G.R. No.
122191 October 8, 1998 Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah
Laws Applicable: Art 19 and 21 of Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Conflict of Laws, factual situation,
connecting factor, characterization, choice of law, State of
the most significant relationship
FACTS:Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA), foreign airlines
corporation doing business in the Philippines and may be
served summons in agent in Makati, hired Milagros P. Morada
as a flight attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia.
April 27, 1990: While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew members
Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi
nationals. It was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels so they agreed to have breakfast together at the room
of Thamer. Shortly after Allah left the room, Thamer
attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and
several security personnel heard her cries for help and
rescued her. Indonesian police arrested Thamer and Allah Al-
Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When Morada returned to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident and requested her
to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer
and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officers negotiated with
the police for the immediate release of the detained crew
members but did not succeed. Afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her
inability to understand the local dialect, Morado refused to
cooperate and declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
allowed Morada to return to Jeddah but barred her from the
Jakarta flights.
and they were again put in service. While, Morada was
transferred to Manila.
January 14, 1992: Morada was asked to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He
brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. The
police pressured her to drop the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
June 16, 1993: Morada, while in Riyadh Saudi Arabia, was not
allowed to board the plane to Manila and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy. Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah but it was actually a notice for her to appear before the
court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi,
assured Morada that the investigation was routinary and that
it posed no danger to her so she reported to Miniewy in
Jeddah for further investigation. She was brought to the
Saudi court.
June 28, 1993: Saudi judge interrogated Morada through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident for an hour and let her
go. SAUDIA officers forbidden her to take flight. She was
told to go the Inflight Service Office where her passport was
taken and they told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
July 3, 1993: She was brought to court again and to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment
and to 286 lashes. The court tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, and found her guilty of (1) adultery (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
Failing to seek the assistance of her employer, SAUDIA, she
asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her
case is on appeal. She continued to workon the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve
in the international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
Saudi Arabia. Before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
November 23, 1993: Morada filed a Complaint for damages
against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its country manager.
January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss on following grounds: (1) that the Complaint states
no cause of action against SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-
Balawi is not a real party in interest (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished and (4) that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
After opposition to the motion to dismiss by Morada and reply
by SAUDIA, Morada filed an Amended Complaint dropping Al-
Balawi. SAUDIA filed its Manifestation, Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, subsequently motion for
reconsideration which were all denied.
SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals. TRO
was granted but Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied.
CA: Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari
is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial,
and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order:
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o It is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset:
Morada's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for
the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by
virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
Morada: Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code which is a matter of domestic law
ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the
case and it is the proper forum for recovery of damages
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code which should govern.
HELD: YES. petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
REMANDED to RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the
existence of a foreign element, the problem could present a
"conflicts" case
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is
affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
contain a "foreign element".
o Morada is a resident Philippine national
o SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation
o by virtue of the employment of Morada with the SAUDIA
as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa,
that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise
Forms of foreign element:
o Simple: one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has
a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of
one State involves properties situated in another State
o Complex
Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. RTC of Quezon
City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the
parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction:
o private interest of the litigant
o enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained
o relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial
Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
"vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting
upon him needless expense or disturbance. but unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo
found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing
plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by
hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties
and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
Trial court possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties
o By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the
trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court
o SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended
Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, it seeks to answer 2
important questions:
o (1) What legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
states
o (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically
advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do
not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem
of deciding which of these two important values should be
stressed.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules
fall
o "characterization" or the "doctrine of qualification
process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the
kind of question specified in a conflicts rule
purpose: to enable the forum to select the proper law
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of: (essential element of
conflict rules)
o factual situation/relationship or operative fact (such as
property right, contract claim); and
starting point of analysis
o test or connecting factor or point of contact (such as the
situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing) could be:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence,
his place of sojourn, or his origin
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is,
or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus,
such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The
lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect,
e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be exercised
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law
that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings
are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum
is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the
claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori
applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master
or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to
serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law.
Based on pleadings on record, including allegations in the
Amended Complaint:
o Morada was made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition
o SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as employer by
handing over the person of Morada to Jeddah officials which
contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering. It also took
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith in the guise of
authority as employer.
o Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful but injury or
harm was inflicted upon her person and reputation which
must be compensated or redress for the wrong doing
Complaint involving torts
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" - place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred =
Philippines where SAUDIA deceived Morada, a Filipina
residing and working here.
"State of the most significant relationship" applied
o taken into account and evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered
v private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working
here
v a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the
business of international air carriage
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO
A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
89, RTC of Quezon City
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA
as a flight attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah. On 1990,
while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party
with 2 male attendants, and on the following morning in their
hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to rape her. She
was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help.
The Indonesian police arrested the 2.
MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company
to go back to Jakarta and help arrange the release of the 2
male attendants. MORADA did not cooperate when she got to
Jakarta.
What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi
Courts which she did not understand as this was in their
language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by
SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that she was being
convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with the 2, for what happened in Jakarta.
SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But
because she was wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for
damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al-Balawi),
its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondents claim for alleged
abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic
alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the case. However, the court finds that the RTC of Quezon City
instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. authority to try and hear the case is provided for under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial
is properly a matter of domestic law. Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the (8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest,
case damages of whatever kind, attorney`ys fees, litigation
HELD: YES. expenses, and cots or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
On the presence of a Foreign Element in the case: A factual (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is (Emphasis ours)
inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and xxx xxx xxx
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court the
their birth or conception. The forms in which this foreign venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
element may appear are many. The foreign element may Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract Trial Court]
is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract (a) xxx xxx xxx
between nationals of one State involves properties situated (b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced
in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
assume a complex form. resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact
that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing
with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
arise. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown
by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff
(now private respondent) should be upheld.
The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
MORADA through her act of filing, and SAUDIA by praying for
the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law
problems seek to answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where
some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate
the situation.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or
lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice,
give her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts
or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is
of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the
place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without
basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
In applying State of the most significant relationship rule,
to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all
injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact
with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent
as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our
view, has been properly established.
