Aristotelian Powers

Author(s): William Charlton

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1987), pp. 277-289
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182284 .
Accessed: 03/09/2013 13:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Aristotelian Powers*
WILLIAM CHARLTON

Let us draw distinctions [says Aristotle at

the beginningof Metaphysics(31concerning
bu5vaul; and tvTeXXeFLaand first about
the sort of 6buVacLg which is most properly
called bu'VaRLg, though it is not the most
useful for our present purposes. For
bUVVaLLgand VEQELEta(sic) extend more
widely than those which are so spoken of
only in connection with change. Having
spoken about that, however, we shall make
thingsclear about the others when we come
to draw distinctions about tvtQyEta
(1045b341 046a4).

English-speaking scholars usually translate bu6va[ag and EvTAXcXELa

or
MvSQyELa'potentiality' and 'actuality' or 'actuality', but the quoted
passagewarnsus Aristotleuses these wordsto expressmore contraststhan
one. The 'present purpose' to which he refers is to clarify the contrast
between existing bvva*E1 and existing ?VTEkEXEL'q. I have argued
elsewhere that this shouldbe understoodas the contrastbetween the kind
of existence which attachesto possibilitiesand the kind which attachesto
fulfilmentsof possibilities.In the presentpaper,however,I wishto discuss
the kind of &UVacLLgwhichis 'properlyso called'but 'not so useful'for the
ontologicalenquiry,and whichis 'connectedwith change'.I take this to be
not fulfillablepossibilitybut ratherexercisablepower.So muchmayhardly
be controversial.But there is room for disagreementabout the details of
Aristotle'stheoryof power. Aristotleappearsto distinguishbetweenactive

* A first draft of this paper was read at the conference on Matter and Explanation in
Aristotelian Science and Metaphysics held at Trenton State College, N.J., between
October 31st and November 2nd 1986. 1 am grateful for the comments made then, and
especially for those of Joan Kung who replied to my paper.

Phronesis 1987. Vol. XXXII13 (AcceptedMay 1987) 277

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
and passive powers, between two kinds of active power, and between a
narrowconceptionof powerwhichexcludes,anda broadconceptionwhich
embraces, what he calls 'nature'.I shall try to clarifyand evaluate these
distinctions.
Aristotle'smaindiscussionsof powerare in A 12 and E 1-9. In A 12 he
notes andsets asideuses of bu6vacxtu andits cognatesto expressthingsother
thanpower (l019b34-5): the 'metaphorical'use of bt-ivauL; in mathematics
for a root (b33-4) and the uses of bvvaTog and 6abivaTogto expresslogical
possibility and impossibility (b22-30). Even in connection with power the
wordsare used in more waysthanone, but here the varioususes 'focus'on
one thing, 'a sourceof changein somethingelse' (1019b35-1020a4). This is
what we today call an 'active'power. Under this headingis includedthe
powerto accomplishsomething'at will' (1019a23-4),i.e. a skill, andpassive
power is defined in terms of active: an object has the passive power to
becomef if somethingelse has the active power to make it f (1020a2-3).
e refers back to A (1046a4-6)and presents substantiallythe same
account:the basic concept is that of a sourceof changein somethingelse
(aJO_16). It is possible, however, to discern two developments. First,
Aristotle notes that it would be possibleto take passivepower as primary
and define active in termsof it: 'a thingis buvaTog if eitherit itself has the
abilityto be affectedor somethingelse has the abilityto be affectedby it'
(a20-1).Secondly,e is less anthropocentric.In A Aristotle'smainexamples
of powers are knowledgehow to buildand medicalskill (1019a16-18);the
only power explicitlysaid to belong to anythinginanimateis the power to
sound of a well-tuned lyre (1019b14-15). In E, though the art of the builder
reappears,pride of place goes to the inanimatepower to heat.
'By a causal power', says Davidson (Essays on Action and Events, 1980,
p. 64), 'I meana propertyof an objectsuchthata changeof a certainsortin
the object causes an event of anothersort'. Davidsonremarks(ibid) that
this definition'is indifferentto the intuitivedistinctionbetweenthe active
and the passive', and at first it may seem to cover Aristotle'sactive and
passivepowers. Aristotle'sphrase 'a sourceof change in somethingelse',
however, has a naturalplasticityof meaning, whereas 'a propertyin an
objectsuchthata changein thatobjectcausesanotherchange'soundsmore
rigidandphysicalistic.Whatkindof a propertycouldA have 'suchthat'A's
becomingfcausesB's becomingg?The word'property'suggestssomething
like the shapeof a billiard-ballor the porousstructureof a sponge,andsuch
propertiesdo come into the explanationof why thingsthat have them are
affected in certainways, or affect other thingsin certainways, by certain
action. But whetherAristotle'spowersare all conceivedby him as causal

