Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Estimating Consequences
and Severity
3.1. Purpose
31
32 3. Estimating Consequences and Severity
Extremely
toxic above Category 3 Category 4 Category 5 Category 5 Category 5 Category 5
BP*
Extremely
toxic below BP
Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5 Category 5 Category 5
or highly toxic
above BP
Highly toxic
below BP or
Category 2 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5 Category 5
flammable
above BP
Flammable
Category 1 Category 2 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5
below BP
Combustible
Category 1 Category 1 Category 1 Category 2 Category 2 Category 3
liquid
Magnitude of Loss
Vessel Vessel
Spared or rupture rupture
non- Plant Plant Plant 3,000 to >10,000
Consequence essential outage outage 13 outage 10,000 gal gal
Characteristic equipment <1 month months >3 months 100300 psi >300 psi
Mechanical
damage to
Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 4 Category 4 Category 5
large main
product plant
Mechanical
damage to
Category 2 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 4 Category 5
small by-prod-
uct plant
Overall cost of
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5
event
Note: This table of values is for example only, to indicate what one or more companies use to catego-
rize consequences. CCPS does not endorse one method over another.
35
36 3. Estimating Consequences and Severity
TABLE 3.2
Qualitative Categorization (Combined Loss Categories)
Low Consequence
Facility Minimal equipment damage at an estimated cost of less than $100,000 and
with no loss of production
Medium Consequence
Facility Some equipment damage at an estimated cost greater than $100,000 and
with minimal loss of production
High Consequence
Environment Significant release with serious offsite impact and more likely than not to
cause immediate or long-term health effects
Note: This table of values is for example only, to indicate what one or more companies use to catego-
rize consequences. CCPS does not endorse one method over another.
38 3. Estimating Consequences and Severity
FIGURE 3.2. Typical vulnerability zone from detailed (mathematical) modeling. ERPG 2 is
the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individu-
als could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible
or serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individuals ability to take
protective action.
For these reasons, this method is typically used only for compounds that
are new to a company, or for scenarios requiring a higher level of scrutiny
than LOPA can provide. Modeling is frequently reserved for scenarios that
require CPQRAthe step beyond LOPA.
In this section, consequences are assessed for the scenarios described in the
continuing examples. We will use two methods in this chapter to categorize
the consequences to illustrate the concepts used for LOPA.
The first (Method 1) will use a category, look-up method, using Table 3.1
as the reference table. For this approach, only the boiling point, flammability
data, and total quantity of the material are required.
The second (Method 3) will qualitatively estimate the scenario conse-
quences using prior experience of the authors. Method 3 is further addressed
in Chapter 7, where we include consideration of the probability of ignition,
probability of harm, etc.
In writing this book, we also confirmed the consequence severity by a
detailed dispersion calculation and flammable effects model (Method 4), but
the results are not shown in the book. This method required
flammability data for hexane,
past experience with similar incidents in the industry, and
a general understanding of fires and explosions and the models that
describe these phenomena.
METHOD 1
Using this method, the consequence category from Table 3.1 for a release of
40,000 lb of a flammable liquid below its boiling point is Category 4.
METHOD 3
For this method up to 40,000 lb of hexane is released which could result in a
large pool fire. In view of the low volatility of hexane, a flammable cloud is
3.4. Continuing Examples 41
not expected beyond the pool. A flash fire is considered unlikely, based on the
flash point of hexane at process temperatures. The fire has the capacity to
injure personnel in the immediate area of the spill, which now includes an
area beyond the dike. This qualitative interim result will be combined in
Chapter 7 with the probability of ignition, probability of personnel present,
and probability of harm done to personnel, given they are present.
METHOD 1
Using this method, there is no consequence since the release is completely
contained by the dike. Table 3.1 ignores spills of flammable liquid into dikes,
if the dikes are assumed not to fail.
METHOD 3
For this method we have up to 40,000 lb of hexane in the dike which could
result in a contained pool fire. In view of the low volatility of hexane, a flam-
mable cloud is not expected beyond the pool. A flash fire is considered
unlikely, based on the flash point of hexane at process temperatures. The fire
has the capacity to injure personnel in the immediate area. This qualitative
interim result will be combined in Chapter 7 with the probability of ignition,
probability of personnel present, and probability of harm done to personnel,
given they are present.
METHOD 1
Using this method, the consequence category from Table 3.1 for a release of
40,000 lb of a flammable liquid below its boiling point is Category 4.
42 3. Estimating Consequences and Severity
METHOD 3
For this method up to 40,000 lb of hexane are released which could result in a
large pool fire. Again, in view of the low volatility of the hexane, a flammable
cloud is not expected beyond the pool. A flash fire is considered unlikely,
based on the flash point of hexane at process temperatures. The fire has the
capacity to injure personnel in the immediate area of the spill, which now
includes an area beyond the dike. This qualitative interim result will be com-
bined in Chapter 7 with the probability of ignition, probability of personnel
present, and probability of harm done to personnel, given they are present.
METHOD 1
Using this method, there is no consequence since the release is completely
contained by the dike. Table 3.1 ignores spills of flammable liquid into dikes,
if the dikes are assumed not to fail.
METHOD 3
For this method up to 40,000 lb of hexane may be present in the dike which
could result in a contained pool fire. Again, in view of the low volatility of the
hexane, a flammable cloud is not expected beyond the pool. A flash fire is
considered unlikely, based on the flash point of hexane at process tempera-
tures. The fire has the capacity to injure personnel in the immediate area. of
the spill. This qualitative interim result (a release of 40,000 lb of hexane into
the dike) will be combined in Chapter 7 with the probability of ignition, prob-
ability of personnel present, and probability of harm done to personnel, given
they are present.
Chapter 4 will explain how scenarios are selected and developed for pur-
poses of LOPA. As mentioned earlier, categorizing the consequences is often
the screening criteria for selecting the scenarios for LOPA. Other criteria can
also be used. Chapters 5 and 6 will complete the data collection and scenario
development efforts for a LOPA scenario.