A.C. No.
1512 January 29, 1993 That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C.
Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member
of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case
to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the
parties and their witnesses who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes
and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and
first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her
sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City;
that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his
residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar
St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent
did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served
as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from
her residence every morning and took her home from the convention
site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of
respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then
they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which respondent
proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would
accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months from her
acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would think it over
first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house
almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to
make her decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973,
she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent
continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with
the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and
went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00
p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but
before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took
her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the
jeep by the beach where there were no houses around; that in the
course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated
his promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward
and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to her private
parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this Trans?",
but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and
reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near, the month
we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day,
just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his
promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty;
that she told him that she was afraid because they were not yet
married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have
sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the
intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated his promises
and assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry her;
and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat
outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had this
sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of
two or three times a week, and she consented to all these things
because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-
127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant
noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end
of the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted to a
pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent
and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she
objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not
to worry because they would get married within one month and he
would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and
talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal
as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her mother
left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would
follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the
house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto
Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant
and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he
could not marry complainant because he was already married (p.
137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so you
fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p.
138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant
not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife
for 16 years and he would work for the annulment of his marriage
and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a
monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to
Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support; he came back
to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked
about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant
that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back
in February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same thing
(p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila
when she delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she
cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and
instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma
took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she
delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and
tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no
avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got
sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical
treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did
not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer
and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp.
150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and
one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6,
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old;
that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife
for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby
embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's
father since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew
complainant's mother because they were former classmates in high
school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he used
to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became
friends and often talked with each other, and even talked about their
personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged
from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he invited her to
be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab,
Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that
the arrangement was for him to fetch her from her residence and
take her home from the convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each other and after the
convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a
week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he
used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited
complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening
after the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he
decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to
have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they
started the usual kisses and they were carried by their passion; they
forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he took
her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many
times whenever they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up
in the airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that
complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the
child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would
take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents
of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was
married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was
already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he
answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he would be charged
with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as
he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant
consented to have sexual intercourse with him because of her love
to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and
that the present case was filed against him by complainant because
of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu
waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's
medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are
not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time
(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been
born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom
be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at
the time of his relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for
quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at
the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually
with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he
used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend when he invited her,
with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the
Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30,
1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the morning and
took her home from the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973;
that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents'
permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at
about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before going
 home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked
the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after
the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at
about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which usually
ended at the airport where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver
her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22,
1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her
brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible
visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and
again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her
to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on
June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City;
that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was
dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend
that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the
findings and recommendation of the Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by
respondent attorney of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous
marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant.
Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal
on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a
deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said
marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him
legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was
also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced his son
and went around with friends as though he was never married much less had a child
in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of
his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to
complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and
respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of
the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's
moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite
my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even
suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we
cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1
[1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery
of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and
as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of
marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-
serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of
the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could
not because he was already married and would open him to a
charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why
 did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having
been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter
into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a
moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly
immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant
because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent
may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that
he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his
removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral
character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing
qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682
[1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either
be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206
SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January
1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A.
Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains the power
to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a
lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another man was null and
void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer),
married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned
her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349,
July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and
marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have
the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations
with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached
his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is
therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the
exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited
debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar
against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either
moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos,
107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a
manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs.
Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be
allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned profession of law
(Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral
conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED
and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent. Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
DECISION description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

NARVASA, C.J.: On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
friends.
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of from me."
his contract with the company. He wrote:
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented
by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial
to my rights and interests." the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
b
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
c
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your
sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract." On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of: his salary.

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
ignorance and evident bad faith;" contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;" months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
may properly use. were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. [9]
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
disciplined (sic) ** " synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2] He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured." [10] He claims he was manipulated into
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" [3] in which he questioned the reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced to sign a blank
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; [12] He says Alawi
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
of a Royal Family **."[4] pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays
[6]
complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
 It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." [18]
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA." Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14] excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced
that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right
inter alia that: cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word
to ** (his) rights and interests;" should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
[21]
(his) will," and "concealed the real facts **." While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15] thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the Code because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." [17] More than once has use of the title of attorney.
this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
 Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga,
Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133,
requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority
to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending
action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998,
requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as
counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. [2] On September 7, 1998, the
Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for
comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he
had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He
reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case
compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand,
private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get
even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he
did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court
were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents
request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the
Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the Court. [5] On January 25, 1999, the
Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such
 practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the
comment on the administrative complaint. following findings and recommendation:
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close
blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town
of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law
degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up
to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms.
Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the
conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth
certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against
Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family,
he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she
did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent
also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service,
initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary,
he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in
this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a
helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch
clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is
holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he
was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment
RECOMMENDATION
and referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation,
report and recommendation.
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for
and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents
before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that
the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was
handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise
cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively
declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the
family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high
regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent
ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big
sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the
case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the
years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence.
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing permission kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6] 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge. law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
their profession. The said section reads: are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official
or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
give professional advise to clients. Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No.
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession
public as a lawyer. contemplated by law.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not
term private practice prohibited by the said section, to wit: amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission
therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of
the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve
real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on
numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and
August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed
leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However,
he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of
the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice
of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
 in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179
A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in
the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a
kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make
a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review
of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They
must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission
on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the
COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this
is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it
is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate
and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of
the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform
that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires
an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the
corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of
major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context
or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has
become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques
of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred
to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning
big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates
of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could
not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number
of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal
with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than
the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into
the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who
needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in
the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by
a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the
few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in
a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas
jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with
a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to
think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of
the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as
barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found
an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning
and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department,
it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models
can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying
to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
 structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with
an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law
is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give
him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991,
p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of
their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team,
and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies
that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved
in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the
meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3)
conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
 In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative
drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference
in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects
of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is
the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties,
but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails
to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents
a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua
non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush
are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar
of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and
all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
 three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that
his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion
of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is
far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law
for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President
of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced
that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of
a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
 services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when 1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files
a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
The following relevant questions may be asked:
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
law". (Martin supra)

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected
with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that
he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period
of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged
in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have
no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
Coup Attempt Member

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
following companies:
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period. b. Dataprep, Philippines

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except d. Semirara Coal Corporation
for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because e. CBL Timber Corporation
he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not Member of the Board of the Following:
a member of the Bar there?
 a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection
with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the
giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition
of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined
as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort
of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to
it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for
the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring
agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how
many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-
one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.
Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he
had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I
don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
 contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where
he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so,
that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker
he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one
of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled
"attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without
being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally
qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court
and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill,
and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means
'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State
v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in
the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the
foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced
that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of
a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
 services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva,
14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when 1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files
a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or
not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
The following relevant questions may be asked:
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY
FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for
not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
law". (Martin supra)

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected
with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that
he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform,
served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers
like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period
of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged
in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have
no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
Coup Attempt Member

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
following companies:
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period. b. Dataprep, Philippines

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except d. Semirara Coal Corporation
for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because e. CBL Timber Corporation
he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not Member of the Board of the Following:
a member of the Bar there?
 a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection
with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the
giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition
of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined
as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort
of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to
it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for
the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring
agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how
many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-
one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.
Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he
had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I
don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
 contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where
he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so,
that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker
he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one
of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled
"attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without
being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally
qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court
and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill,
and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights
are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means
'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State
v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in
the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the
foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in vs.
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate. R E SO L U T I O N

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of

discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. REGALADO, J.:

I vote to GRANT the petition. Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.

8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through

The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
 THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-
0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue
with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has
made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to
the public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s)
of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as
any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance
of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements
in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services
being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code,
there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that
is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage
as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such
as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse,
this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence
is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be
better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages
of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing
better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection
of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform
all of its services, but only if such services are made available
exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however,
may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services
ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may
not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted
before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and
without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities.
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to
the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must
conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus
yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to
the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who
act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are
the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish
the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims
that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly
and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case,
the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public
from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid
to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses
of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time
to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains
that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from
the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal
services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but
by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken
to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however,
seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment,
which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they
avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic,
Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them.
Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight
on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above
cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement
to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the
Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the
law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries
the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to
enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for
their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are
the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that
secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when
in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it
falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by
lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant
can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of
the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a
fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and
the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on
his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents
of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack
of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get
from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would
be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as
the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the
kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental
legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the
bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation
is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules
of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of
the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular
client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal
Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,
absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.
The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines
by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes
to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce
and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should
be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case
in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of
law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
 between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197
A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged
in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what
its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January
13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx
for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.
N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it
is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in
the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot
afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we
start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how
we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
 There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or
follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while
you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would
refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice
law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and
effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in
the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals"
or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed
to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure
of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed
to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity
to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar
to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must
be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands,
as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be
dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action
as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court,
and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's]
Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file
written memoranda. 4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative
to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for
the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure
was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on
the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
 justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in
the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule
drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission
on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of
justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers,
and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of
integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges
and prosecuting officers;
 (3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining
and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting
officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased
lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set
up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor
may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically,
will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission
on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put
in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of
law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it
is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through
collective action; but there can be no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty
to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded
as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation,
while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to
push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed
to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law
upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it
should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to
fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of
a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of.
The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended,
might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
 Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because
although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will
give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not
had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they
have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young
and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members
of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more
meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4)
greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance
of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8)
more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less
than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar
has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a
total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support
for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast
their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission,
12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it,
and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII
of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.