278

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
propertieslike these is one of the main questionswe are investigating.
In E 5 Aristotle distinguishesthose active powers which depend on
habituation and reason (MOog
and koyos, 1047b34)from those which do not.
He offers three differentiae:(1) The former exist only in living things
whereas the latter also occur in inanimateobjects. (2) The former are
abilitiesto affect thingsin opposite ways (medicalskill enablesus to make
people less healthyas well as healthier),whereasthe latterhave only one
effect. (3) As a result,if somethingwith an activepowerof the secondkind
comes into contactwith somethingwith the correspondingpassivepower,
the active power necessarilyoperates:when a hot hot-waterbottle comes
into contact with cold toes, it cannot but raise their temperature;on the
other hand if a doctor comes into contact with a patient he does not
necessarilyheal or necessarilyexacerbatethe disease: which he does de-
pends on appetition (OQFt1g)or choice (nQoakQEoLg).
How profoundare these differences?In DA III 9-11Aristotleasks'What
in the soul changes animalsin respect of place?' (432a18-19)and replies
6QetqL (433bl). It is clear that he is talking about voluntary or intentional
movements,not aboutthe movementof the manwho is sent spinningby a
caror carriedroundthe Sunby the Earth.Manyreaders,however,thinkhe
is looking for an explanatoryfactor of the same kind, and concludethat
both in DA III and in Met. E he is declaring0QEELgto be an efficient cause.
Thus RichardSorabjisays that 6QFeL is 'a necessitatingefficientcause'of
purposiveacting('Body and Soul in Aristotle',Philosophy1974p. 82) and
that when the doctor desires to heal and the circumstancesare propitious
'the exercise of his ability is just as much necessitated'as that of the hot-
water bottle's (Necessity,Causeand Blame, 1980, p. 52). SimilarlyDavid
Charlesfoundshis whole interpretationof Aristotle'sphilosophyof action
on the belief that Aristotle makes 6QE~tLthe efficient cause of action
(Aristotle'sPhilosophyof Action, 1984,pp. 57-8 etc.) and cites 1048alO-22
in supportof the claim that (in Aristotle'sview) 'desiringis that type of
activity which - if certain conditions obtain - will by itself produce the
relevant action' (p. 86).
This seems to me a most perverseway of understandingthe relevant
passages.The naturalway of readingE 5 is to take 6dEtLgas an alternative
to an efficientcause:whetherandin whatdirectionthe doctorexerciseshis
skill is determinedby 6Q?eLtbecauseit is not renderedinevitableby causal
factors- he makesthe patientbetter or worse becausehe wantsto and not
becausehe has to. Sorabjiand Charlesmay be misledby Aristotle'suse of
the word'necessity',&vayxq,at a6-8anda14;they apparentlytake Aristotle
to be sayingthat the fulfilmentof certainconditionsrendersthe exerciseof