NOTE:
These test factors or points of contact or connecting
factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence,
his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or
is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus,
such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The
lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect,
e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that
should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of procedure not going to the substance of the
claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori
applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master
or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia
Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers
were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker
tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy
heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were
arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-
assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in
Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia
Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was
brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and
eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289
lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying
with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction
and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted
hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the
Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case because the applicable law should be the law of
Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs
under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over
Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with
petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs
effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia
Airliness rights hence a submission to the courts
jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case
because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is
bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our
Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the
right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court,
a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam
(case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the
defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file
the case here because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be
very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again,
Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a
case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called
locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at
bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was
summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet
with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she
was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was
defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to her
wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous,
was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation,
misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said
as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious
conduct took place).
UNITED STATES vs. FOWLER December 31, 1902 (1 Phil
614)
PARTIES:
Complainant and appellant: United States
Defendants and appellees: William Fowler et. al.
FACTS:
August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of
16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the
vessel Lawton. The counsel for defendants alleged to the
Court of First Instance that they were without jurisdiction
over the crime charged . Since it happened in the high seas
and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the
jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be
dismissed.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on board
of transport not registered in the Philippines
HELD:No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the
crime of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in teh Philippines. The transport
Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are
without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime
committed on board the same.
Title: US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:
In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft
of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the
vessel, Lawton. The counsel for defendants alleged to the
Court of First Instance of Manila that they were without
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the
high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in
which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that
the case be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction over the criminal case theft committed on board
while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in
the Philippines.
Held:No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime
of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule
states that such crimes are triable in our country when
crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from
a foreign port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the
case at bar, the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas
at the commission of the crime. Given the location of the
vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our
jurisdiction.
Brief Fact Summary. Defendants published an article and
reenacted a play about Plaintiff and his family being held
hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed
by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for
false light.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Defendants published an article and
reenacted a play about Plaintiff and his family being held
hostage. The article and play were false, but were portrayed
by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for
false light.
Facts. Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held
hostage in their suburban Philadelphia home by three
escaped convicts. Plaintiff and his family were released
without any harm but the story made the front pages of the
newspapers. Plaintiffs then moved to Connecticut. Time, Inc.
(Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway
thriller, The Desperate Hours. The article said Plaintiff and his
family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article
included pictures of scenes from the play that was to be
reenacted in Plaintiffs Philadelphia home. Plaintiff sued
under Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law;
Defendants publication of the issues gave the impression
that the play was true when in fact it did not accurately
recount Plaintiffs actual experience and Defendant knew the
article was false and untrue. Defendant answered that the
article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial
judge denied Defendants motion to dismiss and the j
ury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000
in punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue. Does a publication of a false report on a matter of
public interest need only meet the New York Times test of
actual malice to permit recovery in a lawsuit for false light?
Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.
* Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a
concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of their
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society, which
places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. A
broadly defined freedom of the press assures the
maintenance of our political system. Fear of litigation will
inevitably create the danger that the legitimate utterance will
be penalized. However, constitutional guarantees cannot
tolerate sanctions against calculated falsehood without
significant impairment of their essential function.
* The evidence in this case reasonably would support a jury
finding of either innocent or merely negligent misstatement
by Defendant, or a finding that Defendant portrayed the play
as a re-enactment of the Hill familys experience reckless of
the truth or with actual knowledge that the portrayal was
false.
Dissent. (J. Fortas) Altering or changing the true facts so the
article as published was a fictionalized account is a knowing
or reckless falsity per se. Alteration denotes a positive act
and not a negligent or inadvertent happening.
Concurrence. There are two concurring opinions. Justice
Harlan concurs in part and dissents in part.
* (J. Douglas) It seems to me to be irrelevant to talk about
any right of privacy in the context of this highly public event.
Plaintiff was catapulted into the public domain by events over
which he had no control. His activities are now a matter of
public domain.
* (J. Harlan) Constitutional standards would be met by a
finding of negligence by Defendant. Plaintiff is neither a
public figure nor a public official. It would be unreasonable to
assume that Plaintiff could find a forum for making a
successful refutation of Defendants material. Plaintiff came
to the public attention through an unfortunate circumstance
and without any voluntary acts on his part. He has not
waived his privacy nor any protections afforded by the State
from irresponsible publicity.

Discussion. Sanctions against either innocent or negligent
misrepresentation would present a grave hazard of
discouraging the press from exercising constitutional
guarantees. However, constitutional guarantees can tolerate
sanctions against calculated falsehood without significant
impairment of their essential function. The trial judge did not
instruct the jury properly in that a finding of liability could
only be based on a finding of knowing and reckless falsity in
the publication of the article.
WESTERN EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY CO V. REYES
(1925)
Short Summary: A foreign corporation wanted to enjoin a
domestic corporation who intends to use the foreign corp's
name in RP, and would engage in the same business as the
foreign corp, from using its name. Court held that even if the
corporation is not doing business and is not licensed in the
Philippines, it could still protect the use of its trade name.
Facts:
-a foreign corporation organized under laws of Nevada was
issued a provisional license by Director of Bureau of
Commerce and Industry
-it then started importing and selling in RP electrical and
telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by Western
Electric Co (WEC international), a foreign corpo, never
licensed nor engaged in business in RP; they had been in the
business for the past 50 years and have acquired high trade
reputation
-Herman et. Al filed Articles of Incorporation as a Philippine
corp w/ name Western Electric Company (WEC)+ they are
also engaged in manufacturing of electrical and telephone
apparatus and supplies.
-WEC international filed for Temp Injunction to stop issuance
of certificate of incorp for WEC
Defense: WEC is a foreign corp not licensed, nor is doing
business, in RP so has no legal capacity to sue
WON WEC HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE TO PROTECT ITS
REPUTATION EVEN IF ITS NOT REGISTERED NOR DOING
BUSINESS IN RP? YES
-the right to use the company's corporate and trade name is
a property right which may be asseted against the whole
world
-HANOVER STAR MILLING V. ALLEN AND WHEELER CORP:
trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of
municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every
market where the trader's goods have become known and
identified by the use of the mark
RA 8293: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF 1998
-established the Intellectual Property Ofice
-does not allow corps to register as their trade names those
which are
Well known internationally and in the RP, WON registered in
RP (already used as a mark by some other person)
Used for identical or similar goods or services
-allows a corporation w/c may not be engaged in business or
is not registered in RP to still file suit (civil or administrative)
to protect its trade name (note: only owners of registered
marks in RP can recover damages for trademark
infringement)

Western Equipment vs. Reyes GR 27897, 2 December
1927; En Banc, Johns (J) Facts: In 1925, Western
Equipment and Supply Co. applied for the issuance of a
license to engage in business in the Philippines. On the other
hand, Western Electric Co. has never been licensed to
engage in business, nor has it ever engaged in business in
the Philippines. Western Equipment, since the issuance of its
license, engaged in the importation and sale of electrical and
telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by Western
Electric. A local corporation, Electric Supply Co. Inc. has been
importing the same products in the Philippines. In 1926,
Electric Supplys president, Henry Herman, along with other
persons sought to organize a corporation to be known as
Western Electric Co. Inc. Western Equipment, et al. filed
against Herman to prevent them from organizing said
corporation. The trial court ruled in favor of Western
Equipment, holding that the purpose of the incorporation of
the proposed corporation is illegal or void.
Issue: Whether the foreign corporation Western Electric Co.
Inc. has right of action to prevent an officer of the
government from issuing a certificate of incorporation to
Philippine residents who attempt to pirate the corporate
name of the foreign corporation and engage in the same
business.
Held: Yes. A trademark acknowledges no territorial
boundaries of municipalities,
Rights to the use of its corporate name or trade name is a
property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect
against the whole world, in any of the courts in the world
even in jurisdictions where it does not transact business
just the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or
personal, against trespass or conversion. The trial court was
correct in holding that the purpose of the proposed
corporation by Herman, et. al. as fraudulent and contrary to
law, as it attempts to unjustly compete with the real Western
Electric Co. Inc. and deceive Filipinos into thinking that the
goods they propose to sell are goods of manufacture of the
real Western Electric Co. states or nations, but extends to
every market where the traders goods have become known
and identified by the use of the mark.
Sterling Products Vs. Farbenfabriken Bayer GR L-19906, 30
April 1969; En Banc, Sanchez (J). Facts: The Bayer Cross in
circle trademark was registered in Germany in 1904 to
Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer (FFB), successor to the
original Friedr. Bauyer et. Comp., and predecessor to
Farbenfabriken Bayer aktiengessel craft (FB2). The Bayer,
and Bayer Cross in circle trademarks were acquired by
sterling Drug Inc. when it acquired FFBs subsidiary Bayer Co.
of New York as a result of the sequestration of its assets by
the US Alien Property Custodian during World War I. Bayer
products have been known in Philippines by the close of the
19th century. Sterling Drugs, Inc., however, owns the
trademarks Bayer in relation to medicine. FBA attempted
to register its chemical products with the Bayer Cross in
circle trademarks. Sterling Products International and FBA
seek to exclude each other from use of the trademarks in the
Philippines. The trial court sustained SPIs right to use the
Bayer trademark for medicines and directed FBA to add
distinctive word(s) in their mark to indicate their products
come from Germany. Both appealed. Issue: Whether SPIs
ownership of the trademarks extends to products not related
to medicine. Held: No. SPIs certificates of registration as to
the Bayer trademarks registered in the Philippines cover
medicines only. Nothing in the certificates include chemicals
or insecticides. SPI thus may not claim first use of the
trademarks prior to the registrations thereof on any product
other than medicines. For if otherwise held, a situation may
arise whereby an applicant may be tempte3d to register a
trademark on any and all goods which his mind may conceive
even if he had never intended to use the trademark for the
said goods. Omnibus registration is not contemplated by the
Trademark Law. The net result of the decision is that SPI may
hold on its Bayer trademark for medicines and FBA may
continue using the same trademarks for insecticide and other
chemicals, not medicine. The formula fashioned by the lower
court avoids the mischief of confusion of origin, and does not
visit FBA with reprobation and condemnation. A statement
that its product came from Germany anyhow is but a
statement of fact.
La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez GR 63796-97, 21
May 1984; First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J) Facts: La
chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual
owner of the trademarks Lacoste, Chemise Lacoste, even before 1964, Hemandas cannot be allowed to continue
Crocodile Device and a composite mark consisting of the
word Lacoste and a representation of a crocodile/alligator,
used on clothings and other goods sold in many parts of the
world and which has been marketed in the Philippines
(notably by Rustans) since 1964. In 1975 and 1977,
Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration for the
trademark Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device both in
the supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise
Lacoste SA filed for the registration of the Crocodile device
and Lacoste. Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas,
assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.) opposed the registration of
Lacoste. In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a
letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition
committed by Hemandas and requesting the agencys
assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court.
Various goods and articles were seized upon the execution of
the warrants. Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants,
which the court granted. The search warrants were recalled,
and the goods ordered to be returned. La Chemise Lacoste
filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a
prejudicial question that need to be resolved before the
criminal action for unfair competition may be pursued. Held:
No. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not
partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must
first be definitely resolved. The case which suspends the
criminal action must be a civil case, not a mere
administrative case, which is determinative of the innocence
or guilt of the accused. The issue whether a trademark used
is different from anothers trademark is a matter of defense
and will be better resolved in the criminal proceedings before
a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter
in an administrative proceeding. Inasmuch as the goodwill
and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste products date back
the trademark Lacoste for the reason that he was the first
registrant in the Supplemental Register of a trademark used
in international commerce. Registration in the Supplemental
Register cannot be given a posture as if the registration is in
the Principal Register. It must be noted that one may be
declared an unfair competitor even if his competing
trademark is registered. La Chemise Lacoste is world
renowned mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980
Memorandum of the Minister of Trade to the director of
patents in compliance with the Paris Convention for the
protection of industrial property, effectively cancels the
registration of contrary claimants to the enumerated marks,
which include Lacoste.
LA CHEMISE LACOSTE V. FERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. L-
63796-97)
Facts:Petitioner La Chemise Lacoste is a foreign corporation
and the actual owner of the trademarks Lacoste, Chemise
Lacoste, and Crocodile Device used on clothing and other
goods that are sold in many parts of the world. Herein
respondent Hemadas & Co., a domestic firm, applied and was
granted registration of the mark Chemise Lacoste and
Crocodile Device for its garment products. Sometime later,
petitioner applied for the registration of its mark Crocodile
Device and Lacoste but was opposed by herein respondent.
Later, petitioner filed a letter-complaint of unfair competition
before the NBI which led to the issuance of search warrants
and the seizure of goods of respondent Hemadas.
Respondent moved to quash the warrants alleging that its
trademark was different from petitioners trademark.
Respondent court ruled to set aside the warrants and to
return the seized goods.
Issue:Whether or not petitioners trademark is a well-known
mark protected under the Paris Convention.
Ruling: YES.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the
present suit before our courts for unfair competition or
infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are
moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign
states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are
parties.
Pursuant to this obligation, the Ministry of Trade issued a
memorandum addressed to the Director of the Patents Office
directing the latter to reject all pending applications for
Philippine registration of signature and other world famous
trademarks by applicants other than its original owners or
users. The conflicting claims over internationally known
trademarks involve such name brands as Lacoste, et. al. It is
further directed that, in cases where warranted, Philippine
registrants of such trademarks should be asked to surrender
their certificates of registration, if any, to avoid suits for
damages and other legal action by the trademarks foreign or
local owners or original users.
The Intermediate Appellate Court, in the La Chemise Lacoste
S.A. v. Sadhwani decision which we cite with approval
sustained the power of the Minister of Trade to issue the
implementing memorandum and declared La Chemise
Lacoste S.A. the owner of the disputed trademark, stating:
In the case at bar, the Minister of Trade, as the competent
authority of the country of registration, has found that
among other well-known trademarks Lacoste is the subject
of conflicting claims. For this reason, applications for its
registration must be rejected or refused, pursuant to the
treaty obligation of the Philippines.
Advertisements
Wells Fargo vs. Collector of Internal Revenue GR
46720, 28 June 1940 First Division, Moran (J): 4 concur,
1 concur in result Facts: Birdie Lillian Eye died on 16
September 1932, at Los Angeles, California, the place of her
alleged last residence and domicile. Among the properties
she left was her 1/2 conjugal shares of stock in the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., an anonymous partnership
(sociedad anonima), organized under the laws of the
Philippines. She left a will duly admitted to probate in
California where her estate was administered and settled.
Wells Fargo bank and Union Trust Co. was duly appointed
trustee of the trust by the said will. The Federal and
California States inheritance taxes due thereon have been
duly paid. The Collector of Internal Revenue in the
Philippines, however, sought to subject the shares of stock to
inheritance tax, to which Wells Fargo objected. Issue:
Whether the shares of stock are subject to Philippine
inheritance tax considering that the decedent was domiciled
in California. Held: Originally, the settled law in the United
States is that intangibles have only one situs for the purpose
of inheritance tax, and such situs is in the domicile of the
decedent at the time of his or her death. But the rule has
been relaxed. The maxim mobila sequuntur personam,
upon which the rule rests, has been decried as a mere
fiction of law having its origin in considerations of general
convenience and public policy, and cannot be applied to limit
or control teh right of the State to tax property within its
jurisdiction and must yield to established fact of legal
ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and
cannot be applied if to do so whould result in inescapable
and patent injustice. The relaxation of the original rule rests
on either of two fundamental considerations: (1) upon the
recognition of the inherent power of each government to tax
persons, properties, and rights within its jurisdiction and
enjoying, thus, the protection of its laws; and (2) upon the
principle that as to intangibles, a single location in space is
hardly possible, considering the multiple, distinct
relationships which may be entered into with respect thereto.
Herein, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein. The
certificates of stock remained in the Philippines up to the
time when the deceased died in California, and they were in
possession of one Syrena McKee, secretary of the
corporation, to whom they have been delivered and indorsed
in blank. McKee had the legal title to the certificates of stock
held in trust for the true owner thereof. The owner residing in
California has extended here her activities with respect to her
intangibles so as to avail hereself of the protection and
benefit of Philippine laws. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the
Philippine Government to tax must be upheld.
70 Phil. 325 Mercantile Law Corporation Code
Shares of Stock Situs of Shares of Stock
In September 1932, Birdie Lillian Eye died in Los Angeles,
California, USA which was also her place of domicile. She left
various properties. Among those properties include some
intangibles consisting of 70,000 shares in the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, a corporation organized and
existing under Philippine laws.
The Collector of Internal Revenue sought to assess and
collect estate tax on the said shares. Wells Fargo Banks &
Union Trust Company, the trustee of the estate of the
decedent Eye, objected to said assessment. Wells Fargo
averred that said shares were already subjected to
inheritance tax in California and hence cannot be taxed again
in the Philippines (note at that time the Philippines was
still under the Commonwealth and were not yet totally
independent from the US).
ISSUE: Whether or not the shares are subject to estate tax in
the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that even though the
Philippines was considered a US territory at that time, it is
still a separate jurisdiction from the US in several aspects
particularly taxation. Hence, the Philippines has the power to
tax said shares. The situs of taxation is here in the Philippines
because the situs of the shares of stock concerned is here in
the Philippines because of the fact that the said shares were
issued here by a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines which is also domiciled here.
Further, (and this is the deeper reason), when Eye was alive,
she actually delivered the title to said shares to the resident
secretary of the corporation here in the Philippines hence the
shares never left the Philippines.
Note: As a rule, intangibles follow the person (mobilia
sequuntur personam). Hence, intangibles are taxable in the
place where their owner may be domiciled. However, Section
104 of the NIRC provides that if the shares have attained
business situs here in the Philippines, then said shares are
taxable here even if the owner of said shares are domiciled
abroad.
PHILIP MORRIS, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing
whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates
by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when
respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, from manufacturing and selling MARK
cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that
petitioners respective symbols MARK VII, MARK TEN, and
MARK, also for cigarettes, must be protected against
unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but
are suing on an isolated transaction, They Invoked provisions
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals of member-
countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine
courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair
competition, without need of obtaining registration or a
license to do business in the Philippines, and without
necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for
infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco before
the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and
selling cigarettes bearing the trademark Mark which is
identical and confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks.
The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs right
of property to such trademark or trade name.
Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal
law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in
the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement
inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not by any means
imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
applied in most countries, rules of international law are given
a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative
enactments
Ruling/s:
No. There is no proof that any of petitioners products which
they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and
available for commercial purposes anywhere in the
Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that
actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to
the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade
name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the
complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage
can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their
right to be protected.
PHILIP MORRIS V. CA (G.R. NO. 91332)
Facts:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws
not doing business in the Philippines and registered owners
of symbols MARK VII, MARK TEN, and LARK used in their account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the
cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent
Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes
bearing the symbol MARK asserting that it is identical or
confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners relied
on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and
the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court
denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners
are not doing business in the Philippines, respondents
cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner.
CA granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion,
dissolved the writ.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners mark may be afforded
protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive
relief.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no
necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response
because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965
international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been
acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of
existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there
can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in
commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in
business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for
infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the
Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged,
which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement
irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on
question whether they have an exclusive right over their
symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will
depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in
line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus
incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a
complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually
using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a
foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the
local market.
(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their
complaint as well as in the very petition filed with this Court
indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines,
for these frank representations are inconsistent and
incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached.
Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must
show that there exists a right to be protected and that the
facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said
right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are
extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in
throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the
manufacture and sale of private respondents MARK
cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the
ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result
of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and
this, during the pendency of the case before the trial court,
not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to
be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other
hand, if the status quo is maintained, there will be no
damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as
they are not doing business in the Philippines. In view of the
explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that
they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it
inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be
suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration
heretofore discussed on the absence of their right to be
protected.
MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE
TABACO, INC. vs. E.J. GALLO WINERY and THE
ANDRESONS GROUP, INC.
FACTS: On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in
the RTC-Makati for trademark and trade name infringement
and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and
preliminary injunction.
They claimed that petitioners adopted the Gallo
trademark to ride on Gallo Winerys and Gallo and Ernest &
Julio Gallo trademarks established reputation and popularity,
thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of
the purchasing public who had always associated Gallo and
Ernest and Julio & Gallo trademarks with Gallo Winerys
wines.
In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other
affirmative defenses that: petitioners Gallo cigarettes and
Gallo Winerys wine were totally unrelated products. To wit:
1. Gallo Winerys GALLO trademark registration certificates
covered wines only, and not cigarettes;
2. GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through
different channels of trade;
3. the target market of Gallo Winerys wines was the
middle or high-income bracket while Gallo cigarette buyers
were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income
workers;
4. the dominant feature of the Gallo cigarette was the
rooster device with the manufacturers name clearly
indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION, while in the case of
Gallo Winerys wines, it was the full names of the founders-
owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just their surname GALLO;
On April 21, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit,
respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On August 19, 1993, respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied.
On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed
respondents petition for review on certiorari.
After the trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC,
on November 26, 1998, held petitioners liable for,
permanently enjoined from committing trademark
infringement and unfair competition with respect to the
GALLO trademark.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTCs decision and
subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUEWhether GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were
identical, similar or related goods for the reason alone that
they were purportedly forms of vice.
HELD Wines and cigarettes are not identical, similar,
competing or related goods.
In resolving whether goods are related, several
factors come into play:
the business (and its location) to which the goods
belong
the class of product to which the good belong
 the products quality, quantity, or size, including the
nature of the package, wrapper or container
the nature and cost of the articles
the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential
characteristics with reference to their form, composition,
texture or quality
the purpose of the goods
whether the article is bought for immediate consumption,
that is, day-to-day household items
the field of manufacture
the conditions under which the article is usually
purchased and
the articles of the trade through which the goods flow,
how they are distribted, marketed, displayed and sold.
The test of fraudulent simulation is to the likelihood of the
deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with
an established design and desirous of purchasing the
commodity with which that design has been associated. The
simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be as appears
likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a
need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks
to purchase.
The petitioners are not liable for trademark infringement,
unfair competition or damages.
WHEREFORE, petition is granted.
G.R. No. 46631 (November 16, 1939) MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins instituted an action in the
CFI of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company for dividends on shares of stock registered in his
name, payment of which was being withheld by the
company; and, for the recognition of his right to the control
and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its Answer to
the Complaint averred that in connection with the shares of
stock in question, conflicting claims were being made upon it
by said Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, his wife Idonah
Slade Perkins, and one named George H. Engelhard, and
prayed that these last two be made parties to the action and
served with Summons by Publication, so that the three
Claimants may litigate their conflicting claims and settle their
rights among themselves. The court has NOT issued
an Order compelling the Conflicting Claimants to interplead
with one another and litigate their several claims among
themselves, but instead ordered Respondent Eugene Arthur
Perkins to amend his Complaint including the other two
Claimants as Parties-Defendant. The Complaint was
accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed for
in the Original Complaint, Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins
prayed that Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock
in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Thereafter, Summons by Publication were served upon the
non-resident Defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H.
Engelhard, pursuant to the Order of the trial court.
Non-resident Defendant Engelhard filed his Answer to
the Amended Complaint, while Petitioner Idonah Slade
Perkins, through counsel, filed her pleading entitled
objection to venue, motion to quash, and demurrer to
jurisdiction wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the
lower court over her person. Petitioners
objection, Motion and Demurrer having been overruled as
well as her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Denial,
she now brought the present Petition for Certiorari, praying
that the Summons by Publication issued against her be
declared null and void, and that, with respect to her,
Respondent Judge be permanently prohibited from taking any
action on the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the Petitioner as a non-resident
Defendant, or, notwithstanding the want of such jurisdiction,
whether or not said court may validly try the case?
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner contends that the proceeding instituted against her
is one of interpleading and is therefore an action in
personam. She contends that the lower court had not
acquired jurisdiction over her person not only because she is
a non-resident, but also because the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the action.
RULING:
Yes. Here, the service of the Summons by Publication was
ordered by the lower court by virtue of an action quasi in
rem against the non-resident Defendant. The action
being quasi in rem, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction over the
person of the Petitioner.
Petition is DENIED with costs against the Petitioner.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The general rule is that a suit against a non-resident cannot
be entertained by a Philippine court. Where, however, the
action is in rem or quasi in rem in connection with property
located in the Philippines, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res, and its jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident is non-essential. In order that the court may exercise
power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should
take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof
being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the
nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the
property is impliedly recognized by law In an action in
rem or quasi in rem against a non-resident defendant,
jurisdiction over his person is non-essential, and if the law
requires in such case that the summons upon the defendant
be served by publication, it is merely to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident, as laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff
[1878], may be found in a recognized principle of public law
to the effect that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory
(Story, Confl. L., ch. 2; Wheat, Int. L., pt. 2, ch. 2). The
several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary
principle, that the laws of one State have no operation
outside of its territory, EXCEPT so far as is allowed by comity;
and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process
beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or
property to its decisions. Any exertion of authority of this
sort beyond this limit, says Story, is a mere nullity, and
incapable of binding such persons or property in any other
tribunals Story, Confl. L., sec. 539 (Pennoyer v. Neff [1878],
95 U.S., 714; 24 Law. ed., 565, 568-569).
When, however, the action relates to property located in the
Philippines, the Philippine courts may validly try the case,
upon the principle that a State, through its tribunals, may
subject property situated within its limits owned by non-
residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens
against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no
respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the
owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its
citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a
legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to
satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the States
jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated
within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into the non-
residents obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can
then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the
disposition of the property. If the non-resident has no
property in the State, there is nothing upon which the
tribunals can adjudicate. (Pennoyer v. Neff [1878])
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action
brought by Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins in
his Amended Complaint against Petitioner Idonah Slade
Perkins seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property
located in the Philippines. That property consists in certain
shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines
under the provisions of the Spanish Code of Commerce, with
its principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its
mining activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the
jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the
certificated evidencing the ownership of those shares are
within or without that jurisdiction. (Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations, Permanent ed. Vol. 11, p. 95). Under these
circumstances, SC holds that the action thus brought is quasi
in rem, for while the judgement that may be rendered therein
is not strictly a judgment in rem, it fixes and settles the title
to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of
the nature of the judgment in rem (50 C.J., p 503). As held
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v.
Neff [1878]:
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one
taken directly against property, and has for its object the
disposition of the property, without reference to the title of
individual claimants; but, in a large and more general sense,
the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the
direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by
them, or of some interest therein.
The action being in quasi in rem, the CFI of Manila has
jurisdiction over the person of the Petitioner. In order to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process, Summons has been served upon her by publication.
There is no question as to the adequacy of publication made
nor as to the mailing of the Order of Publication to the
Petitioners last known place of residence in the United
States. But, of course, the action being quasi in rem and
notice having be made by publication, the relief that may be
granted by the Philippine court must be confined to the res, it
having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against
the non-resident. In the Amended Complaint filed by
Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money judgment or
other relief in personam is prayed for against the Petitioner.
The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be
without any interest in the shares in controversy and that she
be excluded from any claim thereto.
Fujiki v Marinay
2013 FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy. While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor
of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
Citation: G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Ponente: Carpio; SECOND DIVISION
Doctrine:
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further
confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could
not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they
eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay
met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier
marriage being dissolved. Marinay suffered abuse from
Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish
contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple
was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that
declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). In this case,
petitioner prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did
not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on
the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or
Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed
that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule
applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the
Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the
Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to
cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and
the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor
General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v.
De Castro and Nial v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
ISSUE: Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD: YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in
a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove
as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate
the proceedings.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING vs. CA
FACTS In 1979 to 1981, Philippine International Shipping
Corporation (PISC) leased from Interpool Ltd. and its wholly
owned subsidiary, the Container Trading Corporation, several
containers pursuant to the Membership Agreement and
Hiring Conditions and the Master Equipment Leasing
Agreement both dated June 8, 1979. The other petitioners
Philippine Construction Consortium Corporation, Pacific Mills
Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Company, guaranteed to
pay the obligation due and any liability of the PISC arising out
of the leasing or purchasing of equipment.
In 1979 to 1981, PISC incurred outstanding and unpaid
obligations with Interpool, in the amount of $94,456.28,
representing unpaid per diems, drop-off charges, interest and
other agreed charges, resulting in a case before the US
District Court, Southern District of New York wherein a default
judgment against petitioners was rendered ordering the corp.
to pay in the amount of $80,779.33, as liquidated damages,
together with interest in the amount of $13,676.95 and costs
in the amount of $80.00. or for a total judgment of
$94,456.28. To enforce the default judgment of the US
District Court, a complaint was instituted against PISC and
other guarantors before the QC RTC. PISC failed to answer
the complaint and they were declared in default. The RTC
ruled in favor of Interpool and which was affirmed by the CA.
In the first instance, petitioners contend that the U.S. District
Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they
had not been served with summons and a copy of the
Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW). In the second instance,
petitioners contend that such jurisdictional infirmity
effectively prevented the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
39927 and from enforcing the U.S. District Court's Default
Judgment against them. Petitioners contend, finally, that
assuming the validity of the disputed Default Judgment, the
same may be enforced only against petitioner PISC the 9
petitioners not having been impleaded originally in the case
filed in New York, U.S.A.
ISSUE W/N the US District Court default judgment can be
enforced and against the 9 other petitioners? Yes.
RULING To begin with, the evidence of record clearly shows
that the U.S. District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction
over PISC under the procedural law applicable in that forum
i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the
Summons and Complaint which were in fact attached to the
Petition for Review filed with the SC, were stamped
"Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC Manila." indicating that service
thereof had been made upon and acknowledged by the PISC
office in Manila on, 18 January 1983 That foreign judgment-
which had become final and executory, no appeal having
been taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner PISC-is
thus "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." The
SC note, further that there has been in this case no showing
by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S.
District Court was vitiated by "want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. " In other
words, the Default Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a
liability of U.S.$94,456.28 in favor of respondent Interpool, is
valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction.
The existence of liability on the part of petitioner PISC having
been duly established in the U.S. case, it was not improper
for respondent Interpool, in seeking enforcement in this
jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such liability, to
have included the other 9 petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim,
Marcos Bautista, Carlos Laude,Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu Lao,
Ong Teh Philippine Consortium Construction Corporation,
Pacific Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.) as
defendants in Civil Case No. Q- 39927, filed with Branch 93 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The record shows that
said 9 petitioners had executed continuing guarantees" to
secure performance by petitioner PISC of its contractual
obligations. As guarantors, they had held themselves out as
liable. "whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to
respondent Interpool under their separate "continuing
guarantees" executed in the Philippines. The New York award
of U.S.$94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by
PISC of its own obligations under those Agreements. The SC
consider the 9 other petitioners as persons against whom [a]
right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions [has been] alleged to
exist" and, consequently, properly impleaded as defendants
in Civil Case No. Q-39927. There was, in other words, no need
at all, in order that Civil Case No. Q-39927 would prosper, for
respondent Interpool to have first impleaded the 9 other
petitioners in the New York case and there obtain judgment
against all 10 petitioners.
BOUDARD vs. TAIT
FACTS [Emilie Renee Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard and as guardian of their children, obtained a
favorable judgment from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi,
French Indo-China, for the sum of 40,000 piastras, against
Stewart Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his
failure to appear at the trial. Said judgment was based on the
fact that Mr. Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was
killed in Hanoi by co-employees although outside the fulfill-
ment of a duty.
Emilie Bouderd filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the
execution of the Hanoi judgment but the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Hanoi
Court, Tait not being a resident of that country.

RULING
". ..It is said that the French law regarding summons,
according to its English translation presented by the appel-
lants, is of the following tenor:
"SEC. 69 (par. 8). Those who have no known residence in
France, in the place of their present residence; if the place is
unknown, the writ shall be posted at the main door of the hall
of the court where the Complaint has been filed; a second
copy shall be given to the Attorney-General of the Republic
who shall visae the origilLal." But then, Exhibits E, E-1, F and
F-1 show that the summons alleged to have been addressed
to the appellee, was delivered in Manila on September 18,
1933, to J.M. Shotwell, a representative or agent of Churchill
& Tait, Inc., which is an entity entirely different from the
appellee.
Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee
was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint
of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives.
The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings
in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only
effective against a party if summons is duly served on him
within such foreign country before the proceedings. "The
fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam, over
nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be
based upon personal service within the state which renders
the judgment.
It can not be said that the decision rendered by the Court of
Hanoi should be conclusive to such an extent that it cannot
be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint of
our laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of appellants'
claim, and, as such, naturally admits proof to the contrary...
In view of the foregoing considerations, our conclusion is that
we find no merit in the errors assigned to the lower court and
the appealed judgment is in accordance with the law."
SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL vs. BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
SUGAR COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. L-22470; May 28, 1970
Facts: Under a Contract dated May 6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign
corporation with offices at Calcutta, India, agreed to sell to
defendant, a domestic corporation with offices at the Manila,
1,700,000 pieces of Hessian bags at $26.20 per 100 bags,
C.I.F. Iloilo. Shipment of these bags was to be made in equal
installments of 425,000 pcs. or 425 bales during each of the
months of July, August, September and October, 1949.
On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised defendant that of the
850 bales scheduled for shipment in July and August, the
former was able to ship only 310 bales owing to the alleged
failure of the Adamjee Jute Mills to supply the goods in due
time. In a letter dated September 29, 1949, defendant
requested plaintiff to ship 100 bales of the 540 bales
defaulted from the July and August shipments. In this
connection, it may also be mentioned that of the 425 bales
scheduled for shipment in September, 54 bales were likewise
defaulted resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the
object of the controversy.
Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the Government of India
increased the export duty of jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees
per ton. On October 27, 1949, plaintiff wrote to defendant for
an increase of $4,000.00 in its letter of credit to cover the
shipment of 154 bales which under the contract should have
been included in the July, August and September shipments.
On February 6, 1951, defendant received notification from
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration in
Calcutta, India, advising it that on December 28, 1950,
Plaintiff applied to said Tribunal for arbitration regarding their
claim. The Tribunal requested the defendant to send them its
version of the case. This, defendant did on March 1, 1951,
thru the then Government Corporate Counsel, former Justice
Pompeyo Diaz.
The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration,
refused to sustain defendants contention and decided in
favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of 18,562 rupees and 8 annas. This award
was thereafter referred to the Calcutta High Court which
issued a decree affirming the award.
Issue: WON the decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court
of Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines.
Held: Under the Rules, a judgment for a sum of money
rendered by a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is
brought in a Philippine court, said judgment may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact
There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a
breach of contract when it failed to deliver one-hundred fifty-
four Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered
into with appellant, should have been delivered to the latter
in the months of July, August and September, all of the year
1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-
hundred fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with
the contract aforesaid, the increase in the export tax due
upon them would not have been imposed because said
increased export tax became effective only on October 1,
1949.
To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and of the
High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the facts
of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same
may be impeached, as they have been sufficiently
impeached by appellant, on the ground of clear mistake of
law. We can not sanction a clear mistake of law that would
work an obvious injustice upon appellant.
Northwest Orient Airlines v. CA 241 SCRA 192 [1995]
FACTS [In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency
Agreement was entered into by plaintiff Northwest Orient
Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. (Sharp),
through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized
Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets.
Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made
on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which led the
latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount,
with claim for damages.
The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of summons
against Sharp at its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff
failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court
decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's
head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite
such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District
Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered
judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of
83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the
judgment became final and executory.
Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it
filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring
that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered
without due and proper notice to Sharp.
The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the
merits. Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to
Evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer motion, hold-
ing that the foreign judgment in the Japanese court sought to
be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the Court
of Appeals sustained the trial court, holding that the process
of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction
was acquired over the person of the defendant by serving
him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence, this appeal
by Northwest.]
RULING: "A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary
is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment
in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys
the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being
the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese
court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of
such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it
contends that the extraterritorial service of summons
effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only
ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not,
therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In
this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service'of process on SHARP. As to what this
law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or
by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that
Japanese procedural law is and to show taat under it, the
assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accord-
ingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service
of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the
Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the
so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked. Applying
it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar
with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private
foreign corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section
14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service
may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such
resident agent, on the government official designated by law
to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall
be made on the government official designated by law, to
wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign
insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the
case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities
and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Whenever service of process is so made, the government
office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal process to the corporation at its
home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a
resident agent authorized to receive court processes in
Japan. This silence could only mean, or at least create an
impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the
designated government official or any of its officers or agents
in Japan could be availed of.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District
Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at
its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of
service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the
summons and other legal documents to the Philippines.
Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the
summons together with the other legal documents to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which in turn, forwarded
the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the
court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal
office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the
proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation
Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of
service is not valid under Philippine law holds no water.
Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan
through its four registered branches at the time the collection
suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of JAPAN,
and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said
courts' lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by
the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA and C.F.
SHARP & COMPANY INC. G.R. No. 112573 February 9,
1995
FACTS: Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc.
(NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in the RTC-
Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court
against private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc.,
(SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
factual and procedural antecedents of this controversy:
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its
Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales
Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter
to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of
the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25,
1980 sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th
Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan against
defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,
Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture.
The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful
because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that
Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive
court processes was in Manila and would be back on April 24,
1980.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendants office to
serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same
claiming that he was no longer an employee of the
defendant.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the
judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the
complaint and the writs of summons served at the head
office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the
Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme
Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic
channels upon the defendants head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276, Records).
Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at
the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to
hear the plaintiffs complaint and on [January 29, 1981],
rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at
the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and
until payment is completed (pp. 12-14, Records).
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff
Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not having
appealed the judgment, the same became final and
executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence,
on May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was
filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 54.
defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese Court: (1) the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the
said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public policy
and rendered without due process of law.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
It agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait
wherein it was held that the process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the
boundaries of the state. To support its position, the Court of
Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case,
personal service of summons within the forum is required for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
(Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To confer
jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is
necessary.
ISSUE: whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over
a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving
summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine
corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior
attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.
HELD: YES. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary
is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. 6
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.(See Sec. 50, R 39)
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the
invalidity of such judgment.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 8 In
this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this
law is is a question of fact, not of law.
It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to
what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under
it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the
so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying
it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar
with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
there is no such resident agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be
made on the government official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign
insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the
case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities
and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a
resident agent authorized to receive court processes in
Japan.
While it may be true that service could have been made upon
any of the officers or agents of SHARP at its three other
branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would
not preclude service upon the proper government official, as
stated above.
As found by the respondent court, two attempts at service
were made at SHARPs Yokohama branch. Both were
unsuccessful.
The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of
Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the
Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the
other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese
Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were
delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs
of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve
the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This
service is equivalent to service on the proper government
official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence,
SHARPs contention that such manner of service is not valid
under Philippine laws holds no water.
We find NORTHWESTs claim for attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. We
find no evidence that would justify an award for attorneys
fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary
damages warranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the
challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWESTs claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in
sustained the trial courts dismissal of NORTHWESTs
complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is
hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L
COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged
in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint
therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
Lessons Applicable: Territoriality Principle (conflicts of law)
FACTS: Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp &
Company (C.F.), through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby
the Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation
tickets
March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of
the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages
April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil
Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan
The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful
because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila and would be back on April
24, 1980
April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve the
summons but he refused to receive claiming that he no
longer an employee
After the 2 attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme
Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other
legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan>
Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry (now Department) of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines>Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F. Main Office
August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit the writ of summons but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing.
January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment ordering
the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the
rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed
March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit
copy of the judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became final
and executory
May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the
judgment a RTC
July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to
be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this
jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper
notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear
mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the
Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering
that this is an action in personam. The process of the Court
in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese
jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in
the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar
CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign
court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such
court could acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it
must be served in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign
court
ISSUE: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.
HELD: YES. instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the
challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and exemplary damages
Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the Japanese court must stand.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to
be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or,
(2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be
made on the government official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign
insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign
banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of
other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the
government office or official served shall transmit by mail a
copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy is a necessary part of the service.
The service on the proper government official under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of
the Corporation Code
Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate
foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the
status of domestic corporations
We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy
should we make a discrimination against a foreign
corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to
the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.
not only with every requirement of law made specially of
foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by
of law made of domestic corporations the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan regularity of performance of official duty.
through its four duly registered branches at the time the
collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident
of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of