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Vicarious Liability:

The tort doctrine that imposes responsibility upon one person for the failure of anot
her, with whom the person has a special relationship (such as parent and child,
employer and employee, or owner of a vehicle and driver), to exercise such as a
reasonably prudent person use under similar circumstances.

Vicarious liability is a legal doctrine that assigns liability for an injury to a person wh
o did not cause the injury but who has aparticular legal relationship to the person w
ho did act negligently. It is also referred to as imputed Negligence. Legalrelationship
s that can lead to imputed negligence include the relationship between parent and c
hild, Husband and Wife, owner of a vehicle and driver, and employer and employee.
Ordinarily the independent negligence of one person is not imputable to another.

Art. 2180. NCC The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

Art. 2182. NCC If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents
or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property
in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
Art. 221. FC Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 218. FC The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Rule 92 Sec. 2. ROC Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the
word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

LIBI VS IAC

Civil Law Torts and Damages Vicarious Liability of Parents Murder-Suicide of Minor
Lovers
FACTS:
Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December
1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies.
Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors
were found dead inside Julie Anns house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority
that time was 21).
Apparently, Wendell used his fathers gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed
suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio
and Amelia Libi).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?
HELD:
Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in
safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know
that their son had possession of said gun. They only found out about it when the shooting
happened. Further, they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local
Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and were not
acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure
that their minor children shall not cause damages against other persons.
What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in
cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what
the damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This
is also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have
acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely subsidiary, they
can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION


vs. KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, INC
FACTS:
WG & A JEBSENS SHIPMGMT. Owner/Operator of M/V "SUPERFERRY 3" and KEPPEL
CEBUSHIPYARD, INC. (KCSI) enter into an agreement that the Dry docking and
Repair of the above-named vessel ordered by the Owners Authorized
Representative shall be carried out under the Keppel Cebu Shipyard Standard
Conditions of Contract for Ship repair, guidelines and regulations on safety and
security issued by Keppel Cebu Shipyard. In the course of its repair, M/V "Superferry
3" was gutted by fire. Claiming that the extent of the damage was pervasive, WG&A
declared the vessels damage as a "total constructive loss" and, hence, filed an
insurance claim with Pioneer. Pioneer paid the insurance claim of WG&A, which
in turn, executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt in favor of Pioneer. Pioneer tried to
collect from KCSI, but the latter denied any responsibility for the loss of the subject
vessel. As KCSI continuously refused to pay despite repeated demands, Pioneer,
filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission CIAC seeking for payment of U.S. $8,472,581.78 plus interest, among
others. The CIAC rendered its Decision declaring both WG&A and KCSI guilty
of negligence, the CIAC ordered KCSI to pay Pioneer the amount of P25,000,000.00,
with interest at 6% per annum. Both Keppel and Pioneer appealed to the CA. The
cases were consolidated in the CA. the CA rendered a decision dismissing
petitioners claims in its entirety. Keppel was declared as equally negligent.
ISSUE:
1. To whom may negligence over the fire that broke out on board M/V
"Superferry 3" be imputed?
2. What is the extent of the damage, if any?
RULING:
1. The issue of negligence undeniably, the immediate cause of the fire was the
hot work done by Angelino Sevillejo (Sevillejo) on the accommodation area
of the vessel, specifically on Deck A. As established before the CIAC
Pioneer contends that KCSI should be held liable because Sevillejo was its
employee who, at the time the fire broke out, was doing his assigned task,
and that KCSI was solely responsible for all the hot works done on board the
vessel. We rule in favor of Pioneer. At the time of the fire, Sevillejo was an
employee of KCSI and was subject to the latters direct control and
supervision. There was a lapse in KCSIs supervision of Sevillejos work at the
time the fire broke out. KCSI failed to exercise the necessary degree of
caution and foresight called for by the circumstances.

The circumstances, taken collectively, yield the inevitable conclusion that


Sevillejo was negligent in the performance of his assigned task.
His negligence was the proximate cause of the fire on board M/V "Superferry
3." As he was then definitely engaged in the performance of his assigned
tasks as an employee of KCSI, his negligence gave rise to the vicarious
liability of his employer43 under Article 2180of the Civil Code. KCSI failed to
prove that it exercised the necessary diligence incumbent upon it to rebut the
legal presumption of its negligence in supervising Sevillejo.44 Consequently,
it is responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of its employee,
and its liability is primary and solidary.

2. Damages In marine insurance, a constructive total loss occurs under any


of the conditions set forth in Section 139of the Insurance Code, which
provides Sec. 139. A person insured by a contract of marine insurance may
abandon the thing insured, or any particular portion hereof separately valued
by the policy, or otherwise separately insured, and recover for a total loss
thereof, when the cause of the loss is a peril insured against:
(a) If more than three-fourths thereof in value is actually lost, or
would have to be expended to recover it from the peril;
(b) If it is injured to such an extent as to reduce its value more than
three-fourths; x x x. It cannot be denied that M/V "Superferry 3"
suffered widespread damage from the fire that occurred on February 8,
2000, a covered peril under the marine insurance policies obtained by
WG&A from Pioneer. The estimates given by the three disinterested
and qualified shipyards show that the damage to the ship would
exceed P270,000,000.00, or of the total value of the policies
P360,000,000.00. These estimates constituted credible and acceptable
proof of the extent of the damage sustained by the vessel. Considering
the extent of the damage, WG&A opted to abandon the ship and
claimed the value of its policies. Pioneer, finding the claim
compensable, paid the claim, with WG&A issuing a Loss and
Subrogation Receipt evidencing receipt of the payment of the
insurance proceeds from Pioneer. The Loss and Subrogation Receipt
issued by WG&A to Pioneer is the best evidence of payment of the
insurance proceeds to the former, and no controverting evidence was
presented by KCSI to rebut the presumed authority of the signatory
to receive such payment.

Principal Defenses in Actions Based on Negligence


Damnum Absque Injuria:
damage without legal wrong.

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. A loss or damage without injury.

Literally means damage without wrongful act. It means that a loss or harm
incurred from something other than a wrongful act does not warrant a legal
remedy. For example, a person may harm another in due exercise of his
right. However, the injured person cannot sue the person who exercised his
rights

Custodio VS CA
Civil Law Torts and Damages Damnum Absque Injuria Actionable Wrong
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida
Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasas
house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their
property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the
Custodios and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages.
Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade done by the families in front.
The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give
Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation.
The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of
Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
HELD: No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left
because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was
well within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement
agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all
the right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement
was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just
compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the
fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this
case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.

Sudden Peril Rule:


Sudden peril doctrine is a principle of torts law that a person confronted with a
sudden emergency is not obligated to exercise the same degree of judgment and
care as someone who is acting under normal conditions. It exempts a person from
the ordinary standard of reasonable care if that person acted instinctively to meet a
sudden and urgent need for aid. The doctrine applies when the sudden emergency
is created in any way other than the actor's own conduct, as where the emergency
is created by the unexpected operation of a natural force or by the innocent or
wrongful act of a third person.

Valenzuela VS CA
FACTS:

June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards
the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so
she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights
and seeked help

She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon

While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she
was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was
intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated
and was replaced with an artificial one.

Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial
leg)]

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as
unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of
this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty
salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000,
as reasonable attorneys fees and costs.

CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's
employer

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated

Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the


scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk
and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy
rain)

ISSUE:

1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO


2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD:

CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery
road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient
or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of
space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane
going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be
a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking
zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to
help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether
she had a flat tire and to solicit help if neededshe parked along the
sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES.
Not the principle of respondent superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters
assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were
together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that
it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li

4. YES.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we
are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial
court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -.
physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning
hours of the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would
also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding
adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it
has been documented, are painful.

Assumption of Risk
A defense, facts offered by a party against whom proceedings have been instituted
to diminish a plaintiff's Cause of Action
or defeat recovery to an action in Negligence, which entails proving that the plaintiff
knew of a dangerous condition andvoluntarily exposed himself or herself to it.

Under the federal rules of Civil Procedure, assumption of the risk is an Affirmative
Defense that the defendant in anegligence action must plead and prove. The doctrin
e of assumption of risk is also known as volenti non fit injuria.

Situations that encompass assumption of the risk have been classified in three broa
d categories. In its principal sense,assumption of the risk signifies that the plaintiff,
in advance, has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation ofconduct towar
d him or her and to take a chance of injury from a known risk ensuing from what th
e defendant is to do orleave undone. The consequence is that the defendant is unbu
rdened of all legal duty to the plaintiff and, therefore, cannot beheld liable in neglig
ence.

A second situation occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation wit
h the defendant, knowing that thedefendant will not safeguard the plaintiff against t
he risk. The plaintiff can then be viewed as tacitly or implicitly consentingto the negl
igence, as in the case of riding in a car with knowledge that the steering apparatus i
s defective, which relieves thedefendant of the duty that would ordinarily exist.

In the third type of situation, the plaintiff, cognizant of a risk previously created by t
he negligence of the defendant,proceeds voluntarily to confront it, as when he or sh
e has been provided with an article that the plaintiff knows to behazardous and cont
inues to use after the danger has been detected. If this is a voluntary choice, the pl
aintiff is deemed tohave accepted the situation and assented to free the defendant
of all obligations.

In all three situations, the plaintiff might be acting in a reasonable manner and not
be negligent in the venture, because theadvantages of his or her conduct outweigh
the peril. The plaintiff's decision might be correct, and he or she might even actwith
unusual circumspection because he or she is cognizant of the danger that will be en
countered. If that is the case, thedefense operates to refute the defendant's neglige
nce by denying the duty of care that would invoke this liability, and theplaintiff does
not recover because the defendant's conduct was not wrongful toward the plaintiff.
Contributory Negligence:
Negligence on the part of an injured party that combines with thenegligence of
another in causing the injury, sometimes so as todiminish or bar the recovery of
damages for the injury.

Art. 2179.NCC When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Volenti Non Fit Injuria


Doctrine that refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so.

FORTUITOUS EVENT:
Art. 2215.NCC In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may
equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred
to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the
defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to
lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

PRESCRIPTION
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

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