G.R. No.

202961, February 04, 2015

EMER MILAN, RANDY MASANGKAY, WILFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO

MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employees return of its
properties.

Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc.s (Solid Mills) employees. 1 They are represented by the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective bargaining agent. 2 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

As Solid Mills employees, petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property
owned by Solid Mills.3 According to Solid Mills, this was [o]ut of liberality and for the convenience of its
employees . . . [and] on the condition that the employees . . . would vacate the premises anytime the
Company deems fit.4 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003, Solid Mills would cease its
operations due to serious business losses.5 NAFLU recognized Solid Mills closure due to serious business
losses in the memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003. 6 The memorandum of agreement
provided for Solid Mills grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation
leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the employees. 7 Pertinent portions of the agreement provide: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHEREAS, the COMPANY has incurred substantial financial losses and is currently experiencing further
severe financial losses; chanrobleslaw

WHEREAS, in view of such irreversible financial losses, the COMPANY will cease its operations on October
10, 2003; chanroble slaw

WHEREAS, all employees of the COMPANY on account of irreversible financial losses, will be dismissed
from employment effective October 10, 2003; chanroble slaw

In view thereof, the parties agree as follows: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

1. That UNION acknowledges that the COMPANY is experiencing severe financial losses and as a
consequence of which, management is constrained to cease the companys operations.

2. The UNION acknowledges that under Article 283 of the Labor Code, separation pay is granted to
employees who are dismissed due to closures or cessation of operations NOT DUE to serious
business losses.

3. The UNION acknowledges that in view of the serious business losses the Company has been
experiencing as seen in their audited financial statements, employees ARE NOT granted separation
benefits under the law.

4. The COMPANY, by way of goodwill and in the spirit of generosity agrees to grant financial
assistance less accountabilities to members of the Union based on length of service to be
computed as follows: (Italics in this paragraph supplied)

Number of days - 12.625 for every year of service

5. In view of the above, the members of the UNION will receive such financial assistance on an equal
monthly installments basis based on the following schedule: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
 First Check due on January 5, 2004 and every 5th of the month thereafter until December
5, 2004.

6. The COMPANY commits to pay any accrued benefits the Union members are entitled to, specifically
those arising from sick and vacation leave benefits and 13th month pay, less accountabilities based
on the following schedule: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

One Time Cash Payment to be distributed anywhere from. . . .

....

7. The foregoing agreement is entered into with full knowledge by the parties of their rights under the
law and they hereby bind themselves not to conduct any concerted action of whatsoever kind,
otherwise the grant of financial assistance as discussed above will be withheld. 8 (Emphasis in the
original)

Solid Mills filed its Department of Labor and Employment termination report on September 2, 2003. 9 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Later, Solid Mills, through Alfredo Jingco, sent to petitioners individual notices to vacate SMI Village. 10 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners were no longer allowed to report for work by October 10, 2003. 11 They were required to sign a
memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th
month pay, and separation pay would be released.12 Employees who signed the memorandum of agreement
were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the constructed houses
inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits and separation pay.13 Petitioners refused to
sign the documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay.14 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation pay,
accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay.15 They argued that their accrued benefits and
separation pay should not be withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice. 16
Moreover, the 13th month pay is based on law, specifically, Presidential Decree No. 851. 17 Their possession
of Solid Mills property is not an accountability that is subject to clearance procedures. 18 They had already
turned over to Solid Mills their uniforms and equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations. 19 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, Solid Mills argued that petitioners complaint was premature because they had not
vacated its property.20 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners.21 According to the Labor Arbiter, Solid Mills illegally withheld
petitioners benefits and separation pay.22 Petitioners right to the payment of their benefits and separation
pay was vested by law and contract.23 The memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003 stated no
condition to the effect that petitioners must vacate Solid Mills property before their benefits could be given
to them.24 Petitioners possession should not be construed as petitioners accountabilities that must be
cleared first before the release of benefits.25 Their possession is not by virtue of any employer-employee
relationship.26 It is a civil issue, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.27 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is entered ORDERING respondents SOLID MILLS,

INC. and/or PHILIP ANG (President), in solido to pay the remaining 21 complainants: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

1) 19 of which, namely EMER MILAN, RAMON MASANGKAY, ALFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO
MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, MYRNA IGCAS, RAUL DE LAS ALAS, RENATO ESTOLANO, REX S. DIMAFELIX,
MAURA MILAN, JESSICA BAYBAYON, ALFREDO MENDOZA, ROBERTO IGCAS, ISMAEL MATA, CARLITO
DAMIAN, TEODORA MAHILOM, MARILOU LINGA, RENATO LINGA their separation pay of 12.625 days pay
per year of service, pro-rated 13th month pay for 2003 and accrued vacation and sick leaves, plus 12%
interest p.a. from date of filing of the lead case/judicial demand on 12/08/03 until actual payment and/or
finality;chanrobleslaw

2) the remaining 2 of which, complainants CLEOPATRA ZACARIAS, as she already received on 12/19/03 her
accrued 13th month pay for 2003, accrued VL/SL total amount of P15,435.16, likewise, complainant Jerry L.
Sesma as he already received his accrued 13th month pay for 2003, SL/VL in the total amount of
P10,974.97, shall be paid only their separation pay of 12.625 days pay per year of service but also with
12% interest p.a. from date of filing of the lead case/judicial demand on 12/08/03 until actual payment
and/or finality, which computation as of date, amount to as shown in the attached computation sheet.

3) Nine (9) individual complaints viz., of Maria Agojo, Joey Suarez, Ronaldo Vergara, Ronnie Vergara,
Antonio R. Dulo, Sr., Bryan D. Durano, Silverio P. Durano, Sr., Elizabeth Duarte and Purificacion Malabanan
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to amicable settlement, whereas, that of [RONIE ARANAS],
[EMILITO NAVARRO], [NONILON PASCO], [GENOVEVA PASCO], [OLIMPIO A. PASCO] are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute.

The Computation and Examination unit is directed to cause the computation of the award in Pars. 2 and 3
above.28 (Emphasis in the original)

Solid Mills appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. 29 It prayed for, among others, the
dismissal of the complaints against it and the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision. 30 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed paragraph 3 of the Labor Arbiters dispositive portion, but
reversed paragraphs 1 and 2. Thus: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez dated 10/17/05 is AFFIRMED in so far as
par. 3 thereof is concerned but modified in that paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the following complainants, namely: Emir Milan, Ramon Masangkay, Alfredo Javier, Ronaldo
David, Bonifacio Matundan, Nora Mendoza, Myrna Igcas, Raul De Las Alas, Renato Estolano, Rex S.
Dimaf[e]lix, Maura Milan, Jessica Baybayon, Alfredo Mendoza, Roberto Igcas, Cleopatra Zacarias and Jerry L.
Sesmas monetary claims in the form of separation pay, accrued 13th month pay for 2003, accrued vacation
and sick leave pays are held in abeyance pending compliance of their accountabilities to respondent
company by turning over the subject lots they respectively occupy at SMI Village Sucat Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila to herein respondent company.31

The National Labor Relations Commission noted that complainants Marilou Linga, Renato Linga, Ismael Mata,
and Carlito Damian were already paid their respective separation pays and benefits. 32 Meanwhile, Teodora
Mahilom already retired long before Solid Mills closure.33 She was already given her retirement
benefits.34
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The National Labor Relations Commission ruled that because of petitioners failure to vacate Solid Mills
property, Solid Mills was justified in withholding their benefits and separation pay.35 Solid Mills granted the
petitioners the privilege to occupy its property on account of petitioners employment. 36 It had the
prerogative to terminate such privilege.37 The termination of Solid Mills and petitioners employer-employee
relationship made it incumbent upon petitioners to turn over the property to Solid Mills. 38 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration on October 18, 2010, 39 but this was denied in the
November 30, 2010 resolution.40 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari 41 before the Court of Appeals to assail the National Labor
Relations Commission decision of August 31, 2010 and resolution of November 30, 2010. 42 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

On January 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals issued a decision dismissing petitioners petition, 43thus: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED.44

The Court of Appeals ruled that Solid Mills act of allowing its employees to make temporary dwellings in its
property was a liberality on its part. It may be revoked any time at its discretion.45 As a consequence of
Solid Mills closure and the resulting termination of petitioners, the employer-employee relationship between
them ceased to exist. There was no more reason for them to stay in Solid Mills property.46 Moreover, the
memorandum of agreement between Solid Mills and the union representing petitioners provided that Solid
Mills payment of employees benefits should be less accountabilities.47 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On petitioners claim that there was no evidence that Teodora Mahilom already received her retirement pay,
the Court of Appeals ruled that her complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter did not include a claim for
retirement pay. The issue was also raised for the first time on appeal, which is not allowed. 48 In any case,
she already retired before Solid Mills ceased its operations.49 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court of Appeals agreed with the National Labor Relations Commissions deletion of interest since it
found that Solid Mills act of withholding payment of benefits and separation pay was proper. Petitioners
terminal benefits and pay were withheld because of petitioners failure to vacate Solid Mills property.50 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that Carlito Damian already received his separation pay and benefits. 51
Hence, he should no longer be awarded these claims. 52 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the resolution promulgated on July 16, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners raise in this petition the following errors: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT PAYMENT OF THE MONETARY CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING
COMPLIANCE OF THEIR ACCOUNTABILITIES TO RESPONDENT SOLID MILLS BY TURNING OVER THE
SUBJECT LOTS THEY RESPECTIVELY OCCUPY AT SMI VILLAGE, SUCAT, MUNTINLUPA CITY.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RULING OF THE NLRC DELETING THE INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM IMPOSED BY THE
HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER HERNANDEZ ON THE AMOUNT DUE FROM THE DATE OF FILING OF THE LEAD
CASE/JUDICIAL DEMAND ON DECEMBER 8, 2003 UNTIL ACTUAL PAYMENT AND/OR FINALITY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RULING OF THE NLRC DENYING THE CLAIM OF TEODORA MAHILOM FOR PAYMENT OF
RETIREMENT BENEFITS DESPITE LACK OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT SHE RECEIVED THE SAME.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CARLITO DAMIAN IS ENTITLED TO HIS MONETARY BENEFITS FROM
RESPONDENT SOLID MILLS.54

Petitioners argue that respondent Solid Mills and NAFLUs memorandum of agreement has no provision
stating that benefits shall be paid only upon return of the possession of respondent Solid Mills property.55 It
only provides that the benefits shall be less accountabilities, which should not be interpreted to include
such possession.56 The fact that majority of NAFLUs members were not occupants of respondent Solid Mills
property is evidence that possession of the property was not contemplated in the agreement. 57
Accountabilities should be interpreted to refer only to accountabilities that were incurred by petitioners
while they were performing their duties as employees at the worksite. 58 Moreover, applicable laws, company
practice, or policies do not provide that 13th month pay, and sick and vacation leave pay benefits, may be
withheld pending satisfaction of liabilities by the employee.59 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners also point out that the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to declare that petitioners act of withholding possession of respondent Solid Mills property is
illegal.60 The regular courts have jurisdiction over this issue.61 It is independent from the issue of payment
of petitioners monetary benefits.62 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For these reasons, and because, according to petitioners, the amount of monetary award is no longer in
question, petitioners are entitled to 12% interest per annum. 63 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners also argue that Teodora Mahilom and Carlito Damian are entitled to their claims. They insist that
Teodora Mahilom did not receive her retirement benefits and that Carlito Damian did not receive his
separation benefits.64 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents Solid Mills and Philip Ang, in their joint comment, argue that petitioners failure to turn over
respondent Solid Mills property constituted an unsatisfied accountability for which reason petitioners
benefits could rightfully be withheld.65 The term accountability should be given its natural and ordinary
meaning.66 Thus, it should be interpreted as a state of being liable or responsible, or obligation.67
Petitioners differentiation between accountabilities incurred while performing jobs at the worksite and
accountabilities incurred outside the worksite is baseless because the agreement with NAFLU merely stated
accountabilities, without qualification.68 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the removal of the award of 12% interest per annum, respondents argue that such removal was proper
since respondent Solid Mills was justified in withholding the monetary claims. 69 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents argue that Teodora Mahilom had no more cause of action for retirement benefits claim. 70 She
had already retired more than a decade before Solid Mills closure. She also already received her retirement
benefits in 1991.71 Teodora Mahiloms claim was also not included in the complaint filed before the Labor
Arbiter. It was improper to raise this claim for the first time on appeal. In any case, Teodora Mahiloms
claim was asserted long after the three-year prescriptive period provided in Article 291 of the Labor
Code.72 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, according to respondents, it would be unjust if Carlito Damian would be allowed to receive monetary
benefits again, which he, admittedly, already received from Solid Mills. 73 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The National Labor Relations

Commission may preliminarily
determine issues related to rights
arising from an employer-employee
relationship

The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties rights over
a property, when it is necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-
employee relationship.

Article 217 provides that the Labor Arbiter, in his or her original jurisdiction, and the National Labor Relations
Commission, in its appellate jurisdiction, may determine issues involving claims arising from employer-
employee relations. Thus: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. (1) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even
in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations including those of persons in domestic or
 household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that they have the right to the immediate release of their benefits as employees separated
from respondent Solid Mills is a question arising from the employer-employee relationship between the
parties.

Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by an employee.
Employers may also have claims against the employee, which arise from the same relationship.

In Baez v. Valdevilla,74 this court ruled that Article 217 of the Labor Code also applies to employers claim
for damages, which arises from or is connected with the labor issue. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Whereas this Court in a number of occasions had applied the jurisdictional provisions of Article 217 to claims
for damages filed by employees, we hold that by the designating clause arising from the employer-
employee relations Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual
damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily
connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal
case.75

Baez was cited in Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission.76 One of the issues in Domondon is
whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to decide an issue on the transfer of ownership of a vehicle
assigned to the employee. It was argued that only regular courts have jurisdiction to decide the issue. 77 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This court ruled that since the transfer of ownership of the vehicle to the employee was connected to his
separation from the employer and arose from the employer-employee relationship of the parties, the
employers claim fell within the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction. 78
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to the labor issue raised and
must arise from an employer-employee relationship for the labor tribunals to have jurisdiction.

In this case, respondent Solid Mills claims that its properties are in petitioners possession by virtue of their
status as its employees. Respondent Solid Mills allowed petitioners to use its property as an act of
liberality. Put in other words, it would not have allowed petitioners to use its property had they not been its
employees. The return of its properties in petitioners possession by virtue of their status as employees is
an issue that must be resolved to determine whether benefits can be released immediately. The issue raised
by the employer is, therefore, connected to petitioners claim for benefits and is sufficiently intertwined with
the parties employer-employee relationship. Thus, it is properly within the labor tribunals jurisdiction.

II

Institution of clearance procedures

has legal bases

Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a standard procedure among
employers, whether public or private. Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real
or personal, belonging to the employer but are in the possession of the separated employee, are returned to
the employer before the employees departure.

As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees. The Labor Code
provides:chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Art. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his
wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the workers
consent.

The Labor Code also prohibits the elimination or diminution of benefits. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
Art. 100. Prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits. Nothing in this Book shall be
construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the
time of promulgation of this Code.

However, our law supports the employers institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages.
As an exception to the general rule that wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished, the
Labor Code provides: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any
deduction from the wages of his employees, except: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to
recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance; chanroble slaw

2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by
the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and

3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. (Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the employer. cralawred

Debt in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer. It includes any
accountability that the employee may have to the employer. There is no reason to limit its scope to
uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would argue.

More importantly, respondent Solid Mills and NAFLU, the union representing petitioners, agreed that the
release of petitioners benefits shall be less accountabilities.

Accountability, in its ordinary sense, means obligation or debt. The ordinary meaning of the term
accountability does not limit the definition of accountability to those incurred in the worksite. As long as
the debt or obligation was incurred by virtue of the employer-employee relationship, generally, it shall be
included in the employees accountabilities that are subject to clearance procedures.

It may be true that not all employees enjoyed the privilege of staying in respondent Solid Mills property.
However, this alone does not imply that this privilege when enjoyed was not a result of the employer-
employee relationship. Those who did avail of the privilege were employees of respondent Solid Mills.
Petitioners possession should, therefore, be included in the term accountability.

Accountabilities of employees are personal. They need not be uniform among all employees in order to be
included in accountabilities incurred by virtue of an employer-employee relationship.

Petitioners do not categorically deny respondent Solid Mills ownership of the property, and they do not claim
superior right to it. What can be gathered from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations
Commission, and the Court of Appeals is that respondent Solid Mills allowed the use of its property for the
benefit of petitioners as its employees. Petitioners were merely allowed to possess and use it out of
respondent Solid Mills liberality. The employer may, therefore, demand the property at will. 79 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The return of the propertys possession became an obligation or liability on the part of the employees when
the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus, respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold
petitioners wages and benefits because of this existing debt or liability. In Solas v. Power and Telephone
Supply Phils., Inc., et al., this court recognized this right of the employer when it ruled that the employee in
that case was not constructively dismissed.80 Thus: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

There was valid reason for respondents withholding of petitioners salary for the month of February 2000.
Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted to his employer in the amount of around P95,000.00.
Respondents explained that petitioners salary for the period of February 1-15, 2000 was applied as partial
payment for his debt and for withholding taxes on his income; while for the period of February 15-28, 2000,
petitioner was already on absence without leave, hence, was not entitled to any pay.81
The law does not sanction a situation where employees who do not even assert any claim over the
employers property are allowed to take all the benefits out of their employment while they simultaneously
withhold possession of their employers property for no rightful reason.

Withholding of payment by the employer does not mean that the employer may renege on its obligation to
pay employees their wages, termination payments, and due benefits. The employees benefits are also not
being reduced. It is only subjected to the condition that the employees return properties properly belonging
to the employer. This is only consistent with the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched
or benefited at the expense of another.82 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For these reasons, we cannot hold that petitioners are entitled to interest of their withheld separation
benefits. These benefits were properly withheld by respondent Solid Mills because of their refusal to return
its property.

III

Mahilom and Damian are not

entitled to the benefits claimed

Teodora Mahilom is not entitled to separation benefits.

Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that Teodora Mahilom already
retired long before respondent Solid Mills closure. They found that she already received her retirement
benefits. We have no reason to disturb this finding. This court is not a trier of facts. Findings of the
National Labor Relations Commission, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon
this court.83
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, Teodora Mahiloms claim for retirement benefits was not included in her complaint filed before the
Labor Arbiter. Hence, it may not be raised in the appeal.

Similarly, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that Carlito Damian
already received his terminal benefits. Hence, he may no longer claim terminal benefits.

The fact that respondent Solid Mills has not yet demolished Carlito Damians house in SMI Village is not
evidence that he did not receive his benefits. Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court
of Appeals found that he executed an affidavit stating that he already received the benefits.

Absent any showing that the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals misconstrued
these facts, we will not reverse these findings.

Our laws provide for a clear preference for labor. This is in recognition of the asymmetrical power of those
with capital when they are left to negotiate with their workers without the standards and protection of law.
In cases such as these, the collective bargaining unit of workers are able to get more benefits and in
exchange, the owners are able to continue with the program of cutting their losses or wind down their
operations due to serious business losses. The company in this case did all that was required by law.

The preferential treatment given by our law to labor, however, is not a license for abuse. 84 It is not a signal
to commit acts of unfairness that will unreasonably infringe on the property rights of the company. Both
labor and employer have social utility, and the law is not so biased that it does not find a middle ground to
give each their due.

Clearly, in this case, it is for the workers to return their housing in exchange for the release of their
benefits. This is what they agreed upon. It is what is fair in the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 189861 November 19, 2014

MICHELIN ASIA PACIFIC APPLICATION SUPPORT CENTER, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO J. ORTIZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 2, 2009 and the
1 2

Resolution dated September 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 106570
3

which annulled and set aside the Resolutions dated March 24, 2008, June 24, 2008, and
4 5

September 22, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR LAC No.
6

01-000455-08 dismissing respondent Mario J. Ortiz's (Ortiz) appeal due to several procedural errors.

