ATTORNEY AND CLIENT

1. Duty of Lawyers to Clients.

Duty of lawyers to property and effects of wards.A lawyer is charged with the knowledge that the
property and effects of the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they
cannot be taken and expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money
taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. (Fernandez vs. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140)

A confession of judgment based on compromise made by attorney without the client's special authority
may be set aside. (Acenas vs. Sison, 8 SCRA 711.)

No laxity in performance of duties as attorney where postponements were not all upon petition of
respondent attorney.The fact that the hearing of the case had been postponed several times not all
upon the petition of the respondent attorney because it was also continued upon petition of the
adverse party and in several instances upon joint motion of the parties is held not enough to support the
charge of laxity in the performance by the respondent of his duties as attorney. (Dauz vs. Fontanoza, 9
SCRA 14.)

Refusal to return client's papers not devoid of justification.The refusal of respondent lawyer to return
the documents or receipts that had come into his possession as attorney, whose professional service
bad been engaged by complainant to bring the action against the latter's debtors, may not be the
proper conduct, but is held to be not devoid of justification where the respondent believed he was
entitled to retain them unless his fees agreed upon in writing be paid first. (Id.)

The placing of an attorney's private and personal interests over and above those of his client constitutes
a breach of the lawyer's oath deserving admonition. (Sta. Maria vs. Tuason, 11 SCRA 563.)

Giving client erroneous information not misbehavior sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.An
attorney's furnishing his client erroneous information that he had failed to file the brief within the
reglementary period when in fact the truth is that when complainant filed the instant complaint before
the Supreme Court the said period had not yet expired, thus causing said client to seek the appointment
of an attorney de oficio who in due time filed a motion for reconsideration, is held to be an unwarranted
behaviour but not in itself constitute a misbehaviour as may warrant disciplinary action. But not having
rendered the service for which he was engaged, respondent lawyer should return the amount he had
been paid as partial payment of his attorney's fees. (Katindig vs. Brillantes, 12 SCRA 190.)

A lawyer must have special authority to sign the compromise agreement of his client's case. (Jacinto vs.
Montesa, 19 SCRA 513; Dorego vs. Perez, 22 SCRA 8.)

It is the bounden duty of a lawyer to inform his client whether his case is meritorious or not. (Cobb-
Perez vs. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291.)
When a party is represented by a counsel, a notice to the f ormer is not a notice in law, unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. (Pabiling vs. Parinacio, 24 SCRA 100; J. M. Javier Logging
Corporation vs. Mardo, 24 SCRA 776.)

It is the duty of counsel to notify the Court of any change of his address. (Juane vs. Garcia, 25 SCRA 801.)

Any information acquired by counsel during the clientattorney relationship is confidential. (Nombrado
vs. Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13.)

Even if client-attorney relationship has terminated, it is not good practice for counsel to appear against a
former client. (Id.)

ANotice to Lawyer is Notice to Client.

Notice to one counsel of record is equivalent to notice to all lawyers for the same party and also to the
clients. (Damasco vs. Arrieta, 7 SCRA 224; Deluao vs. Casteel, 26 SCRA 475; Palteng vs. Justices of the
Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 736; Palanca vs. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819.)

Service upon counsel of a domestic corporation is valid.Section 13, Rule 7 (now Section 13, Rule 14) of
the Rules of Court provides that service of summons upon a domestic corporation may be made on its
agent. In the case at bar, when defendant corporation's counsel in the administrative stage of the
present tax case received the summons, they were still acting for and in behalf of defendant in
connection with its tax liability involved in the case. Perforce, they were the taxpayer's agent, and under
the aforecited rule service upon them is sufficient. (Republic vs. Ker & Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA 207.)

Issuance of summons to a party is not necessary where it has been impleaded and submitted to court's
jurisdiction through its counsel. (Visitacion vs. Manit, 27 SCRA 524.)

BRight of Clients.

Standard of care required of client.Where the party was duly notified of the proceedings in the case
through his counsel, his failure to inquire from his counsel as to the status of the case does not
constitute excusable negligence as to justify rehearing or retrial. As a client he should have been in
contact with his counsel from time to time in order that he may be informed of the progress of his case,
thereby exercising that standard of care which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important
business. (Fernandez vs. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138.)

Where the circumstances show that the client knew the contents of the documents which he claims his
lawyer induced him to sign, the lawyer cannot be held guilty of malpractice. Salamanca vs. Bautista, 8
SCRA 459.)

It is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to counsel on matters concerning his case.Florendo
vs. Florendo, 27 SCRA 433.
CNegligence of Lawyers.

A client is bound by negligence or mistake of his lawyers. (Flores vs. Philippine Alien Property
Administrator, 107 Phil. 773; Gordulan vs. Gordulan, 3 SCRA 205; Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719; Mina vs. Pacson, 8 SCRA 774; Ramos vs. Potenciano, 9 SCRA 590;
Cabalag vs. Roxas y Cia., 18 SCRA 1099; Ocampo vs. Caluag, 19 SCRA 971; Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 25 SCRA 707; Rivera, vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 59.)

Failure of counsel to inform client that he rested the case is not excusable negligence. (Fernandez vs.
Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138.)

Negligence of government lawyers performing official duties not considered breach of duties as
members of the bar.The negligence of government lawyers representing a party in a case, not
because said party had engaged their services as her lawyers, but because it was part of their official
duty to do so, does not constitute breach of their official duties as members of the bar, but, rather, a
violation of their official duties. (Cruz vs. Cabal, 12 SCRA 270.)

Negligence of appellant's counsel in not ascertaining date of receipt from post office of letter of
notice.The delay of the appellant bank in perfecting its appeal cannot be considered due to excusable
negligence where appellant's counsel carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt stamped on
the letter by its legal department's receiving clerk was the date of receipt from the post office. It was
known or at least should have been known to him that from appellant's system of handling and
receiving correspondence from its legal and other departments the date of receipt by the receiving
clerks of its several departments could not be relied upon as the very same date of receipt from the post
office, Counsel for appellant could have easily found out the latter date had he made proper inquiry
from its postal mail clerk or its registered mail clerk and in the circumstances of the case at bar, there
was no excuse for his failure to do so. (Joven-De Jesus vs. Philippine National Bank, 12 SCRA 477.)

When incompetence of counsel is not a ground for new trial.Mistakes of counsel as to the
competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden
of proof, his failure to introduce certain evidence, or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are
not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel be so great that his client is
prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his case (People vs. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; Montes vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 48 Phil. 640.) Negligence, mistake or fraud of one's own attorney is
not a ground for granting a new trial (O'Quinn vs. Tate, [Tex.] Civ. App., 187 S.W. 2d 241). (Palanca vs.
American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819.)

An Attorney is guilty of malpractice or gross negligence in allowing the period to appeal to lapse. (Toquib
vs. Tomol, Jr., 26 SCRA 601.)

An attorney is guilty of carelessness or negligence for presenting evidence containing false statement
although of which he had no participation. (Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 673.)
Where appellants were given their day in court and they failed to appear, judge's rendition of judgment
in the unfinished case is proper. (Visitacion vs. Manit, 27 SCRA 524.)

Counsel who affixed signature in the stipulation of facts deems admitted all its contents. (Philippine
Education Co., Inc. vs. Manila Port Service, 27 SCRA 1031.)

2. Conduct of Lawyers.

AMisappropriation of Funds of Clients.

The attorney is guilty of retention of client's fund when he collected an .excessive amount of attorney's
fees and alleged expense of litigation and the case was terminated after a brief hearing. (Sta. Maria vs.
Tuason, 11 SCRA 563.)

Misappropriation of funds of client.The acts of a lawyer in preparing fictitious deeds of sale

pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case, asking his client to sign document wherein it
was made to appear that she received a money when in truth she did not receive said amount, and
receiving money from his client for deposit in court to repurchase property but instead he
misappropriated the money, are held to constitute malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of
the bar. (Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1.)

Conversion of sums of money entrusted to counsel.Respondent asked and received from petitioner's
family the sum of P500 allegedly to be used in filing the proper action in court to stay the auction sale of
petitioner's property. The auction sale went on as scheduled and the property was sold to the highest
bidder. It appears that respondent filed no motion with, and paid no money to, the court in order to
stop or postpone the auction sale. The money was never returned to petitioner. On another occasion,
petitioner solicited respondent's help in applying for an industrial loan with the Development Bank of
the Philippines. Respondent not only did not file the application for loan but also did not pay to the bank
the amount of P30.00 which petitioner gave him for filing fee. Said amount was likewise never returned
to petitioner. Held: Respondent is guilty of malpractice. Considering that respondent never returned to
petitioner the amounts involved, the presumption is that he appropriated the same for his own use to
the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. (Manaloto vs. Reyes, 15 SCRA
131.)

BProhibition to Purchase Property of Client.

Counsel is prohibited to buy property of client. (Sotto vs. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Del Rosario vs. Millado,
26 SCRA 700.)

CMiscellaneous.

Threat to file disbarment proceedings by a client to his attorney constitutes light threats punishable
under Article 283 of the Revised Penal Code. (Batolanon vs. Leorente, 8 SCRA 787.)
Appearance by lawyer employed by both parties to draft partition for one against the other is doubtful.
(Bautista vs. Barrios, 9 SCRA 695.)

Censurable conduct of lawyer brought to attention of trial court.The attention of the trial court may
be invited by the appellate court to the censurable conduct of the lawyer of one of the parties in a civil
case, for the trial court to take such action as may be warranted. (People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation vs. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471.)

Participation of a lawyer of one party in the affairs of the other party is brazenly unethical. (Vda. de
Zubiri vs. Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157.)

3.Attorney's Lien.

A satisfaction of the judgment in fraud of the lien may be vacated even by motion and the attorney will
be allowed to enforce the judgment for the amount of his lien. (Bacolod Murcia Milling Company, Inc.
vs. Henares, 107 Phil. 560.)

Extinction of lien through waiver.The American cases holding that satisfaction of the judgment
extinguishes the lien proceed on the theory that there has been waiver of the lien either by the
attorney's active conduct or by passive omission. (Id.)

The client, upon receiving satisfaction of the judgment without paying his lawyer, holds the proceeds of
the judgment in trust for his lawyer to the extent of the value of his recorded lien, because after the
charging lien has attached, the attorney is, to the extent of said lien, to be regarded as an equitable
assignee of the judgment of funds produced by his efforts. (Id.)

An attorney cannot claim to have a retaining lien over any funds, papers or documents belonging to the
estate, even if these properties may have come into his possession in the course of his work as such
counsel f or the administrator. (Inton vs. Matute, 17 SCRA 1010.)

Charging lien in labor case.An order of the Court of Industrial Relations, directing an employer to pay
to a lawyer 30% of the amount of the back wages due to the laborers under a final and executory
judgment of the Supreme Court and to deposit the balance in court (Tagka-wayan Labor Union vs. Sta.
Cecilia Sawmills, Inc., L-19273, Feb. 1964) is merely a part of the process of execution of the said final
judgment, on which the lawyer had filed a charging lien. Decisions do not usually specify the manner of
execution thereof, the same being governed by law, which, for all intents and purposes, is part of the
decision itself. (Sta. Cecilia, Sawmills, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 19 SCRA 735.)

Employer is bound by charging lien.The employer cannot complain of lack of notice as to the said
charging lien since it does not represent the laborers. That is a defense which the laborers may set up.
The employer filed a motion for the reconsideration of the original resolution allowing the attorney's
fees. Besides, it has no valid grounds for contesting the validity of the lien. (Id.)

AAttorney's Fees.
Determining the payment for attorney's fees.In order to determine the value of the legal services of
an attorney and whether they were rendered for the administrator of an estate in connection with his
administration, a hearing should be held at which both the administrator and the oppositors should be
present. It would be premature to authorize the payment of said services from the funds of the estate
before its propriety has been determined in such hearing. (Gozon vs. Malapitan, 107 Phil. 1033.)

When administratrix is liable for attorney's fees.Where the contract entered into between the lawyer
and the administratrix calls for payment of attorney's fees for services the former may render personally
to the latter for the purpose of enabling her to be declared the sole heiress of the estate, the
administratrix should be the one liable for such services, although they have redounded indirectly to the
benefit of the estate. (Laurente vs. Caunca, 107 Phil. 1051.)

The duty of the courts in regard to attorney's fees.The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers
act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful
fees. The courts cannot deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so. (Id.)

Opinion of judge as to lawyer's capacity not basis of fee.The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a
lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fees. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and
the nature of the services rendered. (Id.)

Purchasers in bad faith of a parcel of land who brought an action for its recovery from the true owner
were held liable to pay attorney's fees to the latter on his counterclaim. (Mapalo vs. Mapalo, 17 SCRA
115.)

Award of attorney's fees is justified even if defendant did not appeal when the defendant himself asked
for damages in his answer and said Court considered said attorney's fees as included in the concept of
damages under the new Civil Code. (Enecilla vs. Magsaysay, 17 SCRA 125.)

Defendant is liable for attorney's fees where he acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim. (Inducil vs. De los Santos, 17 SCRA 332.)

A counsel who was discharged before the services agreed upon could be rendered by him in full should
be awarded with the same compensation. (Flores vs. Philippine National Bank, 17 SCRA 506.)

Workmen's Compensation Commission may grant attorney's fees as vested by Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. (National Development Company vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 17 SCRA 1006.)

Fees in labor cases.Lawyers who represented the struggling members of the Union to secure benefits
for all the employees should be paid corresponding fees by all those favored or benefited by the award
secured by them. (Martinez vs. Union De Maquinistas, Fogoneros y Motormen, 39 SCRA 167.)

Fees in arrasire case.Where the parties in their stipulation of facts in an arrastre case left the amount
of the attorney's fees to the court's discretion, the sum of P1,000 awarded by the trial court to the
consignee was found to be just and reasonable. (Yu Kimteng Construction Corporation vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 19 SCRA 587.)
4. Withdrawal and Dismissal of Counsel.

The withdrawal and dismissal of counsel must be made with the consent of the client and in formal
petition filed in the case. (Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873.)

Where charge of abandonment of case against counsel was not proved.Petitioner charges respondent
counsel of abandonment in that he retired from the cases without the prior written consent of his client
filed in court. This charge cannot prosper. First of all, respondent did not retire from the cases.
Petitioner dismissed respondent in proposing to petitioner that another lawyer conduct the hearing of
the cases did not amount to abandonment by respondent of said cases. On the contrary, it tended to
show his interest in said cases, otherwise, he would not have proposed that another lawyer attend to
the hearing of the cases in his absence. (Manaloto vs. Reyes, 15 SCRA 131.)

Withdrawal of counsel cannot be considered when his last motion to withdraw to appear for his client is
only one day before the date set for resumption of the hearing. (Visitacion vs. Manit, 27 SCRA 524.)

Counsel has no right to presume that the court would grant his withdrawal. (Id.)

Dismissal of lawyer by client must be justifiable, otherwise, lawyer is entitled to recover compensation.
(Aro vs. Naawa, 27 SCRA 1090.)

ASubstitution of Lawyers.

Appearance of a new counsel after the client has dismissed his former counsel is proper. (Laput vs.
Remotigue, 6 SCRA 45.)

Rule to be followed in change of attorneys.In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a
given case, there must be: (1) written application for substitution; (2) a written consent of the client;
and (3) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted. And in case the consent of the attorney to
be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the motion for
substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules, (Ramos vs. Potenciano, 9
SCRA 589.)

Effect of non-compliance with rule.Where the procedure for substitution of attorneys is not followed,
the attorney who appears to be on record before the filing of the application for substitution should be
regarded as the attorney entitled to be notified of all notices and pleadings. (Id.)

Effect of service on attorney substituted not in compliance with rule.Where the procedure for
substitution of attorneys is not followed by petitioners, nor by their new counsel, the client is
answerable for the shortcomings of his counsel of record. (Id.)

5. Briefs.

The Supreme Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period
of three months due to his failure to pay the fine of P50.00 imposed on him for not having filed the
appellant's brief in a criminal case. (In re Dianala Jo, 1 SCRA 31.)
Where explanation that failure to file brief is due to hypertension not satisfactory.The explanation of
appellant for failure to file his client's brief despite lapse of the thirty (30) days extension granted by the
Supreme Court is not satisfactory, firstly, because his claim that for the past six months, he had been
sickly suffering from hypertension is not supported by any medical certificate; secondly, because
hypertension alone, in general, could not have prevented him from preparing his client's brief; and
thirdly, because even assuming that he was, to a certain degree, disabled and incapacited to prepare
said brief, he could have easily so informed the Court in due time, thus avoiding delay in the disposition
of the case. (People vs. Tan, 15 SCRA 252.)

ATTY. MA. LUISA A. MENDOZA

Note.See also annotations on Immorality as a Ground for Suspension or Disbarment ATTORNEY AND
CLIENT, 39 SCRA 136, May 31, 1971
 THE DECORUM OF A LEGAL PRACTITIONER

By

Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

1.Introduction, p. 103.

2.Duties of Lawyers, p. 107.

3.Suspension and Disbarment, p. 112.

4.Conclusions, p. 114.

_______________

1. Introduction

A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the
minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community,
looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence especially so when he
volunteers his professional services. (Blanza and Pasion vs. Arcangel, Administrative Case No. 492, 21
SCRA 2). The standard of professional and personal integrity which should be applied to persons
admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. (Royong vs. Oblena,
Administrative Case No. 376, 7 SCRA 859). Thus, attorneys must continue to adhere to the standards of
mental and moral fitness set up for the practice of law. (In re Guiterrez, Administrative Case o. L-363, 5
SCRA 661; Go vs. Candoy, Administrative Case No. 736, 21 SCRA 439). Membership in the Bar entails
various obligations. The lawyers, intimate link with the administration of justice demands obligations
from him which are not usually expected of ordinary laymen. He has strong influence in the community;
people consider him honorable and wise worthy of imitation; as such, he should not only preach the law
but likewise set the example by observing and upholding the same.

He has a duty to his brothers and sisters to utilize peaceful and legal means in seeking justice and refrain
from doing intentional wrong to their opponents. He should strive to maintain public confidence in the
administration of justice and in the integrity of the judiciary. He should discourage in dividuals,
particularly public officials, from disregarding the supremacy of the law and respect for the rights of
citizens. He should be bold in attacking and exposing any breach of professional ethics. He should always
be active in the necessity of purging the Bar and the Bench of unscrupulous elements. He must combat
all kinds of corruption that may creep into the judiciary.

Lawyers should likewise ward off any attempt to subvert judicial independent because the stability of
democracy can only be maintained with a strong and independent judiciary. Because of their training,
lawyers are better equipped to detect and thwart any effort to encroach upon or weaken the judiciary.
Many key positions in the government are occupied by lawyers. Politics has attracted more lawyers than
members of any other profession; perhaps this is because of their peculiar knowledge of the peoples
political and civil rights and the government legal structure.

The lawyer-politician should always be above the common concept of politics. Legal ethics is no
different from any other form of morality; neither should political ethics be any different. Both
necessitate the use of the principles of right and wrong to the behavior of persons in their various
callings. A lawyer should bear in mind that for his misdemeanor as a public official, he may either be
suspended or disbarred.

A lawyer should never lend his aid to the enactment of un just and unwise laws. On the contrary he
should exert his best efforts in securing the passage of laws which would promote the public interest.
Lawyers wield great influence upon the countrys legislation for they have at their command two potent
weaponspublication of learned research and arguments in court. They should use them wisely for the
public good. (Carter, Ethics of the Legal Profession, p. 34). A lawyer openly, and in his true character may
render professional services before legislative or other bodies, regarding proposed legislation and in
advocacy of claims before departments of government upon the same principles of ethics which justify
his appearance before the Courts; but it is unprofessional for a lawyer so engaged, to conceal his
attorneyship, or to employ secret personal solicitations, or to use other means than those addressed to
reason and understanding, to influence action. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 26).

A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in which he gives information upon the law;
but he should not accept employment from such publication to advise inquiries in respect to their
individual rights. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 40).

Just like other public officers, the lawyer assumes office with the attendant duties and privileges; one
such duty is the rendering of free services to poor litigants. A superior court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause
shown. (Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court).

For persons accused of crimes, lawyers may at times be assigned as counsels de oficio. If the defendant
appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be
allowed for procuring attorney. (Rule 116, Section 3, Rules of Court). A lawyer as counsel de oficio is
duty bound to exert his best efforts in behalf of an indigent client. (People vs. Estebia, L-26868, 27 SCRA
106). Attorneys de oficio may be assigned not only in trials before the inferior courts but also in appeals.
It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal
case, to ascertain from the appellant, if he be confined in prison, whether he desires the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court to appoint an attorney to defend him de oficio and to transmit with the
record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with
this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry. (Rule 122, Section 13, Rules of Court). A
lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason
and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 4).

Finally, a lawyer should not give advice nor render service if it would involve his loyalty to the laws. No
client, corporate or individual, however, powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is
entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the laws
whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption
of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public.
When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and just
condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client to
observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication he is free and is entitled to advice as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously
believes to he its just meaning and extent. But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 32).

2. Duties of Lawyers

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges,
not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar
against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial
officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such
cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be
protected. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 1). An attorneys duty of prime importance is to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. (People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106,
and others). It is the duty of counsel to uphold the dignity of the court by not using offensive languages
(In Re Hon. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107); and lawyers have a duty to maintain respect for the courts and
judicial officers. (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234).

It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness
in the selection of judges. It should protest earnestly and actively against the appointment or election of
those who are unsuitable for the Bench; and it should strive to have elevated thereto only those willing
to forego other employments whether of a business, political or other character, which may embarrass
their free and fair consideration of questions before them for decision. The aspiration of lawyers for
judicial positions should be governed by an impartial estimate of their ability to add honor to the office
and not by a desire for the distinction the position may bring to themselves. (Canons of Professional
Ethics, 2).
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent persons, victims only of suspicious
circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound,
by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 5).

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his
relations to the parties, and any interest in or connections with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to divulge his secrets or confidence
forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. (Canons of
Professional Ethics, 6).

A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his clients cause before advising thereon, and he
is bound to give a candid opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or contemplated
litigation. The miscarriages to which justice is subject, by reason of surprises and disappointments in
evidence and witnesses, and through mistakes of juries and errors of Courts, even though only
occasional, admonish lawyers to beware of bold and confident assurances to clients, especially where
the employment may depend upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy will admit of fair
judgment, the client should be advised to avoid or to end the litigation. (Canons of Professional Ethics,
8).

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and
to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the
proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of
questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyers to do whatever may enable him to succeed
in winning his clients cause.

It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his clients innocence or in the
justice of his cause.

The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 15).

A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which
the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persist in such wrong-doing the lawyer should terminate
their relation. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 16).

A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration, and he
should never minister to the malevolence or prejudices of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause. The
client can not be made the keeper of the lawyers conscience in professional matters. He has no right to
demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive personalities. Improper
speech is not excusable on the ground that it is what the client would say if speaking in his own behalf.
(Canons of Professional Ethics, 18). It is the lawyers duty as a member of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1).

It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also to the Courts and to the public to be punctual
in attendance, and to be concise and direct in the trial and disposition of causes. (Canons of Professional
Ethics, 21).

Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in
the profession, and should accept without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has
wronged his client. The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owes it to
the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities.
The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 29).

No client, corporate or individual, however, powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however
important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty
to the laws whose ministers we are, disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or
corruption of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal
of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern
and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the best interests
of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his
undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise
his client to observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by
competent adjudication he is free and is entitled to advice as to its validity and as to what he
conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent. But above all, a lawyer will find his highest
honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a
patriotic and loyal citizen. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 32).

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyers
employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of them should accept employment,
which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private
advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available
sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that this
obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.

If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the truth in respect to the
accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary
to prevent the act or presence of his client after full disclosure. (Canons of Professional Ethics, 37). Any
information acquired by counsel during the attorney-client relationship is confidential. An attorney owes
loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated and it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in
another case another person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from,
and independent of the former case. (Nombrado vs. Hernandez, Administrative Case No. 555, 26 SCRA
13).

Duties of attorneys.It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines;

(b) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secret of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval.
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
any mans cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the
end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by the process of law. ((Rule 138, Section 20,
Rules of Court).

3. Suspension and Disbarment

While suspension is the act of the court prohibiting an attorney from practicing law for a certain definite
period (Archer, Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer, p. 282), disbarment is the act of the court in
withdrawing from an attorney the right to practice law. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 371). Disbarment is
likewise defined as a quasi-summary proceeding instituted and prosecuted before an appropriate court
for the purpose of depriving an attorney of his license to practice his profession by reason of some
misconduct. (Ballantine Law Dictionary, 379).

The distinction between suspension, and disbarment is that: in suspension, the deprivation of an
attorneys right to practice his profession is merely for a certain period, while in disbarment, the
deprivation is more or less permanent. Another distinction between the two is that in suspension, this
power is a prerogative vested upon the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance, while in
disbarment, this authority rests exclusively upon the Supreme Court.

The two primary objects of disbarment and suspension are: (1) To compel the attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his clients; and (2) To remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. (Ex
Parte Brounsall, 66 C. 66 C.J. 581). Disbarment is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. (Paras vs. Vailoces, Administrative Case No. 439, 1 SCRA 954).

A member of the Bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purposes of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Rule 138, Section 27, Rules of Court). Another ground for suspension
or disbarment is found in Article 209, of the Revised Penal Code. Said article states: Betrayal of trust by
an attorney or solicitorRevelation of secrets.In addition to the proper administrative action, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, by any malicious
breach of professional duty or inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal
any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity. The same penalty shall be
imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the
defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice
his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Rule 138, Section 28, Rules of
Court).

Upon such suspension the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the
Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall
make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension,
or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. (Rule 138, Section 29, Rules of
Court).

No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and
answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Rule 138, Section 30,
Rules of Court).

4. Conclusions

In America (and the Philippines), where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government
rests upon the approval of the people, it is particularly essential that the system for establishing and
dispensing justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have
absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to
a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and un-sullied. It cannot be so maintained
unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval
of all just men. (Canons of Professional Ethics, Preamble).

It is in this regard that the Supreme Court, which has an inherent and independent authority over
lawyers, does not hesitate to purge the members of the Bar who have not lived up to their sworn duties.
However, the Court also protects attorneys from unjust accusations that may be brought against them;
this is in line with the judicial oath to administer justice, particularly among members of the legal
profession.
The case subject of annotation is an example of a just dismissal of a disbarment case for the protection
of a lawyer. In this case, the complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent on the grounds
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. In resolving the issues, the Court ruled that the evidence
adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the
respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, From all indications, there is little room for
doubt that she filed this disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed.
It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their private consciences.
(Abaigar vs. Paz, Adm. Case No. 997, September 10, 1979).

This case shows how imperative it is for a lawyer to exercise decorum at all times. For if a lawyer fails in
this aspect, he discredits the noble profession to which he belongs and he violates his sworn oath. This
being so, he has no business being a member of a sacred calling and so he should be purged from among
its ranks. The Decorum of a Legal Practitioner, 93 SCRA 103, September 10, 1979
 THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

By

Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

I.Introduction, p. 667.

1.Scope and related matters, p. 667.

(a)Scope, p. 667.

(b)Related annotations, p. 668.

2.Background data, p. 668.

(a)Definitions and related issues, p. 668.

(b)Legal Pointers, p. 669.

II.Specific Matters Involving Privileged Communications, p. 670.

1.Absolutely and Qualifiedly Privileged Communications, p. 670.

2.Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Proceedings, p. 671.

3.Unprivileged Matters, p. 673.

_______________

I. Introduction.

1. Scope and related matters.

(a) Scope.

This annotation compiles cases involving issues and matters involving privileged communications. The
specific issues together with the related cases are: absolutely and qualifiedly privileged communications;
judicial, legislative and administrative proceedings; and unprivileged matters.

For purposes of this annotation, the cases given are those, which have a bearing to the issues involved.

(b) Related annotations.

The Doctrine of Privileged Communication, 57 SCRA 82. Identity of Person Libeled, 16 SCRA 818.
Privileged Communications in Judicial Proceedings, 1 SCRA 81.

2. Background data.
(a) Definitions and related issues.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Every communication is privileged which is made in good faith with a view to obtain redress for some
injury received or to prevent or punish some public abuse. (U.S. vs. Galeza, 31 Phil. 370.).

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous or actionable. (U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 742.)

In the law of libel and slander, one which, except for the occasion on which or the circumstances under
which it is made, would be defamatory and actionable.

Privileged communications are divided into two general classes, namely: 1) those which are absolutely
privileged; and 2) those which are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 68.).

ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

One for which, by reason of the occasion on which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in
a civil action for slander or libel.

One in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is
made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be
injured thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 68.).

QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

A defamatory communication made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice, and
as to such communications there is no civil liability, regardless of whether or not the communication is
libelous per se or libelous per quod.

A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances exist, or are reasonably

believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty to make a communication to a certain
other person to whom he makes such a communication in the performance of such duty, or where the
person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of society that he should tell third persons
certain facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do so. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 69.).

PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE.

The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, though, as in incidental result it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. (People vs. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947.).

The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in
the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being
that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds
freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages. (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case No. 598, 27 SCRA 633.).

The doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code,
as an exception to the general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it is true in the absence of good intention and, justifiable motive. (Elizalde vs. Gutierrez, 76
SCRA 448.).

(b) Legal Pointers.

When confronted with cases involving privileged communications, the legal practitioner should
constantly bear in mind the provisions of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code for said provisions
constitute the basic law in any question or issue involving said subject matter.

2. Specific Matters Involving Privileged Communications.

1. Absolutely and Qualifiedly Privileged Communications.

Where the article is a fair and true report of the complaint filed in court published without remarks, the
article is a privileged communication. (Cuenco vs. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 212.).

Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which although containing defamatory
imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith. (Orfanel vs. People, 30 SCRA
819.).

A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted
in bad faith. (Orfanel vs. People, 30 SCRA 819.).

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. (Orfanel vs.
People, 30 SCRA 819.).

Invoking Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, defendants maintain and the lower court held that,
having been preferred in the course of the performance of their duties, the charges against plaintiffs
partakes of the nature of a privileged communication, which, as such, is not actionable however, the
argument overlooks the fact, that the privilege conferred by said article is not absolute, but qualified;
that, the presumption of good faith, in effect, contained therein, is rebuttable; that in fact, plaintiffs
explicitly allege that the charges against them are, not only false, but, also malicious; and that the truth
of this allegation is deemed hypothetically admitted in defendants motion to dismiss. (Ubarra vs.
Biscom Employees Cooperative Association, Inc, 25 SCRA 498.).

Defamatory statements made during trial of a case may be under the rule of privilege where the
prosecution did not object its entry in the record. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555; People vs. Balao, 23
SCRA 632.).

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged
the courts favor a liberal rule. (People vs. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901.).

In absolutely privileged communications, the freedom from liability is absolute or without condition,
regardless of the existence of express malice, as contrasted with qualifiedly privileged communications,
which are conditioned on the want or absence of express malice. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60.)

In cases of absolutely privileged communications, the occasion is an absolute bar to the action; whereas,
in case of qualifiedly privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie presumption in favor
of the occasion. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60.)

2. Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Proceedings.

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only
because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also due
to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and
legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper
administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. (Cuenco vs. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 212.).

Plea of defensive libel is rejected where alleged defamatory imputation by plaintiff was a privileged
communication. (Antonino vs. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70.).

Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of
the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of
language. (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case No. 598, 27 SCRA 633.).

The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings. (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case No. 598, 27 SCRA 633.).

The allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are statements made in
the course of a judicial proceedings, i.e., in CAR cases 1254 and 1255besides being relevant, pertinent
or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby preventing
any liability on the part of the respondent. (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case No. 598, 27 SCRA 633.).

Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privilegedthat is, privileged
regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of maliceif the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.).
A communication sent by an official to his immediate superior in the performance of a legal duty, as an
explanation of a matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer, although
employed in a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for, is excusable in the interest of public policy
and is considered a privileged communication, for which the writer is not liable for damages. (Deao vs.
Godinez, 12 SCRA 483.).

In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the pleadings and must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the
trial. (People vs. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901.).

Counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected
with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry. (Tolentino vs.
Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396; People vs. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901.).

The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made during the course of
judicial proceedings. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60.).

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA
60.).

3. Unprivileged Matters.

If in truth, the suits for damages instituted by plaintiff spring from his malicious desire to work undue
hardship to the defendants, the latter are not without adequate recourse in law; and if they plead for a
righteous cause, the course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, for the courts are ever vigilant in the
protection of a partys rights. Upon the other hand, the courts will not favor a party who seeks to expose
the adverse partys alleged dirty and twisted mind and wickedness by an abuse of privilege.

The defendants answer in Civil Case No. C-6607 is quite complete and sufficient without the derogatory
statements in question, and their inclusion therein was clearly made solely for the purpose of giving
vent to their ill-feelings against the plaintiff, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does
not extend. (Elquiades Gutierrez vs. Enrique H.R. Abila, Restituto Clemente and Manuel Francisco, G.R.
L-59161, January 30, 1982.).

In order to escape criminal responsibility for libel or slander, it is not enough for the party who writes a
defamatory communication to another to say that the writer expresses therein no more than his opinion
or belief. The communication must be made in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty.
(Orfanel vs. People, 30 SCRA 819.).

A private communication, maliciously made by one person to another, although in the performance of a
legal, moral or social duty, is not privileged. (Imperial vs. Ziga, 19 SCRA 726.).
An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is
not a privileged communication although the defendant published the same while performing his official
duty, either as a Member of Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang,
17 SCRA 876.). The Concept of Privileged Communications, 111 SCRA 667, January 30, 1982
 COMPENSATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES

By

Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

1.Introduction, p. 794.

2.Contract Regarding Compensation, p. 795.

3.Judicial Power to Regulate Fees, p. 798.

4.Factors Affecting Recovery of Attorneys Fees, p. 798.

5.Kinds of Attorneys Fees, p. 799.

6.Actions to Recover Fees, p. 801.

7.Attorneys Liens, p. 802.

8.Attorneys Fees as Costs, p. 804.

9.Attorneys Fees as Damages, p. 805.

________________

1. Introduction

There is no dispute that the lawyer is entitled to demand reasonable compensation for his services. The
basis of this right rests primarily on the fact of employment, whether under an express or implied
contract with the person sought to be charged. As a rule, this right is not lost because his services did
not redound to the benefit of his client, provided that they have been faithfully and intelligently
performed. (Wolfson vs. Compensation for Legal Services

Anderson, 48 Phil. 672.). In this regard, the Supreme Court held that where the papers or documents
prepared by an attorney were later declared fictitious and void by the court, such fact does not preclude
recovery of fees in the absence of evidence that the attorney had knowledge of or was in connivance
with the deceased in the commission of the act which gave rise to its nullity. (Arevalo vs. Adriano, 62
Phil. 671.). Likewise, fees were allowed even when the services rendered were purely administrative in
character not requiring such degree of skill and experience. (Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit Company,
39 O.G. 532.). Fees were also granted where the services rendered involved only the appointment of
administrator of the estate in the Court of First Instance. (Escueta vs. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil. 405.).

It is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the services contracted for. The obligation
to pay compensation for services rendered is a necessary consequence for every contract of
employment. Persons who benefit by the services of an attorney are not obliged to compensate him
whenever such services were rendered without their knowledge or consent, or even against their
protest. (Orosco vs. Hernaez, et al., 1 Phil. 77.). There is likewise no obligation to compensation when
services were rendered with the clients knowledge, if the circumstances show that such services were
intended to be gratuitous. (Young vs. Bruere, 78 Cal. 127.).

2. Contract regarding compensation

Section 24, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Lopez et al.
vs. Pan American Airways, 16 SCRA 431.).

An attorneys fee as stipulated is unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate

compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. This
means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained, would be
sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been
perpetrated on him. (High Point Casket Company vs. Wheelers, 19 A.L.R. 391.). In this regard, it was
decided that an award of fifteen percent attorneys fees is considered reasonable. (Cosmopolitan
Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Reyes, 15 SCRA 258.).

An attorney is entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services. The client who retains his services even without the benefit of a written contract does so
with an implied promise to pay reasonable value of the services rendered, unless the same were
intended to be gratuitous. (Young vs. Bruere, 78 Cal. 127.). The absence of such written or express
promise to pay does not, in any manner, prejudice the right to compensation where the employment is
fairly made out from all the attendant circumstances. In this case, the courts are authorized to
determine what constitutes a reasonable compensation for the value of his services on the basis of
quantum meruit. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 50.).

Quantum meruit means as much as he deserves for the value of services rendered. An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney x x x. (Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of
Court.). Other factors to be considered in the determination of reasonable attorneys fees are: (1) The
responsibility involved; (2) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment; (3) The skill and experience called for in the performance of
the service; (4) The results secured; and (5) Whether or not the fee is contingent or absolute, it being a
recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent. (Delgado
vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil. 419.). The circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of
an attorney are: (1) the amount and character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble
involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected
by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8)
the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee
when it is contingent than when it is not. (Martinez vs. Banagon, 7 SCRA 613, etc.). Other guides in
determining fees are: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to properly conduct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance of
employment in the particular case will preclude the lawyers appearance for others in cases likely to
arise out of the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be
employed, or will involve the loss of their business while employed in the particular case or antagonisms
with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved in
the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (5) the contingency or the
certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character of the employment, whether casual or for an
established and constant client. (Canons of Professional Ethics, Section 12.). In this regard, the following
cases have been mentioned as instances where fees may be recovered on the basis of quantum meruit:
(a) When, for justifiable reasons, the attorney withdraws from the case before its termination; (b) When
the retainer contract is declared null and void due to certain irregularities in its execution; (c) When the
fees agreed upon under a written contract are found unreasonable or unconscionable; (d) When no
amount of fees is expressly agreed upon between the parties, or when there is no written contract
between the parties but the fact of employment is recognized. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 51.).

Cases where attorneys cannot recover fees for their legal services are: (a) When the client discharges
the attorney for justifiable reasons as when the latter acted with bad faith and fraud; (b) When the
cause fails and the fee agreed upon is either contingent or champertous; (c) Where the attorney serves
adverse or conflicting interests from that of his client; (d) When the contract of retainer is illegal or
contrary to public policy and good morals; and (e) Where the attorney acts as executor or administrator
of the estate under his administration; in such case, he cannot collect fees for the professional services
he may render for the estate under his administration. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 52.).

Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that in case of ambiguity of contracts between attorney and client
concerning compensation, a construction favorable to the client should be preferred. (De los Santos vs.
Palanca, 8 SCRA 764.).

3. Judicial power to regulate fees

The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics
limit the lawyers freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to
undertake his duties, first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and second as an officer of
the court in the administration of justice, he thereby submits himself to the authority of the court.

The power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorneys fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. And one of
the powers of the court is to regulate his right to charge fees for his professional services. (Cruz vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 826.). In this regard, it was likewise stated that the assessment of
attorneys fees is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, depending upon the circumstances of
each case. (Soriano vs. Ubat, 1 SCRA 366, etc.).

4. Factors affecting recovery of Attorneys Fees

The failure to accomplish the task assigned to the attorney here contemplated involves his withdrawal
or his discharge, and not because the services he rendered did not redound to the benefit of the client.

Where the withdrawal of the attorney for cause takes place before the accomplishment of the task
assigned to him, the rule is that such withdrawal has the effect merely of nullifying the agreement
relative to the fees stipulated but does not bar recovery of compensation. He may be allowed to recover
on the basis of quantum meruit. (Mambulao Lumber Company vs. Philippine National Bank, 22 SCRA
359.). This same case likewise held that counsel fees are invariably fixed on a quantum meruit basis
whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive and unconscionable.

It is true that under section 24 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor, it is likewise required that the fees stipulated must
not be unreasonable or unconscionable.

Where the withdrawal of the attorney is without any justifiable cause, the attorney does not only lose
his right to recover fees, even on the basis of quantum meruit, but he may also be subjected to
disciplinary action. His actuation constitutes abandonment which is a violation of his duty to deal with
his clients cause with fidelity. And where his client suffers damages by reason of such unjustifiable
withdrawal, he may be held responsible for such damages. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 49.).

The discharge of an attorney by the client with or without cause necessarily affects recovery of the
stipulated fees. The rule is that where the lawyer is discharged with justifiable cause, he may not
recover compensation whether based on the contract or on the basis of quantum meruit (In re Badger, 9
F [2d] 560.). However, when he is discharged without justifiable cause, his recovery of the stipulated
fees would depend on whether the same is unconscionable or not. If found reasonable, he may recover
the full amount under the contract, otherwise, he is allowed to recover on the basis of quantum meruit.
(Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil. 419.).

5. Kinds of Attorneys Fees

Attorneys fees are: (1) Contingent fees; and (2) Champertous fees.

Contingent fees are those agreed upon by the parties subject to the stipulation that the attorney will be
paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation succeeds. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 52.).

Contingent fee contracts are generally recognized as valid and binding upon the lawyer and client who
made them in the absence of fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression of facts on the part of the
attorney. (Ulamlay vs. MRR, 45 Phil. 540.).
Contingent fee contracts are permitted since they are the only means by which the poor and helpless
may be able to seek redress of their grievances whenever their rights are violated. Poverty invariably
prevents persons injured through the negligence of others from securing the services of counsel to
protect and enforce their rights.

Lawyers are generally allowed to charge a much higher compensation for their professional services
contingent upon the success of the suit. They assume all the risk; they get nothing for their services
whenever the suit fails. So that where the clients stipulate to pay attorneys fees to the extent even of
one third of the hereditary estate provided that they succeed in validating the will and codicil of the
decedent, such compensation, considering that it is contingent upon the success of the proceedings, is
considered reasonable. (Quitoriano and Velasco vs. Centeno, 59 Phil. 646.).

Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the court, in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges. (Canons of Professional Ethics, Section 13.).

A champertous fee is that recoverable under a contract whereby the lawyer undertakes the prosecution
of a suit at his own expense to recover things or property claimed by the client, agreeing to look solely
to a certain percentage of the recovery for his compensation, without any right to receive anything for
his services when the suit fails. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 53.).

The distinctions between a contingent fee contract and champertous fee contract are: (1) in a
champertous fee contract, the attorney undertakes for his own account the expenses connected with
the suit, no such undertaking obtains in a contingent fee contract; and (2) contingent fees may be paid
in cash, whereas champertous fees are always paid from a portion of what things or property are
recovered. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 53.).

6. Actions to recover fees

An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. (Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of Court.).

Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be
compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services;
and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition, or fraud, (Canons of
Professional Ethics, Section 14.).

Before resorting to lawsuits, the lawyer must exert every effort possible to recover professional fees in
as friendly a manner as may be consistent with dignity and proper decorum. When this fails, then the
proper remedy that he may take under the circumstances to enforce payment of his fees for services
rendered is an action in assumpsit. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 55.).

As a rule, the action to recover attorneys fees may be instituted against the client who retained his
services under a written or oral contract of employment. Where his services were retained by another
for the client, then the lawyer must institute the suit against such person. (Laureta, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, p. 55.).

During the pendency of an action, the adverse party settles the case with the client without notice to
the latters counsel, then the suit to collect fees must be instituted not only against the client, but also
against the adverse party. (Western State Oil and Land Company vs. Helms, 72 A. L.R. 357.). At the same
time, an attorney cannot be deprived of his fees under a contract of employment if his client, the
debtor, effects a settlement with the judgment creditor without his (debtors) attorney. (Chreste vs.
Louisville, L.R.A., 1917-B, 1123.).

The rule is that no written agreement is necessary to prove plaintiffs obligation to pay their attorneys
fees. It is enough that facts and circumstances show the nature and extent of the legal services rendered
as to enable the court to determine the reasonable amount that should be awarded. (De Reyes vs.
Peyer, L-145, September 7, 1946.).

In the determination of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered by an attorney, the courts
may consider the testimony of qualified witnesses, given as expert opinion. (Rodfish vs. Fox, 39 Am. Dec.
646.). However, the court may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. (Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of Court.).

In an action to recover attorneys fees, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove: (a) His employment as an
attorney in his professional capacity; (b) As such attorney, he rendered service for the defendant in
accordance with the task assigned to him; and (c) That the amount charged for such services was
reasonable. (Early vs. Sy Giang, 4 Phil. 727.).

7. Attorneys Fees

Two kinds of attorneys liens are recognized: the retaining (or possessory) lien and the charging lien. The
rule is that an attorney has a lien for his compensation upon his clients funds and papers in his
possession the course of his professional employment, and upon any judgment or recovery obtained
during his services. (State of Texas vs. White Wall, 483 19 L. ed. 992.).

A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession professionally until the balance of his fees for his professional
services are paid. (7 C.J.S. 4141.). It is a passive right which is dependent upon possession and does not
attach anything not in the attorneys hands. At best, it is a mere right to retain the papers as against the
client, until the attorneys fees are fully paid. (Rustia vs. Abeto, 40 O.G. 3277, 3281.). It secures not only
the costs and charges due the lawyer on a particular case or matter, but also extends to costs and
charges due him for professional services already rendered in other professional employment. (5 Am.
Jur. 390.). In one case, the lien was extended to moneys collected by the attorney for his client in the
course of his professional employment, whether or not upon a judgment or award. (Alano vs. Tan, 106
Phil. 445.). The courts respect this right to exercise his lien in a manner in keeping with the preservation
of the dignity and respectability of the profession. The inconvenience that may accrue to the client by
reason of the retention of his important papers by his attorney claiming professional fees for his services
underlie the reason and essence of the lien. The court may require the attorney to deliver such papers
to the client whenever the embarrasment resulting from their retention is great, however, in such case,
the client is required to file the proper security for the attorneys compensation. (Chua Ke, et al. vs.
Abeto, 63 Phil. 539.).

