Beruflich Dokumente
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respondents.
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS
This case started out as a complaint for sum of money and damages by
Dionisio Llamas against Romeo Garcia and Eduardo de Jesus. Petitioner
borrowed P400,000.00 from respondent; that, on the same day, they executed a
promissory note wherein they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the
loan; that the loan has long been overdue and, despite repeated demands, they
have failed and refused to pay it. Resisting the complaint, Petitioner Garcia
averred that he assumed no liability under the promissory note because he
signed it merely as an accommodation party for De Jesus; and, alternatively,
that he is relieved from any liability arising from the note inasmuch as the loan
had been paid by de Jesus by means of a check and the issuance of such and
the respondents acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note.
ISSUES
HELD
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS
ISSUES
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in
upholding the validity of the foreclosure on petitioners property and in
upholding the validity of the dacion en pago in this case.
HELD
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS
ISSUES
HELD
1. YES. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or
judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept
payment and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. In this case,there
is a valid consignation as there is a valid tender of payment in an amount
sufficient to extinguish the obligation.
PARDO, J:
FACTS
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner was truly in arrears in the payment of the rentals
on the subject property at the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment
HELD
NO. There was no clear assent from the petitioner to the change in the
manner of application of payment. The silence of the petitioner with regard the
request of the respondent with regard the application of the rental did not
mean that he consented thereto. Assuming further that petitioner did not
choose the obligation to be first satisfied, giving the respondent the right to
apply the payments to the other obligations of the petitioner, Article 1252 of the
Civil Code provides that no payment shall be made to a debt not yet due and
that payment must be first applied to the debt most onerous to the debtor
under Article 1254. The decision of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of the facts and the law on the application of payment.
Hence, the ejectment case subject of the instant petition must be dismissed,
without prejudice to the determination and settlement of the money claims of
the parties inter se.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS
Case No. 54863 was a suit for collection of a sum of money filed by Eden
Tan against the Tibajia spouses. A writ of attachment was issued by the trial
court and the Deputy Sheriff filed a return stating that a deposit made by the
Tibajia Spouses had been garnished by him. On 10 March 1988, RTC Branch
151 of Pasig rendered its decision ordering the Tibajia spouses to pay her an
amount in excess of P300,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified
the decision by reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages. The
decision having become final, Eden Tan filed the corresponding motion for
execution. On 14 December 1990, the Tibajia spouses delivered to Deputy
Sheriff Eduardo Bolima the total money judgment. Private respondent refused
to accept the payment made by the Tibajia spouses and instead insisted that
the garnished funds deposited with the cashier of the RTC Manila be
withdrawn to satisfy the judgment obligation. Petitioners filed a motion to lift
the writ of execution on the ground that the judgment debt had already been
paid. However, the motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that
payment in cashiers check is not payment in legal tender and that payment
was made by a third party other than the defendant.
ISSUE
HELD
NO. In the recent cases of Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and
Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court held that a check, whether a managers check or ordinary check, is not
legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender
of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or
creditor. The ruling in these two (2) cases merely applies the statutory
provisions which lay down the rule that a check is not legal tender and that a
creditor may validly refuse payment by check, whether it be a managers,
cashiers or personal check. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
MENDOZA, J.:
The parties in this case entered into a Loan Agreement with Assumption
of Solidary Liability whereby petitioners were given a loan of P500,000.00 by
private respondent. The contract provided for the payment of 12% annual
interest, 2% monthly penalty, 1 1/2% monthly service charge, and 10%
attorneys fees. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on the printing
machinery in petitioners establishment. Petitioners subsequently obtained a
second loan evidenced by two promissory notes. The deed of chattel mortgage
was amended correspondingly. Private respondent was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank and Ricardo Lirio and Cristina Destajo were
appointed as receiver and in-house examiner, respectively. Petitioners made a
partial payment of P50,000.00 on the second loan. They later wrote private
respondent a letter proposing to settle their obligation. Private respondent
replied that it would reduce the penalty charges up to P140,000.00, provided
petitioners can pay their obligation on or before July 30,1986. The private
respondent sent two demand letters to petitioners seeking payment of the
balance of P266,146.88. As petitioners did not respond, private respondent
filed for the foreclosure of the mortgaged machineries. Petitioners claimed that
they had fully paid their obligation to private respondent. Petitioners added
that this fact of full payment is reflected in the voucher accompanying the
Pilipinas Bank check they issued, which bore the notation full payment of
IGLF loan.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners are liable for the payment of the penalties and
service charges on their loan.
HELD
YES. The answer is in the affirmative. Art. 1270, par. 2 of the Civil Code
provides that express condonation must comply with the forms of donation.
Art. 748, par. 3 provides that the donation and acceptance of a movable, the
value of which exceeds P5,000.00, must be made in writing, otherwise the
same shall be void. In this connection, under Art. 417, par. 1, obligations,
actually referring to credits, are considered movable property. In the case at
bar, it is undisputed that the alleged agreement to condone P266,146.88 of the
second IGLF loan was not reduced in writing. Wherefore, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
REGALA, J.:
FACTS
ISSUE
Yes. It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
cancellation of the allocation contracted by Arrieta in Rangoon, Burma, was
the failure of the letter of credit to be opened with the contemplated period. In
the premises, however, a minor modification must be effected in the dispositio
portion of the decision appealed from insofar as it expresses the amount of
damages in U.S. currency and not in Philippine Peso. Republic Act 529
specifically requires the discharge of obligations only "in any coin or currency
which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts." In
view of that law, therefore, the award should be converted into and expressed in
Philippine Peso. UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the award should be converted
into the Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the
obligation was incurred or on July 1, 1952 when the contract was executed.