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Terrorism
Preamble
Violence has haunted man from the times of Adam’s and has been responsible for m
any of mankind sufferings. The violent channels have used many strategies to att
ain their vested interests. Terrorism is one the oldest such channels, although
its recent resurgence has created many misconceptions. But the historic evidence
s suggest its presence since antiquity. In preceding text we will scrupulously a
nalyze the roots of terrorism and its modern re-birth. We would briefly analyze
the tactics and strategy employed by terror nets over the centuries. Later we wo
uld also suggest how to deal with this menace.
Earlier History
The history of terrorism is as old as human race. As per (Gerrard Challiand and
Arnaud Blin 55) the first recorded use of terror as an instrument was used by ze
alots, a sect of Jews which revolted against the Roman Empire in First Century P
alestine. This organization was founded by Judah of Galilee and used terror tact
ics against the Romans. During that age the individuals involved were given the
name of sicari which means the dagger man. The zealots struggle was a religious
and political struggle. The main cause was to throw away the yoke of Roman Empir
e and reform the religion on their philosophical lines. The tactics involved the
killing of Roman figures and organized guerilla warfare against the Roman Legio
ns. The recruits of the zealots mostly belonged to the working class. In modern
terms this could also be said as the liberation war of the Jews against Roman Em
pire.
Assassins are the next well documented historic organization which used terror a
s an instrument to force their philosophy. As per (Gerrard Challiand and Arnaud
Blin 59), Assassin’s emerged in 11th century A.D Islamic world. They belonged to
Ismailia sect of Islam. They had a specific ideological and political agenda. W
ith the rise of Hasan Bin Sabah in remote areas of Persia, the movement got into
a full swing. Nizam Ul Mulk, the prime minister of the Turk Seljuk state was th
e first victim of long list of emblematic dignitaries assassinated by the cult.
He was assassinated in 1092. From there safe haven in Alamut, a remote region of
Persia, Assassin’s acquired populace support by missionary work and intensive p
ropaganda. The next step after the acquisition of populace support was to gain c
ontrol over the local region. The control over the local region was established
by employing tactics of clandestine subversion, force and persuasive campaign. W
ith the passage of time the clandestine cult acquired enormous power against the
mighty Seljuk rulers. Although they were never in a position to overthrow the c
entral government but yet succeeded to avoid military overcome by the rulers. Th
e two military campaigns’ of Seljuk’s against Hasan proved futile. Assassin’s cr
eated an elite group of mercenaries known as fedayeen. This elite group was actu
ally a death squad hired to eliminate the nobles and emblematic dignitaries of t
he state. These killings provided a psychological blow to the state and caused a
narchy and chaos in general public.
Terrorism in middle ages
The paradigm of terror in the middle ages was evolved from secrets societies to
more organized state terrorism. Mongols led by Genghis Khan laid the foundation
stone of institutionalized terrorism which was perfected to an unprecedented deg
ree by Tamerlane. The nomad warriors of Mongolia believed in physical annihilati
on of opponents by concentration of force and element of surprise. Tamerlane use
d the terror instrument to a great effect against his rivals. In 1387 after taki
ng the city of Isfahan, the death toll raised to 100,000 to 200,000. After the m
assacre Tamerlane built 50 pyramids each comprising of thousands of heads. This
rape of Isfahan was used as an example for other besieged city. Although this ta
ctic never worked on all occasions but still yielded significant effect. The war
of religion in Europe also used terror as an effective instrument against the r
ivals. During the thirty year war in Europe the terror was also orchestrated by
the armies as an instrument of acquiring edge over the adversaries. The main obj
ective of these terror campaigns was to acquire swift favorable military results
. The most widely reported incident of this era was sack of Magdeburg. The imper
ial Bavarian army of General Tilly massacred the whole population of town after
take over. The main objective was to send a message across all other potential t
argets to surrender without offering resistance. The atrocities committed during
these wars led to the evolution of modern Human Rights concept during the treat
y of Westphalia which ended the war of religion and terror associated with it.