279

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
active powers necessary,the scope beingp -O El q. I think that this may
indeed be whatAristotlehas in mindin a6-8:giventhe fulfilmentof certain
physicalconditions,the exerciseof a non-rationalpoweris necessitatedand
thatof a rationalpoweris not:- (p- EO q). Eventhere,however,the Greek
is more easily understood as stating a de dicto necessity of the form (p r[
-+
q) andit seems to me thatthatinterpretationis mandatoryfor a14: it follows
fromthe definitionof wantingthatif I wantto do somethingandcan etc., I
do it. Charlesthinksthat for Aristotle'explanationinvolvesnecessitation',
(p. 198), but I agreewithSorabji(Necessity,p. 55) thatartifactslike houses
and statues which arise 'fromthought'neverarise from necessity(APo II
95a4-5). No doubt we should be hesitant about creditingancient philo-
sopherswith distinctionslike the de re/ de dictodistinction;butit is implicit
in the naturalreadingof this passage,and Aristotle recognisessomething
like it at GA V 778b16-19 (I am grateful to James Lennox for calling my
attentionto this passage).
As for DA III 9-10, the discussionthere is concernedwith movements
alreadysingledout as purposiveanddue to soul (see my 'Aristotleand the
Harmonia Theory' in A. Gotthelf (ed.) Aristotle on Nature and Living
Things,1985,pp. 136-7).Thoughtanddesirearebeingconsideredprecisely
as capacitiesfor intentionalaction.Whatis done intentionallyis done more
or less skilfully;it is an applicationof the agent'sidea (corrector incorrect,
cXv,qor &TEXvLa) of how to producesome effect; and it is a fulfilmentof
some kind of desire. Skilland desire, then, may be said to enable us to act
intentionally;but they enable us as non-causalfactors.It maysoundodd to
describea skill as a non-causalfactorbecausea skilfuldoctoris preciselya
manwho cancauseimprovementanddeteriorationin health.But hisskillis
not so muchthe causalpowerto causeeitheror bothof thesechangesas one
of the thingsin him by virtueof whichhis causingof them is not accidental
or fortuitousbut intentional.A skill is an abilityto causewhicheverof two
opposed changesyou like. You cannotexercisea skill withoutexercising-
or, as it maybe, refrainingfromexercising- causalpower.But the exercis-
ing of causalpower is an exerciseof skill only if it is purposive,gvFxCc TOV
and converselycausalactionof the kindwe are considering,the causingof
changein somethingelse, is purposiveonly if it is an applicationof skilland
a fulfilmentof desire.
Rather than causal powers, then, skill and desire should be reckoned
preciselyas non-causalsourcesof change.They differfromgenuinecausal
powers like the power of the hot-waterbottle to heat in that they render
things intelligiblein a formallydifferentway. The heat of the hot-water
bottle enablesus to understandthe rise in temperatureof the toes through

280

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
seeing it as inevitable. The doctor's skill enables us to understandhis
movementsin fillingthe syringe,injectingthe patientetc., as voluntaryand
intelligent.
In the paper on the a'Q[iovLa theory I develop the idea that Aristotle
connectsthe distinctionbetween these waysof explainingand understand-
ing with his distinctionbetween form and matter. In general, behaviour
which is explained teleologicallyis due to the form of the behaver, and
behaviourwhichis explainedcausallyandas inevitableis due to the matter.
I now wishto suggestthatthe differencebetweenthe doctor'spowerto heal
and the hot-waterbottle'spowerto heat arisesfromthe factthatthe former
pertains to the doctor's form, whereas the latter pertainsto the bottle's
contents. That they so pertain goes almost without saying, but the
suggestionthatpowersof formandmattergenerallydifferin thiswayneeds
to be explainedand defended.
Aristotle does not, so far as I know, use the phrase 'power of form'
(uvVavUgTOV Eaboug or the like) and I shall later say how he could have
had reasonsfor avoidingit. He does, however,talkfreelyof powersof soul,
and a soul is, of course, the form of a living thing. Moreoverany active
power of formwould have to be a powerof soul. For if a thingis inanimate
its form is a mere physical structure or &Q,OovLa, and it is a central
Aristotelian (and Platonic) doctrine that 'a &LpRovta cannot change
anything' (DA 407b34), i.e. has no active powers.
Aristotle chiefly uses the phrase 'power of soul' for the powers to
assimilatefood, perceive,thinkandmove aboutdiscussedin the DeAnima.
These are not powersin the narrowsense definedin A 12 ande 1: in those
passagesan activepoweris definedas a sourceof changein somethingelse,
and therebydistinguishedfroma thing'snature,whichis a sourceof change
in that which possesses it. In 1049b5-10,however, Aristotle notes that
b6ivaciu;may be used in a broad sense to include nature. The De Anima
powers are powers in the broadsense.
That being so, I do not think it is proper to ask if they are active or
passive:that distinctiondependson agentandpatientbeingdistinctat least
in the way in whichthey are distinctwhen a doctorprescribestreatmentfor
himself.Mightit not be held thatthe nutritivepower, at least, is both active
and passive - that it includesboth a power to cause what possesses it to
become biggerand a powerto be causedby its possessorto becomebigger?
If we took this line, we shouldindeed be conceivingthe nutritivepower as
causal.It is difficult,however,to see whatcouldmakeA's powerto causeA
to becomef differentfromA's powerto be causedby A to becomef, unless
we divideA into two partsandallotone powerto each. Such,at least, seems

281

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
to be Aristotle's view. 'It looks' he says (Phys. VIII 254b30-2) 'as if in
anaimalsjust as much as in boats and other artifactsthat which effects
changeis distinctfrom that whichundergoesit'; and he adds (255al2-13),
reasonably enough, 'How could anything continuous and naturally
homogeneous (oi pupvg) change itself?' There is, of course, a power to
cause change in food, but the correspondingpassivepower is in the food,
not the self-nourishingorganism.
L.A. Kosmanin 'Being ProperlyAffected' (Essayson Aristotle'sEthics
ed. A. Rorty, 1980) says:
The perceptual capacities, and the faculties of reason and thought as well, are
potentialitiesof the sensitive and intelligentsubject to be affectedin certainways, to
be acted upon by the sensible and intelligibleformsof objects in the world (p. 107).

Kosmantakes these powersof soul to be passivepowers.In the case of the

not affectedby the
intelligentsubjectAristotleis explicitthat it is &.nuaOg,
formsit 'receives'(DA III 429a15,cf. b29-30).Aristotlecertainlyholds it is
partof perceivingto be affectedin some way, andpartof experiencingany
emotion to undergo a physical change. These physiologicalprocesses,
however, are only the materialelement in feeling and perceiving(403bl
etc.). In their formal aspect emotion involves appetition (403a30) and
perceptionis inseparablefromappetition(414b1-2). Appetitionis hardlya
mode of passivity.MoreoverAristotle warnsus in DA II 5 that the verb
3aoXE-tv is used to cover several quite different things. The passage is less
clear than we could wish, but Aristotle seems to draw two distinctions.
First,there is a distinctionbetweenchangefor the worse, 'destructionby a
contrary'(417b3) (as when, say, a knife becomes rusty or blunt), and
acquiringa good state of whichthe acquireris naturallycapable,as whena
child learns (b15-16). Even the latter Aristotle is reluctant to call 'being
affected'(b13-14). Secondlythere is the distinctionbetween both these on
the one hand and, on the other, coming to exercise a capacityalready
possessed.The latteris a 'preservation'(b3) andeither'not an alteration'at
all or 'a differentkind of alteration'(b6-7). If the power to perceive is a
capacityfor tdoaXev, it is a capacityfor naraXELv only in this last, highly
Pickwickiansense.
But althoughpowersof soul are not eitheractiveor passivein the causal
sense, they are active in a non-causalsense. The nutritivepower is not
simplya power to affect food. The food is affected by heat; the nutritive
power is the power to heat and cool food in whateverway is necessaryto
nourishthe organism,andto heat andcool the food in this waybecauseit is
so necessary.It is a sourceof teleologicallyexplainablechange,of change

282

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
for the benefit of the organism.Insofaras the power to perceive and the
power to experienceemotion are powersto desire, pursueand avoid they
too are sourcesof change?VEXdTOU. We have a notionof activityaccording
to whicha thingis activeinsofaras its movementsoccurin accordancewith
its perceptionsanddesires,or insofarat least as theyoccurbecausethey are
necessaryor beneficial for it. A thing is passive insofar as changes take
place in it independentlyof any wishes or needs it may have. Activityand
passivityof this kindare not so muchcausalas teleological.Powersof soul
are all active in this teleologicalway. Aristotle avoids confusionby using
here not notloL;, his word for causal action, but words like EQyovand
nQDa'tt(so, e.g., GA I 731a25).
It mightbe thoughtthatbiologicalpowerslike the powerof self-nourish-
mentdifferfromskillsin a furtherwaybesidesin beingsourcesof changein
what has them: medical skill can be exercised in either of two opposed
ways, in makingpatients better and in makingthem worse, whereas an
embryo'spower to grow can be exercisedin only one way, in developing
into a maturespecimenof its species. But Aristotle would insist that the
organism'spower is exercised in two ways, in heating and in cooling, in
growingto a certainsize andin ceasingto growbeyondthat (cf. 416al-18).
This, for Aristotle, is essentialto any 'zotic'process:whenthingsare active
in the sense that 'theymove themselves,it is unreasonablethatthey should
move themselves in only one way' (Phys. VIII 255a6-11).(It may be
becausehe makesthisrequirementthatAristotledoes not feel anyneed for
sensitivityas a conditionof teleologicallyexplainablebehaviour;an organ-
ism does not have to perceivethat it has reachedthe rightsize.)
As Aristotle avoids the phrase 'power of form' so he avoids 'powerof
matter' (6iuvactgTij; fikTiior the like). Speaking, however, of 'bodies',
odwgaTa,a word which covers not only materialobjects but also specific
kinds of material, he says that 'their most decisive differences are
differencesin their 3atOr),their 'Qya and their buvda,EL' (DC III 307bl9-
23), andin Meteor.IV we aretold thatkindsof material,whetherorganicor
inorganic:
differfromone anotherboth by theirpeculiaritiesregardingperceptionand by their
active powers. For the pale, the fragrant,the sonorous, the sweet, the hot and the
cold are what they are by virtue of being able to affect perception in some way, and
other things which get their appellation from being affected are what they are by
virtue of their distinctive modes of being affected - I mean things which can be
melted, solidified, bent and so on (384b35-385a6).

Aristotle holds, in fact, that materialsare differentiatedby active and

passivecausalpowers.That was not a completelynovel idea. In Phaedrus

283

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
270c-d Platotells us that, 'accordingto Hippocratesandthe truth',the right
way to investigatenatureis to 'look at the power'of whatwe areinterested
in 'andsee what it is naturallysuch as to do to what and to undergoat the
agencyof what'.Thereis a suggestionof thisprocedureinAncientMedicine
(24, cf. 16, 20, 22) andAristotlecouldhavepickedit up fromhis fatherthe
Macedoniancourt physician.Whereas, however, Plato in the Phaedrus
appliesthe procedureto psychologyand literature(271 a, e) andin Sophist
247 e offers the power to affect and be affectedas what materialand non-
material existents have in common, Aristotle employs the procedure
chiefly in investigatingorganicand inorganicmaterials.
In MeteorIV 385a10-18Aristotlelists 18 kindsof passivepowerby which
'bodies' are differentiated.He representsthese, however, as derivative.
The primitiveor basicpowersare only six in number:heaviness,lightness,
heat, cold, wetnessanddryness.Heavinessandlightnessoccupythe centre
of the stage in DC IV; in GC II and MeteorIV they are displacedby the
remainingfour. InAristotle'sSystemof the PhysicalWorldSolmsentells us
he is startledby this change (p. 337). He could have sparedhimself the
shock by attendingto the explanationAristotle gives at GC II 329a20-2.
Heat, cold, wetness and drynessare powersin the narrowsense whereas
heaviness and lightness are powers only in the broad sense, sources of
change in thingsthat possess them.
Preciselyhow are heavinessandlightnesssourcesof change?'Thingsare
called heavy and light by virtue of being able to be moved naturallyin
certain ways', viz. to and from the Cosmic Centre (DC IV 307b31-2). In
Phys. VIII 255b31-2 Aristotlesaysthat heavinessis a passivepower,but he
cannot mean it is a passive power in the causal sense, a power whichits
possessor has by virtue of some other thing's having an active power
(1020a2-3).Material is heavy just insofar as things composed of it can
undergochange of place towardsthe Centrewithoutbeing acted upon by
anythingelse. But the power is passive in a non-causalway in that the
movementis not purposiveor 'vital'(255a5-7). Beingin theirproperplaceis
a realisation(255bl1) of theirnaturefor light and heavythings,but not an
objective. The heavy man whose ladderbreaksmoves towardsthe Centre
independentlyof his needs and againsthis will.
Aristotle's account seems foolish because there is, in fact, no Cosmic
Centreto or from whichthingsmove. Massiveobjectsmove towardsone
another.But it does not followthatAristotlewaswrongto saylightnessand
heaviness are sources of change in the thingswhich possess them and to
distinguishthemfromothercausalpowers.Gravitationalmassis definedin
termsnot of an intrinsicpropertylike temperatureor shape,buta relational

284

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
property, distance: it is a power, we might say, to reduce the distance
between its possessors.That being so, it is a sourceof changeratherin its
possessorsthan in other things. To us it may seem that the heavinessof a
brickis a passivepower it has to be moved by the Earth, but that is partly
because we make use of other referenceitems; we think that the brickis
displacedrelativelyto the fixed stars, say, while the Earthstays put. But
strictlyspeakingthe massof the brickis a powerwhichconcernssimplythe
distancebetweenthe brickandothermassiveobjects.Moreoverthereis no
causal action by which massiveobjects reducethe distancebetween them
(or resistactionwhichtendsto separatethem) in the wayin whichthereis a
mode of action by which one object melts or bends another. As Aristotle
says (255b15-16), this is what it is to be heavy. It is perhapsbetter not to
thinkof an objectcomposedof heavymateriallike a brickas havinga single
power relative to other massive objects; ratherwe should think of it as
having various powers diffused through it (which play a part, though
doubtlessnot the sole part,in keepingit together).But Aristotle'sidea that
heavinessis a sourceof changeandresistanceto changein whathasit rather
encouragesthan discouragesthis way of thinking.
Heat, cold, wetness and drynessseem to be regardedby Aristotle as
powerswhichare both active andpassivein the strictsense. Certainlythey
are all active powers to affect sense-organs.In the interactions,however,
which get most attention in his scientific works - the formationof the
variousinorganicandorganicmaterials- Aristotlethinksthatheat andcold
are active powers and wetness and drynesspassive (Meteor IV 378b12-13,
384b28-9,cf. GA II 742al5-16). The passive powers by which these materials
are differentiatedsometimesat least dependon structure,for instanceon
having pores of a certain sort, and can be acquiredand lost. Aristotle
believes that a thing'sliabilityto changein respectof them is a functionof
its wetnessor dryness.Wetnessanddryness,then, aresecond-orderpassive
powers,powersto be changedin respectof stickiness,brittlenessandother
manifestfirst-orderpowers. Aristotle also believes that one thingchanges
another'sfirst-orderpowersby some mode of heatingor cooling. Heat and
cold are active powersto producechange in these first-orderpowers.
Sorabjiargues(Necessity, Cause and Blame, pp. 51-6) that Aristotelian
causes do not always necessitate, but Aristotle regularlyspeaks of these
thermodynamicinteractions as necessary, and the necessity, as I said
earlier,seemsto be morethande dicto.Exactlyhow is the meltingof a piece
of wax, say, renderedinevitablewhen it is heated?In Phys. III. 3 Aristotle
argues that 3tOLqoL;, the exercise of an active power, and naTOT1Lg, the
realisation of the correspondingpassive power, are both in the thing

285

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
affected, and that they are one, althoughthe accountof each is different
(202a20).We are offeredas modelsthe ratiosof one to two andtwo to one,
an upwardand downwardslope (a18-20)and the road from Thebes to
Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes (b13-14). Charles(op. cit. p.
14) arguesthat the relationshiphere is not (as is usuallysupposed;so, for
instance,EdwardHussey,Aristotle'sPhysicsIll andIV ad loc.,) numerical
identity, but I do not find the passages he cites (242b37-9, 227b16-18)
establishthe point. AristotlewouldcertainlysaythatmygoingfromAthens
to Thebes on Mondayis differentfrom my makingthe same journeyon
Tuesday,but the point at issue is not thatbut whether,say, my pressingon
my car'sacceleratorfor severalhourson Mondayis identicalwithmy being
translatedfromAthens to Thebesin those hours.Charles'own view is that
the causal action and the change which is undergone, instead of being
identical,havethe same 'underlyingprocess'.A underlyingprocessis 'non-
causallysufficient'for what it underlies;the coming into contact of two
telephonewiresmightbe the underlyingprocessin thissensefor the coming
into being of an open line between two speakers(cf. p. 246). Since some-
thingcan be the underlyingprocessto itself (p. 29), Charles'view thatA's
action in causing B to become f has the same underlyingprocess as B's
becomingf (pp. 28-9) probablyamountsto the view that it is non-causally
sufficient for B's becomingf in this way. If so, I am not sure there is
differenceof substancebetweenhim and me on this point, but I dislikehis
terminology.It is bewilderingto say that the relationshipof A's actionin
causingB to becomef to B's becomingf is that it is non-causallysufficient
for it. We do better to say it is one of numericalidentity,especiallyas the
relationshipof the upward to the downwardslope is surely numerical
identity. Aristotle, however, is not content to say simply that sonoLtg and
Jt6a0ioL; are one and the same. He says they stand in a 6iiva[Lg -
VEQyELa relationship (202b9-10)- where EVE'QELa should surely be
taken in the problematicsense distinctfrom the sense of 'power'.I would
suggest that he thinks the causal action is the actualcomingabout of the
changein the patient.I havedefendedthisidea on its own meritselsewhere
('CausationandChange',Philosophy1983,pp. 145-6)andwillnot develop
the defence here; but if A's action is the actualcomingabout in B of the
changeto f, that changewill be necessaryand inevitable.
Aristotle's readers may sometimes have been misled by his talk of
teaching and learning. These are awkwardparadigmsfor 7roL'raG; and
naOiqcng andit soundsoptimisticto saythatA's teachingB andB's learning
fromA arethe samething.But teachingandlearningarementionedonly in
a discussion advertised as 'logical' (202a21), and it is characteristicof

286

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
logical,as distinctfromphysical,discussionsthatexamplesfromthe artsare
used to throwlighton naturalphenomena.The identityfor whichAristotle
is arguingis between physicalcausalaction, typifiedby heatingor pushing
and pulling,and physicalchange, not betweensuch non-physicalactivities
as teachingand learning.
Heat, cold, wetness and drynessand the powers listed in Meteor.IV. 8
are causalpowersby anystandardincludingDavidson's.The basicfourare
definitive of the elements (DA II 423b27-9) and the others differentiate
ordinary materials. It looks, then, as if causal powers are powers of
materialsand powersof materials(with some qualificationsfor heaviness
and lightness)are causal.We have seen, on the other hand, that capacities
for teleologicallyexplainablechangeare powersof form. I concludewith a
suggestionabout why Aristotle does not put the matterin quite this way.
The leading role in Aristotle's ontology is played by perceptiblesub-
stances consistingof form and matter:living things and, followingthem,
artifacts(with inanimatenaturalobjects like stones and cloudsnot getting
much prominence). It is these things which are the primaryowners of
powers. In Phys. 1I. 1 Aristotlearguesthat nature,the sourceof changein
what possessesit, is identicalwith an object'smatteror form (193a28-31). I
suggestthathe hesitatesto speakof powersas belongingto matterandform
because he thinksthat the sourcein an object of teleologicallyexplainable
changejust is its form, and the sourceof causallyexplainablechangejust is
its matter.
Only living thingscontain sourcesof teleologicallyexplainablechange.
That the form of a living thing consists of powers is a commonplaceof
Aristotelian scholarship:nearly everyone says that the Aristoteliansoul
consists of the powers to assimilate food, grow, perceive etc. That is
misleading if it suggests that the powers belong to the body or to the
materialsthat make it up. When Aristotlespeaksof psychologicalpowers
he speaksof themas belongingto the soul, andhe treatsthe notionof a soul
as the notion of a kind of agent. But as I said in my paper 'Aristotle's
Definitionof Soul' (Phronesis1980,pp. 184-5)I do not thinkhe considersit
importantto distinguishthe concept of a perceivingpurposiveagent from
the concept of the powers to perceiveand pursueor avoid. The source of
pursuitand avoidance of things perceived is the person to whom those
thingsarebeneficial,usefulor harmful;a manin his formalaspectis himself
the source of his behaviour.But the identificationof causal powers with
mattermay seem more problematic.
Thatis becausewe regularlyspeakof materialsas possessingpowers,and
followingLocke (Essay III.iii.15)we thinkthat theirpowersdependon an

287

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 'internalgenerallyunknownconstitution'.More precisely,we think that
the only thing which can be an internalsource of change, the only thing
which can accountfor how an object is affected and affects other things,
must be some kind of internalstructure,specifiablein geometricterms,
enriched, at best, with the idea of motion or time. The use made by
scientistsof notions like lattice structureencouragesthis way of thinking.
It is a way to be resisted. In the first place, it leads to the notion of a
Lockean substratum:if the ultimate owner of causal powers is not an
Aristotelianrn'vokov,whatelse can it be? Secondlya causalexplanationin
termsof structurecanneverbe the fullstory.Forin themselvesgeometrical
propertiesarenot causal.The shapeor structureof a bodymay,as Aristotle
observes, affectthe way in whichit acts or in whichforcesact on it (DC IV
313al4-15),but is not itself a sourceof force or of resistanceto change.
Among modernwritersRom Harrehas shownhimselfparticularlycon-
sciousof this. In ThePrinciplesof ScientificThinkingCh. 11he arguesthat
'the structuralarrangementsand motions'of the partsof ordinaryobjects
mustdependultimatelyon entitieswhichare not 'solidvolumesin motion'
(p. 303). At the deepest level in naturetherecan be no distinctionbetween
a power and what possesses it: the basic constituentsof matterhave no
'internalconstitution'(p. 312) but are, so to speak, barepowersor centres
of power. Harrehimselfconceivesthese entities as punctiformunitsscat-
tered throughany region which we should say is occupied by a material
object. But this is not a sufficientlyradicalbreakwith the corpuscularian
view he wants to reject. Insteadof attachinghis powers as propertiesto
corpuscles he attaches them in the same kind of way to points within
corpuscles.Thatway lies the Leibnizianlabyrinthof the continuum,andit
is betterto attachthem to the ordinaryobjectsthe corpusclesare supposed
to compose. But they should not be attachedas properties.We have no
clearidea of whata propertyof an objectis, andsuchunclearnotionsas we
have (somethinglike a garmentor a coat of paint, somethingsomehow
exemplified)do not fit powers. They should be attachedas matter. The
non-basicpowersof a knifeto cut and a bottle to intoxicateare the steel in
the one, the brandyin the other. But these materials,insofaras they are
extensive and can vary throughouttheir extension, also match Harre's
conception of basic powers, which resemble Aristotle's heaviness and
lightnessin beingpowersto attractandrepel. Ournotionof the materialin
the knife, extendingandvaryingas it does, is ournotionof the powerof the
knifeto resistbeingpulledto piecesandits powerto attractandbe attracted

288

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
by other massivebodies. The notions of matterand causalpower become
less puzzlingwhen we recognisethat they coincide.

University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne

289

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:42:13 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions