CASE N0 2: MANUEL IMBONG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970

FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two
delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed
Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall
be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative
district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5,
and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality
of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set
the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within
the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application
with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the
Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office
in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977

REPUBLIC V
HON. AMANTE P. PURISIMA,

FACTS

A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for
the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintif being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time,
the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre
Service ,where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on
the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of
the national government unless consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other
decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance
of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

RULING

The Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) is part of the government being in fact an
office under the office of the President and therefore, cannot be sued without the
consent of the State. The consent to be efective must come from the State, acting
through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant RCA agreed
to had no binding force in the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of
his authority

CASE NO 37: G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

FERNANDO A. FROILAN,
vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO.

Facts:

Plaintif, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan

Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the
vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he
executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For
various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping
Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale
cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the
defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Plaintif appealed the action of the Shipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet
restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping
Commission. Plaintif had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintif, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a
writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful
possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan
and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of
said vessel.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.

Rulings:

The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for
affirmative relief against the plaintif to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of
the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintif may avail itself of the diferent forms of actions open to
private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the
defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set
up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have
divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of
the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and
processes.
CASE NO 38: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991

FACTS:

The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which
initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of
President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of
the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an opposition
thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then presented a
"motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the
PCGG responded by filing a motion. in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the
PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution.
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories
to Plaintif," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintif"' as well as a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August
25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago
filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.

HELD:. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary
litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while
assuming to represent or act for the State.

The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced
and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's
exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even ofered objections thereto
and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these
documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private
respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or
otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

CASE NO 39: MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

18 SCRA 1120

FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville",
consigned to MobilPhilippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the CustomsArrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling
arrastre operations therein. TheCustoms Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of theshipment.Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the CustomsArrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amountof P18,493.37 plus other
damages.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law,defendants cannot be sued.Appellant contends that not all
government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of
the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functionsand as such,
can be sued by private individuals.

HELD: Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary
innature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
isundertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
thesovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.The Bureau of
Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart
from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, thatof assessing
and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tarif andcustoms duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function,arrastre service is a
necessary incident.Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessaryincident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs, so that engagingin the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could notperform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereignimmunity, granted as to the end, should not be
denied as to the necessary means to that end

CASE NO 40 Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84

Republic of the Philippines, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, November 28, 1973

Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by
Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.

Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And
for the strength of this writ, the provincial sherif served notices of garnishment with several
banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.

The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP,
hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

Issue:Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

CASE NO :41 PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595

Facts:

On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter
by a notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA)
in the sum of P12,724.66 deposited with the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La
Union filed an administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion,
alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character
and therefore may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union
Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may be sued.

HELD: Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from
garnishment. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is
attributed. The government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has
abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation.
Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in efect can be sued.
Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.

CASE NO : 42 SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. L-1648August 17, 1949

Facts:

Plaintifs, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts one for each
of the three apartments. The period for the three leases was to be for the duration of the
war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US. The apartment
buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in
Manila.

Six months after September 2, 1945 when Japan surrendered plaintifs

approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and requested the return of
the apartment buildings. Plaintifs requested to renegotiate said leases, to execute a lease
contract for a period of three years. Respondents sent a letter refusing to execute new
leases but advised that the US Army will vacate the apartments before February 1, 1947.
Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintifs formally requested Tillman
to cancel said leases and to release the apartments. Tillman refused to comply with the
request.

The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with the
demand. Plaintifs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an
action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
.The Municipal Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower
court.

HELD: The original action in the Municipal Court was brought on the basis of
these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any
back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the US Government not
only because the contracts were entered into by such Government but also
because the premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war
and immediately after the terminations of hostilities. It is clear that the courts of
the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for Unlawful Detainer.
The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very
beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the
filing of the suit which is essentially against her, though not in name..

Case # 43

USA vs Ruiz

136 SCRA 478 May 22, 1985

Facts:

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. US invited the
submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman and Co.,
respondent, bid for it. Then later the respondent received a disqualification to receive an award due to its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating. The company filed a complaint to order the defendants to
allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and asked for the issuance of unit for preliminary
injunction. The defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint: being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant, United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit. They filed a motion to dismiss
but was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
able to invoke state immunity

Held:

Yes, the bidding for the said contract exercised governmental functions since the project was an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, unquestionably, this is a governmental function and it is not utilized for commercial or
business purposes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the correct test of state immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a state but the legal nature of the act. Therefore, they can invoke state
immunity.

Case #44

Sanders vs Veridiano

162 SCRA 88, June 10, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo
city. Private respondent, Anthony M. Rossi and Ralph L. Wyer, were both employed as permanent full-
time game room attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA but was converted to
permanent part time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing
officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained ibelous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and
thus filed for damages against petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official functions for the acts they did to the
respondents

Held:

Yes, the petitioners were performing their duties when they had acted for which they have been
sued for damages by the private respondents. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official functions. The suit could not
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.
Therefore, the petitioners were immune from the complaint against them.

Case # 45

USA vs Rodrigo

G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990

Facts:

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been found out after investigation that Genove had poured
urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, the
club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
Issue:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in the performance of their official duties

Held:
 No, Lamichia is not immune from suit and cannot invoke state immunity for the act done by the
latter is not in connection with his official duties as member of the US Air Force but as the manager of the
restaurant at the John Hay Air Station that partake of the nature of a business enterprise by the US
government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity and losing his sovereign immunity as a consequence. But, the court still dismissed
the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in
the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for
his unbelievably nauseating act.

Case # 46 USA vs. Guinto G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990

Facts:

The private respondents are suing officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding they conducted for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by
Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his
bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit for acts done by them in the performance of
their official duties

Held: No, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons losing his sovereign immunity as a
consequence. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs
RODRIGO, except for the lacking of record as evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions. This case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings

e Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, [December 2, 1940] CASE NO: 51

FactsL: It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
various streets in Dasmarias. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer
challenges its constitutionality.
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice,
however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group.|||

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.

Ruling: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
CASE NO: 50 Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, [April 11, 2002]
Facts: Personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started
arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1."
In the meantime, the respective governments of the two countries (PH-US) agreed
to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a case
attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently
by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who
filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers.
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their
organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly
afected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

Issue: whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement

Ruling: It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism
advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or
allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of
the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant
petition, are indeed authorized.

case no :54 Meyer v. State of Nebraska (262 U.S. 390)

FACTS:

Plaintif is an instructor in Zion Parochial School. He was tried and convicted in the District
Court for Hamilton County, Nebraska to be in violation of a state law forbidding, under
penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any
modern language, other than English, to any child who has not attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade. It was alleged that on May 25, 1920, he unlawfully
taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of ten
years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court
of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. It argued that the legislature had seen the
baneful efects of permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in the country, to rear and
educate their children in the language of their native land. The purpose of the statute was
that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in
Nebraska. Hence, it held that the enactment of the statute comes reasonably within the
police power of the state.

HELD:

the Supreme Court held that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable
relation to any end within the competency of the State. The established doctrine is that
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State to efect.

That the State may do much in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically,
mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must
be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be
coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution -- a desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.
CASE NO 55: Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510)

FACTS:

The appellees were two Oregon corporations, the Society of Sisters and Hill Military
Academy, both owning and conducting schools. They argue that by reason of the statute
and threat of enforcement, their business is being destroyed and their property depreciated.
It has already caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise
continue. The appellees allege that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to
choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training,
the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and
teachers to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void.

HELD:

YES. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees right against
thedeprivation of their property without due process of law. It declared the right to conduct
schools was property, and that parents and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct
the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that these
schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that enforcement of the challenged
statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage, and thereby destroy their owners'
business and property. Finally, that the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause
irreparable injury, and the suits were not premature.

As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged
by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only.