AKBAYAN-Youth v.

COMELEC
March 26, 2001
G.R. No. 147066: AKBAYAN - YOUTH, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - YOUTH, ALYANSA, KALIPI,
PATRICIA O. PICAR, et. al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. NO. 147179: MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO,
COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, et. al., ALL OF THE COMELEC, respondents.
BUENA, J.
SUMMARY: Akbayan-Youth and other youth representatives filed an original petition for certiorari
and mandamus to nullify COMELEC's Resolution denying their request for a conduct of special
registration of the youth voters who were unable to register for the May 14, 2001 national
elections before the Dec. 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC and to declare Sec. 8 of R. A.
8189 unconstitutional insofar as it causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others
similarly situated. They also pray that COMELEC be ordered to conduct said special registration.
They argue that notwithstanding Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election, COMELEC possess a
"standby power" under Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and adopted by Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 8436 to fix
additional periods and dates for registration of voters other than those already provided for
under existing laws. HELD: Petition DENIED. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements, which includes the aforementioned
prohibitive period in Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 and Sec. 35 of R.A. 8189 which provides for 100 day
period prior to regular election for any registered voter or representative of a political party
within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter's list.
The standby powers of COMELEC under Sec. 28 of RA 8436 cannot be invoked as it would come
into play only in cases where the pre-election acts are capable of being reasonably performed
within the available period prior to election day. In the case at bar, COMELEC has emphasized the
"operational impossibility" of conducting a special registration, which can no longer be
accomplished within the time left.
FACTS:
During the General Registration for the May 14, 2001 General Elections, allegedly 4M youth,
particularly new voters ages 18 to 21, failed to register before the Dec. 27, 2000 deadline set
by the COMELEC. Subsequently, they requested for a 2-day additional registration day on Feb.
17 & 18, 2001.
Sen. Raul Roco, chair of Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's
Participation, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing.
The COMELEC Commissioners who attended the hearing eventually filed a report where they
expressed concern that said special registration may open the flood parts for hakot system
and laid down guidelines to serve as safeguards against fraudulent applicants. They also
stated that the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this request with
directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available funds for
the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the estimated
costs of additional 2 days of registration.
In a Resolution, the COMELEC DENIED the request after a consultation meeting with the
regional heads where they agreed to disapprove the request on the ground that Sec. 8 of
R.A. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996) explicitly provides that no registration shall
be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
Aggrieved, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed
before SC the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
o To nullify COMELEC's Resolution and to declare Sec. 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional
insofar as it causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.
o To direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos
o COMELEC possess a "standby power" under Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 6646 & Sec. 28 of
R.A. No. 8436 to fix additional periods and dates for registration of voters other than
those already provided for under existing laws.
 Petitioner Michelle Betito, a UP student, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, for same
purposes
ISSUE + RATIO # 1: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
COMELEC Resolution denying the request for special registration of the youth voters? (NO)

The COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within
the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter Sec. 8 of RA 8189.
o COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to
the registration of voters
o Whatever action COMELEC takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather
than the legality of the act.
The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.
o SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATION: Sec. 1, Article V of the Const: Suffrage may be exercised
by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the
elections. No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage."
o PROCEDURAL LIMITATION: The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned
upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner.
2 prohibitive periods:
o Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 (System of Continuing Registration of Voters ): The Personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
o Sec. 35 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List): - Any registered
voter, representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except 100 days prior to
a regular election xxx."
Prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters
from the permanent voter's list
The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants,
and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of
securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
If a special voter's registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for
exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. The period serves a vital role in
protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive
periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on
the application and would be obliged to simply take them at face value.
 The very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is
enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls.
Stand-by/Residual Powers of the COMELEC
Petitioners: COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a 2-day special registration, through
the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436.The act of registration is a pre-election
act. Hence, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 6646 1 as adopted in Sec. 282 of R.A. 8436, the COMELEC,
pursuant to its standby or residual powers, may fix other periods and dates in order to ensure
that voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.
SC: The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Sec.
3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise meaning
and coverage, thus: a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board;"
However, the provisions invoked by petitioners and Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by
COMELEC actually share some common ground and are capable of being reconciled.
o Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 applies considering that it explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election.
o Sec. 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are
capable of being reasonably performed within the available period prior to
election day
CAB: COMELEC has emphasized the "operational impossibility" of conducting a special
registration, which can no longer be accomplished within the time left.
o COMELEC has a rigorous schedule 3 of pre-election activities and taking this into
consideration, it will have roughly a month to act as a buffer against any number of
unforeseen occurrences that might delay the elections. According to the COMELEC,
registration of voters does not refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and
writing names. Registration is, in fact, a long process that takes about 3 weeks to
complete not even counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in
the first place.