The Facts

On March 1, 2003, Ortiz was employed by petitioner Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support
Center, Inc. (Michelin ASC) as Personnel Manager and was thereby involved in the processes of
recruitment, probation and employee contract monitoring, medical claims, and payroll, among
others.7

In line with the Michelin Groups "Tonus" initiative, which is a program for improving working
methods, increasing efficiency, and reducing fixed costs across all of its affiliates, functions, and
departments globally, a formal review of the Service Personnel processes at Michelin ASC was
8

conducted and results there from determined that the functions of the Personnel Manager could be
absorbed by the Service Center/Site Manager and/or Assistant Personnel Manager. Thus, on 9

November 30, 2006, Michelin ASC sent Ortiz a letter informing him of the termination of his
10

employment effective the close of business on December 31, 2006 on the ground of redundancy. It 11

also notified the Department of Labor and Employment - Regional Office about Ortizs intended
termination and submitted an Establishment Termination Report. 12

On December 6, 2006, Ortiz accepted a separation package in the amount of P2,225,561.66 and 13

executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim (quitclaim) in favor of Michelin ASC. Respondent also
14

signed a Final Pay Computation evidencing payment of the said amount. 15

This notwithstanding, Ortiz, on February 27, 2007, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
16

Michelin ASC, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-02-01810-07, claiming, among others, that: (a)
17

he was not aware that Michelin ASC had an impending redundancy program; (b) he was promised a
separation package in the amount of 2.5 months salary for every year of service; and (c) he, was,
however, offered a lesser package upon his termination but was forced to accept the same since he
had a family to support and was then 53 years old. 18

The LA Ruling

In a Decision dated November 27, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the illegal dismissal
19

complaint, holding that Michelin ASC complied with the statutory requirements of a valid redundancy
program and that the same was conducted in good faith. In this relation, the LA pointed out that
20

Ortiz executed a quitclaim in favor of Michelin ASC and had received the total of 2,225,561.66, which
amount was more than what the law provides as separation pay. Furthermore, the LA did not
21

sustain Ortizs claim regarding the separation package amounting to 2.5 months salary for every
year of service, considering the Affidavit executed by Michelin ASCs Senior Legal Counsel,
22

Angeline Khoo, denying the same. Unconvinced, Ortiz appealed before the NLRC.
23 24

The Proceedings Before the NLRC

In a Resolution dated March 24, 2008, the NLRC dismissed Ortizs appeal for not having been duly
25

perfected, observing that his Memorandum of Appeal was not accompanied by a certificate of non-
forum shopping in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the
26

NLRC (NLRC Rules).

27

Ortiz moved for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated June 24, 2008,
28 29

considering that his motion was filed out of time. In particular, the NLRC observed that Ortiz himself
admitted that he received a copy of the resolution sought to be reconsidered on April 14, 2008.
However, his motion for reconsideration was only filed on May 7, 2008, hence, beyond the 10-day
reglementary period to perfect the same, in violation of the mandatory requirement under Section
15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules.
30

Dissatisfied, Ortiz filed a second motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2008, to which Michelin ASC
31

was required to comment. 32

In a Resolution dated September 22, 2008, the NLRC did not give due course to the second motion
33

for reconsideration for being in violation also of Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules, or the
34

prohibition against second motions for reconsideration.

The Proceedings Before the CA

Undeterred, Ortiz, on December 12, 2008, filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the
35

LA Decision and the NLRCs March 24, 2008, June 24, 2008, and September 22, 2008 Resolutions.

In a Resolution dated December 19, 2008, the CA dismissed Ortizs petition for having been filed
36

out of time, remarking that a second motion for reconsideration before the NLRC was not allowed.
The CA also dismissed the petition on the ground that a relevant pleading was not attached to it, i.e.,
Ortizs reply.

Ortiz filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 9, 2009, to which Michelin ASC was required
37

to comment. 38

In a Decision dated June 2, 2009, the CA reversed its earlier December 19, 2008 Resolution, and
39

annulled the NLRCs March 24, 2008, June 24, 2008, and September 22, 2008 Resolutions, thus
directing the NLRC to give due course to Ortizs appeal. Mainly, the CAruled that there was prima
faciemerit in Ortizs contention and found it fitting to relax the procedural rules.
40

Aggrieved, Michelin ASC moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution
41 42

dated September 29, 2008, hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue before the Court is whether or not the CA properly granted Ortizs petition for
certiorariand annulled the NLRC Resolutions.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that
the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse
of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," the discretionary authority must be exercised in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law.43

After evaluating the relevant antecedents of this case, the Court comes to the conclusion that no
grave abuse of discretion, in the sense above described, was committed by the NLRCin dismissing
Ortizs appeal. As seen from the preceding factual narration, it is clear that the NLRC in due
observance of its own procedural rules had amply justified its dismissal of Ortizs appeal in view of
his numerous procedural infractions, namely: (a) his failure to attach to his Memorandum of Appeal a
certificate of non-forum shopping in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules; (b) his filing
44

of a motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs March 24, 2008 Resolution beyond the 10 day
reglementary period in violation of Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules; and (c) his filing of a
45

second motion for reconsideration in violation of Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules. 46

Of significant consideration is Ortizs violation of the mandatory requirement on the timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration, which thus rendered the NLRCs initial March 24, 2008 Resolution final
and executory. Silva v. NLRC instructs:
47

Time and again, this Court has been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration within the l0-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order,
resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirementto forestall the finality of such order,
resolution or decision.The statutory base for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Codeand
48

Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
49

Commission. (Emphases supplied)

50

"A definitive final judgment [ such as the NLRCs March 24, 2008 Resolution ] however erroneous,
is no longer subject to change or revision." Settled is the rule that "[a] decision that has acquired
51

finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of
a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law." 52

Hence, by the foregoing consideration alone, the CA should have dismissed Ortizs certiorari
petition. But this is not all.
1wphi1

To compound his mistakes, Ortiz even filed a second motion for reconsideration, which is a
prohibited pleading under the NLRC Rules. As a prohibited pleading, the filing of said motion could
not have tolled the running of the 60-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. Thus, since the NLRCs June 24, 2008
Resolution assailed by Ortizs second motion for reconsideration was received by him on July 8,
2008, while his petition for certiorari before the CA was filed more than 60 days thereafter, or on
53

December 12, 2008, his certioraripetition should have been dismissed outright for having been filed
54

out of time.
Therefore, for all these reasons, the Court reverses the CA Decision and reinstates the NLRC
Resolutions dismissing Ortiz's appeal. Accordingly, it is now unnecessary to delve on the other
ancillary issues raised in the petition of Michelin ASC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2009 and the Resolution
dated September 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 106570 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated March 24, 2008, June 24, 2008,
and September 22, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR LAC No. 01-
000455-08 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 G.R. No. 195109, February 04, 2015

ANDY D. BALITE, DELFIN M. ANZALDO AND MONALIZA DL. BIHASA, Petitioners, v. SS VENTURES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., SUNG SIK LEE AND EVELYN RAYALA , Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 18
June 2010 Decision1 rendered by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109589. In its
assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which denied the Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond filed by respondents SS Ventures International, Inc.,
Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala

In a Resolution2 dated 30 December 2010, the appellate court refused to reconsider its earlier decision.

The Facts

Respondent SS Ventures International, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly engaged in the business of
manufacturing footwear products for local sales and export abroad. It is represented in this action by
respondents Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala. Petitioners Andy Balite (Balite), Monaliza Bihasa (Bihasa) and
Delfin Anzaldo (Anzaldo) were regular employees of the respondent company until their employments were
severed for violation of various company policies.

For his part, Balite was issued a Show Cause Memorandum by the respondent company on 4 August 2005
charging him with the following infractions: (1) making false reports, malicious and fraudulent statements
and rumor-mongering against the company; (2) threatening and intimidating co-workers; (3) refusing to
cooperate in the conduct of investigation; and (4) gross negligence in the care and use of the company
property resulting in the damage of the finished products. After respondent found Balites explanation
insufficient, he was dismissed from employment, through a Notice of Termination on 6 September 2005.

Bihasa, on the other hand, was charged with absence without leave on two occasions and with improper
behavior, stubbornness, arrogance and uncooperative attitude towards superiors and employees. Bihasa was
likewise terminated from the service on 5 May 2006 after her explanation in an administrative investigation
was found unsatisfactory by the respondent company.

Anzaldo was also dismissed from employment after purportedly giving him due process. The records of the
infractions he committed as well as the date of his termination, however, are not borne by the records.

Consequently, the three employees charged respondents with illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages,
13th month pay and attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter.

In refuting the allegations of the petitioners, respondents averred that petitioners were separated from
employment for just causes and after affording them procedural due process of law.

On 30 December 2007, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 3 in favor of petitioners and held that
respondents are liable for illegal dismissal for failing to comply with the procedural and substantive
requirements in terminating employment. The decretal portion of the Labor Arbiter Decision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [petitioners] are hereby found to have been illegally dismissed even as
respondents are held liable therefore.

Consequently, respondent corporation is hereby ordered to reinstate [petitioners] to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with backwages initially computed at this time and
reflected below.

The reinstatement aspect of this decision is immediately executory and thus respondents are hereby
required to submit a report of compliance therewith within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Respondent corporation is likewise ordered to pay [petitioners] their 13 th month pay and 10% attorneys
fees.
13th month Attorneys
Backwages
pay fees

1. Andy P162,969.0 P P
Balite 4 17,511.00 18,048.00
2. Delfin
158,299.44 17,511.00 17,511.00
Anzaldo
3.
Monaliza 116,506.62 17,511.00 13,401.75
Bihasa
All other claims are dismissed for lack of factual or legal basis.4
Aggrieved, respondents interposed an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal and paying the corresponding
appeal fee. However, instead of filing the required appeal bond equivalent to the total amount of the
monetary award which is P490,308.00, respondents filed a Motion to Reduce the Appeal Bond to
P100,000.00 and appended therein a managers check bearing the said amount. Respondents cited financial
difficulty as justification for their inability to post the appeal bond in full owing to the partial shutdown of
respondent companys operations.

In a Resolution5 dated 27 November 2008, the NLRC dismissed the appeal filed by the respondents for non-
perfection. The NLRC ruled that posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award is
indispensable for the perfection of the appeal and the reduction of the appeal bond, absent any showing of
meritorious ground to justify the same, is not warranted in the instant case.

Similarly ill-fated was respondents Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution6 dated 30 April 2009.

On certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision and allowed the relaxation of the rule on
posting of the appeal bond. According to the appellate court, there was substantial compliance with the rules
for the perfection of an appeal because respondents seasonably filed their Memorandum of Appeal and
posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. While the amount of the appeal bond posted was not
equivalent to the monetary award, the Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to sufficiently
prove their incapability to post the required amount of bond. 7 The Court of Appeals disposed in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [NLRC], the
instant petition is GRANTED. The [NLRCs] Resolutions dated November 27, 2008 and April 30, 2009,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. [The NLRC] is hereby directed to decide petitioners appeal on the
merits.8
In a Resolution9 dated 30 December 2010, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier decision.

Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari10 praying that the Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution be reversed and set aside on the ground that: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE RESOLUTION OF THE
NLRC DISMISSING RESPONDENTS APPEAL FOR NON-PERFECTION THEREOF.11
The Courts Ruling

Petitioners, in assailing the appellate courts decision, argue that posting of an appeal bond in full is not only
mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon
the NLRC. They posit that the posting of an insufficient amount of appeal bond, as in this case, resulted to
the non-perfection of the appeal rendering the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.

Banking on the appellate courts decision, respondents, for their part, urge the Court to relax the rules on
appeal underscoring on the so-called utmost good faith they demonstrated in filing a Motion to Reduce
Appeal Bond and in posting a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00. In justifying their inability to post
the required appeal bond, respondents reasoned that respondent company is in dire financial condition due
to lack of orders from customers constraining it to temporarily shut down its operations resulting in
significant loss of revenues. Respondents now plea for the liberal interpretation of the rules so that the case
can be threshed out on the merits, and not on technicality.

Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts12 and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of
facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, when
supported by substantial evidence.13 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The NLRC ruled that no appeal had been perfected on time because of respondents failure to post the
required amount of appeal bond. As a result of which, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has attained finality.
The Court of Appeals, on the contrary, allowed the relaxation of the rules and held that respondents were
justified in failing to pay the required appeal bond. Despite the non-posting of the appeal bond in full,
however, the appellate court deemed that respondents were able to seasonably perfect their appeal before
the NLRC, thereby directing the NLRC to resolve the case on the merits.

The pertinent rule on the matter is Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, which sets forth the rules on
appeal from the Labor Arbiters monetary award: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. x x x.

xxxx

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphases
ours).cralawre d

Implementing the aforestated provisions of the Labor Code are the provisions of Rule VI of the 2011 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC on perfection of appeals which read: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Section. 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof. x x x If the 10th day or the 5th day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the
last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

xxxx

Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal shall be: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(1) filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
(2) verified by the appellant himself/herself in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court ,as amended;
(3) in the form a of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and with a statement of the date when the appellant received the
appealed decision, award or order;
(4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and
(5) accompanied by:
i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and legal research fee;
ii) posting of cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
and
iii) proof of service upon the other parties.
xxxx

(b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

xxxx

Section 5. Appeal Fee. - The appellant shall pay the prevailing appeal fee and legal research fee to the
Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office of origin, and the official receipt of such payment shall form
part of the records of the case.

Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall
either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive
of damages and attorneys fees.

xxxx

The Commission through the Chairman may on justifiable grounds blacklist a bonding company,
notwithstanding its accreditation by the Supreme Court. cralawre d

These statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders
of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon
(1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal.14 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

In McBurnie v. Ganzon,15 we harmonized the provision on appeal that its procedures are fairly applied to
both the petitioner and the respondent, assuring by such application that neither one or the other party is
unfairly favored. We pronounced that the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to 10%
of the monetary award pending resolution of the motion to reduce appeal bond shall be deemed sufficient to
perfect an appeal, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

It is in this light that the Court finds it necessary to set a parameter for the litigants and the NLRCs
guidance on the amount of bond that shall hereafter be filed with a motion for a bonds reduction. To ensure
that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give parties the chance to seek
a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however defeating the benefits of the
bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC
shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that
is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the
meantime that an appellants motion is pending resolution by the Commission. In conformity with the NLRC
Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages
and attorneys fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the required percentage shall an appellants period to
perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed suspended. cralawre d

The rule We set in McBurnie was clarified by the Court in Sara Lee Philippines v. Ermilinda
Macatlang.16 Considering the peculiar circumstances in Sara Lee, We determined what is the reasonable
amount of appeal bond. We underscored the fact that the amount of 10% of the award is not a permissible
bond but is only such amount that shall be deemed reasonable in the meantime that the appellants motion
is pending resolution by the Commission. The actual reasonable amount yet to be determined is necessarily
a bigger amount. In an effort to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation of the state to afford
protection to labor on the one hand, and the opportunity afforded to the employer to appeal on the other,
We considered the appeal bond in the amount of P725M which is equivalent to 25% of the monetary award
sufficient to perfect the appeal, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

We sustain the Court of Appeals in so far as it increases the amount of the required appeal bond. But we
deem it reasonable to reduce the amount of the appeal bond to P725 Million. This directive already considers
that the award if not illegal, is extraordinarily huge and that no insurance company would be willing to issue
a bond for such big money. The amount of P725 Million is approximately 25% of the basis above calculated.
It is a balancing of the constitutional obligation of the state to afford protection to labor which, specific to
this case, is assurance that in case of affirmance of the award, recovery is not negated; and on the other
end of the spectrum, the opportunity of the employer to appeal.

By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this case, the employees would still be assured of at least
substantial compensation, in case a judgment award is affirmed. On the other hand, management will not
be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal. cralawred

In line with Sara Lee and the objective that the appeal on the merits to be threshed out soonest by the
NLRC, the Court holds that the appeal bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 which
is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond is sufficient to perfect an appeal. With
the employers demonstrated good faith in filing the motion to reduce the bond on demonstrable grounds
coupled with the posting of the appeal bond in the requested amount, as well as the filing of the
memorandum of appeal, the right of the employer to appeal must be upheld. This is in recognition of the
importance of the remedy of appeal, which is an essential part of our judicial system and the need to ensure
that every party litigant is given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause
freed from the constraints of technicalities.17
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo De-Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. cralawlawlibrary

Endnotes:
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 203642, January 18, 2016

THOMASITES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (TCIS), Petitioner, v. RUTH N. RODRIGUEZ,

IRENE P. PADRIGON AND ARLYN B. RILLERA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 from the Resolution2 dated May 24, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 124630, dismissing outright the Thomasites Center for International Studies' (TCIS) petition
for certiorari3 from the Decision4 dated September 30, 2011 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-8376-05, filed by Ruth N. Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Arlyn B. Rillera
(Rillera), and in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-8401-05, filed by Irene P. Padrigon (Padrigon) (respondents). chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

On July 29, 2004, Rodriguez, 34, Rillera, 36, and Padrigon, 30, all graduates of the University of the
Philippines and holders of teaching licenses from the Professional Regulation Commission, were hired by Dr.
Jae Won Park and Dr. Cheol Je Cho (Dr. Cho), Korean nationals and President and Academic Dean,
respectively, of TC1S, to develop the academic programs of the said school, design its curricula, create
materials for the school website, recruit American and Filipino staff, draft documents required for the
school's Technical Education and Skills Development Authority accreditation, help supervise the construction
of the school building in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, as well as draft the school's rules and regulations
and student and faculty handbooks. The parties executed no written contracts but the respondents were
promised a monthly salary of P25,000.00 plus shares of stock.5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As soon after classes opened on December 20, 2004 at the Crown Peak Hotel in Subic Bay, disagreements
arose between the respondents and the American teachers on the question of salaries. At the meeting called
by Dr. Cho on January 7, 2005, the American teachers threatened to resign unless the respondents were
terminated. That same afternoon, the respondents were served with letters of termination 6 effective January
8, 2005, signed by Dr. Cho, citing as reason the restructuring of the company and consequent evaluation of
its staffing requirements.7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 24, 2005, Rodriguez and Rillera filed NLRC Case No. RAB-lIi-01-8376-05, 8 while Padrigon filed
NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-8401-05, both for illegal dismissal and money claims, against TCIS and Dr. Cho.
TCIS and Dr. Cho were served with summons by registry through Dr. Cho, giving them 10 days from receipt
to file their position paper.9 TCIS and Dr. Cho did not file their position paper, but they were represented by
counsel at the hearings held on February 15, 2005, March 15, 2005, and April 19, 2005. 10 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On May 8, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision 11 finding that the respondents were illegally
dismissed, and directed TCIS and Dr. Cho to reinstate them with full backwages in the total amount of
P1,125 000.00, plus 10% as attorney's fees.12 Dr. Cho received a copy of the decision on June 21,
2006.13chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

On August 11, 2006, the complainants moved for issuance of a writ of execution. At the September 22,
2006 pre-execution conference, Atty. Joy P. Bayona (Atty. Bayona) entered her appearance as counsel for
TCIS and Dr. Cho. Conferences were held on October 2, 2006, October 23, 2006, November 24, 2006 and
December 15, 2006. But at the hearing held on December 1 8, 2006, the law firm of Andres Marcelo
Pedernal Guerrero and Paras entered its appearance as counsel for TCIS and filed a petition for relief from
judgment. On January 30, 2007, the LA directed the issuance of a writ of execution, which was served on
TCIS's counsel on February 8, 2007; the LA merely noted the petition for relief due to wrong venue and lack
of jurisdiction and because it was a prohibited pleading. 14 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

On February 19, 2007, TCIS re-filed its petition for relief, with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, before the NLRC. It claimed that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction
over it since the summons and notices were addressed to Dr. Cho, who did not represent TCIS; that the
entry of appearance of Atty. Bayona at the pre-execution conference was signed only by Dr. Cho in his
capacity as therein respondent and academic dean of TCIS; that TCIS did not receive any notice of the
proceedings; and, that although the NLRC is not bound by technical rules of procedure, TCIS's right to due
process was violated since it was deprived of the right to file its position paper. TCIS further argued it faced
a shut-down and would suffer irreparable damage unless the execution was enjoined, although it also
expressed willingness to post a bond to guarantee payment of whatever damages may be awarded by the
NLRC.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On September 30, 2011, the NLRC denied TCIS's petition on the ground that it had other adequate remedies
such as a motion for new trial or an appeal; that it failed to show that due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence it was prevented from availing thereof; that it could not avail of the equitable remedy
of petition for relief for the purpose of reviving its appeal which it lost through its negligence. 16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed on May 24, 2012 the TCIS's petition outright for its failure to
indicate the material dates to show the timeliness of the petition. Moreover, TCIS attached an incomplete
copy of the NLRC decision as well as did not attach copies of the complaint, position papers, appeal
memorandum, motion for reconsideration and other relevant portions of the records to support the
allegations in the petition.17 The CA also denied its motion for reconsideration on September 26, 2012 for
lack of meritorious grounds.18 chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

In this petition, TCIS invokes the following grounds:

A.

THE HONORABLE [NLRC] ERRED IN APPLYING RIGIDLY THE PROCEDURAL RULES ON TECHNICAL
REQUIREMENTS AND DISMISSED [TCIS'S] CERTIORARI BASED ONLY THEREON|;] chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

B.

THE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUMMONS WERE VALID DESPITE BEING
DIRECTED TO DR. CLIO, THE ACADEMIC DEAN OF [TCIS;] chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

C.

THE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TEIE [RESPONDENTS] WERE ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED[.]19 chanrobleslaw

In Jaro v. CA,20 where the CA dismissed a petition for review from a Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB.) decision for not being in proper form and lacking pertinent annexes, the Court
admonished the appellate court for putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just
resolution of the case, and ruled that there was more than substantial compliance when the landowner
amended the petition, now in proper form and accompanied by annexes which were all certified true copies
by the DARAB. The Court stated:

In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. [NLRC], we ruled that the subsequent submission of the
missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons
behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no
longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein
substantially complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases
to the [CA], stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions "the appellate court clearly put
a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case."

We cannot see why the same leniency cannot be extended to petitioner, x x x.

If we were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as what the [CA] would have
it in this case, the ends of justice would be defeated. In Cusi-Hernundez vs. Diaz, where the formal
requirements were liberally construed and substantial compliance were recognized, we explained that rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid application of technicalities that, tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must be avoided. We further declared that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be served better."
In the similar case of Piglas-Kamao vs. [NLRC], we stressed the policy of the courts to encourage the full
adjudication of the merits of an appeal.21 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)

In Piglas Kamao (Sari-Sari Chapter) v. NLRC,22 the Court also ruled that there was substantial compliance
after the petitioner therein subsequently attached the lacking documents to the motion for reconsideration,
reiterating the Court's policy to encourage the full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. 23 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As to the merits of its petition before the NLRC, TCIS argued that its right to due process was violated due
to the invalid service of the summons and a copy of the complaint in the LA; moreover, being mere
probationary employees, the respondents were validly dismissed for failing to qualify as regular employees.

The Court denies the petition.

In Philippine Amanah Bank (now Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, also known as
Islamic Bank) v. Contreras,24 the Court stated:

Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. It is a remedy, equitable in character, that is
allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail of the remedy of petition for relief.25(Citation
omitted)

Otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been
lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to the mistake in the mode of procedure by
counsel.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Tuason v. CA;27 the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment, thus:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence.28 (Citations omitted)

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment must
strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed
period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with
these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of
the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment,
order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation. 29 chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The NLRC pointed out that TCIS's petition for relief was filed beyond the period provided under Rule
38.30 The earliest that it could have learned of the LA's judgment was on June 21, 2006 when Dr. Cho
received a copy thereof, and the latest was during the pre-execution conference held on September 22,
2006, when Atty. Bayona formally entered her appearance as counsel for TCIS and Dr. Cho. TCIS's petition
for relief was filed only on February 13, 2007, well beyond the 60-day period allowed. 31 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA that no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence prevented
TCIS from filing an appeal from the decision of the LA, even as the NLRC also noted that the petition also
lacked the requisite affidavit showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the facts
constituting its good and substantial cause of action.32chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
TCIS was afforded every opportunity to be heard. The service of summons and notices of proceedings to Dr.
Cho was perfectly valid and binding upon TCIS since they were sent to him at its address, and Dr. Cho is a
responsible officer of TCIS. Dr. Cho was TCIS's academic dean who hired the respondents and also signed
their termination letters. The attendance of TCIS's counsel at the hearings held on February 15, 2005, March
15, 2005, and April 19, 2005 is also proof that it was duly notified of the LA's judgment. 33
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. cralawla wlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Brion,* Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
cral
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES, G.R. No. 142351

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Promulgated:
COMMISSION , AND
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, November 22, 2006
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to reverse and set aside the September
30, 1999 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49183,
which affirmed the June 13, 1997 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 012311-97 remanding the complaint of
respondent Aricayos to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings, and the February
11, 2000 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.[4]
 The instant petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, payment of back wages, and damages filed by private
respondent Aricayos against petitioner.The initiatory pleading was filed before the
NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. III in San Fernando, Pampanga and
docketed as RAB III-05-7022-96.

The facts culled from the records are:

The owner of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. (St. Martin) is
Amelita Malabed. Prior to January 1996, Amelitas mother managed the funeral
parlor; respondent Aricayos, on the other hand, was formerly an overseas contract
worker. Sometime in 1995, Aricayos was granted financial assistance by Amelitas
mother. As a sign of appreciation, respondent extended assistance to Amelitas
mother in managing St. Martin without compensation. There was no written
employment contract between Amelitas mother and respondent Aricayos;
furthermore, respondent Aricayos was not even listed as an employee in the
Companys payroll.
When Amelitas mother died in January 1996, Amelita took over as manager
of St. Martin. Much to her chagrin, she found out that St. Martin had arrearages in
the payment of BIR taxes and other fees owing to the government, but company
records tended to show that payments were made thereon. As a result, Amelita
removed the authority from respondent Aricayos and his wife from taking part in
managing St. Martins operations.

Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos accused St. Martin of his illegal dismissal

as Operations Manager of the company. He believed that the cause of his
termination was Amelitas suspicion that he pocketed PhP 38,000.00 which was set
aside for payment to the BIR of St. Martins valued added taxes.
 On October 25, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of
petitioner declaring that his office had no jurisdiction over the case, in this wise:
We rule in favor of the respondent since this office has no jurisdiction over
the instant complaint, because as held in Dela Salle University vs. NLRC, 135
SCR 674, 677 (1988) where the existence of an employer-employee relationship
is disputed and not assumed, as in these cases, the determination of that question
should be handled by the regular courts after full dress trial and not by the Labor
Arbiter. The Supreme Court ruled:

We hold that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no

jurisdiction over the case. It was properly brought to the Civil
Court. The issue was the existence of the employer-employee
relationship between Lao and the University. Under Article 265 (5)
The existence of employer-employee relations is assumed not
disputed.

In this case, it is necessary to determine whether Lao

became a permanent employee after she was hired as a
probationary employee. The determination of the question could be
more competently handled by the court after a full dress trial and
not by the Labor Arbiter by means of position paper procedure
followed by him.[5]

Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos appealed the Labor Arbiters adverse ruling

to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution annulling the
Arbiters Decision and remanded the case to him for appropriate proceedings, to
determine the factual issue of the existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties, ratiocinating this way:

Considering the diametrically opposing contentions of the parties herein

on the issue of employer-employee relationship, it was imperative on the Labor
Arbiter to have threshed out the issue in further appropriate proceedings. The
Labor Arbiter is so authorized under our Rules when the facts are not too clear. As
it is, the conclusions herein are not well substantiated.

Indeed, the ends of justice would better be served if both parties are given
further opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on issues at hand.[6]
 When its motion for reconsideration was rejected by the NLRC, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
130866.

On September 16, 1998, this Court through Justice Jose Vitug, rendered the
landmark Decision in this case then docketed as G.R. No. 130866, holding for the
first time that all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decisions of the
NLRC should henceforth be filed with the CA, thus:
Therefore, all references in the amended section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and refer
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Thus, the petition was remanded to the CA and redocketed as CA-G.R. SP

No. 49183.

Subsequently, the CA rendered the assailed September 30, 1999 Decision,

dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit with the finding that respondent
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in its pronouncement that the
Labor Arbiter did not make any finding on the alleged employer-employee
relationship between the parties, reasoning this way:

Actually the Labor Arbiter did not determine whether there is an

employer-employee relation between the parties because according to him, such
issue should be resolved by the regular court pursuant to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in De la Salle University vs. NLRC (135 SCRA 674, 677 (1988)).

For its part, respondent NLRC, is remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter,
reminded the latter that he is authorized by the NLRC Rules to determine, in an
appropriate proceeding the existence of an employer-employee relationship.[7]

In its February 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

was likewise denied. Thus, the instant petition.
 Petitioner insists that, contrary to the findings of the NLRC as affirmed by
the CA, the Labor Arbiter actually concluded that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties considering the memoranda, position papers, and
the documentary evidence presented in support of their respective positions. St.
Martin asserts that the Labor Arbiter already undertook the appropriate proceeding
referred to by the NLRC and the CA and therefore, the NLRC and the CA decided
the case contrary to the evidence presented, the applicable laws, and jurisprudence.

The petition must fail.

The main issue is whether the Labor Arbiter made a determination of the
presence of an employer-employee relationship between St. Martin and respondent
Aricayos based on the evidence on record.

Petitioner St. Martin contends that the Labor Arbiter indeed made a finding
of the non-existence of any relationship between respondent Aricayos and the
company based on the position papers and memoranda of the parties. In addition,
petitioner claims several affidavits of its employees were attached to its position
paper whereby they attested under oath that respondent Aricayos was never an
employee of St. Martin. It concludes that the Arbiter made the determination of the
absence of an employer-employee relationship only after considering the
documentary evidence on record and hence, substantial evidence supports such
finding.

On the other hand, respondent Aricayos supports the pronouncement of the

NLRC as affirmed by the CA that there was no determination whether he was an
employee of St. Martin and the main basis for the dismissal of his complaint was
the reliance of the Labor Arbiter on the cited case of De La Salle University v.
NLRC that it should be the regular court which should make such finding.
 We rule for respondent Aricayos.

At the outset, it is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a question
of fact which is proscribed by the rule disallowing factual issues in appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in Rule 45, Section
1 that petitions of this nature shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. Petitioner St. Martin would like the Court to examine the
pleadings and documentary evidence extant on the records of the Labor Arbiter to
determine if said official indeed made a finding on the existence of the alleged
employer-employee nexus between the parties based on the facts contained in said
pleadings and evidence. Evidently this issue is embraced by the circumscription.

Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of the
documentary evidence as an exception to the general rule, we are precluded by the
abject failure of petitioner to attach to the petition important and material portions
of the records as would support the petition prescribed by Rule 45, Section 4. St.
Martin asks us to find out if the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding that
respondent Aricayos was not in its employ; but committed the blunder of not
attaching to the petition even the Decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be
reviewed, the NLRC Decision, the position papers and memoranda of the parties
filed with the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of petitioners employees, and other
pieces of evidence that we can consider in resolving the factual issue on
employment. Without these vital documents, petitioner cannot be given the relief
prayed for.

Even with the inadequate information and few documents on hand, one thing
is clearthat the Labor Arbiter did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to
determine the veracity of the conflicting positions of the parties. On this point
alone, a remand is needed.
 We held in a catena of cases that while a formal trial or hearing is
discretionary on the part of the Labor Arbiter, when there are factual issues that
require a formal presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor Arbiter cannot
simply rely on the position papers, more so, on mere unsubstantiated claims of
parties.

In Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, we remanded the case for further

proceedings as equity and justice demand that not only the factual issue of whether
or not an assistant vice-president is a managerial employee, but also whether
petitioner is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages, should be
considered.[8] In Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. NLRC, [9] we also
put to task the Labor Arbiter for issuing an order submitting the case for decision
without conducting a hearing. As such, the Labor Arbiters Decision was rendered
merely upon his reliance on the bare allegations of the parties in their position
papers. While the parties submitted documentary evidence in Progress Homes v.
NLRC[10] it was clear that a hearing was still required in order to ventilate the
factual issues.

In the case at bar, there are certain admissions by petitioner St. Martin that
should have prodded the Labor Arbiter to conduct a hearing for a more in-depth
examination of the contrasting positions of the parties, namely; that respondent
helped Amelitas mother manage the funeral parlor business by running errands for
her,[11] overseeing the business from 1995 up to January 1996 when the mother
died, and that after Amelita made changes in the business operation, private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management
of St. Martin.[12] These facts, as admitted by the petitioner and the affidavits of St.
Martins witnesses, could have been examined more in detail by the Labor Arbiter
in a hearing to convince himself that there was indeed no employment relationship
between the parties as he originally found.
 In the light of these premises, we find no reason to disturb the assailed
judgment of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit,

and the September 30, 1999 Decision and the February 11, 2000 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49183 are hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEORNARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
 AT T E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice