3/8/2017 G.R.No.

179382

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.179382January14,2013

SPOUSESBENJAMINC.MAMARILANDSONIAP.MAMARIL,Petitioners,
vs.
THEBOYSCOUTOFTHEPHILIPPINES,AIBSECURITYAGENCY,INC.,CESARIOPEA,*ANDVICENTE
GADDI,Respondents.

DECISION

PERLASBERNABE,J.:

ThisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariassailingtheMay31,2007Decision1andAugust16,2007Resolution2
oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.CVNo.75978.ThedispositiveportionofthesaidDecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 28, 2001 and the Order dated June 11, 2002 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only defendants AIB Security
Agency, Inc., Cesario Pea and Vicente Gaddi are held jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffsappellees
SpousesBenjaminC.MamarilandSoniaP.MamariltheamountofTwoHundredThousandPesos(P200,000.00)
representingthecostofthelostvehicle,andtopaythecostofsuit.TheothermonetaryawardsareDELETEDfor
lackofmeritand/orbasis.

DefendantAppellantBoyScoutofthePhilippinesisabsolvedfromanyliability.

SOORDERED.3

TheAntecedentFacts

Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps. Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. They
would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound
locatedat181ConcepcionStreet,Malate,ManilaforafeeofP300.00permonthforeachunit.OnMay26,1995
at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. The following morning,
however,oneofthevehicleswithPlateNo.DCG392wasmissingandwasneverrecovered.4Accordingtothe
security guards Cesario Pea (Pea) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom
BSPhadcontracted5foritssecurityandprotection,amalepersonwholookedfamiliartothemtookthesubject
vehicleoutofthecompound.

On November 20, 1996, Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint6 for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila,Branch39,againstBSP,AIB,PeaandGaddi.Insupportthereof,Sps.Mamarilaverredthatthelossof
thesubjectvehiclewasduetothegrossnegligenceoftheabovenamedsecurityguardsondutywhoallowedthe
subjectvehicletobedrivenoutbyastrangerdespitetheiragreementthatonlyauthorizeddriversdulyendorsed
by the owners could do so. Pea and Gaddi even admitted their negligence during the ensuing investigation.
Notwithstanding,BSPandAIBdidnotheedSps.Mamaril'sdemandsforaconferencetosettlethematter.They
thereforeprayedthatPeaandGaddi,togetherwithAIBandBSP,beheldliablefor:(a)thevalueofthesubject
vehicle and its accessories in the aggregate amount of P300,000.00 (b) P275.00 representing daily loss of
income/boundary reckoned from the day the vehicle was lost (c) exemplary damages (d) moral damages (e)
attorney'sfeesand(f)costofsuit.

In its Answer,7 BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with
respect to the manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket8 itself expressly
stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left
therein."ItalsoclaimedthatSps.MamarilerroneouslyreliedontheGuardServiceContract.Apartfromnotbeing
partiesthereto,itsprovisionscoveronlytheprotectionofBSP'sproperties,itsofficers,andemployees.

Inadditiontotheforegoingdefenses,AIBallegedthatithasobservedduediligenceintheselection,trainingand
supervision of its security guards while Pea and Gaddi claimed that the person who drove out the lost vehicle
from the BSP compound represented himself as the owners' authorized driver and had with him a key to the
subjectvehicle.Thus,theycontendedthatSps.Mamarilhavenocauseofactionagainstthem.

TheRTCRuling

Afterdueproceedings,theRTCrenderedaDecision9 dated November 28, 2001 in favor of Sps. Mamaril. The

dispositiveportionoftheRTCdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Boy Scout of the Philippines and AIB
SecurityAgency,withsecurityguardsCesarioPenaandVicenteGaddi:

1.TopaytheplaintiffsjointlyandseverallythecostofthevehiclewhichisP250,000.00plusaccessoriesof
P50,000.00

2.Topayjointlyandseverallytotheplaintiffsthedailylossoftheincome/boundaryofthesaidjeepneyto
bereckonedfromitslossuptothefinaladjudicationofthecase,whichisP275.00aday

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3.TopayjointlyandseverallytotheplaintiffsmoraldamagesintheamountofP50,000.00

4.TopayjointlyandseverallytotheplaintiffsexemplarydamagesintheamountofP50,000.00

5.Topayjointlyandseverallytheattorney'sfeesofP50,000.00andappearancesincourttheamountof
P1,500.00perappearanceand

6.Topaycost.

SOORDERED.10

TheRTCfoundthattheactofPeaandGaddiinallowingtheentryofanunidentifiedpersonandlettinghimdrive
out the subject vehicle in violation of their internal agreement with Sps. Mamaril constituted gross negligence,
rendering AIB and its security guards liable for the former's loss. BSP was also adjudged liable because the
GuardServiceContractitenteredintowithAIBofferedprotectiontoallpropertiesinsidetheBSPpremises,which
necessarilyincludedSps.Mamaril'svehicles.Moreover,thesaidcontractstipulatedAIB'sobligationtoindemnify
BSPforalllossesordamagesthatmaybecausedbyanyactornegligenceofitssecurityguards.Accordingly,
theBSP,AIB,andsecurityguardsPeaandGaddiwereheldjointlyandseverallyliableforthelosssufferedby
Sps.Mamaril.

On June 11, 2002, the RTC modified its decision reducing the cost of the stolen vehicle from P250,000.00 to
P200,000.00.11

OnlyBSPappealedtheforegoingdisquisitionbeforetheCA.

TheCARuling

In its assailed Decision,12 the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of security guards Pea and
Gaddi.However,itabsolvedBSPfromanyliability,holdingthattheGuardServiceContractispurelybetweenBSP
andAIBandthattherewasnothingthereinthatwouldindicateanyobligationand/orliabilityonthepartofBSPin
favor of third persons, such as Sps. Mamaril. Nor was there evidence sufficient to establish that BSP was
negligent.

ItfurtherruledthattheagreementbetweenSps.MamarilandBSPwassubstantiallyacontractofleasewhereby
the former paid parking fees to the latter for the lease of parking slots. As such, the lessor, BSP, was not an
insurernorboundtotakecareand/orprotectthelessees'vehicles.

On the matter of damages, the CA deleted the award of P50,000.00 representing the value of the accessories
insidethelostvehicleandtheP275.00adayforlossofincomeintheabsenceofprooftosupportthem.Italso
deletedtheawardofmoralandexemplarydamagesandattorney'sfeesforlackoffactualandlegalbases.

Sps.Mamaril'smotionforreconsiderationthereofwasdeniedintheAugust16,2007Resolution.13

IssuesBeforetheCourt

Hence,theinstantpetitionbasedonthefollowingassignmentoferrors,towit:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ABSOLVING RESPONDENT BOY

SCOUTOFTHEPHILIPPINESFROMANYLIABILITY.

II.

THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDSERIOUSMISTAKEWHENITRULEDTHATTHE
GUARDSERVICECONTRACTISPURELYBETWEENBOYSCOUTOFTHE

PHILIPPINES AND AIB SECURITY AGENCY, INC., AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY
NOTHINGINTHESAIDCONTRACTTHATWOULDINDICATEANYOBLIGATIONAND/ORLIABILITYON
THE PART OF THE PARTIES THEREIN IN FAVOR OF THIRD PERSONS, SUCH AS PETITIONERS
HEREIN.

III.

THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDSERIOUSERRORINTHEINTERPRETATIONOF
LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
PETITIONERS A CONTRACT OF LEASE, WHEREBY THE BOY SCOUT IS NOT DUTY BOUND TO
PROTECTORTAKECAREOFPETITIONERS'VEHICLES.

IV.

THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSSERIOUSLYERREDWHENITRULEDTHATPETITIONERSARE
NOTENTITLEDTODAMAGESANDATTORNEY'SFEES.14

Infine,Sps.Mamarilmaintainthat:(1)BSPshouldbeheldliableforthelossoftheirvehiclebasedontheGuard
Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued and (2) the CA erred in deleting the RTC awards of damages
andattorney'sfees.

TheCourt'sRuling

Thepetitionlacksmerit.

Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damagetoanother,shallindemnifythelatterforthesame.Similarly,Article2176oftheCivilCodestates:

Art.2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,isobligedto
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties,iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthisChapter.
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Inthiscase,itisundisputedthattheproximatecauseofthelossofSps.Mamaril'svehiclewasthenegligentactof
security guards Pea and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. Proximate
cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
interveningcause,producestheinjuryorloss,andwithoutwhichtheresultwouldnothaveoccurred.15

Moreover, Pea and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's contention16 that they readily admitted being at fault
duringtheinvestigationthatensued.

Ontheotherhand,therecordsarebereftofanyfindingofnegligenceonthepartofBSP.Hence,noreversible
errorwascommittedbytheCAinabsolvingitfromanyliabilityforthelossofthesubjectvehiclebasedonfaultor
negligence.

Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 218017 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is
uncontestedthatPeaandGaddiwereassignedassecurityguardsbyAIBtoBSPpursuanttotheGuardService
Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employeremployee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards
assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should be
attributedtoAIB,thetrueemployerofPeaandGaddi.18

InthecaseofSoliman,Jr.v.Tuazon,19theCourtenunciatedthus:

It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committedbythesecurityguardsattachestotheemployeragency,andnottotheclientsorcustomersofsuch
agency.Asageneralrule,aclientorcustomerofasecurityagencyhasnohandinselectingwhoamongthepool
ofsecurityguardsorwatchmenemployedbytheagencyshallbeassignedtoitthedutytoobservethediligence
ofagoodfatherofafamilyintheselectionoftheguardscannot,intheordinarycourseofevents,bedemanded
fromtheclientwhosepremisesorpropertyareprotectedbythesecurityguards.Thefactthataclientcompany
may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
servicesenteredintowiththesecurityagency.20

Nor can it be said that a principalagent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards Pea and
Gaddiastomaketheformerliableforthelatter'scomplainedact.Article1868oftheCivilCodestatesthat"bythe
contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on
behalfofanother,withtheconsentorauthorityofthelatter."Thebasisforagencythereforeisrepresentation,21
whichelementisabsentintheinstantcase.RecordsshowthatBSPmerelyhiredtheservicesofAIB,which,in
turn,assignedsecurityguards,solelyfortheprotectionofitspropertiesandpremises.Nowherecanitbeinferred
intheGuardServiceContractthatAIBwasappointedasanagentofBSP.Instead,whatthepartiesintendedwas
apureprincipalclientrelationshipwherebyforaconsideration,AIBrendereditssecurityservicestoBSP.

Notwithstanding, however, Sps. Mamaril insist that BSP should be held liable for their loss on the basis of the
GuardServiceContractthatthelatterenteredintowithAIBandtheirparkingagreementwithBSP.

Suchcontentioncannotbesustained.

Article1311oftheCivilCodestates:

Art.1311.Contractstakeeffectonlybetweentheparties,theirassignsandheirs,exceptincasewheretherights
andobligationsarisingfromthecontractarenottransmissiblebytheirnature,orbystipulationorbyprovisionof
law.Theheirisnotliablebeyondthevalueofthepropertyhereceivedfromthedecedent.

Ifacontractshouldcontainsomestipulationinfavorofathirdperson,hemaydemanditsfulfillmentprovidedhe
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a
personisnotsufficient.Thecontractingpartiesmusthaveclearlyanddeliberatelyconferredafavoruponathird
person.

Thus,inorderthatathirdpersonbenefitedbythesecondparagraphofArticle1311,referredtoasastipulation
pourautrui,maydemanditsfulfillment,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur:(1)Thereisastipulationinfavorofa
third person (2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract (3) The contracting parties clearly and
deliberatelyconferredafavortothethirdpersonthefavorisnotmerelyincidental(4)Thefavorisunconditional
anduncompensated(5)Thethirdpersoncommunicatedhisorheracceptanceofthefavorbeforeitsrevocation
and(6)Thecontractingpartiesdonotrepresent,orarenotauthorized,bythethirdparty.22However,noneofthe
foregoingelementsobtainsinthiscase.

It is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject
1 w p h i1

agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Sps. Mamaril did not convey any
acceptancethereof.Thus,undertheprincipleofrelativityofcontracts,theycannotvalidlyclaimanyrightsorfavor
underthesaidagreement.23AscorrectlyfoundbytheCA:

First,theGuardServiceContractbetweendefendantappellantBSPanddefendantAIBSecurityAgencyispurely
betweenthepartiestherein.Itmaybeobservedthatalthoughthewhereasclauseofthesaidagreementprovides
thatdefendantappellantdesiressecurityandprotectionforitscompoundandallpropertiestherein,aswellasfor
itsofficersandemployees,whileinsidethepremises,thesameshouldbecorrelatedwithparagraph3(a)thereof
whichprovidesthatthesecurityagencyshallindemnifydefendantappellantforalllossesanddamagessuffered
byitattributabletoanyactornegligenceoftheformer'sguards.

Otherwisestated,defendantappellantsoughttheservicesofdefendantAIBSecurityAgencyforthepurposeof
thesecurityandprotectionofitsproperties,aswellasthatofitsofficersandemployees,somuchsothatincase
oflossof[sic]damagesufferedbyitasaresultofanyactornegligenceoftheguards,thesecurityagencywould
then be held responsible therefor. There is absolutely nothing in the said contract that would indicate any
obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons such as herein plaintiffs
appellees.24

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Moreover,theCourtconcurswiththefindingoftheCAthatthecontractbetweenthepartieshereinwasoneof
lease25asdefinedunderArticle164326oftheCivilCode.Ithasbeenheldthattheactofparkingavehicleina
garage,uponpaymentofafixedamount,isalease.27EveninamajorityofAmericancases,ithasbeenruled
thatwhereacustomersimplypaysafee,parkshiscarinanyavailablespaceinthelot,locksthecarandtakes
the key with him, the possession and control of the car, necessary elements in bailment, do not pass to the
parkinglotoperator,hence,thecontractualrelationshipbetweenthepartiesisoneoflease.28

Intheinstantcase,theownersparkedtheirsix(6)passengerjeepneysinsidetheBSPcompoundforamonthly
feeofP300.00foreachunitandtookthekeyshomewiththem.Hence,alessorlesseerelationshipindubitably
existed between them and BSP. On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessor (BSP) is
obliged:(1)todeliverthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontractinsuchaconditionastorenderitfitfortheuse
intended(2)tomakeonthesameduringtheleaseallthenecessaryrepairsinordertokeepitsuitableforthe
usetowhichithasbeendevoted,unlessthereisastipulationtothecontraryand(3)tomaintainthelesseeinthe
peacefulandadequateenjoymentoftheleasefortheentiredurationofthecontract."Inrelationthereto,Article
1664ofthesameCodestatesthat"thelessorisnotobligedtoanswerforamereactoftrespasswhichathird
personmaycauseontheuseofthethingleasedbutthelesseeshallhaveadirectactionagainsttheintruder."
Here,BSPwasnotremissinitsobligationtoprovideSps.Mamarilasuitableparkingspacefortheirjeepneysasit
evenhiredsecurityguardstosecurethepremiseshence,itshouldnotbeheldliableforthelosssufferedbySps.
Mamaril.

It bears to reiterate that the subject loss was caused by the negligence of the security guards in allowing a
strangertodriveoutplaintiffsappellants'vehicledespitethelatter'sinstructionsthatonlytheirauthorizeddrivers
may do so. Moreover, the agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps. Mamaril's vehicles were
coordinatedonlywithAIBanditssecurityguards,29withouttheknowledgeandconsentofBSP.Accordingly,the
mishandlingoftheparkedvehiclesthatresultedinhereincomplainedlossshouldberecoveredonlyfromthetort
feasors(PeaandGaddi)andtheiremployer,AIBandnotagainstthelessor,BSP.30

AnentSps.Mamaril'sclaimthattheexculpatoryclause:"Managementshallnotberesponsibleforlossofvehicle
oranyofitsaccessoriesorarticlelefttherein"31containedintheBSPissuedparkingticketwasvoidforbeinga
contractofadhesionandagainstpublicpolicy,sufficeittostatethatcontractsofadhesionarenotvoidperse.Itis
bindingasanyotherordinarycontractandapartywhoentersintoitisfreetorejectthestipulationsinitsentirety.
Ifthetermsthereofareacceptedwithoutobjection,asinthiscase,whereplaintiffsappellantshavebeenleasing
BSP'sparkingspaceformoreorless20years,32thenthecontractservesasthelawbetweenthem.33Besides,
theparkingfeeofP300.00permonthorP10.00adayforeachunitistoominimalanamounttoevencreatean
inferencethatBSPundertooktobeaninsurerofthesafetyofplaintiffsappellants'vehicles.

On the matter of damages, the Court noted that while Sonia P. Mamaril testified that the subject vehicle had
accessorieswortharound!J50,000.00,shefailedtopresentanyreceipttosubstantiateherclaim.34 Neither did
she submit any record or journal that would have established the purported P275.0035 daily earnings of their
jeepney. It is axiomatic that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty and a party is
entitledonlytosuchcompensationforthepecuniarylossthatwasdulyproven.Thus,absentanycompetentproof
oftheamountofdamagessustained,theCAproperlydeletedthesaidawards.36

Similarly,theawardsofmoralandexemplarydamagesandattorney'sfeeswereproperlydisallowedbytheCAfor
lackoffactualandlegalbases.WhiletheRTCgrantedtheseawardsinthedispositiveportionofitsNovember28,
2001decision,itfailedtoprovidesufficientjustificationtherefor.37

WHEREFOREpremisesconsidered,theinstantpetitionisDENIED.TheMay31,2007DecisionandAugust16,
2007ResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.75978areAFFIRMFED.

SOORDERED.

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ARTUROD.BRION MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case wets
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,SecondDivision

CERTIFICATION

PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,andtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

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Footnotes
*Spelledas"Pea"insomepartsoftherecords.

1 Rollo, pp. 1122. Penned by Associate Justice Aurora SantiagoLagman, with Associate Justices
BienvenidoL.Reyes(nowamemberofthisCourt)andApolinarioD.Bruselas,Jr.,concurring.

2Id.at2425.

3Id.at2122.

4Id.at66.

5Id.at107110.GuardServiceContractdatedSeptember23,1976.

6Id.at96100.DocketedasCivilCaseNo.9680950.

7Id.at117118.

8Id.at101.

9Id.at6074.

10Id.at7374.

11Id.at124129.

12Id.at1122.

13Id.at2425.

14Id.at4445.

15VallacarTransit,Inc.v.Catubig,G.R.No.175512,May30,2011,649SCRA281,295296.

16Rollo,pp.73,97,and144(TSN,November28,1997,p.15).

17 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions,butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhomoneisresponsible.

xxxx

Employersshallbeliableforthedamagescausedbytheiremployeesandhouseholdhelpersacting
withinthescopeoftheirassignedtasks,eventhoughtheformerarenotengagedinanybusinessor
industry.

xxxx

Theresponsibilitytreatedofinthisarticleshallceasewhenthepersonshereinmentionedprovethat
theyobservedallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilytopreventdamage.
18SeeJaymev.Apostol,G.R.No.163609,November27,2008,572SCRA41,5354.

19G.R.No.66207,May18,1992,209SCRA47.

20Id.at5051.Citationsomitted.

21 Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage Corp., G.R. No. 179446, January 10, 2011,
639SCRA69,84.
22Narvaezv.Alciso,G.R.No.165907,July27,2009,594SCRA60,67.

23IntegratedPackagingCorp.v.CA,G.R.No.115117,June8,2000,333SCRA170,178.

24Rollo,pp.1718.

25Id.at18.

26Art.1643.Intheleaseofthings,oneofthepartiesbindshimselftogivetoanothertheenjoymentoruse
of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for
morethanninetynineyearsshallbevalid.
27Tolentino,CivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.V,Reprinted2002,pp.204205.

28 Cited in the article Liability of Parking Lot Operators for Car Thefts, Washington and Lee Law Review
20.2(1963):362.<http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol20/iss2/18.>(visitedJanuary3,2013).
29Rollo,p.139(TSN,November28,1997,p.10).

30Goldsteinv.Roces,G.R.No.L8697,March30,1916.

31Seesupranote6.

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32 Sps. Mamaril parked their jeepneys inside the BSP compound since 1971. The loss of their vehicle
occurredin1995.
33OngLimSing,Jr.v.FEBLeasing&FinanceCorp.,G.R.No.168115,June8,2007,524SCRA333,347.

34Rollo.p.140(TSN.November28,1997.p.11).

35Id.

36Macasaetv.RTransportCopr.,G.R.No.172446,October10,2007,535SCRA503,515.

37DutchBoyPhilippines,Inc.v.Seniel,G.R.No.170008,January19,2009,576SCRA231,241Cipriano
v.CA,G.R.No.107968,October30,1996,263SCRA719720.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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