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Preface

In the mid -seventies I discovered that my patience with most main -

stream philosophy had run out . What had instead begun to seem
promising was the new wave in philosophical method , which ceased
to pander to " ordinary language" and which began in earnest to
reverse the antiscientific bias typical of " linguistic analysis." Even
here I had a major misgiving , however , because the sciences em -
braced by the new wave as relevant to understanding the nature of
the mind did not include neuroscience . Indeed , the best of what there
was had espoused a novel and sophisticated form of dualism - theory
dualism - that dismissed neuroscience as largely irrelevant to theo-
ries in psychology and philosophy . Since I was a materialist and
hence believed that the mind is the brain , it seemed obvious that a
wider understanding of neuroscience could not fail to be useful if I
wanted to know how we see , how we think and reason and decide . I

therefore decided to find out in detail whether what was already

known in neuroscience was of any use in understanding cognitive
functions . Beginning with ..a cautious paddling at the available edges
of neuroscience , I quickly found myself venturing further and further
from shore, and finally setting tull sail.
In the midst of the unencumbered delights of discovering what was
known about nervous systems and how neurobiologists got that
knowledge , questions of a distinctly philosophical nature continued
to make demanding background noises: Is it possible that we could
have one grand , unified theory of the mind -brain ? What would such
a theory look like ? Is a reductionist strategy reasonable or not ? As a
philosopher , I had found myself driven to the neurosciences, but
having immersed myself in the neurosciences, I found I could not
leave the philosophy alone either . For those far-reaching, wide -
embracing questions asked about neuroscientific research I well rec-
ognized to be philosophical questions- moreover , questions where
philosophers of science and historians of science have had useful
things to say. It is now evident that where one discipline ends and the
other begins no longer matters, for it is in the nature of the case that
x Preface

the boundaries are ill defined . This book is thus the result of what I
came to regard as neurophilosophicalinquiries.
Given the range of topics I needed to know about, I was through -
out the project necessarily dependent on the willingness of neuro-
scientists to explain their research, to tell me what they thought was
important and why , and to give advice on who else to talk to and
what to read. My vvorst fear- that as a philosopher I would be con-
sidered an utter waste of time - was virtually never realized. Invari -
ably neuroscientists were exceedingly generous, often going beyond
explanations asked, allowing me to observe or participate in experi-
ments, explaining details of techniques, and drawing back the curtain
on the wider vision that motivated their research.
From time to time I found considerable disagreement among
neuroscientists on fundamental issues, and at first I tacitly assumed
that there must be someone who really knew what was what and who
could settle for me what is the Truth . In the end I knew that I had to
make up my own mind , and do it the way any neuroscientist would :
find out as much as I reasonably could about the issue and go with
what seemed most reasonable. A vague decision procedure, to be
sure, but the only one I know of .
Without the generosity and patience of many people, not only
neuroscientists , but also philosophers , psychologists, and computer
scientists, this book would still be a shapeless intention . To Larry
Jordan I am especially indebted for giving me a basis in neurophysiol -
ogy and in laboratory techniques and for convincing me that it is
essential to think about how organisms move. I also owe an enor-
mous debt to Rodolfo Llinas , whose unique blend of experimental
understanding and drive for theory gave me a sense of what a large,
unifying framework for neurobiology and psychology might look like
and how known data would figure in that framework . For similar
reasons, I am grateful to Francis Crick , whose general understanding
of the entire field of vision and sense of how theoretical problems in
neurobiology might be solved directed me in getting a grip on the
functional questions . More than anyone else, Llinas and Crick have
made neuroscience seem like the most exciting thing in the world and
consequently rekindled - and, I suspect, realigned- my philosoph -
ical preoccupations .
Among philosophers , my first and greatest debt is to Paul M .
Churchland , who has been a partner in the venture from the very
beginning . It was he especially who convinced me of the importance
of bringing science and the philosophy of science to bear on questions
in the philosophy of mind , and this has made all the difference in
thinking about consciousness, cognition , and subjective experience,
and about the general framework needed for a unified science of the
 .
Preface Xl

mind -brain . Consistently naturalistic in his approach to philosophical

questions, and robustly skeptical of folk psychology , he pointed me
in the direction of the neurosciences. Dan Dennett made a difference
in countless ~ ays, one of which was convincing me to write the book
in the first place. In addition , by taking a blue pencil to the manu-
script in several of its incarnations , he helped me avoid many mis-
takes. Best of all, perhaps, he set an example of how philosophy
ought to be done . Stephen Stich also gave me unstinting encourage-
ment and advice, and his ruthless clarity helped keep mushiness
from creeping in . To Jerry Feldman I owe a debt of thanks for a careful
reading of the manuscript and for much useful criticism and advice.
Cliff Hooker discussed large parts of the manuscript with me as well ,
and his general conception of the development of philosophy since
the turn of the century provided an organizing focus.
Many other people gave me ideas, advice, and invaluable conversa-
tion or read some substantial section of the manuscript and suggested
revisions . I should mention especially the following : Ted Bullock, Jeff
Foss, Don Griffin , Alastair Hannay , Stevan Hamad , Ken Heilman ,
Don Herzog , Geoffrey Hinton , Marcel Kinsbourne , Marta Kutas,
Michael Gazzaniga, Ron Giere, Lisa Lloyd , Vemon Mountcastle ,
David alton , Andras Pellionisz, Susan Schefchyk, Martin Sereno,
Terry Sejnowski, Allison Shalinsky , Aaron Smith, Michael Stack,
Larry Weiskrantz , Chris Wood , David Zipser , and Steve Zucker . I
want also to thank Harry and Betty Stanton of MIT Press/Bradford
Books for their genteel encouragement and for making the produc -
tion end of publication almost fun . Gustav Szabo designed the cover,
and I am grateful to him for .working out exactly the right theme.
Finally , thanks to Darlene Stack for the ready supply of buck-you -
uppo and for entertaining us through many a Manitoba blizzard .
For financial support , my greatest debt is to the Social Sciencesand
Humanities Research Council of Canada, without whose generous
funding in providing release time from teaching this project would
have been impossible (grants 410- 81- 0182, 451- 83- 3049). I am also
grateful to the University of California at San Diego for support in the
final stages of preparation of the manuscript (grants RJ111- G, RK91-
G). In addition , I should like to thank the Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton for giving me a peaceful and productive year in
1982- 1983, during which large portions of the book moved into posi-
tion . I owe a special debt to the University of Manitoba for having the
courage to support me in a host of important ways on a project that
was not , by most lights , conventional .

PSC
LaJolla1985
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