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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN MEDINA, SR. y PALANCIO

G.R. No. 127756-58. June 18, 2003
By: Dianne D. Salto

DOCTRINE:

The extent to which the trial judge may intervene in the presentation of evidence must largely be a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case. But the
interrogatory must be such as not to intimate or express an opinion as to the truth of the case or the
merits of the contentions of either of the parties. An intimation of opinion by question is as repugnant
as a direct statement of opinion. The judge must remember that he is as much judge on behalf of the
accused whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the State for the purpose of
safeguarding the interest of a society.

The questions of the trial judge do not call for hearsay evidence. The purpose of the trial judge in
propounding questions to the doctor was to elicit informations relayed to her by the private
complainant as the bases for the physical examination and not to prove the truth of the said
informations. In other words, the questions call for independently relevant statements.

FACTS:

Prosecutions Evidence

The appellant was charged with four counts of rape upon the sworn complaint of the victim Ma.
Theresa Salvatierra, the daughter of appellants wife and his stepdaughter. Four informations were
filed against the appellant charging him for the crime of rape.

The Spouses Cornelio Salvatierra and Virginia M. Basa had three children, namely: Ma. Theresa, born
on March 22, 1983, Shiela and Pajek. For some reason, the marriage failed and the couple decided to
live separately. By March 1990, Virginia and the appellant began living together as husband and wife.
The appellant was then about twenty years old. Virginias children by her husband also stayed with
them in the farm of De Belen at Barangay Patallac, Cabanatuan City. Ma. Theresa could no longer
remember her biological father and regarded the appellant as her tatay.

Shortly thereafter, still in 1990, the appellant asked Ma. Theresa to accompany him to catch fish in a
creek at the De Belen farm by means of pante. It was then noontime. She agreed. While they were
preparing the pante, the appellant suddenly embraced her. Frightened, Ma. Theresa fled, but the
appellant caught up with her. He led her to a grassy place and undressed her. He then removed his
short pants and briefs and laid on top of her. He held both her hands and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She felt excruciating pain. Completely helpless, Ma. Theresa cried. After satiating his lust, the
appellant dismounted. He threatened to kill her, including her mother and sister, if she told them
about what he did to her. Cowed by the appellants threat, Ma. Theresa kept the harrowing incident to
herself.

By 1994, the appellant, Virginia and her children had by then transferred their residence to Manoy
Taba, Barangay Patallac. One day, at around noontime, Ma. Theresa was left alone in the house with
the appellant. He had earlier sent away her younger sister Shiela on an errand to buy cigarettes. Ma.
Theresa was outside the house when the appellant summoned her inside, and asked her to help him
squeeze the pimple on his back. Ma. Theresa dutifully did as told. Forthwith, the appellant took hold of
Ma. Theresas hands, pulled her and forced her to lie down on the wooden bed. She resisted, but the
appellant was too strong for her. He removed her dress and undressed himself. The appellant then laid
on top of her and inserted his penis into her sexual organ. Ma. Theresa again felt pain. After a few
minutes, the appellant dismounted. The appellant once more threatened to kill her and her family if
she told them what he had done to her. Ma. Theresa kept the ordeal to herself because of the
appellants threat.

In 1996, the appellant and Virginia had transferred their residence to Paloc, Sta. Arcadia, Cabanatuan
City. At around noontime of August 3, 1996, the appellant and Ma. Theresa were left alone in the
house. Virginia was out selling fish, while Shiela was again sent out on an errand by the appellant. Ma.
Theresa was in the kitchen when the appellant suddenly grabbed her arms. He then pulled her to the
bedroom and made her lie down on the wooden bed. She put up a struggle, but the appellant held her
hands, pinned down her legs and then laid on top of her. The appellant removed her clothes and
undressed himself. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. Again, Ma. Theresa felt pain on her
sexual organ. After several minutes, he dismounted. He warned Ma. Theresa anew against reporting
the matter to her mother. But he told her that after the harvest, he would bring her to Mindoro.
Later that evening, Ma. Theresa was sleeping with Shiela, when she was suddenly awakened by the
appellant. When she stood up, the appellant grabbed and pulled her towards the other unoccupied
wooden bed. He undressed Ma. Theresa and laid on top of her. Ma. Theresa again tried to free herself,
to no avail. After unclothing himself, he forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina.
On August 6, 1996, Virginia was doing laundry when Shiela told her that the appellant had a nickname
for Ma. Theresa. She told her mother that the appellant called Ma. Theresa Tamis because her private
part was sweet. Virginia was incensed, and asked Shiela where she and Ma. Theresa slept on August
3, 1996, when Virginia was not in the house. Shiela replied that Ma. Theresa slept beside the
appellant. Virginia then asked Ma. Theresa if the appellant did anything to her. Ma. Theresa became
hysterical and tearfully embraced her mother. She was trembling as she told her mother that the
appellant would kill them if she said anything. Virginia assured her daughter that they would soon
leave the appellant. It was only then that Ma. Theresa narrated everything to Virginia, how and when
the appellant sexually assaulted her. Ma. Theresa confided to her mother that the appellant had been
raping her since 1990, and that the last time she was raped was on August 3, 1996. Virginia was
afraid that if they all left the house, they might be killed by the appellant. Thus, she instructed her
daughter to go to school as usual and to meet her in the street corner after class if she and her sister
could leave the house; otherwise, Virginia told Ma. Theresa, she would send somebody to fetch them.
Virginia forthwith left the house. Ma. Theresa and Sheila could not leave because the appellant
ordered Ma. Theresa to cook rice, and Shiela to catch fish at the pretil. Unknown to Ma. Theresa, her
mother had already told their neighbors what the appellant had done to her daughter. Ma. Theresa
was surprised when their neighbors, including Mang Araboy, arrived at their house armed with bolos
and empty pails, pretending to gather kangkong near the house of the appellant. Momentarily, the
appellant arrived and greeted the visitors. He was shocked when one of the visitors grabbed him by
the neck and demanded to know: Is it true that you molested your daughter? The appellant tried to
disengage himself and enter the house, but failed when the same visitor boxed him. The neighbors
then brought Ma. Theresa to the barangay hall where she met her mother. The rape incidents were
reported to the police authorities on August 7, 1996. On the same day, Ma. Theresa gave her sworn
statement to the police investigator.

Dr. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman, an obstetrician-gynecologist, conducted a physical examination on Ma.

Theresa. In her medical report, Dr. de Guzman disclosed her findings, stating in part:

External Genitalia: no pubic hair noted, labia majora and minora are not yet prominent, no discharge
noted.

Internal Examination: Cervix admits 1 finger with ease, 2 fingers with difficulty, multiple hymenal
lacerations with old shallow healed laceration at 12,2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11:00 oclock position, no discharge
noted, Uterus small, Adnexae-negative.

PREGNANCY TEST - NEGATIVE. Gram. Staining-negative [of] the [presence] of spermatozoa.

Evidence of the Appellant

He avers that it was his son Benjamin, Jr. who had consensual sexual relations with Ma. Theresa. He
also caught the two having sexual intercourse and he just kept it to himself because he doesnt want
any conflict with Virginia. Also, appellant met Virginia and they started living together as husband and
wife in March 1990. They had a turbulent life together. She was the jealous type and they quarreled
often. Virginia actually suspected that the appellant and her daughter had an amorous relationship.
She even told Ma. Theresa that perhaps Ma. Theresa wanted to take her place as the live-in partner of
the appellant. In the evening of August 6, 1996, the appellant and Virginia had a violent quarrel. He
told her that he was leaving her. Virginia was enraged. She then instigated her young daughter Ma.
Theresa to charge him with rape, to get back at him for wanting to leave her.

TRIAL COURT: Finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and hereby
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and death penalty.

APPELLANTS CONTENTION: That the trial court showed bias and partiality thereby depriving the
accused appellant to a fair and impartial trial when the presiding judge actively participated in the
examination of complaining witness and that of Dra. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman by asking leading
questions and on cross examination of the accused. He argues that the trial judge exhibited bias and
partiality in favor of the prosecution when he propounded leading questions to Dr. Ma. Lorraine de
Guzman requiring hearsay testimony. The judge allegedly asked questions on matters pertaining to
his defense even before the prosecution rested its case.

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERALS CONTENTION: That the questions propounded by the judge to
the witness for the prosecution were meant merely to expedite the proceedings and to clarify events
subject of her testimony. Besides, the counsel of the appellant never interposed any objections to the
questions of the trial court, and even cross-examined the said witness on those matters.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the questions propounded by the judge to the witness for the prosecution were meant
merely to expedite the proceedings and to clarify events subject of her testimony.
RULING:

The trial judge in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts. The judge has the right,
nay the duty, to ask questions to elicit relevant facts and to make the records bear the truth. He is not
a mere figurehead or an umpire in a trial and it is his duty to see that justice is done. He cannot be
expected to remain always passive and stoic during the proceedings. Being the arbiter, the judge may
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite the progress of the trial and prevent
unnecessary waste of time.

The trial judge may even be considered negligent in the performance of his duties if he permits a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might
develop some material facts upon which the judgment in the case should turn. In an effort to
ascertain the truth, a judge may examine or cross-examine a witness by leading questions. He may
even seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit
additional relevant evidence are not improper.

The extent to which the trial judge may intervene in the presentation of evidence must largely be a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case. But the
interrogatory must be such as not to intimate or express an opinion as to the truth of the case or the
merits of the contentions of either of the parties. An intimation of opinion by question is as repugnant
as a direct statement of opinion. The judge must remember that he is as much judge on behalf of the
accused whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the State for the purpose of
safeguarding the interest of a society.

In this case, the appellant asserts that the trial judge propounded leading questions requiring hearsay
evidence to Dr. de Guzman, which in some way, helped the prosecution build its theory of the case.
The questions objected to by the appellant and the answers to said questions read:

COURT
Wait Fiscal, question from the Court.
Q: What did the victim tells [sic] you?
A: She told me that she was raped, Your Honor, on August 3, 1996 at around 12:00 p.m. and also
when the patient was only 6 years old, she was first molested by the accused, sir.
Q: Did she tells [sic] you more or less how many times has she been raped or molested?
A: She did not tell me how many times but she told me that she was raped for [sic] several times,
Your Honor.
Q: Did she tells [sic] you who raped her?
A: Yes, sir, she told me she was raped by his step father [sic].
Q: Based on that, you conducted an examination?
A: Yes, sir.[17]
The questions propounded to the doctor by the trial court judge which the appellant avers as aiding
the prosecution read:
Fiscal Macaraig:
Q: Dr., in cases where there were several or multiple old healed lacerations and there was an
allegation on the latest incident of rape, is it still possible that a new laceration pertaining to the latest
incident or rape be found if there were already multiple old healed lacerations?
Witness:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about in this particular patient which allegedly there was, that the latest incident was August
3, 1996, was there any findings of anew [sic] laceration regarding this latest incident?
A: None, sir.
Court:
Q: Is it also possible that there will be no new lacerations because there were already old lacerations?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That is possible because in the laceration you found almost all the numbers of the clock where old
lacerations were found almost. The Court will reform the question. In this particular case there are
already six (6) old lacerations and it is possible that there be no more new laceration?
A: It is also possible that there will be new laceration[s] if the object penetrated [sic] is big enough or
if there is force or if there is instrumentation, there can be new laceration be found. [sic]
Court:
Q: But it can also be possible that there will be no laceration?
Witness:
A: Yes, sir, because the patient is no longer a virgin, sir.[18]
On the other hand, the questions propounded by the trial judge, which the appellant believes were
intended to demolish the factual basis for his defense even before the prosecution rested its case, are
as follows:
Court:
Q: In 1990 dont you have any other male companions or house male [sic] in your house aside from
Benjamin Medina?
A: None, sir.
Q: In 1994 dont you have any male companion in your house aside from Benjamin Medina?
A: None, sir.
Q: In August, 1996 do you have any male companion in your house aside from Benjamin Medina?
A: None, sir.
Q: Of your own knowledge, has Benjamin Medina a son that ever visited you or caused in sleeping in
your house [sic]?
A: None, sir.

The Court believes that the questions propounded by the trial judge to Dr. de Guzrnan were proper,
the purpose of which was only to clarify certain aspects of the testimony of the doctor in relation to
the examination of the private complainant and her report thereon and not really to help the
prosecution build its case against the appellant.

The questions of the trial judge do not call for hearsay evidence. The purpose of the trial judge in
propounding questions to the doctor was to elicit informations relayed to her by the private
complainant as the bases for the physical examination and not to prove the truth of the said
informations. In other words, the questions call for independently relevant statements.