The charging lien is the equitable right of the attorney to have the fees due him for services in a
particular suit secured by the judgment or recovery in such suit. (7 C.J.S. 1142.). It is the right which the
attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and execution issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured for his clients. This right affords him adequate protection with respect
to the fruits of his labor against dishonest clients. (Myers vs. Miller, 117 A.L.R. 977; Robinson vs. Rogers,
33 A. L.R. 120.). Such lien arises and exists only from the time it is caused to be entered upon the records
and notice thereof served upon the adverse party. (Rule 138, Section 37, Revised Rules of Court.). It may
be entered before or after the court renders judgment, without the necessity of filing a separate suit to
determine the amount of his claim and to enforce the lien. (Palanca vs. Pecson. 50 O.G. 1585.). It should
be filed in the case where services were rendered and not in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased client. (Matute Olivas vs. Canlas, 43 SCRA 463.). Before a charging lien can be
enforced, it is necessary that a judgment must first be secured. The procedure requires the attorney to
file a motion to record his charging lien with notice to the client and the adverse party. Before the lien is
annotated, the court shall give the client every opportunity to oppose it proving his grounds therefore.
One such ground is that the attorneys fees had already been paid. (Candelario vs. Caizares, 4 SCRA
738.). Upon the annotation of the lien, the attorney does not, however, acquire a right to be subrogated
in the rights of his client. It merely gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court; in short, he becomes an equitable assignee of the
judgment to the extent of the value of his services. (Epp. vs. Hinton, 102 Kan. 432.).

The retaining lien is distinguished from a charging lien in that the former is a general lien, that applies to
the documents and funds of the client in the lawyers possession regardless of the outcome of the case,
while the latter is a special lien for compensation on the fund or judgment which the attorney has
recovered. (Matute vs. Matute, 33 SCRA 35.).

8. Attorneys Fees as Costs

No attorneys fees shall be taxed as costs against the adverse party, except as provided by the rules of
civil law. But this section shall have no relation to the fees to be charged by an attorney as against his
client. (Rule 142, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court.).
In City and Municipal Courts, the allowable costs are only: for attendance of counsel on the day of the
trial, five pesos; and for each additional days attendance required in the actual trial of the case, one
peso. (Rule 142, Section 9b & c, Revised Rules of Court.).

In the Court of First Instance, the following costs may be recovered: for the complaint or answer, fifteen
pesos; and for attendance of attorney down to and including final judgment, twenty pesos. (Rule 142,
Section 10a & b, Revised Rules of Court.).

In the appellate courts, the following costs are recoverable: for attendance of attorney down to and
including final judgment, Thirty pesos before the Court of Appeals, and Fifty pesos before the Supreme
Court. (Rule 142, Section 11a, Revised Rules of Court.).

9. Attorneys Fees as Damages

As a rule, attorneys fees are not allowed as an element of damages. Consideration of public policy
makes it unwise to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel a defeated party to pay the fees of
counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide the door of temptation to the opposing party and
his counsel to swell fees to undue proportions, and to apportion such fees arbitrarily between those
properly pertaining to one branch of the case and the other. (Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26 Phil. 566; Andreas vs.
Green, 48 Phil. 463.).

In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (Article 2208, Civil Code of
the Philippines.).

Where the complaint is clearly unfounded and the record strongly indicates that it was filed for the
purpose of harassment, the plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount as attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation pursuant to article 2208 of the New Civil Code. (Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60,
etc.).

The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys fees. (Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155.).

Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be granted when defendant is in bad faith in refusing
plaintiffs valid claim. (Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation vs. Central Bank, 23 SCRA 1044; Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co. Inc. vs. Rodriguez, 58 SCRA 547.).

An award for attorneys fees is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel and the litigant, not his
counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees for execution. (Gan
Tion vs. Court of Appeals, 28 SCRA 235.).

Where the complaint was filed in good faith, attorneys fees cannot be granted to the defendants simply
because the judgment was favorable to them, for that may amount to imposing a premium on the right
to redress grievances in Court. In this case, we find no sufficient showing of bad faith in petitioners
having filed his taxpayers suit. Petitioners persistence could, perhaps, be attributed more to erroneous
conviction on his part in the righteousness of his cause rather than an act of harassment or vexation
against the respondents. (Gonzales vs. National Housing Corporation, et al., G.R. L-50092, December 18,
1979.). Compensation for Legal Services, 94 SCRA 794, December 18, 1979
 WHAT IS A JUDGE?

By

JOSE AGATON R. SIBAL

_______________

1.Judge the Visible Representation of the Law, p. 786

2.Embodiment of Competence, p. 786

3.Obedience to the Law, p. 787

4.Government Service, A Public Trust, p. 789

5.To Keep Abreast with the Laws, Rulings and Jurisprudence, p. 789

6.Duty of Investigating Judge, p. 790

7.Reminder, p. 791

_______________

1. Judge the Visible Representation of the Law

A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.1

A judge is the visible representation of the law and more importantly, of justice.2 As such, he should
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.3 The nature of a judges position demands equanimity,
prudence, fortitude and courage.4

2. Embodiment of Competence

A judge should be the embodiment of competence and independence and should administer justice
impartially and

_______________

1 Rule 1.08, Code of Judicial Conduct.

2 Arban vs. Borja, 143 SCRA 634; Fonacier-Albano vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538.

3 Inciong vs. De Guia, 154 SCRA 93.

4 See J. Perfectos dissent in Summers vs. Ozaeta, 81 Phil. 754 cited in Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1995 ed., p. 325.

without delay.5 He should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.6

A judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis of the complaint and
the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the
administration of justice if judges cannot just be accused of apparent deficiency in the analysis of the
facts of the case and in their grasp of the legal principles. For, the service in the judiciary means a
continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end.7

Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on his part, respondent judge
should have exercised the requisite prudence, especially under the environmental circumstances of the
criminal case where personal liberty was involved. He should have carefully examined all relevant facts
and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review
of the case which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legal questions. The
controversy could have been avoided had he kept with the injunction that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning
process in law never ceases.8

3. Obedience to the Law

The Supreme Court has several times before stressed that a judge is viewed as the visible representation
of law and justice and justice from whom the people draw their will and inclination to obey the law; the
judge must, accordingly, be

_______________

5 Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Code of Judicial Conduct.

6 Wingarts vs. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436.

7 Roa, Jr. vs. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57.

8 Wingarts vs. Mejia, supra, citing Re Comelec Resolution No. 2521, 234 SCRA 1.

the first to abide by the law and present an example for others to follow.9 Part and parcel of his duty to
be faithful to the law is his duty to exercise all necessary and appropriate diligence to ascertain that
instruments, like extrajudicial confessions of guilt of offenses so serious as triple murder to which he
attaches his signature, have complied with all reasonable fidelity with the requirements of the
Constitution and applicable law.10

The appropriate standards of judicial diligence of cases like this one were spelled out about a dozen
years ago in People vs. Barros,11 in the following manner: It would do well to remind judges, fiscals and
other officers to whom persons accused of a crime are brought for swearing to the truth of their
statements to adopt the practice of having the confessants physically and thoroughly examined by
independent and qualified doctors before administering the oath, even if it is not requested by the
accused. Or, if no doctor is immediately available, the swearing officers should themselves examine the
entire bodies of the confessants for marks of violence, particularly the portions covered by their
clothing. Such examination, if regularly required, and the results officially noted, would not only deter
attempts to secure confessions through violence, but ultimately shorten and speed up criminal trials by
precluding future controversies on whether the statements were obtained through torture or not.
Common sense advises that the swearing officers should not be content with affirmations by the
accused that their statements are voluntary, nor with denials that they were improperly procured.
Manifestations of this kind are to be expected of the accused who is to return to the custody of the
agents who obtained the confessions, since repudiation of the statement would only result in the
infliction of further punishment by those charged with improperly extracting the challenged
statements.

_______________

9 Sabitsana vs. Villamor, 202 SCRA 435; Impao vs. Makilala, 178 SCRA 541.

10 Moroo vs. Lomeda, 246 SCRA 69.

11 122 SCRA 34.

4. Government Service, A Public Trust

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than
a seat in the judiciary.12 Members of the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and free any appearance of impropriety in personal behavior, not only
in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life.13 They are strictly mandated to
maintain good moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage
public decency.14

Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that a judges official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Supreme Court has consistently demanded faithful
compliance with these canons and imposed administrative sanctions against erring judges.15

5. To Keep Abreast With the Laws, Rulings and Jurisprudence

In the case of Carpio vs. De Guzman,16 the Court reiterated the pressing responsibility of Judges to keep
abreast with the

_______________

12 Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258.

13 Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao vs. Tupas, 175 SCRA 292.

14 Legaspi vs. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679; see also Leynes vs. Veloso, 82 SCRA 325.

15 Antonino vs. Veles, 242 SCRA 171. See also National Intelligence and Security Authority vs. Tablang,
199 SCRA 766; In re: Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, 202 SCRA 638; Pico vs. Combong, 215 SCRA 421; Alfonso
vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 238.

16 262 SCRA 615.

law and changes therein, as well as with latest decisions of the Supreme Court.17 Ignorance of the law,
which everyone is bound to know, excuses no onenot even judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire
tenetur non excusat. Moreover, the role of justices and judges in the administration of justice requires a
continuous study of the law and jurisprudence,18 lest public confidence in the judiciary would be
eroded by the competent and irresponsible conduct of judges. A judge in accordance with sworn duties
should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.19

6. Duty of Investigating Judge

Within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall
transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the resolution of the case, stating briefly
the findings of facts and the law supporting his action, together with the entire records of the case,
which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits and other
supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused; (d) the order of released
of the accused and cancellation of his bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.20

In the case of Surigao Citizens Movement for Good Government vs. Coro,21 the respondent judge in the
case tried to cover up her negligence by claiming that she already issued resolutions forwarding these
cases to the provincial prosecutor for proper action. A close examination of the resolutions, however,
reveals that these were issued only in 1995. The complaints were filed from 1988 to 1992. This means
that the

_______________

17 Aurillo vs. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283. See also Vasquez vs. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10; Ajeno vs. Inserto, 71
SCRA 166; Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78.
18 Ting vs. Atal, 231 SCRA 80.

19 Canon 3, Rule 3.1, Code of Judicial Conduct.

20 Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.

21 262 SCRA 285.

cases have been pending for three to seven years before respondent judge acted on them. This is a clear
violation of the rule requiring municipal judges to resolve cases for preliminary investigation within ten
(10) days from conclusion thereof.

Furthermore, respondent judge has been remiss in her duty as presiding judge to conduct a periodic
review of the archived cases in her sala.22 It appears that all the archived cases in respondent judges
sala have remained untouched for several years. Respondent judge reviewed these cases only after
SURCIMO filed a complaint with the Executive Judge charging her with undue delay in the disposition of
cases. Were it not for the pressure exerted by the complainant, respondent judge would not have
attended to said cases.

The Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency and gross negligence for failure
to act promptly on the cases pending in her sala and for unduly archiving cases which are not within her
jurisdiction.

7. Reminder

This is a good time as any to remind judges, as they are expected to show more than a cursory
acquaintance with the elementary rules governing procedure x x x and well-settled authoritative
doctrines. Courts exist to promote justice and thus to serve public interest. Their administration should
be speedy and careful. Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the
business of the Court, so far as he can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community.23 What Is A
Judge?, 268 SCRA 786, February 27, 1997
 THE LIFE OF A JUDGE

By

Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

1.Introduction, p. 188.

2.Qualifications for Becoming a Judge, p. 189.

3.Judicial Conduct, p. 192.

4.Judicial Liabilities, p. 196.

5.Resume, p, 197.

________________

1. Introduction

The judicial office exists for one solemn purposeto promote justice and thus help in securing
happiness and contentment for the people. This purpose alone saddles the judge with tremendous
responsibilities. The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to his
personal conduct which concern his relation to the State and its inhabitants, the litigants before him, the
principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court, and the witnesses and attendants who aid him in
the administration of its functions. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 1).

A judge is a legal arbiter. People go to him seeking the proper application of the law to their causes; he
is expected to do it impartially and independently. His admission to the bar, in the first place, and his
appointment to the office is their guarantee that he is mentally and morally capable of passing upon the
merits of their various cases. To the average layman, he is beholden as a person whose life and way of
thinking has been moulded within the confines of law and justice. He is looked upon as an individual
gifted with a mature and just disposition. He is expected to be deserving of the trust and confidence
which the public necessarily places in his person, if they are to find the solution to their legal problems
in his office.

A judge siting on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. (Umale
vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84). Thus, a good judge invites the peaceful settlement of disputes in the
community by his office. By his erudition and fairness, he gains public confidence. In turn, people
welcome his judgement in settling their disputes. This is the general public feeling notwithstanding the
occasional passionate outbursts of defeated parties. On the other hand, a bad judge encourages
discontentment, dissension and strife in the community. In view of these actuations, people avoid his
office and instead take the law into their own hands.
To tip the scale in favor of a peaceful and contented constituency, a judges character should be
unquestionable. A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties
he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of
public clamor, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should
deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his
private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 31).

2. Qualifications for Becoming a Judge

To enable the citizens to have confidence in him, a judge must be learned, that is, he must have a
mastery of the principles that underlie the law. This may be quite exacting and too strict a standard with
which to measure ones worth as a judge, but the average citizen expects no less if he is to continue
seeking his rights through the courts. Even assuming that the standard is idealistic, it would not in the
least detract from the power of the people to demand an approximation of it from those who would
want to occupy the reversed position of a judge.

However, a judge must not be a genius or exceptionally gifted because if that were so, then very few
could be found to fill the various judicial offices in our country these days. He should be merely devoted
industriously to the study of the law. Judges of inferior courts, which according to the Constitution refer
to all those outside the Supreme Court, are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. (Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78). Having accepted his position, a
judge owes it to the dignity of his court, to the legal profession to which he belongs, and to the public
who is dependent upon him, to know the law which he is called upon to interpret and to apply. Instead
of spending his leisure time in pursuing pleasure, such time should be devoted to study and research. He
must be abreast with developments in the law, the latest rulings, decisions, and precedents. As has been
mentioned, one can have the capacity to be a judge who is a man of learning, who spends tirelessly the
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the
law. (Barker, quoted in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 209). A judge must be all these in order to
merit the position. Indeed, a judge who often quotes legal provisions in his rulings incorrectly, is not a
reliable individual to be trusted with for the answer to the peoples legal predicaments.

A judge must necessarily have good moral character. He should be gifted with a disposition to do right
and never wrong, to administer justice and not injustices. More than the practitioner, he should have a
strong moral fiber to enable him to resist the temptations that surround his office.

An individual with a perverted thinking of right and wrong is not fit and not safe to sit in judgment of
persons who seek his office, is tendency is to misapply the law and this causes loss of confidence in the
judiciary. It is truly dangerous to allow such an individual to occupy this position with such powers and
prerogatives. A judge with a predisposition towards wrong is bound to commit even minor legal
infractions thus setting a bad example.

A judge should be courageous in his mission to administer justice. He must be above public clamor and
the considerations of personal popularity. He must be brave enough to displease any man or interest or
power, but should render justice without regard for his personal advantages or safety. Thus, if evidence
warrants it, the conscientious and fearless judge must decide a case against a close relative of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court before which institution the judges promotion may be pending. Nor
should he have fear to decide a case against a bosom friend or a close relative, even if it means incurring
their unending condemnation and hatred. As such, a judge should be mindful that his duty is the
application of general law to particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and
that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may
personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it
to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
law. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 18).

Thus also, while a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind that his
undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a sever attitude on
his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of
trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and
lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a
controversial tone.

He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or a premature judgment.
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 14).

3. Judicial Conduct

A judges personal behavior in his day-to-day life must be beyond reproach. In his community, he stands
as the legal symbol. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law and he should be the example for
others. He should be very, very careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. Thus, one
important judicial norm is that a judges official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety.
(Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 and reiterated in Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27).

He should abstain from participating in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved. If he
has personal litigation in the court of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that
account, but he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 28). Likewise, he should not accept any presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers
practicing before him, (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 29).
A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will
in any way interfere with his devotion of the expeditious and proper administration of his official
functions. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 23). Thus, while judges are not disqualified from holding
executorships or trusteeships, they should not accept or continue to hold any fiduciary or other position
if the holding of it would interfere or seem to interfere with the proper performance of their judicial
duties, or if the business interests of those represented require investments in enterprises that are apt
to come before the court, or to be involved in questions of law to be determined by it. (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 26).

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective
litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 30).

While entitled to entertain his personal views on political questions, and while not required to surrender
his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will
attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party against
another.

A judge should avoid making political speeches, contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of
candidates for political office, or participating in party conventions. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 27).

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments
previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It
is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally
tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.

It is highly improper for a judge to utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for purposes of
speculation, and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of his judicial
judgment for him at any time to become a speculative investor upon the hazard of a margin. (Canons of
Judicial jethics, 25).

He should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of
his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private
business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private
business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of his
office or the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he should not solicit for
charities, nor should he enter into any business relations which, in the normal course of events
reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interests into conflict with the impartial
performance of his official duties. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 24).

He should be temperate, patient, attentive, impartial, and, since he is to administer the law and apply it
to the facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law, diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the
facts. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 4). Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that judges should be temperate and
patient, courteous to counsel. (Delgra Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237).

A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 3).

A judge administers justice. As such, a judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general
law to particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his
duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding upon
him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should
administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 18). Judges, in their seal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and
should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their
power as laid down by the statute and by the rules of procedure. (Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52).

Judges should decide cases promptly (Secretary of Justice vs. Bullecer, 56 SCRA 24); they should strictly
and faithfully observe laws and regulations regarding pursuance of other vocations (Jakosalem vs.
Cordoves, 58 SCRA 11); and their decisions should be faithful to the norms of judicial duty. (Bondoc vs.
De Guzman, 57 SCRA 135). Justice should not be molded by the individual idiosyncracies of those who
administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be
extreme or peculiar in his judgment, or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court. Though
vested with discretion in the imposition of mild severe sentences, he should not compel persons
convicted or to submit accused to some humiliating act or discipline of his own devising, without
authority of law, because he thinks it will have a beneficial corrective influence.

Judges imposing sentence should endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and
should not seek popularity either by exceptional severity or undue leniency. (Canons of Judicial Ethics,
19).

He should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him.
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 5). His interest in his office should be one which stops not at the minimum of
the days labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which
proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. (In re
impeachment of Judge Floredeliza, 44 Phil. 608). He should be prompt in disposing of all matters
submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied. (Canons of Judicial Ethics,
6). He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 7).

He should organize his court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business and he
should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, sheriffs, and other assistants who are sometimes
prone to presume too much upon his good-natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association with
him. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 8).

He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 9). Judges should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced,
and also to all others concerned in the administration of justice in their courts.

They should also require, and, as far as their power extends, enforce on the part of clerks, court officers,
and counsel civility and courtesy to witnesses, litigants, and others having business with the court.
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 10).

Judges should discourage ex parte hearing of applications for injunctions and receiverships where the
order may work detriment to absent parties; they should act upon ex parte applications only where the
necessity for quick action is clearly shown; if this be demonstrated, then the judge should endeavor to
counteract the effect of the absence of opposing counsel by scrupulous cross-examination and
investigation as to the facts and the principles of law upon which the application is based, granting relief
only when fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The judge should
remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendants and should
not be granted lightly or inadvisedly. One applying for such relief must sustain the burden of showing
clearly its necessity and this burden is increased in the absence of the party whose freedom of action is
to be restrained temporarily. (Canons of judicial Ethics, 15).

4. Judicial Liabilities

Under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, a judge who directly or indirectly impedes or impairs the civil
liberties of another person, shall be liable to the latter for damages, provided that the act or omission of
the judges complained of constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or any other penal statute.

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision,
shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. (Article 204, Revised Penal
Code). A judicial officer is not liable criminally for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith,
and that he may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgement only if it is shown beyond
cavil that the judgment is unjust as being contrary to law or as not supported by evidence, and that the
same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Evangelista vs. Baes, 61
SCRA 475).

Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall render a manifestly unjust
judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and temporary
special disqualification. (Article 205, Revised Penal Code). To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a
manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown,
according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. (In re Hon. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107). In the absence of evidence that the
judge decided the cases out of ignorance, partisanship, favoritism or with intent to violate the law, he
cannot be said to have rendered an unjust judgement. (Lampanog vs. Villarojo, 55 SCRA 304

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable
neglicence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be
suspension. (Article 206, Revised Penal Code).

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of
malicious delay in the administration of justice. (Article 207, Revised Penal Code).

5. Resume

Since judges hold quite a sensitive position, it is but necessary that they act properly at all times and that
the Supreme Court, which has supervision over them, be ever watchful for judges of inferior courts, who
may sometimes be forgetful of their sworn duties and responsibilities. In a substantial number of cases
filed against judges, quite a number were resolved in their favor. However, the case subject of
annotation is worthy of note because of the actuations of the respondent judge and because of the
somewhat forceful language used in the decision.

In said case, the respondent judge was accused of conniving with the Mayor of Rizal, Cagayan in the
filing of a fictitious criminal case of qualified trespass against Hermogenes Anguluan and other persons
resulting in the imprisonment of the persons charged for three (3) days and of advising the complainants
and Aleco Anguluan, Diosdado Gundan and Jose de la Cruz, to sign an affidavit without explaining the
contents thereof and without allowing them to read said affidavit. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
alleged in the criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police that the crime was committed on
December 10, 1973. The criminal complaint was filed only on June 18, 1974. The respondent judge
should have known immediately by simply reading the criminal complaint that the crime charged had
prescribed. The respondent judge displayed gross ignorance of the law in giving due course to the
criminal complaint as a result of which the persons accused were detained for three days. Although the
preliminary examination was conducted on August 29, 1974, the warrant of arrest was issued only on
August 3, 1976. The failure of the respondent judge to issue the warrant of arrest within a reasonable
time is suspicious. The respondent judge was either ignorant of his duty or he was impelled by an
ulterior motive. And finally, the respondent judge admitted that he did not explain the affidavit to the
affiants before he administered the oath. His excuse that he could not read without his eyeglasses is
asinine, to say the least. (Anguluan and Anguluan vs. Taguba, Adm. Matter No. 1402-MJ, September 14,
1979).
This case once again showed that the Supreme Court is indeed worthy of public trust. This decision truly
exhibits the statesmanship of the members of that august institution, who are models not only for
judges but also the general public. Said members have manifested themselves as true examples of what
judicial officers should be and they have once again proven that the Supreme Court is the final bulwark
of democracy. The Life of a Judge, 93 SCRA 188, September 14, 1979
 JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

By

FLORIMOND C. ROUS

_______________

1.Introduction, p. 720

1.Scope and related matters, p. 720

(a)Scope, p. 720

(b)Related Annotations, p. 720

2.Background data, p. 721

(a)Definitions and other allied issues, p. 721

(b)Legal Pointers, p. 721

2.Specific Matters Involving Judicial Misconduct, p. 722

3. Abuse of Discretion, p. 722

4.Inefficiency, p. 726

_______________

1. Introduction

1. Scope and related matters

(a) Scope

This annotation compiles cases involving issues and matters regarding judicial misconduct. The specific
issues together with the cases are: abuse of discretion and inefficiency. ficiency. For purposes of this
annotation, the cases given are those which have a bearing to the issues involved.

(b) Related A nnotations

Judicial Decorum, 99 SCRA 149,

Judicial Conduct, 78 SCRA 379.

Judicial Conduct in Court Trials, 60 SCRA 343.

Significant Observations on Judicial Discretion, 45 SCRA 349.

2. Background data

(a) Definitions and other allied issues,

Judge, A public officer who by virtue of his office is clothed with judicial authority.

A public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in accordance with law. In its most
extensive senses the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace.

The term judge in Sec. 54, Rev. Election Code, comprehends all kinds of judges, like judges of the Court
of First Instance, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
and justices of the peace. (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 687).