Birth of Modern Terrorism
As per (Gerrard Challiand and Arnaud Blin 92), the birth of modern terrorism wit
h its expression took place in French revolution. The terror tool was employed b
y the revolutionaries as an apparatus of state to safeguard the popular sovereig
nty. The industrial revolution and advancements in explosive technology started
to change the sphere of order of peace restored by Westphalia. The huge strategi
c impact of small investments in terrorist activities inspired many opportunists
to use terror as a tool in the late nineteenth century. It was successfully man
ifested in Europe and France by the anarchist movements. The dawn of twentieth c
entury saw a new sort of political terrorism in Russian revolution of 1917. Jose
ph Stalin used an un-precedential state terrorism to gain absolute power. The So
viet model was emulated globally by China and Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Ireland o
ffered another terrorist model where Irish Republic Army destabilized the Britis
h rule with very little means and in an organized fashion. During the pre-world
war II era, the terrorism was employed as a vital tool by Fascist elements of Eu
rope. Even during the World War II, Axis elements employed it as un-precedential
manner to crush local resistance. During the latter half of twentieth century,
terror has been successfully employed by the revolutionary, freedom and fanatic
elements. The Iranian revolution, freedom movements across the globe are an exam
ple of its applications in the modern times.
The dawn of twenty first century witnessed the razing of twin towers by dogmatic
group of terrorist. The horrendous act of 9/11 was the prevalent act of terrori
sm by a non-state actor in history of human society. There action provoked the m
ight of a super power. The technologically equipped modern world initiated an on
going fight against the deeply rooted stems of the terror. The first time in his
tory of mankind a general consensus against the terror tactic has reached.
Defining Terrorism
Before analyzing the concept lets first make an attempt to define it. Although t
errorism is one most widely spoken word in modern world but still the widely acc
epted definition of terrorism is not known to the world. (Hoffman) Make an attem
pt to establish a widely accepted definition of terrorism. However the wide use
of the tactic by guerilla organizations and liberation movements has made it a d
ilemma for modern world. The predicament continues even at the United Nation For
um. In 1972 an attempt to define terrorism internationally after the Munich Olym
pic incident went in vain, after profound criticism by Arab League and Yasir Ara
fat. The main argument behind the whole episode was that one man’s terrorist is
another man’s hero. Keeping in view the dynamics of liberal movements the argume
nt is quite correct. In middle ages or late nineteenth century the terrorist cla
ns openly admit their controversial identity. But the twentieth century saw a nu
mber of freedom movements and their cloak has provided these clandestine operati
ons a self proclaimed legitimacy. The recent dogmatic international terror organ
izations also had a bundle of heavy logics to prove the legitimacy of their hein
ous acts.
Shrouded in the concealment of political agenda and propaganda the concept could
not be assertively defined. This lack of clarity and confusion of a clear parti
ng has provided a propaganda base to these cults like Al Qaeda.
Analyzing Terrorism
From the synopsis of the early history of terrorism and modern tactics, it is cl
early established that most of these atrocious acts are not sudden. They are wel
l planned and premeditated as mentioned by (Hoffman 229). With few exceptions th
is perception is quite right. The acts of zealots, Assassin’s, Mongols, Imperial
ist’s, Anarchist and Al Qaeda were well planned and executed to attain political
and military objectives. The assassination of Nizam Ul Mulk, the massacre of Is
fahan, the rape of Magdeburg, 9/11 and 7/7 all were well planned operations. All
of them carried a certain message to the adversaries encompassing a specific po
litical objective.
The zealot’s exploited the nationalist and religious agenda to acquire populous
support. While Assassin’s used specific theological base to lure the common comm
unity. Robespierre provided the terror regime, a sound argument of defending the
popular sovereignty. Now Al Qaeda is using the Jihad concept against west for a
cquiring general support among the Muslim world. All the terror networks of diff
erent era have used vague but enchanting slogan’s to entice population support.
The vagueness of their agenda always exempted them from accountability by the po
pulation.
The deprived working classes of the societies have always provided the work forc
e for almost all the terror cults. The cases of state terrorism had a different
source for compliance of their atrocities. The deprived classes of any society a
re soft target for these so called reformers, revolutionaries and jihadis. The z
ealots used the oppressed Jewish clans for their recruitment. While Assassin’s u
sed a nexus of religion, theology and brain washing for enrollment of their work
force. Al Qaeda is also employing people’s which are not happy from their socie
ties. These differences could be ideological, physical, mental and psychological
. The indifferences among the communities/societies have always provided these c
ults with fertile grounds.
The terror tactics used by the Non-State actors are established since primitive
history. The assassinations, mass killings, bomb blasts and medium scale propaga
nda might not be able to topple the central governments but bring in a humongous
psychological blow to the rivals. The assassination of Nizam Ul Mulk, 9/11 and
7/7 has got the mighty government agencies napping and resultantly creating a ch
aos, anarchy and feeling of insecurity among the masses. These terror tactics ma
y need only very few physical losses to perpetrators but their political/social
impact particularly in today’s information age is huge. The institutionalized te
rror tactics used by Mongols, Tamerlane and Imperialist were aimed to create fea
r and subdue their opponents without offering resistance.
Dealing with Modern Terrorism
The concealment and penetration ability of the terrorist organization had always
made it hard for the authorities to uproot them. This natural resilience has al
ways used by these factions to their advantage. It is pertinent to note that all
these terror nets have a safe haven to operate, nurture and train their operato
rs. But even the destruction of these safe havens has not yielded favorable resu
lts for the authorities. The uprooting military efforts of Alamut by Seljuk’s an
d invasion of Afghanistan by United States has not served the desired objectives
for the planner’s. Slight mishandling of these military operations can go horri
fically wrong and can aid these terror nets. Mishandling of such operations coul
d add to the local support of these nets and can bring in more recruits.
The threat of terrorism has to be handled skillfully and almost on all fronts. O
nly military might may not be enough to break these nets. The main political bas
e of these networks had to be encountered effectively. In today’s information ag
e propaganda and anti-propaganda campaigns are not difficult to run. The ideolog
ical, religious, theological and political agenda of these clandestine organizat
ions has to be confronted by strong counter-argument and awareness among the mas
ses. The radical arguments of Jihadis can be countered by moderate Muslims. By t
hese continuous efforts the radical Islamists could be isolated from the majorit
y Moderates. The repulsion on ideological front can cause an enrollment cut to t
he Jihadis. The successes on ideological fronts can evoke discontentment among t
he Jihadis and may ignite the desperate actions. Once out of their hideouts and
dented penetration capability they can become easy targets for the apprehension.
It has to bear in minds that isolating Islamic world and labeling them as terro
rists would aggravate the situation. This would in turn increase support for rad
ical ideas and provide them with the logistic support to carry on with their ope
rations. This solution with slight changes might be applicable to all such cases
. Without a cause or depleted political these nets can be left stranded. The tim
e span of their complete elimination may not be defined explicitly. Historically
like the complete uprooting of zealots and Assassin’s took almost two centuries
. Patience, tolerance, justice and lastly the force if blended together in right
mix could prove vital for an enduring success over the menace.
Conclusion
The use of terror is a common and economic tactics employed by different organiz
ation over a period of time. The foundation stones of all terror nets are almost
identical with petty differences. However the strategy dealing with these organ
izations differ widely due to spatial orientation and era. In modern world the t
error is inspired from radical Religious thoughts which need to be countered exc
lusively on all fronts. Patience and tolerance is the key to uproot it from its
stem.

Works Cited
Gerrard Challiand and Arnaud Blin. The History of Terrorism: From Anitquity to A
l Qaeda. Los Angeles: Regent University of California, 2007.
Hoffman, Bruce. "The Modern Terrorist Mindset." Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism
. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 229-225.