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H.L.A.HartsTheConceptofLaw

HerbertLionelAdolphusHart(190792)wasaBritishphilosopherwhowasprofessorofjurisprudenceatthe
UniversityofOxford.HismostimportantwritingsincludedCausationintheLaw(1959,withA.M.Honor),
TheConceptofLaw(1961),Law,LibertyandMorality(1963),OfLawsinGeneral(1970),andEssayson
Bentham(1982).

TheConceptofLaw(1961)isananalysisoftherelationbetweenlaw,coercion,andmorality,anditisan
attempttoclarifythequestionofwhetheralllawsmaybeproperlyconceptualizedascoerciveordersoras
moralcommands.Hartsaysthatthereisnologicallynecessaryconnectionbetweenlawandcoercionor
betweenlawandmorality.Heexplainsthattoclassifyalllawsascoerciveordersorasmoralcommandsisto
oversimplifytherelationbetweenlaw,coercion,andmorality.Healsoexplainsthattoconceptualizealllaws
ascoerciveordersorasmoralcommandsistoimposeamisleadingappearanceofuniformityondifferent
kindsoflawsandondifferentkindsofsocialfunctionswhichlawsmayperform.Hearguesthattodescribe
alllawsascoerciveordersistomischaracterizethepurposeandfunctionofsomelawsandisto
misunderstandtheircontent,modeoforigin,andrangeofapplication.

Lawsarerulesthatmayforbidindividualstoperformvariouskindsofactionsorthatmayimposevarious
obligationsonindividuals.Lawsmayrequireindividualstoundergopunishmentforinjuringother
individuals.Theymayalsospecifyhowcontractsaretobearrangedandhowofficialdocumentsaretobe
created.Theymayalsospecifyhowlegislaturesaretobeassembledandhowcourtsaretofunction.They
mayspecifyhownewlawsaretobeenactedandhowoldlawsaretobechanged.Theymayexertcoercive
poweroverindividualsbyimposingpenaltiesonthoseindividualswhodonotcomplywithvariouskindsof
dutiesorobligations.However,notalllawsmayberegardedascoerciveorders,becausesomelawsmay
conferpowersorprivilegesonindividualswithoutimposingdutiesorobligationsonthem.

HartcriticizestheconceptoflawthatisformulatedbyJohnAustininTheProvinceofJurisprudence
Determined(1832)andthatproposesthatalllawsarecommandsofalegallyunlimitedsovereign.Austin
claimsthatalllawsarecoerciveordersthatimposedutiesorobligationsonindividuals.Hartsays,however,
thatlawsmaydifferfromthecommandsofasovereign,becausetheymayapplytothoseindividualswho
enactthemandnotmerelytootherindividuals.Lawsmayalsodifferfromcoerciveordersinthattheymay
notnecessarilyimposedutiesorobligationsbutmayinsteadconferpowersorprivileges.

LawsthatimposedutiesorobligationsonindividualsaredescribedbyHartas"primaryrulesofobligation."
Inorderforasystemofprimaryrulestofunctioneffectively,"secondaryrules"mayalsobenecessaryin
ordertoprovideanauthoritativestatementofalltheprimaryrules.Secondaryrulesmaybenecessaryin
ordertoallowlegislatorstomakechangesintheprimaryrulesiftheprimaryrulesarefoundtobedefective
orinadequate.Secondaryrulesmayalsobenecessaryinordertoenablecourtstoresolvedisputesoverthe
interpretationandapplicationoftheprimaryrules.Thesecondaryrulesofalegalsystemmaythusinclude1)
rulesofrecognition,2)rulesofchange,and3)rulesofadjudication.

Inorderfortheprimaryrulesofalegalsystemtofunctioneffectively,therulesmustbesufficientlyclearand
intelligibletobeunderstoodbythoseindividualstowhomtheyapply.Iftheprimaryrulesarenotsufficiently
clearorintelligible,thentheremaybeuncertaintyabouttheobligationswhichhavebeenimposedon
individuals.Vaguenessorambiguityinthesecondaryrulesofalegalsystemmayalsocauseuncertaintyasto
whetherpowershavebeenconferredonindividualsinaccordancewithstatutoryrequirementsormaycause
uncertaintyastowhetherlegislatorshavetheauthoritytochangelaws.Vaguenessorambiguityinthe
secondaryrulesofalegalsystemmayalsocauseuncertaintyastowhethercourtshavejurisdictionover
disputesconcerningtheinterpretationandapplicationoflaws.

Primaryrulesofobligationarenotinthemselvessufficienttoestablishasystemoflawsthatcanbeformally
recognized,changed,oradjudicated,saysHart.Primaryrulesmustbecombinedwithsecondaryrulesin
ordertoadvancefromtheprelegaltothelegalstageofdetermination.Alegalsystemmaythusbe
establishedbyaunionofprimaryandsecondaryrules(althoughHartdoesnotclaimthatthisunionisthe

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onlyvalidcriterionofalegalsystemorthatalegalsystemmustbedescribedinthesetermsinordertobe
properlydefined).

Hartdistinguishesbetweenthe"external"and"internal"pointsofviewwithrespecttohowtherulesofa
legalsystemmaybedescribedorevaluated.Theexternalpointofviewisthatofanobserverwhodoesnot
necessarilyhavetoaccepttherulesofthelegalsystem.Theexternalobservermaybeabletoevaluatethe
extenttowhichtherulesofthelegalsystemproducearegularpatternofconductonthepartofindividualsto
whomtherulesapply.Theinternalpointofview,ontheotherhand,isthatofindividualswhoaregoverned
bytherulesofthelegalsystemandwhoaccepttheserulesasstandardsofconduct.

The"external"aspectofrulesmaybeevidentintheregularpatternofconductwhichmayoccuramonga
groupofindividuals.The"internal"aspectofrulesdistinguishesrulesfromhabits,inthathabitsmaybe
viewedasregularpatternsofconductbutarenotusuallyviewedasstandardsofconduct.Theexternalaspect
ofrulesmayinsomecasesenableustopredicttheconductofindividuals,butwemayhavetoconsiderthe
'internal'aspectofrulesinordertointerpretorexplaintheconductofindividuals.

Hartarguesthatthefoundationsofalegalsystemdonotconsist,asAustinclaims,ofhabitsofobediencetoa
legallyunlimitedsovereign,butinsteadconsistofadherenceto,oracceptanceof,anultimateruleof
recognitionbywhichthevalidityofanyprimaryorsecondaryrulemaybeevaluated.1Ifaprimaryor
secondaryrulesatisfiesthecriteriawhichareprovidedbytheultimateruleofrecognition,thenthatruleis
legallyvalid.

Therearetwominimumrequirementswhichmustbesatisfiedinorderforalegalsystemtoexist:1)private
citizensmustgenerallyobeytheprimaryrulesofobligation,and2)publicofficialsmustacceptthe
secondaryrulesofrecognition,change,andadjudicationasstandardsofofficialconduct.2Ifbothofthese
requirementsarenotsatisfied,thenprimaryrulesmayonlybesufficenttoestablishaprelegalformof
government.

Moralandlegalrulesmayoverlap,becausemoralandlegalobligationmaybesimilarinsomesituations.
However,moralandlegalobligationmayalsodifferinsomesituations.Moralandlegalrulesmayapplyto
similaraspectsofconduct,suchastheobligationtobehonestandtruthfulortheobligationtorespectthe
rightsofotherindividuals.However,moralrulescannotalwaysbechangedinthesamewaythatlegalrules
canbechanged.

AccordingtoHart,thereisnonecessarylogicalconnectionbetweenthecontentoflawandmorality,andthat
theexistenceoflegalrightsanddutiesmaybedevoidofanymoraljustification.3Thus,hisinterpretationof
therelationbetweenlawandmoralitydiffersfromthatofRonaldDworkin,whoinLawsEmpiresuggests
thateverylegalactionhasamoraldimension.Dworkinrejectstheconceptoflawasacceptanceof
conventionalpatternsofrecognition,anddescribeslawnotmerelyasadescriptiveconceptbutasan
interpretiveconceptwhichcombinesjurisprudenceandadjudication.

Hartdefineslegalpositivismasthetheorythatthereisnologicallynecessaryconnectionbetweenlawand
morality.However,hedescribeshisownviewpointasa"softpositivism,"becauseheadmitsthatrulesof
recognitionmayconsiderthecompatibilityorincompatibilityofarulewithmoralvaluesasacriterionofthe
ruleslegalvalidity.4

Legalpositivismmaydisagreewiththeoriesofnaturallaw,whichassertthatcivillawsmustbebasedon
morallawsinorderforsocietytobeproperlygoverned.Theoriesofnaturallawmayalsoassertthatthereare
morallawswhichareuniversalandwhicharediscoverablebyreason.Thus,theymayfailtorecognizethe
differencebetweendescriptiveandprescriptivelaws.Lawsthatdescribephysicalorsocialphenomenamay
differinformandcontentfromlawswhichprescribepropermoralconduct.

Hartcriticizesbothformalismandrulescepticismasmethodsofevaluatingtheimportanceofrulesas
structuralelementsofalegalsystem.Formalismmayrelyonarigidadherencetogeneralrulesofconductin
ordertodecidewhichactionshouldbeperformedinaparticularsituation.Ontheotherhand,rulescepticism
maynotrelyonanygeneralruleofconductinordertodecidewhichactionshouldbeperformedina
particularsituation.Formalismmayproducesuchinflexibilityintherulesofalegalsystemthattherulesare

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notadaptabletoparticularcases.Rulescepticismmayproducesuchuncertaintyintheapplicationofthe
rulesofalegalsystemthateverycasehastobeadjudicated.

InternationallawisdescribedbyHartasproblematic,becauseitmaynothavealloftheelementsofafully
developedlegalsystem.Internationallawmayinsomecaseslacksecondaryrulesofrecognition,change,
andadjudication.Internationallegislaturesmaynotalwayshavethepowertoenforcesanctionsagainst
nationswhodisobeyinternationallaw.Internationalcourtsmaynotalwayshavejurisdictionoverlegal
disputesbetweennations.Internationallawmaybedisregardedbysomenationswhomaynotfaceany
significantpressuretocomply.Nationswhocomplywithinternationallawmuststillbeabletoexercisetheir
sovereignty.

Inanylegalsystem,theremaybecasesinwhichexistinglawsarevagueorindeterminateandthatjudicial
discretionmaybenecessaryinordertoclarifyexistinglawsinthesecases.Hartalsoarguesthatbyclarifying
vagueorindeterminatelaws,judgesmayactuallymakenewlaws.Heexplainsthatthisargumentisrejected
byRonaldDworkin,whocontendsthatjudicialdiscretionisnotanexerciseinmakingnewlawsbutisa
meansofdeterminingwhichlegalprinciplesaremostconsistentwithexistinglawsandwhichlegal
principlesprovidethebestjustificationforexistinglaws.5

DworkinsaysinLawsEmpirethatlegaltheorymayadvancefromthe"preinterpretivestage"(inwhichrules
ofconductareidentified)tothe"interpretivestage"(inwhichthejustificationfortheserulesisdecided
upon)tothe"postinterpretivestage"(inwhichtherulesofconductarereevaluatedbasedonwhathasbeen
foundtojustifythem).6Acompletelegaltheorydoesnotmerelyidentifytherulesofalegalsystem,butalso
interpretsandevaluatesthem.Acompletelegaltheorymustconsidernotonlytherelationbetweenlawand
coercion(i.e.the"force"oflaw),buttherelationbetweenlawandrightfulnessorjustifiability(i.e.the
"grounds"oflaw).Thus,Dworkinarguesthatacompletelegaltheorymustaddressnotonlythequestionof
whethertherulesofalegalsystemarejustifiedbutthequestionofwhethertherearesufficientgroundsfor
coercingindividualstocomplywiththerulesofthesystem.

FOOTNOTES

1H.L.A.Hart,TheConceptofLaw(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994),p.110.
2Ibid.,p.116.
3Ibid.,p.268.
4Ibid.,p.250.
5Ibid.,p.272.
6RonaldDworkin,LawsEmpire(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1986),p.66.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Austin,John.TheProvinceofJurisprudenceDeterminedandTheUsesiftheStudyofJurisprudence.
London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1954.

Cohen,Marshall."HerbertLionelAdolphusHart,"inTheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.NewYork:Crowell,
CollierandMacMillan(1967)pp.4178.

Dworkin,Ronald.LawsEmpire.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1986.

Hart,H.L.A.TheConceptofLaw.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994.

CopyrightAlexScott2004

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