1 An Act introducing additional reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes

2 An Act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system in the May 11, 1998 National or Local elections and in subsequent national and local electoral
exercises, providing funds therefor and for other purposesSEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - If it should no longer be possible to observe
the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so
voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.

3 The last 60 days will not be a walk in the park for the Comelec. 1) We have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. Without the Project of Precincts, we
won't know how many forms to print and so we're liable to come up short.
2) The Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the 4th of March.
3) The Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration Records of registered voters in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified, and sealed beginning
March 30, until April 15.
4) The Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and printed out of use on election day; and finally
5) The preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the Voters Information Sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
 According to its timetable4, if it were to hold a special election, it would finish
o
preparations only on June 10, well past the election date on May 14.
The determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and
application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do,
under prevailing circumstances.
Also, the law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo
tenetur ad impossible. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium
nulla obligato est.
CAB: The "stand-by power" of COMELEC under Sec. 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the
possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
On disenfranchisement
Petitioners: They were disenfranchised when COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on
Dec. 27, 2000 instead of Jan. 13 (pwede 14), 2001 -> 120 days from May 14, 2001, the date
of the regular election.
SC: There is no allegation that anyone of the petitioners has filed an application to be
registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the
COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register
between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she
was disallowed or barred by COMELEC from filing his application for registration.
Also, the petitioners are not without fault. They admit that they failed to register, for whatever
reason, within the period of registration. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no
one come to court with unclean hands.

ISSUE + RATIO # 2: Whether or not SC can compel COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of
mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections? (NO)
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
The determination of w/n the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or
practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise
of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora: SC's function is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing of GAD amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power.
Also, certain factual circumstances show that both the executive and legislative departments
intimate that, indeed, there is a legal obstacle in the way of the conduct by COMELEC of a
special registration.
o SC takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has now issued Proclamation No.
15 calling Congress to a Special Session, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of
new voters.

4 Possible time table:Apr. 16 & 17: Special registration - filling the application for registration with the Election Officer.
Apr. 24: Posting requirement - The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or municipal
bulletin board for at least one week prior
May 1 & 2: Election Registration Board is convened for hearing considering that time must be allowed for the filling of oppositions
May 2 to 7: Election Registration Board rules on the Applicant's registration and post notices of its action assuming that there are no challenges
May 10: Copies of the notice of the action taken by the Board will have already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of registered political parties. (Only at this
point can our Election Officers once again focus on the business of getting ready for the elections.)
May 11: Once the results of the special registration are finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters' List generated; after which the new CVL would
be posted. [This would be improper as the R.A. 8189 provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election].
May 15 - Finish the inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book of Voters [Already overshot the May 14 election date]
May 15-June 10 (26 days): Prepare the allocation of Official Ballots, Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the new
registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different
municipalities.
 oHB No. 12930 and SB No. 2276 have also been filed in Congress seeking the
amendment of R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said
law.
DISPOSITION: DENIED.

KAPUNAN, J., CONCURRING OPINION

The "standby power" of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration
under Sec. 29 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in the context of the
inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing, i.e. the period provided in
Sec. 126 of B.P. 881 which provided that the registration of voters is to be held only on the
seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election. There was insufficiency of the 2-day
registration period under Section 126.
Sec. 126 of B.P. 881 has, however, been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 8189, which prescribes
an entirely new system of registration, and which in fact allows a prolonged period of
registration for potential voters.
Moreover, Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 cannot prevail over R.A. 8189
with respect to the pre-election activity of registration since the latter deals specifically with
registration of voters.
PARDO, J., DISSENTING OPINION
Comelec committed GAD ousting itself of jurisdiction, first, in ruling that the deadline for
registration of voters was on December 27, 2000, and failing to give adequate publicity for
the dissemination of this deadline and, second, in denying the petition of the "youth" or of
those who were unable to register before the deadline to be given a special time to register
On Stand-by Power of COMELEC
R.A. No. 6646, Sec. 29 is reproduced verbatim in R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 which shows a
Congressional intention to retain the "standby power" of the Commission to fix periods for
pre-election activities given even under B.P. 881, Sec. 52 [m].
The prohibition to conduct registration 120 days before a regular election is directory, not
mandatory, and Comelec is vested with residual power to conduct pre-election activities,
including registration of voters beyond the deadline prescribed by law.
Comelec has actually misled the public by its erroneous resolution declaring that the last day
for registration under the system of continuing registration was on December 27, 2000.
Counting the 120 days from May 14, 2001, the date of the regular election, the last day fell
on January 14, 2001.
The legal and operational problems which Comelec claim they would encounter with the
holding of a special registration as well as the effect on its preparation for the May 14, 2001,
elections, are matters that can be solved with proper planning, coordination and cooperation
among its Members, staff and other deputized agencies of the government
On the matter of the exclusion/inclusion of voters as prescribed in B.P. 881
The period fixed therein within which to file petitions with the municipal or metropolitan trial
courts may be shortened and the courts may resolve the applications in time to be received
by the election officers or the board of election inspectors concerned not later than 30 days
before the May 14, 2001 elections

AARES V. BALISING
13 March 2000

Facts: A, B, C, D, and E were accused of estafa. They filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the criminal case without prejudice. After more than 2 months, private complainants
sought the revival of the criminal case. When the trial court allowed revival of the case, the
accused questioned the order, claiming that the prior dismissal had already become final and
executory.

Issue: Whether the said order became final and executory

Held: Yes. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of
15 days from his receipt of the decision or order to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After
the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes
outside the courts power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no
other remedy but to file a new complaint.

Vda. de Urbano vs. GSIS

GR No. 137904, Oct 19, 2001

Topic: Statutes inPari MateriaStatutes in pari materia should be read and construed together
because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of
one uniform system.

VDA DE URBANO v. GSIS

FACTS:

1. In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing
loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS
bid 154k on the property and emerged as the highest bidder.
2. In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired
Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS told them to pay
the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.
3. The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets
Dpeartment subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an extension of 30 days to
the November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a
public bidding.
4. The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property.
The Gsis AAD declined.
5. The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the
GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite attempts
from Vice Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the
the petitioners were unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
6. The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for
250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the petitioners then offered a
50,000 downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k
in check as earnest money. The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution 881
that declined their offer to repurchase.
7. At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They
accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.
8. The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate
of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano
the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasnt given due
consideration.
9. Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal
investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC
of QC branch 102.
10.The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
11.Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
 1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?
3. Was GSIS in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?

Ruling: Petition Dismissed

RATIO:

1. No

Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize,
and dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD
1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to
the system.

SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the
terms and condition of financial accommodations to its members with the dual purpose of
making the GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that
the Board could exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase
the subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of
PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.

With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that
repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period imposes no such obligation on the
purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to him (the
board as well)

The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the subject property was not based
on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners to make good
their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the
petitioners were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay.

In the comments of the AAD manager, the observation was that the petitioners lacked the
capacity to pay up.

The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board
exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS cant be
faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioners application under
Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant be annulled on such invoked right.
 2. No.

The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.

Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of
the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public sale.

GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable
govt property and not acquired assets.

SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or
those no longer needed. The house was obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by
petitioners.

With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the General guidelines on the divestment or
disposal of assets of government owned corporations the law stipulated that it availed of
an exception to the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such
exception applied to sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of
business. The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided for Audit
Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of Government Agencies, which also did
not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in
the regular course of business nor to the disposal by govt financial institutions of foreclosed
assets or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to the Govt
under proclamation no 50.

The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.

Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the
subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held
that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein
statutes that relate to the same thing ought to be taken in consideration in
construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari
material are to be taken together as if they were one law.

Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to
generate more revenue for GOCCS through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look
into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on
the disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.

Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said
yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus
did not offend the requirements of the said coa circulars.

3. No.

GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for repurchase of subject property was based
on a factual determination of the petitioners financial capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146.
Also, GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.

The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, cant also impute bad faith on GSIS
when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte case, the court held that the
constitutional right to information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions
involving public interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a
purely private transaction. Pets. Cant demand to be informed of such public negotiation since
they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the GSIS terms of
repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.

Calingin v. CA (12 July 2004, Quisumbing)

Procedural

Issue 1

WON the decision of the Office of the President (OP) was already final and executory

Petitioner: The decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it has original jurisdiction
become final and executory only after the lapse of 15 days from the receipt thereof and that the
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the running of the said period in accordance
with Section 15, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 67, Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code (Rep. Act 7160), which provides that
decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory, applies only to
decisions of the Office of the President on administrative cases appealed from
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and
independent component cities, and sangguniang bayan of municipalities within the Metro
Manila Area. It does not cover decisions on cases where the Office of the President has
original jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial Governor.

Respondents: No arguments in the case but Im sure they argued that it was already final and
executory

Held: NO

Ratio:
 It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. The case
on hand involves a disciplinary action against an elective local official. Thus, the Local
Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative Code
which is of general application.

Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the
Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly.

Even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 12, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sec.
68 of the Local Government Code provides for the immediate execution pending appeal.

The decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the
decisions were rendered mandated them to be so. (Lapid v. CA)
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of
Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG
Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution.

Issue 2

WON the exemption granted by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 3992 is valid

Petitioner: The exemption was invalid for being based on a mere draft resolution. According to
him, a draft resolution does not operate as a final resolution of a case until the proper resolution
is duly signed and promulgated.

Held: VALID

Ratio:

A perusal of the records reveals that the Resolution in O.P. Case No. 00-1-9220 was
approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the
authority of the President. Hence, the approval was before the promulgation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record also shows that the request to
implement the said suspension order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President pursuant to the requirements stated in
the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No. 3529 which may be applied by analogy and in
relation to Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 merely requires the request to be in
writing indicating the office and place from which the officer is removed, and the reason
for said movement, and submitted together with the formal complaint executed under
oath and containing the specific charges and the answer to said complaint. The request
for the exemption was accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of
Controversion, Reply and Draft Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the
COMELEC to substantiate the request were submitted. There being a proper basis for its
grant of exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate
jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor et
al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was
directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.
Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from
instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and
a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:

The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is
unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to
test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The
constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to
comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task
is to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
adopting the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions
express the objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except when technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them
prevails. This case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has
the legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it
cannot be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language
employed is not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated
in the constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people
not only at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not
give rigid answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical
environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for
why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.
There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its
taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled.
5. According to the Chief Justice, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny
due process only under pain of nullity.

6. It is the failure to provide equal protection of the laws (Article 3, Section 1, par.1 of the
Constitution) that rests the case of the petitioner. Since the statute in question, R.A. 2616,
singles out the Tatalon Estate for expropriation, the petitioner is in the right to assert a denial of
equal protection. However, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its
disposal to follow a system of priorities, especially when a serious social or economic problem is
at hand. In the bills Explanatory Note, Congress claims that given the problem of Quezon Citys
growing population, expropriating the land will help solve the overpopulation and implement
the land-for-the-landless program of the present Administration. Singling out Tatalon
Estate doesnt stigmatize the effort of the statute as denial of equal protection.

7. On the occasion of expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be possessed by vendors

and vendees could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional protection.

8. The statute of concern can stand the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary
may lend itself susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures with
social and economic implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding
insistence on the primacy of property rights, contrary to what the Constitution ordains.

TEEHANKEE, concurring and dissenting

- Concurs with main opinion to reverse the decision of the lower court dated January
10, 1963
- respondents may now properly file the expropriation proceedings
- Doesnt agree with the court that the constitutional power of the Congress for the
expropriation of lands is well-nigh all embracing.

Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr.

121 SCRA 51 Political Law Constitutional Law Period to Resolve a Case from Date of
Submission Promulgation vs Rendition of Judgment Constitutional Period to Decide not
Mandatory
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution
finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the
attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their
respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until
September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his
decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was
scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate
judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower
courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of
filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to
run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition
of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision
with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period
because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as
the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from
the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior
courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to
this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in
meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice
system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed
period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT vs NLRC (1988)

FACTS:

Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman by petitioner Hagonoy when he was
indefinitely suspended and thereafter dismissed for abandonment of work and conflict of interest
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of wages and emergency
cost of living allowance against Hagonoy with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga
Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being government entity, its
personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. And the protests
concerning the lawlessness of dismissal from service fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and
not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on favor of Villanueva
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A Writ of Execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter to garnish
petitioner Hagonoys deposits with the planters Development Bank.
Hagonoy filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. NLRC
denied the application.

Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law

HELD: YES
The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied on P.D. No. 198, known as
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 which exempts employees of water districts from the application of the Civil
Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed to take into account that P.D. 1479 wiped away the said exemption

Moreover, the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [T]he Civil Service
embraces ... government owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision (which is on March
17, 1986), the applicable law is that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to render a decision that he in fact rendered.
By the time the NLRC rendered its decision (August 20, 1987), the 1987 Constitution has already come into effect.
The SC believes that the 1987 Constitution does not operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor
Arbiter to render a decision, which was before outside the scope of its competence.

Therefore, a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a complete nullity, vesting no
rights and imposing no liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may refile this complaint in an appropriate

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED