Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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1 Arpaio would have a chilling effect on campaign/political speech in direct contravention of the
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United States Supreme Courts stated goals. Mr. Arpaios statements made to the press during
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that time are not probative of the willfulness mens rea element of criminal contempt because
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5 the statements were campaign posturing and not made under oath. To allow these prejudicial
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statements into evidence would force Mr. Arpaio to waive his Fifth Amendment rights to
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mount a defense.
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9 Mr. Arpaio moves the court to enter an order barring introduction of any statements he
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made during his reelection campaigns.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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13 Mr. Arpaio has been elected Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona in 1992, 1996, 2000,
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2004, 2004, and 2012. He ran for re-election unsuccessfully in 2016. In some quarters, the
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former Sheriff is known as Americas Toughest Sheriff. During his campaigns, to fit his
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17 image as the nations Toughest Sheriff, the Defendant made statements to bolster his image
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and reputation, some pertaining to his stance on illegal immigration.
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During the Defendants hearing on civil contempt, many of the Defendants statements,
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21 made during his campaign, were used against him to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
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that the Defendant intentionally committed civil contempt of court. This was in error since
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civil contempt has no intent element. All the testimony in the hearing regarding the
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25 Defendants state of mind was utterly irrelevant since it did not tend to prove an element and
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should have drawn objections from his counsel. Now, it is possible that the Defendants
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campaign statements could be offered or moved into evidence to prove his state of mind with
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1 respect to the criminal contempt charge when it violates the SCOTUS policy to encourage
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political speech and the Defendants Fifth Amendment rights.
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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5 I. THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE THE ELEMENT OF WILLFULNESS
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
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7 To understand the difference between civil contempt and criminal it is helpful to
8 understand the elements of both. In explaining the elements of civil contempt, federal courts
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have said [a] plaintiff must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence to establish
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11 that a party is liable for civil contempt: (1) that a valid order of the court existed; (2) that the
12 defendants had knowledge of the order; and (3) that the defendants disobeyed the order. In re
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Vaso Active Pharm., Inc., 514 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). Nowhere in the
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15 explanation of the elements of civil contempt does willfulness appear. Federal courts have
16 echoed this, stating that despite this fact, and without the protections afforded a criminal
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defendant, Judge Snow allowed a great number of Mr. Arpaios campaign statements into
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19 evidence. The statements were irrelevant as they do not prove a single element of the civil
20 offense charged. Not only should Mr. Arpaios counsel have objected on the basis of
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relevance, but Mr. Arpaio should have been counseled to assert his Fifth Amendment rights.
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23 In stark contrast to civil contempt, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has said of
24 criminal contempt [w]e have held that the crime of contempt is established when a defendant
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willfully disobeys a clear and definite court order of which the defendant is aware. United
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27 States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1986)(citing United States v. Thoreen, 653
28 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1428, 71 L.Ed.2d 648
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1 (1982); United States v. Baker, 641 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.1981); and Chapman v. Pacific
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Telephone and Telegraph Co., 613 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir.1979)). Thus, willfulness is an
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essential element of criminal contempt. Id. Regarding the burden of proof in a criminal
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5 defense case, the Ninth Circuit has said [t]o sustain a judgment of criminal contempt, willful
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disobedience must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Willfulness means, in this context,
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a deliberate or intended violation of the court's order. Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d
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9 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985)(internal citations omitted). While evidence proving Mr. Arpaios
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state of mind is relevant to the criminal charge, his campaign-related public statements and
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posturing, in specific, are not only protected speech, but allowing them to be discussed in a
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13 criminal trial is not probative, but instead is highly prejudicial, and, in essence, would be the
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government forcing Mr. Arpaio to waive his Fifth Amendment rights.
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II. CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE OF
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
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Generally speaking, the American public, as reflected by our political institutions places
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19 great value on our speech liberties, especially in the realm of politics. The Supreme Court has
20 said that the First Amendment is intended to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
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which truth will ultimately prevail." McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)
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23 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). With respect to
24 the campaign-related statements of elected officials, the Supreme Court has said [t]he role that
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elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely
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27 to express themselves on matters of current public importance. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
28 375, 395, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). In this case, Mr. Arpaio was an elected official
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1 freely expressing himself on the matter of illegal immigration, which is of great public
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importance. Per the Supreme Courts admonition that the First Amendment is intended to
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create an uninhibited marketplace of ideas, and his position as both an elected official and a
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5 candidate, Mr. Arpaio had the right to communicate his ideas to the voting public without
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inhibition. If this Court allows Mr. Arpaios campaign statements to be used to criminally
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convict him, it will have a chilling effect on expressions about matters of current public
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9 importance. Future candidates will remember that Mr. Arpaios campaign statements were
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used against him and will self-inhibit their own speech to steer clear of ramifications which
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may be years down the road.
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13 Of campaign speech, the Supreme Court has said [w]e have never allowed the
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government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during
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an election. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 78182, 122 S. Ct. 2528,
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17 2538, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002). The Ninth Circuit elaborated on the idea, stating that the
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marketplace of ideas is undermined if public officials are prevented from responding to speech
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of citizens with speech of their own. Mulligan v. Nichols, 835 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2016)
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21 (petition for certiorari docketed March 3, 2017). Granted, allowing Mr. Arpaios campaign
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statements to be introduced is not a direct prohibition on Mr. Arpaio making statements, but it
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will have a ripple effect on future campaign speech and make future candidates circumspect
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25 about communicating about political subjects of public interest because the statements could be
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used against the candidates years in the future.
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The Supreme Court has also said [t]he interest of the public in hearing all sides of a
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