Court. The words courts and judges are used synonymously and interchangeably, generally
speaking. In ordinary parlance, judges are spoken of as courts and courts are referred to when the
person means the judge only, It is common for laymen, lawyers and judges, as well as the law, to use
these terms interchangeably. But there is an important distinction between the court, as an entity, and
the person who occupies the position of judge, Courts may exist without a judge. There may be a judge
without a court. (Pamintuan vs. Llorente, 29 Phil. 346).

(b) Legal Pointers

When confronted with cases involving judicial misconduct, the legal practitioner should constantly bear
in mind the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly Rule 135; Rule 137; Rule 138, Section
35; and Rule 140; the Canons of Judicial Ethics; the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 204, 205,
206, and 207; Articles 32 and 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and Article 14(1) of the Code of
Commerce. These are the provisions which constitute the basic law in any question or issue involving
this subject matter,

2. Specific Matters Involving Judicial Misconduct

3. A buse of Discretion

Disapproval of amended record on appeal again for alleged non-compliance with Rules is arbitrary and a
grave abuse of discretion. (National Electrification Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 394).

Disapproval by trial court of appearance of Comelec lawyer for petitioners who are indigents and denial
of his request for extension of time to file record on appeal for petitioners constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. (Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 753).

Refusal of judge to accept the bond offered by actual of land to discharge receiver constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. (Abrigo vs. Kayanan, 121 SCRA 20).
A judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing Clerk of Court as receiver. (Abrigo vs.
Kayanan, 121 SCRA 20),

Judge is guilty of grave abuse of discretion and lawyer is negligent in failing to notify Court of their
withdrawal from the case, (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMA WU-MIF) vs. Reyes, 117
SCRA 585).

Motion of defendant for extension of time to file answer to the complaint filed on the date of trial is
proper and trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring defendant in default. (Joes-steel
Container Corporation vs. Commonwealth Financing Corporation, 117 SCRA 43).

Denial of first postponement by court constitutes grave abuse of discretion and denial of due process.
(Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Caizares-Nye, 116 SCRA 312).

Capricious disregard by judge in not complying with requirements before issuance of search warrants
constitutes abuse of discretion. (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657).

Grave abuse of discretion was committed by trial court for declaring petitioner as in default despite
absence of notice to it of the pre-trial. (Zenith Insurance Corporation vs. Purisima, 114 SCRA 62).

Trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside an order of provisional dismissal
despite receipt of motion for postponement of the fiscal on the same day said order was issued. (People
vs. Araula, 111 SCRA 598).

The respondent judges refusal to allow the presentation of the newly discovered evidence concerning
the alleged unregistered voters, as well as the undue haste with which he rendered the decision in the
electoral protest manifested his arbitrariness and are indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. (Seares vs. Hernando, 110 SCRA 343).

There being a valid ground for petitioners request for deferment of hearing, respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same, (Estubaya vs. Mijares, 108 SCRA 98).

The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in refusing the reasonable request of appellants
counsel to withdraw as counsel because he was appointed Judge and of new counsel to be given
extension of time to file appellants brief. (Fabio vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 58).

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the rule that litigants have no
right to assume that extension of time to file appellants brief shall be granted to the instant case
Inasmuch as appellant died during the pendency of the appeal Under the Rules, the courts are required
to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative to represent the
estate of a deceased party, (Vda de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534).

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (Imutan vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 286),
Grave abuse of discretion is committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying application for probation
despite ample evidence that applicant is entitled to the benefits of probation.

(Cabatingan vs. Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA 187).

Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the government to take immediate possession of
the properties to be expropriated along affected streets, (De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660).

Disapproval by judge of record on appeal for lack of subject index constitutes grave abuse of discretion,
correctible by certiorari. (Abuso vs. Acosta, 100 SCRA 223).

For petition for certiorari to prosper, the grave abuse of discretion committed by tribunal must be
shown. (Ignacio vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 048),

The Supreme Court can review or alter findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations if such findings
are completely devoid of basis and there is grave abuse of discretion. (Citizens League of Free Workers
vs, Court of Industrial Relations, 98 SCRA 225).

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it
prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was already extinguished. The Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the
information charging him with that offense, (Lontok, Jr. us. Gorgonio, 89 SCRA 632).

Considering that petitioners amended record 011 appeal in the instant case was approved on January
15, 1966, and that the adverse party does not dispute the correctness, accuracy and veracity of such
findings, the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the ap-
peal (Manipol vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 513).

Grave abuse of discretion was committed when order of dismissal was set aside and the criminal case
against the accused was reinstated or revived (Salcedo us. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811).

Trial judge gravely abused his discretion for not granting postponement sought by defendants on
account of illness. (Peggy vs. Tapucar, 88 SCRA 785).

Where motion to dismiss was based on disputed facts, the trial judge who refused to set it for hearing at
the insistence of the other party and who orders the dismissal of the case commits a grave abuse of
discretion. (Arceo vs. Aquino, 88 SCRA 15).

Declaring defendant in default when period for filing of answer has not yet expired constitutes abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (Flora vs. Nicolas, 87 SCRA 58).

Disregard of available facts by a judge constitutes grave abuse of discretion. (Commissioner of Customs
vs. Geronimo, 80 SCRA 74).
ln order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence, and that
the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Ruiz, Jr. vs. Avenido, 79
SCRA 4).

A trial judge who failed to order the arrest of the accused, who was charged with slight physical injuries,
after his failure to appear at the trial despite due notice of his bondsmen and who pleaded guilty to the
charge is warned and admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duties. (Veloso vs.
Carmona, 11 SCRA 286),

A trial judge who meticulously examined the evidence in a criminal case before him and explained the
reasons why he acquitted the accused therein cannot be found liable of grave abuse of discretion.
(Cortez vs. Constantino, 75 SCRA 12),

Refusal of the judge to furnish counsel with a copy of the transcript and order issued in open court is
misconduct in office. (Tamo vs. Gironella, 73 SCRA 613).

It is the duty of the municipal judges to first examine witnesses personally, under oath and reduced to
writing, to determine whether or not probable cause exists that accused is guilty of crime charged
before issuance of warrant of arrest. (Rolando vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 543).

In the exercise of a judges discretion, the judge must be free to act in accordance with his own
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, (City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 12 SCRA 98).

A judge who takes cognizance of and tries a case previously assigned to another branch of the court
without reasonable explanation for doing so commits a grave abuse of discretion, (Luque vs. Kayanan,
29 SCRA 165),

The reliance by a judge on private inf ormation to dissolve an injunction is an abuse of discretion.
(Canlas vs. Aquino, 2 SCRA 814).

4. Inefficiency

The question of power is not involved herein. That is inherent in any judicial tribunal. But having found
that evidence was wanting to link LAI MAN to the mailing of the foreign currencies, there can be no
justification for respondent judge to have ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign
currencies to said LAI MAN. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds RESPONDENT Regional Trial Court Judge, Manuel E. Valenzuela, guilty of
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and considering the responsibility of
this Court for the just and orderly functioning of this countrys Judiciary, with power of discipline, and
although recent developments now preclude us from dismissing him from the service, it is hereby
ordered that all leave and retirement benef its and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby
forfeited with prejudice to being reinstated in any branch of public service, whether pertaining to local
or national government, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
(People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela and George Lai Man, G.R. Nos. 6395060, April
19, 1985).

A penalty of fine equivalent to six (6) months salary meted on judge for serious ignorance of law.
(Monsanto vs. Palarca, 126 SCRA 45).

Trial judge errs in dismissing a complaint which contains two causes of action where one of them clearly
states a suffi-cient cause of action against the defendant. (Mendoza vs. Bautista, 121 SCRA 760)

Where the lawyers alleged contumacious language contained in a brief is directed against the appellate
court, not the trial judge, the judge is without jurisdiction to punish the lawyer for contempt.
(Evangelista vs. Sepulveda, 121 SCRA 884).

Tardiness of petitioners counsel in court attendance for a very short time occasioned by excusable
negligence, not a license for trial judge to deprive petitioner of his right to be heard. (Advento vs.
Mijares, 120 SCRA 45).

Judge found delaying resolution on motion for reconsideration is fined equivalent to three months
salary. (Vda. de Ochoa vs. Tolentino, 118 SCRA 222).

Lack of key personnel having only one working stenographer overloaded with cases to transcribe are no
excuse for trial judge to delay by seven (7) months resolution of a motion. (Shan, Jr. vs. Aguinaldo, 117
SCRA 32).

For failure to decide a case within 90 days, a judge is fined equivalent to the salary for 30 days and with
warning. (Lagaret vs. Bantuas, 114 SCRA 603).

A trial judge must not delay the promulgation of the decision in a criminal case. (Yu vs. Consolacion-
Serrano, 113 SCRA 450).

A judge could not use his clerk of court as scapegoat for his slothfulness in submitting monthly reports.
(Yu vs. Consolacion-Serrano, 113 SCRA 450).

Trial judge is admonished for resolving a motion after lapse of more than eight months. (Corporate
Managers and Consultants, Inc. vs. Acosta, 113 SCRA 281).

Only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judges alleged error was committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against
a trial judge (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178).

A trial judge is admonished for not property taking care of the records of a case and his notes of the trial
which thereby resulted in delay in the promulgation of the judgment. (Pealosa vs. Rosero, 111 SCRA
171).

Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. A judge could be

inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence,
and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. (Suroza vs. Honrado,
110 SCRA 388).

Administrative action may be taken against a judge at the court of first instance for serious misconduct
or inefficiency. (Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388).

Where judge is found guilty of gross negligence and incompetence, he is hereby fined an amount
equivalent to three (3) months salary with a stern warning that a repetition of similar offense will be
dealt with more severely, (Pernea vs. Montecillo, 109 SCRA 424).

Rendering a decision in a civil case beyond the reglementary 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency. (In re: Jose P. Madara, 104 SCRA 245).

Delay in resolving a motion to dismiss a civil case pending before a judges sala within the reglementary
90-day period fixed in the Constitution and submission of false certificates of service are not excusable,
(De Leon vs. Castro, 104 SCRA 241).

Delay in deciding a case beyond the 90-day period required by Section 5 of the Judiciary Act constitutes
an act of slothfulness. (Penera vs. Dalocanog, 104 SCRA 193).

Delay by judge in transmittal of records to the Court of First Instance upon conclusion of a preliminary
investigation constitutes dereliction of duty. (Cusit vs. Jurado, 102 SCRA 633).

Postponements for a few months could still be explicable but delay for ten (10) years is reprehensible.
(Bulan vs. Cardenas, 101 SCRA 788).

A municipal judge who postponed the hearing of a criminal case indefinitely should be dismissed from
the service. (Bulan vs. Cardenas, 101 SCRA 788).

Judge is censured or reprimanded for his unawareness of, or unfamiliarity with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and the duration and graduation of penalties. (In re: Judge Jose G. Paulin.
101 SCRA 605).

Failure of judge to set aside case for hearing for reception of offended partys evidence of civil liability of
accused who had pleaded guilty to the crime of less serious physical injuries, judge is warned and
admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duties. (Morta, Sr. vs. Alviso, Jr., 101 SCRA
221).

Delay of four years in disposition of cases assigned in judges sala cannot be countenanced. (Flor vs.
Cruz, Jr., 101 SCRA 43).

Delay in rendering a decision of a criminal case for more than 2 years is inexcusable. (Singson, Sr. vs.
Villanueva, 101 SCRA 39).

Making untruthful statements in monthly certificates of service of disposition of cases and motions
submitted for decision for 90 days, and admitted failure to retrieve for a long time the records of a civil
case, constitutes gross negligence and irresponsibility, fine of 3 months and warning. (Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc. vs. Garcia, 100 SCRA 542).

Charge of uttering intemperate language constitutes conduct unbecoming a judge (Santos us. Cruz, 100
SCRA 538).

A judge may not engage in private business without the written permission of the Supreme Court.
(Borre vs. Moya, 100 SCRA 314).

Complainants desistance or loss of interest in prosecuting his case does not warrant dismissal of case if
the charge can be sufficiently established. (Advincula vs. Malicudio, 100 SCRA 39).

A Court of Agrarian Relations judge cannot be excused for not delivering at once, and instead waiting for
several months on the ground that he wanted to wait for the termination of a closely related case. The
judge is reprimanded. (Castro vs. Malazo, 99 SCRA 164).

Although judges may be excused for occasional mistakes or for failure to keep abreast with decisions of
the Supreme Court, they must show more than cursory acquaintance with the rules on preliminary
investigation and authoritative doctrines. (Duplas vs. Arquiza, 99 SCRA 141).

Misrepresentation of judge in his answer to the complaint is highly censurable. (Ubongon vs. Mayo, 99
SCRA 30).

An attorney who files in the trial court a motion for issuance of a writ of execution for his fees, while the
resolution of the Supreme Court thereon is still pending, on the ground that the Supreme Court failed to
resolve the claim within 18 months as provided for in the Constitutiona provision not yet interpreted
by the Supreme Court, and a trial judge who grants such a motion are both guilty of contempt of court.
They are both reprimanded. (Corpus vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 424),

Judge is reprimanded and admonished for his failure to pro mulgate a decision in a case within three
months after the case was submitted for decision. (Beduya us. Alpuerto, 96 SCRA 673).

Judge who was previously fined one months salary is fined equivalent to three months pay for not
inhibiting himself in a criminal case where an accused is his nephew. (Rivera vs. Barro, 96 SCRA 338).

A judge is required to inhibit himself where one of the accused is related to him within the fourth
degree, even where the fiscal asked for the dismissal of the case pending reinvestigation, (Rivera vs.
Barro, 96 SCRA 338).

A judges failure to observe the procedure of holding a person in contempt warrants a corrective penalty
of one months pay forfeiture. (Galangin vs. Abad, 96 SCRA 329).

Transcription of stenographic notes and complicated nature of case is not a valid defense for not
deciding a case within 90 days. The Trial judge is reprimanded, (Guitante vs. Bantuas, 95 SCRA 433).
A trial judge should not appoint his clerk of court as administrator of a decedents estate. (Vasquez vs.
Malvar, 85 SCRA 10).

Failure by judge to act speedily on a motion to dismiss a criminal case for which an accused had
languished in jail for more than one month constitutes neglect of duty. (Rodriguez vs. Barro, 84 SCRA
663).

The facts as found justify the complaint for gross inefficiency as the respondent judge failed to comply
with basic prerequisites for issuance of search warrant. (Secretary of Justice vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301).

Where judge failed to decide a case within statutory ninetyday period, having continued to collect his
salaries in the meantime, upon his certification that he had no pending matters to resolve, such judge
may be administratively sanctioned. (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, 73 SCRA 110).

A judge for failure to decide within statutory ninety-day period, having continued to collect his salaries
in the meantime, upon his certification that he had no pending matters to resolve deserves proper
sanction. (Raval vs. Romero, 72 SCRA 172).

A municipal judge who heard a cadastral case notwithstanding the absence of any cadastral answer by
the claimant in the cadastral case and who admitted that he did not personally prepare the decision in
said case is subject to disciplinary action and fined in an amount equivalent to one month s salary. (Lim,
Jr. vs. Vacante, 69 SCRA 376).

A judge may not put the blame on his clerk of court for his remissness and slothfulness. (Tadiar vs.
Cases, 60 SCRA 215).

A judges failure to file his order of dismissal of two criminal cases in the records of the same and his act
of furnishing the prosecution a copy thereof only after the lapse of more than one year af ter the
issuance impairs public confidence in the fair and honest administration of justice and shows that judge
is unfit for office, (Tadiar vs. Cases, 60 SCRA 215).

Inattention to duty shown by respondent judge is punishable. (Macabasa vs. Banaag, 57 SCRA 465).

Municipal judge, who errs in rendering judgment based or personal notes of another judge, may be
admonished (Ladrada vs. Cachola, 56 SCRA 64).

Leniency of a judge in administrative supervision of his employees is an undesirable trait. (Buenaventura

vs. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). Judicial Misconduct, 135 SCRA 720, April 9, 1985
 THE CONSUMMATE JUDGE

By

JULIANA DE CASTRO-AZARRAGA*

_________________

I.Introduction, p. 171

II.Duty of Judges, p. 172

1.Proper and efficient court management, p. 172

2.Courtesy and civility, p. 173

3.Prompt disposition of court business, p. 173

a)Reason for the rule, p. 174

4.Mastery of the principles of law, p. 174

5.Exacting standards of decorum required of judges, p. 175

III.Disqualification of a Judge, p. 176

A.Under the Rules of Court, p. 176

B.Due Process Requirement, p. 176

a)Effect of the filing of an administrative charge, p. 177

b)Can a judge revoke his voluntary inhibition?, p. 178

IV.Preparation of Decision, p. 178

A.Delay in the Disposition of a Case, p. 178

1.Exception, p. 179

B.Writing and Signing of Judgment by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case, p. 179

C.Erroneous Order or Decision; When to Merit Disciplinary Action, p. 179

1.Judicial remedies against errors in a decision, p. 180

_______________
* Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City.

D.Unjust Judgment; When is There One; Remedies, p. 180

E.Authority to Interfere with Acts of Another Judge, p. 180

F.Procedure in Writing and Signing of Judgment by Acting Presiding Judges and Acting/Assisting Judges
in Branches other than Their Own, p. 182

G.Right of Judge to Question Witnesses, p. 183

V.Prohibitions and Restrictions on Judges, p. 184

VI.Conduct and Behavior Unbecoming of Judges, p. 185

A.Contemptuous Conduct; When is There Such, p. 185

B.Improper Conduct, p. 185

C.Oppressive Conduct, p. 187

D.Abuse of Discretion, p. 187

E.Inefficiency, p. 188

F.Immorality, p. 188

G.Ignorance of the Law, p. 189

H.Absenteeism, p. 191

I.Partiality and Bias, p. 191

_________________

I. Introduction

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial functions, but also in his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. (Garcia vs. Valdez, 292 SCRA 461) One who occupies a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of justice must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of
such exalted office. A Judges private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all
appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. (Dysico vs. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283)

II. Duty of Judges

1. Proper and efficient court management

The judge is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official duties. He cannot take
refuse behind the supposed mistakes or inefficiency of his clerk of court.

Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

A judge should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
(Canon 18, Canons of Judicial Ethics; Conducto vs. Monson, 291 SCRA 619)

A judge should, at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should adopt a firm
policy against improvident postponementsmore importantly, he should follow the time limit set for
deciding cases. (Hernandez vs. De Guzman, 252 SCRA 64)

Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions in dispensing justice, should be more circumspect
in the performance of their duties. (Galvez vs. Eduardo, 252 SCRA 570)

In far-flung municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, MTC and MCTC judges
assigned to those municipalities or circuits may, in their capacities as notaries public ex-officio, perform
any act within the competence of a regular notary public provided that (a) all notarial fees charged be
for the amount of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer, and (b) a certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. (Tabao vs. Asis, 252 SCRA 581)

2. Courtesy and civility

All judges should always observe courtesy and civility. (Re-tuya vs. Equipilag, AM No. 1431-MJ, July 16,
1979, 91 SCRA 416)

Judges should be temperate, patient and courteous. (Delgra vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237) In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone, or a tone that creates
animosity. He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance in court. (Canon 9 and 14,
Canons of Judicial Ethics)

3. Prompt disposition of court business

The Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the period fixed by law. (Canon 3, Rule 3.05) They are called to be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. (Id., Rule 3.01)

Article VIII, par. 15(1) of the Constitution states:

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months, for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.

To implement the constitutional mandate, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required period.

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for
decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period
specified in the Constitution. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting judge. (Alfonso-Cortez vs. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482; Mappala vs. Nuez,
etc., 240 SCRA 600)

a) Reason for the rule

1. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute. (Abarquez vs. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109)

2. The court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. (Bendesula vs. Laya, etc., 58 SCRA
16; Castro vs. Malazo, 99 SCRA 164)

4. Mastery of the principles of law

The role of judges in the administration of justice requires a continuous study and research on the law
and jurisprudence. (Mamolo vs. Narisma, 252 SCRA 613) Service in the judiciary means a continuous
study and research from beginning to end. (Mendoza vs. Lavilles, 254 SCRA 286)

Those who wield the judicial gavel have the duty to study our laws and their latest wrinklesthey owe it
to the public to be legally knowledgeable for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. (Bio vs.
Valera, 257 SCRA 462)

Judges are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars adopted by the
Supreme Court which affect the conduct of cases before them. (Bayog vs. Natino, 256 SCRA 378)

To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are
expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that
magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. (Cortes vs. Agcaoili,
294 SCRA 425) Judges can live up to the expectations of being faithful to the law and maintaining
professional competence, Canon 3, Rule 3.01, only by diligent effort to keep themselves always abreast
of the legal and jurisprudential developmentsthe learning process in law is a never ending and
ceaseless process. (Re: Hold Departure Order, issued by Judge Juan C. Nartatez, 298 SCRA 710)
A judge who, through ignorance of the law or serious misconduct, frustrates the ends of justice,
commits a rank disservice to the cause of justice which calls for the application of appropriate
disciplinary measures. (Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr., 232 SCRA 690 [1994]). Gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. (Estoya vs. Singson, 237 SCRA 1
[1994]). Observance of the law he is bound to know is required of judges (Hermo vs. Dela Rosa, 299
SCRA 68)

5. Exacting standards of decorum required of judges

A judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice. (Vedaa vs. Valencia, 295 SCRA 1) A judge is the visible representation of the law and the
embodiment of the peoples sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep himself
away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his
everyday actuations. (Lao vs. Abelita III, 295 SCRA 267)

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he has been counsel for a party without the
written consent of all the parties in interest signed by them and entered upon the record. (Inhibition of
Judge Eddie R. Roxas, RTC-Br. 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato, 298 SCRA 306)

As exemplars of law and justice, judges must avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of
impropriety in all their actionsthey should not take undue interest in the settlement of criminal cases
as the same may compromise the integrity and impartiality of their office. (Ferrer vs. Maramba, 290
SCRA 44)

In Lao vs. Abelita III, the Investigating Justice has aptly declared the sentiment of the Court in saying
that

The administration of justice is a mission. Judges from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in
the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights, looked upon as the embodiments of all that is right,
just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages
every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This
should not come to pass.

III. Disqualification of a Judge

A. Under the Rules of Court

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to the other party, within the fourth civil
degree computed according to the rules of the civil law or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee, or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court where his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record. (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546; Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court)
B. Due Process Requirement

A judge who told the offended party that their case is weak even before they had been fully heard will
be disqualified from further hearing the case. (Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124) In this particular case, the
Court said:

In every human litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial
judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him
to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
impressions. He is to ref rain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be
deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well
as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the
balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that would cast doubt on his
impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with
constitutional significance. As set forth in Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz:1 It is now beyond dispute that due
process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient
to reassure litigants of his being fair and just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: It has been
said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal,
and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.2

It is in line with the due process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for disqualification of
judges,3 outside of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection,
or his having presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is the subject of review.

Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall not allow family, social or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. (Villaluz vs. Mijares, 288 SCRA 594)

a) Effect of the filing of an administrative charge.

The mere filing of an administrative charge against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from
hearing the case. (Rosello vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 459)

_______________

1 50 SCRA 18.

2 Gutierrez vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249.

3 Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court.

b) Can a judge revoke his voluntary inhibition?

In ruling against such an action, the Court said:

We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed in him by the
parties as an impartial and objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that give rise,
fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but
to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that (a) judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in
litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt (on) his honest actuations and probity
in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He
should exercise discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The
better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. (Garcia vs. Burgos, 291 SCRA 546; Bautista vs.
Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535)

IV. Preparation of Decision

A. Delay in the Disposition of a Case

Failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitute gross
inefficiency. (Lambino vs. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60) Non-observance of the rule is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. (Alfonso-Cortes vs. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482
[1993])

A judge who fails to decide cases within the required period and continues to collect his salaries upon
his certification that he has no pending matters to resolve, transgresses the constitutional rights of
litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. (Lambino vs. De Vera, supra.)

Respondent judge is guilty of delay in deciding cases where three (3) years had gone by, after the
prosecution rested its case and the accused was considered to have waived her right to introduce
evidence by her failure to do so, without a decision in sight. (Sta. Ana vs. Arinday, Jr., 283 SCRA 392)

1. Exception

Where the delay in the disposition of a case is beyond the control of the judge, especially in the absence
of any showing that it was done in bad faith and intended to prejudice party to the case or that it was
motivated by some ulterior ends, the judge should not be blamed for the delay.

B. Writing and Signing of Judgment by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case

That the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated
the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, considering that
the whole record is available for his perusal. (People vs. Rabutin, 272 SCRA 197; People vs. Epaola, 271
SCRA 689; Arceo vs. People, 256 SCRA 569 [1996]). It is axiomatic that a judge who did not hear the
case may write the decision based on the record of the case. (People vs. Sorrel, 278 SCRA 368; People
vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 [1996]).

However, a judges assessment of the credibility of the witnesses must be received with caution if he
neither personally heard the testimonies of the witnesses nor observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. (People vs. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344)

C. Erroneous Order or Decision; When to Merit Disciplinary Action

To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake of a judge must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate, or in bad faith. (Del Callar vs. Salvador, 268 SCRA 320)

As a matter of public policy not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
make him liable therefor. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the act of a judge in his
official capacity does not always amount to misconduct although such acts may be erroneous. (Riego vs.
Leachon, Jr., 268 SCRA 777)

An erroneous dismissal of an election protest which is a mere error of judgment is not enough to cast
suspicion of foul play or intentional delay on the part of a judge. (Miranda vs. Castillo, 274 SCRA 503)

Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judges integrity, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge, unless
the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. (Webb vs.
People, 276 SCRA 243)

1. Judicial remedies against errors in a decision

The law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a trial court
in the exercise of its jurisdictionthe ordinary remedies include a motion for reconsideration and
appeal, while the extraordinary remedies are, inter alia, the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. (Flores vs.
Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302)

D. Unjust Judgment; When is There One; Remedies

To hold a judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
(Naval vs. Panay, 275 SCRA 654) It must likewise be shown that the judgment is unjust or that it is
contrary to law or not supported by evidence and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice. (Gonzales vs. Bersamin, 254 SCRA 652)

E. Authority to Interfere with Acts of Another Judge

A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or judge. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. De Guzman, Jr., 267 SCRA 291)
It is well-settled that a judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently
assigned to him. (Washington Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 821)

Petitioners contend that, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Judge Descallar had authority to
quash the search warrant previously issued by Judge De la Rosa. This contention is well-taken. The fact
that Judge De la Rosa was the executive judge is not material, because jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in qua executive judge. (Mina vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 246 SCRA 229 [1995], cited
in Washington Distillers, Inc. vs. CA, supra.)

It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search
warrant. (Malalaon vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249 [1994]) It may be conceded, as a matter of
policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch
thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet
been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses
contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to
be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal
case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by
Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the courts
territorial jurisdiction. (Malalaon vs. Court of Appeals, supra)

F. Procedure in Writing and Signing of Judgment by Acting Presiding Judges and Acting/Assisting Judges
in Branches other than Their Own

The Court, in the case of Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC Branch 24, Manila,
292 SCRA 694, issued the following ruling:

Basically, a case once raffled to a branch belongs to that branch unless re-raffled or otherwise
transferred to another branch in accordance with established procedure. When the Presiding Judge of
that branch to which a case has been raffled or assigned is transferred to another station, he leaves
behind all the cases he tried with the branch to which they belong. He does not take these cases with
him even if he tried them and the same were submitted to him for decision. The judge who takes over
this branch inherits all these cases and assumes full responsibility for them. He may decide them as they
are his cases, unless any of its parties moves that his case be decided by the judge who substantially
heard the evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision. If a party therefore so
desires, he may simply address his request or motion to the incumbent Presiding Judge who shall then
endorse the request or motion to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the latter may in turn
endorse the matter to the judge who substantially heard the evidence and before whom the case was
submitted for decision. This will avoid the renvoir of records and the possibility of an irritant between
the judges concerned, as one may question the authority of the other to transfer the case to the former.
If coursed through the Office of the Court Administrator, the judge who is asked to decide the case is
not expected to complain, otherwise, he may be liable for insubordination and his judicial profile may be
adversely affected. Upon direction of the Court Administrator, or any of his Deputy Court Administrators
acting in his behalf, the judge before whom a particular case was earlier submitted for decision may be
compelled to decide the case accordingly.

We take the opportunity to remind trial judges that once they act as presiding judges or otherwise
designated as acting/assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases substantially heard by
them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are promoted to higher positions in the judicial
ladder, may be decided by them wherever they may be if so requested by any of the parties and
endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges through the Office of the Court Administrator. The
following procedure may be followed: First, the Judge who takes over the branch must immediately
make an inventory of the cases submitted for decision left behind by the previous judge (unless the
latter has in the meantime been promoted to a higher court). Second, the succeeding judge must then
inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case, at least substantially, and before whom
it was submitted for decision, may be required to decide the case. In this event, and upon request of any
of the parties, the succeeding judge may request the Court Administrator to formally endorse the case
for decision to the judge before whom it was previously submitted for decision. Third, after the judge
who previously heard the case is through with his decision, he should send back the records together
with his decision to the branch to which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or personal
delivery, whichever is more feasible, for recording and promulgation, with notice of such fact to the
Court Administrator.

Since the primary responsibility over the case belongs to the presiding judge of the branch to which it
has been raffled or assigned, he may also decide the case to the exclusion of any other judge provided
that all the parties agree in writing that the incumbent presiding judge should decide the same, or
unless the judge who substantially heard the case and before whom it was submitted for decision has in
the meantime died, retired or for any reason has left the service, or has become disabled, disqualified,
or otherwise incapacitated to decide the case.

The Presiding Judge who has been transferred to another station cannot, on his own, take with him to
his new station any case submitted for decision without first securing formal authority from the court
administrator. This is to minimize, if not totally avoid, a situation of case-grabbing. In the same vein,
when the Presiding Judge before whom a case was submitted for decision has already retired from the
service, the judge assigned to the branch to take over the case submitted for decision must
automatically assume responsibility of deciding the case.

G. Right of Judge to Question Witnesses

It is the judges prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. (People vs.
Castillo, 289 SCRA 213)

If the only way to make the witnesses give details is for the judge to ask questions based on their
complaints and affidavits, the Supreme Court sees no reason why this should be considered improper,
after all, the witnesses could deny what the judge asks them if it is not true. (Flores vs. Sumaljag, 290
SCRA 568)

A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness has given direct testimony.
(People vs. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761)

V. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Judges

Judges are enjoined to exercise the contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint,
with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and
not for retaliation and vindictiveness. (Esmeralda-Baroy vs. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1)

No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. (Tabao vs. Asis, 252 SCRA 581)

Municipal judges can administer oaths or execute certificates only on matters related to their official
functions but they cannot notarize private documents. (Tabao vs. Asis, su-pra) That a judge acted in the
spirit of christian charity is not a valid excuse for him acting as a private counsel and notary public.
(Ibid.)

Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of the respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 of the
Family Code which, while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability. (Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129)

A judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and partiality. (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283)

VI. Conduct and Behavior Unbecoming of Judges

A. Contemptuous Conduct; When is There Such

Well-established is the rule that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge
in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. In
Louis Vuitton vs. Villanueva, 216 SCRA 121 (1992), citing Pabalan vs. Guevarra, 74 SCRA 53 (1976), the
Court held:

x x x it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own conviction,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests
upon considerations of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary.
Where the order was issued in the exercise of judicial discretion coupled with the fact that no evidence
was adduced that the issuance thereof was motivated by bad faith, although said order was
subsequently set aside, the respondent judge could not be charged of contemptuous conduct. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will x x x. (Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, 20 SCRA 1007 [1967])

B. Improper Conduct

A judge who submits a false certificate of service is administratively liable for serious misconduct under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and he is further criminally liable to the State under the Revised
Penal Code. (Bolalin vs. Occiano, 266 SCRA 203)

By deliberately ignoring or disregarding the Supreme Court Resolution requiring the respondent judge to
comment on the complaint, and that of February 14, 1996 giving him a nonextendible period of five
days from notice within which to file his comment with a stern warning that his failure to do so would be
dealt with administratively, the respondent Judge demonstrated not merely indifference, but
disobedience to, disrespect for and contempt of the Court, the highest tribunal of the land to which he
owes fealty. (Lagatic vs. Peas, Jr., 276 SCRA 46) Such conduct of respondent judge constituted
misconduct and insubordination. (Ibid.)

Every officer and employee in the Judiciary is duty bound to obey the orders and processes of the
Supreme Court without the least delay. (Pascual vs. Runcan, A.M. No. R-668-P, 23 Dec. 1992)

A judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel, for
the latter are not the guardian of the formers responsibility. Under Canon 8 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics he was required to organize his court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch and he
should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, sheriffs, and other assistants who are sometimes
prone to presume too much upon good-natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association with
him. (Lagatic vs. Peas, Jr., supra.)

That a judge has not been punished or penalized for any other injudicious deeds and has no other
pending administrative complaints against him cannot counter-balance for his gross misconduct over
the yearsa judge, after all, is expected to comport himself as befits a man of law and a dispenser of
justice, and he cannot point to his supposedly previous faultless record to offset the gravity of even a
single but enormous failing. (Abarquez vs. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109)

Considering the extremely serious nonfeasance and malfeasance obtaining in this case, especially in the
light of the number and nature of cases abandoned by judicial neglect to the prejudice of the parties
who have thus been kept in limbo and uncertainty for years, we are not inclined to give respondent
judge any degree of mitigation. The fact that respondent judge has been in the judiciary for 25 years
does not extenuate but even aggravates his liability for, with such length of actual experience in the
administrative workings of the courts, he cannot pretend that he was unaware of the illegality of his
acts. Simply stated, it is incredible that he did not know that he had not decided so many cases and that
he should have timely done so in order to draw his salary. (Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra.)

C. Oppressive Conduct

Slapping someone on the face is hardly a defensive action; for a judge to slap her alleged antagonist on
the face suggests rather that it was more to show contempt for the person she slapped and possibly to
embarrass her than to protect herself from any act of aggression that the latter was about to commit.
(Ferrer vs. Maramba, 290 SCRA 44)

D. Abuse of Discretion

A judge commits grave abuse of discretion when he grants an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction without any notice of hearing. (Carale vs. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132)

Respondent judge whimsically and capriciously ordered the quashing of the informations
notwithstanding the ruling in Torralba, 230 SCRA 33, and Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
(Vasquez vs. Hobilla-Alinio, 271 SCRA 67)

A judge commits grave abuse of authority when he hastily issued a warrant of arrest on the same day
that the information for slight physical injuries was filed against the accused. This is in gross violation of
the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and
given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence. (Dais vs. Asadon,
290 SCRA 561)

E. Inefficiency

A judge who falsifies his Certificate of Service is administratively liable for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under the Rules of Court and likewise under the Penal Code. (Enriquez vs. Camarista, 280
SCRA 1)

When the inefficiency springs from the failure to consider so basic and elemental rule, a law or principle
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority. Makalintal vs. Teh, 280 SCRA 623.

Failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.
(Abarquez vs. Rebosura, supra.)

Failure to observe the procedure required by law as regards the date of hearing of the petition for
naturalization and granting the same is clearly attributable to the judge. (Hermo vs. Dela Rosa, 299 SCRA
68)

Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.
(Quintu vs. Lucero, 261 SCRA 1)
F. Immorality

Respondent judge took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and
lascivious desires. Instead of being loco parentis over his subordinate employees respondent judge was
the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. (Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259
SCRA 354)

By daring to violate complainant within the sanctity and secrecy of his chambers, respondent judge did
the utmost violence to complainant within a place which, properly viewed, is an integral part of a temple
of justicein his court. (Vedaa vs. Valencia, 295 SCRA 1)

The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record
reveals that he had two families. (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47)

By having sexual intercourse with a girl who is only fifteen years old, a judge violated the trust reposed
on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality
required of members of the judiciary. (Naval vs. Panday, 275 SCRA 654)

The act of a judge of offering the father of the minor a substantial amount of money in consideration for
the withdrawal of the charges against him for rape is considered, by law, an obstruction of justice. (Ibid.)

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectful members of the community, and as an
inconsiderable attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239)

G. Ignorance of the Law

Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment are irrelevant and
immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. (Balayon vs. Ocampo, 218 SCRA 13)

Unfamiliarity with the Indeterminate Sentence law is cen-surable. (Felongco vs. Dictado, 223 SCRA 696)

Not realizing the importance and indispensability of bail hearing is, to be sure, gross ignorance of the
law. (Tabao vs. Espina, 257 SCRA 298)

A judge who acts on a motion to lift the warrant of arrest without due notice to the prosecution and
proceeds to lift the warrant of arrest releasing the accused from custody, deliberately throws overboard
the laws and rules on preliminary investigation thereby making himself liable for misconduct or grave
abuse of authority or dereliction of duty. (Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611)

A judges issuance of an order of release when the accused had never been arrested is a display of gross
ignorance of the law. (Adapon vs. Domagtoy, 265 SCRA 824)
It has been said that when the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Supena vs. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA 1)

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing
laws and jurisprudence but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. (Naval
vs. Panday, supra.)

When a judge grants bail to a person charged with capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required hearing, he is considered guilty of
ignorance of the law or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence. (Almeron vs. Sardido, 281 SCRA 415)

For his distressingly lamentable unfamiliarity with quite elementary procedural rules regarding the
duration of the reglementary period of appeals from the Regional Trial Court, the Courts to which such
appeals may be taken, and the modes by which appeals are taken to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, a judge was severely reprimanded. (Suasin vs. Dinopol, 281 SCRA 88)

Where the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to
still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was merely feigned to subserve an
unworthy purpose. (DBP vs. Llanes, Jr., 266 SCRA 654)

Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. (Bayog vs. Natino, 271 SCRA 268)

There will be a great faith in the administration of justice if there be a belief on the part of the parties
that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles. (Supena vs. Dela Rosa, supra.)

H. Absenteeism

It is imperative that judges be present during office hours, unless there is valid excuse for them to be
absent. (OCAD vs. Bara-acal, 288 SCRA 363)

In the implementing Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, promulgated on
January 11, 1983 which provides for the session hours of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts as well as duty during weekends and
holidays by all Executive Judges and providing for a Motion day, what the lawmakers had in mind was
the purpose of insuring maximum efficiency of the trial courts and the speedy administration of justice.
This, it is imperative that judges be present during office hours, unless there is a valid excuse for them to
be absent. (Ibid.)

I. Partiality and Bias

A judge who had earlier enjoined the preliminary investigation of the accused at the Regional State
Prosecutors Office level cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial
judge in the trial proper.(People vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452)

Fact that the respondent judges appreciation of the evidence differed from that of the petitioners
which could be biased, does not warrant the conclusion that said judge has rendered an unjust
judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law. (Bacar vs. De Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328)

A judgment is not necessarily unjust because the judge who rendered it should have inhibited herself.
(Ubarra vs. Ma-palad, 220 SCRA 224)

To disqualify a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same by clear and
convincing evidence. (Webb vs. People, 276 SCRA 243) To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must
be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some
basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. (Ibid.)

Divergence of opinion between trial judge and partys counsel as to admissibility of evidence is not proof
of bias and partiality. (Go vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397)

Jurisprudence teaches us that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with
caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. (People vs. Castillo, 289
SCRA 213) THE CONSUMMATE JUDGE, 316 SCRA 170, October 4, 1999
 JUDICIAL CONDUCT IN COURT TRIALS

By

JORGE R. COQUIA

1.Judicial Ethics in General, p. 343.

2.Personal Behaviour of Judge, p. 345.

3.The Judge as Governor of a Trial, p. 346.

4.Impartiality of the JudgeA Sacred Trust, p. 347.

5.Attitude of Judges Towards Witnesses, p. 348.

6.Examination of Witness by Trial Judge, p. 349.

7.Proper Basis of Examination by Trial Judge, p. 350.

8.Extent of Cross-Examination by Trial Judge, p. 352.

9.Attitude of Trial Judge to Counsel, p. 352.

10.Remarks and Utterances by Trial Judge, p. 353.

________________

1. Judicial Ethics in General

"You shall appoint judges and officials throughout your tribes to administer true justice for the people in
all the communities which the Lord, your God, in giving you. You shall not distort justice; you must be
impartial. You should not take a bribe; for a bribe blinds the eyes even of the wise and twists the words
even of the just. Justice and justice alone shall be your aim, that you may have life and may possess the
land which the Lord, your God, is giving you" (Deuteronomy, 16,1820).

The chief function of a judge is the administration of justice whether he is a trial or appellate judge, his
chief duty is to see that justice is done in the cases that come before him. There can be no such thing as
a peaceful society in the absence of an impartial judiciary to settle controversies on the basis of what is
just and right and to direct the power of the State in the enforcement of law (J. Parker, "The Judicial
Office in the U.S.", Case and Comment, April, 1950).

The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent the duties in respect to his personal
conduct which concerns his relation to the State and its inhabitants, the litigants before him, the
principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court and the witnesses and attendants who aid him in
the administrative function (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 1, Administrative Order No. 162, Department of
Justice, August 1,1946).

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self respecting human units in a
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other departments of government. We are pleased to think
of judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office because
when asked if in the future he would delay a case at the King's order, he replied: "I will do what becomes
of me as a judge." (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).

"As the law stands, we can only express passive disapproval of Judge Lopez's action if it be true, as
alleged, that he had a preconceived opinion that all the accused being prosecuted or to be prosecuted
before the court or division of which he is a member are innocent and should be absolved. This would
be no less true if his leaning happened to be on the side of the prosecution. That his opinion was
inspired by an honest conviction of law and justice might mitigate but would not obliterate the inequity
of his position. Its damaging effects would not be lessened by the sincerity of his conviction. His bias and
partiality would be as shocking to our private sense of decency and as injurious to public interest and
sentiments as they would if his motives were wicked.

"At the risk of preaching platitudes we may call attention to the 'things necessary to be had in
remembrance by judges' among which are:

That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any judgment at all, 'till the while business and both
parties be heard.'

That I never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself unprejudiced 'til the whole
be heard.' " "

Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law should not lose the proper judicial perspective and should see to
it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid
down by statute. And by the rules of procedure if they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated
to other officials there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of justice and in
many instance oppressived disregard of the basic requirements of due process (Queto vs. Catolico, L-
25204, Jan. 30,1970, 31 SCRA 452).

2. Personal Behaviour of Judge

The personal behaviour of a judge in everyday life should always be beyond reproach (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 5). To his community, he stands as a symbol of the law. He should be the first therefore to abide
by the law and set the example for others. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction (Id., 24).

A Judge cannot prevent any person-even a litigant or counsel in a case before him to entertain an
opinion about him as a judge. Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that
opinion is flattering to the judge or not. It would be different if a person would deliberately and
maliciously express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to malign and
descredit him. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by
judges who are free from bias and prejudice and it should not be made to count against the citizen if he
so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so
thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him
which may not altogether be flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties
in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should
never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties (Austrio vs. Masaquel, L-22536, August 31,1967, 20 SCRA 1247).

A judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be
exercised for purpose that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for the
judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise (Id.).

The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
unless necessary in the interest of justice (Victoriano vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-17735, July 30, 1962, 5 SCRA
653; Buyco vs. Zosa, L25800, August 31,1970, 34 SCRA 710).

3. The Judge as Governor of a Trial

The judge conducting a trial is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of
assuring its proper conduct and the fair and impartial administration of justice between the parties to
the litigation. The wide discretionary powers vested in him are to be exercised so that abuse of justice
shall not be accomplished under forms of law. He may within reason take all steps necessary to see that
the trial is conducted in an orderly manner and kept within bounds prescribe by decency and ordinary
rules of good conduct, and statutes which tend to restrict the powers of the judge in conducting the trial
are usually given a strict construction.

The conduct of the judge in trying a case must be fair to both sides, and he should refrain from remarks
that may injure a litigant. So too, in criminal cases the judge should use the greatest care to avoid
prejudicing the cause of the state or of the accused by his language or conduct. Since the judge's duties
are of judicial in nature, he should not act as counsel for a party by raising the objections which the
party should make. How far a departure from fairness amounts to reversible errors determined by
inquiry as to whether that which was done was prejudicial to the party complaining. (53 American
Jurisprudence 73)

It should be stated as a basic proposition that the conduct of a trial is under the control of the judge who
is presiding. There are rules to guide him, of course, but how to apply them depends to some extent his
own interpretation and understanding of such rules (Dizon vs. De Borja, Adm. Case No. 163-J, Jan.
28,1971, 37 SCRA 46).

4. Impartiality of the JudgeA Sacred Trust

The administration of justice is a lofty function and is no less sacred than a religious mission itself. Those
who are called upon to render service in it must follow that norm of conduct compatible only with
public faith and trust in their impartiality, sense of responsibility, exercising the same devotion to duty
and function done by a priest in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy
(People vs. Bedia, 46 O.G. 358).

The administration of justice is in the hands of the court, and local passions and prejudices have no
place in the court room. They must be sternly kept out, not invited in (U.S. vs. Custan, 28 Phil. 19; People
vs. Tobias, 45 O.G. 3456).

The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the
history of our courts. In fact the administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon
this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading the whole system of judicature,
and it is the popular acknowledgment of inviolability of this principle which gives credit, and even
toleration to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which disregard this safeguard to litigants
would more appropriately be termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be as
shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious to the public interest. The learned and
observant Lord Bacon well said that the virtue of a judge is seen in making inequality equal. That he may
plant his judgment as upon even ground. Caesar demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous but
beyond suspicion, and the State should not be less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose keeping
are placed not only the financial interest, but the honor, the liberty, and the lives of its citizens, and it
should see to it that the scales in which the rights of the citizens are weighed should be nicely balanced,
for, as well said by Judge Bronson in People vs. Suffolk, Common Pleas (18 Wend. 550): "Next in
importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge." (Diaz vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 902).

A judge sitting on a case must at all times be fully hear, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal A judge has
both the duty of rendering just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to his Kinsmen and as to his integrity (Conde vs. Hon. Villaluz, L-33508, May 25,1973,51
SCRA 84).

5. Attitude of Judges Towards Witnesses

A judge should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous to counsel especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and also to all others
concerned in the administration of justice in his court. In addressing counsels, litigants or witnesses, he
should avoid a controversial tone. Undue interference, impatience or a participation in the examination
of witnesses especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may
tend to prevent the proper presentation of a cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9,10,14).

It is the duty of the trial judge to regulate the conduct of witnesses, provided in so doing he does not
take away, nor abridge any right of the accused. Although as a general rule the judge should not
interrupt the examination of witnesses, he may ask a witness if he understands the question which has
been put to him, and if it is evident that he does not understand, he may explain to him the nature of
the answer or information called for, and assist or direct the witness with respect to a technical point
with which he has difficulty or advise counsel of witness' lack of understanding.

It is also proper for the trial court to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary. He may rebuke a
witness for levity or for other improper conduct, or restrain or silence a witness who is too voluble in
using profanity, or who persists in answering questions to which objections have been sustained. The
judge may direct a witness that the he must answer a question in a responsive manner, and also direct
him to tell only that of which he has personal knowledge and admonish him to answer truthfully and
without evasion (23 C.J.S. 343).

The Court may also caution a witness to pay attention to questions and answer so as to be heard, not to
become excited, and to think over what he has about to say. In the interest of an orderly trial, a trial
court may rebuke witnesses, and moreover, it may cause the arrest and punishment of a witness who
refuses to answer proper questions asked, or is guilty of other contemptuous conduct (53 American
Jurisprudence 79).

In the course of a judicial proceeding, the trial judge cautioned the witness not to look at the attorney
for the defendant but to fix his attention on the trial judge who was at the same time examining him.
When the witness did not heed to this warning, the judge arose from his seat, approached the witness
and seized him by the shoulders, turned him around and said, "Look at me."

In disapproving the act of the judge, the Supreme Court made the following observations: "In our
opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness by the shoulders and turning him about was
unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every
witness is entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice." (In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1).

It was clear that the judge did not lose his temper and permitted himself the use of abusive language
against defendant therein. It was noted, however that the blame could be mitigated by the evasiveness
of the defendant-(Castillo vs. Bullecer, Adm. Case No. 119, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 122).

6. Examination of Witness by Trial Judge

It is ordinarily proper for a judge to put competent and material questions to a witness either on his
examination in chief or on his cross-examination in order to elicit material facts which have not
otherwise been brought out, or to clarify points essential to the determination of the issues.

Although it is within his authority to propound questions to and examine witnesses for the purpose of
eliciting facts material to the case at bar, he should not usurp the functions of counsel, prescribing the
order of calling witnesses, or interfering with the general conduct of the case by the attorneys, or by
examining witnesses to the exclusion of counsel Nor should the judge by a dissertation, addressed to a
witness, endeavor to get him to change his testimony (53 American Jurisprudence 74).
The judge should not ask a question which is based on the assumption of accused's guilt of the offense
charged (23 C.J.S. 345).

The right of trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material
point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides, is too well established to
need discussion. The trial judge in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts and they
would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permit a miscarriage of justice as a result of
a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact upon
which the judgment in a case should turn. So where a trial judge sees that the degree of credit which he
is to give the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can
be no question that in the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as
will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the
truth (U.S. v. Hudieres, 29 Phil. 45).

It is not only the right, but also the duty of courts to find the truth, and to this end they may and should
take part in the interrogatory of witnesses, when necessary to clarify points essential to the
determination of issues involved, and in so doing, courts do not transcend the proper bounds of judicial
inquiry (People vs. Lilia, C.A., GR No. 909-R, November 24 1947).

7. Proper Basis of Examination by Trial Judge

The trial judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expeditious trial and to prevent
unnecessary waste of time, to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue
interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his
part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstance of a
trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto (People vs. Hinolan, CA 47 O.G. 3596; U.S. v. Hudieres, 27 Phil. 45; U.S. v. Lim Kui, 35
Phil. 504; U.S. v. Binoyah, 35 Phil. 23).

While it is well settled that the court has the right to propound questions to witnesses during the trial of
a case, the exercise of such right is based on the need of clarifying points that are brought up during the
examination of the witnesses, and which counsel have failed to elucidate in the direct or cross
examination. It is then that the court is amply justified to interrogate the witness and thus interrupt the
questioning by counsel. The exercise of a trial judge of his right to question witnesses, with a view of
satisfying his mind on any material point which may present itself during the trial if a case over which he
presides must be done sparingly, judiciously, in order to avoid any criticism on the part of counsel
(Abutan vs. Fernandez, CA G.R. No. 913-R, August 30, 1947, citing People vs. Ferrer, CA G.R. No. 1155-R,
July 28,1947).

The Supreme Court in several cases has sanctioned the right of a trial judge to question witnesses, with
a view to satisfy his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over
which he presides. However, in the case before us the trial judge had exceeded somehow the discretion
allowed him by such ruling by questioning witnesses even in matters which properly fall within the
province of the prosecutor or counsel for the defendant. In order, therefore, to avoid any unwarranted
criticism in the premises, it is believed that the exercise of the power to question witnesses in
accordance with the said ruling of the Supreme Court should be done sparingly and judiciously (People
vs. Ferrer, 44 O.G. 112).

Although the right of the trial court to examine a witness cannot be denied, it is a right to be sparingly
used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it, unless it appears to be necessary in, or in order to
secure a full and clear understanding of the trial (York vs. U.S., 299 Fed. 778). For much greater and
weightier reasons the trial court should refrain from propounding improper and embarrassing questions
to a witness (People vs. Anabon, CA G.R. No. 5574-R, April 24,1951).

A severe examination by the trial court of some of the witnesses for the defense, in an effort to develop
the truth and to get at the real facts is not in itself sufficient to justify the comment in the brief on
appeal of counsel for the defendant that the trial judge assisted the prosecution with an evident desire
to secure conviction. It is not only the right, but oftentimes the duty of the trial judge to re-examine a
witness when, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it appears to be necessary in order to secure a full
and clear understanding of the facts or to test to his satisfaction the credibility of the witness under
examination (U.S. v. Lim Tiu, 31 Phil. 504).

There is nothing on the record to show that anyone of the judges of the trial court attempted to help
the prosecution. The question propounded by the judge, subject to appellant's complaint, appeared to
have been intended to elicit the truth from the witnesses. The inquisitiveness complained of by
appellant's counsel did not have the purpose of unduly harming the substantial rights of the accused. It
was only to be expected from judges who, with full consciousness of their responsibilities, could not
easily be satisfied with incompleteness and obscurities in the testimonies (People vs. Moreno, G.R. No.
L-1441, April 7,1949).

8. Extent of Cross-Examination by Trial Judge

The Court cannot remain indifferent in the face of arbitrariness committed by the trial judge. It is
admitted that the trial judge had interferred with the examination of the witnesses, that the right of the
defense to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and the rights of the defense in the direct
examination of his own witnesses have unduly been curtailed; that the trial judge attempted on
occasions to brow beat the defense; that the trial judge deprived the defense counsel the opportunity of
filing a written memorandum. The trial judge's conduct, on the whole lays grounds to the suspicion that
he was prejudiced against the cause of the defense as emphasized by the fact that without waiting for
any testimony or evidence that the parties may present, the trial judge had volunteered, in certain
portions of the record, his personal knowledge as to the height and stature of the deceased. The Court
feels it unavoidably its duty to express its disapproval of the acts of arbitrariness committed by the trial
judge, with the hope that he will not repeat them, nor will any other judicial officer follow his example
(People vs. Bedia, 46 O.G. 358).

9. Attitude of Trial Judge to Counsel

Judges should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and also
to all other concerned in the administration of justice in their courts. They should also require, and, as
far as their power extends, enforce on the part of clerks, court officers, and counsel civility and courtesy
to witnesses, litigants and others having business with the court (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 10).

A trial judge may not compliment one attorney at the expense of another.

It is undoubtedly within the province of the trial judge to admonish and rebuke counsel when guilty of
misconduct as occasions may require, and use other preventive measures necessary to maintain the
dignity of the courts. In rebuking counsel, the degree of severity is left to the discretion of the trial judge
so long as it does not prevent a party from having f air trial. Unmerited rebuke is, of course, improper.

To threaten to punish counsel for contempt if he persists in offering certain evidence or makes
objections to offers of testimony is misconduct where a counsel acts in good faith or the objections are
proper (53 American Jurisprudence 28).

The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to his personal
conduct which concern his relation to, among others, to the practitioners of law in his court. Judges
should be temperate and patient, courteous to counsel. In conversations between judge and counsel,
the judge should be studious to avoid controversies. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part
of justice; and an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge to show quickness
of concept in cutting of counsel too short. We prefer to think that restraint is still a trait desirable in
those who dispense justice (Ysasi v. Fernandez, L-28593, January 30,1970,31 SCRA 237).

Where the judge's prejudice against a suitor has concretely manifested itself and the animosity between
respondent judge and petitioner, a party to the case below, had developed through a long period of
time, the respondent judge should inhibit himself from hearing the case. All suitors are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial tribunal
(Luque v. Kayanan, L-26826, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 165).

10. Remarks and Utterances by Trial Judge

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between the litigants
and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a
controversial tone. He should avoid interruption of counsel in their arguments, except to clarify his mind
as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or a premature
judgment (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 14).

The trial judge should be cautious and circumspect in his language and conduct. He must be fair to both
sides and the extent to which he may go in comments and remarks during the trial is governed by the
fundamental principle that should be said or done by him which will not prejudice the rights of the
parties litigants. This includes remarks to counsel touching on the management of the case and
reflecting on their conduct as well as those touching the character of the witnesses and the value of
their testimony.

While the rule forbids a judge, during the course of a trial, to comment upon the evidence, it has been
held applicable to comment made, as an incident to a ruling, a remark which is necessarily made in
ruling upon an objection, such as an objection to the admission of evidence, does not constitute ground
for reversal. It is better, of course, for a court merely to rule on the objection or motion without
comment on what the evidence shows (53 American Jurisprudence 75).

The Court may order to place on record that the witness was in tears while testifying so that appellate
courts may behold, upon review, as good a picture as is possible of the incidents at the trial. The defense
may, however, show, if it can, that the weeping was a little trick or was due to extraneous causes, in
order to counteract whatever prejudicial effects the statement of the court might produce (People vs.
Maniego, L-2253, May 21,1949).

It was held that the trial judge discredits one of the witnesses by the supposed expression of lack of
sincerity in his face. Facial expression is not necessarily indicative of one's feelings. So many people have
expressions on their faces that hide their real thoughts. If the trial judge begins to doubt the credibility
of said witness because of the expression of his face, he should have made it so appear in the record and
he should also ask the witness why he was showing such an expression in his face to give him the
necessary opportunity to explain (People vs. Enriquez, CA G.R. No. 790-R, October 11,1947).

It will be noted that the counsel for plaintiffs made an insulting remark when he said: "I observe that
Your Honor has been taking an active part in these proceedings since the beginning . . ." The insinuation
made in the remark, while not express, is that the judge has been partial or hostile, which is entirely
unfounded. The above remark was a challenge against the probity and fairness of the judge in the
course of the trial, and we find that the imposition of the fine of P20.00 may not be considered as a
grave abuse of discretion. When, thereafter, counsel for plaintiffs openly stated that he was going to ask
for the disqualification of the judge, he clearly showed disrespect to the judge and the imposition of
another fine then and there by the judge cannot also be said to have been with grave abuse of
discretion.

We understand from the petition that the tone and manner in which the judge made those questions or
remarks were haughty and arrogant and hostile. The tone may be so, if ever arrogant, could not have
been meant by the judge to be so.

We find no interest or partiality, nor hostility in said attempt on the part of the judge. On the other hand
we find it to be motivated by a desire to shorten the trial by making plaintiff go directly to the issue
involved (Ventura & Clarin v. Judge Yatco, G.R. L-11223, November 16,1959).

Upon moving for a reconsideration of his ruling, the respondent judge rose and shouted to counsel,
saying, "I told you to stop talking. I do not like to hear anything more from you! You get out of this
courtroom! Sino ka dito?" The lawyer was then ousted from the courtroom on orders of the respondent.
Although the complaint for gross ignorance of the law, as well as conduct unbecoming a magistrate
against the respondent judge was dismissed on motion of the complainant, the said judge was
nevertheless admonished to refrain, at all time, from any official conduct that may well be regarded as
not entirely free from the appearance of impropriety or intemperateness. (Otero v. Municipal Judge
Juan G. Esguerra, Adm. Matter No. 655-MJ, May 23,1974,57 SCRA 57). Judicial Conduct in Court Trials,
60 SCRA 343, October 30, 1974
 THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A LAST CHANCE TO REDEEM HIMSELF

By

Prof. LOHEL A. MARTIREZ

I.Introduction, p. 549.

1.Scope and Related Matters, p. 550.

(a)Scope, p. 550.

(b)Related Matters, p. 551.

II.Judicial Ethics, p. 551.

(a)Avoidance of appearance of impropriety, p. 551.

(b)Infractions of Law, p. 552.

(c)Social Relations, p. 552.

III.Comments, p. 553.

IV.Useful pointers, p. 555.

_______________

I. Introduction.

The case under Annotation is entitled CONCEPCION FONACIER-ABAO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
CONSTANTE A. ANCHETA, respondent, Adm. Matter No. 1938CFI, promulgated September 11,1981.

It is quite unfortunate that the case was decided just on time when the Judiciary is in the process of
undergoing a sweeping judicial reform from top to bottom. And the Justices of the Supreme Court must
have been so irked with the deportment of the judge. The dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, is rather too harsh. The judge should have been given a last
chance to redeem himself from what has been found and proven to be serious misconduct prejudicial
to the judiciary and the public interest. That, light penalties of admonition and fine and/or brief
suspension as recommended by the Investigator should have been imposed upon the respondent. If
the prize for serious misconduct is dismissal, so be it. Thats what the Court pronounced. But, the
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and the disqualification from holding any government office
is too severedevastating, to say the least.
The case above-mentioned is among the latest decisions touching on the matter that gave very stern
reminders to all members of the bench that the Supreme Court is really bound to cleanse its ranks with
erring personnel. That supreme ideal is not impossible to attain. For one thing, the selection process
should be more stringent; and another, the control and supervision aspect should be streamlined; and
lastly, the public should be quick to denounce misdeeds. But for as long as the Bench is manned by
HUMAN BEINGS, of men and women unfree from individual prejudices (which is true to anybody), the
task is not at all too easy. There will be similar cases in the future. As a social being, man has to deal with
his fellowman whether in or out of court, litigants or non-litigants, individually or collectively and so on.
No force on earth can change this fact of life; not even the religious fanatics. Social contacts between
man and woman is inevitable. One thing is certain: Nobody is perfect.

1. Scope and Related Matters

(a) Scope.

The case encompassed subjects dealing with a judges actuations. It covered charges on consorting
with litigants, receiving gifts and favors, threatening a female court employee and fabrication of
evidence among others.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics supposed to be observed by all judges found its way through the spirit of
the case and still is a beckoning light for those who are in the service and for those who wish to join the
service.

(b) Related Matters,

Annotations that may be read in relation to conduct expected of public of ficials:

(1) Grave Abuse of Discretion, Amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction under the case entitled
People of the Philippines, versusHon. Magno B. Pablo, G.R. No. L-37271, promulgated June 25, 1980;

(2) A Judge should evince due care in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives under the case entitled
Theresita O. Revita, versusMunicipal Judge Sergio F. Rimando, Adm. Matter No. 1439 promulgated
July 22,1980;

(3) The Lawyer and the Judge under the case entitled Corleto vs. Hon. Jose Arro, G.R. No. 51919,
promulgated August 6, 1980;

(4) Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules
under the case entitled Esteban Ubongan, versusCity Judge Toribio Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1255-CTJ,
promulgated August 6,1980;

(5) Culpable Dereliction of duty of a judge under the case entitled Fidel Sierra, versusJudge
Leodegario A. Belarmino, Adm. Matter No. 967-MJ, promulgated March 24,1981.

II. Judicial Ethics.

No. 3. AVOIDANCE OF APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.

A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach.

No. 10. COURTESY AND CIVILITY.

Judges should be courteous to counsel, especially those who are young and inexperienced, and also to
all others concerned in the administration of justice in their courts.

They should also require, and, as far as their power extends, enforce on the part of clerks, court officers,
and counsel civility and courtesy to witness, litigants, and others having business with the court.

In the case of Retuya vs. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416, the Supreme Court said: A judge is expected to
practice courtesy and civility and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.

No. 22. INFRACTIONS OF LAW.

The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be
a demoralizing example to others.

In De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540, the Supreme Court said: the judge is the visible representation of
the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey
the law. They see in him as intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, x x x. Thus, for the
judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.

No. 29. GIFTS AND FAVORS. He should not accept any presents of favors from litigants or from
lawyers practicing bef ore him.

No. 30. SOCIAL RELATIONS.

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interest
in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or
prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.

III. Comments.

There were cases in the past where the Supreme Court imposed lighter penalties for erring judges. Set
forth below, are a few of those cases:
(1)Vasquez vs. Judge Severino Malvar, A.M. No. 884, August 31, 1978. The judge was found guilty of
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT in office. Penalty: To pay a fine equivalent to one month salary;

(2)Evangelista vs. Baes, 61 SCRA 475. Reprimanded for hearing a case wherein his nephew-in-law acted
as counsel;

(3)Barrera vs. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98. A judge is subject to Reprimand for accusing the Supreme Court of
allowing its clerk to arrogate unto himself the powers of the court;

(4)Villapando vs. Judge Quitain, L-41333, 75 SCRA 24. FAVORITISM is not to be tolerated, but it is much
more odious if directed against one coming from the poor and the dispossessed. More consideration
should be shown to one having less in life. Penalty: The judge was required to EXPLAIN within 30 days
why no administrative action should be taken against him. No costs.

(5)Rodriguez vs. Hon. Silvino Lu. Barro, Adm. Matter No. 1587-CTJ, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 663. The
respondent judge had been previously severely reprimanded for his carelessness and negligence, and
enjoined to exercise henceforth due care and diligence in the discharge of his functions, with a
WARNING that a repetition of such misconduct would be dealt with more severely.

(6)Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc. vs. Judge Cartagena, Adm. Matter No. 707-MJ, July 21, 1978, 84
SCRA 128, The judge was ADMONISHED due to the delay in settling his obligation with the bank. He
was admonished against a repetition of the same act for, being incumbent member of the Judiciary he is
expected to be model of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in
his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions.

(7) In Moral vs. Barro, Adm. Matter No. 179-CJ, September 28, 1973, the judge was ordered to PAY A
FINE equivalent to his salary for one month.

(8) In a deliberate FAILURE to dispose a civil case within the 90-day period in violation of Sec. 5, R.A. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, the judge was only REPRIMANDED.

(9) The judge was DISMISSED only, without other forfeitures, in Lopez vs. Mun. Judge Corpuz. Adm.
Matter No. 425-MJ, promulgated August 31, 1977.

(10) In Veloso vs. Mun. Judge Carmona, Adm. Matter No. 502MJ, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 450, the judge
was only WARNED and ADMONISHED to be more careful in the performance of his duties, for failure to
order arrest of accused.

(11) In Revita vs. Judge Rimando, Adm. Matter No. 1439-MJ July 22, 1980, 98 SCRA 619, the judge was
ADMONISHED and warned and to exercise more prudence and circumspection in the performance of his
duties when he committed error in judgment. (12) For abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the judge was neither reprimanded nor admonished in Corsino vs. Nicolas and Hon. Arnold
A. Savella, No. L-38367, November 24, 1978, 82 SCRA 58.
The aforecited cases simply show that not all misconduct in office, including serious ones are punishable
by outright dismissal. Likewise, if it were so, not all who were dismissed from the service forfeited other
benefits.

The judge who accused the Supreme Court was not dismissed from the service, but simply reprimanded.

In another vein, a lawyer was found guilty of CONTEMPT who uttered false charges such as avalance of
the sadistic resolution en banc and such as vomitting injustice, referring to the Supreme Court.

Depending upon the degree of the offense in administrative matters, the Court have decided so many in
the past. An array of decisions point out that there was no stopping in the drive to clean up the judiciary
with those who comitted abuses while in office. Sometimes, the Court acted with compassion, but at
times it acted with the fullest force of the law and the rules.

What then, is expected of a good judge? In Lapena vs. Collado, 76 SCRA 82, the Supreme Court ruled: It
is desirable that a judge should at all times manifest fidelity to the trust reposed in him. Necessarily, an
adequate grasp of the codal and statutory provisions, not to mention the Constitution, as well as of legal
doctrines is of the essence. That he should be impartial is likewise a truism of equal importance,
however, is the promptness with which cases in his sala are disposed of. The peoples faith in the
administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low income group, would be greatly
impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts, which unlike collegiate tribunals
where there is need for extended deliberations, could be expected to act with dispatch. Unfortunately,
it cannot be denied that delay still attends the performance of the judicial task. It could amount to
serious inefficiency, arising either from lack of skill in their handling of authoritative legal materials or
the lack of a proper system in the handling of court business. For that matter, negligence, if reckless in
character, could amount to serious inefficiency. . ."

In Aducayan vs. Flores, L-30370, May 25, 1973, the Supreme Court said Judges are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Moreover, while it
becomes hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever increasing decisions, a modicum of effort should be
exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they betray awareness of
well-settled and authoritative doctrines. . ."

IV. Useful pointers.

(1) The technical rules of procedure applied in judicial trials do not strictly apply in administrative
proceedings. (Oromeca vs. Social Security, 4 SCRA 1188)

(2) A judge may be suspended for violating the Constitutional right of the complainants due process of
law. (Gardones vs. Delgado, 58 SCRA 58).

(3) A judge should rely on the merits of his own defense against a complaint filed against him. (Coral vs.
Serrano, 60 SCRA 1).
(4) Misconduct of a judge that will be taken cognizance of in an administrative complaint against him
must have a direct relation and be connected with the performance of official duties. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. (Almosco vs. Magro, 73 SCRA 107)

(5) The sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard
to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. (Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306)

(6) An administrative charge against a judge is in its nature highly penal and must, therefore, be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise the charge will be dismissed. (Suerte vs. Ugbinar, 75 SCRA 69). THE
JUDGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A LAST CHANCE TO REDEEM HIMSELF, 107 SCRA 549,
 DILEMMA OF A TRIAL JUDGE: TOO LITTLE OR TOO MUCH

By

ROGELIO E. SUBONG*

________________

I.Introduction, p. 232

II.Nature of the Function of Judges, p. 233

III.The Canons of Judicial Ethics, p. 234

a)Pertinent Canons, p. 235

b)Analysis of these pertinent Canons, p. 236

IV.Some Pertinent Cases on Judicial Behavior in the Adjudication of Cases, p. 237

a)Ventura et al. vs. Judge Yatco, 105 Phil. 287 (1959), p. 237

b)Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140 (1960), p. 239

c)People vs. Lacson, 1 SCRA 414 (1961), p. 239

d)Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 (1969), p. 240

e) Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 (1970), p. 241

f)Castillo vs. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1975), p. 241

g)Lastimoso vs. Lamba, 90 SCRA 285 (1979), p. 242

h)Retuya vs. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 (1979), p. 243

i)People vs. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196 (1980), p. 243

j)People vs. Muit, 117 SCRA 696 (1982), p. 244

k)Domanico vs. CA, et al., 122 SCRA 218 (1983), p. 244

l)People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 (1984), p. 245

m)Valdez vs. Aquilizan, 133 SCRA 1250 (1984), p. 245

n)People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 295 (1986), p. 246

o)People vs. Hatton 210 SCRA 1 (1992), p. 247

p)Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997), p. 248

q)People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 (1997), p. 249

_______________

* A.B. 62 (UP)-LL.B. 66 (UP)

V.Judge Intervention During Trials and Due Process, p. 250

VI.The Case Under Annotation: People vs. Robert Castillo, supra, p. 251

VII.Conclusion, p. 253

________________

I. Introduction

The judge in every trial is also on trial. He constantly walks the judicial tightrope, so to speak. Sometimes
the lawyers are better off than him because they can exhibit the most intense zeal in their advocacy and
they are even commended for it. Indeed, the lawyers are expected to do no less. On the other hand, the
judge can not be too zealous in his actuation towards either side in a case. He had to trudge upon a
perilous middle ground ever maintaining that delicate balance between the causes of contending
parties. In any case, it is his duty to participate during trials to ferret out the truth. But if he so
participates, he is faced with a nettlesome dilemma oftoo little or too much. In other words, if he
presides with apathy or overkill, he gets criticized either way. So while he is expected to participate in
the proceedings he should not betray even the slightest tilt for or against either party. While the rest of
the courtroom dramatis personae may get away with occasional outbursts, the judge is virtually
strapped under a huge magnifying glass where his every remark, gesture, body language and even the
way he rolls his eyes in reaction to courtroom events is subjected to careful analysis for indicia of
possible bias and prejudice.

When a judge remains altogether impassive and sphinx-like in his courtroom mien, he may be faulted
with the sins of sloth, apathy and even incompetence, while lives, freedom and/or property is on trial.
Then too, he may unwittingly abet wasteful meanderings and wanderings in the proceedings. Rights of
litigants may be frittered away by an unfocused or indifferent judge during the proceedings. He is then
akin to a potted plant in a courtrooma decoration and a mute witness to a vignette of human drama
before him. But then when he asserts his presence and performs his duty as arbiter of the law, he may
be accused of crossing that thin line between neutrality and bias. Such actuations are both a reversible
error and/or a ground for disciplinary action.
A judges zeal or abundance of it during a criminal trial appears to be one of the complaints of an
accused in the case of People vs. Robert M. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282 promulgated on April 20, 1998.
Accused-appellant assigned as error the alleged overweening zeal of the trial judge in his participation in
the examination of the accused and his witness. He charged that said judge has crossed the line from
clarificatory questioning into that of an advocate for the prosecution. The case brings to the fore this
constant problem of a judge who wanted to clarify matters taken up during a trial but gets faulted for
favoring the benefited party. His behavior is stigmatized as one of bias and prejudice for having shed the
supposed cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Before we analyze this case, let us first discuss related
matters relative to judicial conduct during trials.

II. Nature of the Function of Judges

A judge is the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64
SCRA 540). Whether he measures up in the public perception is another matter. But in this imperfect
world, he is about the best alternative to the uncivilized way of deciding disputes. We can no longer dip
the hands of a suspected thief in boiling water to see whether his skin gets scalded (although our police
have more interesting methods of finding the guilt of such suspect). Nor can we simply let the litigants
settle their disputes the old-fashion waythrough mortal combat (the more proficient in the art of
mayhem and killing would often be declared the righteous). This way, justice would depend upon
factors other than the truth.

Thus laws were invented so that everyone gets his due free from the vagaries of constitutional fortitude
or skills in combat. But since we cannot summon the deity to administer the law for us with Olympian
even-handedness, we have to make do with our fellow humans to whom we have entrusted our lives
and fortunes. Thus the judge is a human invention borne of necessity and faith that he shall dispense
justice or render everyone his due with abiding fairness and blindness to the glare of position and
influence of the parties.

A judge decides legal disputes and interprets the laws. He grants relief to an aggrieved party and exacts
sanctions against the aggressor or violator of the rights of others. The parties who entered into litigation
have the unarticulated acceptance of the verdict that may ensue because of their faith in his integrity.
He is some kind of an enlightened equalizer. He should at all times manifest depth of commitment and
concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check
the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his
fellow mortals (Azucena vs. Muoz, 33 SCRA 722). If the judge no longer commands faith and respect,
instead of going to the courts, an aggrieved party would resort to extra-legal means to secure relief.
Then, anarchy is not really far away.

III. The Canons of Judicial Ethics

The ethical standards for judges are culled from the behavior of man in relation to his community and
much more. Since our system of laws rely mainly upon codified body of rules, the ethical guide for
judicial actuation and behavior is found in numerous sources: Code of Judicial Conduct of October 20,
1989; Arts. VII, XI and III of the Philippine Constitution of 1987; Arts. 9, 20, 27, 32, 35,737,1491, 2005,
2029 to 2035 and 2046 of the New Civil Code; Rules 71, 135, 137, 139-B and 1140 of the Rules of Court;
Arts. 204, 205, 206 and 207 of the Revised Penal Code; R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act); Canons of Judicial Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility of June 21, 1988; Judiciary Act of
1948; B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980);

Supreme Court decisions; Foreign decisions; Opinions of Authorities in Legal and Judicial Ethics; other
statutes; and circulars of the Supreme Court (Ernesto L. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1994 ed., pp.
327-345).

From among these sources, the Code of Judicial Conduct of 1989 which was approved by the Supreme
Court contains fairly comprehensive guidelines for judicial conduct. These canons have the force and
effect of law and judges are directed to comply with the same otherwise, they shall be subjected to
administrative sanctions. If the breach of these canons is criminal in nature, they can also be held
criminally liable.

a) Pertinent Canons

In relation to the subject-matter under annotation, which is judicial conduct during trials, let us produce
certain relevant provisions under this Code of Judicial Ethics:

CANON 1.A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Rule 1.0.A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Rule 1.02.A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

CANON 2.A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01.A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3.A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

Rule 3.01.A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Rule 3.02.In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.

Rule 3.03.A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.

Rule 3.04.A judge should be patient, attentive, courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for courts instead of the courts for the litigants.

Rule 3.05.A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
period.
Rule 3.06.While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind
that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of
truth.

Rule 3.07.A judge should abstain from making public comment on any pending or impending case and
should require similar restraint on the part of court personnel.

b) Analysis of these pertinent Canons

The above provisions contain the crux of judicial behavior. As set forth in Canon 1, a judge is enjoined to
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. This exhortation assumes crucial immediacy in
light of denunciations often made against the so-called hoodlums in robe. Then there are also charges
against some members of the bench who sell decisions and Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) to the
highest bidder.

The other salient area covered by these canons are those that pertain to the conduct of a judge in the
trial of cases. Pertinent to one of the errors raised in the case under annotation is the delineation of the
proper actuation of the trial judge during the proceedings as litigants prove their respective contentions
through witnesses and documents.

The Code admonishes that the judge should do the following in the courtroom:

1. Conduct in the courtroom: he should maintain order and proper decorum in the court;

2. Attitude towards lawyers, litigants, witnesses and others appearing before him: he should be patient,
attentive and courteous, especially to the inexperienced lawyer;

3. Participation during trial: he may intervene in the presentation of evidence during trial, to promote
justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity. But he should always bear in mind that undue
interference may prevent the proper interpretation of evidence of the cause or the ascertainment of the
truth;

Nos. 1 and 2 are quite clear and need no further elaboration. The source of possible misinterpretation is
with No. 3the extent of participation of the judge during a trial. It is a given that a judge can intervene
or participate during the trial, particularly during the presentation of testimonial evidence, provided the
purpose is to promote justice (which is broad), to prevent waste of time (which can be shown then
when the witnesses cannot get to the point or opposing counsel interposes petty objections to delay the
proceedings) and to clear up some obscurity (which can also be shown when a judge asks a witness for
details and genuine clarificatory questions).

As to whether or not the active participation of a judge during proceedings is for promoting justice,
preventing waste of time or clarifying certain obscure point is often disputed by the accused who gets
convicted thereafter. Thus it is the usual remonstrance of accused against a judge who demonstrated
certain amount of zeal in the examination of witnesses against the former. Therefore, up to what point
is the trial judge supposed to participate in the proceedings?

The cases that we have summarized here present a fairly discernible picture of the dilemma a judge
faces as an arbiter of the law. Should he be a zealous advocate for one side, a fair and enlightened
magistrate, a passive umpire or a silent observer, unperturbed, bored and indifferent to the drama
unfolding before him?

IV. Some Pertinent Cases on Judicial Behavior in the Adjudication of Cases

a) Ventura, et al. vs. Judge Yatco, 105 Phil. 287 (1959)

Since the turn of the century, there have been pronouncements on proper judicial conduct during trials,
but we may begin with the case of Ventura, et al. vs. Judge Yatco, 105 Phil. 287 (1959) which eloquently
delineates the limits of judge participation during these proceedings. This case was brought to the High
Court on a petition for Certiorari of the orders of the trial judge who declared a lawyer in contempt, for
questioning the formers active participation in the examination of witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff
protested that the judge was unfairly meddling with the presentation of his case. This led to a
contempt order and later dismissal order of the complaint. Before the High Court, petitioner claimed
that the trial judge had interrupted the proceedings by remarks, motu proprio, in a most aggressive
and angry manner; that his participation as judge has been overzealous, showing a prejudgment of the
case and bias, prejudice, partially and hostility against the plaintiffs and their counsel.

Held: Petition denied. The High Court said that it read the transcript of the trial carefully and found that
indeed the court actively took part in the examination of the witnesses. But it concluded that we do not
find that said active participation in the trial contained or showed any prejudice, bias, or hostility against
the witness or his case. The High Court then set forth the proper conduct of a trial judge during trials:

While judges should as much as possible refrain from showing partiality to one party and hostility to
another, it does not mean that a trial judge should keep mum throughout the trial and allow parties to
ask questions that they desire, on issues which they think are important issues, when the former are
improper, and the latter, immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must take a leading part
therein, by directing counsel to submit the evidence or the facts in dispute by asking clarifying
questions, and by showing an interest in a fast and fair trial. Judges are not mere referees like those in
boxing bouts, only to watch and decide the results of the game; they should have as much interest as
counsel in the orderly presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are
overlooked, directing them to ask the question that would elicit the facts of the issues involved,
clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in trials in the above
form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions whether pertinent or impertinent, material or
immaterial, the speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the Government and of the people
cannot be attained. Counsel should therefore not resent any interest that the judge takes in the conduct
of the trial, they should be glad that a trial judge takes such interest and helps in the determination of
truth.

b) Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140 (1960)

In Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140 (1960), the petitioner sought the annulment of the Order of a
judge reprimanding a counsel and ordering him to return the fees he received from a party, as well as
the Order denying said counsels Motion for Reconsideration. This denial Order also contained a warning
to said counsel not to use improper language in his pleading.

In this case, a lawyer was found guilty of contempt and was further directed to return the P200 he
collected from a party. Exchanges of insulting words ensued between judge and counsel. The judge
described counsel to be below average standard of a lawyer.

Held: Order of the judge modified in that counsel need not return the money. The High Court denied the
request of the judge to strike off portions of the motion for reconsideration wherein the lawyer
employed strong language. It even pointed out that the judge had it coming:

If anyone is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made
insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing
to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language
himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.

c) People vs. Lacson, 1 SCRA 414 (1961)

In People vs. Lacson, 1 SCRA 414 (1961), the accused Governor Rafael Lacson and his men appealed the
decision convicting them of murder of Moises Padilla, then candidate for mayor of Magallon, Negros
Occidental during the elections of 1951. They charged that the court below exhibited patent bias
against the accused and had conducted the trial in tyrannical and arbitrary manner prejudicial to the
rights of the defense.

Held: Decision affirmed. The High Court found that the record proves beyond reasonable doubt that
the slaying of Moises Padilla was incited and ordered by Governor Lacson and carried out by some of
his co-accused. It declared that this charge of bias was not substantiated by the records. The court tried
to expedite the proceedings considering the number of the accused. And that the court dispensed
adverse rulings against the prosecution about as often as against the defense. The High Court also
declared that:

This Court has already ruled that trials should be regarded as a joint endeavor of the court and counsel
to ascertain the true facts and applicable law as expeditiously as possible, and not as games of
technicalities where the judge is to be reduced to the passive role of an umpire charged with the
exclusive task of awarding the price to superior skill.

d) Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 (1969)

In Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 (1969) the lawyer for a party sought the disqualification of the judge
because of his hostility towards the latter culminating in his being declared in contempt and detained
for a few hours. The lawyer charged that the judge took cognizance of the case even though not
assigned to him and he issued orders which were doctored, untrue and ungenuine. The proceedings
were marked by bitter exchanges between judge and counsel.

Held: Disqualification granted since allowing the judge to further hear the case would not be in the best
interest of justice which he is bound to serve. But the High Court took occasion to upbraid both
protagonists for their behavior.

To the lawyer, the Court advised that:

While a lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of hostile court
[Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724] he should not be given to intemperate outbursts which only tend
to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

And to the trial judge, the Court also reminded that:

All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-
free, disinterested and impartial tribunal. It declared that next in importance to the duty of rendering
a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will befit no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge.

e) Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 (1970)

In Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 (1970) the trial judge quarreled with the fiscal over a mere
interpretation of a witness testimony. At one point, the judge cut short the manifestation of the fiscal
and ordered him jailed for contempt of court. A timely petition for certiorari for abuse of discretion was
filed with the Supreme Court which issued a Cease and Desist Order against the judge.

Held: Certiorari granted and contempt Order nullified. The High Court declared that the power of
contempt should be resorted to in the interest of justice. It found that the fiscal did not misbehave as to
warrant issuance of contempt order. Citing previous rulings it warned that: Patience and gravity of
hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace
to a judge x x x to show quickness of conceit in cutting off x x x counsel too short.

f) Castillo vs. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1975)

In Castillo vs. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1975), a trial judge was sought to be disqualified for having
called to his chamber 2 offended parties in rape cases and tried to dissuade them from further pursuing
their respective cases. He explained that their evidence against the accused was weak and they would
only be exposed to further embarrassment if hearings were to proceed. He further explained that his
actuation was as an act of charity and a clear attempt to humanize justice.
Held: Petition to disqualify granted. The High Court held that:

In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are
crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than to the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be
deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to fact, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well
as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with
patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum.

g) Lastimoso vs. Lamba, 90 SCRA 285 (1979)

In Lastimoso vs. Lamba, 90 SCRA 285 (1979), a military officer filed an administrative complaint against a
judge who in an illegal possession of firearms case vouched for the character of the accused and
expressed surprise why this case was filed against the latter. The judge denied the charge and explained
that he in fact gave due course to the case against the accused.

Held: Petition dismissed but not without the following reminder:

Respondent Judge is thus entitled to be cleared. Nevertheless, it is not inappropriate as a reminder to

every occupant of the bench that random remarks could be misinterpreted. Every effort should therefor
be made so that the least doubt as to ones impartiality should not arise.

h) Retuya vs. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 (1979)

In Retuya vs. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 (1979), a former accused filed a complaint for disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer and a judge for their actuation which led to her prosecution for estafa for
allegedly not paying her counsel. The High Court found some credence to the gripe of complainant that
she did not receive gentle treatment from respondent judge when, in an abrasive, if not coercive
manner, he seemingly pressured her to settle the claim of the lawyer.

Held: Judge was absolved from the charges but the High Court warned that: A judge is expected to
practice courtesy and civility and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety (Pars. 4, 10
and 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162, 42 O.G. 1803).

i) People vs. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196 (1980)

In People vs. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196 (1980), the convicted accused on appeal assigned as an error,
that the trial judge deprived Catindihan of a fair and impartial trial and favored the prosecution by
taking an active part in the examination of witnesses.

Held: Decision of conviction affirmed. Whatever bias on the part of the judge did not prevent the
defense from adequately presenting its evidence. Accused was given all the opportunity to absolve
himself. It declared:
The rule is that a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. But he should bear in mind that his undue
interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on his
part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a
trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.

The High Court also cited the ruling in Ventura vs. Judge Yatco, supra, about the proper role of judge
during trials.

j) People vs. Muit, 117 SCRA 696 (1982)

In People vs. Muit, 117 SCRA 696 (1982), a soldier was prosecuted and convicted with murder of a town
mate due to jealousy. One of the errors raised on appeal was that the judge was palpably biased
against the accused owing to the questions he asked the witnesses during the trial.

Held: Decision affirmed. It pointed out that: The alleged bias of the Trial Judge against the accused is
without basis. The clarificatory questions propounded by him during the trial were intended to test the
credibility of witnesses and to extract the truth.

k) Domanico vs. CA, et al., 122 SCRA 218 (1983)

In Domanico vs. CA, et al., 122 SCRA 218 (1983), the Petitioner brought this case to the Supreme Court
claiming denial of substantial justice due to the alleged biased participation of the trial judge in the
examination of the petitioner. Petitioner claimed as error what even the Court of Appeals found that the
judge lacked the moderation expected of him as a trial judge. He charged that the judge was not fair
and impartial thus he was deprived of due process which entitled him to a new trial. Excerpts from the
transcript of the trial were reproduced to show how the judge participated during the proceedings.

Held: Decision affirmed. The actuation of the judge even of impatience did not preclude petitioner from
presenting his evidence. The High Court agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
appealed decision was not based on any immaterial matters elicited by the trial judge during his
examination of petitioner. It cited its holding in People vs. Catindihan, supra, which allowed the judge
to intervene in a trial to hasten the proceedings and clarify matters but he should be careful that undue
interference and show of impatience may scare witnesses and prevent proper presentation of evidence.

l) People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 (1984)

In People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 (1984), the accused on appeal, also assigned as error the active
participation of the judge in the examination of witnesses as though he were acting for the prosecution.

Held: Conviction affirmed. The Court noted that the trial judge asked questions of the witnesses and the
accused during the trial. But this did not amount to interference as to make the case for the
prosecution. The Court noted that:
The questions of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain
points and confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an
indication of bias. It cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen
to reveal certain truth which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

m) Valdez vs. Aquilizan, 133 SCRA 150 (1984)

In Valdez vs. Aquilizan, 133 SCRA 150 (1984), the accused sought the nullification of the proceedings and
the disqualification of the judge for irregularities during the prosecution for 3 rape cases involving the
same accused and offended party. In one hearing wherein the private prosecutor was absent, the judge
decided to undertake the questioning of the offended party who was still under cross-examination. He
manifested that it is the Honorable Judge who is examining her. He then proceeded to ask questions
to the witness, but the Court observed that the examination is better described as direct examination.
The accused was convicted thereafter.

Held: Proceedings nullified and the judge ordered disqualified from hearing the cases. The Court found
arbitrary actions by the judge from the available records of the case that warrant the nullification of the
proceedings and setting-aside of the decisions of conviction of the accused.

As to the explanation of the judge that his questions were merely clarificatory, the High Court argued
that this is belied by the transcript which shows that he asked the private complainant searching
questions and this is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript. The judge also claimed that he was
protecting the right to speedy trial of the accused, but he held trial even in the absence of his counsel.
It observed that: If an accused has a protector like the respondent judge, there is no need for a fiscal
or a private prosecutor. It then concluded that it is obvious that respondent judge did not manifest the
requisite cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved.

n) People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 295 (1986)

In People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 295 (1986), the 2 accused were prosecuted for murder for the death of a
person who was attacked by their group. Although prosecution evidence did not point to them as the
knife-wielders they were convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal they claimed violation of due
process because the judge showed clear bias against them. They claimed that the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge is a requisite of due process.

Held: Accused acquitted for not having been accorded due process. The High Court noted that the
examination of the accused and their witness, was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at
times irrelevant, at worst malicious. The judge appeared to have allied himself with the prosecution to
discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense. The judge took particular
interest in the tattoos of one of the accused and he even required him to remove his shirt; he
maliciously asked if the accused was convicted at the National Mental Hospital; he showed continuing
hostility to the accused; one of them was immediately cross-examined by him even before the defense
asked the first questions; he asked about irrelevant matters that had no probative value like the extra-
marital affair of the mother of one of the accused. A transcript of the cross-examination of the judge of
a witness for the accused showed malice and contempt of the judge towards accused. The High Court
concluded: The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they
were irrelevant, and sometimes cruel.

The High Court further concluded that considering the way the accused were tried, they should be
immediately released.

While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that, because their constitutional
rights have been violated, their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
so cannot be pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick condemnor and must
set the defendants free.

o) People vs. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 (1992)

In People vs. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 (1992), the convicted accused on appeal also questioned the bias and
partiality of the trial judge during the proceedings. He claimed that the judge asked leading questions
and on various points not asked by the fiscal during the presentation of prosecution evidence. The
accused pointed out that the judge asked a witness 51 questions as against the 25 asked by the fiscal on
direct and then 40 questions on cross-examination. Furthermore, a witness for the defense was asked
59 questions by the judge while the fiscal asked only 9. As the Court noted: The same attitude was
displayed by the judge during the entire trial of the case.

Held: Conviction reversed but on other grounds. The Court held that the trial judge did not manifest
any bias in favor of the prosecution. It however found that indeed the judge was overzealous in
controlling the conduct of the hearing. He asked more questions than did counsel for the accused or the
fiscal. It is conceded though that the judge did not manifest any bias in favor of the prosecution in asking
the witnesses for the prosecution nor any hostility or malice against the defense witnesses. We note
also that the questions asked by the court were clarificatory questions aimed to paint a clearer picture
of what was testified to by the witnesses.

The High Court also cited the pertinent holding in People vs. Ibasan, supra.

p) Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)

About the latest case that set forth the proper conduct of a judge in the examination of witnesses during
trials is Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997). It held that due process was denied the
accused when the judge assumed the role of both magistrate and advocate. Accused Airport Manager
and his Asst. Manager were prosecuted for malversation of public funds involving the amount of 55
million pesos which were released from the coffers of then Manila International Airport. They
interposed the defense that they merely complied with the written directive of the then President
Marcos to secure the release of the money for the purpose of allegedly paying the obligation of the
government to the PNCC. They were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for which prison terms and fines in
the amount equivalent to that lost by the government were imposed. They appealed and raised several
assignments of errors.
Held: Decision of conviction reversed. The accused raised several errors before the High Court, but it
directed most of its attention to the one they overlookedthe actuation of the members of the
Sandiganbayan during the proceedings. It then ruled that what appears to be more compelling reason
for these acquittal is the violation of the accuseds basic constitutional right to due process. It quoted
the declaration of Justice Cruz in a case that: Respect for the Constitution is more important than
securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused. (People vs. Exala, Dissenting
Opinion, 221 SCRA 494). It also explained that even if this error was not raised by the accused, this is still
reviewable because an appeal throws the whole case open to reviews.

The High Court noted the unusual zeal of the members of the Sandiganbayan who asked more questions
than that of the prosecution and defense combined on a particular witness. And as to the main accused,
Mr. Tabuena, the High Court noted he was asked 67 questions on cross-examination by Sandiganbayan
while the prosecutor only asked 14. It reproduced pertinent records of the proceedings to show the
extent of participation of the justices during the trial. It noted that: x x x the questions of the court
were in the nature of cross-examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.

Thus the Court came out with the following admonition:

The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his
mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But
not only should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be
sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible,
neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial. Here, these limitations were not observed.
Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when
the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross-examination supplementing those made by
Prosecutor Vierness and far exceeding the latters questions in length. The cold neutrality of an
impartial judge requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court,
with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.

q) People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 (1997)

In People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 (1997), the accused who was convicted of rape of a pregnant
woman and was sentenced to death raised as error on appeal the Judges alleged bias and partiality in
favor of the prosecution during the entire proceedings as evidenced by his active participation in the
entire proceeding, consistently taking the cudgels for the prosecution, instead of conducting the trial
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Held: Decision affirmed with modification the death penalty to reclusion perpetua for the offense was
not committed under grounds that warrant death penalty. As to the actuation of the judge, the High
Court after studying the records concluded that the trial judge may have exhibited a degree of zeal
which could lead to impressions of partiality and bias. However, this per se does not warrant
nullification of the entire proceeding in the case. It cited the cases of People vs. Hatton, supra, and
Ventura vs. Yatco, supra. It further noted that counsel for accused-appellant did not object, during the
trial, to the manner of questioning of the trial judge nor was his inhibition sought by the defense for
alleged bias and partiality for the prosecution.

However Justice Francisco wrote a Dissenting Opinion citing his ponencia in the case of Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra:

1) To give life to the due process requirement of cold neutrality of an impartial judge, the right of the
judge to participate in the examination of witnesses must be sparingly used in order to avoid the
impression of partiality in favor of one party. Thus to reiterate People vs. Opida (142 SCRA 295) x x x x
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this as a minimum
guaranty of due process.

2) Under the doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, the failure of the accused to
signify any kind of objection (whether by objecting to the judges question or by seeking for his
inhibition) to the judges partiality during trial does not prevent this Court from taking cognizance of this
irregularity and thereafter render a judgment of acquittal grounded thereon if circumstance warrant.

It seems that this dissenting opinion is more compelling and consistent with the settled position of the
Supreme Court on the deprivation of due process before an overzealous court.

V. Judge Intervention During Trials and Due Process

A judges actuation during the trial is crucial because it can be a reversible error on appeal for which
considerable time and fortune may be for naught. In civil cases, the undue participation of a judge in the
proceedings may raise the suspicion of bias and partiality. And when certain documents or testimonies
are not presented or blocked by a judges clearly partisan ruling, rules of evidence or due process are
breached resulting in the remand of the case or reversal of decision. On the other hand, in criminal
cases, a biased or partial judge in favor of the accused may not be called to account anymore for review
purposes his actuation during the proceedings. But that is not to say that he can altogether escape from
responsibility for he may still be charged criminally or administratively (Retuya vs. Equipilag, supra). And
if such bias and partiality result in conviction of the accused, particularly, when the judge has shown
undue zeal in behalf of the prosecution by virtually taking over the direct examinations of the offended
parties and their witnesses and by conducting extensive and probing cross-examination of the accused
and his witnesses, then the conviction may be thrown out on appeal for due process violation.

Thus the High Court spoke with a sense of finality: It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be
satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants
of his being fair and just (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 [1973]. The rationale here is that it would
be a waste of time and a set-back to the cause of justice if the accused would be convicted by the trial
court only to be acquitted on appeal on ground of lack of due process because the judge had been
partial and bias.
 VI. The Case Under Annotation: People vs. Robert Castillo, Supra

In People vs. Robert Castillo, supra, the accused-appellant who was convicted with murder assigned four
(4) errors but errors 3 and 4 may be distilled into the alleged prejudice and bias of the trial judge against
the accused. As to the alleged prejudice, the accused claimed that the trial judge asked him questions
which should pertain to the prosecutor. And as to the alleged bias, there was judgment of conviction
that followed. Accused pointed out that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked
questions in a leading manner, interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers
favorable to the prosecution, and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusion of
bad moral character, which could not be objected by defense counsel because they (have) been
ventilated by the judge himself. He also cited pages in the transcript to support his charge of bias and
prejudice.

But the High Court was not persuaded by these claims of the accused. In a nutshell, it set forth the
following basic postulates and findings:

a) it is the prerogative and duty of the judge to ask clarificatory questions to elicit the truth;

b) on the whole, the questions asked by the judge were clarificatory questions;

c) questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within
judicial prerogative.

What is the significance of this decision? It merely adheres to the required level of participation of the
judge during trials. The Court assessed the questions as merely clarificatory and not in the nature of
cross-examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.

However, readers of the decision now and in the future would not really know the basis for the
assessment of the High Court. The reason is that the challenged excerpts of the transcripts of
stenographic notes of the questions propounded by the trial judge were not reproduced in the decision
unlike in the Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, supra. Indeed, whether the questions were really clarificatory
or adversarial, we would not be in a position to agree or disagree. The Court further noted that the
propriety of the judges queries depended upon whether accused was prejudiced by such questioning
and accused failed to show such prejudice. We wonder, why this statement was made at all. What could
be a more glaring perception of prejudice on the part of the accused than the fact that the accused was
convicted by the trial judge. And finally, the High Court made a rather curious conclusion: In fact, even
if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. It is a
wonder how the High Court could have predicted that the decision of the trial court would have been
still for conviction even in the absence of those questions asked by the judge and the answers thereto.
These are operations of the mind of the trial judge which the High Court could not have divine with
absolute certainty.
 VII. Conclusion

There is always a lurking peril when a judge exhibits a high level of zeal during a trial. If he does not
participate and provide the light and compass during the trial, he is nothing short of a potted plant in
robe, if there is such. If he actively participates and one side gets the short end by it, he is perceived as a
second adversary in the courtroom, by those who cry bias and prejudice by his participation. And if he
displays so much zeal and knocks down all oppositions in the courtroom to get things done, he is then
perceived as a judicial Rambo unmindful of those legal niceties of procedure. In fact even if he
cautiously treks the middle ground trying his best to be as evenhanded as possible, he may still be
faulted by the losing party. Indeed, it is still that continuing problem of doing too little or too much.

So what is to be done? Will a judge be a potted plant or a judicial Rambo? The answer is simple. He
should be a fair and enlightened magistrate dispensing the benefits and sanctions of law equally or to
those such are due. In the area of criminal adjudication, a trial judge is specifically reminded that, he
should always remember that he is so much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and
whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the
interests of society (Murphy vs. State, 13 Ga. App. 431, 79 S.E. 228 cited in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan,
supra.). And in other areas of adjudication, he should ever be guided by the timeless advice of U.S. Chief
Justice John Marshall thatjudicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the judge, always for the purpose of giving effect . . . . to the will of the law (Osborn vs. Bank, 9
Wheat 738, 866 (1824) cited in The American Judicial Tradition, G. Edward White, Oxford University
Press, 1975 ed., p. 35). However, if by doing his bounden task, a judge is still faulted and criticized, it
goes with the territory, so to speak. But he should hearken to the timeless admonition of Justice
Malcolm in a famous decision involving a libel case instituted by a judge against those who criticized his
official actuation: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can
be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience (People vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 [1918]). Dilemma of a
Trial Judge: Too Little or Too Much, 289 SCRA 231, April 20, 1998
 MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE OF JUDGES

(Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment)

by

JORGE R. COQUIA

1.Introduction, p. 309.

2.Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office as Criminal Acts, p. 309.

3.As an Administrative Liability, p. 309.

4.Section 67 of the Judiciary Law Now Superseded by the 1973 Philippine Constitution, p. 310.

5.Under the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, p. 310.

6.As Civil Liability, p. 311.

7.Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, p. 313.

8.Unjust Decision Defined, p. 313.

9.Essential Elements of Offense, p. 313.

10.Unjust Judgment Distinguished from Bribery, p. 314.

11.Meaning of Knowingly, p. 314.

12.Judgment Rendered Through Negligence, p. 314.

13.Unjust and Interlocutory Order, p. 315.

14.Malicious Delay in the Administration of Justice, p. 316.

15.Degree of Proof in Administrative Cases Against Judges, p. 317.

16.Judges and Justices Not Civilly Liable, p. 320.

17.Civil Liability of Judges for Violation of Civil Liberties, p. 321.

18.Exception to the Doctrine, p. 322.

1. Introduction

The rulings in Re: The Hon. Rafael C. Climaco, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Adm. Case No. 135-J, January 21, 1974 and Graciano Lampauog, et al. vs. Francisco Villarojo, Municipal
Judge of Ginatilan, Cebu, Adm. Matter No. 381-MJ, January 28, 1974 have emphasized the previous
decisions of the Supreme Court on the essential requirements in proving charges against judges alleged
to have knowingly rendered an unjust judgment and for other acts of malfeasance and misfeasance.

2. Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office as Criminal Acts.

The Revised Penal Code penalizes acts of malfeasance

and misfeasance committed by judges such as knowingly rendering unjust judgment (Art. 204),
judgment rendered through negligence (Art. 205), unjust interlocutory order (Art. 206) and malicious
delay in the administration of justice (Art. 207).

3. As an Administrative Liability

Section 67 of the Judiciary Law (Rep. Act. No. 296) which has superseded Section 173 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides for the proceedings for the removal of a district Judge.

Section 67 of the Judiciary Law provides: No district Judge shall be separated or removed from office by
the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court,
involving serious misconduct or inefficiency, for the removal of said judge from office after the proper
proceedings. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon
information of the Secretary of Justice to conduct an inquiry into the official or personal conduct of any
judge appointed under the provisions of this Law, and to adopt such rules of procedure in that regard as
it may deem proper; and, after such judge shall have been heard in his own defense, the Supreme Court
may recommend his removal to the President of the Philippines, who, if he deems that the public
interests will be subserved thereby, shall thereupon make the appropriate order for such removal.

The President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Supreme Court, may temporarily
suspend a judge pending proceedings under this section. In case the judge suspended is acquitted of the
cause or causes that gave rise to the investigation, the President of the Philippines shall order the
payment to him of the salary, or part thereof, which he did not receive during his suspension, from any
available funds for expenses of the judiciary.

The cost and expenses incident to such investigations shall be paid from the funds appropriated for
contingent expenses of the judiciary, upon vouchers approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.

See also Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

4. Section 67 of the Judiciary Law

Now Superseded by the 1973 Philippine Constitution

Section 6, Art. X of the New Philippine Constitution reads:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Section 7 of the New Philippine Constitution provides:

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of sixty five years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and by a vote of at
least eight Members order their dismissal.

5. Under the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 declares as unlawful any act of a public officer:

1. Causing any undue injury to any party including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

6. As Civil Liability

Art. 32 of the New Civil Code provides:

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witness face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess
guilt or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts;

In any of the cases referred to in his article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

7. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment

Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.

This provision is taken from article 346 to 350 of the Penal Code of Spain.

8. Unjust Decision Defined

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The
source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error.

It is well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the
ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense
aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy,
revenge, greed, or some other similar motive (IV Viada, Codigo Penal, 305).

9. Essential Elements of Offense

In order to be criminally liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must
be established; (a) that an unjust judgment be rendered by the judge; (b) that such unjust judgment be
rendered knowingly. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered
maliciously or in bad faith, that is knowingly it to be unjust.

10. Unjust Judgment Distinguished from Bribery

A justice of the peace who receives money or other valauble thing in consideration of his agreement to
decide an action in favor of the person giving the money without regard as to what the evidence in the
case may be, is guilty of bribery and not knowingly rendering an unjust judgment because it is not
known whether the decision made by the justice of the peace was just or unjust one (U.S. vs. Gacutany
28 Phil. 100).

11. Meaning of Knowingly

As interpreted by Spanish courts, the term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious and
deliberate intention to do an injustice (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 1884 and
January 10, 1900, cited in Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, p. 418. Mere error in the
interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.

The offense of rendering an unjust judgment was committed by a municipal judge who under the
pretence that the warden failed to deliver to him the keys to the jail as requested, imposed upon him a
fine of 20 pesetas, and executed it by distraining and selling property belonging to the warden (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of Jan. 9, 1906).

12. Judgment Rendered Through Negligence

Article 205 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Judgment rendered through negligence.Any judge who, by reason of inxecusable negligence or

ignorance, shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be
punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.

This provision is similar to Art. 351 of the Old Spanish Code.

This crime is hard to prove as it is not easy to conceive of a judgment that is rendered through
inexcusable negligence.

Malice or dolus is usually the ordinary source of this kind of offense (Groizard, Vol. 4, p. 83). He who
intentionally fails to comply with the duties of his office commits the crime of prevarication. Dereliction
of duty may also be committed by one who acts without malice, by omitting in the performance of his
duty that diligence, prudence, and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public
service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, March 28, 1911 and
April 24, 1920).

Manifestly unjust judgment is meant that which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation,
even though the understanding of the law applied be mistaken, but on the contrary a notorious
violation of a legal provision is apparent, in a clear and indisputable manner, to logic and reason
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, Feb. 19, 1891, cited in Guevarra, op. cit., p. 421).

According to Article 262 of the Provisional Law of Spain for the organization of the Judiciary, negligence
or ignorance shall be considered inexcusable there, although unintentionally so much decision is
manifestly contrary to law. It may be easily understood that in order that a decision may be considered
unjust it is necessary that evidence of its injustice be such that it cannot be doubted by & person having
a meager knowledge of the law (Albert The Revised Penal Code, p. 455).

13. Unjust and Interlocutory Order

Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the
penalty shall be suspension.

This provision is taken from article 352 of the old Penal Code of Spain. The unjust interlocutory order
must also be issued knowingly or by inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

An interlocutory order is a ruling on a collateral issue which does not decide the case on the merits. It is
distinguished from a decision or judgment that does not disposed of the case completely but leaves
something to be done. An interlocutory order which does not dispose of the case but reserves further
questions or directing for future determination, or an order or where an order requires the parties to
perform certain acts for final adjudication or other, it is an interlocutory order (Phil. Coal Miners Union
vs. Cebu Portland Cement, L-19007, April 30, 1964; De Ocampo vs. Republic, L-19553, Oct. 31, 1963;
People vs. Hewald, 105 Phil. 1297).

A warrant or arrest is not an interlocutory order. It is a perfectly valid process issued after the
requirements of the law have been complied with (People vs. Valdez, 53 O.G. 4865). When the act in
question is issued by a judicial officer all that the law can secure is a guaranty that the officer shall not
with impunity do wrong wilfully, fraudulently, or corruptly. If he does so act, he is liable both civilly and
criminally. But if it is only for error of judgment he is not liable either civilly or criminal. If a citizen has
had a fair and honest exercise of judgment by a judicial officer in his case, it is all the law entitles him to
and although the judgment may be erroneous and the party injured, it is danum absque injuria, for
which no action lies. (Bevard vs. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479, 81 Am. Def. 618).

14. Malicious Delay in the Administration of Justice

Art. 207 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of
malicious delay in the administration of justice.

This is taken from Art. 353 of the old Penal Code of Spain.

Malice connotes more than a mere voluntary act. It must show deliberate evil intent (People vs.
Malabanan, 62 Phil. 786; U.S. vs. Caete).

The term malicious has been construed by the Supreme Court of Spain as equivalent of deliberate intent
(Decision of January 10, 1900).

A judge should display that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the days labors fixed
by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on
holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. The judge must cultivate a capacity for
quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome. He must not delay by slothfulness of
mind or body the judgment to which a party is entitled. (In re Impeachment of Flordeliza, 44 Phil. 608).

15. Degree of Proof in Administrative Cases against Judges

To convict a judge for serious misconduct it must be shown that the acts complained of were corrupt or
injured by an intention to violate the law which are in persistent disregard of well known legal order (In
re Impeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212).

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by
evidence, and the same was made with malicious and deliberate intent to do injustice.

Administrative charges against judges may be dismissed for want of substantial evidence (Agsalud vs.
Ramos, Adm. Case No. 57, Oct. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 268).

Where the record is bereft of indication that the judge failed to follow; the dictates of the law, the
supervisory power of the Supreme Court does not come into play (Villanueva vs. Querubin, L-26137,
Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 103).

Where charges of misconduct was not substantiated, admonition is nevertheless proper inasmuch as
the judge should have taken great pains to avoid the impression that his personal feelings were not kept
under control, as is rightfully expected of a judge (Conde vs. Superable, Jr., Adm. Case No. 812, Sept. 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 727).
On the basis of the following facts that the judge was exonerated of the charge that he delayed the
disposition of the criminal case to favor the accused: (1) judge committed no error or misconduct in
calling the criminal case for trial even before resolving the motion for cancellation of the bail bond
because the judge delayed the arraignment and trial of the case, he could have been rightly charged
with favoring the defendants by the consequent delay; (2) there is no evidence sufficiently showing
undue familiarity between the judge and the accused (Montemayor vs. Echiverri, Adm. Case No. 153-J,
Dec. 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 798).

Indeed when the actuations of a judge are assailed on grounds other than legal ones, and imputing to
the judge personal motives, the judge cannot be blamed if he takes personal interest in trying to
dissolve the imputations (Montalban vs. Canonoy, Adm. Case No. 179-J, March 15, 1971).

We should be the last to deter or discourage parties who harbor what they feel to be a legitimate sense
of grievance against a judges actuation from taking steps the law canfers to assure observance of the
high standard expected of men in the judiciary. Considering that a judged reputation for probity is highly
valued, as it should be, and, in many instances, his most precious possession, is it too much to expect of
a complainant that he should ponder well and seriously before filing charges? Otherwise, even if the
result be an acquittal, an erroneous impression as to the judges capabilities, difficult to erase
afterwards, might have been created. This admonition should not be less especially on one like the
complainant, who is a member of the Philippine Bar and, as such, presumably aware not only of his
right but of his responsibilities to account and its occupant (Azucena vs. Hon. Emmanuel Muoz, Adm.
Case No. 130-J, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 122).

A judge cannot be disciplined if the charges against him are not proved by satisfactory evidence (Espinas
vs. Quicho, Adm. Case No. L-165-J, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 644). See also Dei Castillo vs. Climaco, Adm.
Case No. 141-J, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 507); Tobias vs. Ericta, Adm. Case No. 242-J, July 29, 1972, 46
SCRA 83); (Superable vs. Escalona, Adm. Case No. 122-J, July 31, 1968).

The Supreme Court dismissed an administrative complaint against a judge of a Court of First Instance for
being ridiculously incredible, frivolous and flimsy. The court found that the complaint was filed because
the respondent judge denied the petition of counsel, disqualifying him from hearing two criminal cases
(Tolentino vs. Colayco, Adm. Case No. 174-J, Jan. 28, 1972, 43 SCRA 40).

Even when charges of grave misconduct, consisting of harrassment, oppression and persecution were
not proved to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court, a judge was admonished that he should have taken
great pains to avoid the impression that his personal feelings were not kept under control and it is
rightfully expected of a judge (Conde vs. Superable, Jr., Adm. Case No. 812, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA
727).

The Supreme Court held that a trial judge had committed grave abuse of discretion and warned him that
he is not a depositary of arbitrary powers, but a judge under a sanction of law (Go Lea Chu vs.
Gonzales, L-23687, Feb. 26, 1968).
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Second only to the duty
of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its
fairness and the integrity of the Judge. It is difficult; enough to attain the ideal of a presiding judge being
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. It becomes doubly difficult for such, qualities to
be in evidence whenever the matter before him is so enmeshed and so intertwind with partisan
considerations that even if he could justly lay claim to such attributes, he still would be susceptible to
the suspicion, by whichever group may feel that its just claim is rejected, that he acted not in
accordance with the cold dictates of reason, but with the promptings and urgings of his sympathy and
predilections in whatever direction they may lie.

16. Judges and Justices Not Civilly Liable

As a general rule, justices of the Supreme Court and judges are immuned from liability for damages
arising from a judgment rendered in bad faith. Reasoning its opinion, the United States Supreme Court
said: But, however, it may be as to the matters that we have stated, we regard it as fundamental that
the immunity of the defendant from this suit is the same as that of judges in the United States, which is
established beyond dispute (Brady vs. Fisher, 20 L. ed. 285). Whatever may have been the Spanish law,
this is a principle so deep seated in our system that we should regard it as carried into the Philippines by
implications as soon as we established courts in these islands (Acts of the Philippine Commission, Nos.
136, 222. Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Chap. 1369, Secs. 1, 5; 32 Stat. 963). Reasons somewhat
analogous to those adverted to in Carrington vs. United States (208 U.S. 1) make the rule perhaps more
important in the Philippines than it is here (U.S.). It is true that in Act No. 190, Section 9 of the Philippine
Commission (1901) it is provided that no judge, justice of the peace, or assessor shall be liable to civil
action for recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good
faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction; and it is argued that it is important that
any judge shall be liable for a judgment rendered in bad faith. But without considering the question of
power, we are of the opinion, for the reason to which we have referred, that this should not be
construed to convey such an implication, at least, as to judges of the Supreme Court. That section is
shown to have in mind inferior judges of the Supreme Court, That section is shown to have in mind
inferior judges and the like By its mention of justices of peace and assessors, as to whom a different rule
has been held to prevail (Alzua vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 309).

17. Civil Liability of Judges for Violation of Civil Liberties

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides for liability for damages on the part of any public officer or
private individual who directly or indirectly obstruct, impede defeat or impair the exercise of the
constitutional rights of a citizen enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution (See Art.
III, Bill of Rights, 1935 Constitution, new Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and Article IV on Suffrage,
[1935 Constitution new Art. VI of the 1973 Constitution]).

The aggrieved party may file a separate and distinct civil action for damages which shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution. Liability for damages may include actual or compensatory
(Art. 2199), moral (Art. 2217), nominal (Art. 2221), temperate (Art. 224) and also exemplary damages
(Art. 2229).

The last paragraph of Art. 32 of the Civil Code, however, provides: The responsibility herein set forth is
not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.

The reason for the rule of non-liability of judges are:

(1) The necessary result of the liability would be to occupy the judges time and mind with the defense
of own interests, when he should be giving them up wholly to his public duties, thereby defeating to
some extent the very purpose for which his office was created.

(2) The effect of putting the judge on his defense as a wrongdoer necessarily is to lower the estimation
in which his office is held by the public, and any adjudication against him lessens the weight of his
subsequent decisions.

(3) The civil responsibility of the judge would often be an incentive to dishonest instead of honest
judgments, and would invite him to consult public opinion and public prejudice when he ought to be
wholly above and uninfluenced by them.

(4) Such civil responsibility would constitute a serious obstruction to justice, in that it would render
essential a large increase in the judicial force, not only as it would multiply litigation, but as it would
open each case to endless controversy. If one judge can be tried for his judgment, the one who presides
on the trial may also be tried for his, and thus the process may go on until it becomes intolerable.

(5) Where the judge is really deserving of condemnation, a prosecution at the instance of the state is a
much more effectual method of bringing him to account than the private suit.

(6) Judicial offices would never be accepted by any man of standing, reputation or financial worth, if, at
the peril of his fortune, he must justify his judgments to the satisfaction of court summoned by a
dissatisfied litigant to review them. (Cooley on Torts, 2nd ed., p. 475.)

18. Exception to the Doctrine

The doctrine of non-liability of judges from civil damages is not however absolute. Speaking for the
Court, Mr. Justice Carson said that nothing should be understood as. giving to the judges power to act
with partiality or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively without fear that they may be
called to account for such conduct. No judge, however high his rank may be, is above the law which it is
his office to administer.

Restating the rule on liability Justice Carson said, If the question is one which a judge, qualified in the
average may for the position occupied by the offending judge or for a similar judicial position, would
regard as a real question, then it is one whose determination requires the exercise of judicial functions.
But if it is one so clear that a judge, qualified as aforesaid, would not regard as a real question then it is
one whose determination does not require the exercise of judicial functions. In the former case, the
judge is not liable; in the latter, he is (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534). Malfeasance and
Misfeasance of Judges, 55 SCRA 308, January 28, 1974