7 Jonsson Och Ljunggren Sweco Samarco Immediate Causes To The Failure of The Fundo Dam

SAMARCO IMMEDIATE
CAUSES TO THE FAILURE

OF THE FUNDO DAM
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED BY
THE FUNDO TAILINGS DAM REVIEW PANEL
2016-10-12 / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS / GLLIVARE

SWECO GRUVDAMMAR OCH DEPONERINGSHANTERING
JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN

1
10/24/2016
SAMARCO IMMEDIATE
CAUSES TO THE FAILURE
OF THE FUNDO DAM Rio de Janeiro
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED BY Sao Paulo

THE FUNDO TAILINGS DAM REVIEW PANEL
2016-10-12 / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS / GLLIVARE

SWECO GRUVDAMMAR OCH DEPONERINGSHANTERING
JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN

2
10/24/2016
Introduction
In 2015 on November 5 the 110 m high
Fundo Tailings Dam failed in a liquefaction
flowslide.
More than 60 Mm3 of tailings and water
spread as a mud flow in the river system
along its 650 km path to the Atlantic Ocean.
In total 18 people lost their lives.
The owner Samarco Minerao S.A. (BHP
Billiton Brazil Ltda, Vale S.A.) initiated The
Fundo Tailings Dam investigation to
determine its cause
http://www.samarco.com/en/balanco/ (161011)
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/analy
sis/revisiting-brazils-worst-ever-environmental-disaster/
IMMEDIATE CAUSES TO THE FAILURE OF THE FUNDO DAM / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS 16-10-12 / JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN 2016-10-24
Introduction
Fundo Tailings Dam failed in a liquefaction Fundo dam
flowslide.
spread as a mud flow in the river system
along its 650 km path to the Atlantic Ocean.
determine its cause
Santarm dam
Introduction
flowslide.
spread as a turbidity plume in the river
system along its 650 km path to the Atlantic
Ocean.
determine its cause
Introduction
flowslide.
Ocean.
determine its cause
Introduction
flowslide.
Ocean.
determine its cause
70 000 000
Introduction 60 000 000 60 000 000
50 000 000 Overview of release from tailings dam 50 000 000

failures during the last 20 years
40 000 000
Approx. release [m3]
30 000 000
20 000 000
10 000 000
-10 000 000

Failures with approximated amount of release Failures with unknown amount of release Source: www.Wise-uranium.org / Tailings Dam Incidents,
U.S. Committee on Large Dams - USCOLD, Denver,
Colorado, ISBN 1-884575-03-X, 1994
8
Immediate causes to the Fundo Reference:
Fundao Tailings Dam Review Panel Report on the
dam failure
immediate Causes of the Failure of the Fundao Dam,
August 25, 2016
http://fundaoinvestigation.com/
Panel: Norbert R. Morgenstern (Chair), Steven G. Vick,
Cassio B. Viotti, Bryan D. Watts
Start of construction: 2007
Dam type: Upstream raised tailings dam
ADDED TEXT AND SKETCHES ON THE REVIEW PANELS REPORT
Dam height at failure: 110 m (EL +900 m) FIGURES ARE FOR EXPLANATORY PURPOSES ONLY DURING THE
PRESENTATION.
Level crest at Beach of

failure sand tailings Compacted
berms of tailings
Starter
dam
Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

9
dam failure
August 25, 2016
PRESENTATION.

berms of tailings
Starter
dam

10
dam failure
August 25, 2016
PRESENTATION.

berms of tailings
Starter
dam

11
dam failure
August 25, 2016
PRESENTATION.

berms of tailings
Starter
dam

12
dam failure
August 25, 2016
PRESENTATION.

berms of tailings
Starter
dam

13
Liquefaction
Conditions required:
o Contractive material > volume decreases during

shearing because the particles move together.
o Saturation > all voids are filled with water. If

shearing occurs in a saturated contractive tailings Sand
excessive pore pressure may generate. grains
o Trigger mechanism, rate of loading vs.

drainage capacity > if the loading (shearing) is
large enough or repeated many times the pore Normal pore water High pore water
pressure in the voids may increase to such extent pressure pressure
Saturated soft sand. Saturated soft sand.
that friction between the grains is lost. Strength maintained High pore water pressure
because friction from may break the friction
the grains touching. between the grains
causing liquefaction.
14
Series of events and conditions
The dam failure occurred because of a series of
events and conditions that allowed the failure to take
place
Main incidents and conditions:

a) Year 2009 - Damage to starter dam
b) Year 2011,12 - Slime deposition issues
c) Year 2012 - Shift of the dam crest alignment (the set
back)
15
IMMEDIATE CAUSES TO THE FAILURE OF THE FUNDO DAM / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS 16-10-12 / JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN 10/24/2016
Year 2009: Damage to the Start dam (Dike 1)
April 2009, large seepage flows

carrying tailings on the downstream
slope. DAMAGE TO SLOPE
Seepage flows emerged above

underdrain outlet level.
LEAKAGE WATER
Figure from Panel report:

16
Consequences
Underdrains were sealed as they could not be repaired. One of the most
important element became inoperative
A new blanket drain constructed on the surface of the tailings The sand
tailings below and upstream of the new blanket drain remained saturated
NEW DRAIN
ONLY SKETCHED
Original figures from Panel report:

UNDERDRAIN
ONLY SKETCHED 17
Year 2011/12 Slime deposition issues
During 2011 and 2012 slime was

rerouted through an overflow channel
into the Fundao reservoir.
The original and revised design

specified a minimum 200 m wide beach
of sand tailings to control saturation.
SAND TAILINGS SLIMES
Original figures from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/

Figure from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/
18
Consequences
Deposition of slimes in areas where this was not intended in design
At times beach only 60 m wide.
Slimes near the downstream slope and below the raised dam construction.
BEACH 200 m WIDE
S L I M E S

19
Year 2012: The left abutment Set back
In October 2012 the dam alignment (crest)

was moved upstream from its original
design, called the setback crest.
The change due to structural integrity

issues of a abutment concrete gallery, that
drained left abutment run-off water.
SETBACK CREST

20
IMMEDIATE CAUSES TO THE FAILURE OF THE FUNDO DAM / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS 16-10-12 / JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN 10/24/2016
Consequences
The setback had significant effects. Moving the embankment

back, toward the impoundment, caused it to be raised over the
slimes deposited in 2011 and 2012.
SETBACK CREST
S L I M E S
Original figure from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/
21
Immediate causes to the Fundo dam failure
Liquefaction:
Contractive (loose) material
Saturation
Trigger mechanism liquefaction by

lateral extrusion [Movie clip 2.5 min,
start at 2:53]
22
IMMEDIATE CAUSES TO THE FAILURE OF THE FUNDO DAM / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS 16-10-12 / JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN
2016-10-24
Thanks for your attention!!
+46 72-501 17 21 +46 76-109 30 84

Magnus Ljunggren Jonas Jonsson
Dam design, inspections, control Tailings management, dam safety, site selection

7 Jonsson Och Ljunggren Sweco Samarco Immediate Causes To The Failure of The Fundo Dam

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SAMARCO IMMEDIATE

CAUSES TO THE FAILURE

2016-10-12 / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS / GLLIVARE

JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED BY Sao Paulo

2016-10-12 / SVEMIN MILJKONFERENS / GLLIVARE

JONAS JONSSON, MAGNUS LJUNGGREN

Introduction 60 000 000 60 000 000

50 000 000 Overview of release from tailings dam 50 000 000

-10 000 000

Level crest at Beach of

Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

Level crest at Beach of

Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

Level crest at Beach of

Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

Level crest at Beach of

Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

Level crest at Beach of

Underdrain Original figure from Panel report:

o Contractive material > volume decreases during

o Saturation > all voids are filled with water. If

o Trigger mechanism, rate of loading vs.

Main incidents and conditions:

April 2009, large seepage flows

Seepage flows emerged above

Figure from Panel report:

Original figures from Panel report:

During 2011 and 2012 slime was

The original and revised design

SAND TAILINGS SLIMES

Original figures from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/

At times beach only 60 m wide.

BEACH 200 m WIDE

Original figures from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/

In October 2012 the dam alignment (crest)

The change due to structural integrity

Original figures from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/

The setback had significant effects. Moving the embankment

Original figure from Panel report: http://fundaoinvestigation.com/

Contractive (loose) material

Trigger mechanism liquefaction by

+46 72-501 17 21 +46 76-109 30 84

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