter, ed. Udo Maria Nix and R. Ochslin (Freiburg: Herder, 1960).
2 Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aujbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften,
ed. Bernard Groethuysen, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 7 (Stuttgart and Gi>ttingen: B. G.

Teubner and Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), p. 131.
3 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 195 I), p. 329; Being
and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Basil Blackwell, 1962),
p. 377.
4 I shall explain what I mean by "nowness" below.
5 Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatise and Defence, trans.
E. Colledge and B. McGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), pp. 177-179; hereafter
cited as Essential Sermons; Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. R. B. Blakney
(New York: Harper and Row, 1941), pp. 136-137, 167; hereafter cited as Modern
Translation.
6 Ibid.
7 Essential Sermons, pp. 177, 179; Modern Translation, pp. 212-214.
8 Essential Sermons, pp. 179, 183, 188, 191,282, 288; Modern Translation, pp. 119-120,
122-123, 140-141, 188.

9 Essential Sermons, pp. 168-169, 172-173, 178, 183-184, 264-265; Modern
Translation, pp. 136-137.

10 Modern Translation, p. 121.
11 Essential Sermons, pp. 184, 190, 248, 260; Modern Translation, pp. 107, 131, 189,
191.
12 Essential Sermons, pp. 177, 182-184,204, 206; Modem Translation, pp. 107, 118-119,
165, 197-200, 215.
13 What has been presented here is, of course, an incomplete and rather simplified account
of Hiedegger's and Merleau-Ponty's views on this subject.
14 Eckhart's recommendation not to try is also connected with his discussions of detach-
ment, in e.g., Essential Sermons, pp. 177-178, 285-287.
15 E.g., in Essential Sermons, pp. 156, 190, 280-281, 294.
16 And in some cases (such as Zen Buddhism), they use humour, which also consists
of breaking and confusing categories.
17 Note, however, that some of the seeming paradoxes and contradictions can, in fact,
be made sense of, as has been done in this chapter concerning the necessity of trying
not to try, the unceasing now, the true self which is no self, or the now which is always
new.
18 Essential Sermons, pp. 178, 183, 188, 190, 197, 288; Modern Translation, pp. 120,
213.
DANIEL ZELINSKI
ZEN AND TYMIENIECKA'S

THREE MOVEMENTS OF THE SOUL
INTRODUCTION
Professor Tymieniecka's Logos and Life, Book Two: The Three

Movements of the Soul, which is part of a larger critique of Reason via
an analysis of human creativity, has received much recognition as a
groundbreaking work in the Phenomenology of Religion. 2 She herein
offers an overarching theory of spiritual development via a phenome-
nological analysis of spiritual/creative acts, which she claims are uniquely
human phenomena. These "pre-empirical stirrings" are not directly acces-
sible to consciousness, hence much of the early part of her work is
focused on uncovering the essential characteristics of these acts. Due
to time considerations, I will here solely focus on the fruits of her
analysis, the three movements of the soul. I will offer the briefest expli-
cation of each of these movements and then provide a comparative
analysis of them via the stages of mystical development suggested in
the Ox herding pictures of Zen Buddhism. I close with two suggestions
for further development.
THE THREE MOVEMENTS
The first movement, Radical Examination, begins when an individual

turns away from the everyday life world in search of meaning and
purpose to this finite and contingent existence. Tymieniecka claims that
this "disentanglement" from the social-life world in order to question
it, is a common aspect of all mystical traditions. Unfortunately, the soul
finds no answers to these questions - initially all personal projects are
found to be void of ultimate meaning.
However, the determined soul's drive for transcendence is unrelenting.
Hence, it continues its search for ultimate meaning to pass beyond the
contingency of the constituted world, but now via a drive for ideal
objects: Truth, Beauty, Justice, etc. This constitutes Tymieniecka's second
stage, Exalted Existence. Alas, again the search is found to be futile.
Frustration can easily lead to despair at this point. To continue the soul
397

398 DANIEL ZELINSKI
must realize that it is not alone and seek communication with others
and communion in the One.
The third stage, Towards Transcendence, begins with another shift
in perspective. Now the fulfillment of the unique human telos, the drive
for meaning, is not to be met by the attainment of any end, whether
personal or ideal. The search for and eventual attainment of the spiri-
tual life which characterizes this stage, is carried out via a pursuit of
union with the Ultimate, the One, and/or "everything-that-lives". This
telos receives grounding in concrete intuitions via ecstatic actions.
However these raptures are by no means an ending point, but instead
propel the soul forward to the spiritual life, which is the culmination
of the mystic's development. The new way of life is characterized by a
pervasive feeling of peace and serenity, by a desire to communicate
with others sharing this realization, and by an affective moral sense
("goodwill towards others").
SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ZEN OX-HERDING PICTURES
The Ox-herding pictures are the most famous depiction of stages of

mystical development in Zen. In the first picture, "Seeking the Ox", the
individual seems to fit perfectly into Tymieniecka's radical reflection.
Note the original commentary by Kuo-an Shih-yuan,
The Ox has never really gone astray, so why search for it? Having turned his back on
his True-nature the man cannot see it. Because of his defilements he has lost sight of
the Ox. Suddenly he finds himself confronted by a maze of crisscrossing roads. Greed
for wordly gain and dread of loss spring up like searing flames, ideas of right and wrong
dart out like daggers. 3
The search for the Ox is the search for ultimate meaning, for transcen-
dence. However, the individual is trapped in a maze, caught up in the
"defilements" of the world and the personal projects which it glorifies.
No genuine answers are to be found there.
In the second picture, "Finding the Tracks", the search is continued,
now with the awareness that personal ends are ultimately meaningless.
One realizes, "different shaped vessels are basically of the same gold and
each and every thing is a manifestation of the Self". 4 Here the indi-
vidual is clearly guided by the search for ideals. However again there
is dissapointment: "he is unable to distinguish good from evil, truth
from falsity. [Alas, h]e has not [yet] actually entered the gate". 5
TYMIENIECKA'S THREE MOVEMENTS OF THE SOUL 399
The following three pictures depict a difficult transition process, where

a new, deeper way of being is glimpsed and then all the more fervently
sought. This change in perspective and being, leads the soul to abandon
its search for ideals, and seems to be fully accomplished in picture 6,
Riding the Ox Home.
The struggle is over, 'gain' and 'loss' no longer affect him .... Astride the Ox's back,
he gazes serenely at the clouds above. 6
The subject is at peace with herself, in a state of repose character-

istic of Tymieniecka's final stage, towards transcendence. Both picture
7, Ox Forgotten- Self Alone, and picture 8, Both Ox and Self Forgotten,
clearly depict ecstatic states of unitive consciousness. Picture 7 begins,
"In the Dharma, there is no two-ness". Picture 8 begins, "All delusive
feelings have perished and ideas of holiness too have vanished". This
drawing, an empty circle which was once the last picture in the sequence,
depicted the Zen ideal of the pinnacle of spiritual experience (satori). 7
These perceptions of unity fit perfectly with Tymieniecka's characteri-
zation of Towards Transcendence. Moreover, in Zen, as in Tymieniecka's
theory, these exceptional states came to be seen not as the end of mystical
development but as sparks which infuse a more complete spiritual life.
This way of life is depicted in the tenth picture, Entering the
Marketplace with Helping Hands. Each of Tymieniecka's characteris-
tics of this way of life is present in this picture's commentary:
The gate of his cottage is closed and even the wisest cannot find him. His mental panorama
has finally disappeared. He goes his own way making no attempt to follow the steps of
earlier sages. Carrying a ground, he strolls into the market; leaning on his staff, he
returns home. He leads innkeepers and fishmongers in the Way of the Buddha.
Here there is an integrated awareness of unity, together with a feeling

of peace, a desire to share and commune with others, and a distinct moral
sense of goodwill - precisely the features which characterize the spiri-
tual life realized in Tymieniecka's Towards Transcendence stage:
TWO OBSERVATIONS
Mystical Being and Intentionality of Action

We have noted that the guiding/defining telos for each movement of
the soul is a drive to transcend the finiteness and contingency of human
existence. In the third stage and the spiritual life which it spawns, this
400 DANIEL ZELINSKI
drive takes the form of a pursuit of a realization of one's unity with

the Cosmos which is manifested by and advanced through ecstatic states
of consciousness.
However, it is important to note that Zen often emphasizes the impor-
tance of non-teleological consciousness. In the highest form of zazen,
shikan-taza, which literally means "just-sitting", this is clearly the case.
However, Zen does not merely contend that non-intentional conscious-
ness has a role in meditation; it insists that the same attitude should
pervade one's everyday life. D. T. Suzuki insisted, "Zen emphasizes
the purposelessness of work or being detached from teleological con-
sciousness [continously]". 9
This is a difficult notion to grasp. For anything to be accomplished,
for any work to be done - telos is essential. Hence, Zen exponents
contend that enlightenment involves the maintenance of both (seem-
ingly incompatible) types of consciousness. For the enlightened Zen
individual, ends are present but not in the ordinary way. This is clearly
the case in the notion, wei wu wei (literally, "acting through nonac-
tion"), which Zen inherited from Taoism.
But what are we to make of this "unordinary" presence? Clearly, in
Zen the action, "the play", is always the primary focus and not the guiding
telos. Also, the enlightened individual does not identify with any telos
no matter how lofty. I believe that this lack of identification is helpful
in explaining the concept of selflessness, an idea which is prevelent
throughout the mystical literature and elevated to dogma in Buddhism.
Mysticism and Morality

One last observation. Mysticism is often charged with seeking a per-
spective which leaves morality behind and hence with being amoral. This
is one line of argument in Arthur Danto's Mysticism and Morality, for
example. 10 It is not to hard to see how this criticism can emerge from
a superficial reading of the mystical literature, since there are frequent
assertions in most major mystical traditions of claims of transcendence
of dualities of good/evil and right/wrong.
In two footnotes to her section on Radical Examination, Tymieniecka
comments on the neo-Taoist text, The Biography of Master Great Man. 11
Here Juan Chi expounds the emptiness and crudeness of social values and
contrasts them with the way of the Perfect Man. "The Perfect Man has
no affairs: the Universe is his concern. He knows no distinctions of 'true'
TYMIENIECKA'S THREE MOVEMENTS OF THE SOUL 401
and 'false', no difference between 'good' and 'bad"'Y Tymieniecka sum-

marizes, "In short, even 'morality' is the reason for human misery,
whereas going to the Great Beginnings we reach a state beyond good and
evil, true and false - the wisdom of life". 13
It appears at first glance that Tymieniecka here follows the com-
mon association of mystical/spiritual life with amorality. However,
Tymieniecka also recognizes the fact that, although it is unwilling to
recognize the authority of prescriptive social ethics, and (often) even
the legitimacy of moral praise and blame, mysticism is not devoid of
all moral sense. Suzuki insisted, "Zen is on the other shore of good
and evil, but this does not mean that Zen is unconcerned with ethics" .14
I have noted that in Tymieniecka 's description of the spiritual life,
an affective moral sense guided by "goodwill towards others" is one of
the primary characteristics. She asserts that this goodwill is inspired by
the realization of one's unity with the Cosmos. I believe that this claim
is suggestive of a theory of a mystical ethics which has yet to be fully
developed. Such a theory would spell out this connection and its ethical
implications. For example, one line of reasoning here could contend
that moral notions of respect and care for others could via these expe-
riences of unity extend ordinary prudential reasoning to others. Just as
the ordinary prudent individual takes great effort to avoid personal pain
and promote personal well-being, so the enlightened individual, who
experiences this connection with "all-that-lives", perceives pain as to
be avoided and well-being as to be promoted everywhere. Such a view
seems to be epitomized in Chuang-Tzu's verse, "The Joy of Fishes",
where Chuang-Tzu claims to know the fishes' happiness through, "my
own sense of joy as I walk along the same river". 15 I offer this here as
a mere suggestion, but clearly the project of a mystical ethics (i.e., an
ethics grounded in mystical experience) is an interesting one and awaits
further development. 16
CONCLUSION
Let me reiterate that I find The Three Movements of the Soul, very
effective at providing an overarching theory of mystical development
and life. I hope I have revealed that the traditional picture of spiritual
development within Zen Buddhism fits nicely into the framework of
Tymieniecka's Three Movements. I suggest that a similar analysis via
this conceptual structure could be undertaken for the pictures of mystical
402 DANIEL ZELINSKI
development within any of the major mystical traditions. I also believe

that Tymieniecka's analysis is fruitful in suggesting areas for further
research - I have noted two: the phenomenology of nonintentional (i.e.,
purposeless) mystical action, and the explication of a mystical ethics.
University of California, Irvine
NOTES
1 An earlier version of this paper was delivered as a presentation at The World
Phenomenological Institute Conference in Boston, 1993.

2 Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. Logos and Life, Book Two: The Three Movements of the
Soul (Kiuwer Academic Press, Boston, 1988).

For reviews, see Phenomenological Inquiry, v. XIV, October, 1990.
3 Recorded in Philip Kapleau's The Three Pillars of Zen (Anchor Books, NY, 1980),
p. 314.
4 Ibid., p. 315.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 319.
7 Satori experiences (at least under this depiction) are excellent candidates for being
instances of a state of consciousness which is currently being referred to as a Pure
Conscious Event, allegedly a nonintentional/contentless conscious state; see Robert
Forman's The Problem of Pure Consciousness (Oxford University Press, NY, 1990).
8 Kapleau, p. 323.
9 Suzuki, D. T. Essays in Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, edited by
William Barrett (Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, NY, 1956).
10 Danto, Arthur, Mysticism and Morality (Columbia University Press, NY, 1987).
11 "The Biography of Master Great Man", in: Donald Holzman, Poetry and Politics:
the Life and Works ofJuan Chi (A. D. 210-263) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1976).
12 Ibid., p. 197; quoted in Tymieniecka, p. 202.
13 Tymieniecka, p. 202.
14 Suzuki, p. 258.
15 The Way of Chuang- Tzu, edited by Thomas Merton (New Directions Press, 1969),
p. 97.
16 I in fact attempt such a development in my dissertation, The Meaning of Mystical Life:
An Inquiry into Phenomenological and Moral Aspects of the Ways of Life Advocated by
Dagen Zenj: and Meister Eckhart (University of California, Irvine), utilizing Eckhart's
and Dogen's views of spiritual life.
PART SIX
CREATIVE PERMEATION OF
VITAL SENSE: THE AESTHETIC
SENSE OF LIFE AND SCIENCE
The conference in progress.
LUIS FLORES H.
THE IMAGINATION AS THE ORIGIN OF SCIENCE

Rupture and Continuity with the Quotidian Lifeworld
I. DEFINITIONS
This discussion is confined to the case of the empirical sciences.

Consequently, we exclude the case of the formal sciences.
By "quotidian lifeworld", we understand the everyday network of acts.
We define "imagination" as the human competency for producing
images. In tum, by "image", we understand a schema given on the
horizon of sensibility, which can be intended as a simulation of reality
(cognitive function), as an induction (or an obstruction) to a realization
(deontic function)- for example, the image of a skull on a flask of poison,
as a symptom or an index of the imagining person (symptomatic function)
and as an aesthetic performance (aesthetic function) - for example, the
Count of Lautreamont's definition of a beautiful image. In the case of
the cognitive function of the image, the map never has identity with what
is mapped: there are not two Cratyles, or, as Borges said, the perfect map
of a city is the city itself. Therefore, the image supposes a minimal non-
identification with the reality, a recombination of the perceived, a liberty
with respect to the restrictions imposed by knowledge. There is para-
doxically in every image a germ of iconoclasm with regard to the reality.
II. SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION AND REALITY
If we restrict ourselves to the scientific imagination, it has as telos reality

and consequently it is not a mere fancy. Nevertheless, the paradox is
that to describe reality, it is necessary to image it, that is, to keep it at
a distance. Einstein said that experience can suggest the appropiate
mathematical concepts, but these cannot be deduced from it (Dissertation
Herbert Spencer, 1933). In tum, SchrOdinger thinks that the physicist
takes a somersault from a finite set of data when he proposes a curve
represented by an equation.
We maintain that the mere exercise of reason from a logical point
of view is not sufficient. The pure exercise of the sensibility, that is,
simple scientific observing, is not sufficient either. Even then there is
405

406 LUIS FLORES H.
no scientific observing which is independent of theoretical presupposi-

tions.
III. IMAGINING OBJECTS
What does the scientific imagination offer? It introduces new objects.

Le Verrier successfully imagines Neptune to resolve the anomalies of
Uranus. Nevertheless, he is unsuccessful after the invention of Vulcan
in accounting for the anomalies of the perihelion of Mercury. Mendelejeff
imagines germanium and its characteristic properties. Winkler finds it
some years later. There is also an imagining of the spatial form of objects:
see the case of the moon as a sphere. Finally, the behaviour of objects
can be imagined: for example, Kepler proposes the elliptic orbit for the
planets.
IV. TWO TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION:

THE FUZZY AND THE EXACT IMAGINATION
Scientific imagination bifurcates into fuzzy and exact imagination. In the

first case, we find, for instance, the metaphor of the sea of air that per-
mitted Torricelli to create the pneumatics from the hydraulics. We also
have analogies like the comparison between language and chess in
Saussure. Or Enrico Fermi's analogy between the collision of slow elec-
trons with the atom and the collision of slow neutrons with the nucleus,
which opened the nuclear age. In the second case, we have, for example,
geometry and mathematical models. The model here is a representation
that simplifies and idealizes the real, defining a scale of validity and
establishing mathematical rules for control and statistical prediction.
Models define the universe in which theories are true.
V. SCIENCE AND THE QUOTIDIAN LIFEWORLD
Our quotidian behavior is already a schematization of our lifeworld.

Science takes certain features of the quotidian to the limit by means of
the scientific imagination. It is in this manner that there arise the mass
point, the zero friction, the infinite temperature. In the other direction,
it is interesting to see the return of scientific terms to quotidian speech:
see the use of "neurotic", "circle". This process involves conflicts like
that between the astronomer Francesco Sizi's mythical point of view
IMAGINATION AS THE ORIGIN OF SCIENCE 407
and Galileo's mathematical point of view- nature written in mathematical

characters.
VI. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE
As long as there is a phenomenology of science, that is to say, a theory

of the constitution of science, this supposes we can surprise science in
flagrante, catch it in fieri. G. Holton thinks that if we want to analyse
the imagination of scientists at work, it will have to be by taking them
by surprise. It is a question of considering science not only as ergon,
as statements that must be verified or falsified, as did positivism, logical
positivism and structuralism. It is a matter of understanding science as
energeia, as process, but not in the sense of the psychology of inven-
tion (Hadamar). Furthermore, the connections of scientific behavior
with technics have hidden science as the praxis of ethical responsibility
and as the poiesis of networks of schemas working as conjectures.
Appreciating the dimension of poiesis leads to perception of the rhetor-
ical dimension of science. Therefore, scientific metaphors play not only
an illustrative and pedagogical role, but also a heuristic role.
VII. THE SCIENTIFIC OBSERVER
What are the consequences of the thesis of the axial character of the
scientific imagination for the scientist? The scientific observer is not a
complicated computer, nor a res cogitans surrounded by res extensa.
He is, first of all, an incarnated observer, inseparable from the quo-
tidian lifeworld. In Il Saggiatore, Galileo brackets the sensible animal
that perceives colours, odors and flavors. As he says, tickling is not
the subject matter of science and the quality of color is only a name.
The scientific observer is also a temporalised observer and this is a
condition for the possibility of retrodiction and prediction. The quotidian
expectation, what Popper calls prophecy, becomes scientific conjecture
if and only if some restrictions are respected. The culmination of this
conjecture is the prediction. But the essential point is that the conjec-
ture is not reducible to the application of the logical deductive model,
as long as it supposes a halo of connections with quotidian life and,
consequently, with culture.
408 LUIS FLORES H.
VIII. SCIENTIFIC SYMBOLISM
Scientific symbolism supposes a language of concepts regulated by

identity and a language of metaphors regulated by analogy. As H.
Blumenberg has proposed, in Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie,
concepts are crystallizations of the unstable magna of metaphors. In
our view the concept is previously a conatus and, as such, it implies a
comprehensive rank of possibilities. One such conatus is the metaphor,
which is more decisive in the periods of gestation of a discipline. The
concept presupposes what Kuhn calls "normal science" and especially
the existence of "rules".
IX. SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION AS A

SOPHISTICATED REVERIE
Scientific imagination is a sophisticated and controlled reverie, but not

an illusion. Metaphors are the core of these reveries. The metaphor
collects the tension and the variety of research, it collects more the pathos
than the ethos of research. In general, scientific images are attractors
of apparently chaotic processes, they are the turning points of the reor-
ganization of the scientific worldview.
It is interesting to observe how the Parmenides' sphere is prolonged
in the circle as spatial ideal of motion in Archimedes and Galileo. Galileo
is opposed to Kepler's ellipse because he chooses the classical point of
view and he considers that Kepler's proposal is a form of mannerism,
as E. Panofsky has proven: for Galileo the ellipse is a degenerated cir-
cumference. Let us just note that the geometrical term KVKAO<; (circle)
was formerly the term denoting a wheel.
X. OUR DEFINITION OF THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIUM
Scientific imagination integrates the processes of the deduction and induc-

tion of sentences in the global process of production of images. Thus,
we call the "scientific imaginarium" the operative system of images,
not necessarily thematic, with which a scientific discipline works. This
imaginarium is more basic than the network of commitments that Kuhn
calls a "paradigm".
IMAGINATION AS THE ORIGIN OF SCIENCE 409
XI. CONDITIONS FOR THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION
The production of images supposes a horizon of liberty. B. Mandelbrot

has said: "For me, the central aspect of scientific research is the chaos.
The discipline kills, simply, the imagination. The essential is precisely
how to move between these two extremes" (Haken et al., 1990, p. 102).
For Mandelbrot, scientific imagination does not imply complication,
but simplicity. Furthermore, it is not a question of conceiving an imag-
ination free from theoretical tools and techniques. Computers allowed
Mandelbrot himself to introduce iteration in pure mathematics (1955).
Let us add that Galileo's scientific imagination required the algebra
of Tartaglia, but also the art of perspective and chiaroscuro of Vasari (see
Samuel Y. Edgerton Jr.'s interpretation) for his criticism of the image
of the moon as a perfect sphere.
XII. INTELLECTIO VERSUS IMAGINATIO
There have been scientists who have reacted against the imaginative con-
dition of science (Hertz, Heisenberg, Dirac), reanimating the distinction
between intellectio and imaginatio formulated by Descartes and Leibniz
with respect to the chiliogon. Nevertheless, there they are: Einstein's
thought experiments (that of the train, that of the roof of the house),
Bohr's analogy between the atom and the Copernican solar system,
Feynman's diagram, Kekule's hexagonal structure of benzene, the tech-
nical metaphors of the heart as pump in Harvey, of the biosphere as a
peristaltic pump, or of the brain as a computer. And, above all, there is
Darwin's imaginarium: natural selection, the struggle for life, the tree
of life and its bifurcations, the entangled mound, the face of the nature
beaming with joy, or the nature as a surface covered by ten thousand
sharp coins (see Stephen Jay Gould's analysis). Finally, let us remember
the role of Plato's metaphor of the sun that favored the appearance of
Copernicus' theory in a Neoplatonic atmosphere.
XIII. THE TURNING POINT IN LEONARDO DA VINCI
On the horizon is Husserl's Krisis. The works of G. Holton, the sym-

posium of Barcelona (1987), the Congress of Spoletociencia (1991) are
signs of the forthcoming consciousness about the role of the scientific
imagination. But maybe it is necessary to go back, before Galileo, to
410 LUIS FLORES H.
Leonardo de Vinci to see the antecedent phase of the trifurcation of

modem culture into science, art and technics. There the dream of Icarus,
the beginning of modem mechanics, and anatomy as the foundation of
painting, still communed.
Kuhn still considers Newton's to be the paradigm of paradigms.
Bronowski remarks that the same day Newton proposed his formula
for universal gravitation, he thought about a flung ball going around
the world (Bronowski, 1979, Third Lesson). In Bronowski's terms, it
is a step from the metaphor to the algorithm, but we maintain that it is
the thought experiment of the ball that supports Newton's formula.
XIV. CONCLUSIONS
Scientific imagination is a type of invention, but one most decisive for

integrating scientific rationality and scientific sensibility. We think that
today conditions are more fertile not only for reflection on constituted
science, but also for surprising it in its origins as it established its limits.
Instituto de Filosofia
Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bronowski, J ., The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1979).
Bruner, J. S. et al., Immagini e metafore della scienza, Gius (Rome: Laterza & Figli, 1992.
Comp. Lorena Preta).
Haken, H. et al., Sobre Ia imaginaci6n cientifica (Barcelona: Tusquets Ediciones, 1990).
Ed. Jorge Wagensberg.
WOJCIECH BALUS
FROM MOURNING TO MELANCHOLY

Toward a Phenomenology of the Modern Human Condition
In his famous article Mourning and Melancholia, Sigmund Freud con-

trasted the denotations of the two title notions. They have one feature
in common, he wrote, they are a reaction to the feeling of some loss.
However, while mourning is induced by an actual fact - "mourning is
regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of
some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country,
liberty, an ideal, and so on" 1 - in melancholia the cause remains hidden:
"the inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot
see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely". 2 Therefore, mourning
is a normal state which relates to a reality existing outside a person,
whereas melancholia is a pathological state sweeping over the human
ego. "In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty;
in melancholia it is the ego itself". 3 Thus the mysteriousness of melan-
cholia lies in the fact that loss affects the very essence of man. This
fact is responsible for the difficulty of detecting the cause of the illness
and it also explains why "the patient represents his ego to us as worth-
less, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches
himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished". 4
By the idea of melancholia Freud understands a mental disease. 5
However, the term melancholy traditionally encompasses the whole
spectrum of states, beginning with transient moods and proceeding
through a constant mental disposition (a character type) down to patho-
logical cases. Already Hippocrates knew about it (distinguishing between
a disease and a temperament); it is also dealt with in the present-day
ample literature of the subject.6 In this situation one should ask whether
the diagnosis made by Freud refers only to melancholia (understood as
a mental disease) or whether it also speaks about melancholy (thus having
a more universal application).
Undoubtedly, every melancholy state is "egotistic" in character.
Among its essential constituents are solitude, withdrawal from life, and
concentration upon oneself. Even in the company of numerous people
a man sunk in melancholy is clearly isolated from that group. His
stooping figure, unseeing look, and deep meditation shut him off from
411
AT. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Ll/, 411-418.

412 WOJCIECH BAt.US
any contact with the company. A melancholic's gaze, as has been empha-
sized by traditional iconography beginning with Albrecht Di.irer, is usually
fixed on some indefinite space. His eyes are searching for something
there, yearningly seeking far-away worlds. 7 Yet, as Anette von Droste-
Hi.ilshoff wrote in one of her letters, "dieser ungli.ickselige Hang zu
allen Orten, wo ich nicht bin, und allen Dingen, die ich nicht babe,
durchaus in mir selbst liegt und durch keine auBeren Dinge hineinge-
bracht ist". 8 Thus it is the human ego that is the source of yearning. It
is the ego that feels nostalgia- pain and grief (ii'A:yo'(,) caused by one's
distance from something close, dear, and safe, some irresistible longing
for one's homeland (v6crto'(,). 9
The feeling of longing is by its very nature a reaction to some loss.
One can only ask: What is it that has been lost if longing for some-
thing that exists somewhere beyond the horizon has been evoked by
something that "lies entirely in me"? In such a situation the human ego
must not only be the source but also the object of longing. Leaning
towards the world becomes at the same time a journey into oneself:
looking for something far away is in fact a search for one's own spiri-
tual balance. Hence the state of melancholy - no matter whether it is
pathological in character (melancholia) or is a momentary mood- always
reveals some kind of corrosion of the human interior. 10
The above statement permits the extension of Freud's concept to
non-morbid varieties of melancholy. While doing this, however, we must
introduce a certain reservation. It would follow from Anette von Droste-
Hiilshoff's words that melancholy, albeit concerning the human ego,
absorbs the outer world as well. A look into the distance links, using
Kant's language, the transcendent with the transcendental. Melancholy
is a combination of the sense of loss with that of longing; hence the
tension between the inner and the outer, between the consciousness of
the void left by something and the painful, frequently hopeless, seeking
for something that has vanished. Therefore, we cannot say, as does Freud,
that in melancholy only the ego becomes poor and empty, whereas the
world undergoes no change. This is because in each case "the lost object
is not solely an object but also part of a person, and the essence of the
feeling of loss - contrary to what Freud asserted - lies in the fact that
the ego and the object are inseparable in it" .ll
The loss of an object always afflicts its owner. Thus, by losing a
thing we experience the loss of part of ourselves. "A melancholy man",
FROM MOURNING TO MELANCHOLY 413
according to the views of Utszl6 Foldenyi, 12 "is melancholy also because

in the smallest loss of an object he discovers his own imminent death".
Melancholy is a state in which every loss is referred to the owner's
existence. Nonetheless, both Freud and other researchers observed time
and again that it was usually impossible to establish the direct causes
of the disease or of the melancholy etat d' ame. In Petrarch 's Secretum
meum, St. Augustine asks Franciscus: "Do you feel unhappy? [... ]
And why?" The answer was: "For a thousand reasons!", 13 which may
also be interpreted "that the only ground for melancholy lies in its ground-
lessness" .14
Thanks to Martin Heidegger we know that a man's cognitive attitude
towards the world is manifested not only by acts of perception but also
by moods, since the latter open him up to the entirety of existence.
Besides, the philosopher recalled that moods "come over" a man and thus
appear without any specific cause. The state of joy makes us regard
the whole world as friendly. There are, however, moments when a man
is aware of the fragility of himself and of everything that surrounds
him. It then seems that there is nothing constant or certain in the universe,
that sooner or later every object and every living being is doomed to anni-
hilation. These last feelings occur in the mood of dread. Therefore, a
sense of loss need not result from any actual occurrence. It is enough
to experience the very possibility of the non-existence of the world and
oneself- this being sometimes an obscure and not self-evident experi-
ence, the ground somehow mysteriously giving way under one's feet, a
vague loss - for anxiety or terror to be germinated.
Hubertus Tellenbach argues that melancholic disease only develop
in people of a specific mental structure. The typus melancholicus is a
human being that needs stability. His world must be well ordered,
immutable, constant. Even a slight disturbance in this totality may have
disastrous consequences, even breeding disease. An apparently imper-
ceptible change in the environment engenders the destruction of the
human ego, leads to depression, fear, and collapse. 15 This precisely is
melancholic loss perceived as groundless.
It happens likewise in non-pathological states. There, too, melan-
choly frequently "comes over" a man suddenly as a vague feeling
suggesting that something is "not quite right" in the world. However,
it differs from a disease in that such an experience usually does
not bring about a stupor but a substitution of the longing for death
414 WOJCIECH BAl.US
(Todestrieb) for the instinct of life. 16 Anguish and dread are repressed
here by a specific satisfaction. Petrarch wrote: "Things come to such a
point that all I suffered fills me with false sweetness. This state of spirit
means to me a full measure of anguish, misery, and dread, is an open
road to despondency. [...] And what brings all pain to a climax is the
fact that with a kind of secret delight I always feed on my tears, reluc-
tantly freeing myself from them". 17 In the discovery of the frailty of
all things can be found a positive element- "the joy of grief".
The presence of this positive element turns melancholy away from the
path leading to despair. While despair is a state of definite character, a
state of hopelessness without future, Kierkegaard's "sickness unto death",
"melancholy is a despair that did not have time to mature". 18 In melan-
choly the discovery of nihility does not terrify because terror is softened
and sweetened. The melancholy "joy of grief" removes a man from the
object of his experience, allowing him to contemplate his own state but
at the same time eliminating all commitment. Melancholy is a state of
passivity in which the awareness of changes, decay, and end is filtered
through a specific bittersweet reverie. 19
The state of melancholy is thus the destruction of the human ego.
Nevertheless, this destruction does not consist principally in constant
engrossment in doldrums and in the domination of a pessimistic outlook.
Its essence is rather in the inhibited ability to experience extreme states
and emotions: full joy, great fear, or total despair. A melancholy person
has a sense of loss but is not quite sure of what he has lost. He yearns
for something but is unable to assess the value of the object of his
yearning. In consequence, he remains staring into an indefinite distance,
nostalgically awaiting something dolorous, some of which will or will
not come, will appear now or later in some indefinite future.
Mourning is a concrete and specified state. Freud wrote: "Reality-
testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists. [... ] This
demand arouses understandable opposition. [...] This opposition can
be so intense that a turning away from reality takes place and a clinging
to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis.
Normally, respect for reality gains the day. Nevertheless its order cannot
be obeyed at once. They are carried out bit by bit, at great expense of
time and cathectic energy, and in the meantime the existence of the lost
object is psychically prolonged. [... ] The fact is, however, that when
the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhib-
ited again''. 20 Therefore, mourning requires full recognition of the fact
of another person's death. This death is experienced to the end, with

the acceptance of the void left by the deceased.
Philippe Aries argues that the structure of mourning described by
Freud came into existence in Europe as late as the Romantic period in
consequence of the understanding of death at that time. The death of
another, someone dear, beloved, acquired then the character of a
paradigm. This stemmed from the growing importance of emotionality
in culture and also from changes taking place in the family and in society.
A large community, participating collectively in the fact of the depar-
ture of one of its members, was replaced by the small group of the family
and close friends of the deceased. Likewise, the vision of life after death
underwent alternation: instead of a concrete, theological vision of heaven
and hell there appeared an indefinite place of reunion with the deceased.
All this caused an outburst of mourning of an emotional character. 21
Yet, precisely such a mode of experiencing mourning may lead to
melancholy. This is because the hope of meeting again in the other world
is a yearning evoked by a loss. The loss and yearning, in turn, lead
deep into the ego - to recollections. Herder wrote:
Eine Mutter, die ihr einziges Kind verloren hat, sieht in den ersten Tagen nichts vor
sich als den erblaBten Leichnam. [... ] Sobald sie sich wieder erinnert, wieviel Witz
ihr Kind schon gezeigt babe, was fiir lebhafte Antworten es gegeben [... ]: so loset
sich der Schmertz in Triinen auf: Die Empfindung wird vermischt und zur Elegie weich
genug. 22
The work of mourning is disturbed. Its transformation into an elegy is

tantamount to dulling the acuteness of pain, to passing into a state of
passivity, a state of bittersweet reverie.
Every loss, as has been written before, is also some kind of loss of
our own ego. After the death of someone dear to us this double loss
must be fully accepted. A transformation of mourning into elegiac melan-
choly permits us to avoid profoundly experiencing the fact of the loss.
Melancholy offers an illusive consolation and opiate recollections, albeit
rooted in the consciousness of something irrevocably lost, yet dulling the
anguish. Instead of a truly religious awareness that a deceased person
is "there" and thus is no longer "here", or of the atheistic conviction
that everything is finished forever, there appears undecidability: it is
true that the deceased does not exist but it is likewise true that somehow
or other he still exists. Melancholy accepts simultaneously the two con-
tradictory conclusions. 23
416 WOJCIECH BALUS
Melancholic undecidability did not manifest its full potentialities until

the Twentieth Century. Our times have eradicated death from everyday
consciousness and everyday life, mourning having become "unseemly". 24
All this has happened on account of the understanding of life as an
aspiration for success, to which death is an obvious enemy and, first
and foremost, because of the decline of religious faith. "Success" in
this situation can only be temporal, whereas on the other side there reigns
dark nihility. In these conditions the acceptance of mourning would
have to be tantamount to the affirmation of nihility. It is therefore easier
to renounce it, contenting oneself with vague nostalgia and an elegiac
mood, disguising the truth, implicit in the departure of another person,
that everybody will die. The loss caused by death turns directly against
the ego of the living, devastating it and laying it open to nihility.
Melancholy alleviates this state, obscures the "bright night of nihility"
(Heidegger), arrests the emotions and thoughts in the state of undecid-
ability. It seems to say that no one knows what is on the other side,
that it is like this or like that; it next turns the stream of consciousness
back towards recollections, offering a bittersweet reverie. In this way
it prevents despair from maturing. However, it does not restore full joy
either. The melancholy ego remains corroded, although the conscious-
ness of the inevitability of one's own death has undergone a specific
hibernation.
But this is not all, since in the present-day experience of melancholy
we may find a kind of metaphysical experience. 25 A melancholy man dis-
covers in spite of everything that our existence is fragile and that thus
there exists in the world some mysterious depth. At the same time,
though, this discovery is immediately dissolved in a reverie isolating him
from despair or dread. This is why eventually melancholy prevails in
contact with the fact of death, because it says something about the
nature of the universe ("de generatione et corruptione"- to paraphrase
the title of Aristotle's treatise) but not emphatically enough to destroy
utterly the world of a man of worldly success.
It cannot be denied that melancholy elements have always accompa-
nied human thoughts about death. Suffice it to point to numerous works
of sepulchral art, showing human figures in "sorrowful" poses. This
sequence begins with Greek sculpture (e.g., the celebrated "sarcoph-
agus of weepers", dating from the Fourth Century B.C.), and, passing
through the Middle Ages, reaches modem times. 26 Nonetheless, in those
days melancholy did not dominate in contact with the world of the
dead. It was considered to be a mental disease caused by black bile

and was thus regarded as a pathological state. The Renaissance melan-
cholia generosa was an inseparable attribute of Saturn's children of
genius, but its dual character was limited solely to enabling mystic flights
into the world of truth alternating with depressing fits of dejection. The
mediaeval acedia was a sinful separation from hope and God - tris-
titia de bono divino. A melancholy mood was something transitory and
shallow. Only a gradual decline of the Christian vision of the world along
with a greater appreciation of emotional states as a site of the truth
about man have changed the situation.
As long as a person felt himself to be a part of an entirety surpassing
him in excellence, he regarded melancholy as a pathological, sad, or at
best unusual state. However, once the human ego gained cosmic freedom,
becoming a free subject capable of independent thinking (e.g., doubting
and negating) and of unconstrainedly following its own emotions, the
position hitherto held by melancholy also changed. 27 "Melancholy," as
Wolf Biermann wrote after Freud, "is a narcissistic form of mourning". 28
By discovering threat and nihility the human ego has found its own finite-
ness. In a dead person it finds itself. All the same, a melancholy person
in his moods is in fact concerned with his own being, with his con-
tinued existence in the world. This is why present-day melancholy is a
dissolution of the sense of finiteness in undecidability.
Jagellonian University
Krakow
NOTES
1 S. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", in Freud, On Metapsychology: The Theory
of Psychoanalysis (The Penguin Freud Library, Vol. XI) (London: 1991), pp. 251-
252.
2 Ibid., p. 254.
3 Ibid., p. 254.
4 Ibid., p. 254.
5 It is to be noticed that in the German original Freud used in the term "die Melancholie",
which simply means "melancholy" (see: "Trauer und Melancholie", in Freud, Gesammelte
Werke, Vol. X [London: 1946], pp. 428-446). Melancholia appears only in the English
translation of the article.
6 R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, F. Sax!, Saturn and Melancholy. Studies in the History of
Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (London: 1964), p. l.

7 Ibid., passim; F. Nordstrom, Goya, Saturn and Melancholy. Studies in the Art ofGoya
418 WOJCIECH BALUS
(Goteborg, Uppsala: 1962), p. 14; W. Batus, "Unbestimmtheit als Bedeutungstriiger.

Bemerkungen iiber das Bild 'Blick in die Feme' von Christian Ruben", Mitteilungen
der Osterreichischen Galerie 78179 (1990/1991): 46-60.
8 Quoted after W. Benjamin, Deutsche Menschen (Frankfurt/M: 1977), p. 63.
9 J. Starobinsky, "Le concept de nostalgia", Diogene 54 (1966): 96. The term "nostalgia"
was invented by Johannes Hofer. See his: Dissertatio medica de Nostalgia (Basel: 1688).
10 Starobinsky, op. cit., p. 106ff; S. Vromen, "Maurice Halbwachs and the Concept of
Nostalgia", Knowledge and Society, 6 (1986): 55-66; B.S. Turner, "Ruine und Fragment.
Anmerkungen zum Barockstil", in Allegorie und Melancholie, ed. W. von Reijen
(Frankfurt/M: 1992), pp. 212-214.
11 L. F. Foldenyi, Melancholie, trans. N. Tahy (Munich: 1988), p. 333.
12 Ibid.
13 F. Petrarca, Opere Latine, ed. A. Bufano, Vol. 1 (Turin: 1975), p. 138.
14 U. Horstmann, Der lange Schatten der Melancholie. Versuch iiber ein angeschwiirztes
Gefiihl (Essen: 1985), p. 24.
15 H. Tellenbach, Melancholie. Problemgeschichte, Typologie, Pathogenese und Klinik
(Berlin, Gottingen, Heidelberg: 1961).
16 L. Binswanger, Melancholie und Manie. Phiinomenologische Studien (Pfullingen:
1960), pp. 49-50; S. Biran, Melancholie und Todestriebe. Dynamishe Psychologie der
Melancholie (Psychologie und Person, Vol. II) (Munich, Basel: 1960).
17 Petrarca, op. cit., pp. 140--142.
18 J. Tischner, "Chochot sarmackiej melancholii", in Tischner, Swiat ludzkiej nadziei
(Krakow: 2nd ed., 1992), p. 19.
19 E. Cioran, Sur le cimes du desespoir (Paris: 1992), Ch. "Melancolie"; P. Richardson,
"Wonne der Wehmut/Joy of grief', Archiv fiir das Studium der neueren Sprachen und
Literaturen 211 (1974): 377-378.
2 Freud, op. cit., p. 253.
21 Ph. Aries, L' Homme devant Ia mort (Paris: 1977), Ch. X.
22 Quoted after Ch. Kahn, Die Melancholie in der deutschen Lyrik des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Heidelberg: 1932), pp. 24-25.
23 For the idea of "undecidable", introduced into the philosophy of science by Kurt
GOdl, see: J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago: 1981), p. 219 and V.
Descombes, Le Meme et /'Autre. Quarante-cinq ans de Ia philosophie fran~aise
(1933-1978) (Paris: 1979), pp. 177-178.
24 G. Gorer, Death, Grief and Mourning in Contemporary Britain (New York: 1965);
Aries, op. cit., Ch. XII.
25 W. Batus, "Die Melancholie der Metaphysik bei Giorgio de Chirico. Ein Schicksal
der Modeme", Ars 2 (1994): 162-174.
26 M. Preaud, Melancolies (Paris: 1982), Ch.: "La Mort melancolique".
27 Foldenyi, op. cit., pp. 133ff; R. Kuhn, The Demon of the Noontide. Ennui in Western
Literature (Princeton: 1976). Ch. VI-XI; G. Blambeger, Versuch iiber den deutschen
Gegenwartsroman. Krisenbewufltsein und Neubegriindung im Zeichen der Melancholie
(Stuttgart: 1985), pp. !6-19.
28 Quoted after: "Komm, heilige Melancholie". Eine Anthologie deutscher Melancholie-
Gedichte, ed. L. Volker (Stuttgart: 1983), p. 522.
JAN M. BROEKMAN
MIMESIS, LAW AND MEDICINE
Modem medicine finds expression in the clinical act and is strongly deter-
mined by an image. Clinical activity and reference to the image of the
body have belonged together since the origins of medicine. Medicine
created images of the body, of body parts, of organs, of functional depen-
dencies between those parts. That is the substance of connections between
the drawings of Da Vinci or Descartes and the recent mapping in genetics
or the neurosciences. Techniques of (re )presentation and their results
are part of our age, with its television, its comics, its audio-visual rep-
resentations. The clinical picture as a picture is related to such culturally
determined forms of knowledge.
These dialectics of the image do not concern images we possess or
produce: they concern images that we are. The imaginary character of
an illness transcends the differentiations of diseases. Diseases are images
of a culture. Relevant philosophical explications can lead to refine-
ments of the terminology and self-understanding of our daily clinical
practice. The leading question is: Is the clinical picture a picture of a
disease, or a picture of an image, that is: A picture of a picture? The
latter suggestion points to the fact that the roots of illness and disease
are in a culture, not in a private and individual body. This observation
reaches the philosophical and in particular the phenomenological foun-
dations of medicine and culture. Deeper than the nosological techniques
of medicine are questions of a semiological nature and of reference.
REFERENCE
Is the clinical picture a picture of a disease? Any acceptance of this

idea is based on a philosophical naivete and a trust that lacks founda-
tion. Ontology is at stake. If the inherent trust is well-founded, then there
must "be" an independent and autonomous entity pictured in the clinical
picture. If a particular disease can be pictured that way, then the totality
of medical nosology can do the same. One can hardly say that a con-
temporary philosophy of medicine reflects this aspect of the ontological
implications of the concept of disease. It would touch the foundations
419

420 JAN M. BROEKMAN
of nosology as well as the evidences of medicine. A major philosoph-

ical issue of this complex problem is the reference, inherent to all
representations. It clearly pertains to the reference on which the act of
representation is based.
Medicine is not a closed philosophical system. Medicine did not
always embrace the Cartesian method and mind; 1 the Hippocratic corpus
bears witness to this attitude. Semiology is one of the oldest forms of
medical practice. This was long before Descartes. Naming and refer-
ence were essential to the semiological project. Two issues are important
here:
( 1) Any mark or sign in medical practice has a corporeal character.
One could debate the question of whether this is partially or entirely
the case. But the body is the foundation of any medical diagnostics,
also with regard to questions of the mind. In semiological perspective
the medical diagnosis is an ensemble of bodily symptoms, brought
together to a specific syntagma, namely, 'the disease'.
(2) Medicine was and is determined by its representation. Represen-
tation is basic to the diagnosis and to the cure. Both are essentially the
result of mimetic processes. Doctor and patient emancipate themselves
from these processes and regard themselves as autonomous. These
appearances create a distance between themselves and mimetics. But self
and mimetics belong together. The distance is reinforced by legal thinking
and the application of the law in medicine. An indication of this devel-
opment is the legal and contractual interpretation of the doctor-patient
relationship.
One can repeat the fundamental scheme of the above observations.
It is generally said and accepted in clinical practice, that (a) the impres-
sion of an X, which (b) results in a doctor or any medical observer of
a patient, (c) refers to something defined and real - Y - and this (d) leads
to and legitimates the medical, specialist or scientific examination of
the patient and his or her symptoms. Now (a), (b) and (c) form the
guarantee and the legitimation for (d). The latter is, however, unthink-
able without the preceding (a), (b) and (c). The three factors concerned
have abstractly and philosophically been indicated as a concept that is
basic to all possibilities of representing, picturing and expressing reality.
In this view medicine is based on an aesthetic process. Medicine should
be understood as a semiology. The aisthesis of the body, of the illness
and of reality is continuously present in medicine.
MIMESIS, LAW AND MEDICINE 421
MIMESIS
What body is envisaged here, what sort of signs are meant? Two distinct
formulations have to be considered. The first refers to developments
leading away from the strict knowledge of the body as a totality of organs
and their functions. Consequently, medical knowledge should not entirely
be understood as organic knowledge. The second formulation is more
radical, and by no means antithetical. Knowledge is a phenomenon of
life in itself. It should therefore be understood as limited, restricted, a
temporary value in the encompassing perspective of human cultures.
Knowledge about life can thus become irrelevant to that life. What
questions arise in this view, what body is meant here? What is the
meaning of signs in life, what do they indicate to us, when life makes
knowledge relative?
This comes down to the question whether the body can be described
without references. Antonin Artaud wrote in his Heliogabale: "The body
is the body. It is solitary. It does not depend on organs. The body is never
an organism. Organisms are the enemies of the body."2 Do these words
imply that in our daily experiences and philosophies knowledge and
nature were connected too quickly and too evidently? If we allow those
questions, things become less evident. This might stimulate insight,
wisdom and prudence. Deleuze and Guattari, in L'Anti-ffidipe, annotate:
" ... nothing more useless than an organ .... "Organs enforce a hocus-
pocus understanding of the human body. Its divinity and value are based
on the tricks and shiny effects of machinery. 3 They quote Artaud:
Le corps sous la peau est une usine surchauffee,
et dehors,
le malade brille,
il luit,
de taus ses pores,
eclates.
Michel Serres considers the foundations of mimesis in the symmetries,

parallels and related connections between the human organ and the appa-
ratus. This is visible on all levels of the body and of organic life. Mimetic
forces are difficult to qualify. In this regard, the "Wisdom of the body"
is a treacherous formula. The body often adapts itself to alien elements,
but it can equally well reject them. Demarcations do not coincide with
422 JAN M. BROEKMAN
the distinction between micro and macro-organisms. The relative equi-

librium and quietness of the body embraces good and evil. Leriche's
formula is impressive: the body embraces its own causes of destruc-
tion and death. Where and how is judgement possible?
The French expression "s'appareiller" is meaningful here. it could
be transformed into English as "to apparate." Two friends, two lovers
but also two adversaries may closely resemble one another after some
time. Mimetic forces create this appearance. Orthopaedists, dentists and
many other medical specialists know that force intimately. The apparatus
has to nestle against the organ. Human knowledge has to nestle against
nature; in doing so, the artificial imitates nature. Reality and its image,
its cliche - the problem concerns mimesis. An image elucidates an
image. If the apparatus nestles against the organ, identities can be
abolished.
SEMIOLOGY
Emile Littre, doctor and linguist, and for some time a close friend of
August Comte, developed a lifelong interest in the connections between
linguistics and medicine. He regarded semiology as an important com-
ponent of medicine. The signs of a disease should be read, and the reading
of those signs determines medical intervention and clinical practice.
Roland Barthes in "Semiologie et Medecine" (1972) 4 has drawn our atten-
tion to the fact that semiology was originally a concept of medical
practice. The meaning of the word was even found in the medical pub-
lications of the beginning of the nineteenth century. Already at the time
of Littre, the word also had another meaning. It was used for new military
strategies to govern troops not only by shouting words (viva vox), but
also by giving signals. Thus the science of signs was no longer attached
to articulated language alone. In relating semiology and medicine, illness
is no longer understood as a private and personal experience, but also
as an objective and scientific issue.
This development relates to what Foucault puts forward in his Birth
of the Clinic. He suggests that our renewed interest in the concept of
signs includes ideology. This interest belongs specifically to the history
of modernity and it characterises contemporary values, normative atti-
tudes and experiences. The relationship between semiology and medicine
thus becomes an indication for the foundations of medicine in culture.
All this is a revaluation of a traditional metaphor, namely, that reality
is a book and mankind the reader of that text. Interpreting reality is

seen as a truly hermeneutic process. The book of history is identical to
the book of nature. Thus conceptualisation nestles against nature. The
far-reaching identification in this nestling implies a particular philo-
sophical attitude towards reality. Nature finds its teleology in history.
In this process, nature becomes an element and particularly an expres-
sion of human knowledge and of culture.
Roland Barthes makes a distinction between symptom and sign in
medical knowledge. One can take the view that this refers to the problem
of the ontological character of facts in medicine. It places conceptual
knowledge in the light of ontological statements. These statements are
never overtly debated in medicine, and only very seldom in philoso-
phies of medicine. The second point of Barthes' essay deals with the
systematicity of medical knowledge. Does this systematicity reflect the
nature of the human body? What is the status of the body in the systemic
character of medical knowledge? A system is, according to Barthes, a
network of correlations between signs. How could an illness be under-
stood in terms of conceptual differences and opposition creating such a
network? How to understand the body and its illness? Is such an under-
standing possible beyond its proper discourse? This central issue
regarding semiology requires a further elaboration of the connections
between sign and symptom in medicine.
SIGN AND SYMPTOM
According to Foucault and Barthes, a symptom is a form in which the

illness presents itself to the patient and to the doctor. Three elements
determine the idea of a symptom: (1) a symptom is a cause, and that
cause presents itself spontaneously. Symptoms thus imply the idea of a
causa-prima since there is always a first symptom from which all others
can be deduced. The deliberateness of that cause does not exist as a
natural factor, but results from conceptual thinking; (2) a symptom is
said to induce the illness, which means that an illness is regarded as
given. In Kantian terms, illnesses are the result of affects rather than
of effects; and (3) a symptom is explicable in terms of an organism but
there is no decision as to whether a symptom has equal explanatory
power in terms of the actual living body. In other words: the idea of a
symptom leaves medicine with the philosophical problem of extrapola-
tion from organisms to the body. Once again it regards the question of
424 JAN M. BROEKMAN
the relationship between nature and concept - a relationship that was

characterised as mimetic.
Barthes tried to solve this philosophical problem with the phenome-
nological suggestion that there is finally only one symptom, namely
the fact of morbidity in its objectivity and discontinuity. A deduction
from Heidegger's Sein zum Tode? We will not discuss this issue, but
rather stress some other philosophical implications:
1. Morbidity, illness, disease and discontinuity are characteristics of
a symptom as far as the symptom remains connected to knowledge of
the organism. Is the morbidity of the organism identical to the illness
of the living body?
2. Does medical thinking and consequently its diagnosis, treatment
and healing, imply a meaning of 'life' and 'death' that is strictly deter-
mined by the characteristics of medical discourse?
3. The lack of clarity about the relations between morbidity and illness
within medical discourse is in essence a conceptual lack of clarity. Facts
in medicine are not understood at the level of signs, although there is
a constant interest in the transformation of facts into signs. Medicine
strives for a specific practice to present that clarity of signs. Signs are
deciphered symptoms. But symptoms can only be symptoms insofar as
they can be deciphered. This problem touches on the possibility of
transforming facts into signs. Not nature, but the unfolding conceptual-
isation of knowledge itself forms a great barrier, an epistemological
obstacle (Bachelard) to medicine. The elucidation of the preconditions
for understanding a symptom is therefore identical to the process of
the self-explanation of medicine as a conceptual system.
4. The relation between sign and symptom is Euclidean. Symptoms
can become signs under the condition that they find an appropriate
place in the order of medical concepts. This order is, however, described
by the doctors as a description of reality on the basis of specific medical
knowledge. That presentation of thinking as a description conceals the
normative and coercive character of the discourse.
5. Barthes writes: " ... le medecin serait alors celui qui transforme,
par mediation du langage . . . le symptome en signe. " 5 The doctor
transforms symptoms into signs within the boundaries of language.
Doctors implicitly suggest that language is their instrument and they
themselves a descriptive authority. This mirrors the medical ideology,
which Foucault unveiled in view of the institutional setting. Here is an
epistemological factor at work. To present a construction as a descrip-
tion is an ideology of ontological relevance. Being, or, nature, has to

legitimate and to conceal evaluation, or, concept. It is remarkable, how
legal and medical discourse make the same ideological move in episte-
mological terms. Medicine does not describe illnesses, its activity is
constructive rather than descriptive. Diseases acquire their medical
identity through their signs. These signs are treated as names for a specific
reality. Reality would not be a particular medical reality without that
naming process.
6. The construction and reconstruction of medicine as a particular
practice in our society transforms the doctor into a master of time. The
question has already been formulated, whether the time of medicine is
the time of the organism or of the immediate living and experiencing
body, its social context included. However, time in medicine can only
be mastered under the condition of an overall identification of organism
and actual living body. Our considerations of time in medicine and in
the medical case have made it clear that Barthes' remarks concern the
medical case. He extrapolates the problem of time in medical cases to
the entire medical discourse, without mentioning the specific concen-
tration of epistemological issues of medicine in the case. It is only on
the basis of such a naive extrapolation and general identification of
time and medicine, that Barthes is able to write:
... en passant du symptome au signe, le signe medical oblige a une maitrise de Ia
maladie comme duree; on retrouverait Iii le principe meme de Ia medecine hippocra-
tique; dans Ia mesure meme oil il est fait pour maitriser le temps de Ia maladie, le signe
medical aurait une triple valeur, ou une triple fonction; il est anamnestique, il dit ce qui
s'est passe; il est prognostique, il dit ce qui vase passer; et il est diagnostique, il dit ce
qui se deroule actuellement. 6
Barthes does not make any distinction between what happens as a life
event and what happens medically, in the course of medical events. The
difference is important, but not problematic. The passage from symptom
to sign is a semantic passage, but an institutional one as well. It is not
evident that the semantic level and the institutional level are identical.
To take such an identification for granted is philosophically naive.
7. It thus becomes clear that the relation between sign and symptoms
in medicine parallels the relation between brute facts and institutional
facts. Symptoms are seen as the brute facts of the organism. It is the
particular art of medicine, to read them as signs. But that implies a
transformation of meaning, which often remains unnoticed. Meanings
of phenomena are transformed from a brute state into institutionalised,
426 JAN M. BROEKMAN
conceptualised knowledge. That imposes the naive question on the

problem of a philosophical foundation for medicine: "are there brute
facts?" The answer should be that there are brute facts only insofar
as there is institutionalised knowledge. Bruteness is not apart from,
but part of institutions. Such bruteness in the form of symptoms is a
necessary condition for medicine and its semiology.
8. The relevance of the institutional character of medicine has many
epistemological aspects. One of these relates to the patient in medical
discourse. Before any relevance of medical semiology can be expressed,
there have to be patients! This means that patients have to be involved
in medical meaning, before medical semiology becomes effective. There
are no diagnostic or other predicates outside the medical discourse and
its complex network of meanings. Any possibility of producing signs and
symptoms results from this semantic level. This level, institutional by
nature, precedes every possibility of medical discourse, speech, action
and thought. The illness of the patient, the production of the signs of a
disease, the reading of those signs and related semiological issues are
a precondition for this institutional fact. There must be patients. Any
symptom needs the general institutional framework of meaning in culture.
A symptom has to find its appropriate place in that framework. The
reading and interpreting of signs can only take place within that frame-
work.
9. The framework is not only the epistemological context for the
appropriate medical knowledge. The human body mirrors knowledge
in many respects. That is made true in medicine. Medical symptoms
not only have to find their place in the institution and in the medical
framework of knowledge, they also have to have their appropriate place
in the body. That body is in such cases a medically interpreted body,
for only in such bodies can symptoms find their place. Only in those
bodies can medical semiology nestle! The human body has to be full
of medical experiences and thought patterns; the body has to be possessed
by the meanings of medicine. Only then can medicine interfere, care
and cure. Only then is the body a bearer of virtual medical meaning, signs
and symptoms. In this view the human body is a particular body: culture
and institutions can involve that body in meanings through which it
lives the limits of life. Life and death are not external to that body,
they are already internalised. Medical semiology brings this internali-
sation into the open. Barthes: "11 apparait tout de suite ... qu'en medecine
le signe ... a besoin, pour signifier, de son lieu, c'est-a-dire d'un espace
corporel. On voit alors que Ia semiologie medicate, et c'est en cela qu'elle

se distinguerait du mecanisme de Ia langue, a besoin, pour que le signe
opere sa fonction significante, d'une sorte de support corpore1."7
SIGN, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
Is the human body the ontological basis of all referential activity? Does
semiology need the human body to construct an illness of that body?
Barthes pointed out how medicine needs a body in order to designate and
to be meaningful. The same could be said of law. Legal subjectivity needs
a body and bodily awareness. In many cases legal discourse identifies
the body and its "owner." One should ask: what kind of body is meant
here? Semiology has shown that such a body has already been interpreted
medically and legally before it can regard itself as the body of such a
discourse. That, of course, involves a multiplicity of metaphorical func-
tions of the concept "body." Wittgenstein's idea is important: there are
(in an ontological sense of the word) no boundaries, but they can be
drawn. We do so within the power of our ideological consciousness.
The drawing of boundaries is possible in such a way that bodies are
not automatically identified with organisms. They are bodies impregnated
with medical and legal meaning and experience.
The diagnosis of the doctor can be understood in terms of a reading
of the signs of the body. This reading is never completely univocal, never
a positivist reading of absolutely clear meanings. All doctors hesitate
to form the diagnosis. Tentative expressions are used, provisional insights
formulated. The determination of an illness is in many cases a matter
of trial and error. That is not a sign of the doctor's feebleness or modesty
in view of medical qualifications. It rather shows the characteristics of
semiology in practice!
What does this mean? As early as 1927 Ludwig Fleck considered
the semiological importance of the doctor's activity. He focused on
reference. Fleck's estimation was that in medical thinking and particu-
larly in the medical diagnosis, reference was part of a general theory
of science to come. A special contribution was his orientation of the
development of a theory of science in medicine. It was an opinion of
his time that medicine is not to be taken to be a science, and that chem-
istry or physics are to be used as a point of reference for a theory of
science. Fleck went beyond those biases, and that gave him a clear insight
into the semiological components of medicine.
428 JAN M. BROEKMAN
Technical knowledge in medicine develops rapidly, and the episte-

mological fixation follows these developments. Medical practice confirms
this general development in science. Fleck's concern is that medicine
lacks an "original concept" such as is inherent to other branches of
science and reinforces the referential activity of those sciences. To
him any proposition in this regard is too abstract, too volatile, too
idealistic.
Medicine does not necessarily require such an "original concept,"
says Fleck, but rather an embedment in cultural processes. He stresses
the determinative forces of a certain tradition and style of thinking, a
particular readiness to accept certain results of scientific thought. The
"concept" of his days is thus replaced by a "mainstream of thought,"
the "originality" is transformed in a certain embedding of devices. Fleck's
theories are therefore often seen as a predecessor to Kuhn's studies on
the scientific paradigm, its developments and changes. Hence his for-
mulation of 1946:
... das Individuum ist eher Reprasentant bestimmter sozialer Funktionen als bewuBte
QueUe der Handlung. Im irrtiimlichen wie im wahren Wissen entsteht die Anschauung
nicht durch logische Kalkiilation irgendwelcher Elemente, sondem durch einen kom-
plizierten stilisierenden ProzeB. Es gibt keine Beobachtung, die nicht durch die
ausgerichtete und begrenzende Denkbereitschaft voreingenommen ware. 8
Although there is no "original concept," there is a specific style in the

doctor's diagnosis and in medical thought. That is again visible in the
described 'trial and error' procedure. That aspect is also a matter of
style and tradition in medicine. Again Fleck:
Nirgends auBerhalb der Medizin gibt es so viele Pseudo- und Parabestimmungen.... Diese
besondem Namen existieren in der Medizin wei! man ... in einem bereits bestimmten
idealen Krankheitstypus gesondene Untenypen unterscheiden muBte .... Je weiter sich
das arztliche Wissen fonbewegt, desto mehr solcher Bestimmungen.... 9
Biases are thus in Fleck's view an epistemological virtue, a necessary

condition for science and a style of culture and evaluation. This is not
unlike the unfolding of a system. Names and signs, illnesses, pseudo-
determinations and normative concepts form the framework of medicine.
"System" is, therefore, not an appropriate expression. The unfolding
of names and signs, determinations and normative concepts in medicine
parallels the unfolding of doctrinal concepts in jurisprudence. This
parallel is undoubtedly much more visible in European continental
legal thinking than in Anglo-Saxon case law. However, the two legal
systems do produce the same dynamics of conceptual relationships as

does medicine. In that regard cases in medicine are like cases in law.
Their conceptualisation and all relevant nosological and legal-doctrinal
names demonstrate a strong relation of kinship and of family relation-
ships. Affiliation of the basic concepts is a central issue and a binding
force in both discourses. Affiliation functions as the encompassing ratio-
nality and is the necessary form of rationality in both discourses.
The philosophical implication is serious. One form of rationality takes
the place of another. A scientific rationality and its associations with
logical positivism are transposed into a discursive rationality, embracing
a narrativity which is founded on affiliation. A kinship of key concepts
produces rationality and scientific development. It also legitimises
the continuous play with nosological and doctrinal names and determi-
nations. The constitutive forces of legal and medical discourse are
apparently based on the production of semantic differences, their oppo-
sitions and their harmony. Medical action and intervention require a basic
security. This also applies to legal action and intervention. The security
most needed in the profession has hitherto found its expression in the
basic schemata of logical positivism. It seems, however, that the described
process of trial and error in medical diagnosis and therapy expresses
narrative rather than positivist rationality. In legal theory, a parallel can
be found in the loss of the influence of legalism and the decreasing influ-
ence of positivist standpoints in jurisprudence. Maintaining the social
effect of the two discourses justifies the continuous naming and renaming
of events. Semiology interprets this as play with differences and unifi-
cation. The trials and errors in the naming of illnesses have a great
semantic value in themselves. They enhance the semiological approach
in medicine and the cultural embededness of the discourses. This is
true for the naming of an illness, it is also true for the experience of
illness and the experience of naming illnesses. There can be no sign
without or beyond a semantic context. There is no experience of an illness
without or beyond a medical, nosological context.
This sheds light on the most remarkable parallel between medical
nosology and legal doctrine. Signifiers transform into signification, the
two weave a network with untraceable threads. A complexity of meanings
and a multitude of social and institutional relations comes into exis-
tence. Their intertwinement removes any positivistic understanding and
determination of signs and symptoms. The event in itself is beyond the
intention of its author, who is not able to determine a definitive, univocal
430 JAN M. BROEKMAN
meaning of the sign, because of the complexity of relationships and

contexts. Medical and legal practices are therefore poetic by nature,
and only a poetic understanding of the traditional applicatio really fits.
The experience of an illness is always the experience of a signified entity.
It may be difficult in daily practice, but it is theoretically important to
accept that this experience is the experience of a name which has become
a concept (disease X).
If the body and its illness, including the fact that this body dies, are
signifiers, then they are already signified in the embracing context of
culture. Meaning precedes meaning. Illness is a sign only as a bearer
of signification: the disease. The object of experience is the illness only
as preceded signification. The name is the turning point. Barthes: " ...
au fond, lire une maladie, c' est lui donner un nom; et des ce moment
... il y a une sorte de ... reversibilite vertigineuse entre le signifiant
et le signifie; Ia maladie se definit comme concours de signes; mais le
concours de signes ne s'oriente et ne s'accomplit que dans le nom de
Ia maladie .... " 10 What is experience in this semiological context? Is
any determination or analytical description possible? In any case it does
not concern experience that is founded on the univocal application of a
concept. In other words, this perspective radically questions whether a
clinical picture can ever belong to the experience of illness. The con-
sideration does not result from the opposition between concept and nature,
but rather from the very nature of semantics. In contrast to legal expe-
rience (the body as a legal subject) and medical (the body as bearer of
illnesses and diseases), medical semiology reveals the indeterminacy
of bodies and awareness. That awareness evidently destroys the episte-
mological schema of reference. It happens not only with regard to
particular medical or legal references, but to referential thought as such.
The body is a token of culture, and a challenge to our philosophical
thought.
The naturalistic and the organic, together with the constructivist
foundation of the image (the relationship between nature and concept)
are seen as aspects, not as the total foundation of experience and rep-
resentation in law or in medical nosology. A reinforcement of this
formation is the fact that medicine itself shows the tension between the
two fundamental conceptualisations. A constructivist medical theory
opposes an organic, holistic and naturalistic understanding of the disease.
Fleck has set the standard with his explanation that this tension cannot
be resolved or abolished, since medical theory and its proper rationality
have to give way to the complexity and irrationality of the illness. He

formulates:
... immer wieder und wieder wird es notwendig, den Blickwinkel zu wechseln, von
einem knosequenten Denkstandpunkt zuriickzutreten. Nur so wird die Welt der Krank-
heitsphiinomene irrational als Ganzes, rational im einzelnen. Weder die Zelluar - oder
Humoraltheorie noch selbst eine funktionale Auffassung der Krankheiten oder deren
'psychogenes' Bedingtsein schopfen allein jemals den ganzen Reichtum der Krankheits-
phanomene aus. u
It is indeed the doctor's experience that one constantly has to change per-
spectives in order to avoid a fixation of the professional mind. Only
then does the world of the phenomena of illness appear as irrational in
its entirety and rational in detail. No discipline or disciplinary concept
touches the richness of the totality of illnesses. The consequences are
meaningful. Medical thinking, referring to illnesses and medical cases,
is determined by the reference to clinical pictures. Medical forms of
understanding are forms of history. They are formations of history, forms
in which history can find its realisation. The illness itself possesses a
genesis in time, and this genesis has to follow the developments of sci-
entific construction. Hence Fleck's morbi can provide us with the clinical
picture! This fundamental insight remains valuable, although today's
accent is on chemical and process development rather than on the history
of a life. But life takes its course together with the illness. Time and
the telos of medicine are closely related. Let us not forget, what medical
technology often disregards: Life and Illness are embedded in Life!
K.U.L., Leuven
NOTES
1 M. Herberger, Dogmatik, Zur Geschichte von Begriff und Methode in Medizin und
J urisprudenz (Frankfurt/Main, 1981 ).
2 A. Artaud, HELIOGABALE ou I' Anarchiste Couronne (Paris, 1934); (Paris, 1979 [2]),
pp. 72ff.
3 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, L'Anti-CEdipe. Capitalisme et schizophrenie (Paris, 1972),
pp. 29ff, p. 9.; Mille Plateaux (Paris, 1980), pp. 95ff.; Cl. Reichler (ed.), Le Corps et
ses fictions (Paris, 1983).
4 R. Barthes, "Semiologie et medecine," in R. Bas tide (ed.), Les Sciences de Ia folie
(Dordrecht, 1972). Reprint in: R. Barthes, L'Aventure semiologique (Paris, 1985), pp.
273-283.
5 Barthes, op. cit., p. 275.
432 JAN M. BROEKMAN
6 Ibid., p. 276.
7 Ibid., p. 277.
8 L. Fleck, "Erfahrung und Tatsache," in L. Schafer and Th. Schnelle (eds.), Gesammelte
Aufsiitze (Frankfurt/M., 1983). pp. 37ff, 128ff.

9 Ibid., pp. 39ff.
10 Barthes, op. cit., p. 280.
11 Fleck, op. cit., p. 43.
PART SEVEN
ATTUNEMENT OF SAMENESS AND

ALTERITY IN THE CULTURAL AND
SOCIETAL NETWORKS OF LIFE
The Mariachi dancing in the square on the occasion of the holiday.
CARMEN LOPEZ SAENZ
A. SCHUTZ: PHENOMENOLOGY AND

UNDERSTANDING SOCIOLOGY
1. A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR

UNDERSTANDING SOCIOLOGY
A. Schiitz (1899-1959) is, no doubt, sociophenomenology's major

representative. Even if his abundant production rather than being inde-
pendent is prone to abound in original concepts of other thinkers like
Husserl or Weber, among others, Schiitz' main merits are the discovery
of the important role Phenomenology plays in sociological studies and
the creation of a sociology that investigates the structure and social dis-
tribution of common sense knowledge.
Schutz's sociophenomenology is meant to be more the description
of the experience of natural attitude rather than its analysis from a tran-
scendental phenomenological vantage point. It is for this reason that
Schiitz completes Husserl's phenomenology by resorting to Max Weber's
sociology of action and understanding while he strives to make com-
patible both Weber's evaluative neutrality and the understanding of the
meaning of behaviours proclaimed by phenomenology.
Following Weber, Schiitz thinks that the main object within the social
sciences is the social agent and that behaviour cannot be explained by
means of causal schemata, instead it should be understood. From this
stems his allegiance to understanding sociology. Nevertheless, Schiitz
criticizes Weber's lack of analysis regarding the intersubjective forma-
tion of meaning that agents provide the social world with. He thinks
that Weber's concept of meaningful action shows some inadequacies since
it does not incorporate a detailed analysis of meaning and of ordinary
meaningful action. To sum up, Schiitz seeks to correct the lack of philo-
sophical foundation in Weber's concepts and considers the subjective
understanding needs of the knowledge of man's conscious functions.
Weber had limited himself to developing the implements necessary for
his empirical research, but he had not delved into the understanding of
the subjective meaning of social action, in intersubjectivity, or in the
structures of conscience that meanings are attached to.
With the intention of analysing these principles and of founding the
435
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/l, 435-457.

436 CARMEN LOPEZ SAENZ
social sciences philosophically, SchUtz addressed Husserl in the 1920's.

Between June 1932, and December 1937, he interviewed the father of
phenomenology. Husserl taught him that in order to turn to things them-
selves it is necessary to analyse the subjectivity which constitutes the
objective world and is in turn constituted by it. Nevertheless, Schiitz
was more interested in the phenomenology of natural attitude than in
transcendental phenomenology. He considered sociology to be a science
that produces second order constructions, derived from those realized
by man in daily life. And he was convinced that phenomenology, in as
much as it is a method to face lived reality, was adequate for under-
standing sociology.
If the subject of science, in Husser! 's opinion, was transcendental inter-
subjectivity and the universe of monads that preceded and produced all
mundane objectivity, it is the individual scientist and his community
that becomes the subject of science. But he agrees with Husserl that
the world of scientific theory is only a finite province of meaning within
other worlds, actual and possible. Besides that, the aim of science is
not that of reaching a world of objective meanings, since the latter are
an abstraction according to Schiitz: meaning is always subjective, that
is, it always makes reference to a subject.
Following Weber and Husser!, Schiitz considers that the social sciences
are to reach scientificity not by imitation of the exactitude of the method
of natural sciences, but by rigourous application of a scientific method
more adequate to their study: the understanding method, which seeks
to know the subjective meaning of human actions. Phenomenological
hermeneutics teaches that the priority of method threatens to lose sight
of objects and truth; that is why the method cannot be alien to the things
investigated. Though the phenomenological method has proved to be
so fruitful, Husser! did not free it from the fundamental object of phi-
losophy, he did not absolutize it.
Phenomenology is, according to Schiitz, a type of thought adequate
for the foundation of Weber's theory because it deals with intentional
reality: reality remains subject to epoche so that we are left with a lived
reality that acts as raw matter for the social scientist. But epoche is
only a deconnection, a bracketing that does not suppress true reality
but exacts a reduction, understood as re(con)duction towards the ego giver
of sense.
Schiitz does not believe that the phenomenological questions are
opposed to empirical procedures, he thinks the phenomenological method
A. SCHUTZ 437
can be very useful if applied to the social sciences. Phenomenology prob-

lematizes concepts such as the existence of social man, the meaning of
others, the characteristics shared by the different socio-cultural worlds
in which historical reality develops, etc. Nevertheless, SchUtz selects only
those aspects of phenomenology that are useful for him to realize his
goals: Husserl's analyses of pre-predicative experience and of the nature
of ideal types, 1 phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, the model
of aperception and of appresentation, retention and protention, noesis and
noema, the conception of things as intersubjectively identical, relative
to an infinity of subjects who find themselves in a relation of mutual
understanding. 2 Schutz also accepts the Husserl's idea of empathy as
the explanation of the constitution of the intersubjective objectivity of
things and of human beings as unitary psychophysical beings; 3 but, all
these concepts only have, for Schutz, a propedeutic value. Like Husser!,
he intuits essences, which is not the same as creating them but a way
of apprehending actively what is passively pre-constituted by the types. 4
Schutz's theory of typification unfolds Husserl's doctrine of intention-
ality within the structure of pre-predicative experience and within the
process of ideation and abstraction which takes place in natural attitude.
In agreement with Husser!, Schutz thinks that experience is always
typified experience and that such typification takes place at a prepred-
icative level (level of passivity). Both authors understand the importance
of typification in the experience of the life-world; they know that types
serve as the point of departure for the eidetic method, that the generic
is already present at the level of passivity. Nevertheless, Schutz approves
only partially of Husserl's affirmation of multiple levels of passivity
and considers that passive syntheses, especially the syntheses of asso-
ciation, are general forms, immanent to conscience; Schutz believes
that Husserl's assertion that the identity of the noema is achieved in
the passive synthesis is not correct, because we cannot assume a passive
fulfilment of consciousness. In addition to this, Schlitz abandoned some
key concepts of phenomenology that he considered idealistic in excess
and accused Husser! of not paying attention to the concrete problems
of the social sciences.
In brief, Schlitz conceives phenomenology in terms of the themati-
zation of natural attitude, of the Lebenswelt. That is why he centers his
work upon the analysis of it and tries to apply transcendental method-
ology to it; this explains his interest in phenomenological psychology
or in the phenomenology of the natural attitude. In other words, Schutz
follows the Husserl who establishes an eidetic psychology able to found

empirical psychology,5 thus, he remains within the wordly sphere and
abandons the transcendental, that which deals with all constitutive
problems. In Natanson's words, Schutz only meant to practice a
Psychology of the natural attitude. 6 He was convinced that the latter
had been an area neglected by phenomenologists and that the origins
of the social world were natural, not transcendental. Nevertheless, he
appreciates the methodology of transcendental phenomenology as a
way to provide phenomenological psychology with rationality and
scientificity.
Schutz counts among Husserl 's most important achievements his
analysis of the Lebenswelt, which directs the development of philo-
sophical anthropology, and his method which can be applied to the world
of natural attitude. 7 Nevertheless, his use of the concept of "life-world"
limits itself to the world of daily life; meanwhile, Husserl made a dif-
ference between the latter and what he called ante-pre-predicative
experience in his Erfahrung und Utreil. Husserl's Lebenswelt was the
fruit of a regressive analysis which started from science and found out
its foundations by means of reduction. For Schutz, instead, daily life is
the starting point for all knowledge, actual or possible. Because of it,
he abandons attitude as experienced (lived) world; from this stems the
existence of several worlds or multiple realities as a function of dif-
ferent tensions in consciousness; he mixes the original world of pure
experience with the world of common sense interpretation. He thinks that
the life-world is not merely physical, but mainly social and that, con-
sequently, there is no ontology of the life-world which does not start with
the description of the I in relation with the other. 8
Although for Schutz the world of daily life is only a sphere of finite
meaning within the world of life, it is a supreme reality, exactly that
which Husserl brackets to thematize its structures and foundation, in order
to meet it once again as self-evident. According to Martin Algarra, for
Schutz, "the concept of "life-world" cannot, then, be understood in
ontological terms, but as a psychological and vitalist notion". 9
The cognitive setting in this life-world of Schutz's is called "natural
attitude" and is directed by pragmatic principles, that is, oriented more
towards controlling the world than towards knowing it. On the contrary,
Husser} addressed it with an orientation primarily gnoseological whose
interest was not at all strategic or technological but, if anything,
emancipative.
A. SCHUTZ 439
Although SchUtz characterizes this world as the world of perfor-

mance (working world), he believes with Husserl that it is not self-
sufficient, that philosophic and social reflexion is essential to its inter-
pretation because the world is not, as it could seem at first sight,
homogeneous but incoherent, only partially clear and, on occasions, con-
tradictory.
Husserl and SchUtz speak of the derived character (derived from the
Lebenswelt) of science, but they do not establish a radical distance
between both of them, because Lebenswelt and science are not different
ontological regions, but interrelated spheres of meaning, epistemolog-
ical levels that do not exclude each other since even the social-scientific
moves within the realm of several regions of meaning.
Regarding the concept of "action", although Schutz inherits it from
Weber, he deals with it in depth, places it in the world of daily life and
links it, as phenomenology would, to perception and the relevance of
realities experienced by the subject. The latter is closely linked to the
stock of knowledge belonging to each of us, constituted by the typifi-
cation and sedimentation of unfamiliar experiences; the interpretation
of experiences is nothing more than the process of ordering them by
means of their inclusion within that stock of knowledge. Husserl, on
the contrary, goes beyond that set of acquired sedimentations and inquires
about the origin of those automatic patterns of knowledge, about the
apodictic "ego" which constitutes all actual and possible meaning. I
believe that it is not possible to do without the transcendental founda-
tion, among other reasons because it is only from it that we can establish
normative principles to guide actions, helpful to contrast the prejudice
and pre-understandings of common sense and also to distinguish true
from false interpretations.
On some occasions, it seems as if Schutz mixed up the roles of active
and passive processes. This difficulty walks hand in hand with the indis-
tinction between the noetic and noematic aspects of intentional processes
and, consequently, of intentionality itself.
Starting with the confusion between active and passive activities,
Schutz affirms that our interpretative scheme is passively constituted and
that it is not the result of the self's thought. He does not explain, though,
what this passive constitution is like nor how the schemata of interpre-
tation are extracted from experience. How can superimposed relevance
be transformed into intrinsic relevance? It is not enough to say that active
interpretations are based on passive syntheses. Relevances are forms of
typification. Nevertheless, SchUtz's theory of typification is incomplete.

Do typifications occur only at a pre-predicative level? In other words,
are they only passively constituted? In Schutz's opinion there is an
interrelation between interest and motivational relevance: that which
attracts our attention, that which motivates us, is precisely what is relevant
to us. While the problem of interest is not separable from active mental
processes, SchUtz's theory of relevance does not clearly establish the dif-
ference between active and passive processes and does not clarify their
role in the phenomenon of relevance.
Schutz interprets social action as human behaviour and understands
it as positive intervention in a given situation or as passive understanding
of it; in other words, "action" is not, for him, synonymous with practice,
but on the contrary, it is theory that can be understood to be so. This
is so because Schiltz defines "action" in terms of human conduct pro-
jected self-consciously by the actor. The term "act" defines already
accomplished action. Action can be either manifest or latent. All manifest
action is the fruit of a project and answers to a purpose. Starting from
M. Weber's postulate about subjective interpretation, SchUtz centers his
theory on the understanding of social action as meanings that an actor
assigns to his action. The subjective interpretation of this meaning is,
for Schutz, a typification of the common sense world, the concrete par-
ticular manner in which men and women in their daily lives, interpret
their conduct and that of others.
Let us say, to sum up, that Schiltz was faithful to phenomenology in
that he was interested in signifying structures; nevertheless, near the
end of his life, he recognized that, although phenomenology clarifies
the structures of meaning in order to found them on the structure of being,
phenomenology wants to found the social world without establishing
its ontology. 10
2. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY
Schutz studied the psychological foundations of action in order to under-

stand the meaning of social action and, with that purpose in mind, he
linked Weber's concept of social action to Husserl's concept of inter-
subjectivity. Like the former, he thought that the world of daily life
was the common realm of intersubjectivity and communication, but
Schutz asked Philosophy for help to dig deeper into the question of inter-
subjectivity.
A. SCHUTZ 441
If social action can be defined as action directly orientated towards

other persons (conscious beings) by the actor's intention, it will be
necessary first to describe how we reach those beings. Schiitz is con-
vinced that the basic problem of phenomenology is intersubjectivity
and, so, he suggests that it should be taken to be an ontological category
fundamental for human existence, a precondition of every immediate
experience in the life-world, a philosophical question and a systematic
problem for the social sciences.
Within natural attitude, intersubjectivity does not posit itself as a
problem but as an evident fact. 11 This aproblematicity owes, in my
opinion, to the fact that we limit ourselves to the apprehension of the
other as a peculiar object, a presentation; quite differently, Husserl studied
intersubjectivity in depth because he considered that what makes the other
into a subject is exactly that which is apresented in him. Common sense
thinking is not thoroughly adequate at the time of facing the problem
of understanding another's action inasmuch as it suffices for our own
purposes at hand. With the aim of augmenting the understanding of
alterity, we must analyse the meaning that particular actions bear to the
actor. That subjective interpretation of meaning is feasible only if the
motives that determine actions are betrayed. Schiitz does not stand up for
common sense knowledge, on the contrary, he makes a distinction
between reality and ideal typicality. Although the latter is rooted in the
former, the fountain of generalized typicality can be found in the
schemata by means which of we organize our lived experience in a
synthesis of recognition. These schemata are the typifications that struc-
ture and organize our worldly existence, and even pre-predicative
experience. Common sense, then, is a constructive process, active and
not something passively given, and typification is an essential ideational
act. Thanks to it, we abstract the specific and attend exclusively to form
or to the structural character of objects.
Zaner thinks that the fundamental subject in Schutz's work is
Intersubjectivity. 12 Really, sociology and all sciences, in general, start
from intersubjectivity as an essential category of understanding, but
they do not think of it as a problem. Any social interaction derives
from the general thesis of the existence of the other "ego". All doubt
cast on the other, on the intersubjective world, leaves intact the
fundamental belief in the other, in our world and its objects. Never-
theless, Schiitz sees that, in order to understand intersubjectivity in
itself, it is necessary to thematize the epoche of the epoche realized by
common sense so as to avoid participating in those beliefs, and there-

fore transform them in a subject of research. SchUtz never shrank from
this philosophical question because he was not satisfied with accepting
the aproblematic experience that we have of the others in daily life;
it was important for him to clarify why we can speak of an other in
general and what sense we assign that fellow man who is alike and an
other.
Schutz thinks that transcendental phenomenology cannot solve the
problem of intersubjectivity, since, within it, the other is an element of
the intentional world constituted by the transcendental ego, in which
every alter ego receives sense and validity. How will intersubjectivity
be possible if the other and the other's contents of conscience are
constituted by the transcendental ego? According to Schutz, Husser!
solves this problem within the non reduced sphere, but not within the
transcendental one. Even presupposing that the others be also "ego",
it seems impossible to solve the contradiction between the worlds
transcendentally constituted by them. Each transcendental ego of inter-
subjectivity should be constituted as man in the world and then it could
be understood that all contain their own transcendental ego. This can only
be clarified by taking into account the functions of transcendental inter-
subjectivity or of the open monadic community. Is this Husserlian
community truly a community of men and women? How can the "ego"
be conjugated transcendentally? Is it even possible to speak of a plurality
of transcendental egos? And if that were the case, how could it be related
to the eidos transcendental ego? Is the alter ego only a possibility of
the eidos transcendental ego in general?
In the Royaumont Congress, Schutz publicly abandoned transcendental
phenomenology basically because, for him, Husserl's transcendental
reduction does not allow for knowing how my transcendental ego can
learn something about a transcendental you, or how can this transcen-
dental you and ego found a transcendental we. 13 Husserl speaks of a
structure of transcendental ego (egos) which is only announced by the
metaphysical noun "monads" but never defined. Accordingly, it seems
that the transcendental ego can only be conceived as singular. Husser!
does not explain clearly how it can be possible that his transcendental
reduction (which constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity) may be
practiced in community. In addition to it, the social communities cannot
be said to be personalities of a superior order and we cannot find in
them any of the features revealed by the analysis of individual persons. 14
A. SCHUTZ 443
Husserl's fallacy was that he hypostatized abstract concepts to assign

them personal existence.
Schiltz seems not to have understood that, within the reduced sphere,
the whole world is preserved although only to the extent that it is the
intentional correlate of my conscious life. He did not ponder enough
on the Husserlian idea that transcendental subjectivity is at bottom tran-
scendental intersubjectivity that constitutes the only objective world; 15
that transcendental intersubjectivity is constituted in the thinking ego
but in such a way that it is the same for any human being.
Schutz considers that in his Fifth Cartesian Meditation Husser! fails
to explain how the Other is constituted as transcendental subjectivity;
he only explains it as a mundane psychophysical unit, 16 consequently,
Husser! has not demonstrated the possibility of a transcendental ego
coexistent with others and constituted within the transcendental ego.
The latter would be necessary in order to overcome the solipsism of
the transcendental sphere. Schutz thinks that the second epoche does
not entail the constitution of the Other as a self-sufficient monad within
my own one, but, if anything, it leads to the aprensentation of another
psychophysical ego through mine. 17 Even if we accept the constitution
of the transcendental ego by means of apresentation through the expe-
rience of its body, even if we presuppose the inferior preconstituted
stratum of owned belongings, what would the second reduction be useful
for? How could the apresentation of the organic alien body entail at
the same time the apresentation of its primordial world? In what way
does the apresentation of the other psychophysical body lead to the
concretization of a totally other monad? How can my monad and that
of the Other constituted by me achieve an intersubjective relationship
and a transcendental community? The transcendental ego builds its world
and the others according to its being and its sense, it constitutes them
only for itself and not for all the transcendental egos. This leads Schutz
to affirm that the other ego that Husser! speaks about is given to me as
a psychological ego rather than as an ego constituting its own sphere
of property.
Paradoxically, Schutz intended to socialize the solitary transcendental
ego, but remained convinced like Husserl, that only by relation to the
ego are the others assigned the specific meaning that we call "we";
only through reference to that "we" whose centre egos occupy, are others
in the position "you" and through reference to them do third ones arise
as "they".
I believe, with Carrington, 18 that Schutz failed to notice the differ-

ence Husser! established between the transcendental and the mundane
sphere; for Husser! intersubjectivity is to be explained on both. On his
part, Schutz was sensitive only to the worldly sphere of intersubjec-
tivity and, because of it, he interpreted Husser! 's explanation of
transcendental intersubjectivity as analogous to that of mundane inter-
subjectivity and thus, concluded that the former was absurd.
For Schutz, the epistemological problem posited by intersubjectivity
is resolved in the natural attitude from the ontological point; intersub-
jectivity is an unquestioned assumption within the mundane sphere. Its
essence is simultaneity (the consciousness of getting old together) because
the intersubjective phenomenon does not happen either in any inner
duration or in the external time of Nature, but in the objective or standard
time as measured by our watches and calendars. It is not a time construed
arbitrarily and subjectively, but the shared time which intersubjectively
coordinates individuals. Schutz does not explain why and how standard
time shares the cosmic time and fails to say what the latter is like. He
does not explain that magic coincidence of standard time, cosmic time
and inner time either. Hence it remains unclear what is the meeting
point for the intersubjective coordination of our different individual
projects.
There is no doubt that if there is an objective time, it will be intimately
linked to intersubjectivity, but will it be the fruit of a simple conven-
tion? The answer might be affirmative regarding standard time but this
is a reflection of cosmic time and all conventional time systems are
translatable in one way or another. Nevertheless, it seems that cosmic
time is a postulate to be presupposed although we are not capable of
understanding it as it is because we are temporarily limited beings.
On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of time independently
of space and this is the reason why it is nearly impossible to under-
stand objective time isolatedly from my baby and its behaviour.
Hence, the most properly social situation is, for Schutz, the face-to-
face situation or pure "we-relationship" which takes place between
partners, between those who share a spacio-temporal community and
are able to connect their motivations (the "motivations in order to" from
the point of view of the actor become "motivations because" on the
part of the sharer), because they participate in the inner current of life
of the other. Only in face-to-face situations is the other apprehended as
uniquely individual within a particular situation biographically deter-
A. SCHUTZ 445
mined. In any other dimension of the world the other is experienced

and apprehended as a type. The remaining social situations can be
deduced from the combination of the two main features of the we-rela-
tionship: immediacy and reciprocity. In Husserlian terms, the face-to-face
situation produces direct intentionality and, therefore, it is the most
evident.
In Schutz, the Thou-orientation is the prerequisite for all social action,
although for it to become a social relationship it is necessary for "me"
to act on the other and thus produce a We-relationship. Access to the
other is based on the interpretation of the experiences kept in our stock
of knowledge and on the presupposition that they can be applied to the
other. We perceive the alter ego without the need of reflexion; by means
of apresentation, as a being endowed with a conscience 19 similar to
mine which assigns subjective meaning to his actions. But the access
to the inner life of the other cannot be total, because if it were, we
would be one and the same person. The understanding of the other is,
in Schutz's sociology, a never-reached margin that, nevertheless, shapes
the intention called "Other-orientation". In order to reach this under-
standing, Schutz builds a system of categories and models based on
common sense experience, the prescientific experience of social reality.
But he does not question how our experiences, supposedly referred to
concrete others, lead to the conviction of their existence. Schutz prefers
to start with the experience of the intentional conscience of the other,
in other words, with the Other-orientation in which the starting point is
the other's experience as concrete human person rather than as tran-
scendental another.
Following the phenomenological tradition, Schutz resorts to analogy
and empathy not only so as to establish the "I can do it again" ideal-
ization and that of "and so on", but also so as to understand the meanings
the other has assigned to his actions. But Schutz concedes that his world
transcends mine because our systems of relevances, experiences, biogra-
phies are different and the other's interior can only be known from the
outside. This is indicative of the finitude of my knowledge, also of
otherness and of the difference between consciousnesses. Nevertheless,
Schutz thinks that the "I" is self-transparent, when experience says that,
on occasions, the other helps the "I" to understand better the meaning
of his/her actions, the image of the invisible part of his/her own body,
his/her unconscious motivations. For the "I" to be truly self-transparent
it is necessary that it first recognize itself as transcendental "I".
Truly understanding the other excedes the limits of self-interpretation.

Does empathetic transference suffice? Schlitz thinks that empathetic trans-
ference only discloses one's own consciousness rather than the other's
consciousness. He criticizes Husserl's indefinition regarding the term 20
and insists that we should not start with the similarities with the "I"
but with the general thesis of the "you" as an alien "I" - a stranger, so
as to then affirm that the whole "you" constitutes his experiences of
consciousness like "me", in other words, that his stream of conscious-
ness shows the same structure as mine, that is, that the other is able,
like myself, to act and think. In this sense, Schiltz's theory of intersub-
jectivity falls prey to a kind of mitigated psychologism.
When Schiltz affirms that intersubjectivity is determined by the
"you's" lived experience and by Du-Einstellung, he seems to be saying
that social interaction is based on pre-conceptual experience and that it
always relies on a non-conceptualizable dimension.
I follow Husserl in believing that this experience, as well as the general
thesis which affirms the existence of the world and of the others, is the
fruit of a natural point of view, which is in turn already marked by reflec-
tion and by the constitution of sense, although in the mundane sphere
we make epoche of those conditions.
In spite of these pieces of criticism on Husserl's theory of intersub-
jectivity, Schiltz agreed on some of his conclusions, for instance, his
doctrine on the body and perception, on the subject's space and time,
on the exchangeability of perspectives, typification and idealization,
the apresentation of alien conscience, the establishing of a common com-
municative environment, the priority of intersubjective understanding and
intentionality over communication, and so on.
Schiltz understood intersubjectivity was a fundamental category within
human existence and the foundation of sociability; he reached for a
solution for it within phenomenology but he did not manage to solve
the problems suggested by the Husserlian theory of transcendental inter-
subjectivity, and as a matter of fact he only dissolved them and analysed
empirical intersubjectivity. He forgot that Husserl coined the term, "tran-
scendental intersubjectivity", referring to the essence of all human
community, real or possible, rather than to factual human interrelations.
What does transcendental intersubjectivity mean versus the mundane
concept of intersubjectivity? For Husser!, we may say it is the basic
structure in defining humanity, because it gives origin to factic inter-
subjectivity and to the categories that help to apprehend it.
A. SCHUTZ 447
Consequently, I believe that this concept is meaningful and may even

be operative in analyzing the notion of intersubjectivity that Schutz is
interested in, a notion that becomes the foundation of all the other rela-
tions: "Within the transcendental subjectivity of the meditating
philosopher, subjectivity that is only valid for him/herself, the creation
of a universe of monads and of a world objective for everybody becomes
impossible under any hypothesis. But the exploration of the structure
of the sense of intersubjectivity and of the validity of the world-for-me
as an objective world, is a legitimate task of the phenomenological
analysis of constitution. And Husser! not only drew this task as field
for his research but he also realized it to a great extent". 21
Following Husser!, Schutz asserts that intersubjectivity and objectivity
of the world are equally originary and, therefore one cannot be derived
or construed by the other.
3. CONSTRUCTIVISM, REALISM OR
PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEALISM?
Schutz considered that the phenomenological theory of intentionality

could not entail the constitution of the objective world and that it pre-
supposed the life-world as unquestionable basis. Hence he has been
accused of reifying the noema, of thinking that it is something real in
the world and not the mere correlate of a noesis, and that beyond the
intentional world (world of noemata) there is a world of things in them-
selves whose existence is not bound to be doubted. 22
This idea, more metaphysical than phenomenological, explains why
I cannot consider Schutz to be a constructivist in the proper sense of
the word, that is, a theoretician for whom society is a compound of
meanings, actions and human intentions, organized in such a way that
social reality becomes a product of individual and collective defini-
tions. Only if these assertions23 are decontextualized can we catalogue
him as such.
What constitutes reality, in his opinion and in the opinion of the gen-
erality of phenomenologists, is the meaning of our experiences and not
the ontological structure of objects, but this does not mean that Schutz's
system is idealistic because, for him, reality lies in meaning; without
it, there would be neither conscience nor knowledge of either actions
or objects. What distinguishes social from natural sciences is that the
matter of the former ones has a meaning already constituted in its proper
object (social life); we choose between different interpretations of the

objects, but the meanings of those are already present in the social world;
that is, the sociologist does not invent anything, he limits himself to an
understanding in depth of human social life: for this reason, he applies
categories and concepts specifically built so as to facilitate the rigorous
apprehension of reality. Schutz himself situates phenomenology between
idealism and realism 24 and considers it to be a scientific method.
We think, like Spurling, that Schutz's phenomenology shows positivist
features; 25 this implies that his program is not openly constructivist;
that is, Schutz does not understand phenomenological social science
only as a construction of ideal types and scientific models of the social
world: "Constructionism of social science within a pure structure of
models". 26
Schiltz practices the epoche and his construction would be, in any case,
methodological and not ontological, because he is not a dogmatic ontol-
ogist. His approach to social reality is purely methodological and this
makes neutrality possible within his concept of science. We transform
and reorganize the social world at the same time that we interpret it;
we fabricate our world by building its meaning.
Certainly, Schutz's method is close to constructivism but it does not
aim at clarifying the ontological structure of being, but at studying the
perception of phenomenic reality and its influence on human actions.
This does not mean that Schutz completely identifies the ontological
sphere with the meaning it has and we assign it: the fact that he centers
his analysis on our experience of reality does not entail that there is
nothing else beyond it. Nevertheless, Schutz ought to have dealt more
deeply with the phenomenological concept of experience and should have
defined it rigorously in order to counter that type of accusation.
Schutz radicalizes Weber's idea of understanding and makes it out
to be true subjective understanding. He concedes that there are different
degrees of understanding and that understanding can never be total
because this would imply that "I" and the "other" share a stream of
consciousness. This is no obstacle for social science because in order
to understand the other's action it is enough for me to know his typical
motivations. Schiltz proves that a science of the subjective is possible
and that such science is not limited to an arbitrary reconstruction of social
actions, rather, it acts in understanding. It follows from it that Verstehen
is not a method, but the way in which humans experience common
sense in daily life. That understanding is subjective does not mean,
A. SCHUTZ 449
then, that the motivations for actions are private or uncontrollable. Quite
on the contrary, Schutz aims at clarifying what the actor means by his
action without imposing on him the interpretive schemata of the observer
(although, evidently the latter's study increases the degree of knowl-
edge that the actor has). Consequently, Schutz's Verstehen is mainly a
common sense way of experiencing human affairs; then it is an episte-
mological problem and, finally, it is a method characteristic of the social
sciences. The fertile analyses of the second aspect effected by Husserl's
phenomenology shed light on the first and third ones.
Schutz does not side with the causal theory of perception which says
that the physical object and our experience of it are interconnected in
such a way that, if we could obtain an extensional relation of percep-
tion, we would be able to explain (from the point of view of a third
person) the identity of the object perceived by several different subjects.
This theory is not explicit enough about the objectivity of things, in other
words, about the recognition on the subject's part that his object is an
object experienced by others. The objectivity of objects, their being
objects shared by a plurality of different subjects, can only be understood
if we acknowledge the role played by the cultural and communicative
encounter between subjects. In fact, it is possible to acknowledge that
the object I experience is the same as that experienced by the other and
so conclude that it is a true object, only thanks to the fact that the I
and the other share the same cultural constructs and communicate with
each other. The meaning of this encounter in which descriptions of the
respective objects are exchanged results in the subjects' consensus about
what the object may be. Consequently, the constitution of the objective
world is an intersubjective achievement grounded on the connection
between the subjects participating in a communicative encounter. This
was shown by phenomenology.
Although, in fact, the intersubjective world is a set of constructions
and typifications and the given is, simultaneously, built by consciousness
as typical, and in spite of the fact that the acts originated from the typ-
ifications have the same importance as the a priori concepts or the
universals, neither Schutz nor Phenomenology reduce the world to a mere
construction of subjective meanings, or lack - as it has been said, 27 a
solid concept of objective reality; what phenomenology rejects is the
objectivism of modem science as well as its pretended absolute knowl-
edge at the same time that it strives for objectivity. On that account,
Phenomenology puts forth a concept of the world as impletive evidence
and full intentionality which is incompatible both with realism and con-
structivism.
Many of Schiltz's critics fail to acknowledge that his concept of reality
is intentional and that Phenomenology does not constitute the world ex
nihilo but that the transcendental subject constitutes itself through it
and is constantly referred to it. To say that reality is the experience of
reality is to affirm that all the perceptions that we can have are referred
to one unity; for this implication to be plausible it is necessary that we
have a scheme by means of which such unity is produced. When Husser!
and Schiltz speak of constitution they refer to those schemata for impli-
cation or familiarity that direct experience; this is the meaning of the a
priori of correlation between the subjectivity of conscience and the world.
The reduction intends to recover the transcendental constituting life,
anonymous in general, which lends the world the only meaning it can
have for us. The a priori of correlation means that the objects are con-
stituted by or are correlates of subjective/intersubjective life and in
addition to it, it means that each object has a peculiar mode of experi-
ence in which the typical features of each realm of the world are given.
It could be objected that the analysis of the mode in which human
reality is given does not reach its essence. Husser! would answer that,
in order to investigate the properties of objectivities in each regional
ontology, we employ imaginative variation while such ontologies should
guide the sciences rather than substitute for them. Schutz accepts Fink's
thesis that Husser! avoided the ontological problematic and dealt only
with formal and regional ontologies.
In any case, Schiltz's constructivism would be merely methodology.
To be more precise, Schiltz subjects realism and constructivism to dialec-
tics; he affirms that if we relate to the world passively (discovering it)
and actively (constituting it), what results is two different but comple-
mentary disciplines. Thus, Schiltz invites us to develop a positive
dialectics of human relationships, to combine the active and passive
meaning of social reality, because the meaning we assign to reality trans-
forms and constitutes a world at the same time that it discovers and
interprets it. Hence Schutz's distinction between our world and our world.
For the above said, Schiltz's sociophenomenology is constructivist only
in a relative sense (the same that may render it positivist and realist),
in so far as its object is social reality and it is the subjects that lend it
meaning, but with reality proposing it.
A. SCHUTZ 451
4. CONCLUSION
Like many other Husserl followers, Schutz showed that Phenomenology

is not an idealizing solipsist method, but that, on the contrary, it becomes
absolutely necessary to study social reality comprehensively, and to
thematize its starting point: the relationship among subjects. His great
merit is to have discovered, in their depth, the presuppositions, struc-
ture and significations of the common sense world, of the intersubjective
world experienced by the human being in the natural attitude. His
punctilious description of the former patiently shows the empirical
applicability and richness of the phenomenological concepts.
Nevertheless, in reducing Phenomenology to transcendental psy-
chology, Schutz meets with difficulties at the time of justifying the
constitution of a shared common objective world. He naively believes
in the factual existence of the other and in the validity of phenomeno-
logical investigation on the constitution of sense within the sphere of
the ego for the sphere of the other. Thus he falls prey to psychologism,
because he mistakes the original world of experience for the world of
daily life or world of common sense28 interpretations; and because he
reduces the transcendental ego to the psychological one, he combines two
constitutions: the transcendental and the psychic, and two constituting
egos while he transforms the difference between the transcendental and
its transcendental correlate, between philosophy and positive science, into
a simple distance between surface and depth. This psychologism bars
SchUtz's derivation of the basic structure of the social world (the world
that exists for me as transcendental ego) from our own everyday thought
on the others. Hence, some authors have come to say that: "Schutz's foun-
dational role is not founded or based upon a phenomenology. The
foundational role that phenomenology may play is precisely determined
in advance by what is the true foundation of his thought (...) Schutz
produces a more or less complex psychologistic perversion of transcen-
dental phenomenology which gives an appearance of radicality to
SchUtz's idealistic individualism". 29 The same authors say that his
methodology is nothing more than a kind of idealistic individualism,
whose only aim is the reduction of the objective world to the individ-
uals' behaviour.
That Schutz privileges face-to-face interactions can lead us to think
of a certain reduction of social reality to a net of inter-individual rela-
tionships, but we think that he cannot be attributed such reduction even
if - like him - we think that only the said relations clarify the origin
and the meaning of sociability. For this reason, we might say that SchUtz's
analysis is enlightening, but requires other complementary studies.
In privileging direct social experience, and, consequently, face-to-face
interaction, Schutz proves his realism - far from the constructivism he
is accused of. Nevertheless, Schutz's goal is not to study the objects them-
selves, but to study the meaning constituted by the activities of our
conscience. In his opinion, the sociologist observes the facts of social
reality, delimits the aim of his study, creates models, etc. Certainly, he
also selects a series of meanings for his agents, but only when these
meanings reproduce a behaviour observed in a particular situation. Thus,
two fundamental results are obtained: to relate the situation to the
meaning assigned by the agent that executed it, and to explain it. For
this reason we cannot say that Schutz's interpretation of social reality
is reductionist, quite on the contrary, sociophenomenology considers
society to be a whole formed by human beings able to create it by
means of their productions and their givenness of meaning.
On a different order of things, sociophenomenology has been vincu-
lated to theories of the action and this is due to what, for us, is a defect
in Schutz's thought: the priority given to the active process of meaning.
I know the importance that perception had for Husserl and I also know
that he established a strong link between it and reflexion. But Schutz
understands it as passive reception of data. That is why in "Type and
Eidos" he mentions passive perception, suffered perception, etc. But, if
the data are passively received and meaning originates exclusively in
active mental processes, how is it possible for the noematic meaning
to become present to conscience when perception is not active? (Let
us say in passing that such meaning is necessary in order to recognize
the typifications of experience and their intentionality.) Schutz would
answer that the only source for that meaning is the stock of knowledge
at hand. Consequently, the processes of constitution of meaning, inten-
tionality and so on, would not be essential. The passive processes would
suffice and the stock of knowledge would become the replacer of sedi-
mented types, necessary so as to give meaning to later experiences.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that ideal types can be free from reflexive
activity and become topics through automatization. Perhaps this is
habitual regarding the use that common sense man makes of them, but
it is not so for the social scientist. Besides that, all ideal types are the
noematic correlate of a noematic process of knowing. Schutz thinks
A. SCHUTZ 453
that the latter can be passively given; I believe that this is impossible and
that, in any case, it would have been convenient for Schutz to clarify
to a greater extent the relation between the social scientist as observer
and as theoretician. Husserl made a distinction between the formation
of generic judgments of contingent empiric universals from the intu-
ition of the eidos through ideation and free variation. SchUtz thinks that
such ideation cannot reveal anything that is not already preconstituted
in the type we receive from familiar objects. 30 In other words, Schutz
affirms that the eidetic concepts are not constituted within conscience but
that they are part of an already given ontology and are, quite simply,
imposed on us. Typifications find their foundation in pre-predicative
experience and the eidetic concepts are based on them. Types are passive
given processes. All this means that Schutz presupposes the ontolog-
ical priority of the real world.
Some of these limitations can be due to the fact that Schutz's study
does not reach beyond Husserl's published materials. In his late writings,
Husserl meant to overcome some of these aporias, he speaks of an
original life which is neither one nor multiple, neither factual nor essen-
tial, but the ultimate foundation for these differences, and refers to the
physical and social Lebenswelt as its ultimate a priori; on the other hand,
Husserl kept on working hard on transcendental intersubjectivity, Ethics,
History....
Habermas affirms that SchUtz and Husserl remained stranded on a
simple generalization of the self's experience,31 because they failed to
see that language is the only means of attaining a dialectics of the par-
ticular and the universal. 32 I, nevertheless, am convinced like them, that
the communicative encounter which originates meaning is based on the
prior acknowledgement of the other as subjects, as human individuals
who are intentionally related to the objects and whose behaviour indexes
the things experienced; Verstehen is not just, as Habermas wants it,
communicative understanding.
The problem is that SchUtz does not pay excessive attention to the
phenomenological genesis of the social world and leaves transcendental
Phenomenology out of the question: although he elucidates the anthro-
pological structures of understanding and the epistemological status of
the social sciences, he is bound to fall prey to relativism and construc-
tivism because he gives up seeking criteria to contrast interpretations and
evaluate their closeness to true social reality. SchUtz's analysis of the
social world is descriptive and typological but, it does not adequately
distinguish between the attitude we adopt in the daily life of the social
Lebenswelt, and the constitutive structures of the social world which
are given to us in daily life. Perhaps for this reason he cannot com-
pletely solve the problem of understanding the other or that of the cultural
object as a trace of the other's conscious life.
It is not enough to make the fundamental structures of the lived
world explicit, because they do not exist per se. Schlitz abandoned
Husserl's theory of transcendental constitution because he thought that
in Husserl it became transformed by wanting to be the foundation for
the structure of being.33 I believe that Husserl remained faithful to his
principles and that he never meant to deduce intersubjectivity from tran-
scendental subjectivity, but he meant to make explicit the meaning of
the true existence of the others; just as the consciousness of one's self
and of the other's are inseparable, in the same way, there cannot be
ontological priority of the constitution of the I in relation to that of the
other, nor conversely. In fact, the aporia Husserl 's transcendental inter-
subjectivity leads to, expresses the very essence of our situation: for
this reason, we believe that there is no need of abandoning it, that it is
very interesting for the social sciences, because it analyses the genesis
of meaning and of the recognitions of meaning. If we leave these
problems aside, communication appears inexplicable.
Maybe the critics are right in saying that Schutz was not totally con-
scious of his philosophical presuppositions or that he did not know how
to extoll all the consequences from them but, at least, he summoned
philosophy and created a school of interdisciplinary research which was
highly significant regarding the human sciences. His analyses have facil-
itated a better definition of the task of understanding, systematizing the
method of ideal types and clarifying Weber's postulate of significant
adequacy. Schutz has demonstrated that phenomenology is an adequate
instrument for conceptualization and that it provides ideal types with a
richer content inasmuch as it presents the fundamental structures of social
existence from which types are constituted. These results should also
permeate the rest of the human sciences.
Husserl's interpretation invites us to understand the other and the I
beyond their psychological and social determinations, to seek an essence
of both which helps as a foundation to their empirical realizations, but
which cannot be reduced to them. The father of phenomenology taught
us that sociability (that vital concretion of intersubjectivity) cannot be
A. SCHUTZ 455
understood unless intersubjectivity has been understood. If we admit that

intersubjectivity, then society may cease to be understood as an arbi-
trary creation that helps to remedy the subject's greediness and egotism.
Husserl demonstrated that strategic utilitarianism is not the only form
of rationality which can be thought of.
For all the above said, we believe that phenomenology lends unity
to the fragmentary sciences, because phenomenology is able to lay
the foundations of the human sciences on basic anthropological princi-
ples and with a particular ontological methodology. For this reason,
it will be necessary to assume the structural rationality of all the
objects of human knowing, the concept of life-world or correlate of the
existing conscience and the radical intersubjectivity of the said world.
Phenomenology can provide the sciences with meanings and paths of
practical intercommunication, but before, it must converse with the dif-
ferent sciences in an attempt to put them in contact by means of a
shared fundamental preoccupation: the roots of man and of the human
condition. In this sense, A. T. Tymieniecka has proposed a phenome-
nology of man and the human condition as the foundational factor
towards interdisciplinary communication. 34
Phenomenology does not propose a particular sociology, but a critical
and constructive reinterpretation of the sociological investigations. For
the phenomenologists, the social can never be an object; it is apprehended
in living it, in describing the lived adequately so as to reconstrue its
meaning. Sociophenomenology does not dichotomize the subject of its
society, because it is the subject that lends meaning to society. Besides,
the phenomenological notion of intentionality has been very useful to
sociology. Phenomenology emphasizes freedom, protagonism within
the social life of the subject and his action (in contrast with the exces-
sive determinism that social functionalism oozes). It considers that the
individual is the beginning of social action rather than a simple product
of social action; it is interested in construed reality, in the genesis of
norms, in creation, in microsociology, in individual interaction and, above
all the rest, in meaning.
UNED, Madrid
Translated by Beatriz Penas Ibanez, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain

NOTES
1 Although the processes of typification act as true a priori, they do not aim at discov-
ering the eidos. If for Husser! essence is the signifying structure of intentional conscience,
for Schiitz, the search for the essence of the state, of society, etc. is not as important as
the examination of the general features of phenomena so as to manifest their multiple
structure and their formal genesis. Essence is thus neither a metaphysical concept nor a
methodological device with empirical determinations. It should be taken into account
that Husser! did not apply those types to social analysis.
2 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers /II (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1966), p. 17.
3 Cf. Ibid., p. 26.
4 Cf. Schiitz, A., "Type and Eidos ... ", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
XX (1959) p. 164.
5 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers /11, p. 4.
6 Cf. Natanson, M., Anonymity. A Study in the Philosophy of A. Schutz (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), p. 123.
7 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers I (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962), p. 149.
8 Cf. Schiitz, A., "El problema de Ia intersubjetividad transcendental en Husser!", Aa.VV.,
Husser/. Tercer coloquiofilos6fico de Royaumont (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968), p. 310.

9 Martin Algarra, M., La communicaci6n en Ia vida cotidiana. La fenomenologia de A.
Schutz (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1993), p. 253.

1 Cf. Schiitz, A., "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music", in: Kersten, F. (ed.)
Music and Man 2(1-2) (1976): II.

11 Cf. Schiitz, A., The Structures of the Life-World. II (Bloomington: Northwestern Univ.
Press, 1989), pp. 152-153.
12 Cf. Zaner, R. M., "Theory of lntersubjectivity: Alfred Schiitz", Social Research XXVII
(1961): 71.
13 Cf. Schiitz, A., "El problema de Ia intersubjectividad transcendental en Husser]",
p. 311.
14 Cf. Ibid., p. 313.
15 A detailed study of the problem of intersubjectivity in Husser!, Merleau-Ponty
and Schiitz, and of its implications with phenomenology, in L6pez Saenz, M. C.,
Investigaciones fenomenol6gicas sobre el origen del mundo social (Zaragoza: PUZ, 1994).
16 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers I, p. 195.
17 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers /11, pp. 66-67.
18 Cf. Carrington, J., "Schiitz on Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husser!", Human
Studies 2 (1979): 95-l 10.
19 Cf. Schiitz, A., Life Forms and Meaning Structure (London: Routledge and K. Paul,
1982), pp. 130-131.
20 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers Ill, p. 37.
21 Schiitz, A., "El problema de Ia intersubjectividad transcendental en Husser!", p. 316.
22 Cf. Schiitz, A., Life Forms and Meaning Structure, pp. 103-105.
23 Cf. Schiitz, A., Collected Papers /, p. 230.
24 Cf. Schiitz, A., El problema de Ia realidad social (B. Aires: Amorrotu, 1962),
p. 105.
25 Cf. Spurling, L., Phenomenology and Social World, p. 174.
A. SCHUTZ 457
26 Thomason, B. C., Making Sense of Reification (London: MacMillan Press, 1982),

p. 62.
27 Cf. Gummer, G., "A Critical Examination of Phenomenological Sociology", Socio-
logical Analysis ID(1) (1972): 13.
28 Hindess, H., Phenomenology and Methodology in the Social Science (Univ. Harvester
Press, 1977), p. 63.
29 Hindess, H., "The Phenomenological Sociology of Alfred Schutz", Economy and
Society 12(1) (1972): 15.
3 Cf. SchUtz, A., "Type and Eidos ...", p. 147.

31 Cf. Habermas, J., La l6gica de las ciencias sociales (Madrid: Tecnos, 1988), p. 198.
32 Cf. Ibid., p. 198.
33 Cf. Schutz, A., "El problema de la intersubjetividad transcendental en Husserl", pp.
315-316.
34 Cf. Tymieniecka, A. T., The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition,
Analecta Husserliana XIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer Ac., 1983), p. 40.
STEPHANIE GRACE SCHULL
A CULTURAL ARCHAEOLOGY OF
THE INSANE GENIUS
In an insane society, the only place for a sane person

is in a mental hospital.
Stephanie Grace Schull, misquoting Thoreau
It seems that every culture needs its outsiders (Babcock, 1975; Stonequist,
1937). That which we want to define is most easily so done by looking
to that which it is not, its negation, its opposite. The inside is known
by its difference to the outside, and the limit between the two is defined
by the circumstances that created it. Culturally speaking, the inside is the
norm and the outside is contrary to the norm - that is, abnormal. We
are all familiar with the sentiments that accompany the recognition of
these boundaries. It is the "us against them," good guys versus bad
guys, nature versus culture, the known versus the unknown, or more
abstractly, the finite (known) in contrast to the infinite (unknown). Any
figure that dwells beyond the limit will be perceived by the insiders as
wild, even deviant; their behavior will be seen as chaotic - they are
the fools, the lepers, the insane. A figure that lives on the margin between
the two realms will foil the attempt to hold tight cultural norms, while
paradoxically determining them - this individual is the living dead, the
trickster, the genius (Turner, 1969).
The genius is perceived to live on the margin between the known
and the unknown. This abnormal realm of the unknown, that lies outside
that which is considered to be the norm, is a source of inspiration for
the genius. This being the case, the genius, according to the normative
approach, is deviant. In so far as the genius is historically, and for that
matter contemporarily, associated with insanity and reacted to negatively
by the "normals," labeling theorists would consider the genius to be a
deviant as well. A disturbing question arises, "Why would a society be
enamored with thinkers whom they believe to be crazy?" This paper
will attempt to answer this question, employing the following premise:
Society not only needs outsiders like the genius, but will go so far as
to create them over and over again (Babcock, 1975; Turner, 1969). That
society presently adds madness to the construction of the genius will
459

460 STEPHANIE GRACE SCHULL
be of interest in this paper. As such, its theme will coincide with labeling
theory (in its constructionist mode). The current beliefs held about genius
are deeply imbued with connotations of congeniality. As a consequence
we can expect that social interactionist (labeling) theory will have to
struggle against the essentialist approach to genius. A tough opponent,
since the very word genius gave us our term congenital.
"How can such an elevated and idolized figure like the genius be
considered a deviant?" This question broaches the notion of "positive
deviance." However, this issue is not important for us here, as Erich
Goode has dealt with this notion in his essay "Positive Deviance: A
Viable Concept?" to the point of disarming what at first seemed to be
an unruly dilemma. He does so through his claim that "positive deviance"
is an oxymoron. At the very point where something can be labeled
deviant, it ceases to be positive. "Positive deviance" is a false notion
as it is an impossibility. Therefore, the mad genius cannot be a positive
deviant.
It is of interest that one of the leading figures in the social interac-
tionist school within the sociology of deviance, Howard Becker, has as
titles for two of his books, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of
Deviance, and The Other Side: Perspectives on Deviance (Goode, 1990).
Apparently, the idea of sides, and therefore of limits, directly connects
tricksters, geniuses, fools, lepers, and the insane with being "outside"
or on the "other side." Similarly, a structural anthropologist writes,
"Liminality, marginality, and structural inferiority are conditions in which
are frequently generated myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems,
and works of art" (Turner, 1969, p. 128).
Which figure one finds at the limit depends upon a culture's values.
During the Middle Ages, when imitation and the academic method of
scholasticism were of value, the trickster figure was found literally on
the margins of books undoing the text and poking fun at the norms, while
the lepers represented those who dwell outside of society, as they were
forced out by medieval society. The handwritten copies of the Book of
Hours are famous for their decorative margins that portray trickster char-
acters symbolizing puns, usually sexual in nature, that are humorous at
the expense of the supposedly sacred text (Camille, 1992). In more recent
times, when originality and creativity are the most valuable traits in
academia, the genius appears on the scene giving birth (giving form)
to material from the other side, while the insane are pushed out and forced
to represent that which dwells completely outside of society's limits.
A CULTURAL ARCHAEOLOGY 461
Hence, there arises the dilemma as to how the shift occurred. How and
why did western civilization exchange the role of the genius to the
trickster and back again, and likewise the insane to the lepers and back?
Before we can do justice to these questions, we must first trace the notion
of genius historically. Then, using genius as our guiding concept, we will
work to uncover that which underlies/gives rise to these questions.
Genius has its origins in the Greek notion of daemon. Jane Chance
Nitzsche (1975) traces the early development of genius:
The birth god, under the auspices of astrology, represented the birth star or horoscope
of the individual. Its early begetting power was similarly into the "seed power" (gener-
ative reason) of the "Father" of the gods, Jupiter, the Stoic World Soul. Eventually genii
were ascribed to the planets and luminaries of the universe, which aided the World Soul
in its generative and fatal tasks. The regions in-between the gods and men were also
believed to be inhabited - by cosmic messengers or daemones, Greek spirits who were
related to the souls of the dead (Di Manes) and to the rational souls of men (daemones).
Eventually the Greek concept of the daemon influenced the Roman genius, so that each
man was said to possess a "soul" (genius or daemon) born with him [congenital], or a
good and evil nature (good and evil daemon, genius, manes). The messenger daemon,
under the influence of Christianity, became an evil demon or renegade angel connected
with astrology, dreams, and the black arts, and was itself replaced by the good angel
[guardian angel] (pp. 4-5).
As I mentioned earlier, during the Middle Ages the genius was not
the outsider, but was incorporated into the religious system by its Greek
relation daemon and embodied the conflicting forces of good and evil,
while the trickster challenged the norm. This is only part of the story;
the amorphous genius has undergone many alterations in the western
world.
The early Greek notion that the daemon was born with each man, gave
the concept of genius a congenital dimension that later lent itself to
associations with genesis, generation, and procreation. "In early Italian
religion, the snake represented the genius loci, the Genius of the house,
or the spirit of the father" (Nitzsche, 1975, p. 8). In the houses of this
time, the genial couch was for the sole purpose of procreation, and was
"frequently adorned with the bronze figure of Genius" (Nitzsche, 1975,
p. 9). Clearly, genius was developing procreative connotations. More
remarkably, the import tended toward the masculine.
Nitzsche (1975) writes, "The Genius of the family acted as 'a smile
for the male seed,' which was transmitted from one generation to another
by father to son, and which embodied the primitive equivalent of the
genetic code. Artistic depictions of the figure usually included a cor-
nucopia, symbolizing the seed, frequently containing phalli, and held

in the left hand" (p. 8). The genius continued to be associated with pro-
creation and eventually becomes genitalia, specifically the genitals of
men (Nitzsche, 1975; Babcock, 1989). From daemon to genius to genii
to genital to generation to genesis, we broach the point where genera-
tion becomes inseparable from creation. "Even in the Middle Ages,
'genius' was linked with 'inventive powers,' 'mental ability.' Its earliest
religious function - generation and creation - bore the seed for a later
artistic flowering on many levels" (Nitzsche, 1975, p. 6). I agree with
Nitzsche that from the notions of generation and creation come future
developments for the perception of genius as a creator of the creative,
as a generator from the genesis, and an originator from the origin, who
is ultimately original.
At the same time, the term "genius" has not lost any of its bias
toward males. During the late Classical period and growing in prevalence
in the Middle Ages, the word "genital" is specifically that of males,
the phallus. The genealogy of this term reveals the traits of the Europeans'
archetypal image of genius, a sentiment which in turn sheds light on
the fact that historically there has been a prejudice that a genius can
only be male (Battersby, 1989). The Romance language's word for pen
has a phallic etymological origin, which narrows the association of genius
even further to male writers. Herein lies the source of the sexist claims
that the very idea of a "female genius" is oxymoronic as put forth by
Kant, Kretschmer, Lombroso ... indeed the list is too long, as this
prejudice had long ago fallen into a deep groove of habit in the minds
of Europeans.
More recently, evidence for the perception of genius as an inherent
characteristic of a lucky few in academia is revealed in Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe's essay "Sublime Truth" (1993). Lacoue-Labarthe explicates
how the gift of the Gods, formally the inspiration for the genius, becomes
the gift from nature to the genius in Longinus and Kant (along with
Edmund Burke, these three thinkers have had the most powerful influ-
ence on the future meaning of genius). Lacoue-Labarthe writes:
The innate is in fact what is phusis: it is the gift of nature and the work of nature; it is
consequently all that comes in art (in techne) from phusis itself.... Kant, one may
recall, defines genius, that is, the artist of the sublime, as follows: "Genius is the talent
(or natural gift) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the innate productive faculty
of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may express the matter thus: Genius is the
innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art" (Sec.
46, 138, 150). In his own way, Longinus says nothing other than this. Not merely is his
definition of the genius the same: he speaks of "great nature," of extraordinary gifts or
presents, of gifts of heaven and so on (p. 97).
It is not clear given the quote above that both Longinus and Kant
are expressing the same dynamic. Rather it seems that Longinus is saying
that the genius has a great nature, which is itself the gift of the heavens,
and Kant is instead claiming that the genius surpasses nature, using a gift
given to it by nature. Kant writes, "[F]or although it is under that law
[of association] that nature lends us material, yet we can process that
material into something quite different, namely, into something that sur-
passes nature" (Sec. 49, 314). Lacoue-Labarthe (1993) himself writes,
"Longinus suggests that this origin of genius is (in)explicable" (p. 101).
He then refers to the following passage in Longinus:
Many a man derives inspiration from another spirit in the same way as the Pythian priestess
at Delphi, when she approaches the tripod at the place where there is a cleft in the
ground, is said to inhale a divine vapor; thus at once she becomes impregnated with divine
power and, suddenly inspired, she utters oracles. So from the genius of the ancients
exhalations flow, as from the sacred clefts, into the minds of those who emulate them,
and even those little inclined to inspiration become possessed by the greatness of others
(XIII, p. 22).
Longinus seems to be under the influence of the Greek daemon in his

understanding of genius, as witnessed by his references to ancestor spirits,
the cosmic messengers (daemones). Furthermore, nature is not respon-
sible for the inspiration; rather it is the work of demons who impregnate
the mind with great thoughts.
Jacob Rogozinski takes a slightly different position on the significance
of the gift in his essay on Kant's aesthetic sublime, "The Gift of the
World" (1993). Rogozinski, like Lacoue-Labarthe, fleshes out the sig-
nificance of Kant's comment on the goddess Isis for information on the
sublime. Isis, whose temple has the engraved expression, "I am all that
is, that was, and that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil"
(Rogozinski, 1993, p. 137), is claimed to be the symbol for Nature.
Isis, a goddess, is transformed by Kant to represent nature (Lacoue-
Labarthe, 1993, p. 74). This switch was made in light of Kant's awareness
about the history of genius, "Indeed, that is presumably why the word
genius is derived from [Latin] genius, [which means] the guardian and
guiding spirit that each person is given as his own at birth, and to whose
inspiration [Eingebung] those original ideas are due" (Sec. 46, 308). Still,
he must make the switch in order to maintain the integrity of his system
- nature must be the source of inspiration for his genius. As part of his
metaphysics, Kant restricts the noumenal realm, the realm of Gods,
from having any exchange with the phenomenal. Consequently, Kant
cannot have the traditional genius who is the messenger of the Gods, like
the Greek daemon, nor the help of the Roman genius. Kant's work on
aesthetics and genius was the single most important influence on the
Romantic perception of genius. Whether it is nature or the Gods that is
responsible for genius, clearly these powerful philosophers take an essen-
tialist (congenital) approach- thinkers who have unquestionably added
to European prejudices regarding genius.
That Kant chose nature to be the responsible force behind the genius
makes more sense when one takes a look at the powerful mythical history
of the boundary that separates nature from culture. These feelings mirror
those held about the limit between the city life (culture) and the wilder-
ness (nature). Symbolically, the lepers and the insane were cast out of
the city and forced to live beyond the city limits, in the forest (wilder-
ness), and the tricksters were always assumed to reside in the forests
as well. Foucault writes, "The town drove them [the madmen] outside
their limits; they were allowed to wander in the open countryside" (1965,
p. 8). Similarly, the boundary between land and bodies of water has
been a universal symbol for the interaction of the spiritual world with
the physical world. The insane seem to have affinitive characteristics with
the archetypal image of water, rendering it eerily appropriate that upon
the extinction of leprosy, there should arise the phenomenon known as
the Ship of Fools (Foucault, 1965). In support of this claim I will add
a detail from Foucault's treatise on Madness and Civilization:
It is for the other world that the madman sets sail in his fool's boat; it is from the other
world that he comes when he disembarks. The madman's voyage is at once a rigorous
division and an absolute passage ... across a half-real, half-imaginary geography, the
madman's liminal position on the horizon of medieval concern (1965, p. ll).
It is therefore no surprise that the ocean reoccurs as an example of the

sublime, the realm of the genius, in Longinus, Burke, and Kant. "It is
this danger that the trial of the sublime awakens, this haunting of chaos,
of what is disgustingly out of this world [de l'im-monde], revived by
the spectacle of the ocean unleashed, of the 'wild disorders' of nature"
(Rogozinski, 1993, p. 140). The noumenal, the ocean, and the wilder-
ness: from the perspective of an insider, someone accustomed to the
rules, norms, and forms of the phenomenal, land, and city life, will
necessarily see these as "other" worlds, chaotic, wild, and unruly. Clearly,
the world of the genius is that of an outsider, a place other than the
"normal" world it circumfuses, and therefore defines.
The genius dwells at the limit, which it defines as it is defined by
the limit, at the point where existence precariously straddles both sides
of the known/unknown, culture/nature, normal/abnormal- at the thres-
hold. Here one will find the marginal character, the genius, at the only
place where the mind can be free and consequently original (as I have
earlier proven originality to be an important trait of the genius), the place
where rules cease to exist. This ruleless side reminds us of our marginal
figures, the tricksters, the lepers, and the insane, and the boundary that
separates them from the insiders. The boundary looks like a limit to
the insiders, anyone that attempts to cross it is crazy: "You've gone too
far!" At the same time we should note that not everyone that lives outside
cultural norms does so willingly. For example, lepers were involun-
tarily labeled and subsequently cast out of society. Here labeling theory
can most convincingly explain the phenomenon described above. Kai
Erikson states:
The community's decision to bring deviant sanctions against the individual ... is a
sharp rite of transition at once moving him out of his normal position in society and
transferring him into a distinctive deviant role ... they announce some judgment about
the nature of his deviancy (a verdict or diagnosis for example), and they perform an act
of social placement, assigning him to a special role (like that of a prisoner or patient)
which redefines his position in society (Gove, 1980, p. 12).
This transference into a new position is in the case of the lepers a very
physical, as well as a social, motion - they are moved outside of "social
boundaries," beyond the city limits.
The issue of "being outside" may very well be different from "being
on the other side." I am partial to Battersby's dividing the notion of
marginality into two categories: the Others, and the Outsiders. Her dis-
tinction is helpful because it brings to the fore a notion that might have
previously played itself out unnoticed. The "Others" are those labeled
deviant and are "viewed as not-quite-human," while the "Outsiders"
are equally labeled deviant and are "viewed as fully-human but not-quite-
normal" (Battersby, 1989, p. 138). I would like to extend this further
to include a theory on the actual position of each figure with respect to
the limit. I suspect that the "Others" are completely across the limit, while
the "Outsiders" straddle the limit and operate from both sides. I do not
see Foucault making the same distinction, although he is clearly inter-

ested in the same phenomena. Nevertheless, I would like to carry this
notion through, and use it as a tool to explain the following schema,
where the lepers and the insane are the "Others" since they are per-
ceived to be monsters. They must be not-quite-human, otherwise they
would be human, and that would be problematic for the "normals" who
want to be separated from them. Consequently, they are placed on the
other side, where their behavior will seem absolutely chaotic and non-
sensical to the insiders. On the other hand, the tricksters and the geniuses
are the "Outsiders" that the "normals" paradoxically value for their
creative efforts, all the while condemning them for their threatening
abnormality. The trickster and the genius seem to deftly move across
limits, juggling both to their advantage.
The interaction between the figures is as follows:
leper trickster
insane genius
The following sections will explain the movement and relationships sym-
bolized by the arrows in the schema presented above:
Leper H Trickster
The catholic presence in the Middle Ages of the Tristan and Yseult
tales provides ample evidence for the association between the leper and
the trickster. These tales were told by many, handed down through the
ages, preserved in tapestries, pottery, and poetry. In the Beroul stories,
Tristan, the hero, is a classic trickster figure. Turner comments, "Folk
literature abounds in symbolic figures, such as 'holy beggars,' 'third
sons,' 'little tailors,' and 'simpletons,' who strip off the pretensions of
holders of high rank and office and reduce them to the level of common
humanity and morality" (1969, p. 110). In a like manner, Tristan spends
a great deal of time duping his uncle the king, running around in dis-
guises, and hiding out in the forest (wilderness). In the most famous
episode, "Yseult's Ambiguous Oath," Tristan and Yseult engage in double
talk like expert jongleurs (tricksters). When Yseult swears before her
kingdom "that no man ever came between my thighs except the leper
who carried me on his back across the ford and my husband, King Mark"
she "lied the truth" (Vasvari, 1993). Her "lying the truth" depended
upon many other tricks that were equally false yet true, for example,
Tristan's disguise as a leper. Tristan stood before King Mark and the
rest of the kingdom, and yet did not stand before them as Tristan, but
rather as a liminal character, a leper. His disguise was symbolic of the
degree of marginality incurred by Tristan when he was forced to dwell
in the marginal world of the forest by King Mark and could only live
in the "real" world in disguise. Another symbolic gesture made in this
episode was Tristan and Yseult's emergence from the forest, the marginal
realm, as tricksters both "lying the truth." The manipulation of language,
the cuckolding of the king, and the disruption of power, share all the
characteristics of typical trickster style. As evidenced by the Tristan tales,
the association between the trickster and the leper was not strange during
the Middle Ages. Naturally, these two liminal figures, these dwellers
in the woods, would share a common home. The two are oddly affini-
tive - they both threaten - albeit one with sexuality and the other with
mortality. Turner writes:
All these mythic types are structurally inferior or "marginal," yet represent what Henri
Bergson would have called "open" as against "closed morality," the latter being essen-
tially the normative system of bounded, structured, particularistic groups. Bergson speaks
of how an in-group preserves its identity against members of out-groups, protects itself
against threats to its way of life, and renews the will to maintain the norms on which
the routine behavior necessary for its social life depends (1969, pp. 110-lll).
The trickster and the leper are "open" and creative; they attempt to
upset the norms while simultaneously defining them. Yet at the same time
their differences are no less significant. For example, the supposedly vol-
untary life (self-labeling) of the trickster who works hard at his tricks,
punning and duping people for his pleasure, is juxtaposed against the
leper who involuntary leads a life of blight. Likewise, the genius is seem-
ingly a more voluntary phenomenon, than is the labeling of the insane.
Trickster ~ Genius
The association of the trickster and the genius sticks for many life-
times. Foucault comments (the figure here termed "the fool" and "the
madman" is the same person I label "the trickster"), "No doubt, madness
has something to do with strange paths of knowledge. The first canto
of Brant's poem is devoted to books and scholars; and in the engraving
which illustrates this passage in the Latin edition of 1497, we see
enthroned upon his bristling cathedra of books the Magistrate who wears
behind his doctoral cap a fool's cap sewn with bells" (1965, p. 25).
How did the trickster eventually give way to the genius? The epistemic
shifts that we acknowledge when we separate history into the ages:
Classical, Medieval, Renaissance, Romantic ... are equally respon-
sible for the trickster fading and the upsurge of the genius. In academia,
the epistemic shift from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance is known
for the change from valuing imitation and the scripture-based method
known as scholasticism in the Middle Ages, to a return to the power
of the mind to generate original work, independent of the biblical texts
in the Renaissance. Consequently, the revival of the Greek daemon
becomes the Renaissance genius, with an added residual emphasis on
creativity due to the procreative nature of the Medieval genius. Now
the trickster is no longer the procreative figure, but rather the genius gives
birth to original works, the genius creates.
Leper ~ Insane
Foucault's Madness and Civilization clearly marks the transition from
an emphasis on the leper as society's liminal figure of choice to an
ostracization of the insane. He explains:
Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from memory; these structures
remained. Often, in these same places, the formulas of exclusion would be repeated,
strangely similar two or three centuries later. Poor vagabonds, criminals, and "deranged
minds" would take the part played by the leper.... With an altogether new meaning
and in a very different culture, the forms would remain - essentially that major form of
a rigorous division which is social exclusion but spiritual reintegration (1965, p. 7).
According to Foucault's constructionist account, society needs and

therefore recreates the "Other." In particular, the insane nicely filled
the space left behind by the vanishing lepers. The psychologist D. C.
Rosenhan, in his "On Being Sane in Insane Places," agrees that certain
groups are created and then singled out for persecution and that, "The
mentally ill are society's lepers" (1973, p. 254). Insanity is construed

to be an illness of the body, the mental equivalent of leprosy; the public
at large does not believe insanity to be a social construction. According
to Erich Goode, nearly every person in the mental health profession
believes that mental illness is symptomatic of something abnormal in
the body; the very nature of the profession seems to demand this per-
spective. It follows that the small group of therapists and former
"psychiatric inmates," who believe psychiatric "diagnoses" to be
"demanding labels without any scientific validity," are known as Radical
Therapists or Antipsychiatrists (Roszak, 1992, p. 55). The very name
of this group, Antipsychiatry, is a testament to the fact that any position
other than essentialism is against the profession. The physical abnor-
mality of the lepers was incorporated into the perception of insanity as
an illness of the body, the "substitution of the theme of madness for
that of death does not mark a break, but rather a torsion within the
same anxiety" (Foucault, 1965, p. 16).
Leper ~ Genius via the living dead
There is an indirect and more marital relationship between the leper
and the genius. The leper infects the genius' blood line through its
direct connection to the insane, and its contemporary, the trickster. The
leper's presence (or as Foucault terms it, "the theme of death") is sensed
most significantly in the genius' reputation of being close to the world
beyond the grave. Since antiquity, beginning with the cosmic messen-
gers, the dead souls that brought information to philosophers and poets,
geniuses were thought of always in relation to the dead. In the same vein,
Plato comments in the Phaedo that all philosophers necessarily live
with one foot in the grave, and Nietzsche boldly states in Ecce Homo,
"In order to understand anything at all of my Zarathustra one must
perhaps be similarly conditioned as I am - with one foot beyond life"
(p. 682). Persons of genius - artists, philosophers, sages - are often
thought of as dwelling on death, always near death, and inspired by spirits
from beyond. In this sense, geniuses represent the living dead, and
likewise lepers were a powerful image of the living dead - they were
alive as their bodies decayed, with one foot in the grave. The lepers
were a constant reminder of mortality, and geniuses are all too often
consumed with morbidity.
Trickster ~ Insane via the fool
The trickster relates to the insane through the fool. The tales of Tristan
are again helpful, as one of his disguises was that of a madman's, and
he was mistaken for a fool, the hybrid of the trickster and the mad indi-
vidual. The fool/madman distinction is not entirely clear during the
Middle Ages. It is not until the insane are completely cast out of society
that there develops the need to have a category formed of those not
quite crazy, but for the most part harmlessly unintelligent. The insane
were seen as dangerous, almost criminal, and definitely deviant, while
the trickster had borderline hero affiliations, and the fool simply bungled
the job. Immanuel Kant (1790) claims that "the foremost property of
genius must be originality.... Since nonsense too can be original, the
products of genius must also be models .... Whatever is ostentatious
(precious), stilted, and affected, with the sole aim of differing from the
ordinary (but without spirit) ... betrays a bungler" (Sec. 49, 319). That
the genius and the bungler are closely related, has been recognized by
many a thinker. Ernst Kretschmer, in The Psychology of Men of Genius
(1931 ), writes:
One reads with a slight smile of superiority, of these teachers of youthful genius who
predicted for its bearer a place in a lunatic asylum, simply because they saw in him a truant
and a ne'er-do-well and were blind to his real greatness of spirit. But these teachers
were absolutely right in their direct observations, for a certain strangeness and irregu-
larity of character is already there, and may be seen even in the earliest years, though
genius can only develop at a much later period. In youth, both dispositions - that which
leads to genius and that which causes genius to run amok socially - develop as a single
stem. That again is a fact most clearly recognised by geniuses themselves. Bismarck, as
a student, remarked, "I shall become either the greatest vagabond or the first man in
Prussia" [emphasis mine) (p. 9).
While the genius and the madman are considered at times to be one
and the same, the genius keeps from being the fool (the bungler) by
just a hair.
Insane H Genius
We have now arrived at the dynamic between the madman and the
man of genius. The image of a mad genius is universal in modem
European cultures. The mad genius was a central figure in the Romantic
era, and we still live in its shadow. In 1885, Kate Sanborn catalogues
the many references to the correspondence between madness and
genius found in history's greatest thinkers. The list reads like a "who's
who" in academia and the arts. Nisbet, an early psychologist, makes a
physiological investigation into the relationship between madness and

genius. He analyzes the mad geniuses of history: Shakespeare, Mozart,
Socrates, Newton. . . . Psychology does not give up this affiliation.
Ernst Kretschmer, in his Psychology of Men of Genius (1931), con-
cludes that men of genius are abnormal and it is no surprise that they
should express the abnormalities of "hypersensitiveness, together with
a very considerable liability to psychoses, neuroses and psychopathic
complaints" (p. 14).
The nineteenth century controversial method of analyzing historical
geniuses through time and space, and the physiological explanation of
genius, has been kept alive and well in psychology. In 1988, a book
written by a psychologist, Julian Lieb, builds on the work of Kretschmer
and investigates the insane genius of Newton, Beethoven, Dickens, and
Van Gogh. Although it is believed that the "mad genius controversy" died
out after the world wars, it seems to periodically flare up (Becker,
1976).
I searched recent journal articles in psychology, social sciences, and
general publications like the New York Times, and found a steady stream
of articles on the connection between madness and genius. For example,
a 1993 Times article caption reads, "An old idea about genius wins new
scientific support; the link to madness turns out to be real and measur-
able." Interestingly, the woman who wrote the article, Natalie Angier,
has also written many pieces on genome research and eugenics. The
popularity of genome research has stimulated new investigations into
the inherent aspect of genius, and has led to a revival of Galton's theory
of genius (Bromwich, 1985). D. K. Simonton has been the most active
researcher and publisher of work in this vein. In the social psychology
textbook, Genius and Eminence, there are two articles by Simonton, as
well as an excerpt from Howard Becker's study of the labeling theory's
position on the "mad genius controversy." Similarly, in a Key to Genius,
there is an admission to the validity of the socially constructed nature
of genius, "Genius, therefore, is not an attribute: it is a dynamic rela-
tionship between its possessor and society. It indicates, in a general
way, what society expects of the genius and how it responds to that
person. There are always geniuses in potentia; but there are no unrec-
ognized geniuses" (1988, pp. 7-8). Today, one can see a slight
constructionist influence on the mad genius controversy. Nevertheless the
essentialist perspective still has a strong grip on its claim to the mad
genius.
With respect to my schema, the square has been completed. I have

attempted to trace the development of the mad genius through its many
stages of social construction. I have done so with the intention of chal-
lenging the traditional essentialist stronghold on the phenomenon of
the mad genius. The residual traces of "the trickster," "the leper," "the
fool," and "the living dead" reveal the evolution of the liminal figure
as society pressures it to respond to its needs. Likewise I have assumed
that the physical (the text, the plastic art) and the mental (every person's
layers of attitudes, beliefs, and prejudices) can be dug through for his-
torical information lying underneath the topographical world. In this
paper, I have rummaged through the images behind my ideas, and
searched texts to find out what is th~re and what is missing, to bring
to my awareness my own hidden beliefs about the "mad genius."
SUNY at Stonybrook
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert, RobertS., ed., Genius and Eminence, 2d. ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1992).
Babcock, Barbara, "'A Tolerated Margin of Mess': The Trickster and His Tales
Reconsidered," in Critical Essays on Native American Literature, Andrew Wiget
(ed.) (Boston: Hall, 1985), pp. 153-184.
Battersby, Christine, Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (London: The
Women's Press, 1989).
Becker, George, "The Mad Genius Controversy: A Study of the Sociology of Deviance,"
Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Stonybrook, 1976.
Beroul, The Romance of Tristan. Translated by Alan S. Fedrick (New York: Penguin
Books, 1970).
Bromwich, David, "Reflections of the Word Genius," New Literary History 17(1) (Autumn,
1985): 141-163.
Burke, Edmund, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime
and the Beautiful (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Camille, Michael, Image on the Edge: The Margins of Medieval Art (Harvard: Harvard
University Press, 1992).
Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.
Translated by Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
Goode, Erich, Deviant Behavior, 4th. ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1994).
Goode, Erich, "Positive Deviance: A Viable Concept?" Deviant Behavior: An
Interdisciplinary Journal12 (1991): 289-309.
Gove, Walter R., ed., The Labeling of Deviance: Evaluating a Perspective, 2d. ed. (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1980).
Hershman, Jablow D. and Julian Lieb, M.D. The Key to Genius (New York: Prometheus
Books, 1988).
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
Kretschmer, Ernst, The Psychology of Men of Genius. Translated by R. B. Cattell (New
York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1937).
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, "Sublime Truth," On the Sublime: Presence in Question
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
Longinus, On Great Writing. Translated by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1991).
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New
York: The Modern Library, 1992).
Nisbet, J. F., The Insanity of Genius and the General Inequality of Human Faculty
(London: Ward and Downey, 1891).
Nitzsche, Jane Chance, The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1975).
Rogozinski, Jacob, "The Gift of the World," On the Sublime: Presence in Question
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
Rosenhan, D. C., "On Being Sane in Insane Places," Science 179 (19 January, 1973):
250-258.
Roszak, Theodore, The Voice of the Earth (New York: Touchstone, 1992).
Sanborn, Kate, The Vanity and Insanity of Genius (New York: Trow's Printing and
Bookbinding, 1885).
Stonequist, Everett, The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).
Turner, Victor W., The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (New York: Aldine,
1969).
VLADISLAV BORODULIN, ALEXEY VASIIJEV
AND VITALlY POPOV
SCIDZOPHRENIA AS A PROBLEM OF
THE THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat

veritas.
St. Augustine, De Vera Religione, 39, n. 72
In the field of psychiatry there is always a set of problems that all serious
and conscious specialists are perplexed by, because they start from the
final result without having found the relevant starting point for analysis
of the process they are trying to understand. Thus they are doomed to
falling into a trap, and that trap is not, in fact, the clinic, but the way
of understanding it.
Throughout its history, psychiatry has constantly looked to rid itself
of these problems by becoming more scientific and less metaphysical.
Some quite sensible results have been heroically achieved in this struggle
for emancipation. But psychiatry now finds itself having simply shoved
all problems relating to understanding to the back of the therapist's mind.
Thus it is metaphysical complexes that now constitute the unconscious
of psychiatric practice.
It would probably be rational, then, to make the psychiatrist master
in his own dwelling, that is to force him to realize the metaphysical
premises and pre-judices that ground his own practice. 1 Metaphysics is
the only way to do this. 2
We psychiatrists, as well as philosophers, have to realize the meta-
physics underlying our work. And as ultimately we are dealing with a
human soul, we have to carry on our conversation within a metaphysics
of consciousness.
The conventional theories of consciousness seem to be unsatisfactory/
for it is clear that consciousness itself is incommunicable and thus escapes
description and theorizing. That is why we have tried meta-theory,
because it does not pretend to provide us with a description of a "factual
state of affairs", but seems to have the possibility of dealing with
consciousness kata dynamis, 4 dynamically, within the process of under-
475

476 VLADISLAV BORODULIN ET AL.
standing, interpretation. Thus meta-theory of consciousness means the

Hermeneia of consciousness. 5
We take up schizophrenia now not because of our special and intimate
concern with this clinical entity itself, but mostly because we are going
to test the interpretive possibilities of the meta-theoretical approach
we maintain and thus to submit it to a pilot study of its relevance.
When Edmund Husser} in his Cartesian Meditations tried to unfold the

theory of "transcendental subjectivity" (and consequently one of "tran-
scendental intersubjectivity"), he had to call the abnormal variants of
consciousness simply "the problems of accidental factualness", with
the realities of consciousness of our mentally ill patients being "only
de facto, only accidentally" undiscoverable to us. This means that I cannot
understand my insane patient due to the mere accident of my being sane.6
Though Husser! himself considered such an explanation to be enough for
his current purposes, we cannot agree it is enough to explain any "abnor-
mality", any mental disturbance by means of referring to an ordinary
accident, that may and surely shall lead us into a regressus ad infinitum
as we progress in grounding the chain of accidental causes. 7
Likewise Karl Jaspers in his famous "Kausale und Verstandliche
Zusammenhange zwischen Schiksal und Psychose bei der Dementia
Praecox"8 leads us unfortunately into the same trap when he advises
the causal explanation of psychologically incomprehensible cases. The
ratio cognoscendi of cause is effect, or sequence. So we are not allowed
to answer the question "Why?" without having first found the answer
to the question "What?", without having understood the nature of the
effect at hand. Moreover, questioning the ground and essence of a process
via reducing the process to its causes and origins makes the process
we are questioning epiphenomenal, that is, it destroys the subject of
phenomenological investigation and a fortiori destroys the subjectivity
we claim to be dealing with.
So when we refuse to admit an accidental cause for mental disease,
we have to develop a Hermeneia of normal consciousness seeking an
architectonic situation that would be a causa immanens of the dynamic
transformations of consciousness into pathology.
Following Mikhail Bakhtin, we consider consciousness to be the space
wherein personal meanings emerge, and therefore we interpret psy-
SCHIZOPHRENIA 477
chopathological phenomena as a pathology of our sense-making, or

a noopathology. Thus, we term these immanent architectonics as the
noopathic situation. Shall we now analyze that situation in situ?
II
Consciousness comes to be consciousness, that is the space of sense-

making, since it comes to be dialogic, that is, as the architectonic
structures of me and other are built. 9
This means, however, that any purely empirical world in which the
self is but a mere passive and experiencing centre of this world ceases
to be an actuality. Thus, the necessity for the self to construct a unique
world of its own comes to be actual. This is the point where personal
life and personality itself arise. It seems to us true to call this unique
personal world existence, following the tradition of Kierkegaard. But what
is, then, the existence?
First of all, it is wrong to understand existence as a possibility of
human being or a result of a free choice in the sense of Fromm's "to
have or to be". Existence is a necessary stage of the ontogenesis of
consciousness. After we have already experienced the world within a
comprehensive picture of "reality", we have to make some sense out
of it. This sense-making appropriation of the world is, incidentally, a way
to make the world proper, or to make the world in its proper sense. 10
Changing the empirical world into an existential world is in a sense
inevitable and we all are doomed to exist.
But since the bold Fichtean experiment has demonstrated the impos-
sibility of making the world from within the activity of the human soul
alone, we have now to follow Kant and recognize some entities as tran-
scendent to this self of ours, in the outer space of my sole consciousness.
But where, then, is the space for my existential world?
The question comprises the answer: our existence is not of a spatial
nature. Existence relates to the outer world just as a text relates to the
language system. Though my utterance is fixed within some linguistic
material, its being my utterance is itself alien to linguistics. 11
Thus what we mean is that existence exists as a text written in the
language of the others but telling the personal meaning of my own
being.
We should note here that when we speak of "others" as providing
the language of existence, we mean not other things but other person-
alities. We believe every psychiatrist realizes this well from his everyday
practice, 12 and as for philosophers, they should know it well after
Socrates.
Thus the other personality is the condition and verge of the space of
my existence. And for this existence of mine a transcendent other comes
to be transcendental. This other personality emerges for me for the first
time and comes into existence as a value from within a deed of mine
wherein my personal meaning is therefore realized. 13
III
So what is going on with schizophrenia?

Kronfeld once had to say in his Perspektiven der Seelenhailkunde
that with a schizophrenic patient it is always that his attitude to the world
is changed pathologically to the extent that even the possibilities of com-
munication (you may duly read: intersubjective possibilities) are lacking.
We understand now that this "pathologically changed attitude" means
in fact an absence of existence. That is why dialogue between therapist
and patient is impossible. We can hardly believe we now know more than
in 1934. 14
But how it is possible for existence to be absent?
Existence, we repeat, is the world of valuable other personalities
coming out of a deed of one's own. Lack of existence, therefore, means
lack of a deed.
Before the deed is done, we on this liminal stage are faced with the
absence of the special awareness of what a deed-making self really is.
Thus, in front of the deed we face our own self as essentially unknown
and strange. To put it briefly, we face ourselves with some other self
and consider our self to be an other. This reveals to us and make us
conscio:~s of a crisis of our self-identity.
This being conscious of one's identity crisis is the noopathic situa-
tion itself.
IV
The plot of this crisis is the paradoxicality of the deed. On the one
hand, it is the deed that constitutes the valuable Other; on the other
hand, the deed itself is possible only towards the Other, as it intends
and thematizes it. Thus in my performing a deed for the first time I
SCHIZOPHRENIA 479
address myself to pure, sheer possibility, that is, to the existential

vacuum. 15
Our being aware of this existential vacuum is anxiety (Angst). Let
us be clear here that we distinguish, after Kierkegaard, fear as an organ-
ismic reaction and anxiety as a "state of the mind", state of consciousness.
We believe we rightfully follow this tradition because of Milton Ericson's
treatments of terminal cancer patients in which he provides us with a
serious demonstration that the patient can reduce his pain and even
make it disappear completely.
From the viewpoint of consciousness kata dynamis, this anxiety is
the crucial state, an architectonic and temporal Sperrung with either
positive or negative ways out being possible. "Positive" are measures that
we use to cope and meet with the situation, namely, an escape from
anxiety into a deed. To put it in Bakhtin's terms, this means taking on
the responsibility of answering the existential challenge, which means
acknowledging that there is "no alibi in existence". 16 Surely, this deed
is dangerous, and one may and inevitably will pay for it with a sort of
"reactive state". Still, we will state now that one who never falls into this
or that "reaction" is suffering from an inborn mental deficiency.
The "negative" way out is to stand forever at the verge of a deed
after having realized one's anxiety. In fact, realization of the existen-
tial vacuum means that the vacuum becomes real. Still existence is the
necessity of consciousness and it realizes itself anyway. However this
is not existential reality, but a kind of existential irreality, a world of
delusion. 16 But as this irreality grows stronger, the reality fades and
becomes more and more irreal and sense-lacking. We can recognize
here the well-known derealization phenomenon.
But as this existential irreality comes to exist, one comes to the point
of losing the value of one's own self, for it is only through experi-
encing a valuable other personality that I may re-cognize my own valueY
Thus entering this delusory world means the loss of my own personal
value, which manifests itself in the impossibility of communication,
that is, in autism.
As the autistic self stays within itself, we deem this to be the specific
schizophrenic disturbance of the internal dialogue of an "Ich-bei-sich"
type. This should be interpreted as the destruction of the questioning
me structure and its motivational possibilities. With this comes a paral-
ysis of motivation. 18
This absence of me within the dialogical situation of consciousness
leads to the expansion of the other structure, which being deprived of

productive sense-making dialogue, goes back to its primordial form of
pure and senseless cultural meanings. These ortho-grams of meanings are
in a contingent and perpetual flow (sounds pretty much like postmod-
ernism), and we can see the manifestations of this de(con)structed
consciousness in the schematicism, archaicism and symbolicism of schiz-
ophrenic thought, or, rather, of schizophrenic speech, in schizophasis.
Thus, we dare conclude, our approach provides us with an understanding
of at least those leading signs of what we call, after Bleuler, schizo-
phrenia.
Now we are going to present a hypothesis about the real schizoge-
neous situation as it was discussed within a seminar of ours. 19
As Paul Ricoeur 20 once put it, there is no self-understanding un-
mediated by texts, and our understanding ourselves is essentially the
interpretation we give to those texts. Thus, our self-understanding is
the interpretation of the text of our existence.
Now if we find ourselves unable to interpret a fragment of our exis-
tential text, then the whole of the existence escapes sense-making
interpretation. Megrabian 21 described such an experience of the sense-
lessness of the world at the early stages of the schizophrenic process,
with the meanings of things being preserved formally. So what we are
in is a sort of pathological hermeneutical circle. We are deprived of
the possibility of making sense of our real existence. So the only space
possible for this sense is the illusory world, the world of autism.
But different existential space makes for different ways of sense-
making, and we start out on a pathologically provoked interpretation
in order to regain our lost personal meaning. This false interpretation,
this delusion is what we had called paranoia in the schizophrenic patient,
paranoia crypta. 22
v
We have titled our report "Schizophrenia as a Problem of the Theory
of Intersubjectivity". We can hardly say now that we have constructed
a theory of intersubjectivity sensu strictu. Still we believe any attempt
at grounding psychiatry and a fortiori psychotherapy upon the theoret-
ical premises of any intersubjective model and method is in vain.
As consciousness exists but kata dynamis, it escapes any theorizing
thereon. It can be interpreted only. That is why what we are dealing
SCHIZOPHRENIA 481
with is not a method, but an approach. We have tried here to prove its
relevance. If it turns out to be relevant, then we can suggest that it is only
in the act of interpretation that consciousness comes to the very possi-
bility of its birth. The act of consciousness is hermeneia.
This means, however, that we cannot acquire any intersubjective
knowledge about consciousness. It can be dealt with only in its being
logos kai dialogos. Thus therapeutic dialogue is the very way of treating
consciousness disturbances. It seems clear to us now that making sense
for our patient occurs within a dialogue between therapist and patient,
where the therapist is not going to "empathize" with the insane self,
and is not displaying his own psychotic potential, as Laing would have
it, but holds the "outsideness" of a patient and thus holds the value of
his patient's singular and suffering consciousness.
Within such a dialogue personal sense making and existence must
be understood and thus repaired. From that the task of preventive psy-
chotherapy can at least be formulated: it must be oriented towards
understanding the ways in which both patient and therapist understand
their selves.
Anyway, it seems to us now that the only intersubjective truth about
consciousness is perhaps that the great thesis of Kierkegaard still holds
true: subjectivity is truth. Or, rather, the only way to avoid theoreti-
cally invalid and, in practice, dangerous judgements on consciousness
is that of understanding the singular and thus meta-theoretical and inter-
pretive nature and existence of subjectivity.
Taganrog, Russia
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is our honour and obligation to express our appreciation of the persons

we are so much indebted to for this report. First of all we mean Dr.
Mikhail Basov, psychiatrist, Chief, Taganrog Hospital for the Insane, 2nd
Dept., and our colleagues Maria and Denis Savin, participants in our
seminar. We also want to express our special thanks to Prof Dr. Alexander
Bukhanovsky, Department of Psychiatry, Rostov-on-Don Medical
Institute, for his highly productive criticism, and to the staff of Taganrog
Municipal Lyceum.
NOTES
1 Cf. "Wo Es war, soli lch werden", in S. Freud. Neue Folge der Vorlesung zur
Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 15, Fr.-M. Fischer (1960).
Still one should distinguish between this classical formulation and the version of Lacan:
"Le moi (de l'analyste, sans doute) doit deloger leva (du patient, bien entendu)"; "Positions
de l'inconscient", in Ecrits (Paris: Seuil, 1966). This Lacanian version we consider to
be aggressive, manipulative, destructive of and thus the very core of the psychothera-
pist's concerns - the "le moi", the Self of the patient.
2 K. Jaspers, "Nur Philosophie versteht Philosophie", in Die Grosse Philosophen (Munich:
1959), Bd. 1, p. 7.
3 According to Thomas H. McGlashan and Christopher J. Keats, "Traditional theories
and categories, in fact, do not apply ... ", cf. their book Schizophrenia (Washington:
American Psychiatric Press, 1989), p. 5.
4 This is the way Kierkegaard speaks about the Self.
5 We use the word "hermeneia", not "hermeneutics" with a special meaning of practice,
not theory.
6 See the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, paras. 53-60.
7 See G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, para. 145.
8 Z.fd.ges.N.u.P., Bd. 14 (1913).
9 See our "Meta-Theory of Consciousness and Psychiatric Practice", Analecta
Husserliana, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 319-328.
10 See e.g., Matthew Roberts' Rethinking Bakhtin (Evanston, 1981).
11 SeeN. Y. Bakhtin, Estetika Solvesnogo Tvorcestva (Moscow, 1979).
12 Cf. e.g., the clinic as treatment of acute grief and other reactive states.
13 SeeM. Bakhtin. Towards a Philosophy of the Act, trans. by Vadim Liapunov (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1993) and our "Meta-Theory ... ", op. cit.
14 "The very eixstence of the group of chronic mental patients implies that we do not
know what is necessary or sufficient to effect a cure", McGlashan and Keats, op. cit.,
p. 6.
15 Take into consideration that the sense of "existential vacuum" here differs radically
from that of Frankl.
16 "The Autistic world is a reality, with relationships to the actual world that cannot
be described", Bleuler, Jahrbuch Bleuler-Freud IV, p. 13.
17 See our "Meta-Theory ... ", op. cit.
18 Cf. Josef Berze's "hypotony of consciousness".
19 We here express our special thanks to Maria Savina for her having provided us with
seminar materials.
20 Paul Ricoeur, in: After Philosophy: End or Transformation (London: Cambridge,
1987), p. 374.
21 A. A. Megrabian, Sindrom otculdenija i bred (Alienation Syndrome and Delusion)
(Rostov-on-Don, 1938).
22 See our "Mikhail Bakhtin and the Problems of Psychiatry", Bakhtin's Collection 2
(Moscow, 1991 ).
JOZEF SIVAK
REGNE ANIMAL ET HUMAIN

Nature intersubjective
I. INTRODUCTION
La problematique constitutive de la nature, objet d 'une "eidetique

materielle", c'est la conception husserlienne des etres a commencer par
1' etre de la nature et pour finir par 1' etre dans le monde, en passant par
l'etre de l'ame. C'est de ce demier que le regne animal et humain ferait
partie. Et comme methode appropriee, c'est celle de !'analyse noema-
tique en prenant pour "guide" l'ame, cela non pas au sens d'un principe
metaphysique car 1' arne fait partie de la nature et par la elle est predonnee.
II. PHENOMENE ANIMAL
Du fond de la nature statique (inorganique et organique vegetale) se

detache le pbenomene animal, cela par sa corpulence, son mouvement,
sa vie collective, sa communication au moyen des sons. 11 fait partie
de la phenomenalite generale et c 'est vrai que les hommes et les animaux
sont d'abord consideres comme de simples corps materiels existant dans
des divisions spatio-temporelles. Mais le pbenomene animal y apporte
une nouvelle couche d'experience sous la forme des data tels que data
tactiles, acoustiques, etc.
1. L' animal comme autre

En remontant au plus haut dans la systematique de Husserl, la reduc-
tion pbenomenologique dans le domaine intersubjectif nous a deja revele
les autres dont les animaux font partie. Le moi-homme est deja constitue. 1
Rappelons seulement que c'est la position privilegiee du corps propre
qui interdit de le confondre avec un corps d'autrui et d'autres corps
(organiques et materiels). Dans sa conception de la corporeite organique,
Husserl mettra 1' accent sur Ia fonction mediatrice de celle-ci en voyant
en elle le modele methodique dans Ia constitution de l'objectivite, des
autres, des animaux, du monde moi y compris.
483
AT. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Lll, 483-503.

484 JOZEF SIVAK
2. Le phenomene pathologique chez l' animal
La corporeite organique est soumise a une regulation biologique, avec

ses aspects normal et pathologique se profilant sur la "nature normale"
qu'est la Terre. Le phenomene pathologique n'entre dans le monde
qu'avec le corps organique compose d'organes multiples et divers dont
certains pourront et meme seront atteints d'anomalies. Mais Husser! priv-
ilegie tout simplement le monde normal sur le monde anormal. Ce demier
peut avoir une dimension solipsiste (par ex. symptomes pathologiques)
ou intersubjectifs (anomalies biophysiques ... ). 11 peut, ensuite, con-
cemer aussi bien 1'arne que le corps. Les troubles physiques ont leur
symptomes organiques et vice versa. Le phenomene pathologique culmine
dans la mort biophysique de l'individu (humain ou animal). 2
L'une des applications de l'idee de normalite est la notion de typique.
Tout homme est constitue d'avance comme une individualite psychico-
typique, d 'un cote et comme une individualite organo-typique, de 1'autre.
Cette typique est I' objet d'une "psychologie physiologique" de l'homme
et de 1' animaV Elle serait subordonnee a une psychologie intention-
neUe.
Cette notion de normalite et sa primaute ont fait couler beaucoup
d'encre. On a fini par constater que Husser! ne voulait pas imposer le
normal au sens normatif. Pourtant, l'idee de normalite n'est pas absurde.
Faisons une contre-epreuve. Si le monde peut etre considere comme iden-
tique, c'est qu'il est donne a une communaute de sujets normale et ces
sujets peuvent avoir leurs proprietes normales et anormales. "Ce serait
alors un contresens", dit Husser!, "que tous les hommes pourraient etre
fous et la normalite un fait subjectif contingent." 4
C'est encore a partir de la perception normale, de I' experience normale
de l'intersubjectivite qu'il faut considerer egalement les phenomenes
parapsychologiques, de pretendues apparitions des esprits (sans corps
organiques), le spiritisme, etc. 5 Ce detour par l"'anormalite", M. Richir
ne le considere que comme produit de la variation imaginaire et non
pas comme une hypothese scientifique car Husser! retoume aussitot a
la "normalite" qui est le "mixte" d'un dehors et d'un dedans, ce qui
fait d'elle quelque chose de positif. "C'est grace a l'enchevetrement
(Verflechtung) qu'un alter ego peut etre pose objectivement, qu'un alter
ego peut etre la pour moi."6
Au lieu de parler de la primaute on pourrait parler de la prevalence
de la normalite. De meme que la vie continue a travers les pauses de
REGNE ANIMAL ET HUMAIN 485
sommeil et d'autres etats semblables, de meme la normalite s'etend a

travers les phenomenes pathologiques occasionnels et sporadiques.
Les data de sensation font partie de la corporeite interne. En ce sens,
les organes ont un caractere bi-lateral en tant qu'ils sont a la fois
mecaniques et subjectifs. Les sensations ne sont pas localisees dans
un organe, mais le mouvement subjectif d'un organe correspond ala
serie d'apparitions d'une chose. A. travers les data, un organe renvoie a
un autre organe, ce qui est un autre argument contre la these de leur
localisation.
Les affects (colere, honte, angoisse ... ) constituent un autre grand
domaine de la corporeite interne avec leurs manifestations extemes
propres (rougeur, par ex.). Tout est done dans la corporeite organique
"expressif', resultat de }'interaction du dehors et du dedans, et indique
par la meme la manifestation du dedans par le langage dans ses dimen-
sions temporelles et spatiales.
3. Experience indirecte, ethologique, intropathique et analogisante

Se pose alors la question des objectivations "anormales" dans la con-
stitution du monde qui est l'affaire de l'homme reduit considere
prealablement comme "normal". Et quel sera l'apport ou le role des
enfants, des animaux, de ces analog a de nous, analoga dont on n' a qu 'une
experience indirecte bien que confirmable?7
Les animaux ont leur sens d'etre en tant que derivations des hommes. 8
Une experience directe, je ne peux avoir que de moi-meme, les realites
intersubjectives dont les animaux, ont besoin de la mediation d'une
Einfiihlung. 9 Meme cette intropathie est derivee de l'Ein.fiihlung humaine
et de meme la zoologie et !'experience zoologique seraient une modifi-
cation de 1'experience anthropologique. Le zoologiste effectue de telles
derivations sans le savoir en effectuant l'aperception animale.
Avec la mort de l'individu le monde ne disparalt pas, seule disparalt
son autodonation, les autres pourront continuer de le reconnaltre. Dans
mon enfance, d'ailleurs, je ne pouvais pas avoir une connaissance du
monde, le monde de mon enfance je ne peux le reconstruire qu' a partir
de rna vigilance d'adulte. 11 en vade meme de l'animal et de son envi-
ronnement animal.
Les differences eventuelles entre les mondes environnants ne font
pas probleme sur le plan ontologique car nous avons deja d'avance une
idee de la nature, a savoir la capacite de passer librement d'une experi-
486 JOZEF SIVAK
ence reelle a une experience possible, experience qui renvoie a un

horizon.
C'est !'experience solipsiste et tres complexe selon qu'il s'agit d'un
sujet adulte ou de !'enfant, sans parler des animaux, qui fait probleme.
Une meduse, par exemple, a-t-elle, elle aussi, son idee de la nature?
L' EinfiihlU'tg dans le domaine des rapports homme-animal, adulte-enfant,
etc. exige it une "deconstruction" de notre aperception (corps-milieu)
en fonctk. du type de corporeite respectif. L'ethologie actuelle plus
developpee qu 'au temps de Husser! pourrait nous informer plus en detail
sur cette deconstruction.
En ce sens, !'experience d'autrui est immediate 10 alors que celle
de !'animal est mediate et represente par la meme une "anomalie" par
rapport a l'aperception "normale". C'est que l'aperception d'un animal
presuppose une proto-aperception, celle du moi-homme. Meme les car-
acteristiques corporelles, qu'il s'agisse d'un animal ou d'un autre homme,
sont des variations d'un proto-type humain. 11 Un nouveau-ne, par ex.,
vit deja instinctivement dans 1'horizon du monde exteme mais il n' a
pas encore un monde de la representation.
L' Einfiihlung et ses modes renvoient a la notion de 1' originalite qui
est celle de la perception possible. L' originalite des objectivites de Ia
nature est une "originalite primordiale" alors que celle des autres, des
animaux et des objets culturels est "secondaire", voire "tertiaire".
La normalite elle-meme est de forme et de degre divers: celle de
1' enfant differe de celle de 1' adulte laquelle differe, a son tour, de celle
de I' existence passive ou active au sein d'une communaute. Si I' on aborde
la normalite par le biais de l'enfance, celle-ci n'a pas encore les notions
d'humanite, de traditions et de totalite. Les enfants, les malades, etc.
ne font pas partie du "nous" normal, mais d'un monde de la manipula-
tion. La dimension historique du monde ambiant n'est !'affaire que de
l'homme normal, idealisation de l'homme adulte. Aussi le monde envi-
ronnant perdrait-il sa normalite si l'on le transposait dans un horizon vide,
anhistorique. L'homme "normal" continuera de jouer son role de modele
dans la constitution du monde de vie.
L'anormalite se manifeste egalement a differents niveaux et est sus-
ceptible d'une typologie. Par exemple, si la myopie est un phenomene
pathologique, un myope peut etre considere comme normal en com-
paraison avec un debile. Les animaux eux aussi peuvent etre atteints
de ces deux types d'anomalie.
11 va de soi pour Husser! que ces differentes experiences ne creent
pas encore des liens sociaux, tout etant ordonne a la nature spatio-
temporelle. Et la communaute d'Einfiihlung, etre-la-l'un-pour-l'autre
(Fiireinander-dasein), 12 ordonnee acelle-ci n'est pas encore un etre social
ou communifie, ne s'agissant que d'une juxtaposition des etres et des
communautes.
Ill. VIE COMMUNAUT AIRE ANI MALE
1. La notion de "sociobiologie" phenomenologique
Un etre vivant "teleologiquement normal" est a considerer comme une

totalite. Il est possible dans l'unite d'un genre, d'une descendance.
Husserl formule une loi selon laquelle tout etre individuel d'une espece
possede comme trait fondamental de la normalite le fait de se propager.
"De la causalite teleologique est ne un nouvel etre vivant." 13 Un etre
vivant est dans le monde en tant que ne, produit et presuppose un autre
etre vivant. Si cette production n'est pas normale deux possibilites
peuvent se presenter: soit Ia mort d'une descendance, soit la modifica-
tion de l'espece, a savoir son adaptation.
Un individu ne saurait representer la "difference" de l'espece. "Etre
loup est une loi teleologique des loups et a proprement parler il est un
loup-individuel seulement parmi les loups individuellement differents
et dans !'horizon de l'espece." 14 Les typiques des especes creent Ia
typique de Ia nature.
Husserl commence d'abord par la subjectivite "pre-sociale" qui n'exige
aucune intropathie et qui se rapporte adeux sortes d' experience: externe
determinant la phenomenalite et se convertissant en une experience de
Ia corporeite et interne, celle de la "saisie de la corporeite propre"
(Leibhaftigkeiterfassung) sans "co-saisie" (Miterfassung). 15 C'est la vie
qui donne un sens egalement aux etres inanimes.
Tout est Ia vie en un et le monde est l'auto-objectivation de Ia vie sous Ia forme des plantes,
des animaux et des hommes qui sont nes et meurent. La vie ne meurt pas parce que Ia
vie est seulement dans une universalite et une unite interne de Ia vie. 16
A ce niveau, les vecus ne sont pas constitutifs de la personne. C'est

le cas, par exemple, des sensations organiques internes (de douleur, de
plaisir ... ). Par ces processus passifs, vegetatifs, on n'explique rien,
1' explication est remplacee par le deroulement meme de la vie.
De la meme maniere, on ne peut pas imaginer une nature physique
488 JOZEF SIVAK
sans "arne" ou bien me me sans corporeite organique. Husserl dit qu 'un

monde sans monade lui appartenant serait impensable. Une monade est
quelque chose qui se developpe et dont une conception du monde est
egalement le produit. En comme nous sommes loin ici d'une monadologie
de Ia phenomenologie formelle, a ce niveau Ia monade est mortelle,
elle aussi, limitee qu'elle est par son adhesion a Ia corporeite organique.
Correlativement a celle-ci, c'est une meme subjectivite qui se ramifie
et s'incarne dans le monde. Husserl attribue a Ia subjectivite ainsi qu'a
Ia corporeite les dimensions ontogenetiques et phylogenetiques tout en
refusant de considerer le monde comme un grand organisme. Mais qu' il
le considere de plus en plus comme un cosmos, cela est certain.
C'est des le debut que le monde est pluraliste, que !'experience du
monde est communautaire. Le monde est essentiellement corpore!, sa sig-
nifiance (Sinnhaftigkeit) teleologique qui consiste dans des teleologies
des especes et des descendances, prescrit a Ia nature universelle Ia "loi
d'une typique concrete" selon laquelle les etres vivants ont des corps
determines. Le corps organique est organise, cette organisation a des
degres et meme l'espece est un organisme se comportant selon les memes
lois teleologiques que I' individu. L' espece meurt ainsi com me un
individu.
Meme le biologiste doit prendre dans sa classification en considera-
tion le fait que les especes sont des collectivites, les genres supremes
renvoyant teleologiquement aux genres inferieurs. Les hommes ne
sauraient exister ni subsister sans le regne vegetal ou animal. 17 "La clas-
sification n 'est pas un jeu logique pur et simple de concepts mais une
loi de Ia teleologie. Les classes exigent d' autres classes en tant que classes
des totalites, totalites d'espece, totalites de validite, etc." 18
Voila les presupposes biologiques, vitaux de ce que pourrait etre une
theorie phenomenologique de Ia societe, presupposes ou fondement et
non pas un determinisme biologique ainsi que le professaient certains
sociologues, contemporains de Husserl, a orientation biologiste. Si
Husserl recusait le psychologisme, il ne pouvait pas accepter non plus
le biologisme. La preuve en est sa constatation (dans Ia Krisis) qu'il
n'y a pas de "zoologie" des peuples, s'agissant des unites spirituelles.
Le monde est communautaire parce qu'il est egalement communicatif.
On a deja parle de Ia phenomenalite de langage. Le monde objectif du
langage (articule et constitue) fonde a son tour aussi bien Ia praxis indi-
viduelle qu'intersubjective de Ia vie. La vie communautaire humaine
est essentiellement la vie dans une communaute de langage, ce par quoi

elle se distingue de la vie communautaire animale.
2. Constitution comme Mitkonstitution

Le monde exteme, monde dans lequel les hommes et les animaux "sont
traites comme de simples choses", autrement dit, un monde sans sujets
objectivants, n' est pas encore le monde environnant ( Umwelt) au sens
plein. 19 Pour qu'ille soit, illui faut une dimension intersubjective, avec
des objets crees de fa~on intersubjective tels les communautes spirituelles,
les objectivites dont se servent les membres d'une communaute. Le
monde environnant en ce sens est un "monde exteme de l'esprit commun"
(Au.fJenwelt des Gemeingeistes).
A l'interieur de ce monde exteme, tout sujet individuel a sa sphere
subjective, son environnement propre ne pouvant etre donne de fa~on
originaire a aucun autre. Pourtant, ce sont les memes choses, les memes
hommes et les memes animaux dont nous avons !'experience. Mais
chacun a ses propres perceptions et ses propres vecus. Cela n' exclut
pas, admet Husserl, que j'aie !'experience egalement des vecus d'autrui
bien que dans une certaine mesure, seulement. La dialectique de la
presence ou de la "proto-presence" (Urprasenz) et de 1' "appresence"
(Apprasenz), dialectique qui caracterise la perception d'une chose, cette
meme dialectique est valable egalement au niveau de I' experience des
autres. Ce qui est present, c'est le corps (d'autrui) et ce qui est appresente,
ce qui "est avec" (Mitdasein), c'est une "conscience-esprit-corps" (Leib-
Geist-Bewufltsein). 20
La subjectivite sociale, celle du monde de l'esprit commun, met en
jeu toutes les modalites d'intropathie: celle de la vie interieure, celle
du caractere, celle des choses communautaires, celle des objets spirituels.
Cependant, au sens stricte, les experiences, les perceptions des sujets
sociaux n'appartiennent pas au monde intersubjectif (objectif), ne
s'agissant que des "donnees immanentes". 21
Que l'objectivite ait une dimension intersubjective, cela rappelle le
caractere bi-lateral du "sujet-objet" qu'est le corps propre. L'objectivite
d'un sujet personnel, sujet d'un monde communicatif, est une objec-
tivite "intersubjective", cela vaut egalement des objets per~us de fa~on
originaire, immediate et qui font partie de cette objectivite.
L'intersubjectif se donne egalement sinon plus de fa~on mediatisee
490 JOZEF SIVAK
dans une suite d'experiences contenant une "co-presence" (Mitgegenwart)

qui, elle, n'est pas perceptible. De meme, faut-ille repeter, de rna forme
intersubjective de la realite je ne peux p.as avoir une experience directe,
mais indirecte, au moyen de I'Einfohlung. Mes propres vecus une fois
objectives en tant que composante du monde ne soot pas non plus experi-
mentables de fa~on directe car Ia forme de Ia realite n'est pas une forme
immanente. 22
L' experience de Ia subjectivite sociale est une experience sociale qui
donne des objectivites sociales qui sont a distinguer des objectivites
ideales. C'est le cas, par exemple, de l'amitie, du mariage, d'une asso-
ciation. De telles objectivites, je ne peux que les comprendre de l'interieur
en tant que participant ou membre.
L'intropathie ou l'empathie donne done un acces privilegie et origi-
naire d'autrui. Elle est fondamentale pour les autres formes de Ia mise
en communaute ou de Ia communification. Mais les modes d' "avec" (mit)
tels que "avoir I' experience avec", "se rejouir avec", etc. soot les modes
d'une "communification originaire" (Urvergemeinschaftung). 23 Dans ces
modes, le vivre et le "vivre-avec" coincident.
La correlation phenomenologique, que devient-elle ace stade? lei aussi
une donnee objective presuppose une subjectivite sous la forme d'un
sujet connaissant auquel Husser I n 'hesite pas a donner I' ancien nom
d'intellectus agens commun au regne animal. Echappant au traitement
psychophysiologiste, l'ego agit sur son corps propre; et sur les autres
ille fait au moyen de I'Einfohlung. D'un autre cote, cependant, il ne cesse
pas d'etre tributaire du psychique et du physiologique et par Ia meme
ordonne a une nature, au monde.
Mais au-dela de la correlation et de cet intellect, autrement dit, de
l'interiorite psychique comprenant ses connaissances et ses verites, se
trouve le monde en soi; inconnaissable ou eventuellement connaissable
pour un intellectus archetypus. 24
A cote du parallelisme psycho-organique, Husser! parle encore d'un
parallelisme "psycho-ontique" qui pose la coexistence des sujets et des
choses. Cette coexistence ne va cependant pas sans probleme lie au
danger d' atomisme ou de mondes separes. HusserI voudra resoudre ce
probleme par moyen de Ia variation donnant le sujet-en-general, d'un
cote, et de Ia possibilite d' alter, de I' autre.
La constitution elle-meme est done toujours une "constitution avec",
les autres participant a mes actes pour fondre dans une activite sociale
a l'interieur d'un societe composee de sujets solidaires. Le fondement
en est le premier pas de l'objectivation et constitue la premiere com-

prehension d'un corps organique etranger qui est aussi le premier
intersubjectif. Husserl arrive finalement a la reciprocite des corps (du
sien et de celui d'autrui) en se donnant, tour a tour, de fa~on interne
ou solipsiste et de fa~on exteme ou communicative. C'est encore le corps
propre ou la chair, terme fran~ais qui s'est impose, entre-temps, qui donne
la coherence au flux psychique et qui en depend.
Suivant Ricoeur:
... plusieurs especes de d~pendance (du flux psychique, sa coherence propre a travers
sa d~pendance au corps) s'enchev~trent dans le type de fonctionnalit~ qui convient au psy-
chique. Au plus bas degr~. nous trouvons une d~pendance "physio-psychique":
!'apprehension constituante du psychique attribue des propri~t~s al'iime en fonction des
"circonstances" corporelles. Cette d~pendance conceme principalement les sensations et
leurs reproductions, les effets sensibles et instinctifs, mais de proche en proche s'~tend
a toute Ia vie psychique .... Mais a un autre niveau une d~pendance "idio-psychique"
interfere avec cette d~pendance "physio-psychique": I' lime d~pend de soi, elle se motive
elle-m~me, sur le mode associatif ou sur les modes plus subtiles d'enchainement (comme
on voit dans le cas de l' alt~ration des convictions intellectuelles, des gouts affectifs, des
d~cisions solitaires, etc.). 25
Dans une perspective solipsiste, !'unification psycho-organique fait

probleme: mon corps est le plus originairement mien (das urspriinglichst
Meine). "Dans mon corps propre je vis de fa~on immediate", ce qui
renvoie a une sorte de "Dasein corporel". De l'autre cote, c'est un
centre de fonctionnement relativement atous les autres objets situes dans
l' espace environnant et s' etendant jusqu' aun horizon ouvert et inconnu. 26
Cet horizon spatial est inseparable d'un horizon temporel. Tout corps
organique a sa temporalite propre faisant partie du temps universe! de
la nature. Et les ames, elles aussi, ne cessent pas de se rapporter a ce
temps universe} ou a l'espace-temps total.
La vie individuelle se deroule sous la forme d'un temps "subjectif'.
Au moyen d'une intuition immediate je peux prendre, neanmoins, con-
science de la duree de toute rna vie. Ainsi est rendue possible la
"periodisation" de la vie presonnelle a l'aide des moyens objectifs
(calendrier, etc.).
Les communautes, elles aussi, ont leur temps qu 'est le temps historique
ou epoque. L'ame ou la subjectivite communautaire est une "subjec-
tivite a plusieurs tetes". Tout ego ainsi "socialise" outre qu'il posssede
sa propre conscience, est relie a la conscience communautraire. Mais
la conscience de ce lien est obscurcie par un horizon indetermine, ouvert
492 JOZEF SIVAK
qu'est l'horizon de rna vie. La conscience de rna naissance, par exemple,

m'echappe.
Dans cette couche du monde ne vivent que des etres instinctifs et
prisonniers des rapports instinctifs qui ne sont pas encore des rapports
sociaux et d'amour au sens plein du mot. A l'etage superieur se trouvent
des sujets personnels dans un monde ambiant dont les animaux font egale-
ment partie. Ce qui lie ici les individus, c'est l'amour personnel en tant
qu' habitus durable et engagement mutuel dans lequel Ia vie et I' effort
d'autrui se joignent a rna vie eta mes efforts. Les communautes y naissent
de fa~on naturelle, telle Ia famille.
3. Le "travail primaire"
Le monde de Ia vie vers lequel nous nous acheminons a Ia meme exten-
sion que le monde comme faire. 27 La premiere couche de ce monde est,
nous le savons deja, sensible, plus exactement celle de Ia praxis vitale.
La praxis au sens large, est celle du "je fais". 28 L'Urgeschichte, "proto-
histoire" de toute praxis de ce Dasein pratique de l'homme, c'est
I' experience.
L' animal vit dans le present concret, Ia part de I' avenir est tres petite
pour lui, a Ia difference de l'homme qui prevoit, sa vie est "une vie
dans Ia prevoyance". La praxis est orientee vers un bien, un but, en
vue de satisfaire, remplir une intention pratique, etc. Par contre, des biens
spirituels peuvent etre utilises de nouveau.
Dans l'ordre de !'importance, la faim et les jouissances precedent
les autre biens. Car le moi est un moi des besoins permanents qui appel-
lent une satisfaction. 29 Pour etre satisfaits, ces be so ins primaires
exigeraient un "travail primaire" en se servant de l'expression de J.
Patocka. 30
Le sujet en tant que sujet agissant et creant au sens large evolue dans
un environnement polystratifie, compose des couches suivantes: 1.
chosale; 2. personnelle; 3. individuelle; 4. socio-personnelleY
Les actes et les activites du moi correspondant a ces couches noe-
matiques representent les essences constitutives de Ia personne. Notons
que Husserl insiste sur le fait que tout acte n'a pas forcement un but
(Ziel), mais par tout acte est vise quelque chose (Meinung). En ce meme
sens, toute creation (Gebilde) en tant qu 'unite intentionnelle, n 'est pas
oeuvre (Werk), par consequent, l'acte (Tiitigkeit, Akt) ou le vecu inten-
tionnel n'est pas a confondre avec l'action (Handlung), 32 cette demiere
pouvant etre aussi bien tbeorique, telle action de juger, que pratique
comme, par exemple, le travail d'un ouvrier. 33
A ce stade, Husserl donne la primaute de la praxis devant la tbeorie.
11 en va de meme de 1' experience somatologique devant la perception
physique demon corps. 34 "J'ai I' experience" est toujours accompagne du
toucher de la main (d'une chose), d'un core et d'une activite spirituelle,
de l'autre. 35 Le correlat de cette activire pratique, c'est une resistance,
un sens "mecanique" du heurter. 36
Le contingent, l'inhabituel interviennent egalement dans le monde. 37
La praxis du moi qui agit a travers son corps mouvant dans le monde
est une "proto-praxis" (Urpraxis) qui accompagne toutes les autres praxis.
Husserl ecrit:
... so bietet sich das Walten, der Wahrnehmung im Leib, das den Leibesbewegungen
den Sinn gibt von ichlich getanen, als eine Praxis des lch in der Welt, und zwar als eine
Ichpraxis, die fiir aile andere praxis mitfungiert und in voraus schon fungiert hat, ibn
mitzugehort, so nun an dem Leibkorper zu iiben als den urpraktischen Objekt. 38
Si le premier niveau de la constitution, celui de la constitution du

monde-nature (Welt~Natur) etait la constitution d'un monde des choses
et des realites qui durent (verharrende), la problematique en question
se situe au deuxieme niveau, celui d'un "monde reel-pratique humanise"
(humanisierte real-praktische Welt). 39 Et de meme qu'il n'y a pas de
nature sans arne, il n'y a pas de mondial sans un sens humain.
IV. LA PLACE DANS L 'ETRE-DE-L' AME
1. La reciprocite des consciences

La saisie analogisante d'autrui a laisse une asymetrie entre moi et
autrui, d'une part et d'autre part, le probleme de l'identite de la nature
intersubjective commune, probleme dont la solution passe par la recon-
naissance de 1' autre en tant qu' autre et non pas derive du moi. 40
D'ailleurs, le realisme empirique de la communification dont il vient
d'etre question contredisait deja l'idealisme transcendantal selon lequel
toute existence tire son sens de l'ego.
Cette reconnaissance de l'autre en tant qu'autre est exigee egalement
par cette mise-la en communaute. Autrement dit, la saisie analogisante
postulee par 1' idealisme transcendantal, doit etre surmontee par la
recipro~ite du moi. La relation moi-autrui doit devenir finalement
494 JOZEF SIVAK
reciproque et des commentaires en ce sens ne manquent pas. P. Ricoeur

note que:
... Ia constitution d'une nature projective, avant meme celle de communautes cul-
turelles, demande que !'experience du moi entre en composition, sur une base de reciprocite
avec !'experience d'autrui, bien que celle-ci tire son sens d'alter ego de rna propre
experience com me ego. 41
En fait, cette reciprocite n'est pas etrangere ala conception de Husserl

qui voyait deja dans la relation intentionnelle une reversibilite mutuelle
entre les termes. Et la relation moi-autrui est une relation intentionnelle. 42
D'ailleurs, il ne faut pas interpreter l'analogie, le raisonnement analogique
au sens logique seulement. Dans un sens plus large et philosophique,
l'analogie fondee sur la ressemblance n'exclut pas la symetrie.
2. Monde identique des ames incarnees

Au centre de la constitution d'un monde en commun, constate Ricoeur,
c'est l'identite qui doit etre reconnue entre Ia signification du corps d'autrui pour lui et
Ia signification qu'il a pour moi. Comment ce corps d'autrui est-ille meme pour lui qui
le vit comme son "ici" et pour moi qui le per~ois comme mon "la-bas"? 43
Husserl demande a son tour:

Comment se fait-il qu'en general je puisse parler de l'identite d'un corps qui, dans rna
sphere primordiale, m'apparait a moi dans le mode d'illic et qui lui apparait a lui en un
"hie" absolu?44
Le fondement de cette identification est de nouveau cette experi-

ence-Iii d' autrui liee avec 1' appresentation presupposant la presentation
avec laquelle elle est fondue. Le corps d'autrui qui apparait dans rna
sphere propre dans le mode de "la-bas" appresente un moi etranger; ce
moi etranger a son propre corps dans le mode d' "ici", corps qui est per'tu
et qui presentifie autrui en meme temps. 11 s'agit done d'un meme corps,
qui est l'etre pour autrui et en meme temps l'etre pour moi. 45
S'il n'en etait pas ainsi, le corps de la-bas ne serait qu'une espece
d'indice de son analogon (corps d'autrui). Le meme corps signifie la
meme nature, a savoir la nature intersubjective commune:
... ce corps illic appartenant a rna Nature primordiale, appresente immediatement ...
!'autre moi; et cela grace a l'accouplement associatif entre ce corps, d'une part, et mon
organisme corpore!, avec le moi psychophysique qui en est maitre, d'autre part. II
appresente avant tout I' activite immediate de ce moi dans ce corps (illic) et son action
(mediate), au moyen de ce corps, sur Ia Nature, qu'il pe~oit, sur Ia meme Nature a laquelle
il (illic) appartient et qui est ainsi ma Nature primordiale. C'est Ia meme Nature, mais
donnee dans le mode du "comme si j'etais, moi, a Ia place de cet autre organisme corpore!."
Le corps est le meme; il m'est donne a moi comme illic, a lui comme hie comme "corps
central" et !'ensemble de ma Nature est Je meme que celui de l'autre. 46
La nature se constitue dans rna sphere primordiale comme identique

par rapport aux perspectives changeantes a partir du corps propre en
tant que "corps-zero" (Nullkorper) dans l'ici absolu. Malgre le fait que
seule rna perspective est originaire et d'autres sont appresentees, je
pen;ois autrui reellement en tant que realite psychophysique 47 et ensemble
avec lui la meme nature objective, le meme monde dans le cadre duquel
le rapport asymetrique moi-autrui change en rapport de reciprocite. Cette
reciprocite est celle des consciences, de deux consciences d'abord, de
plusieurs consciences par la suite. 48 Et des structures noetico-noematiques
on est passe ainsi purement au niveau du noeme, auquel il ne s'agit
plus de la constitution de la conscience ou de l'image d'un objet, mais
de 1' objet, des choses animees et inanimees en tant que telles dans la
mesure oil elles ont leur dimension temporelle, en un mot, de leur origine.
L'analyse intentionnelle doit ici ceder laplace a l'analyse noematique.
A la distinction de la sphere primordiale et de la sphere presentifiee
d'autrui correspond egalement une stratification du noeme: une couche
primordialement vecue et constituee, d'un cote et une couche appresentee
avec un corps etranger en tant qu' "objet premier en soi", puis avec autrui
"en tant qu'homme premier en soi", de l'autre. Deux couches mais un
seul objet et un seul monde identique dans la synthese des deux couches
impliquant le mode possible de donation et d'experience d'autrui.
Remarquons le caractere hierarchisant et s'elargissant de cette consti-
tution: du monde nature} au culture} en passant par le monde humain
et du "premier" pair avec son environnement primordial ala multiplicite
de l'humanite vivant dans le monde (objectif) unique de nous tous. 39
Husserl se rend compte de nouveau que cette harmonie entre mon envi-
ronnement phenomenal et 1' environnement phenomenal d' autrui peut etre,
lors de la constitution appresentative, perturbee par !'existence des
phenomenes anormaux, pathologiques, 49 }'animal etant du cote de
l'anormal.
Qu'est-ce qu'etre normal dans ce contexte? Etre "normal" signifie etre
dans un monde ambiant avec des hommes qui "tous" - a quelques exceptions individu-
elles pres- ont !'experience de (ce monde) en tant qu'identique et determine de Ia meme
maniere, autrement dit, avec des hommes qui l'ont dans Ia certitude en tant qu'experi-
mentale et l'un pour I' autre dans I' identite. 50
496 JOZEF SIVAK
Le normal apparait dans ce passage non seulement dans sa dimension

ontologique, mais aussi logique. Les expressions telles que "tous a
}'exception de quelques-uns", "toujours avec quelques exceptions", etc.
sont des formes logiques qui s'appliquent a l'empirique. 51
Ce qui manque encore a la perception en commun du monde commun,
c 'est une dimension tempore lie commune que Husserl cherchera dans
le cadre de la conscience seule. Car
cette identification synthetique ne presente pas plus de mystere que toute autre identifi-
cation, par consequent, pas plus que n'importe quelle identification ayant lieu a l'interieur
de rna sphere originale propre grace a laquelle !'unite de !'objet peut, en general, acquerir
pour moi un sens et une existence par l'intermediaire des re-presentations. 52
II est done possible de comparer en substance la constitution du

monde appresente avec !'identification du monde presentifie, par
exemple, en souvenir. Meme si !'original est absent, il est toujours
possible de le presentifier. A cela s'ajoute le fait que toutes les presen-
tifications qui se succedent les unes apres les autres sont liees par la seule
conscience synthetique "du meme" dans le cadre de !'unique forme
temporelle. 53
De la meme maniere, il serait possible d'unifier !'experience interne
du moi concret avec la sphere etrangere (qui est presentifiee en elle),
cela par l'intermectiaire de la synthese d'identification de l'organisme
corpore! presente et appresente, et par la meme, de la nature presentee
et appresentee. Cela signifie que les deux moi, le mien et etranger,
coexistent, savoir, existent dans le meme espace et dans le meme temps
(objectifs), ont une forme temporelle commune. A cela s'ajoute le fait
que leurs dun~es propres sont des "modes d'apparition" du temps objectif.
Ensemble avec le monde pour nous se constitue ainsi dans la commu-
naute temporelle egalement le temps. 54
La nature corporelle et les sujets incames constituent ensemble le
"proto-noyau" (Urkern) du monde identique. La corporeite organique
et inorganique constituent le "proto-horizon" ( Urhorizont) qu 'est I'hori-
zon de !'enfant. Enfin, le prefixe "vor-", tres frequent chez Husser!,
conceme les modes temporels. Le "pre-temps": (Vorzeit) est un temps
dans lequel se deroule l'auto-temporalisation du "pre-moi" (Vor-Ich)
qui est un moi qui ne vit pas encore.
Avec !'unite du monde se pose alors la question de l'unite d'une
communaute a ce stade. Le fait de se dire spontanement "nous" ne suffit
pas pour constituer des unites durables, caracteristiques des communautes
d'ordre superieur et complexes. Pourtant, il y a une unite durable et

specifique qui se forme deja a ce niveau, celle qui est fondee sur un
souvenir communautaire, savoir Ia tradition historique. Le temps demeure
ainsi Ia forme de Ia genese intentionnelle d'une communaure. Les actions,
les sentiments et meme les pen sees d' autrui affectent mes prop res
pensees, actions et sentiments. Ce que je n'ai pas re~u. ce qui provient
de moi-meme est originaire, mien et bien qu'en realite co-determine
deja par Ia tradition de nos ancetres (Vorfahrentradition), d'un cote et
par celle de nos contemporains (Mitfahrentradition), de l'autre. Dans
cet echange intersubjectif, les pensees n'entrent pas en collision, a Ia
difference des buts dont Ia realisation est liee avec un profit quelconque.
3. L' attitude nature lie comme attitude "personnaliste"

Dans l'attitude courante ou naturelle ce sont des choses de notre
environnment (table, riviere, etc.) qui sont per~ues en original, sans
substitution aucune.
Dans }'attitude du physicien, par contre, on manie par l'intermedi-
aire des schemes ideaux et methodiques un monde de Ia physique dont
nous avons "une image subjective", autrement dit, un monde per~u par
le lien (causal) de Ia neurophysiologie (J. Patocka). Cette attitude, Husserl
l'appelle, on le sait, "naturaliste".
Or Ia chose de Ia physique ne differe pas de Ia chose de I' attitude
courante, pre-scientifique, ce sont Ia differents aspects d'une meme chose
que Ia phenomenologie aspire a montrer in persona, dans Ia richesse
de ses horizons interne et externe transphenomenaux. La chose-meme,
donnee dans l'attitude phenomenologique, savoir dans l'intuition et non
pas dans Ia praxis theorique mediate, mais dans Ia praxis immediate,
est pleine de sens d'un core, et un aspect du monde, de l'autre. Ce sens
est a saisir, a constituer, par Ia, Ia chose devient un etre pour nous.
Cette appropriation de Ia chose exige non seulement Ia participation de
tous nos sens, mais le "concours de I' arne entiere". 55
Cette attitude phenomenologique et resolument antinaturaliste se lit
encore mieux dans I' approche du corps propre qui a un sens echappant
a Ia physique. Faire apparaitre ce sens, puis, celui de I'homme, pour
finir avec celui de Ia personne, c 'est le point de depart de I' attitude
personnaliste.
La conscience est enchainee au monde non seulement par Ia percep-
tion mais aussi par }'incarnation, savoir par Ia relation au corps qui Ia
498 JOZEF SIVAK
situe a titre de conscience humaine et animale dans le temps et dans

I' espace de la nature. 56
Les deux attitudes sont done impliquees dans la constitution du corps
propre qui se donne d'une double maniere: comme une chose physique
dans une perception somatologique comprenant les data hyletiques,
cinesthesiques, etc. et comme un corps organique lequel est, a son tour,
un melange d'organique et de subjectif.
La nature dans !'ensemble, non pas la nature materielle, contient
tous les corps physiques et organiques. Les ames, ces subjectivites
appresentees et objectivees, le sont par la corporeite organique qui
comprend idea/iter tout ce qui est appresentable: les vecus, les opera-
tions theoriques et pratiques. Les deux spheres, organo-corporelle et
physico-corporelle agissent mutuellement l'une sur I' autre a I' interieur
du corps propre.
Ce qui s'oppose ala nature (materielle) ce n'est pas l'ame mais l'union
de celle-ci et du corps qu'est le sujet humain ou animal. En se sens,
l'homme-animal est une quasi-nature. Avant d'opposer la nature a I' esprit,
d 'etablir un contraste entre eux, c' est-a-dire entre le sens "arne" et le
sens "personne", Husser! passe par suivre les racines du social et du
spirituel dans la corporeite meme au prix d'enfermer I' arne dans !'attitude
"naturali ste".
Je vois !'arne "a" son corps, le toucher a Ia main, Ia joue au visage. C'est au ras des
corps, eux-memes inseres dans Ia texture des choses, que je vois sourdre le psychisme
et s 'y resorber, ... les institutions sociales sont elles-memes susceptibles d 'etre com-
prises comme un jeu d'excitants et de reactions au niveau des comportements du corps
anime. 57
Me me les institutions sociales font done d' abord partie du cadre

psycho-physiologique. Le changement d'attitude n'intervient qu'au
niveau d'une vie communautaire des echanges, des experiences dans la
famille, l'Etat, etc. 58 L' attitude personnaliste se lit ainsi dans I' attitude
naturelle deja en passant par !'attitude naturaliste.
En fin, I' attitude nature lie possecte, par son caractere positif, son
habitus, sa tradition aussi. La traditionalite ne differe pas finalement
de la conventionalite (remplie de prejuges et de conventions ainsi que
de paresse) et appelle sans cesse un renouvellement, un resourcement
originaire par Ia vie qui institue le nouveau et reactive I' ancien. Plus
exactement, une prise de conscience de soi (Selbstbesinnung) est neces-
saire pour corriger nos actes et actions traditionnels et pour creer une
science authentique qui renvoie a une "proto-tradition" (Urtradition) a

devoiler et a clarifier.
V. CONCLUSION
La problematique de l'ame, intermediaire dans la systematique husser-

lienne, entre etre de la nature et etre de !'esprit, devait faire !'objet de
l'une des trois sciences fondamentales chez Husser!: la science de
l'humanite et de l'animalite dans leur exteriorite. 59 Dans les inedits
etudies par R. Toulemont et edites entre-temps en partie par I. Kern, il
est encore question d'une "sociologie intentionnelle".
Par sa conception de la nature intersubjective composee de regnes
animal et humain, Husser! a rejoint la tradition dans ses racines antiques
en renouvelant l'idee d'une "arne du monde", d'un cote, et de !'autre il
a anticipe ce que d'autres appellent aujourd'hui le "principe anthropique
de la vie". 60
Academie Slovaque des Sciences, Bratislava
NOTES
1 Pour avoir davantage de details sur cette constitution, cf. notre etude "Du moi-pur a
Ia personne: a Ia lumiere de Ia pbenomenologie de l'intersubjectivite", in Reason, Life,
Culture, Part II, 1993, pp. 357-374 (Analecta Husserliana, vol. XL).
2 "Das ist (ein) Faktum der physiologischen Erfahrung als synthetischer Fortfiihrung
von Erfahrungen aus der Alltaglichkeit von Anomalitaten darunter denen, die den 'Tod'
mit sich fiihren. Aber jede solche empirische Betrachtung setzt schon die wirkende
'Einfiihlung' und Leibaperzeptionen voraus" (Hua XXIX, p. 325).
3 Cf. Hua XIV, p. 70.
4 Hua XXIX, p. 323; trad. par nous.
5 Cf. Suppl. XLII du t. XIV des Hua.
6 Hua XIV, p. 336; trad. par nous.
7 "Der Sinn dieser Analogie wird dann selbst ein transzendentales Problem darstellen.
Das greift natiirlich iiber in das Reich der transzendentalen Probleme, die schlieBlich
aile Lebewesen umfassen, soweit sie noch so indirekt, eben doch bewahrbar, so etwas
wie 'Leben', auch Gemeinschaftsleben im geistigen Sinne haben" (Hua VI, p. 191).
8 "Unter den animalischen Dingen sind angeschaut die Menschen, und so sehr, daB
erst von ihnen her die bloBen Tiere als ihre Abwandlungen Seinssinn haben" (Ibid.,
p. 230).
9 Cf. ibid., pp. 199-200.
10 II ne faut passe contenter de Ia definition de J'Einfiihlung en tant qu'experience
indirecte et mediate. L'Einfiihlung est d'abord directe, savoir un simple acte de presen-
500 JOZEF SIVAK
tification et indirecte (reflexive), Ia deuxieme etant fondee sur Ia premiere (Cf. Hua
XIII, p. 400 et sq.). Autrui n'est pas atteint ace niveau des data de sensation seulement,
mais encore par Ia volonte qui agit a travers eux. Mais pour qu'il puissse etre reconnu
"en tant qu'ame", il faut de plus, I'Einfiihlung (Ibid., p. 460).
11 Cf. Hua XIV, p. 126.
12 Cf. Hua XV, p. 471.
13 Hua XXIX, p. 317.
14 Ibid., p. 319 ("Der Wolf-Sein ist das teleologische Gesetz der Wolfe, und eigentlich
ist er ein Wolf-Individuum nur als Wolf unter individuell verschiedenen Wolfen und in
dem Geschlechtshorizont ... ").
15 Cf. Hua IV, p. 199.
16 Hua XXIX, p. 334; trad. par nous. Husser) ajoute sous forme de note: "Urtiimliches
Leben kann nicht anfangen und aufhoren." II discute a cette occasion egalement I' objec-
tion du sommeil qui n'est qu'un evenement dans le monde. Mais c'est le passage de Ia
vigilance au sommeil, de Ia vie a Ia mort, de J'actualisation a Ia desactualisation qui fait
probleme, celui de Ia constitution de )"'entre" (-monde, -temps, etc.). Cet "entre" que
developpera plus tard Merleau-Ponty remplace ici le prefixe et Je mode de "quasi".
Applique au sommeil accompagne d'un reve, celui-ci est un mode anormal de Ia vigi-
lance me transportant dans un "quasi-monde" avec des "quasi-interets" (Cf. ibid., pp.
334-336).
17 "Die hoherstufigen Gattungen sind auf die niederstufigen aufgewiesen, sie gehoren
teleologisch zusammen. Fleischfressende Tiere, pflanzenfressende etc. Menschen konnen
nicht sein ohne Tiere und Pflanzen, im Pflanzenreich ein Universalitiit teleologischer
Zusammengehorigkeit" (Ibid., p. 320).
IS Ibid.
19 Cf.HuaiV,p.l96.
20 Hua VI, p. 198; cf. aussi par. 44.
21 Ibid., p. 199.
22 "Mich selbst kann ich 'direkt' erfahren, und nur meine intersubjektive Realitiitsform
kann ich prinzipiell nicht erfahren, ich bedarf dazu Medien der Einfiihlung ... meine
Erlebnisse sind mir direkt gegeben ... die Erlebnisse Anderer sind von mir nur mit-
telbar - einfiihlungsmiiBigerfahrbar. Dabei ist eben auch jedes meiner Erlebnisse als
Bestandstiick der 'Welt' (der objektiven-raum-zeitlichen Realitiitssphiire) nicht direkt
erfahrbar, die Realitiitsform (die der intersubjektiven Objektivitat) ist keine immanente
Form" (Hua IV, p. 200).
23 Cf. Hua XV, p. 553.
24 P. Ricoeur, A I' ecole de Ia phenomenologie, p. 114.
25 Si Ia constitution est finalement une "constitution-avec", le corps organique s'auto-
constitue, cela a travers trois systemes constitutifs: I. l'ego avec ses sensations
kinesthesiques; 2. les sensations tactiles inter-organiques; 3. les sensations tactiles extra-
organiques (relativement aux choses du monde exterieur). En un mot, le corps propre
est une intermediarite de Ia chose physique ou sensible (Sinnending) et du corps organique
sensible (Sinnenleib) ou somatologique.
26 Husserl, op. cit., pp. 38 et 342.
27 Cf. notre etude "Du mondain a l'ontologique dans l'intersubjectivite", in Analecta
Husserliana, vol. XL VIII, pp. 433 et sq.
28 Cf. MS E III 4, p. 1.
29 "Darin liegt das erste Ideal eines befriedigenden Gesamtelebens und eines durch
aus befriedigenden, in dem fiir aile Eventualitliten im voraus gesagt ist, und eines Lebens,
in dem in jeder Gegenwart aus Gegenwartssorge und -aktion immerzu die Giiter geschaffen
werden und bereitgehalten bleiben, die eben fiir die Zukunft vorsorgen, in eins damit
daB die Gegenwart zugleich die in ihr lebendigen primliren Bediirfnisse und die jetzt
erwlichten befriedigt" (Ibid., p. 3).
30 Dans Ia conception des trois mouvements de Patocka, le travail primaire fait partie
du mouvement vital qui repousse le monde primordial a l'arriere-plan en passant ace
qui est present, donne, a ce qui sert Ia vie et renvoie, par deJa des objets, aux enchaine-
ments d'indice mediateurs au niveau personnel, intersubjectif, animal, etc. C'est Ia vie
investie dans !'action sur l'exterieur en vue de !'adapter aux besoins humains. La prece-
dente citation de Husser! peut etre ici mise en paraiiele avec cette constatation de Patocka:
"La vie est plus qu'une duree indifferente, mais Ia necessite incessante, Ia reference aux
fonctions vitales qui doivent etre satisfaites, soit par soi-meme, soit par les autres. Cette
mediation, investissement systematique et durable de Ia vie et de ses forces dans !'action
sur l'exterieur de maniere a !'adapter aux besoins humains ... est le travail primaire."
(Patocka, J., Le monde nature/ comme probleme philosophique, 2eme ed., pp. 225-26;
trad. par nous. Cf. aussi notre etude "La realisation du projet husserlien de 'monde nature!'
selon Jan Patocka", in Analecta Husserliana, vol. XIV, p. 218.)
31 Cf. Hua XIII, p. 426.
32 Ibid., p. 428.
33 Husser! ne thematise cependant pas Ia notion de travail comme le font les marxistes
ou les socialistes, par exemple.
34 "was meinen Leib anbelangt, so kann ich ihn zwar auch als physisches Ding
aperzepieren, und auch er ist, im entwickelten Ich als das konstituiert, aber fur ihn babe
ich die somatologische Wahrnehmung als Leib, und diese statt offenbarvoran und ist
fiir, mich als fungierendes lch das an sich Erste, und das Auffassen, das 'Wahrnehmen'
meines Leibes als physisches Ding ein Zweites" (Hua XIV, p. 61). Une note qui s'y
rapporte: "Die Praxis steht iiberaii voran der Theorie."
35 "Die einheitliche Organerfahrung hat eine Seite naturalen Erfahrung und eine zweite,
'geistige' Seite, und ich kann die eine aktivieren, also in eigentlicher Wahrnehmung geisti-
genweise voiiziehen und wieder die andere" (Hua XV, p. 319, n. 1).
36 Dans un texte comme La Terrene se meut pas (Paris, 1969) Ia praxis elle-meme
represente un mouvement specifique. [Cf. "Sol terrestre. Marche, resistance, praxis (heurt,
production d'effets a distance)"] (Trad. fr. p. 54.)
37 "Die Menschen sind Korperlich-leiblich bloss Natur im Zusammenhang der AIInatur.
Aile leiblichen Verlinderungen, aile Gliederverlinderungen der menschlichen (und dann
auch tierischen) Leiber sind, wenn abstrahiert wird von der in menschlichen Dasein (Dasein
des Menschen als Objekts der konkreten Welt) verleiblichten Psyche, von allen 'Ich'
und lchlichen, mechanische, naturale Bewegungen und sonstige darauf fundierte
Verlinderungen" (Ibid., pp. 321-22, n. 1).
38 Ibid., p. 328.
39 Cf. Ibid., p. 317 et sq.
40 Husser! s'est rendu compte de ce probleme ainsi qu'en temoigne ce passage dans Ia
traduction Levinas des Meditations cartesiennes, passage releve et discute avant nous
502 JOZEF SIVAK
par J.-T. Desanti (cf. Phenomenologie et praxis) et P. Ricoeur (cf. "La Cinquieme
Meditation cartesienne", in A /'ecole de Ia phenomenologie, pp. 197-225): "Avec cette
couche (d'appartenance- J. S.) nous avons atteint I' extreme limite oil peut nous conduire
Ia reduction phenomenologique. II faut evidemment posseder !'experience de cette 'sphere
d'appartenance' propre au moi pour pouvoir constituer !'idee de !'experience d"un autre
que moi'; et sans avoir cette demiere idee je ne puis avoir !'experience d'un 'monde
objectif'." (M.C., p. 80). II faut cependant noter, a cette occasion, que ce passage ne se
trouve ni dans !'edition originate des M.C. par S. Strasser, ni dans Ia nouvelle traduc-
tion faite par M. de Launay. Cela devait echapper egalement a P. Ricoeur qui mentionne
meme l'original [127, l.l8-23] (A I' ecole de Ia phinomenologie, p. 202, n. 6). Si M.
de Launay ne devait pas relever et noter cette difference, il se pose au mains Ia question
de Ia revision et de l'etablissement du texte allemand des M.C.
41 P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 212. Avant Ricoeur mais dans le meme esprit personnaliste
M. Nedoncelle professait Ia reciprocite qu'il pla~ait au niveau des consciences pour fonder
sa "monadologie". L'appariement (Paarung) husserlien bien que fonde sur !'experience
et I' imagination doit etre complete par Ia relation directe de deux consciences dans l'amitie
ou l'amour. Le "nous" communautaire se constitue a partir de cette relation binaire
reciproque qui est a son tour fondee sur Dieu alors que Ia relation intersubjective chez
Husser! demeure laterale, horizontale.
42 "Dans cette intentionnalite toute particuliere se constitue un sens antique (Seinsinn)
nouveau qui transgresse l'ipseite propre (Selbsteigenheit) de mon ego monadique, il
se constitue alors un ego, non pas comme moi-meme, mais comme se reflechissant
(spiegelndes) dans mon ego propre, dans rna monade" (/d., ibid.; M.C., p. 78; trad.
legerement modifiee par Ricoeur).
43 /d., ibid., p. 213.
44 M.C., p. 102 (par. 55).
45 Ibid., p. 104 (orig., p. 151).
46 Ibid.
47 "Ce que je vois veritablement, ce n'est pas un signe ou un simple analogon, ce n'est
pas une image- ... - c'est autrui, et ce qu'en est apprehende dans l'originalite veri-
table, ce corps- illic- (... ) c'est le corps d'autrui lui-meme; .. ."(Ibid., p. 105).
48 "Apres ces eclaircissements il n'est nullement enigmatique que je puisse constituer
en moi un autre moi ou pourparler d'une fa~on plus radicale encore, que je puisse con-
stituer dans rna monade une autre monade et, precisement en qualite d'autre; nous
comprenons aussi ce fait, inseparable du premier, que je puis identifier Ia Nature con-
stituee par moi avec Ia Nature constituee par autrui (... ) (Ibid., p. 107). P. Ricoeur
note a cet endroit que "I' experience en commun de Ia nature est fermement maintenue a
l'inrerieur du cadre rigoureux d'appresentation et de l'idealisme monadique."
49 Ibid.
so Hua XV, p. 157. (Trad. par nous.)
51 La logique a laquelle renvoie aussi Ia psychologie interne de Ia normalite est une
"logique transcendantale concrete et apophantique formelle" comprenant toutes les sciences
aprioriques et se confondant finalement avec Ia phenomenologie tout entiere.
52 M.C., p. 107.
53 Husser! citera a cette occasion, encore l'exemple de Ia constitution des objets generaux
(nombre, fonction geometrique, etc.) qui sont supratemporels. Leur decouverte, "pro-
duction" et presentification presupposent de multiples operations de pensee qu'un autre

sujet pourrait faire a rna place. Comme ces objets ne sont pas dans le temps, le sujet
connaissant peut arriver dans des syntheses d'identification a !'evidence a n'importe queUe
periode de sa vie, ce qui vaut pour n'importe que! sujet a un moment donne. La supratem-
poralite des objets generaux devient ainsi I' omnitemporalite.
54 Ces analyses husserliennes sont devenues !'objet de plus d'un commentaire et de
plus d'une polemique. Citons au moins deux de tels commentaires: l'un de P. Ricoeur
commentant Ia Cinquieme Meditation cartt?sienne, !'autre de A. Schiitz. Ricoeur, par
exemple, ne pense pas que Ia synthese d'identification entre le propre et l'etranger puisse
etre de Ia meme espece que Ia synthese d'identification dans le cadre de !'unique flux con-
scientiel. Selon lui, c'est un point de vue idealiste qui n'a pas permis a Husser! de mener
Ia question de duplication de Ia conscience jusqu'a Ia fin, ce qui vaut egalement de
l'analogie entre le propre et l'etranger. Schiitz, qui a entrepris d'appliquer serieusement
Ia methode phenomenologique au social, d'une part et de realiser le programme husser-
lien de "monde vecu", d'autre part, sera encore plus critique non seulement dans cette
question, mais aussi dans d'autres. Lui aussi il sera sceptique au plus haut point, com-
mentant le par. 55 des M.C. en ce qui conceme l'appresentation du monde primordial
d'autrui, le passage de l'appresentation du moi psychologique etranger a Ia monade
etrangere concrete et a Ia constitution de Ia nature objective en ajoutant une couche
appresentative au corps se trouvant dans rna sphere du propre.
55 " Ia saisie du sens est quelque chose qu'on n'opere pas simplement en ouvrant
les yeux, mais qui requiert le concours de !'arne tout entiere" (J. Patoeka, Introduction
a Ia phenomenologie de Husser/, Millon, 1993, p. 181).
56 Cf. Hua III, par. 39, 53. "La conscience devient", note J. Patocka, "a cet endroit,
par cette relation, !'arne du sujet psychophysique. Husser! envisage le corps dans deux
attitudes fondamentales: !'attitude 'naturaliste', oil !'on part du corps en tant qu'objet,
et I' attitude 'personnaliste', oil I' on part de I' environnement comme correlat des actions
et des motivations personnelles" (ibid., p. 103).
57 P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 127.
58 "Nous ne voyons pas alors l'homme comme etre de nature, mais de culture, nous
ne remarquons pas !'animal quand nous attendons Ia personne, ... ", constate le com-
mentateur des ldeen II (/d., ibid.).
59 Cf. Hua XIII, p. 481. Les deux autres sciences sont: Ia science physique et Ia science
de l'homme en tant que createur des valeurs spirituelles.
6 Cf. G. Torris, Penser /'evolution. De Ia bete a l'homme,
Ed. Universitaires, 1990,
p. 210.
PART EIGHT
DRIVE TOWARD THE

UNITY-OF-EVERYTHING-THERE-IS-ALIVE
Zaiga lkere and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.
ZAIGA IKERE
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA'S PHILOSOPHY

OF LIFE AND THE FOSTERING OF
ECOLOGICAL THINKING
The situation of a human being in the contemporary world is here

to be considered within the metaphysics of life maintained by Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka. Being deeply rooted in the American democratic
tradition devised in the political philosophy of the U.S.A's founders,
Tymieniecka's mode of thinking is strikingly different from the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy propagated in the former Soviet Union. But looking
ahead, Tymieniecka's metaphysics with its regard for the human condi-
tion in unity with "everything-there-is-alive" opens new avenues for
thought in the twentieth century. It is this century that is supposed to
be an epoch where there is non-violence shown to nature as well as to
humanity, and in the light of the new existential situation of human being-
ness, ecological issues should become the decisive factor in the fate of
humankind and the Earth in general.
The role of philosophy and the place of a philosopher in society was
once most vividly characterized by David Hume. He wrote:
The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little accepted in the world,
as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society:
while he lives remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant
is still more despised.... One considerable advantage, which results from the accurate
and abstract philosophy, is its subserviency to the easy and humane, which, without the
former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts and
reasonings.... And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of
philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout
the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politi-
cian will acquire greater foresight and subtlety ... ; the lawyer more method and finer
principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more
caution in his plans and operations. 1
All the more, this idea concerns societies as well as nations amidst
crucial changes, when entirely new existential-practical problems emerge.
In the Baltic countries after their incorporation in the former Soviet
Union, philosophy was under the control of a totalitarian state power.
The Marxist philosophy claimed to be the unique mode of philosophizing.
Actually from after World War II in Latvia up to the '60s there was no
507

508 ZAIGA IKERE
philosophy (in the true sense of the word) - as admitted by the Latvian
philosopher Maija Kule, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and
Sociology, Latvian Academy of Sciences. 2 Subsequently, as Kule states,
philosophical investigations turned to the history of world philosophy,
trying to enlighten society through historical interpretation.
Addressing the career of phenomenology in Latvia, it should be noted
that before the World War II phenomenology as a branch of philosophy
was investigated and interpreted by the Latvian philosopher Teodor
Celms. Beginning with the '90s, the American scholar Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka lavished much of her energy on propagating and discussing
the phenomenological issues of life among Latvian philosophers and
scholars from the Baltic countries and other regions of the former Soviet
Union: international conferences were held in Riga in 1990 and 1991,
and there was a symposium organized in honor of Pope John Paul II's
visit to Latvia in 1993. In Russia and Eastern Europe, Tymieniecka's pio-
neering ventures started as early as 1972, when she first visited the former
Soviet Union to bring phenomenological problems into the limelight.
It is mainly due to her efforts that "the ice was broken, and through
various further contacts with East-European scholars there grew the
project of seeking out phenomenologists and bringing their dispersed
efforts into the common pool." 3
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has focused her philosophical inquiry
upon the human being: one, whose existence ''ultimately consists in man's
self-individualization-in-existence, one who projects himself the signif-
icance of his existence."4 The philosopher proposes the following factors
to be the virtualities through which the unfolding of the human spirit
can be brought about in order to bestow significance on human life: 1)
the aesthetic/poetic sense, 2) the intellectual sense, and 3) the moral
sense. 5
This was the philosophy I heard first from Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
at the international conference in the '90s in Riga and that was in
astounding discordance with my existential experience and the knowl-
edge acquired from the teachings of the Marxist philosophy concerning
the role of the individual and society. A man's role and the place allotted
to him in a society where everything is considered from the class struggle
point of view is but meaningless. One should submit one's personality
to the requirements of the society. One should never confront the System.
Individual life is not relevant to human concerns in the context of the
society's stupendous goal of communism.
A-T. TYMIENIECKA'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 509
One of the conferences took place just after the military coup d'etat
of 1991 failed in the Soviet Union, when the annihilation of human life
was a dire possibility. Tymieniecka's ideas made such an unforgettable
contrast with the impending realities should the military coup have been
successful. When the System is going to fight, an individual's life is
an insignificant bother for governmental power.6
The cornerstone of Marxist philosophy is the class struggle as the
driving factor of human society. According to Marxist thought, the pro-
letariat class is hegemonic in contemporary societies. Hence a personality
and individual life have no value in the scheme of the class struggle.
A philosophy in which the point of departure is the human being and
the human situation in the context of everything-there-is-alive could
emerge only under conditions where the social order welcomes life
and a human being as a custodian of it. One should have shared the
experience of seeing Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka - this fragile woman -
prophesying the philosophy of the unity and sacredness of life in Riga
in 1991, just days after of crisis for the Baltic states and the whole of
the Soviet Union, with violence as our background knowledge (see Note
6) to appreciate fully the impact her words made and the enchantment
they created.
Placing the investigation of the human condition at the center of her
inquiry, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's approach, however, is different from
traditional anthropologies in that her aim is not to single out man from
the rest of the universe, to place an unsurmountable wall between human
rationality and bios, but to consider the human being as a creation "placed
deep in the midst of the unity-of-everything-there is alive." This seems
a novel path for contemporary phenomenology. Mary Rose Barral
addresses this: "It is clear that Tymieniecka is preparing a revolutionary
move away from the current phenomenological investigations and
methods. She makes life the foundation and source of everything in the
human being, without specifying whether she intends to speak of human
life, biological life, or intellectual life. The meaning then seems to emerge;
and she speaks of life as the matrix of all that IS, in which case all
manifestations of life are included." 7 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's objec-
tive is to investigate the human being together with his existential context.
The existential situation of humankind has changed nowadays. With
the surprising development of such sciences as genetics, nuclear physics,
computer science, etc., with man's continuous enstrangement from nature,
humankind feels endangered for having undone the balance established
510 ZAIGA IKERE
between nature and human beings. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka maintains:

"It appears that human inventiveness, ingeniousness in bringing on an
enormous advance in the deciphering of the rules of cosmic and natural
forces ... has broken the timeless pattern of surrender to nature and gone
beyond the equipoise established through millenia of life between nature
and human beings."8 The philosopher concludes that the vital experi-
ence of the stability of life is uprooted. Hence new tasks emerge for
contemporary philosophy. Tymieniecka maintains that "the task of phi-
losophy with respect to the critical situation of humankind today, although
it has come to light only recently, brings us genuine enlightenment
about the cosmos, bios, and the human being - an enlightenment that
constitutes a crucial break from the tentative searching of philosophy
in the past. To pick up the challenge presented by the sciences as well
as the vital concerns of humankind and to formulate a new conception
of nature-life ... is to indicate philosophy's new parameters."9 Edmund
Husserl brought his vast inquiry to human rationality, but now, as
pointed out by Tymieniecka, emphasis falls on the "interchanges that
. . . are made, loosened, and dissolved among living beings as well as
among the modalities of forces and relevances of the biosphere and the
cosmos." 10
Facing the existing reality, it is the moral duty of man to not close
his eyes, but to bravely see and recognize the interdependence of man
and the surrounding environment as well as man's ultimate dependence
on bios. The awareness of the moral sense is the essence that raises
man above the animal kingdom and bestows significance on man's life.
The moral sense, argues Tymieniecka, is what "allows man to estimate
the life situation within the living kingdom as well as his own," within
the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. Tymieniecka maintains that through
the moral sense the human beings should feel the urgency of their
becoming the custodians of everything there is alive. 11
It is vitally necessary to create and maintain this mode of thinking
in our contemporary world to make us realize the grave consequences
humankind will be forced to acknowledge. To create an ecological mode
of thinking is an urgent task of the contemporary educators and philoso-
phers.
I would like to put forward and consider here three stages in fos-
tering ecological thinking that may work for Latvian society and,
presumably, for other societies with a like cultural heritage and cultural
style. Education of such a kind might cover three domains, namely, 1)
teaching the ecological mode of thinking through the nation's folklore,

i.e., lyrical folk songs, fairy tales, riddles, proverbs, sayings, games
especially during the oral cultural period of a child's mental life as
well as his later school years, 2) encouraging and requiring the study
of those authors whose writings bear the marks of the Latvian tradi-
tional world outlook, and lastly, 3) education in different philosophical
views, especially study of anthropological and phenomenological trends
of philosophy such as, for instance, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's meta-
physics.
In order to assess this proposal, one should get a clearer insight into
the Latvian people's traditional world outlook. It is maintained that in
every nation's culture there is a stage of oral culture and a stage of written
culture. Latvian oral culture is represented by Latvian lyrical folk songs
and by fairy tales. Folklore is assumed to cover the period of Latvian
traditional culture. Latvian scholars consider Latvian traditional culture
to have come to an end with the publishing of a collection of Latvian
lyrical folk songs in 1894. In the folk songs the Latvian traditional
world outlook is reflected most vividly. This outlook was grounded in
the peasants' mode of life and experience. When ancient Latvians con-
templated their life experience they often drew comparisons from nature's
phenomena and imaginatively transformed its remarkable phenomena
to reach philosophical conclusions and infuse human earthly life with
significance. Nature was not a "closed" system for them in those times.
Philosophical reflection is initiated by the intellectual and creative stir-
rings within the human being. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka writes of the
unfolding of man's inner self that it is our abilities- to wonder, to marvel
- that launch the human spirit:
The ancients considered philosophy to be born from wonderment .... As a matter of
fact, wonderment about things which do not seem to fall into the simple causal con-
catenation, has its experiential counterpart in marveling; one completes the other. When
we become "enchanted," entranced before the beauty of a flower, plant, tree, this is
marveling. When this beauty or gracefulness, or complexity make us wonder about
the prodigality of Nature in bringing about forms, and about this very bringing about,
this is wonderment. We could say that this marveling-wonderment coupling is a primo-
genital condition of the launching of human spirit. 12
I would like to take the liberty to state that this marveling-wonder-

ment process when turned to man's life experience in comparison to
nature's life prompted the ancient Latvians' spirit to unfold and find
its highest reflection in their lyric folk songs or dainas.
512 ZAIGA IKERE
A Latvian folk song usually consists of four lines. In a great number

of cases the poetic inspiration comes from reflection upon natural
phenomena. The Latvian scholar Vaira VIps-Freibergs describes the form
of the Latvian lyrical folk songs as follows:
The classical daina quatrain is made up of two couplets of octosyllabic verse which are
placed in vigorous syntactic parallelism as often as not. In terms of semantic content,
the most ubiquitous form is the parallel between Nature in the first couplet and Culture
in the second, although the reverse order: Culture/Nature as well as Culture/Culture
parallels may be found. 13
Here are some quatrains illustrating this:

Be rziQ, tavu kuplumiQu Look at the birch tree, its twigs
Lfdz pasai zemftei! Droop to the very ground!
MiimiQ, tavu labumi\}u My dearest Mother, your goodness lasts
Lfdz miiziQa galiQam. To the very end of my life.
Kas var dziesmas izdziediit, Who can sing all the songs,
Kas valodas izrunat? Who can speak all the words?
Kas var zvaigznes izskaitft, Who can count all the stars in heaven
Jiiras zvirgzdus izlasft? And all the pebbles on the sea bottom?
It is man's poetic sense that bridges "the seeming rational wall between
what we call nature and man's internal nature" (A-T. Tymieniecka).
In these lyrical folk songs not only are Man and Nature equated in
parallel constructions, but also Nature and the Divine, as, for instance,
as shown in the following folk song:
Melni ve rsi, balti ragi Black oxen with white horns
Daugave niedras eda. Were grazing in reeds in the Daugava.
Tie nebija melni versi, These were not black oxen,
Tie bij Dieva kumeliQi. They were the horses of Dievs [God].
In this remarkable example, as Vaira VIps-Freibergs explains:

The black oxen are not 'real' animals ... Judging from other daina variants as well as
from other folkloric materials, black oxen with white horns grazing in a real or mythical
river Daugava, the Latvian equivalent of the Greek Okeanos, are a riddle metaphor for
black storm clouds with white edges, hanging low over the horizon. Since Dievs was a
divinity of the bright sky, another, equally appropriate metaphor for the same natural
phenomenon is to refer to storm clouds as his horses. 14
Most often Latvian folk songs bear a message to be taken into account.
They may draw a vivid comparison from nature to tell the child to love
his mother, to have respect for the older generation, to be strong and
bravely face the surrounding realities. It is nature that might offer solace
for an aching heart. Contemporary societies with their advanced tech-
nologies may have forgotten this. And what consolation have we got
instead? A Latvian folk song says:
Pie li.beles piespiedos I lean against an apple tree
Kli. pie savas mli.muli!,Uls. As if it were my own dear mother.
Birst abelei balti ziedi, The tree sheds its white blossoms
Birst man gauzas asari!,Uls. While tears are streaming down my face.
The values of good and evil are verified to a great extent through man's
attitude toward nature. The folk songs created centuries ago make
children aware of the living tie existing between man and nature. The
metaphor visualized in the song above keeps open as it were the gate
between the abstract rationality of man and living nature, helps to bridge
the hiatus between Man and Nature.
One should have reverence for "everything-there-is-alive," if we resort
to Tymieniecka's terminology. The following folk song teaches:
Lauz, mli.si!,Ul, ko lauzdama, My little sister, if you want to break a twig,
Nelauz berza galotn'ites: Then break anything but the very top of the birch tree:
Berzi\).am daudz zari\).u A birch has many tiny twigs,
Visi raud galotn'ites. All of them will cry for the top.
The living bond with nature, man's concatenation with and his self-
enclosure in the surrounding environment is realized by means of verbal
explication in metaphors and similes within these lyrical folk songs.
The code to be deciphered and the message to be retrieved from the
bygone centuries is to the effect that we are the custodians of every-
thing there is alive as well as the heirs of eternal human values, and it
is in that that the moral sense of our existence consists. This idea is incar-
nated in our folklore, and it is stressed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's
philosophy.
The legacy of folklore has significantly moulded the Latvian culture's
style. Tymieniecka evaluates a nation's cultural heritage in the following
way: "The histories of various cultures make manifest how much specific
sets of ideals are handed down from generation to generation and provide
human groups with identity throughout all temporal vicissitudes and
cement their cooperative efforts with a shared spirit." 15
Aesthetic and ethical ideals have not been lost in contemporary Latvian
literary texts. To build the ecological mode of thinking, we should seize
514 ZAIGA IKERE
on those texts where the traditionally established bond of Man and Nature
is implemented. There are many authors whose writings might contribute
to the retrieval of the feeling that we are but a part of everything there
is alive and that the moral sense of our life involves protecting every-
thing that is alive.
Here I will mention only one Latvian author, namely, the poet Fricis
Barda (1880-1919). In his poetry Heraclitus' assumption "One is All"
is most vividly seen. The guiding principle of his world outlook is as
follows: there is only one united and eternal life, it is sacred and all
the living creatures on the Earth are so many various and diversiform
manifestations of this oneness. For Barda, it is not man who is the
supreme manifestation of the living kingdom. All the living creatures
dwelling upon the Earth have equal rights to have and sustain their life.
There is no irrevocable division between man and other living crea-
tures. The poet, for instance, portrays little peewits of the marsh as his
sisters while a blossoming rose bush is his brother. Observing a little
insect trying to climb a grass-blade, the poet exclaims: "And who of
us two is cleverer- he or me- to that question I have no answer!"
Nature with all its phenomena has life and breath in his art. For him
wading pools in spring are slumbrous rain clad in old clothes, but in dark
evenings in March little streamlets are driving in carts. The poet likewise
draws a marvelous picture of how in summer evenings he strides to the
birch grove to bid "good night" to Day's winds while women gather
darkness and pour it into buckets.
I have spoken here of Fricis Barda's poetic vision, but he is not a
unique example in our literature. In Latvian written culture there are many
authors who share the same feelings. I hope, though, to have given the
reader some of the reasons for my conviction that there is much in
common in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka 's basic philosophical concepts and
the Latvian cultural tradition. There is a reason why Tymieniecka's meta-
physics of life is attractive for our philosophers as well as school teachers
with respect to educating the generation that is destined to live in the
XXIst century.
Modern trends in philosophy try to find answers to the essential
questions of being and human destiny in this world. Philosophy has
started the query with well-established ontological, metaphysical and
epistemological questions. Some contemporary philosophers have tried
to reformulate the answers to the great philosophical issues. One may
find such answers in the phenomenology of life as reformulated by Anna-

Teresa Tymieniecka.
Pedagogical University, Daugavpils

Latvia
NOTES
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in The Empiricists
(New York: Dolphin Books, 1961), pp. 309-311.

2 Maija Kiile, "Filzofija kli atkllijums" [Philosophy as Revelation], in Atkliijums No. 1
(Riga, 1991), p. 7.
3 Jadwiga S. Smith, "A Moment in History," Phenomenological Inquiry Vol. 17
(Belmont: The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning,
1993), p. 6.
4 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Human Condition within the Unity-of-Everything-
There-Is-Alive, a Challenge to Philosophical Anthropologies," in Analecta Huserliana,
Vol. XXXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991), p. 295.
5 Ibid., pp. 299-302.
6 Here I would like to remind the reader that the organization of Soviet power and the
establishment of the Soviet regime was from the very start connected with violence.
The dictatorship of the proletariat was a weapon for the building and forming of socialism
as much as it was a weapon for crushing the bourgeois class. In reality that meant that
not only big factory owners or prosperoud farmers were exterminated, but also other civil-
ians who had had some kind of property were put into prison and sent to concentration
camps afterwards. When Latvia as well as the other Baltic states were incorporated into
the former Soviet Union in 1940 and a socialist form of governmental framework was
established instead of the existing democracies, more than thirty thousand civilians (34,250
precisely) were deported from Latvia to Siberia in Russia. Actually 1,355 civilians out
of this number were shot or tortured to death that year in prison dungeons, among them
18 children and 105 women (see 0. Freivalds, "Baigais gads" [The Terrible Year], in Mana
Miija (Riga: 1942), also in Gadagriimata Miijai un Gimenei (Riga: 1994), p. 97). Likewise
in Russia during the years of the establishment of Soviet power not only were represen-
tatives of the bourgeois class exterminated, but also quite decent and innocent people.
According to the accounts by the Soviet demographer B. Urlanis, before the proletariat
revolution in Russia only four million people belonged to the so-called higher offi-
cialdom (inclusive of the members of their families). Two million people of this number
emigrated from Russia. According to the accounts of other Soviet demographers, during
the years from 1918 to 1922, i.e., the first years of the Soviet regime, the total number
of inhabitants diminished from 147.6 million to 132.5 million people. The difference is
15.1 million civilians who were exterminated. See [The Last Hosts of the Kremlin]
Ta6aqHHKOB r., IloCJIC):(HHe X03BCBa KpeMJIB (XapbKOB: E):(HHOpor, 1995), p. 323.
7 Mary Rose Barra!, "Creativity and the Critique of Reason," Phenomenological Inquiry
Vol. 12 (Belmont: The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and
Learning, 1988), p. 137.
516 ZAIGA IKERE
8 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Nature and Culture in the Unity-of-Everything-There-Is-

Alive" in Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo (ed.), Physica, Cosmologia, Naturphilosophie (Rome:
Herder, Universita Lateranense, 1993), p. 287.
9 Ibid., p. 292.
10 Ibid., p. 291.
11 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Human Condition within the Unity-of-
Everything-There-Is-Alive," Analecta Husserliana Vol. XXXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
p. 302.
12 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life Book 3: The Passions of the Soul and
the Elements in the Ontopoiesis of Culture (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), p. 36.
13 Vaira VJ~is-Freibergs, "The Negative Parallel or Negative Simile in Latvian Folk
Poetry," Journal of Baltic Studies No. I (USA: Association for the Advancement of
Baltic Studies, 1995), p. 10.
14 Ibid., p. 16.
15 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Book 3, op. cit., p. 41.
DANIEL R. WHITE
SPIRIT IN FLAMES
Toward a Postmodern-Ecological Phenomenology
The question about the relationship between ecology, the "science

of the household" as the word's etymology suggests, and lifeworld
(Lebenswelt), originally Edmund Husserl's term (in Crisis in European
Science and Transcendental Phenomenology) referring to the phenom-
enology of human experience, requires that both concepts be recon-
sidered, for "ecology" is largely a concept based on the metaphysics
and "systems" theory of modem science, on the one hand, and "life-
world," as the quotation above suggests, functions as a foundation
for phenomenology, on the other. "The Lebenswelt is the object of an
immediate experience (intuition), which is the necessary point of depar-
ture of phenomenological research," comments James Edie in Edmund
Husser/'s Phenomenology (Edie, 1987, pp. 84-85). Indeed, as Edie points
out, Husserl defines phenomenology as Riickgang auf die Lebenswelt,
"a going-back to the prepredicative or prethematic region of experience
which is prior to any thought about experience" (84). Both ecology,
especially in its evolutionary dimension, and phenomenology, especially
in regard to the lifeworld, share a quest for origins, to answer the basic
question, "Whence did we and our world come about?" Evolutionary
ecology looks at the question "objectively," phenomenology "subjec-
tively," and this dichotomy, with its metaphysics and discourse com-
munities, has largely come to characterize the rift between the sciences
and the humanities, respectively. The poststructuralist critique of struc-
turalist pretensions to objectivity, which applies to the "natural" as
well as the "human" sciences, is matched by its undermining of the
"metaphysics of presence," which equally calls into question phenome-
nology's evocation of originary experience. Nevertheless, evolutionary
theory ramified by Derrida's notion of differance, and phenomenology's
lifeworld kindled to Heraclitean fire by Heidegger's hermeneutical
critique amplified by Derrida's deconstructive reading, provide the
impetus of a postmodem ecological discourse that deconstructs the
bifurcations of object and subject, science and art, person and world,
and replaces them with new forms of praxis, new forms of making, of
poetry and authorship, animated by new evolutionary personae. The
517
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Ll/, 517-530.

518 DANIEL R. WHITE
convergence of ecology and lifeworld thus will require some fundamental

revision in the concept of nature and of the person, as well as in the
concepts of natural evolution and human making, poiesis. Ultimately this
will entail the identification of what Gregory Bateson calls "the unit of
mind," and Derrida following Heidegger calls "spirit in flames," with
"the unit of evolutionary survival," which turns out to be not only the
ecosystem but also "the entire evolutionary structure" (Bateson, 1987,
p. 466): the unfolding life of Gaia.
"You know that poetry (poiesis) is a manifold thing; for when anything
whatever goes from not being into being the cause in every case in
poiesis, so that also in all of the arts the labor is making [poieseis],
and all the makers in these arts are poets" (Plato, 1980, p. 205 b8-c2).
Diotima says this to Socrates in the midst of exploring with him the nature
of love, Eros, and the convergence between the good and the beautiful
as the object of the philosopher's quest: "For wisdom (sophia) is one
of the most beautiful things, but Love (Eros) is loving (eros) toward
the beautiful (to kalon), so that by necessity Eros is a philosopher
(philosophon), the philosopher being between the wise (sophou) and
the ignorant (amathous)," she explains (204 b2-5).
It is at the point where being emerges out of non-being that Plato
situated the problem of causation, aitia, or explanation in terms of causes,
aetiology, and, somewhat peculiarly for modem thought, it is also at
this locale that he places the problem of "poetry," or, more broadly,
"making," techne. It is at the intersection of coming into being and of
making, too, that Heidegger, who cites this passage from the Symposium
(205 b8-c2) in his "The Question Concerning Technology," chooses to
situate his notion of poetry, philosophy and technology. Indeed, his very
ontology may be interpreted as arising at this juncture. As he argues in
"The Origin of the Work of Art," "The Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit,
'unclosedness'] intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action
of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in
that which is, to the openness of Being" (67). This openness, or unclosed-
ness, is the very one that resounds in Heidegger's translation of the Greek
word for nature, physis, as "rising into presence." Poetry, philosophy,
technology: all three arise where "man" also finds his origin: in the
opening through which being emerges from non-being. In brief, human
being, nature, technology, philosophy, and the human subject who studies
or shapes them, are full of holes.
As Heidegger contends in "The Question Concerning Technology,"
SPIRIT IN FLAMES 519
in its premodern phases - what Lewis Mumford called its polytechnical

stage - technology is inseparable from poiesis, from making in the
original Greek sense that included poetry and the arts. It is only in the
modem era - what Mumford called the megatechnical phase - that
technology becomes separated from other forms of making and associ-
ated principally with science, progress and capitalism for the wholesale
(in more than one sense) domination of nature. But to conceive of
modem, let alone premodern, technology, as a mere instrument, as a
means to an end which "man" needs to "master," is mistaken, or rather
"merely correct," and not true, Heidegger argues, for the truth of tech-
nology lies in its "essence." But how do we uncover its essence? "We
must ask," he goes on, "What is the instrumental itself? Within what
do such things as means and end belong?" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 6).
This is Heidegger's way of asking, "In what context does technology,
do means and ends, arise?", and the context is the idea of cause and effect.
In Aristotle's view, as Heidegger points out, causation was fourfold:
causa materia/is, the material cause, causaformalis, formal cause, causa
finalis, final cause, and causa e.fficiens, efficient cause. As an example
he adduces the making of a silver chalice: the material cause is the silver,
the matter out of which the chalice is made; the formal cause is the shape
into which the silver is cast; the final cause is the end or purpose, say
a ritual, for which the chalice is made; and the efficient cause is the
silversmith who actually brings the chalice into being - effects it. Until
the sixteenth century the Aristotelian idea of causality held sway, only
to be seriously challenged by modem scientists like Galileo, who argued
in effect that only material and efficient, and to some degree formal, cau-
sations were operative in the objective world, and that final causation
- purpose, teleology - was the subjective projection of human con-
sciousness onto nature, no more valid than myth. Thus Galileo's doctrine
of primary and secondary qualities by establishing that only quantifi-
able phenomena were objective, in effect removed questions of quality,
especially questions of value, from the "real" realm of nature. Therefore
the modem world, whose dominant form of discourse is that of science
and technology, has come to understand causation in a more limited form
than did the classical one. Indeed, Heidegger argues, as have E. A.
Burtt and Mumford, that modernity thinks primarily in terms of one
cause: "The causa efficiens, but one among the four cases, sets the
standard for all causality" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 7). But not even the
classical doctrine of four causes, let alone the modem ideal of one, is
520 DANIEL R. WHITE
sufficient to uncover the essence of causality, according to Heidegger.

"What we call cause [Ursache] and the Romans called causa is called
aition by the Greeks, that to which something else is indebted [das,
was ein anderes verschuldet]" (7). So he would have us see that the
Aristotelian causes" ... are the ways, all belonging at once to each other,
of being responsible for something else" (7).
To say that forms of causation are various, interrelated ways of
"being responsible" may sound odd to modem ears, conditioned by the
separation between primary and secondary qualities, as by the cultural
convention of subject and object which sees the human cogito as the
sole possessor of mind and, hence, ethical sensibility - being respon-
sible - in nature; for how could attributing responsibility to the
supposedly "natural" processes of causation not sound strange, eccentric,
at best poetic? However, from the postmodem-ecological viewpoint
Heidegger has reopened the question of causality, and with it the ideas
of technology and nature, to new, more viable possibilities than those
available within the closed universe of modem discourse. How does he
reopen these key ideas?
Heidegger argues in a vein that is virtually hylozoistic, as much of
Hellenic thought was before, during and after the Greek Enlightenment
of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Hylozoism - from the roots hule,
"matter," and zoe, "life," - is the belief that nature, even matter, is
alive. More broadly it is the attribution of characteristics of the living
to what later, more enlightened ages have considered to be dead. It is
often associated with the "poetic" or "mythological" elements of early
Greek thought, and considered akin to notions like that of anthropo-
morphism and the pathetic fallacy, both attributing not only living but
also human characteristics to nature. Heidegger, in the present discus-
sion, appears to be guilty of this fallacy, if modem scientific thought is
correct; but from the viewpoint (ever tentative) of postmodem ecology
he is not so much guilty as creatively sinful. For postmodem-ecolog-
ical thought the phenomena of life and mind are inseparable, for mind,
to borrow a phrase from Heidegger, "comes to presence" (anwesen) as
variegating patterns of life in relationship - in evolution, in culture, in
poetry. The Archaic Greek view is evident, still, in the title of Aristotle's
De Anima, On the Soul, whose Greek title, Peri Psyches or On the Psyche
clearly reveals a convergence between the ideas of mind and life. For
the word psyche, like its Latin translation anima (compare the Sanskrit
atman), is related to "breath," or the life-principle animating the body;
hence "animals," are "alive." So Heidegger's view is at once archaic

and incipiently postmodem, in that it reopens the idea of nature to the
idea of mind, and the idea of mind to that of nature as a rising-into-
presence, as Derrida suggests in his Heidegger and the Question of Spirit:
In its most proper essence, as the poet and thinker allow it to be approached, Geist is
neither Christian Geistlichheit nor Platonic-metaphysical Geistigheit.
What is it, then? What is Geist? In order to reply to this question in an affirmative
mode, still listening to Trakl, Heidegger invokes flame (Derrida, 1989, p. 6).
The "flame" of nature, Derrida argues, has three traits. First, it does
not reject out of hand spirit's traditional association with breath: spirit
as spiritus and pneuma. "Rather," says Derrida, "[Heidegger] derives
it, he affirms the dependence of breath, wind, respiration, inspiration,
expiration, and sighing in regard to flame. It is because Geist is flame
that there is pneuma and spiritus. But spirit is not first, not originarily
pneuma or spiritus" (97). Second, Derrida argues that Heidegger's Geist
involves the notion of "originary meaning" (Urspriingliche Bedeutung)
in the German idiom gheis. Third, "In the affirmative determination of
spirit - spirit in flames - the internal possibility of the worst is already
lodged. Evil has its provenance in spirit itself," Derrida says (97). It is
in this "spirit in flames" rising up to presence as naturelphysis and ani-
mating its body that we should understand Heidegger's hylozoism and
his idea of mind animating nature, technology and poetry.
In Greek poiesis, the responsible ushering of beings into presence
(Anwesen), is a form of revealing their "truth," which Heidegger under-
stands as the Greek aletheia. This term should not be translated simply
as "truth," he contends, but rather as "revealing" (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 12). In his Early Greek Thinking Heidegger argues at length that
aletheia is a privative form related to the Greek verb lanthanomai, "to
hide," so that a-letheia means "unbidden" or, alternatively, revelation out
of a state of being unrevealed - a light appearing out of darkness. Thus
poetic techne reveals objects, lets them come to presence, lets them be,
with respect for their own truth, their own revelation. This is a freedom
reserved for human beings only, and typically for only a certain race
and gender at that, in the Western tradition, but Heidegger insists on it
for all beings. Many technologists, of course, have a very different
view.
The revelation effected by modem technology, " . . . does not
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis," Heidegger argues.
522 DANIEL R. WHITE
"The revealing that rules in modem technology is a challenging

[Herausfordern] which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it
supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such" (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 14). Science, which establishes "truth" for modern technology, func-
tions, to supplement Heidegger's criticisms with those of critical socialist
theory, as the ideological arm not only of technology but of the class
and gender interests who wield it. The ideological task of science is to
"define" nature or society, whatever its objects, as what Heidegger calls
"standing reserve" (Bestand). This lays the groundwork for instrumental
technology's "challenge" to nature. How convenient for entrepreneurial
power that physics defines nature as transformations of "energy," a
phenomenon conceived as value neutral and not subject to ethical con-
sideration! This means, by definition, that all of nature can be transformed
into standing reserve ready to be exploited for power and profit - exis-
tentialists, Romantics, Greeks, postmodern ecologists and other hylozoists
notwithstanding: the world according to General Electric.
Indeed Heidegger argues that the challenging of nature and defining
it as standing reserve also defines the human subject in a new way: "That
challenging gathers man into ordering," he says. "We now name that
challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing
as standing-reserve: 'Ge-stell' (Enframing]" (19). Technological man
becomes the enframer of nature as standing reserve, as "resource," for
technological exploitation, and is himself in danger of being turned into
standing reserve.
Nevertheless, Heidegger finds locked within the enframing challenge
of modern technology the original kinship to poiesis, the ground from
which megatechnics sprang. And here he finds hope. So he says, citing
Holderlin, "Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest
sense: But where danger is, grows/The saving power also." "To
Save," argues Heidegger, here means "to fetch something home into its
essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine
appearing" (28). Because Enframing is, at its root, a process of revealing
- even though it is a form of revealing which obscures the rising-into-
presence of phenomena out of hiding and represents them literally and
one-dimensionally as standing reserve - it cannot completely divorce
itself from its root, its essence, the truth which is aletheia.
"Only what is granted endures. That which endures primarily out of
the earliest beginning is what grants," Heidegger argues. Technology's
essence, no matter how pervasive its hold, should thus also be consid-
ered as an "essencing," and so subject to the conditions of "enduring,"
most importantly of "being granted." "The granting that sends it one way
or another into revealing is as such the saving power," Heidegger says.
"Thus the coming to presence of technology harbors in itself what we
least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power." Thus, he con-
cludes, "Everything, then, depends upon this: that we ponder this arising
and that, recollecting, we watch over it" (32).
EXISTENCE, DISCOURSE AND EVOLUTION
The dependency of any "essencing," human or technological, on being

"granted," as well as the human essence's dependency on "being spoken
to," reveals an important connection between Heidegger's thinking, on
the one hand, and that of Jacques Derrida and Gregory Bateson, on the
other. For, "being spoken to" as a condition of "ek-sisting" suggests
that "man" "rises into presence" out of discourse, as Derrida would
say, and the idea that technology is dependent for its being, just as any
other essence, on granting can be restated as interdependency of organism
and environment in evolutionary ecology, as Bateson would have it:
more synthetically yet, "man" and "technology" "rise into presence" or
"appear" as forms of evolutionary-ecological discourse, as part of the
conversation of the biosphere's "mind," if we understand "mind" as the
"rising flame," the dynamic flux of breath, of "spirit," as Derrida does
in his aforementioned discussion of Heidegger. This means, in tum,
that the answer to the question concerning technology, or to the ecological
crisis, or to the aporias of modernism versus postmodemity, must come
from a discourse that is not, strictly, "human," or not anthropocentric.
As Heidegger suggests,
The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possi-
bility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself
only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter
this danger.... But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be
of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it (1977,
pp. 33-34).
This "reflection" I take to be the postmodem-ecological discourse, which

is "kindred" to the "saving" power of "nature's" "higher essence," the
evolving languages, written in the phenotypes and genotypes of organ-
524 DANIEL R. WHITE
isms and their environments in coevolution: what Bateson called the

higher logical type where evolutionary learning interfaces with the
process of human speciation and identity formation, where the discourses
of "nature" and "culture" meet: Learning IV, "the combination of phy-
logenesis with ontogenesis" ("The Logical Categories of Learning and
Communication," Bateson, 1987, pp. 279-308, 293; see below).
As Don Ihde argues regarding ecology and Heidegger's "existential
phenomenology" in Technology and Lifeworld,
Phenomenology, particularly with respect to its existentialization of bodily existence, is
a kind of philosophical ecology. But it is an ecology with one difference: The "organism"
which is to be studied is not and cannot be studied "from outside" or from above because,
in this case, we are it (1990, p. 25).
Thus arises Heidegger's argument in "The Origin of the Work of Art"

that the key to human being is Entschlossenheit, "unclosedness,"
openness unconstrained by the boundaries of the Cartesian subject: "The
resolute-ness [Entschlossenheit] intended in Being and Time is not the
deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out
of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being" (Heidegger,
1971, p. 67). In spite of Heidegger's tendency to prioritize Being and
hypostatize nature as "rising into presence," and thus to invoke the meta-
physics of presence criticized by Derrida in Of Grammatology, if we
understand human being, Dasein, as being open (Entschlossenheit) to
Being as physis, nature rising into presence, then "human existence" is
opened to the evolution of Geist understood, once again in Derrida's
sense, as "spirit in flames," or in Bateson's as the evolutionary-ecolog-
ical mind. That both Heidegger and Bateson sometimes "freeze" the flame
in order to discuss it may be a failing in their works, or one insepa-
rable from "human being" understood, in Derrida's terms, as the closure
of discourse to the play of differance. Nevertheless, this play -not Being
or Spirit or Mind - is in postmodern ecological discourse what escapes
when the Cartesian self is unlocked.
Ultimately, in any case, the convergence between ecological and
hermeneutical discourses, which becomes evident when Heidegger's work
is read in the context of Bateson's ramified by Derrida's, creates a new
phenomenology of "lifeworld" as "ecoworld," where the phenomena, the
aesthetics, of "human" existence give way to those of an expanded eco-
logical mind, merging poiesis and evolution.
THE POETRY OF EVOLUTION: STEPS TOWARD

AN ECOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
In the Introduction to Steps to an Ecology of Mind, "The Science of Mind

and Order," Bateson argues that there are two broad domains of scien-
tific and philosophical enquiry in the Western tradition, that concerning
matter-energy, forces and impacts, the domain of physics and entropic
systems, on the one hand, and that of difference, quality, heterogeneity,
natural variety, negative entropy, information, what should be the domain
of the life and social sciences, as well as the humanities, on the other.
The realm of information he calls form, that of entropy substance. He
argues that the task of science is to build a bridge between the funda-
mentals of theory, whether they concern substance or form, and
behavioral data. His thesis is that behavioral scientists, in the develop-
ment of their disciplines, have made a fundamental error:
... they have tried to build a bridge to the wrong half of the ancient dichotomy between
form and substance. The conservative laws for energy and matter concern substance rather
than form. But mental process, ideas, communication, organization, differentiation, pattern,
and so on, are matters of form rather than substance (Bateson, 1987, p. xxvi).
Bateson therefore is concerned with, " ... building a bridge between

the facts of life and behavior and what we know today of the nature of
pattern and order" (xxvi).
Provocatively for the development of poststructuralist theory, more-
over, Bateson concentrates on the notion of difference to develop his
concept of order and pattern and ultimately mind, for he argues that
"A difference which makes a difference is an idea" ("Double Bind, 1969,"
Bateson, 1987, pp. 271-308, 272). If we supplement and transform
Bateson's evolutionary idea in terms of Derrida's differance, then the
static cybernetic model on which Bateson's picture of natural history is
based becomes, like Heidegger's presence, "spirit in flames"- a rekin-
dled Heraclitean fire. Heraclitus says, "They do not comprehend how a
thing agrees at variance with itself; it is an attunement turning back on
itself, like that of the bow and lyre" (ou xuniasin hokos diapheromenon
houtoi homologeei; palintropos harmonie hokosper toxou kai lures-
Fragment LXXVIII, Kahn, 1979, p. 65). A more literal rendering of
the key phrase, hokos diapheromenon houtoi homologeei, is "how a thing
differing agrees with itself," or perhaps better, "how a thing by dif-
fering agrees with itself." This last translation is very close to one of
the central concepts of cybernetics. As Bateson explains,
526 DANIEL R. WHITE
Information, in a technical sense, is that which excludes certain alternatives. The machine
with a governor does not elect the steady state; it prevents itself from staying in any
alternative state; and in all such cybernetic systems, corrective action is brought about
by difference. In the jargon of the engineers, the system is "error activated." The differ-
ence between some present state and some "preferred" state activates the corrective
response ("A Re-examination of Bateson's Rule," 1987, p. 381).
That is, the cybernetic system corrects itself by differing; it brings itself
into agreement with some preferred state by responding to differences
from that state. In Heraclitean terms, it agrees with itself by differing.
This is precisely how one might describe a living system as evolving,
except that an evolutionary system is morphogenic instead of morpho-
static like a steam engine with a governor or a heat pump with a
thermostat.
The evolving system maintains a dynamic variable called survival, a
preferred state to be sure, through genetic differentiation to be corrected
by the "stress" of natural selection, which transmutes the genetic code
and hence enhances the differences in phenotypes of the subsequent
generation. But as we have seen, Bateson argues in "The Role of Somatic
Change in Evolution," what is "preferred" in evolution is an "economics
of flexibility which operates inside the individuals" and "an economics
of variability which operates at the population level" (1987, p. 357). A
poststructuralist tum in evolutionary theory might be affected by sub-
stituting Derrida's "play of differance" for the economics of flexibility
or variability, for the so-called "preferred state" of the population or
organism, thus freeing the cybernetic model from its digital, even if
dialectical, polarization between static states, preferred versus not-
preferred. To do this however would require that we change our tech-
nological thinking from a digital, logical, instrumental discourse toward
an analogic one. To do this would require a complete rethinking of our
technology and science, however, for as Bateson argues,
There is, in fact, almost no formal theory dealing with analogue communication and, in
particular, no equivalent of Information Theory or Logical Type Theory. This gap in formal
knowledge is inconvenient when we leave the rarified world of logic and mathematics and
come face to face with the phenomena of natural history [where] communication is
rarely either purely digital or purely analogic (1987, p. 291).
Bateson likes to invoice Pascal's aphorism, "Le coeur a ses raisons que
la raison ne connait point," "The heart has its reasons which the
reason does not at all perceive" (139). The language of the heart is, in
Bateson's view, a purely analogic yet highly precise form of discourse
that is not traditional theory and is much more like art. This is because
of its analogic form and its rejection of digital binding through abstrac-
tion and dichotomizing between subject and object, signifier and
signified.
Indeed, this is also where Heidegger's theory interfaces, rhizomi-
cally intertwines, with Bateson's, in what he admits to be the unexplored
analog realm, verging on what critics call "art" or "poiesis." As Bateson
goes on to explain about the "algorithms of the heart,"
It is not only that the conscious mind has poor access to this material, but also the fact
that when such access is achieved, e.g., in dreams, art, poetry, religion, intoxication,
and the like, there is still a formidable problem of translation (1987, p. 139).
If poststructuralism is in fact a new form of analog art, merging theory

and poiesis, then the well-known problems in translating it for the unini-
tiated should be expectable. In fact, Derrida's original attack on Levi
Strauss' structuralism in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of
the Human Sciences," may be read as an attempt (successful if you're
"intoxicated" with poststructuralism) to undermine the last refuge of
the platonizing, digitalizing cogito in the realm of "the structurality of
structure." Once it is established that structuralism is an attempt to encode
every aspect of culture by analogy with the Saussurian code of lin-
guistic differences, the concept of structure itself becomes an object of
scrutiny. Isn't it too just another differentiation in an endless chain of
signifiers? Then what gives it metastructural, hierarchical status? What
allows it to embody the structurality of structure? The myth of expla-
nation is the answer, if Derrida is right, and as far as he's concerned that's
just one more story. But stories, if Bateson is correct, are the very pattern
of evolution, and our civilization is in danger of editing itself out of
the epic cycles of natural history exactly because it is insistent upon
digitalizing everything, subordinating it to the Cartesian cogito. Thus
poststructuralism, if it is more than just critique, is an new form of theory-
art, a new poiesis, that is postmodern because it is built on the critique
of and creative leap beyond the world of modernity encased in the tech-
nological prison of the self.
Postmodern-ecological poiesis arises from the realization, prompted
by discourses like Bateson's or Heidegger's, that the Derridean and, more
broadly, poststructuralist critique should not be limited to the social
sciences and the humanities, but should extend its branches, as Donna
Haraway and Stanley Salthe are doing, to natural science and tech-
528 DANIEL R. WHITE
nology as well; that the play of "human" writing that is postmodem art
must no longer be demarcated, as it had been in the dualistic mind of
Modernism, from the larger play of evolution. Thus Heidegger's call
for a rethinking of the question concerning technology can be understood
as a call for a new poiesis of living, postmodem ecological theory-art-
practice.
Bateson's "steps to an ecology of mind" become those toward a post-
modem discourse because they bridge the Cartesian divide between the
res cogitans or "man" and res extensa or "nature," the correlative dualism
between "mind" and "body," and the Freudian demarcation between the
"conscious" and "unconscious." If Bateson is right, "man" and "nature"
as well as "mind" and "body" are moments in the great spiral of dif-
ferences, wrongly separated from one another and hypostatized as
independent realities. Indeed, as his student Anthony Wilden points out
in terms of Lacan, for Bateson the distinction between "conscious" and
"unconscious" is one between modes of language, digital and analog
respectively, in "human" discourse. "Human" must be put into quota-
tion marks because "man" is a concept of the conscious mind: the cogito's
self-demarcation from the "other" of nature and the permutations
of dream, ritual, art, of the "unconscious" mind, of the brain or the
biosphere, where demarcations between self and other break down.
This is the realm where logic and metaphor intertwine. Consider
Bateson's comments in his "Metalogue: Why a Swan?" The question
at hand, which the Daughter puts to the Father (Patriarch?) in the
metalogue, concerning a ballerina's interpretation of a swan, is about
the dancer and what she signifies as she dances:
D: But what about the dancer? Is she human? Of course she really is, but, on the stage,
she seems inhuman or impersonal- perhaps superhuman. I don't know.
F: You mean - that while the swan is only a sort of swan and has no webbing between
her toes, the dancer seems only sort of human.
D: I don't know- perhaps it's something like that.
***
F: No - I get confused when I speak of the "swan" and the dancer as two different
things. I would rather say that the thing I see on the stage - the swan figure - is
both "sort of' human and "sort of' swan (1987, p. 33).
The point is that the dancer is undergoing a transformation from one kind
of discourse to another, from a logical one that separates to a metaphor-
ical one that joins.
Thus ultimately Bateson "steps" across the divide between one form
of discourse and another, from the "human" to the "swan," from "reality"
to "pretend," from logic to metaphor, from univocal patriarchal authority
to polyvocality. This series of steps, moreover, is isomorphic with the
larger processes of Steps to an Ecology of Mind, wherein the processes
of "human" communication merge with those of evolutionary ecology,
those of "culture" with those of "nature," those of "subjective" with
"objective" and, finally, those of "phenomenology" with "ecology," in
the constitution of a new Gaian lifeworld.
University of Central Florida
WORKS CITED
Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Johnathan Barnes. 2 vol. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
Bateson, Gregory, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1987).
Burtt, E. A., The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1980).
Derrida, Jacques, "Differance." Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-27.
Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology. Trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Derrida, Jacques, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington
and Rachel Bowlry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
Derrida, Jacques, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,"
Writing and Difference. Ed., trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978), pp. 278-300.
Descartes, Rene, Discourse on Method and Meditations. Trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (New York:
Penguin, 1985).
Edie, James M., Edmund Husser/'s Phenomenology: A Critical Commentary (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987).
Haraway, Donna J., Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York:
Routledge, 1991).
Havelock, Eric A., Preface to Plato (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Heidegger, Martin, Early Greek Thinking. Trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technology & Other Essays. Trans., ed.
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
Heidegger, Martin, "The Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, Language & Thought. Trans.
Albert Hoftstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 17-87.
Ihde, Don, Technology and Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington: Indiana
Kahn, Charles H. ed., trans., The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge
530 DANIEL R. WHITE
Mumford, Lewis, The Myth of the Machine. 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt, 1970).
Plato, Symposium. Ed. Kenneth Dover. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Pribram, Karl, Languages of the Brain: Paradoxes and Principles in Neuropsychology
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971 ).
Salthe, Stanley N., Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
White, Daniel R., Postmodern Ecology (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1998). Forthcoming.
Wilden, Anthony, The Rules Are No Game: The Strategy of Communication (New York:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987).
Wilden, Anthony, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. Second
Edition (London: Tavistock, 1980).
W. KIM ROGERS
ON THE MODE OF BEING OF

LIVING BEINGS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT
Preliminary Ideas for an Ecological Approach in Philosophy
We may describe our present task as the establishing of a starting point

for theoretical biology or a philosophy of living beings utilizing an eco-
logical approach. The term "ecological" here draws its meaning from
the provenience of its original use by biologists and behavioral scientists.
Consider, for example, the following recent statement by biologists
Bogan, Harper, and Townsend, who define ecology as "the scientific
study of the interactions between organisms and their environment." 1 It
is in terms then of this, its primary meaning, that I describe philosophy
as displaying an ecological approach, and not the secondary, derived -
and to a large extent, popular - meaning as found in the expression
"ecological ethics."
First, let us look briefly at the use hitherto of an ecological or similar
approach in philosophy and the human sciences. With the publication
of Umwelt und Innerwelt des Tiere (1909), Uexkull did not merely add
a new word to the scientific vocabulary of our age (e.g., "Umwelt"),
but introduced in biology a new way of approaching an understanding
of life in terms of the relations of living beings and their environment.
In Uexkull's view, all living beings, from the simplest to the most
complex, are fitted into their unique worlds, and likewise, these worlds
completely match the unique structure and functions of each different
sort of living being. As he put it in his most mature and succinct for-
mulation in the monograph "A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals
and Men": "The subject and object are dovetailed into one another, to
constitute a systematic whole .... " 2 Dubos' more recent description of
life adds but little: "life manifests itself only in the form of complex struc-
tures in which a host of mutually dependent processes are integrated
according to an orderly and unique pattern."3
In philosophy, a similar approach is to be found in Ortega's philos-
ophy of vital reason. In fact, from 1913 on, he said, he had turned to
the works of Uexkull for aid in presenting to his fellow Spaniards the
idea of "my life" as the fundamental reality. In Ortega's view, life is from
its beginning and fundamentally a "unitary duality." 4 "I find myself,"
531
A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/l, 531-547.

532 W. KIM ROGERS
he wrote, "as part of a dual fact whose other part is a world.

Between the world and self there is no priority; neither comes first, but
both come at the same time. Nor is the one or the other nearer us, we
do not first take account of ourselves and then of what lies about us. " 5
Starting with "my life," Ortega presented thus a new interpretation of
what is, of the way of being of a living being and its environment, as
"the mutual and reciprocal existing of man and world. " 6
However, as he had already pointed out in What is Philosophy? "my
life" cannot be just described as the coexistence of self and world, for
the ancient concepts of being, existing, are too static. Coexistence seems
to imply only that the world and I stand beside one another. Rather "to
live is what we do and what happens to us. " 7 As he wrote five years
later in his "Preface for Germans," "Things happen to me just as I happen
to them, and neither has a primary reality other than that determined
by this reciprocal event."8 My life, he declared, is "a dynamic dialogue
between I and my circumstance."9 In Ortega's philosophy of vital reason,
there appears for the first time what we may describe as an ecological
approach in philosophy. 10
However, Dewey was the first philosopher to see the usefulness for
his own philosophy of the development of an ecological science in bio-
logical studies. "Ecology," he wrote, "is full of illustrations of the
interactional ... and it is still fuller of illustrations of the transactional," 11
where there is less emphasis on the separated participants and more on
the full situation of organism-environment.
In Dewey's view, "no organism is so isolated that it can be understood
apart from the environment in which it lives." 12 Wherever there is life,
as he stated in Reconstruction in Philosophy, "it does something to the
environment as well as has something done to itself." 13 Indeed, he con-
tinued, "the interaction of organism and environment ... is the primary
fact, the basic category. " 14 Living "is always an inclusive affair involving
connection, interaction.... " 15
In particular, the organism's behavior "involves organism and envi-
ronmental objects jointly at every instant of their occurence .... " 16 And
its experience "is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction
of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a
transformation of interaction into participation and communication." 17
One should "treat all of his behavings, including his most advanced
knowings, as activities not of himself alone, nor even as primarily his." 18
AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PHILOSOPHY 533
It should also be noted that sinologist Roger Ames in collaboration

with philosopher David Hall recently have begun developing, as an alter-
native to the modem tradition in Western thought, a similar approach
to those already mentioned. However, they have drawn heavily upon
Eastern thought - Confucianism, Taoism - under the (mistaken) impres-
sion that there were no Western sources available, beyond some ideas
of Whitehead, upon which to develop a "holistic" view of human beings
and world.
Ames suggests in particular taking polarity as it is understood in Taoist
materials as a starting point for thinking about the relations between
the different elements in a situation. "Polarity," he writes, "indicates
the nature of the relationship that obtains between two or more events
which are correlatively related, each requiring the other for adequate artic-
ulation ... as a necessary condition for being what it is .... " 19 "A
polar explanation of relationships gives rise to ... a world of 'foci'
characterized by interconnectedness, interdependence, openness, mutu-
ality, indeterminateness, complementarity, correlativity, coextensive-
ness."20 Certainly the approach of Ames and Hall resonates in some
important ways with the ecological approach to be found in the philos-
ophy of vital reason in Ortega, and Dewey's ecological interpretation
of the full situation of organism-environment, their connection and
interaction.
In the late '30's in psychology, Kurt Goldstein, like Ortega and Dewey,
rejected any interpretation of the organism's behavior which treated it
as an isolated entity, or, as was the procedure hitherto followed in most
biological studies, relied solely upon an atomistic reduction of the
organism and its behavior to its parts, their capacities and conditions. The
approach Goldstein took was to understand the mode of being and the
action of living beings in terms of what he called the organism-envi-
ronment unit, the "true unitary pattern of life in which the person and
his environment are interwoven ... ,"21 and their mutual existing in
and through interaction. More exactly, he can be said to have viewed
organism and environment as poles of an interactive event-series or as
engaged in mutual and reciprocal processes. Specifically, all the per-
formances of the organism, whether normal or abnormal, are only
expressions of the organism's attempt to come to terms with the world
in which it lives. It must not be forgotten then that "each organism
lives in a world which by no means contains only such stimuli as are
534 W. KIM ROGERS
adequate for it. It lives not merely in its 'own environment' but in a world
in which all possible sorts of stimuli are present and act upon it. The
organism must cope with this 'quasi-negative' environment."22
The nature of the organism for Goldstein refers to "the essentials for
the occurence of an adequate relationship between the organism and its
environment."23 Further, such a relation of adequacy between the demands
of the environment and the capacities of the organism is one that "cor-
responds in principle to the self-realization of the normal individual. " 24
To realize one's "self," one's "nature," means for him that in this situ-
ation and in a limited way the organism adequately responds to its
environment's demands. The kind of environment it lives in will deter-
mine just what capacities of the organism are requisite for its coping with
its environment. The organism's structure, that is, parts which functionally
belong together, is such that it makes possible performances which are
the fulfillments of the requirements of its environment. Its structure is
"best understood as the result of a process of adequation of the organism
to the environment." 25 The thus acquired structure of the organism is
hence not something contained within the organism but rather is actu-
alized between the organism and its environment. The organism will
not exist or be itself by itself: "the experience of 'being,' of realizing
our nature ... is possible only in a genuine unity with the other [human
being] and with the world." 26
In the 1970's, some American cognitive psychologists began to explore
what they explicitly called an ecological way of thinking about the
mode of existing of living beings and their environment. To begin with,
this new development in psychology was led by J. J. Gibson, and was
focused upon problems related to perception, especially visual percep-
tion. To someone familiar with Ortega's works, Gibson certainly seems
often to be viewing life in a similar way. Gibson took as the starting point
for his studies of perception the mutuality of living being and environ-
ment which "make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other.'m
In perception, Gibson held, the modern conception of perceiving as
involving the separate perceiving of observer and environment is not
merely unnecessary but mistaken. Perception of self and perception of
environment do not belong to separate realms of subjective and objec-
tive experience, but go together. All perceptual activity provides
information not only about the perceiver's environment, but also about
the perceiver. "Perception of the environment is always accompanied
by co-perception of the self." 28 "Each kind of information implies the
other ... "for these "two sources of information co-exist ... one could
not exist without the other."29 For example, transformations of parts of
the environment specify the perceiver's own movements. This is wholly
inconsistent with epistemological dualism in any form, that is, with
there being two independent objects of knowledge, one "subjective"
and the other "objective" in character.
Further, from Gibson's point of view, an ontological dualism which
would separate the "physical" from the "mental," which supports the view
that one has a sensation-based (and non-meaningful) perception of a thing
to which is mentally later added a meaning, is uncalled for and, indeed,
wrong. "The possibilities of the environment and the way of life of the
animal go together inseparably."30 Similarly structured environments
will have different affordances, that is, offer facilities and difficulties,
for different sorts of living beings. What something affords "is neither
an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like .
. . . It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior.'m
Affordances are not properties of the experience of an observer, but
are invariant properties of a thing "taken in reference to an observer.'m
They are ecological properties. 33 Moreover, the affordances of an envi-
ronment of any living being could be the same for all similar beings.
In so far as the environment has a persisting substantial layout, it sur-
rounds all potential observers of the same species in the same way. 34
The modem view that the experience of each observer is private and/or
unique hence must be simply mistaken.
In the 1980's, a British social psychogist, John Shotter, stated that
he shall follow Gibson and "adopt essentially an ecological approach," 35
in which human beings and their world, i.e., Umwelt, their effective envi-
ronment, are regarded as existing only in reciprocal relation to one
another, as mutually constitutive and mutually defining. In his views
he does not just appear to also be using Uexkull as an aid in presenting
his own ideas as Ortega did, but explicitly relates his understanding of
an ecological approach to the ideas of Uexkull's "A Stroll through the
Worlds of Animals and Men" (1957).
Shotter considers as mistaken the Cartesian and indeed general modem
belief in ourselves as existing from birth as "separate, isolated individ-
uals containing 'minds' or 'mentalities' wholly within us, set over against
an 'external' material world." 36 Specifically, it is his intention to repu-
diate the Cartesian starting point for scientific research, the "I" located
within the individual. "There is," he declares, "no such thing as 'a self'
536 W. KIM ROGERS
within people to be investigated."37 He replaces this "inner," foundational

beginning by instead taking as basic the processes going on "between"
people and the affairs which comprise their Umwelt, and also the prac-
tical social processes going on "between" people.
Shatter holds that living beings act in accord with what their envi-
ronment or Umwelt offers or demands of them - an environment which
takes form precisely from the sorts of actions which their organic struc-
ture makes possible:
An animal's responses select and constitute the very stimuli to which they are, within a
forming co-ordination, the responses. But the selectivity is not just one-way. For, just
as the animal's activity works (by making differences) to specify which of all the con-
ditions in the environment at large (if any) constitutes a response's proper stimulus, so
the conditions selected will work back upon the animal to specify the response's value
(by making a difference to the animal), thus to provide in a response's execution a basis
for its own further appropriate modification. 38
In other words, the interaction of a living being and its environment is

describable as reciprocal address and response, as mutual acts of con-
stitution and communication.
The approach Goldstein took, that is, to understand how living beings
exist in terms of what he called the organism-environment unit, their
mutual existing in and through interaction, is very similar to that taken
by Gibson and Shatter. The issues they considered were not just psy-
chological but ontological and epistemological, that is philosophical ones,
as all three of these psychologists recognized. They are concerned with
understanding the mode of existence of this organism-environment unit,
to use Goldstein's expression, and with the implications of that for under-
standing the nature and means of our knowledge of our environment
and ourselves.
A statement by biologist and anthropologist J. Bennett in his The
Ecological Transition may well serve as an epigraphical summary of
the foregoing and the starting point for a like approach in philosophy
as well as in the life and behavioral sciences. He writes: "Ecology ...
expresses, in a single word, the idea of all components of a milieu in
reciprocal interaction with each other."39
What makes an interpretation ecological in character is not the
presence of a certain content, but its focus upon the interactions between
living beings and their environment. The kind of interactions will vary
just as much as the living beings - types of plants, animals, etc. - and
their environment vary. To adopt an ecological approach means taking
the vital system of interactions between living beings and their envi-
ronment (natural, social, personal, spiritual, etc.) as the basic framework
for one's studies of all aspects of life.
The following six ideas set forth, in a brief way, what appear to me
to be several fundamental and interconnected aspects of the mode of
being of living beings and their environment, when we seek to under-
stand it in ecological terms.
First, in the interaction between a living being and the affairs which
comprise its circumstance, something is made which does not exist within
either, or in itself, in the making of which each comes to be comple-
mented and completed by the other. Living in a given environment is
not just a matter of the organism existing beside some affairs. Rather
it is the existing of the organism and these affairs in tension and of its
negotiations with them, of their activities inciting it to action and it doing
something about them. (On the other side, let us also recall here the
dormancy of living beings when tension between them and their envi-
ronment is completely relaxed- that is, when "nothing happens.") The
relations between living beings and their environment are dialogical rather
than individualistic, a dynamic dialogue which is characterized by
polarity and mutuality.
Neither the classical interpretation of reality as consisting of substances
which derive their reason for being and their meaning from within them-
selves, nor the modern conception of reality which reduces all reality
to individual entities and their inherent properties will do when it comes
to understanding the manner of being to be found in life. Entities in
the modern view can be described without reference to their surround-
ings or environment. Individual entities are held to possess and are
completely understandable in terms of their inherent, that is, non-rela-
tional and self-defining properties. The issue being addressed here is
not focused around methodological individualism and the profits thereby
to be realized in the quest for scientific knowledge, but rather meta-
physical individualism. That is, the issue is not how things may or may
not be best studied, but how they exist as living beings and their envi-
ronment, their mode of being.
Moreover, Descartes is deserving of special criticism because of his
attempt to find in the thinking thing a being which is certain because it
needs nothing outside itself to exist, especially not a body-machine. It
is as if he had deliberately chosen to exclude life from his account of
reality. A view of objects as things which are outside each other, in the
538 W. KIM ROGERS
sense that they exist separately, independently, and are located in dif-
ferent places and interact in ways which do not bring about any changes
in their properties, only in their motions or locations, underlies or makes
possible a mechanistic view of the physical world's order and content.
As Merchant put it, "the ontological assumption that nature is made up
of modular components or distinct parts connected in a causal nexus
that transmitted motion in a temporal sequence from part to part gives
us an image of nature as a machine." 40
All attempts to think of living beings and the affairs which comprise
their environment as solitary, separately existing, individual entities must
be foregone. As Ortega wrote in his early essay "Adam in Paradise,"
to live is to co-live, "to entangle oneself in a fine-meshed net of rela-
tionships, to support one thing upon another, to mutually nourish each
other, to get along together, to fulfill one another. " 41 The interaction of
living beings with their environment is a matter not just of one influ-
encing or reacting to the other (which is something obvious) but of
their way of being, of each being made themselves in and through their
producing of their being together.
Second, every interaction between living beings and their environment
is also an unmediated form of communication, of reciprocal "address and
response" as modes of mutual self-production-presentation. The inter-
action of a living being and one or more of the affairs which make up
its circumstance involves a direct encounter of one by the other through
which each becomes the reality it presents to the other.
G. H. Mead said of an animal's behavior that it "represents the adjust-
ment of the animal to a very definite and restricted world. The stimuli
to which the animal is sensitive and which lie in its habitat constitute that
world and answer to the possible reactions of the animal. The two fit into
each other and mutually determine each other. . . ." 42 Thus, as Shotter
comments, "the stimuli to which the animal responds also, as Mead
sees it, respond or answer back to the animal. In so doing, they deter-
mine for the animal the moment-by-moment significance or value of
its own responding, thus providing it with a moment-by-moment basis
for the further continuation of its own activity." 43
This has particular significance for epistemological issues in philos-
ophy. The modem philosophical and scientific tradition viewed reality as
consisting of individuals, that is, separate and independent entities of one
or both of two nondirectly communicating kinds: subjects and objects,
internal things or minds and external things or bodies. "Internal ...
external," "outside ... inside," "intrinsic ... extrinsic," etc., this modem
framework into which our epistemological endeavors are fitted in a
Procrustean fashion is "rationally invisible" to us, to use Shotter's phrase.
"The detachment of the thinking subject from his objects in the act of
cognitive thought," Elias wrote, "did not appear to those thinking about
it at this stage as an act of distancing but as a distance actually present,
as an eternal condition of spatial separation between a mental appa-
ratus apparently locked 'inside' man ... and the objects 'outside' and
divided from it by an invisible wall." 44 Knowledge of the outer, physical
world or of any (non-private) objectifiable aspects of the subject is
thereafter necessarily mediated in some manner, and the epistemolog-
ical endeavor comes to be focused upon the attainment of certainty rather
than veridicality.
The investigation of reality by modem philosophy and science has
hitherto been dominated by the conception of an objective world which
as known receives subjective representation within the mind of an
(ideally, uninvolved) observer. But here there is a move from the clas-
sical idea of an observer who is in direct contact with the world to a
self-observational mode in which what is observed of the world is trans-
formed into our manner of observing it. In this connection, David Hall
writes of the modem invention of "the self which serves as the medium
through which comes all experience of the external world, as well as
all experience of the objects of consciousness.... " 45 One's knowledge
of an external and material world, that is, involved a mental activity called
"thinking" that was concerned in an obscure way with producing or
considering some things called "ideas" which one was able to discover
"in" oneself by reflecting on what one had been "thinking" about - a
dualism of inner and outer, of mental and material realities. It is given
its first definitive expression in the seventeenth century, in the works
of Descartes (and its most radical expression in the transcendental
idealism of Husser! in this century).
But this Cartesian and indeed general modem belief in ourselves as
knowers existing from birth as separate, isolated individual subjects or
minds set over against an external, objective world of individual entities,
with both having only inherent properties, renders unnoticeable in expe-
rience the actual mutually constitutive and mutually presenting activities
going on between ourselves and the people and things around us. In
contrast to the modem perspective, an ecological approach finds oneself
and one's environment to be in communication, each mutually and
540 W. KIM ROGERS
reciprocally informing the other about itself through its diverse activi-
ties.
Ortega pointed out this mutual self-presenting of ourselves and affairs
in our circumstance in his commentary on Plato's Symposium: "The
fundamental meaning of being is being-towards-us .... This flower is
towards us, or towards us it is-flower. Its being is its 'flowering towards
us.' . . . Vice versa, this implies that I am towards this flower when I
see it, smell it, think it or wish it were here. The world is towards us
and we are towards the world...." 46 He expressed this same idea in a
different way in What is Philosophy?: "I consist in occupying myself
with this my world, in seeing it, imagining it, thinking about it, loving
it, hating it, being sad or being happy in it and through it, in moving
about in it, in transforming it and in suffering from it. Nothing of this
could I do if ... it were not confronting me, surrounding me, pressing
at me, manifesting itself... .''47 In the interaction between living beings
and their circumstance, each is constitutionally "open" to the meeting
of the other, each abandons its "privacy" and presents itself to the other.
What from a modern point of view one may consider mediations, e.g.,
sensorially given information, linguistic acts, are rather to be viewed
as modes of reciprocal self-production-presentation.
Third, the mutual self-presenting of living beings and the affairs of
which their environment consists necessitates that each be on the same
scale as the other. For example, by its activities a cell does not directly
address or respond to an acting organism as such. They can, when the
latter is a modern human being, interact only through the mediation of
some instrumentation by which the apparent scale of the former is altered.
Thus as such the cell and the organism do not exist on the same eco-
logical scale. The case is the same as regards an organism and a galaxy.
Sameness or differentiation of affairs by scale in fact here has only an
ecological significance. One the one hand, differences in scale are not
just a matter of proportionate size, of the relation of large to small or vice
versa, but of the relation of living beings to their environment as over
against that which does not as such belong to that environment. On the
other hand, all living and nonliving affairs that interact as such, or interact
with at least one of the affairs as such making up the environment of a
living being, are on the same scale as each other.
Since the publication of Descartes' Discourse on Method, at least,
the modern approach has been to divide whatever it takes as a problem
into as many parts as possible "as is required to solve them best." Objects
and any objectifiable (non-private) aspect of the subject are taken to

be either wholes or parts, with an understanding of the properties and
activity of the wholes being dependent upon knowing the permanent
properties and causal efficacy of the parts, and there being a hierarchy
of objects based upon their different causal powers to effect a change
in the location, state, or behavior of other objects.
An analysis of the organism in terms of whole and parts, however,
is incomplete whenever it overlooks the ecological significance of scale.
What can count as a part of the organism in terms of its relations with
its environment will be a feature or function which is on the same scale
as the organism as such. Further, to affirm, as many have done, that
the organism as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts is to place
these on different scales. This assertion cannot therefore tell us anything
about the organism or its parts, for it ignores the fact that as the parts
of an organism interacting with its environment, whole and parts are
on the same scale.
One should also note here the error of certain sorts of methodolo-
gies which seek an understanding or explanation of the organism or its
environment in terms of reducing the complex organism or affair in its
environment to its "simple parts" when the latter are not on the same
scale as this organism or affair. One does not arrive in this manner at
something simple but at new complexities, that is, multiplicities of affairs
and environments, because when you change your scale, what you have
are other structured realities. In an analogous manner, any attempted
reduction of the type "x is nothing but ... " is fallacious to the extent
that it also leaps scales.
Fourth, all the members of a vital system of interactions are deter-
mined by it as well as it is determined by them. Each, the interactional
system and its particular members, owes to the other its differentiation
and articulation, its becoming what it is. An interactional system and
its members make up a contextual unit which is "nested" within a variable
sequence of actional contexts, both up and down the scales of size and
duration. At all levels there is always contextualization, and no context,
whether superordinate or subordinate, is a cause of (explains) another
context, even though one is included in or is a component of another.
Here one must challenge the modern belief in localization in individual
entities of everything that produces specific actions and the reductionist
type of analysis to which that leads. Charles Taylor points out that
the modern conception of individual entities includes a new kind of
542 W. KIM ROGERS
localization, "the growth of forms of inwardness, in the location in

general of the properties and nature of something 'in' that thing, and
in particular, the location of thought 'in' the mind." 48 "The very notions
of subject and object in their modem sense come to be in this new
localization ... in which subject and object are separable entities. That
is, in principle - though perhaps not in fact, one could exist without
the other ... are in principle self-subsistent."49 Modem philosophy and
science have unreflectively relied upon a view of reality which Teller has
entitled "Particularism." Particularism, Teller says, holds that the world
is composed of individuals, that all properties are nonrelational proper-
ties of individuals or are relations supervening on these. 50 But, on the
contrary, though reality includes innumerable individual centers of
activity, there are no individual entities having only nonrelational prop-
erties. As Gibson wrote, "there are no atomic units of the world
considered as an environment. . . . "51 Or as Gibson's interpreter,
Lombardo, puts it, "units and relationships can be seen as coexistent
and interdependent" and "there exist multiple levels of reality because
there exist multiple levels of relationships. " 52
For example, the meaning of a symbolic action does not depend on
the act performed, or the agent, or on the members of the audience, but
upon a mutual understanding and agreement between all parties involved,
called up in and by that action. We must see this meaning, Shotter writes,
as a reality which is "between," which is "spread out in a non-locat-
able way in their world at large ... [not] in people themselves or in their
environment."53 Any given interaction of living beings and their envi-
ronment is irreducible to "simpler" and separate individual activities.
The idea that you can understand a structured reality, such as living
beings in their environment, by reducing it to its "parts" and explaining
their relations solely in terms of the inherent properties of these "parts"
is certainly wrong. However useful for scientific inquiry the intra-organic
analysis of the organism in terms of whole and parts may be when carried
out in an appropriate way, it is not merely inadequate but pernicious when
applied to the relationships of organisms and their environments. If
organism and its environment are to be regarded as a whole or unit,
then these must be viewed not as its parts but as polarities. The former
view does not allow the treatment of organism and environment in a
manner congruous with their mutuality and reciprocity, with their occa-
sional conflict as well as the complementing and completing one of the
other.
The organism-environment unit is not a "whole" of the type which

is the sum of its parts, let alone something greater than this sum. One
would not call the participants in a conversation parts of a whole - one
could call them different sides, maybe, or partners, and yet it includes
them all. The interaction between the organism and its environment is
very much like a conversation or a series of negotiations. More exactly,
one may view organism and environment as poles of an interactive event-
series or as engaged in mutual and reciprocal processes.
Modem attempts to understand the characteristics of a society as
deriving from combinations of social atoms (individuals) exemplify
where such a reductionist approach as modem philosophy and science
have pursued, lead to fallacious consequences. The model of a whole
built up solely out of and through the relating of the intrinsic features
of parts is not suited to application to living beings and their relations
to each other, or to their relations to non-living elements of their envi-
ronment. It is doubtful if it even applies on any scale to the non-living
structures of reality except in limited ways. Recent developments in
quantum physics support the view that all forms of physical reality are
between themselves so complemented and completed. For instance, all
physical realities, all living and non-living, display edges and figures
according to their original or acquired patterns of interaction with the
patterned operation of other physical realities.
Fifth, in every vital system the interaction between a living being
and one or more of the affairs comprising its circumstances results in
both being changed in some way or ways which in tum changes this vital
system. Note that repetition of the same behavior itself can lead to a
change in a vital system's members. And even a minor change on the
side of one of its members can lead to a significant change of a vital
system. Still, to persisting patterns of interaction there are correlated
persisting patterns of changes of the members of a vital system, and to
the persisting aspects of its members embedded within change, persis-
tence of their patterns of interaction. Each kind of living being's life is
to be understood as its particular, permutable system of synergistic
interactions with its environment.
Hitherto Western thought and science had relied upon a static logic
of identity and contradiction, which was applied not only to concepts and
their linguistic and mathematical expressions but also to every aspect
of reality too. Despite the tremendous usefulness of this approach in
the last two millennia, it has led to the misperception of the character
544 W. KIM ROGERS
of living beings. The issue here is not epistemological - or at least, not

immediately - but ontological. It is a question of how we think about
what is when that is a vital system and its members.
Living beings act in accord with what their world offers or demands
of them - a world which takes form precisely from the sorts of actions
which their organic structure makes possible. But living beings, besides
acting in their world, also act upon it, transforming the conditions for
their own existence, and vice versa. For recognizing that the flower which
was blooming by the wayside is the same flower as eaten by a passing
cow, thinking in terms of persistence and change is more fruitful than
in terms of identity and contradiction.
Sixth, in every vital system there is a preferentiality for order- though
not necessarily one always characterized by some sort of linearity - which
is mutually realized in all modes of interaction. In other words, there
are expressed in the behaviors of a living being and the affairs comprising
its circumstance "motives" or specific patterns of readiness for real-
izing and encountering diverse patterns of action and of the affordances
of affairs which acts anticipate. 54
Further, recognition must be given to the extraordinary parsimony
of particular human actions and experiences. The different manners in
which human organisms live, as disclosed by contemporary research in
such areas as anthropology, archeology, history, as well as clinical psy-
chology, show that particular human organisms and communities of
human organisms only act in their environment in some of the ways
human organisms are capable of acting there. Each of their preferred
actions reflects at the same time a particular restriction which they set
upon what they can do, which tends also to restrict what they can expe-
rience.
From the beginning, in modem philosophy and science the treatment
of nature shifts from a description of its structures to their operations,
from forms to forces, and as Descartes wrote in Discourse on Method,
"knowing the force and action of ... all other bodies which surround
us . . . thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and possessors of
nature." 55 Modem science took as its task the finding of a relationship
between the facts of experience and a mathematically constructed order
by which an exact and certain knowledge of regularities (laws) may be
obtained when the facts are found to be (at least statistically) isomor-
phic with that order, and instruments are developed to allow us to observe
these so found aspects of experience. This knowledge is precisely that
which enables us to effectively control the forces of nature. Note that

it is assumed that the same relations appertain to nature at all levels
and to all bodies equally. Scientific knowledge is thus knowledge of
the regular, and when possible, measureable changes in relations of bodies
or forces to which are attributed then the inherent abilities to undergo
these quantitative variations as their primary qualities, that is, as intrinsic,
inalienable and unchanging properties of these bodies or forces.
Our currently acceptable ways of making sense of our experiences
of ourselves and of our world to ourselves lead us to believe in the causal
efficacy of inherent powers or inherent structures as the necessary and
sufficient explanation of our own observed behavior. Equally, Shotter
points out, the same mode of sense-making "suggests to us a world of
locatable, isolatable, individual mobile entities in orderly cause-effect
relations to each other."56 The illusion follows that everything, we,
animals, inanimate things, must each one possess a "self" with perma-
nent, nonrelational self-defining properties, that acts on or is acted on
by the others in terms of linearly ordered, causal processes.
But if we will no longer consider this to be an acceptable account
of the way living things are and are related, then would that leave the
universe to disorder and random associations? A living being is not
originally confronted with disorder, but rather with a universe of tacit
and potential order towards which one as actor turns with expectations
of encountering in experience regularities and persisting patterns of
changes which can be coordinated with one's preferred patterns of acting
and experiencing, both innate and learned. Each affair encountered then
acts, of course, as a control upon the kind of action one will hereafter
take towards it, and each action likewise as a control upon the kind of
affair one will experience.
Six preliminary ideas have been set forth here in a brief manner as
presenting various basic and interconnected aspects of the mode of being,
living beings, and their environment, when we approach an understanding
of them in ecological terms. These ideas offer to philosophy and science
today an alternative position to the modem tradition and show up the
inadequacy of the modem "atomistic" approach which treated all entities
as separate and independent with only inherent properties. From the
perspective provided by an ecological approach, living beings cannot
be understood without reference to their environment. The modem belief
in human beings as separately and independently existing individuals,
containing "minds" wholly within, that are set over against an external
546 W. KIM ROGERS
"material" world, will not do when it comes to understanding the mode

of beings which exist only in interdependence with their environment.
East Tennessee State University
NOTES
1 M. Bogon, J. Harper, and C. Townsend, Ecology: Individuals, Populations, and
Communities, 2nd. ed. (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, 1990), p. x.

2 J. Uexkull, "A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men", in Instinctive Behavior,
Ed. by C. H. Shiller (London: Methuen, 1957), p. 10.
3 R. Dubos, The Torch of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 35.
4 J. Ortega y Gasset, "Preface for Germans", in Phenomenology and Art, ed. by Philip
Silver (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 55.
5 J. Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy? (New York: Norton, 1960), pp. 200, 219.
6 J. Ortega y Gasset, Historical Reason (New York: Norton, 1984), p. 82.
7 What is Philosophy?, p. 216.
8 "Preface for Germans", p. 67.
9 Ibid., p. 55.
1 Cf. W. Kim Rogers, "Ortega's Development of an Ecological Philosophy", in Journal
of the History of Ideas 55(3) (1994).

11 J. Dewey and A. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949),
p. 128.
12 J. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (Boston: Capricorn, 1963), p. 251.
13 J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 85.
14 Ibid., p. 87.
15 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), p. 282.
16 Knowing and the Known, p. 130.
17 J. Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 22.
18 J. Dewey, "Interaction and Transaction", Journal of Philosophy 43(19) (1946): 506.
19 R. Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature", in Environmental Ethics 8 (1986):
324.
20 Ibid., p. 325.
21 K. Goldstein, The Organism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1939), p. 198.
22 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
23 K. Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology (New York: Schocken
Books, 1963), p. 25.
24 K. Goldstein, "Health as Value", in New Knowledge in Human Values, ed. by A.
Maslow (Chicago: Gateway, 1959), p. 181.
25 The Organism, p. 108.
26 Ibid., p. X.
27 J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1979), p. 8.
28 J. J. Gibson, Reasons for Realism (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1982),
p. 391.
30 Ibid., p. 143.
31 Ibid., p. 139.
32 Ibid., p. 137.
33 Reasons for Realism, p. 404.
34 The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, p. 43.
33 J. Shotter, Social Accountability and Seljhood (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
p. 90.
36 J. Shotter, "Social Accountability and Self Specification", in Social Construction of
the Person (New York: Springer, 1985), p. 172.
37 Ibid., p. 171.
38 Social Accountability and Seljhood, p. 204.
39 J. Bennett, The Ecological Transition (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 163.
40 C. Merchant, Death of Nature (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 228.
41 J. Marias, Jose Ortega y Gasser: Circumstance and Vocation (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. 329.
42 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934),
p. 350.
43 J. Shotter, "In Conversation: Joint Action, Shared Intentionality, and Ethics", in Theory
and Psychology, in press.
44 N. Elias, The History of Manners: The Civilizing Process, Vol. I (New York: Pantheon,
1982), p. 256.
45 D. Hall, "Modem China and the Postmodem West", in Culture and Modernity, ed.
by E. Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), p. 53.
46 A. Dobson, An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 165.
47 What is Philosophy?, p. 201.
48 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 186.
49 Ibid., p. 188.
50 Teller, P., "Relativity, Relational Holism, and the Bell Inequalities", in Philosophical
Consequences of Quantum Theory, ed. by J. Cushing and E. McMullin (Notre Dame,
1989), p. 213.
51 The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, p. 9.
52 Lombardo, T., The Reciprocity of Perceiver and Environment (Hillsdale, 1987),
p. 313.
53 Social Accountability and Selfhood, p. 180.
34 Cf. Trevarthen, C., "Foundations of Intersubjectivity", in The Social Foundations of
Language and Thought, ed. by D. Olson (New York, 1980), p. 325.
55 Descartes, R., Discourse on Method (Indianapolis, 1980), p. 33.
36 Shotter, J., "Speaking Practically: Whorf, the Formative Function of Communication
and Knowing of the Third Kind", in Contextualism and Understanding in Behavioral
Science, ed. by R. Rosnow and M. Georgoudi (New York, 1986), p. 227.
INDEX OF NAMES
-A- Bergson, H. 8, 41, 144, 197-206, 210,

Aeolus 80 467
Ames, R. 533 Berkeley, G. 39
Amundsen, S. 249, 251 Biemel, W. 104, 110
Anaximander 88, 90 Biermann, W. 417
Anaximenes 90 Bingham, G. C. 303-304, 309, 312, 314
Angier, N. 471 Bismarck 470
St. Anselm 38 Blass, F. 81
St. Thomas Aquinas 38, 122-123, 380 Bleuler, M. 480
Archimedes 408 Blumenberg, H. 408
Arendt, D. 378 Boehme, J. 149, 157-158, 160, 162
Aries, P. 415 Bogon, M. 531
Aristotle 11, 37-38, 75, 85, 87, 97, 101, Bohr, N. 409
107, 117-119, 122, 124, 126, 128, Boime, A. 312-313
130, 361, 416, 519-520 Bolzano, B. 104
Artaud, A. 421 Bonner, J. T. 145
St. Augustine 38, 96, 105, 107, 336, Borges, J. L. 405
341-368, 376, 413, 475 Bouhours, Father D. 284
Austin, J. L. 209 Bourdin, P. 212
Ayala, F. J. 120 Brant, S. 468
Brentano, F. 74, 103-104, 210--211, 214,
-B- 216
Babcock, B. 459, 462 Bromwich, D. 471
Bacon, F. 39, 107, 118, 123 Bronowski, J. 410
Bakhtin, M. 476, 479 Brouwer, L. 112
Balzac, H. de 286, 301 Bruno, G. 380
Barda, F. 514 Bryant, P. J. 154, 157
Barlow, M. 206 Bryant, S. V. 154, 157
Barra!, M. R. 509 Buber, M. 328
Barrault, J.-L. 285, 297 Buddha 399
Barthes, R. 422-427, 430 Biih1er, G. 79, 81
Bateson, G. 518, 523-528 Buridan, J. 123
Battersby, C. 462 465 Burke, E. 462, 464
Baudelaire, C. 286, 292, 294, 300--301, Burtt, E. A. 519
307 Buytendijk, F. J. J. 131
Becker, H. 460, 471
Beethoven, L. van 471 -C-
Bennett, J. 536 Cabiri 241
Benton, T. H. 303 Camille, M. 460
549

550 INDEX OF NAMES
Cannon, Sir W. B. 172, 185 Dickens, C. 471

Capelle, W. 29 Diderot, D. 312
Carrington, J. 444 Diels, H. 29
Cavailles, J. 108 Diemer, A. 106
Caws, M. A. 300 Dievs 512
Celms, T. 215, 508 Dijksterhuis, E. J. 118
Chang Chung-yuan 165 Dilthey, W. 58, 74, 109, 222, 237, 245,
Chardin, T. de 373 388
Chisholm, R. M. 214 Diogenes Laertius 96
Christ-Janer, A. 311 Dionysius 275
Chuang-Tzu 401 Dioscuri 241
Cicero 78 Diotima 518
Clade), J. 301 Dobzhansky, T. 130, 145
Clark, T. J. 313 Dogen 402
Claude!, C. 288 Don Juan 275
Claude), P. 298 Driesch, H. 144
Clayson, H. 313 Droste-Hiilshoff, A. von 412
Coleridge, S. T. 21 Dubos, R. 531
Comte, A. 422 Dunne, B. J. 191, 194.
Confucius 45-47 Diirer, A. 305, 308, 314-315, 412
Conrad-Martius, H. 370, 377
Coomarswamy, A. 314 -E-
Copernicus 191, 409 Eckhart, Meister 387-395, 402
Comeille, P. 288 Edie, J. 517
Courcelle, P. 350, 363 Einstein, A. 405, 409
Cuno, J. C. 184-185 Electra 324
Elias, N. 539
-D- Elsen, A. 301
D' Annunzio, G. 295 Epicurus 78
Dante Alighieri 286, 291-292, 294-295, Ericson, M. 479
300-301 Erikson, K. 465
Danto, A. 400 Euclid 104
Dan to, G. 302 Euripedes 26
Darwin, C. 123, 145, 409
Dawkins, R. 124 -F-
Deleuze, G. 421 Fa Tsang 147
Democritus 78, 85, 118 Farber, M. 106
Derrida, J. 312, 372, 517-518, 521, 523, Fermi, E. 406
527 Feynman, R. P. 409
Desanti, J.-T. 502 Fichte, J. G. 229, 256
Descartes, R. 38, 63, 84, 107-108, Fink, E. 104, 106, 242, 450
110-111, 123, 210-212, 215, 223, Flaubert, G. 301
238, 240, 242, 250, 253-256, 258, Fleck, L. 427-428, 430-431
298, 334, 376, 409, 419-420, 537, Florensky, P. 333-335
539--540, 544 Foldeny, L. 413
Dewey, J. 532-533 Foucault, M. 333, 422-424, 464, 466, 469
INDEX OF NAMES 551
Francesca 292 Harper, J. 531

Franciscus 413 Hartmann, N. 74, 133-146, 230
Frangos, D. 79-81 Harvey, W. 409
Frege, G. 105, 107-108, 215 Hegel, G. W. F. 4, 38, 73-74, 87, 109
French, V. 145, 157 Heidegger, M. 4, 8, 41, 74-76, 87,
Freud, S. 171, 411-415, 417 109-110, 134, 215, 232, 245, 317-
Fried, M. 312 331, 370, 378, 380, 388-390, 395,
Fromm, E. 477 413, 424, 517-525, 527-528
Heimsoeth, H. 230
-G- Henry, M. 14
Gadamer, H.-G. 60 Heraclitus 3-8, 15-16, 23-29, 37, 75,
Gaia 518 88-90, 243, 247, 514, 525
Galileo 118, 123, 211,407-408, 519 Herder, J. G. 415
Galton, Sir F. 471 Hermodorus 243
Geffroy, G. 300-301 Hilbert, D. 108, 112
Gehlen, A. 251 Hippocrates 411
Georges, H. 77 Hobbes, T. 39, 123
Gerth, B. 79, 82, 88 Hofer, J. 418
Ghiberti, L. 292 Hoffmann, H. 230
Gibb, J. 354 Holderlin, F. 522
Gibson, J. J. 534-536, 542 Holton, G. 407, 409
Gilson, E. 349, 363-364 Holzweissig, F. 77-79
God 38, 106, 123, 130, 286, 322, 347, Homer 26, 80, 84
349-351, 356, 361, 363-364, 366, Hopper, E. 305, 309-310
368, 375, 380-381, 394, 417 Hopper, J. 310
Gooel, K. 108, 418 Horgan, J. 194
Goethe, J. W. von 309 Howe, E. 170-172
Goldstein, K. 533-534, 536 Hsi-tz'u 161
Goncourt brothers 302 Hugo, V. 286
Goii.i y Atienza, B. 79-81 Hui Neng 46, 48
Goode, E. 460 Hull, D. 120
Goodwin, B. C. 163 Humboldt, W. von 76-77
Gorgias 84 Hume, D. 39, 250, 333, 507
Gove, W. R. 465 Husser!, E. 33-56, 57-68, 74-75, 87,
Gsell, P. 284, 288 99-114, 103-113,117,133,144,211,
Guattari, F. 421 213, 215-217, 219-220, 223, 226-
Guitton, J. 359-360, 366 227, 229-230, 236, 238-239, -242,
Gurwitsch, A. 60, 102 244, 247, 250, 257-258, 333-338,
Gutenberg 99 367, 370-376, 409, 416, 435-444,
Giithling, 0. 87 446-447, 449-456, 476, 483-484,
486-503, 510, 517, 539
-H- Huxley, J. 120
Habermas, J. 453
Haeckel, E. 144 -1-
Hall, D. 533, 539 Icarus 292, 410
Haraway, D. 527 Ihde, D. 524
552 INDEX OF NAMES
Ingarden, R. 370 Lamarck, J.-B. de 123

Isis 463 Lambert, J. H. 71
Iskin, R. E. 313 Landgrebe, L. 60
Lao Zi 45-46
-J- Launay, M. de 502
Jacob, F. 144 Lautreamont, comte de 405
Jahn, R. G. 191, 194 Le Verrier, U. 406
James, W. 104, 167 Leeuwenhoek, A. van 174
Jankelevitch, V. 204 Leibniz, G. W. 11, 23, 38, 91, 99-114,
Jardin-Beaumets, H. du 301 365
Jaspers, K. 245, 476 Leob, J. 145
Jesus Christ 307 Leonardo da Vinci 307, 314-315, 334,
Pope John Paul II 508 409-410, 419
Jonas, H. 14, 130 Leriche, R. 422
Jonsson, I. 178-179, 184 Leucippus 85
Jowett, B. 84 Levi-Strauss, C. 527
Juan Chi 400 Levin, G. 314
Jung, C. G. 149-153, 157, 160 Levinas, E. 372, 501
Jupiter 461 Liberty 288
Lieb, J. 471
-K- Liebig, J. von 169-171
Kant, I. 39,71-73, 101-103, 107, 111- Lipps, T. 370
112, 125, 210, 223-227, 236-237, Littre, E. 422
244-246, 257-258, 272, 275, 333- Locke, J. 39, 123, 250, 310, 409
334, 337. 376, 383, 412, 462-464, Lohmar, D. 108-109
470, 477, 479 Lombardo, T. 542
Kauffman, S. A. 163 Lombroso, C. 462
Kekule von Stradonitz, F. A. 169-172, Longinus 462-464
409 Lotze, H. 104
Kepler, J. 406-408 Lubbock, Sir J. 123
Kern, I. 499 Lyotard, J.-F. 369, 371-372, 374-376,
Kierkegaard, S. 106, 237, 317-318, 382-383
320-328, 330-332, 414, 477, 479,
481-482 -M-
Kretschmer, E. 462, 470-471 Macdonell, A. A. 79, 81
Kronfeld, A. 478 Mandelbrot, B. 409
Kronos 82 Manet, E. 305-307, 312-314
Kiile, M. 508 Marcel 285
Kuhner, R. 77-79, 81-82, 88 Marcel, G. 328-329
Kuo-an Shih-yuan 398 Marias, J. 8, 244
King Mark 467
-L- Martin Algarra, M. 438
La Berma 285 Marx, K. 4
Lacan, J. 482, 528 Masson, M. 170
Lacoue-Labarthe, P. 462-463 Mathieu 324-325
Laing, R. 481 Mauclair, C. 301
INDEX OF NAMES 553
Mauner, G. 306-307 Ortega y Gasset, J. 8, 14, 134, 145,

Mayr, E. 120, 129 209, 229-248, 267-277, 531-535,
Mead, G. H. 538 538, 540
Megrabian, A. A. 480
Meijering, E. P. 359-361 -P-
Mendelejeff, D, 406 Paley, W. 123
Menge, H. 87 Panofsky, E. 308, 408
Merchant, C. 538 Paolo 292
Mercury 151, 156, 159 Paris, C. 134
Merleau-Ponty, M. 66, 69, 245,263,265, Parrnenides 247
281,284-286,336-337,390,395,500 Pascal, B. 284, 526
Michelangelo 242 Passow, F. 78, 89
King Midas 240 Pasteur, L. 177
Mill, J. S. 104 Patocka, J. 492, 497, 501, 503
Miller, J. F. 183 Pearson, C. S. 153
Mirbeau, 0. 286 Penagos, L. 79, 81
Mo Zi 45-46 Petrarch 413-414
Monod, J. 121, 144, 197-198 Phaedra 285
Montero, F. 144 Pichot, A. 197
Montgomery, W. 354 Piguet, J. C. 109
Moore, G. E. 326 Plato, 37, 75, 84-87, 97, 101, 118, 144,
Moreno Villa, J. 244 209, 309, 409, 469, 518, 540
Mozart, W. A. 471 Plessner, H. 131
Mumford, L. 519 Plotinus 350-352
Murray, A. T. 80 Pope-Hennessy, J. 315
Popper, K. 75, 407
-N- Portmann, A. 131, 153-154
Nagel, T. 61-62, 67-68 Protagoras 84-85
Nash, R. 303 Proust, A. 313
Natanson, M. 438 Proust, M. 285, 336
Natorp, P. 104 Prowazek, S. von 176-177
Nedoncelle, M. 502
Newton, I. 410, 471 -R-
Nietzsche, F. 41,327, 364-365,375-376, Racine, J. 285
469 Ramstrom, M. 178, 184
Nijinsky, V. 297-299 Rath, N. 311-312
Nisbet, J. F. 470-471 Reichelt, H. 79, 81
Nishida, K. 260-261 Reinsch, A. 370
Nitzsche, J. C. 461-462 Richir, M. 484
Ricketts, H. T. 176-177
-0- Ricoeur, P. 113, 341, 358, 480, 491, 494,
0'Donnell, J. J. 314-347, 354, 356, 502-503
364-365, 368 Rilke, R. M. 285,291-292,297,299-302
Odette 336 Robinson, T. M. 27
Odysseus 80 Rocha-Lima, H. da 176
Orestes 318, 324-325 Rockwell, N. 86
554 INDEX OF NAMES
Rodin, A. 281-302 Spencer, H. 104, 405

Rodriguez Huescar, A. 230, 238-239, Spinoza, B. 21, 38, 123
245 Spurling, L. 448
Rogozinski, J. 463-464 Stebbins, G. L. 120
Roquentin, A. 326 Stein, E. 369-386
Rosendorfer, H. 337 Stonequist, E. 459
Rosenhan, D. C. 468-469 Strasser, S. 502
Roszak, T. 469 Streider, P. 315
Roux, W. 144-145 Stumpf, C. 104
Rubin, J. H. 313 Suzuki, D. T. 400-401
Rude, F. 288-289 Swann 336
Ruse, M. E. 120 Swedenborg, E. 167-195
Russell, B. 102
Ryle, G. 210-211, 216-217 -T-
Tafel, J. F. I. 195
-S- Takiura, S. 265
Saint-Pierre, E. de 289 Tartaglia, N. F. 409
Salthe, S. 527 Taylor, C. 541
Sanborn, K. 470 Tellenbach, H. 413
Santa Claus 86 Teller, P. 542
Sartre, J.-P. 41, 134, 256-260, 317, St. Teresa of Avila 381
321-331 Thales 88, 90
Saturn 417 Torricelli, E. 406
Saussure, F. de 406 Toulemont, R. 499
Scheler, M. 66, 370 Townsend, C. 531
Schelling, F. W. J. von 127, 130 Triptolemos 86, 90
Schleiermacher, F. 84, 27 Tristan 466-467, 470
Schopenhauer, A. 41 Turner, V. W. 459-460, 467
Schr6dinger, E. 405 Tymieniecka, A-T. 127, 281-286, 288,
Schiitz, A. 435-457, 503 294, 296-297, 299-300, 303-315,
Searle, J. 215 397-402, 455, 507-516
Serres, M. 421
Sextus Empiricus 26
Shakespeare, W. 471 -U-
Shaw, B. 286 Uexkull, J. 531, 535
Unamuno, M. de 21
Shiva Nataraja 305, 310
Urlanis, B. 515
Shotter, J. 535-536, 538-539, 542, 545
Sigstedt, C. 0. 194
Simonton, D. K. 471 -V-
Simpson, G. G. 120 van Gogh, V. 471
Sisyphus 322 Vasari, G. 409
Sizi, F. 406 Vattimo, G. 371-372, 375
Snyder, J. 314 Vega, A. C. 365
Socrates 37, 251, 267, 275, 471, 518 Verworn, M. 144
Solon 89 Vico, G. 14
Soontiens, F. 128 Vi~is-Freibergs, V. 512
INDEX OF NAMES 555
-W- -X-
Wahl, J. 8 Xenophanes 84
Wallon, H. 263
Ward, J. A. 309 -Y-
Weber, M. 435-436, 440, 448, 454 Yseult 466-467
Weismann, A. 144-145
Weyl, H. 108 -Z-
Whitehead, A. N. 130-131, 533 Zaner, R. M. 441
Wilden, A. 528 Zeus 26
Wittgenstein, L. 250, 347-348, 362, 427 Zhuang Zi 46
Wolff, C. 102 Zubiri, X. 239
Wundt, W. M. 260
Analecta Husserliana
The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research
Editor-in-Chief
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning,
Belmont, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
1. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Volume I ofAnalecta Husserliana. 1971

ISBN 90-277-0171-7
2. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Later Husser/ and the Idea of Phenomenology.
Idealism- Realism, Historicity and Nature. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0223-3
3. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible
Worlds. The 'A Priori', Activity and Passivity of Consciousness, Phenomenol-
ogy and Nature. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0426-0
4. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), lngardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies
Establishing the Field of Research. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0628-X
5. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the
Phenomenological Investigation of Man. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0632-8
6. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Self and the Other. The Irreducible Element in
Man, Part I. 1977 ISBN 90-277-0759-6
7. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Human Being in Action. The Irreducible Element
in Man, Part II. 1978 ISBN 90-277-0884-3
8. Nitta, Y. and Hirotaka Tatematsu (eds.), Japanese Phenomenology.
Phenomenology as the Trans-cultural Philosophical Approach. 1979
ISBN 90-277-0924-6
9. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Teleologies in Husser/ian Phenomenology. The
Irreducible Element in Man, Part III. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0981-5
10. Wojtyla, K., The Acting Person. Translated from Polish by A. Potocki. 1979
ISBN Hb 90-277-0969-6; Pb 90-277-0985-8
11. Ales Bello, A. (ed.), The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology.
1981 ISBN 90-277-1071-6
12. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Philosophical Reflection of Man in Literature.
Selected Papers from Several Conferences held by the International Society for
Phenomenology and Literature in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Includes the
essay by A-T. Tymieniecka, Poetica Nova. 1982 ISBN 90-277-1312-X
13. Kaelin, E. F., The Unhappy Consciousness. The Poetic Plight of Samuel
Beckett. An Inquiry at the Intersection of Phenomenology and literature. 1981
ISBN 90-277-1313-8
14. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human
Condition. Individualisation of Nature and the Human Being. (Part 1:) Plotting
the Territory for Interdisciplinary Communication. 1983
Part II see below under Volume 21. ISBN 90-277-1447-9
15. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Calvin 0. Schrag (eds.), Foundations of Morality,
Human Rights, and the Human Sciences. Phenomenology in a Foundational
Dialogue with Human Sciences. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1453-3
16. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Soul and Body in Husser/ian Phenomenology. Man
and Nature. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1518-1
17. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in a Dialogue Between
Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1620-X
18. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition:
Poetic- Epic- Tragic. The Literary Genre. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1702-8
19. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. (Part
1:) The Sea. From Elemental Stirrings to Symbolic Inspiration, Language, and
Life-Significance in Literary Interpretation and Theory. 1985
For Part 2 and 3 see below under Volumes 23 and 28. ISBN 90-277-1906-3
20. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense in the Communal Significance of
Life. Investigations in Phenomenological Praxeology: Psychiatric Therapeutics,
Medical Ethics and Social Praxis within the Life- and Communal World. 1986
ISBN 90-277-2085-1
21. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human
Condition. Part II: The Meeting Point Between Occidental and Oriental
Philosophies. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2185-8
22. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Morality within the Life- and Social World. Interdis-
ciplinary Phenomenology of the Authentic Life in the 'Moral Sense'. 1987
Sequel to Volumes 15 and 20. ISBN 90-277-2411-3
23. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. Part
2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Breath, Breeze, Wind, Tempest,
Thunder, Snow, Flame, Fire, Volcano ... 1988 ISBN 90-277-2569-1
24. Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book I: Creative Experience and the
Critique of Reason. 1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2539-X; Pb 90-277-2540-3
25. Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book II: The Three Movements of the
Soul. 1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2556-X; Pb 90-277-2557-8
26. Kaelin, E. F. and Calvin 0. Schrag (eds.), American Phenomenology. Origins
and Developments. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2690-6
27. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man within his Life-World. Contributions to
Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe. 1989
ISBN 90-277-2767-8
28. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Passions of the Soul. Poetics of the
Elements in the Human Condition, Part 3. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0180-3
29. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man's Self-Interpretation-in-Existence. Phenomenol-
ogy and Philosophy of Life. -Introducing the Spanish Perspective. 1990
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30. Rudnick, H. H. (ed.), lngardeniana II. New Studies in the Philosophy of
Roman Ingarden. With a New International Ingarden Bibliography. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0627-9
31. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense and Its Foundational Significance:
Self, Person, Historicity, Community. Phenomenological Praxeology and
Psychiatry. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0678-3
32. Kronegger, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Aesthetics. Approaches to Compara-
tive Literature and Other Arts. Homages to A-T. Tymieniecka. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-0738-0
33. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), lngardeniana III. Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a
New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the
Fine Arts, and Literature. 1991
Sequel to Volumes 4 and 30 ISBN 0-7923-1014-4
34. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological
Era. Husser! Research - Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development.
1991 ISBN 0-7923-1134-5
35. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husser/ian Phenomenology in a New Key. Intersubjec-
tivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1146-9
36. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husser/'s Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies.
New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition.
1991 ISBN 0-7923-1178-7
37. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics. Time,
Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1195-7
38. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness. The
Passions of the Soul in the Onto-Poiesis of Life. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1601-0
39. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Reason, Life, Culture, Part I. Phenomenology in the
Baltics. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1902-8
40. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture.
Reason, Life, Culture, Part II. Phenomenology in the Adriatic Countries. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2215-0
41. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Allegory Revisited. Ideals of Mankind. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2312-2
42. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.), Allegory Old and New. In
Literature, the Fine Arts, Music and Theatre, and Its Continuity in Culture.
1994 ISBN 0-7923-2348-3
43. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): From the Sacred to the Divine. A New Pheno-
menological Approach. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2690-3
44. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Elemental Passion for Place in the Ontopoiesis of
Life. Passions of the Soul in the lmaginatio Creatrix. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-2749-7
45. Zhai, Z.: The Radical Choice and Moral Theory. Through Communicative
Argumentation to Phenomenological Subjectivity. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2891-4
46. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Logic of the Living Present. Experience,
Ordering, Onto-Poiesis of Culture. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2930-9
47. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Heaven, Earth, and In-Between in the Harmony of
Life. Phenomenology in the Continuing Oriental/Occidental Dialogue. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3373-X
48. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations.
25th Anniversary Publication. Book I. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3825-1
49. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. The Human Quest for an
Ideal. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book II. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3826-X
50. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of
Philosophy. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4126-0
51. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passion for Place. Part II. Between the Vital Spacing
and the Creative Horizons of Fulfilment. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4146-5
52. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative
Condition. Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field. Book I. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4445-6
53. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst
in Creative Virtualities. Harmonisations and Attunement in Cognition, the Fine
Arts, Literature. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition.
Book II. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4461-8
54. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Self-Interpretation-
in-Existence. The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal
Circuits of Life. Phenomenology of Life and the Creative Condition. Book III.
1997 ISBN 0-7923-4462-6
55. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretation-in-
Culture. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book IV.
1997 ISBN 0-7923-4545-2
56. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Enjoyment. From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy
Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4677-7
Kluwer Academic Publishers - Dordrecht I Boston I London

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TheMarin and Anna-Teresa

ANNA- TERESA TYMIENIECKA

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning

For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

Published under the auspices of

Prepared with the editorial assistance of Robert S. Wise

Printed on acid-free paper

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ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA I The Great Plan of Life: The

LIU QINGPING I Life as Logos and Tao: On Husser/'s

FRANS SOONTIENS I The Intrinsic Value of Life and the

THOMAS E. SPREY I The Self-Individualization of Life:

FERNANDO MONTERO MOLlNER I El Mito de Ia Subjetividad 209

MARLIES KRONEGGER I The Creative Source: Rodin 281

JORGE GARCIA-GOMEZ I A Bridge to Temporality:

DANIEL ZELINSKI I Zen and Tymieniecka's Three Movements

LUIS FLORES H. I The Imagination as the Origin of Science:

CARMEN LOPEZ SAENZ I A. Schutz: Phenomenology and

ZAIGA IKERE I Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Philosophy of Life

INDEX OF NAMES 549

The present volume features in a special thematic perspective a portion

A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/1, ix-x.

tion, and numerous other tasks by my most dedicated Assistant Editor,

Worldwide phenomenology has been revived, and reverberates in innu-

A-T. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Lll, xi-xvii.

order"; of a new formulation and distribution of questions, a projection

progress of the inquiries of the life-sciences and the other sciences

THE GREAT PLAN OF LIFE

Progress in philosophy is questionable. It is not only that we nourish our-

A-T. Tymienieclw (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. L/1, 3-29.

A. The Intuitions Inherent in Heraclitus' Declarations and the

aware of it in his everyday practical cognitions. 2 Heraclitus considers

With this last question we reach the bone of contention. Indeed,

B. Flux versus Stasis: The Logic of Contradiction

groundwork the common essential core of the constructive logos. Let

cally opposed to the logic of essences? Such an opposition is unwar-

C. Outline of the Main Tenets of the Phenomenology of Life and

reality, it finds on that ground a nonspeculative, concrete crystalliza-

being in search of the ultimate significance of all: toward the sacred,

A. The Selflndividualization of Life:

B. The Ontopoietic Primal Ordering of the Inner Workings of Life

lying in wait as virtually present resources; (3) circumscribing closer and

C. The Game of Opposites in the Dynamic Unfolding

the constructive becoming emerges within an artery of processes that

D. Life in Its Ties to Non-Life

other, they, from the perspective of life, prepare a profusion of synergetic

E. The Surge of Scanning and Spacing at the Protogenesis of Life

extinction, "envelopment," and transformation again, etc., the "scanning"

F. Flux, the Constructivism of Life, Measure

A. The Overarching Swing of the Self-Replication of Life:

In fact, it is by an essential transformation of the measuring modal-

B. The Human Condition: The Flashpoint of

C. The Creative Manifestation of Life

A. The Median Plane of the Human Soul within the Manifested

functional territories within the human self-individualizing life agency.

B. The Reversal of Life

reality in which we pursue our own self-individualizing course according

A. The Key: The Axis of Life

B. Philosophy, Metaphysics, Wisdom Possible

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7. 132.

of Nature or mankind's intelligence." Heraclitus speaks about "insight" in Gragment

Fragments 9Ja? [9lb]

LIFE, LOGOS, PHENOMENON