Republic of the Philippines Appeals where petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an
SUPREME COURT erroneous conviction for illegal possession of explosives when there was
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976
LORENZO JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio
Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of
explosives (handgrenade) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five
years, seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did
respondent appellate court commit an error of law and gravely abuse its
discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for new trial "for the
reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use
handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent
with Code No. P-36-68 and code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated
31 January 1968)"? 1
The following incidents are not in dispute:
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga,
petitioner Jose was arrested by the local police leading to the filing with
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of several criminal
cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case 6235),
robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives (Crim.
Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried after which the trial
judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated December 15, 1969, and
promulgated on January 15, 1970 2 acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of
illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal
possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the time
of his arrest.
After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed his
notice of appeal. Nine days thereafter or more particularly on January 24,
1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to
permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the
course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The
trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on
the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was
promulgated. 3
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of
no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of
his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess
the handgrenade. 4 In his brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in
the alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new
trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision
of March 8, 1972, affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of
conviction of the court a quo, and declaring that no reversible error was
committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of the case as the
court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its decision." 6
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that
"assuming arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon
appellant's motion for new trial because of the perfection of the appeal,
this Honorable Court before which said motion was reiterated and
which has competence to act thereon should have granted the same if
for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is the
inevitable result of its denial." 7 This motion for reconsideration was
denied in respondent court's resolution of April 3, 1974. 8
A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo
Jose 9 but this was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution
promulgated on July 24, 1974. 10
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco
Carreon, filed with Us this petition for review which We denied outright on
September 6, 1974, "the question raised being factual and for insufficient
showing that the finding of facts by respondent court are unsupported by
substantial evidence, and for lack of merit."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the
following grounds should justify this Court to review the ruling of
respondent appellate court to wit:
1. petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal
interest, and his being imprisoned for five (5) years when
there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on hand is a
result so harsh that the Honorable Court may well
undertake a review of the case just to satisfy itself of the
justice and inevitability of such a result;
2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by
the Honorable Court is involved, as the evidence sought
to be introduced at the new trial is, technically, not newly
discovered: and
3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances
mentioned in his above-quoted statement of the main
legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable
Court because under these decisions, the new trial should
have been granted since there is a 'strong, compelling
1
 reason' in this case for granting the relief prayed for, such
strong compelling reason being the very strong
probability of petitioner's acquittal if a new trial were
granted. (Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto, 40 SCRA
123; Sison vs. Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano
52 SCRA 338; Montecines vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA
14; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25, 1974;
please see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346 ... (pp. 157-158,
rollo)
The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for
reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial
justice nor error of any sort on the part of respondent Court of Appeals,
affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it being admitted by
petitioner that the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new
trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly
papers as correct". This Opposition drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's
counsel.
On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor
General informing the Court that in view of the " Persistence of accused
petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court and respondent
Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent
and/or authority to handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was
constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 with
enclosures, xerox copies of which are being attached to the manifestation
as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General
reads:
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
Padre Faura, Manila
Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:
With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please
be informed that Colonel Pedrito C. de Guzman who is
now Provincial of Sorsogon Constabulary Command,
confirmed that he executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at
Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that he appointed Mr. Lorenzo
Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC Agent on January
31, 1968.
The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga
Constabulary Command also confirmed the appointment
of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.
Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said
appointment.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
FIDEL V. RAMOS
Major General, AFP
Chief of Constabulary (p. 191, rollo)
Inclosure:
Appointmenmt paper
of subject person dtd
Jan. 31, 1968 with
Personal History
Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo
Jose as a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code
Number P-36-68 and Code Nanie "Safari" with expiration on December
31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We quote:
This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our
firearms and such other equipment which it may deem
necessary for your personal protection on the need basis
which will be covered by separate written authority. (p.
192, rollo)
In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the
denial of this petition for review, to give due course and consider the
Petition as a special civil action. In another Resolution of April 4, 1975, the
parties were given time to submit their respective memorandum.
This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must
bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where
justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible legal means to
prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of the
Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it
does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a
miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
which calls for relief from this Court.
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for
upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by
this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al that a prosecuting officer, as the
representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt
shall not escape, innocene shall not suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565,
qouting Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law
Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes
that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to
the court of origin for a new trial.
We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals
that the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall
under the category of newly-discovered evidence because the same
his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a
permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be known to
petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only
2
thereafter.
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to
produce a different result if admitted. 12
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on
newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial
justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Power of appellate court on appeal. Upon appeal from a
judgement of the Court of First Instance, the appellate
court may affirm or modify the judgment and increase or
reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case ito the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial,
or dismiss the case.
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent
appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to
embrace situations as the instant case where the court may grant a new
trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of the
same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. 13 While Section
13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a
new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial. Section 11, Rule 124 quoted
above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the
court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute
meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or re-trial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and not
to obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in
the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from
them for the purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard
them. 15 In this jurisdiction, in not a. few instances, 15* this Court
ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the
statute, vis retraction of witness, 16 negligence or incompetency of
counsel. 17improvident plea of guilty, 18 disqualification of an attorney
de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, 19 and where a
judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the
prosecution and the defense. 20
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to
temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now
before Us which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a
new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his innocence of
the crime charged.
Thus petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession
of a handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the
handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where
he had to make a choice reveal his Identity as an undercover agent of
the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on
subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the
hands of the dissidents considering that Floridablanca the site of the
incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible
exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution. Without revealing his Identity as an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to
possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The
permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his
intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it
the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent
authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a
crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence
concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent
and his authority to possess a handgrenade for the protection of his
person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in the
meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.
We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of
petitioner's cas to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating
exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which
petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the
Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the
documentary sought to be produced, and of cross-examining the persons
who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner,
on his explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence during
the trial.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction
of the herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a
quo for a new trial only for purpose of allowing said accused to present
additional evidence in his defense. The trial court shall inform this Court
of the final outcome of the case within a reasonable time. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 p. 19, rollo
2 p. 21, Ibid.
3 pp. 20-21, Ibid.
4 pp. 4-5, appellant's brief, Court of Appeals, p. 151, Ibid.
3
5 Third Division; L.B. Reyes, J. ponente, Gatmaitan,
Palana, JJ., concurring
6 p. 56, Ibid.
7 pp. 58-59, Ibid.
8 p. 85, Ibid.
9 pp. 86-96, Ibid.
10 pp. 132-137, Ibid.
11 pp. 189-195, Ibid
12 U.S. vs. Luzon, 1905, 4 Phil. 343; People vs.
Mangulabnan, et al., 1956, 99 Phil. 883; Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 4, pp.
345-346.
13 Section 13, Rule 124:
"Motion for new trial. At any time after the appeal from
the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused
becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence material to his
defense, the motion. to conform to the provisions of
section 3, Rule 121." Section 2, Rule 121:
Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new
trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities have been
committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the defendant;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered
which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
introduced and admitted, would probably change the
judgment."
14 Russell vs. McLellan 3 Wood & M. 157
15 Clark vs. Brooks, 26 How.
15* See Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969 Ed. p. 866
16 People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., 111 Phil. 54
17 U.S. vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74
18 People vs. Solacito, L-29209, August 25, 1969, 27
SCRA, 1037; People vs. Mengote et al., L-30343, July 25,
1975; People vs. Vicente del Rosario, L-33270, November
28,1975
19 U.S. vs. Laranja 21 Phil. 500
20 U.S. vs. Pobre, 11 Phil. 51
21 Kearney vs. Snodgrass pp. 309, 310, 12 Or. 311
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141518. April 29, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO,
CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG or ENTENG, HILARIO
ASTUDILLO, alias BODA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698, convicting
appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo of
the crime of Murder; sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion
perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the
heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr.
The Information filed against the appellants reads:
That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 oclock in the
evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while
armed with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR.,
thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which caused his death and thereafter, the accused rode on an
unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No.
7077, which they used in escaping from the crime scene.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded not
guilty.[3] Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At
around 7:00 p.m., of November 12, 1995, brothers Clarence, Crisanto and
Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating
the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the
victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to go with him.
[4] Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras Store, where
they were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto
and Silvestre had an argument.[5]
At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and
Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were selling balut in
front of Floras Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while
Crisanto and Hilario held him by the wrists. Clarence delivered several
stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell
to the ground. Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle.[6]
Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra,
where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Autopsy Report prepared
by Dr. Milagros Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the victim sustained 15
stab wounds and 1 abrasion, as follows:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Stab wound 2 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, neck, [r]ight
4
 Stab wound #2, penetrating 3 cm., each. Antero-lateral aspect,
neck, left [2 cm.], penetrating , 3rd Intercostal
space, paresternal area, left
2 cm., 7th mid axillary line, left
1.5 cm., anterior superior iliac spine, left
1.5 cm., upper outer quadrant, left
1.5 cm., Antero-lateral aspect, middle third thigh, left
2.0 cm., infrascapular area, left
3.0 cm., dorsolateral aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2 cm., dorsomidial aspect, forearm, middle third, left
2.0 cm., suprascapular area, right
1.5 cm., infrascapular area, paravertebral area, right
1.5 cm., paravertebral area, right
2.5 cm., Level of T8, midscapular area, right
#2, 1.5-2.0 cm., lumbar area, paravertebral area, right
Abrasion #2 1.0 2.0 cm., Level T7, paravertebral area, left and right
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Pericardium, 1.5 liter
LW, Right atrium traversing the right ventricle
Hemothorax, left 1 liter
LW, 1.0 cm., posterior lobe, lung left
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiac Tamponade, secondary to Stab Wound.[7]
On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On
November 12, 1995 at around 7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the house of
Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others were playing
cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which he
declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to
leave the house. However, Silvestre followed him in front of Floras Store
and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre
struck him on the head and arm with an empty one-liter softdrink bottle.
[8]
Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter attacked
him. As he retreated, he saw a knife which he then swung at the
victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left with no choice,
Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter collapsed to the
ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder brother, Clarence.
[9] Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from shock and remained seated on the
ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the roadside and
called for help.[10] The appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and
proceeded to the house of Clarences in-laws. On the same night, they
surrendered to the Philippine National Police, stationed at Bangued, Abra.
[11]
On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting
appellants of the crime of Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.
[12] Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and,
assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, not having been alleged in the information, cannot be
appreciated against them.[13] Appellants motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order dated July 13, 1998.[14] However, an Amended
Decision[15] was rendered where the phrase abuse of superior strength
was replaced with TREACHERY in the body of the Decision and in the
decretal portion thereof, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Rep Act No. 7659, qualified by TREACHERY
AND for having conspired together and helping one another to kill
Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle, [which is] however, offset by the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentences them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amount of P65,288.50 [as] actual damages,
P50,000.00 for his death and suffering plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and
exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT
ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE
DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE
SECOND DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCED THEM TO A
UNIFORM PENALTY.[17]
The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses. The settled rule is that the matter of assigning value to a
declaration on the witness stand is more competently performed by a
trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the
witnesses demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. In the
absence of a clear showing that some fact or circumstance of weight or
substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, the trial
judges assessment of the witnesses testimonies shall not be disturbed on
appeal.
A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial
court did not miss any such material circumstance, nor did it commit any
5
palpable error in upholding the facts as established by the
prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and Eduardo
Bata, that the appellants ganged up on the defenseless victim. These
witnesses were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely
testify against the appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.[18]
Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and their affidavit are too inconsequential to merit
consideration. Specifically, appellants point to the failure of Eduardo Bata
to state in his sworn statement that appellants Crisanto and Hilario
restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well as the alleged
unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny Bareng with the Ilocano
words bagsol and binagsol (which mean stab and stabbed, respectively),
in his sworn statement. Suffice it to state that inconsistencies between
the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not
necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex-parte,
is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the
testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the
fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and
elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually being
incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because of
partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific
inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally
not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statement, hence, omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the
prosecution witnesses direct and categorical declarations on the witness
stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements. This is especially so
because their testimony to the effect that Crisanto and Hilario held the
victims wrists while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even
under cross-examination.[19]
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants self-defense
theory. When an accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits
authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on him to
prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the accused.[20]
In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of
aggression came from the deceased, still the appellants plea of self-
defense will not prosper. As stated above, the evidence overwhelmingly
shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able to restrain the victim
by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful aggression or danger on the
lives of the appellants ceased, hence, it was no longer necessary for
appellant Clarence to repeatedly stab the victim. Verily, their act could no
longer be interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire
to kill.[21] Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by the victim
negates self-defense. It certainly defies reason why the victim sustained a
total of 15 wounds on the different parts of his body if appellants were
only defending themselves. Parenthetically, the number of wounds was
eloquently established by the physical evidence, which is a mute
manifestation of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.[22]
From the attendant circumstances, it is evident that appellants
collective and individual act of holding the victims wrists and delivering
several stab blows demonstrated the existence of their common design
to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not
necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be inferred from the
acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills
and a common intent or design to commit a crime.[23]
Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in
appellants contention that the trial cannot validly appreciate the same in
its amended decision because the attendance of treachery was not one of
the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration. Otherwise stated,
appellants posit that the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction
should be limited only to the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence and/or the propriety of
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which was not alleged in the information.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[24] a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction
may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of
the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7,[25] a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused.
[26] These provisions changed the previous rulings[27] of the Court to the
effect that such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal,
provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an
appeal has been perfected.[28] The requisite consent of the accused to
such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the
latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or
penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.
[29] Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly promulgated, any
reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error,
even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an
initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the consent or
upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be
corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for
reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.[30]
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double
jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the accused. Thus,
6
when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked
because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing
such motion.[31] His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its
errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and
make them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the
new judgment it has to render.[32] The raison detreis to afford the court a
chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals
from being taken.[33] In effect, a motion for reconsideration or
modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however,
conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court
which aspects of the judgment of conviction should be reviewed. Having
filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in
the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants
waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the
evidence taken at the trial open for the review of the trial court. At any
rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in the case at bar
was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for
conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which was not alleged in the information. Hence, the court a quo is not
only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
instead of treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the
attendance of a qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information
did not allege such facts.[34] Even before the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure[35] took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances
were required to be so specified in the complaint or information,
otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused.
In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of
execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive
or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to
the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or
manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.[36] Here, it is clear that treachery qualified the killing of the
deceased to murder, considering that the appellants deliberately
restrained the victim so as to enable one of them to successfully deliver
the stab blows without giving the latter a chance to defend himself or to
retaliate.
As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the
prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used by the
appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime
could not have been committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not
aggravating where the use thereof was merely incidental and was not
purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render
the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult.[37]
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly
appreciated in favor of appellants. To benefit an accused, the following
requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.[38]
In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities on the same night of the incident when they learned that the
authorities were looking for them.[39] Though they did not give a
statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should nonetheless be considered in their favor. What
matters is that they spontaneously, voluntarily and unconditionally
placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect
for the law indicates a moral disposition favorable to their reform.[40]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on
the appellants, in accordance with Article 63 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code, should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.[41]
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, the award of moral
and exemplary damages cannot be lumped together as was done by the
trial court. These kinds of damages are different in nature, and require
separate determination. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury as a result of the felonious act.[42] The award of
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the
commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying. In People v. Catubig,[43] we explained:
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on
the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
7
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which Costs de oficio.
is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, SO ORDERED.
if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary
but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[44]
As testified to by the widow of the deceased, the death of her
husband brought grief and emotional suffering to their family.[45] Hence,
they are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
pursuant to current jurisprudence.[46] Likewise, the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of the deceased
justifies the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[47]
The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order that
actual damages may be recovered, the amount actually expended in
connection with the death of the victim must be substantiated with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the instant case, the
records show that the amount of P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court as
actual damages is not fully substantiated by receipts.[48] However, as
the heirs of the deceased actually incurred funeral expenses, they are
entitled to temperate damages.[49] In the recent case of People v.
Abrazaldo,[50] we ruled that where the amount of actual damages cannot
be determined because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the
amount claimed, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
be awarded.
Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is
affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been fixed by
jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds responsibility
therefor.[51]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No.
1698, finding appellants, Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo @ Anteng
or Enteng, and Hilario Astudillo @ Boda, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil
liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
8

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014
VILMA M. SULIMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 21, 2009, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30693 which denied herein petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the appellate court's
Resolution2 dated January 8, 2010, which likewise denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated July 21, 2009.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
In six (6) Informations,3 all dated June 6, 2003,herein petitioner and one
Luz P. Garcia were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a),
(l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of
estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded
arrest and remained at-large despite the issuance of a warrant for her
arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch
21, rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision,4 dated June 7, 2006, reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as follows:
1) In Crim. Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189, accused VILMA
SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubtas principal of the
crimes charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS each and to pay fine
of P200,000.00 for each count.
2) In Crim. Case No. 03-216190, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correctional (sic) and to indemnify Anthony Mancera y Rey the
amount of P120,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. 03-216191, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Estafa and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify
private complainant Perlita A. Prudencio the amount
of P132,460.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
4) In Crim. Case No. 03-216192, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused VILMA
SULIMAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
5) In Crim. Case No. 03-216193, accused VILMA SULIMAN is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional
(sic) and to indemnify Jimmy Tumabcao the amount of P21,400.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency and to
pay the cost.
Accordingly, the bond posted for her provisional liberty is hereby
CANCELLED.
Considering that the accused Vilma Suliman was detained from January 6,
2003 to July 23, 2004 prior to her posting bond for her provisional liberty,
her period of detention shall be credited in the service of her sentence.
Considering that Luz Garcia has not been apprehended nor voluntarily
surrendered to date, let warrantbe issued for her arrest and let the case
against her be ARCHIVED to be reinstated upon her apprehension.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,6 but the RTC denied it in its
Order7 dated January 23, 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads, thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
appeal filed in this case is hereby DENIED and consequently, DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision dated June 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, in the City of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-216188, 03-
216189, 03-216190, 03-216191 and 03-216193 are hereby AFFIRMED
with the following modifications:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189 for illegal
recruitment, the Court sentences accused-appellant VILMA
SULIMAN to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) for
each count.
9
 2. In Criminal Case No. 03-216190 for estafa involving private
complainant Anthony Mancera, the Court sentences accused-
appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer a minimum period of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional to a maximum
term of fifteen (15) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of reclusion temporal.
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-216191 for estafa involving private
complainant Perlita A. Prudencio, the Court sentences accused-
appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum period of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional to maximum
term of seventeen (17) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of reclusion temporal.
4. In Crim. Case No. 03-216193 for estafa involving private
complainant Jimmy Tumabcao, the Court sentences accused-
appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum term of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional to maximum term
of six years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the above CA Decision on May 26,
2009.9 However, neither petitioner nor her counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period for filing the said
motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating counsel, filed a
Motion to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration10 praying that the
same be admitted in the higher interest of "substantial justice and due
process." Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed gross
and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to immediately
inform petitioner about his receipt of the subject CA Decision, thereby
depriving petitioner of her right to file a motion for reconsideration which,
in turn, is a violation of her right to due process.
On July 21, 2009, the CA issueda Resolution denying petitioner's Motion
to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated January 8, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE PETITIONER
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING [THAT]
PETITIONER SHOULD NOTBE BOUND BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF
ATTY. MAYO IN NOT INFORMING HER ABOUT HIS RECEIPT OF THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ADVERSE TO HER ON MAY 26, 2009
OR IN NOT FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO PROTECT THE
RIGHTS AND INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER. 12
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she should not
be bound by her counsel's gross neglect of duty in not informing her of
the adverse decision of the CA. The Court agrees with the observation of
the CA that petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in
monitoring the progress of her case. Evidence of her negligence is the
fact that she did not make any effort to personally follow up her appeal
with her counsel. Instead, she merely relied on a certain Conrad Lucero,
the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates ofher
appeal with the CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v.
People13 is instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels acts, including
even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the
rule isthat a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all
acts necessary or, atleast, incidental to the prosecution and management
of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel
within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as
the act or omission of the client himself. A recognized exception to the
rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the
client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the
gross negligence should not be accompanied by the clients own
negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be
vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the
status of the case. Failing in thisduty, the client should suffer whatever
adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case,
for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of
his lawyer. It is the clients duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time
to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his
case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that
everything is being taken care of is not enough. 14
It may not be amiss to add that this Court notes the propensity of
petitioner and her counsel to disregard the Rules and directives of the
Court. In a Resolution15 issued by this Court on March 14, 2011,
petitioner's counsel was admonished for his failure to file petitioner's
Reply to Comment which was required in an earlier Resolution issued by
this Court.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of
law.16 An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must
strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated.17 The rationale for this
strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to
10
facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. 18 In an age where
courts are be devilled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to befollowed
by appellants with greater fidelity.19 Their observance cannot be leftto
the whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioner
remained obstinate in her non observance of the said Rules. Such
obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the
Rules. On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition
is dismissible.
In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present
petition, as it appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the CA
of her motion to admit her belated Motion for Reconsideration but
likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for illegal recruitment and
estafa, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed
ruling of the CA. Indeed, after a careful and thorough review of the
evidence on record, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit
any error in convicting petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and
estafa.
At this point, it bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the factual findings of the RTC,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding and
conclusive on the Court.20 We emphasize that while jurisprudence has
provided exceptions21 to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of
proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present in the
case.22 The petitioner must additionally show that the cited exceptional
circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the case. 23 In the
instant case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are present .
Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall
mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contact services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Provided, that such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater
than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan
or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or
document in relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document
or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of
securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to
quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the
transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms
and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not
to employ any worker who has not applied for employment
through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs
harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of
the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized
representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment,
placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings,
separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the Department
of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof
by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of
the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to
become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation
engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly orindirectly in
the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers
before departure for monetary or financial considerations other
than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing
rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined
by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes
11
 of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories.1wphi1 In case of juridical persons, the
officers having control, management or direction of their business shall
be liable.24
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution
has established that petitioner and her co-accused committed the acts
enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042
when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the amounts
of P132,460.00, P120,000.00 and P21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they
failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons,
and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such failure
to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is
committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafaby means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part
with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.25
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven
beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
that petitioner and her co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended
that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants for
employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior toprivate complainants' payment of
placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made
by petitioner and her co-accused that inducedthe private complainants to
part with their money. As a result of such false pretenses and
misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the
promised employment abroad never materialized and the various
amounts of money they paid were never recovered. Petitioner argues that
she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware
of the recruitment activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner avers that
when her co-accused received several amounts of money from the
private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity and for her own
benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is not
persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the
forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman International.
Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business of
the said company. Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense,
especially in the face of positive assertions made by the private
complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Indeed,
of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private
complainants had any ill motive against petitioner other than to bring her
to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment.
Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against
human nature and experience.26 Where there is nothing to show that the
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the
solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence. 27 In any case,
petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private
complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner
was the one who offered the private complainants an alleged alternative
employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not
materialize. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals, dated July 21, 2009 and January 8, 2010 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30693, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
12
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22794 January 16, 1968
RUFO QUEMUEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Manglapus Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of
libel, 1 with which he is charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto
mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of
conviction, but imposed, instead the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of
P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party,
with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six (6) months, in case of
insolvency, aside from the costs.
Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous
because: 1) it awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended
had not appealed from the decision of the trial court, which made no
award of such nature; 2) the assessment of damages in a criminal case,
in which the civil action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts
(and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof that damages had been
sustained by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-
payment of the indemnity constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of
debt, which is unconstitutional.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal case opens
the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be
increased 2 and the indemnity is part of the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas vs.
Director of Prisons, 3 this Court held that:
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code that every person criminally liable
is civilly liable.
Although the authority to assess damages or indemnify in criminal cases
is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such
authority passess to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has, in many
cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the

13
offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party who
sought a review of the decision of said Court was the accused. 4
As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered
mental anguish, lost sleep, or could not look his neighbor straight in the
eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very nature, libel causes dishonor,
disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the offended party
is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel
cases; that "where the article is libelous per se" as it is in the case at
bar "the law implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases
is not "required to introduce evidence of actual damages," at least, when
the amount of the award is more or less nominal, as it is in the case at
bar. 5
Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt", within
the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-
payment of "debt". Insofar as said injunction is concerned, "debt" means
an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract", express or
implied. In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the
case at bar arises, however, from a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As
a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said
liability does not violate the constitutional injunction. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Rufo Quemuel.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22345 May 29, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADOR GOMEZ, CRESENCIO I. RICHARDS, J. BOYARSKI,
PRUDENCIO UY, EDUARDO VELOSO, LEONCIO SORONIO, IGNACIO
DAGTAHAN and LAURO GINGCO, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor E.M. Salva and
Attorney E. A. Agana for petitioner.
Eddy A. Deen and M.C. Osmea for respondents Cresencio Richards, et
al.
Cesar Kintanar for respondents Eduardo Veloso, et al.
Hon. Amador E. Gomez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
David Velasco for respondent Lauro Gingco.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The State has filed this petition for certiorari to assail, as allegedly a
nullity, an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing an
information for copra overshipment in violation of Section 4 of Monetary
Board Circular 31 in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act 265.
At the request of the Monetary Board, the Secretary of Justice designated
Special Prosecutor Enrique A. Agana to investigate and prosecute crimes
and offenses in connection with copra exportation from the Philippines.
Special Prosecutor Agana, acting pursuant to said designation, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on December 6, 1962, jointly with the
Fiscal of Cebu City, against seven persons, an information for alleged
overshipment, over-export and/or smuggling out of the Philippines, from
February 1961 to March 1961, in Cebu City, of 1,700 long tons of
Philippine copra valued at $255,000, in excess of the quantity duly
licensed to be exported, contrary to Section 4, Circular 31 of the
Monetary Board in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act 265. Accused
were: Cresencio I. Richards, Richard J. Boyarski, Prudencio Uy (who were
then general manager, assistant manager, and warehouseman,
respectively, of Corominas, Richards & Co., Inc.). Lauro Gingco, Eduardo
R. Veloso, Leoncio Soronio and Ignacio Dagtahan (then representatives of
14
the Philippine Coconut Administration, Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Bureau of Customs and Philippine constabulary, respectively, to the
Export Coordination Committee).
Subsequent to the filing of the information, defendants filed motions to
quash and for bills of particulars. The same were eventually denied and
by September 27, 1963, all of the accused had entered pleas of not guilty.
The court thereafter set the case for hearing on October 23 and 24, 1963.
Notice of said trial was served on Assistant Fiscal Rafael Ybaez of Cebu
City. Special Prosecutor Agana, however, was not separately furnished a
notice.1wph1.t
As a result, on October 23, 1963, Special Prosecutor Agana was not
present when the case was called for trial. At said time, he was attending
to another case in Tacloban City. Assistant Fiscal Ybaez, who appeared,
manifested that he was not ready for trial, the records of the case being
with the Special Prosecutor, who was the one actively handling the case.
Furthermore, he submitted to the court a telegram to him from one
Evangelista stating that the Chief of the Export Department (Central
Bank) just received a subpoena in the case for the date in question, that
Special Prosecutor Agana was at Tacloban City, and requesting that he
ask for postponement. A similar wire from one "F.R. Evangelista" was
addressed to the court and received by it.
Then "the Court tried to sound out the six accused" except Lauro
Gingco, whose counsel filed a motion for postponement "whether they
are agreeable to either a postponement of the trial or a dismissal of the
case without prejudice, but Atty. Eddy A. Deen, Atty. Luis Guerrero, and
Atty. Cesar Kintanar informed the Court that the accused whom they
represent oppose vigorously the postponement of the trial and likewise
object to a provisional dismissal."* Whereupon respondent Judge ordered
the case dismissed, except as to defendant Lauro Gingco.
A motion for reconsideration, filed by Special Prosecutor Agana, was
opposed by defendants Veloso, Soronio and Dagtahan upon the ground of
double jeopardy. Said motion having been denied by the court on October
31, 1963, the Special Prosecutor instituted on January 20, 1964, the
present action for certiorari.
Respondents six accused filed their answer, and, later, their memoranda.
Respondent Judge also separately filed an answer.
In their answer and memoranda, respondents adduced two arguments:
first, that the petition fails upon the merits because respondent Judge did
not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount thereto; and, second, that the petition, if granted,
would place them in double jeopardy.
A return to the sources of the double jeopardy rule reveals that originally
it was held to prohibit only a subsequent prosecution in a new and
independent cause. After the ruling of the United States Supreme Court,
however, in Kepner v. United States,1 a case from the Philippines, the rule
was extended to an appeal in the same case by the prosecution after
jeopardy had attached, thereby in effect viewing such appeal as
presenting a new and separate jeopardy, repugnant to the fundamental
law's provision against double jeopardy. And, since then, the stand
in Kepner has repeatedly been adopted here.2 For that matter, it is set
forth in Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 2. Who may appeal. The People of the Philippines can not
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final
judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the appellant.
The present case, however, is not an appeal by the prosecution asserting
a dismissal to be erroneous; it is a petition for certiorari, assailing the
order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity for having been made with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack, or excess, of jurisdiction. It
stands to reason that if petitioner's submission is sustained, there would
in effect be no order of dismissal to speak of, since it would be legally
non-existent. And thus, there would be no dismissal or termination of the
case as a basis for the plea of double jeopardy.
Accordingly, respondents' second argument on double jeopardy would be
in point only if their first on validity (not simply correctness) of the
dismissal order proves tenable.
Now the record shows the dismissal order to have been capriciously
issued. All the delay prior to the first date set for trial, which lasted
almost ten months after the filing of the information, was caused by the
defendants who presented several motions to quash and for bills of
particulars, which, as respondent Judge later conceded, were "devoid of
serious legal bases" and premised only on "trivial ground".3 The
prosecution's manifestation that it was not ready for trial on said first day
amounted to a motion for postponement. It was the first postponement
asked for by .the prosecution, predicated upon reasonable ground. Since
the reason given for the dismissal order was the delay that so far
attended the case, and since said delay was attributable to the defense
rather than to the prosecution, the dismissal was totally devoid of reason.
Specially is this true, considering that previously, respondent Judge
granted several motions for postponement of arraignment presented by
the defendants, and even Richards' motion to leave for the United States
before he was finally arraigned upon his return (Respondent Judge's
Answer, p. 7). Furthermore, defense moves resulted in about ten months
delay. And the prosecution's first request for postponement was denied,
altho one of the accused also requested for postponement. The dismissal
was therefore purely capricious. It amounted to grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Such a dismissal order, made sua
sponte for no proper reason at all, is void for being issued without
authority. And being void, it cannot terminate the proceedings. The same
jeopardy that attached continues, the cause not having been terminated
15
thereby rendering the defense of double jeopardy without merit (People v.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121, 125).
A purely capricious dismissal of an information, as herein involved,
moreover, deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict.
It denies the prosecution its day in court. Accordingly, it is a dismissal
without due process and, therefore, null and void. A dismissal invalid for
lack of a fundamental prerequisite, such as due process, will not
constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy (People v.
Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966*, Tilghman v. Mago [Fla.] 82 So. 2d
136; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 F. 2d 445).
Finally, respondent Judge states in his answer herein, that he took into
account matters not in the record and outside of judicial notice, which
provided a real though unstated reason for his dismissal order. Said
matter was an alleged dinner invitation from a stranger, styled as Col.
Miguel M. Moreno, extended thru Assistant City Fiscal Ybaez, which he
regarded as suspicious and unusual; that after some investigation as to
this man, he concluded that "the indications were to the effect that some
'pillos' and opportunists were making the Court of First Instance of Cebu
the unwitting forum for extortion and exploitation of persons charged with
crime." (Respondent Judge's answer, pp. 4-7).
Such consideration of extraneous matters by respondent Judge, albeit in
good faith, rendered the dismissal as one affected with partiality and
bias, making it null and void, for lack of another fundamental prerequisite
to due process in a criminal case, namely, an impartial Judge, not moved
by prejudice or bias (Becker v. Webster, 171 F. 2d 762; Wharton v. People,
90 P. 2d 615; 16A C.J.S. 834).
Respondent Judge states in his answer that it is his "hope and
expectation" that this Court "would give vindication to his actuations";
that should this Court, however, resolve otherwise and nullify the same,
ordering the case to proceed upon trial on the merits, he prays that "he
should be disqualified therefrom and that the case should be ordered re-
raffled among the other five branches of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu". Stated as reason for the prayer is that "in all frankness, he has lost
all respect in the manner the special prosecutor, Atty. Enrique A. Agana
has been prosecuting the case."
In justice to Special Prosecutor Agana, it should be pointed out that
respondent Judge, in his order of October 23, 1963, said:
x x x In fairness, however, to Special Prosecutor Agana, the Court
finds satisfactory his explanation that his failure to personally
appear before this Court on October 23, 1963 was due to reasons
beyond his control, and that it was due to the fact that by a
curious coincidence he was designated by the Secretary of
Justice, in Administrative Order No. 375, dated October 17, 1963,
and had to leave Manila for Leyte, to assist the Provincial Fiscal in
the prosecution and investigation of old crimes and offenses
arising within said province. The Court likewise finds satisfactory
the further explanation of Special Prosecutor Enrique A. Agana
that his not having vigorously resisted the various motions for (1)
another preliminary investigation before arraignment, (2) bill of
particulars, and (3) motions for dismissal filed by the defense
during the early stages of this case was due to the fact that he
considered them all to be devoid of serious legal bases, and that
he knew all along that the presiding Judge of this Court was fully
aware of the trivial nature of the grounds for those various
motions. . . .
Now considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already in effect when
respondent Judge filed his answer herein containing the prayer to be
disqualified from the case, altho not yet in effect when the proceedings at
issue were taken in the court below, states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that,
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons" other than the usual
grounds for disqualification, this Court, after considering all the
circumstances of the case, finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-
stated request for disqualification from further sitting in the Richards
case, and We rule that he is thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to
have inhibited himself from further taking cognizance of the case.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted and respondent Judge's
dismissal order of October 23, 1963, in Criminal Case No. V-9350 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu is hereby declared null and void and
without legal effect. Respondent Judge is, at his request, deemed to have
inhibited himself from taking further cognizance of said case, and said
case is hereby ordered to be proceeded to trial upon the merits by
another Judge of the same Court to be chosen by raffle in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 22, Revised Rules of Court. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Makalintal, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40198 August 1, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENEDICTO URSUA, defendant-appellant.
16
Villafuerte, Tible and Valer for appellant. defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from
Ocampo & Cea and Rosendo R. Luntok for the offended party as appellee. the judgment of conviction, the offended party should have the right
AVANCEA, C.J.: within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is
In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, an information was filed prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that
against Benedicto Ursua, charging him with the crime of homicide of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether loses
through reckless imprudence. In the course of the trial, in which the its jurisdiction over the cause, the offended party would be deprived of
private prosecution intervened, and after the evidence had been taken, his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the
the trial court found the following facts to be proven. date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal before the expiration
On November 17, 1934, in the municipality of Libmanan, Province of of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of the
Camarines Sur, the accused, who was acting as municipal president, accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the
ordered the policemen Alejandro Quiro to ask the municipal president for judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has
the latter's revolver. When Alejandro Quiro delivered the revolver to the jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused, the latter, noticing that it was not loaded, requested the chief of private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the accused.
police to load it. The chief of police loaded it with four cartridges and As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to have entered judgment
delivered it to the accused, with the cylinder in proper place and trigger with respect to the civil liability of the accused (Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil.,
locked. Shortly after the accused had taken the revolver in his hands, a 344). Section 407 of General Orders, No. 58 expressly imposes upon the
discharge was heard which hit Alejandro Quiro in the abdomen, resulting courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil liability
in his death. arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in
Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of a separate action.
homicide through reckless imprudence, as charged in the information, Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the court of
and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision correcional. The origin for the purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused (U.
court, however, failed to enter judgment with respect to the civil liability S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600, 602.) So ordered.
of the accused in favor of the heirs of the deceased. Street, Abad Santos, Vickers and Diaz, JJ., concur.
The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July 8, 1933, and the
accused was noticed thereof on July 13th, on which date accused filed
notice of appeal. On the 18th of the same month, the private prosecution
filed with the court a motion for reconsideration of its judgment on the
ground that it failed to make any finding relative to the civil liability of the
accused and to sentence him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The
trial court, believing that, because the accused had been appealed by the
accused and said appeal had been allowed, it had already lost its
jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of the private prosecution, denied
the said motion. The private prosecution excepted to this ruling and
appealed therefrom.
In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933,
declared the appeal of the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only
question left to be decided is the appeal of the private prosecution with
regard to the civil liability of the accused.
The trial court's resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by
the accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by the private prosecution nine days after the date
of the judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its
prosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused
(section 107, General Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that such right
is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his
17
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-112387 October 13, 1994
MANUEL P. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and SALVADOR H.
LAUREL, respondent.
Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner.
Laurel Law Offices for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated July 16, 1993 and October 25, 1993 in CA-G.R.
No. 13429, entitled "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus Manuel P. Martinez, Accused-Appellee, and Salvador H. Laurel,
Private Complainant and Appellant." What petitioner Manuel P. Martinez
actually seeks is the dismissal of the information for libel filed against him
in the Trial Court. On the basis of the facts hereunder set forth, the Court
denies his plea.
On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, 1 an Information
dated March 23, 1990 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of
Manila by Assistant Prosecutor Antonio J. Ballena, charging Manuel F.
Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and scurrilous
imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article
entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his
Manila Times column Narrow Gate. The Information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 90-82891 and assigned to Branch XI.
Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" 3 which, was denied by
Judge Manuel E. Yuzon in an Order dated June 21, 1990. 4 The case was
set for arraignment and pre-trial conference on July 31, 1990, but this
setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement.
On October 8, 1990, complainant Laurel filed a motion to set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial. Action on the motion was held in abeyance by
the pairing judge, Hon. Gerardo Pepito, pending assumption of duty of
Judge Yuzon's successor.
In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding
a prima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City
Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court on October 26,
1990, a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of
Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito on
November 6, 1990.
On February 6, 1991, complainant Laurel attempted once more to have
the case set for arraignment and trial. No action was taken on his said
motion, and a subsequent motion dated July 16, 1991 praying for the
resolution of the February 6, 1991 motion met the same fate.
By letter dated August 16, 1991 addressed to the City Prosecutor of
Manila, 5 then Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter
alia that while the language used in the article may be unsavory and
unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as if
embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication
under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed resolution was
therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the
dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez.
Consequently, a motion to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 90-82891 was filed on August 26, 1991 and set for hearing on
December 17, 1991. At the hearing, upon manifestation of complainant's
counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had received no copy of the
motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish
said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond
thereto.
It does not appear that the case prosecutor complied with the trial court's
order; this notwithstanding, said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A.
Barrios, issued on February 18, 1992 and Order 6 reading:
Before arraignment was had, the Department of Justice
conducted & since concluded review and reinvestigation
of the charges, the Resolution of which is Annex "A" of the
prosecution's motion to dismiss. The prosecution's fresh
stand is that "there is no sufficient evidence against the
said accused to sustain the allegation in the information."
Coming as it does from the officials having control of the
prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, and
there being no objection, the motion to dismiss is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed. The office/officer
having custody of it is directed to forthwith release to the
accused his cash bond submitted under O.R. NO. 46865.
SO ORDERED.
Complainant Laurel having sought and been denied a reconsideration of
said Order, he went to the Court of Appeals, ascribing error to the lower
court in (a) recognizing the regularity and validity of the petition for
review filed by Martinez with the DOJ and the DOJ's giving due course
thereto, and (b) granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice
thereof to complainant Laurel, and basing said dismissal not on evidence
on record but on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, to whom the
judge completely subordinated his judgment and whose opinion, on its
face, was clearly puerile and flimsy and violated or disregarded numerous
Supreme Court decisions.
Martinez, on his part, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no
appeal lies from the dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the
private complainant, particularly where dismissal was at the instance of
18
the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of Justice. He
contended that if any remedy was available to private complainant, it was
a petition for certiorari, not an appeal. Said motion notwithstanding, the
Court of Appeals ordered complainant to file his brief. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's
Brief recommending that the Order dated February 18, 1992 of the lower
court granting the prosecution's motion to dismiss, be set aside and the
case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
On July 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, issued a
Resolution 7 granting the appeal and remanding the case for arraignment
of the accused and trial on the merits. The Appellate Court ruled that
private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid grievance
against the order of dismissal before arraignment" and that the remedy of
appeal was properly available because the order of dismissal was a final
order which terminated all proceedings in the case. Quoting extensively
from the People's Manifestation, the Court found the review by then
Acting Justice Secretary Bello to run counter to prevailing jurisprudence
and DOJ Circulars. It further ruled that the trial court completely
abdicated its jurisdiction in favor of the Justice Department when it
dismissed the case on the mere say-so of the prosecutor, without
requiring the latter to present evidence to enable the court to arrive at its
own judgment.
Martinez sought, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the above
Resolution. 8 Hence, the present recourse. His arguments in support
thereof do no warrant reversal of the challenged judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not
foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said order having issued before
arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. 9
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is
granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed thereby in
double jeopardy. 10
In People vs. Guido, 11 this Court ruled that the word "party" must be
understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also
other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the
criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held
to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is
derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the
offense. 12 The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari from an order rendered in a criminal case was
likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes vs. Gopengco 13and People
vs. Calo, Jr., 14 which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court in order to promote their object . . . ." 15
In People vs. Nano 16, the Court, while declaring the petition filed before
it by the private counsel for the offended parties to be defective in form,
nevertheless took cognizance thereof in view of the gravity of error
allegedly committed by the respondent judge against the prosecution
denial of due process as well as the manifestation and motion filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General praying that the petition be treated as if
filed by the said office. The same exceptional circumstances obtaining in
the Nano, case justified the Court of Appeals' taking cognizance of the
appeal filed by private complainant Laurel, i.e.: denial of due process
consisting in the failure of the prosecution to furnish counsel for private
complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss despite being ordered to do
so, as well as of the Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief 17 filed by
the Solicitor General in the appellate
court, recommending the setting aside of the Order of the lower court
dated February 18, 1992 and the remand of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings.
It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the
People or the prosecution. The reason, as explained by the Court in Orbos
vs. Civil Service Commission, 18 is that as the lawyer of the government,
its agencies and instrumentalities, the Solicitor General has the duty to
"see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the
limits set by
law. . . . It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client's position." When that happens, as
the Court observed in Orbos:
. . . the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his
opinion and recommendation to the Court which is an
invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some
occasions he begs leave to be excused from intervening
in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its
own comment different from the stand of the Solicitor
General or in a situation when he finds the contention of a
private party tenable as against that of the government or
any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has
recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed
criminal cases.
The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is
correct because the order of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed
of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the
lower court. 19 In Bell Carpets International Trading Corp. vs. Court
Appeals, 20 this Court held that "(t)he remedy against such a judgment is
19
an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal,
whether of fact, or of
law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial
Court. . . . (T)he party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of
appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of
the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil
action of certiorari."
The rule with respect to the disposition of motions to dismiss filed by the
fiscal was laid down by the Court in Crespo vs. Mogul, 21 where it was
held that:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complainant or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal even cases while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Petitioner maintains that it is precisely in recognition of the above-cited
rule that the prosecutor left the disposition of the case to the discretion of
the lower court by filing the appropriate motion to dismiss; and that it
was neither the Justice Secretary nor the fiscal who dismissed the
information, but the trial judge himself, who exercised his discretion by
approving the stand taken by the prosecution.
The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court
consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise
its discretion properly and judiciously. Other procedural lapses that must
be pointed out are attributable to petitioner Martinez, who filed a petition
for review with the Department of Justice despite the denial by Judge
Yuzon of his motion for reinvestigation, and to the Justice Secretary, who
took cognizance of the petition for review despite the fact that an
information had been filed in court. But that is water under the bridge.
What now concerns the Court here with is how the trial judge acted in
relation to the motion to dismiss. First, he granted the same without the
prosecution having furnished private complainant a copy of the motion
despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively depriving
private complainant of his day in court.
Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting
Secretary of Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that
"there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused to sustain the
allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of objection to
the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the
prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a
copy of the motion to dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon
considerations other than the judge's own personal individual conviction
that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or
disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of
discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be
convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment
of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required ws the trial judge's own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of
judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its
supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make
an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring
the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge
relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was
the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to
do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in
violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul. 22
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private
complainant's right to due process as well as upon an erroneous exercise
of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said
dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for arraignment
of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court
of Appeals are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
20
 The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel
E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May
20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view
of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal
and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in
the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does
the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his
civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
Republic of the Philippines extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
SUPREME COURT extinguished:
Manila 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
EN BANC personal penalties; and as to the
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, extinguished only when the death of the
vs. offender occurs before final judgment;
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
21
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task
of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished
from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is
final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las
penas personales siempre, y respecto a
las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia
firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the
ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que
adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no
haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni
reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory,
"there cannot be any determination by final judgment
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no
party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp.
859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People
vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964.
See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought
to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But
then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and
let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to
clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof
criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
22
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by
the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio
Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People
of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the
death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by
this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to
the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil
liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil
Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication,
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility,
the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. The said
principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime
itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
(Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability
of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of
the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to
his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court
relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the
defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court
of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of
money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be
included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos,
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than
delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished
together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed
from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
23
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the
correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so,
this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through falsification
and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action
(Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-
40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability
solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination
of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of
the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed
irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil
liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article
30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be
that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
24
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on
appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso
facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed
but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such
claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal
action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is
to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same
has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the
court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is
but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to
death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all
things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of
and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such
civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to
be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the
Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that
does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this
fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just
a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said
civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article
30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the
main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis
of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil
actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint
of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
25
 Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed
in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money
claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration.
Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the
civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate
civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that,
in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil
action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused
and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising
from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we
stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as
a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
26
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on
a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120034. August 20, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA A.
ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No.
6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty
(20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of
Pasay City, Br. 114.
After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried
in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as
charged and imposed on her the death penalty.
As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue
that confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically
review her death sentence. The issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910
ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al.,[1] we already held
thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review a
decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by
the accused or by the courts, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and
sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the
trial of the accused. Such trial is not terminated until the Supreme Court
has reviewed the facts and the law as applied thereto by the court
below. The judgment of conviction entered on the trial is not final,
can not be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until
the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. In a sense
the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and
reports thereon to the Supreme Court with his recommendation. While in
practice he enters a judgment of conviction and sentences the prisoner
thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by the Supreme Court, it has
none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is a mere
recommendation to the Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the
record which are presented with it. This is meant in no sense to detract
from the dignity and power of Courts of First Instance. It means simply
that that portion of Spanish procedure which related to cases where
capital punishment was imposed still survives.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which
capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is
one having for its object simply and solely the protection of the
accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he
is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest tribunal
of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a
second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can
waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions." (Emphasis supplied)
The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General Orders No. 58 as
amended, which provides:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record, or
any part thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acquittal,
or in which the sentence imposed is not death, unless such case shall
have been duly appealed; but such sentence shall be executed upon the
order of the court in which the trial was had. The records of all cases
in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court
of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or
not, and of all cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for investigation and
judgments as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such
cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty
days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the rendition of sentence."
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty. Its section 2(4) of Article VIII provided for review by this Court of
27
death penalty cases. Both our Rules of Court of 1940[2] and
1964[3] require the transmission to this Court of the records of all cases
in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court,
whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for review and
judgment as the law and justice shall dictate. It will be noted that these
rules were taken from the second part of General Orders were taken from
second part of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Section 4 of Act No.
194.[4]
Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated
the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the 1953 case of People vs. Villanueva,
[5] we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict does
not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his conviction, viz.:
"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be
allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary
criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the
appeal does not remove the case from the jurisdiction of this
court which under the law is authorized and called upon to
review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the
decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as was said by this court
through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532,
speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision imposing the
death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not
final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until
the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that
although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said
decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that
until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes
upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic
review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or
evade."
The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al.,[6] involves
the escape of a death convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the
escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of
reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case of People vs. Daban, et al.,
[7] the ponencia of former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to
wit:
"xxx xxx xxx"
"Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware
of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: `The records of all cases in which the
death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance,
whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to
the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and justice shall
dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the
Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen (15)
days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form
prescribed by Section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be
forwarded as provided in Section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days after
the filing thereof by the stenographer.' The penalty imposed on appellant
Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of
death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until
after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the
lower court decision. As explained in former Chief Justice Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court: `In this connection, it must be
emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty
entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is
wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the
Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is
entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a
final judgment and sentence; and that until it has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and
conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme Court is something
which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.' The mere
fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could not be relied upon by
respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's
brief."
Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the
death penalty.[8] Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure
for review of death penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule 122 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of
review.Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and
judgment" by this Court. Our case law continued its fealty to
the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case of People vs. Saliling, et al.,
[9] we held, thru former Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not
precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at
large. In the 1984 case of People vs. Buynay, et al.,[10] we reiterated
the rule that the escape of a death convict will not automatically result in
the dismissal of his appeal.
Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes Congress so provides.[11] On December 13, 1993, Congress
reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission
of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews
death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic
and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to
be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option.[12]
With due respect to the dissenting opinions, of our esteemed
colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia,
authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, has
no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In
28
death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and
tone of section 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule, viz.:
"Section 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. - In all
cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and
judgment, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new
trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten
(10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."
Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla,[13] by our dissenting
colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is not a death penalty case. Only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant. Consequently,
we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to
the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.
Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between "x x x a
death convict, i.e. one convicted to death by a trial court who remains in
the custody of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his appeal and a
death convict, i.e. one convicted to death by the trial court but who
escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal."
They rationalize the distinction by holding:
"It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict
withdraws his appeal from the trial court's judgment convicting him to
death, the appellate court may still and nonetheless review the judgment
of conviction for the convict-appellant has at least remained in the
custody of the law to await final verdict in his case. In the second case,
however, the accused no longer recognizes and respects the authority of
law and the duly-constituted authorities in general and this Court in
particular. Such supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not
be taken lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority
of the Court is an essential and implicit element in an effective and
credible judicial system.
"No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of
the justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even
vindication via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another
breath, continuing to be a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very
authority of the system whose protection he seeks and invokes."
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing
jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases,
regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the
Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may
be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn
his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal
not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the
law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of
pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will
not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by
the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is
not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No
litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the
Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have
to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen
is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in
crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be
diluted.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous
crimes for as discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition
of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding
stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the
license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal
whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an
erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy
ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends
all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal
interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not
be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law
enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of
the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions
should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let
us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to
have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is
implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to
be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right
to be wrong.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new
period of thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to file the Brief
of the accused Josefina A. Esparas.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur in separate opinion.
Padilla, J., dissents.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Melo, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., join Justice
Padilla's dissenting opinion.
29
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147070. February 17, 2004]
SANTIAGO TAMAYO alias BATOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review, petitioner Santiago Tamayo alias Batog
prays that the resolutions[1] dated November 10, 2000 and January 31,
2001 of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that the
appellate court be directed to reinstate and give due course to his appeal.
On December 15, 1998, petitioner was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City of arson punishable under Art. 321,
no. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to
12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Petitioner
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of
appeal. On June 30, 1999, the appellate court required him to file an
appellants brief. Petitioner, however, failed to file the required brief
despite the lapse of one year. This prompted the Court of Appeals to issue
the assailed resolution dated November 10, 2000 dismissing his
appeal. The Court of Appeals treated petitioners failure to file the
appellants brief as an abandonment of his appeal, pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, praying that he be given ample
time to prepare his appellants brief. He averred that he was completely
unaware of the non-filing of the brief by his former counsel who withdrew
from the case without his knowledge and consent. On January 31, 2002,
the Court of Appeals issued another resolution denying reconsideration
on the ground that
xxx as of 29 January 2001 or forty-one (41) days after the filing of this
Motion, accused Santiago Tamayo still failed to submit his Appellants

30
Brief. Accordingly, the Court viewed this non-compliance as an
abandonment of his appeal.
WHEREFORE, for failure to file the mandatory Appellants Brief within the
reglementary period, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED.[2]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that he should not be made to bear the adverse
consequences of his former counsels negligence. He claims that his
former counsel abandoned his case without informing him and that it was
only when his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals that he
learned of his former counsels withdrawal from the case.
He further contends that the exercise by the appellate court of the
power to dismiss the appeal was not in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play as he was denied his right to be heard on appeal.
He insists that the Court of Appeals should have excused the
procedural lapse since strict compliance with the rules meant sacrificing
justice for technicality. Considering that no material injury was suffered
by the People of the Philippines by reason of the delay in the filing of his
brief, the appellate court should have allowed him to file it even beyond
the reglementary period.
In his comment, the Solicitor General argues that the Court of
Appeals acted correctly in issuing the assailed resolutions since: (a) the
delay in filing the brief was not merely a matter of a few days or weeks
but of more than one year; (b) for more than a year, petitioner
negligently failed to exert effort to confer with his counsel about the
progress of his appeal; (c) knowing the gravity of the offense and the
severity of the penalty imposed on him, petitioner should have been
diligent enough to communicate with his counsel concerning his case and
(d) even though he filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his appeal, prudence dictated that, without waiting for the resolution of
his motion, he should have filed his brief within a reasonable
time. Clearly, petitioner failed to do what was reasonable under the
circumstances, hence his appeal was rightly dismissed for the second
time.
Petitioner, in his reply, retorts that he could not be expected to
presume that the motion for reconsideration would be granted. His
primordial concern then was for his appeal to be reinstated. Thus, before
filing the requisite brief, he still had to wait for the order of the Court of
Appeals reinstating the appeal.
We grant the petition.
Except for criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or death, an appeal from the judgment of the lower court is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. The circulars of this
Court prescribing technical and other procedural requirements are meant
to promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions that clog the docket and
waste the time of the courts. These technical and procedural rules,
however, are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial justice. A
deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their
prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason
for the existence of courts.[3]
It must be noted that, in the case at bar, it is not disputed that
petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal and that the appellate court
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner merely failed to submit his
appellants brief within the period provided by the rules. A distinction
should be made between the failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period
granted by the appellate court. The former results in the failure of the
appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over the appealed decision
resulting in its becoming final and executory upon failure of the appellant
to move for reconsideration. The latter simply results in the abandonment
of the appeal which can lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its
reconsideration.[4]
In the instant case, when appellant learned about the dismissal of his
appeal, he timely moved for its reconsideration on the ground that he had
no knowledge that his counsel not only failed to file the required brief but
actually withdrew as such without his consent. Apparently, the Court of
Appeals did not act on petitioners motion praying for the reinstatement of
his appeal. Instead, it precipitately issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal for the second time on the same ground - that petitioner was
deemed to have abandoned his appeal. According to the Court of
Appeals, forty-one (41) days from the filing of appellants motion for
reconsideration had already lapsed and no brief was ever filed. We hold,
however, appellant not responsible therefor because he was waiting for
the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. It must be recalled that,
in his motion, he prayed for the reinstatement of his appeal and that he
be given sufficient time to file his brief in the event of reinstatement of
his appeal. It would have been improper therefore for appellant to
presume the favorable outcome of the motion he filed. He was not
expected to file his brief right after moving for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of his appeal without an order from the court directing him to
do so. In a considerable number of cases, the Court has deemed it fit to
suspend its own rules or to exempt a particular case from its strict
operation where the appellant fails to perfect his appeal within the
reglementary period, resulting in the appellate courts failure to obtain
jurisdiction over the case. With more reason, there should be a wider
latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural rules when
the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed
case and, as in this case, petitioner failed to file the appellants brief.
This is not to say, however, that technical and procedural rules
governing appeals, including those prescribing reglementary periods,
need not be observed at all or may be ignored at will. The remedy of
appeal may be availed of only in the manner provided for by law and the
rules. However, while, as a general rule, a review on appeal is not a
31
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and may be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, still it must be
remembered that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Courts
should thus proceed with extreme care so as not to deprive a party of this
right. Laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum
or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and
attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.[5] The need to safeguard
petitioners rights should caution courts against motu proprio dismissals of
appeals, specially in criminal cases where the liberty of the accused is at
stake. The rules allowing motu proprio dismissals merely confer a power
and does not impose a duty; and the same is not mandatory but merely
directory, which therefore requires a great deal of prudence, considering
all the attendant circumstances.[6] Thus, substantial justice would be
better served by reinstating petitioners appeal.
Moreover, dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon since our general policy is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits. This Court is therefore constrained to relax the
rules to give way to the paramount and overriding interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
November 10, 2000 and January 31, 2001 resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners appeal is
REINSTATED. Petitioner is hereby ordered to file his appellants brief in the
Court of Appeals within a non-extendible period of fifteen days from
receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134981. June 18, 2003]
FREDELITO P. VITTO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking to set aside the
Resolution dated August 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20245, People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Pajaron, et al., denying
petitioner Fredelito P. Vittos Motion For Leave Of Court To File Appellants
Brief.
The facts are as follows:

32
 Fredelito Vitto, petitioner, together with Vic O. Pizarro and Danilo P.
Pajaron, were charged with homicide under an Information filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 94-5749.
After hearing, or on October 23, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision[2] convicting all the accused of homicide and sentencing them
to six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
All the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20245. Since then, they have remained at
large for failure to post bail on appeal.
On November 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution[3] requiring them to explain why their appeal should not be
deemed abandoned in view of their failure to submit themselves to the
proper authorities during the pendency of their appeal.
On December 1, 1997, petitioner, through counsel de parte,
submitted his explanation stating that he was not aware that he should
surrender to the Court of Appeals. His counsel then requested an
additional period, or up to December 20, 1997, within which (a) to
contact the accused who is in Mindoro and advise him to submit himself
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; and (b) to file the appellants
brief.[4]
However, petitioner did not present himself to the Appellate Court
within the period requested by his counsel. Neither did he file an
appellants brief. Thus, on March 31, 1998, the court issued a
Resolution[5] dismissing the appeal.
On July 21, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion For
Leave Of Court To File Appellants Brief stating that his failure to surrender
himself to the authorities and to file the brief within the time requested
was because he works in a remote farm in Mindoro and has no sufficient
funds to pay for his transportation to Metro Manila.
In a Resolution dated August 6, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion, thus:
As the Resolution of March 31, 1998 dismissing the respective appeals of
the accused-appellants had already become final and executory on
May 5, 1998 insofar as the accused-appellant Fredelito Vitto is
concerned, the Motion for Leave of Court to File Appellants Brief
filed by his counsel only on July 21, 1998 is DENIED outright.[6]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying his Motion
For Leave Of Court To File Appellants Brief. He thus prays that the
application of the Rules of Court be suspended in his favor and that his
brief be admitted considering his predicament.
In his comment on the petition, the Solicitor General prayed that the
petition be denied for being unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure of
2000 provides:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The
Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and
with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except where the appellant is represented by a counselde oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal. (8a)
In People vs. Potajo,[7] we held that an appeal by the accused is
considered abandoned where he fails to properly prosecute his appeal or
does some act inconsistent with its prosecution, such as when he refuses
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the authorities.[8]
In the present case, the record shows that petitioner, through
counsel, asked the Court of Appeals for an extension until December 20,
1997 within which to submit himself before it and to file the appellants
brief.[9] However, petitioner failed to comply with his commitment. Such
omission is fatal to his appeal.[10] Thus, the Court of Appeals, in its
Resolution of March 31, 1998, considered petitioners appeal as having
been abandoned and consequently dismissed the same. The Resolution
became final and executory on May 5, 1998.[11] As such, the Appellate
Court, in its assailed Resolution dated August 6, 1998, correctly denied
petitioners subsequent Motion For Leave To File Appellants Brief
submitted on July 21, 1998, or more than two (2) months after the finality
of the Resolution dismissing the appeal.
While petitioner, who is being represented by a counsel de parte,
wants to avail himself of the opportunity to prove his innocence, yet he
insolently refused to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the very same
Appellate Court from which he is seeking relief. Such actuation cannot be
countenanced.
Petitioners claim that he was not aware that he must surrender
himself to the court is a flimsy excuse. It bears stressing that he was
represented by counsel throughout the trial and while his case was on
appeal. Considering that he was facing a serious charge, it was
incumbent upon him to inform his lawyer of his whereabouts and to
inquire about the status of his case from time to time. In the same
manner, his counsel should have exercised the required diligence
incumbent upon him to acquaint his client regarding the proceedings in
the appellate court.
Indeed, the law cannot protect a party who sleeps on his rights,
[12] or does some acts inconsistent with its prosecution.
33
 In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184091 January 31, 2011
EDWARD GARRICK VILLENA and PERCIVAL DOROJA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOMAR B. DEGERON, CHRISTIAN
DANDAN, and ELIZABETH BORCELIS, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 2 and August 1,
20083 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224.
The antecedents
Petitioners Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edward Garrick Villena and Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Percival Doroja, together with PO2 Nicomedes Lambas
(PO2 Lambas), PO3 Dan Fermalino (PO3 Fermalino), 4 Police Chief
Inspector Jovem C. Bocalbos, PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao (PO3 Macalinao),
PO1 Alvaro Yumang (PO1 Yumang), and Imelda Borcelis, were indicted for
the crime of robbery (extortion)5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 202, Las Pias City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
05-0025.
After arraignment, where the accused all pled "not guilty," and pre-trial,
trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners failed to appear before the trial
court to adduce evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who
appeared before the court to present his evidence.
On August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision 6 convicting
petitioners, together with PO2 Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao,
and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged.
During the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners
again failed to appear despite proper notices to them at their addresses
of record. In the absence of petitioners, the promulgation was made
pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest
against them.
On October 11, 2007, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William
F. delos Santos, filed their separate notices of appeal before the RTC. In
the said notices, they explained that they failed to attend the
promulgation of judgment because they did not receive any notice
thereof because they were transferred to another police station.7
In the Order8 dated November 20, 2007, the RTC denied due course to
petitioners notices of appeal. The RTC ratiocinated in this wise
Case record shows that the Decision of the court dated August 29, 2007
was promulgated on September 3, 2007. The appropriate notices and
subpoenas were duly sent to the accused but [they were] returned with
the notation that they are no longer residing at their given address/es. In
the present case, all three accused raised the excuse that they were not
notified of the setting of the promulgation. The Court finds this ground
unmeritorious since the accused have the obligation to inform the Court
of the changes in their address in order that the orders, notices and other
court processes may be properly sent to them. In any case, the counsels
on record for the accused Macalinao, Doroja and Villena were duly
notified of the scheduled hearings and promulgation of judgment.
Moreover, with the non-appearance of the accused-movants during the
presentation of defense evidence and on the scheduled promulgation of
the decision, the Court already issued a Warrant of Arrest against the
three accused. This means that they have lost their standing in court and
unless they surrender or submit to the jurisdiction of the court, they are
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. (People v.
Del Rosario, et al., G.R. Nos. 107297-98, December 19, 2000, citing
People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79, 87-88 [1991]).
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Notices of Appeal filed by accused PO3 Reynaldo
Macalinao, PO1 Percival Doroja and P/Insp. Edward Garrick Villena are
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to
Reconsider the November 20, 2007 Order.9Petitioners likewise filed a
joint Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order of November 20, 2007). 10
Resolving the said motions, the RTC issued its Order 11 dated February 8,
2008, granting the prayer for reconsideration of PO3 Macalinao, giving his
notice of appeal due course. However, the said Order denied herein
petitioners motion, for failure to adduce any valid excuse or compelling
justification for the reconsideration, reversal, and setting aside of the
November 20, 2007 Order. The RTC found
x x x In the case of accused Reynaldo Macalinao, it is pristinely clear from
the case records that he has been actually attending the scheduled
hearings of the case since its inception. He was also the only one, among
the police officers accused in this case, who testified in Court in defense
of the charges leveled against him.
Moreover, the Court, after a second look at the records finds that his
failure to attend the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007 (of
34
the Decision dated August 29, 2007) was due to an excusable and
justifiable reason. As stated in his Manifestation/Motion on the Subpoena
dated August 29, 2007, the basis for his non-appearance was for the
reason that he was transferred from Raxa Bago, Tondo, Police Station (PS-
1) to Police Station 11, Meisic located at Felipe II, Binondo, Manila, since
July 26, 2006, as evidenced by [the] Certification dated September 19,
2007 issued by P/Insp. Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief Administration
Section.
We cannot say the same thing for the other two (2) accused, namely, PO1
Percival Doroja and P/Insp. Edward Garrick Villena as they have not
manifested nor informed the Court of the cause of their non-appearances
despite notices and subpoenas sent to them nor sought for the lifting of
the Bench Warrant issued against them unlike accused Reynaldo
Macalinao. Also, it can be keenly observed that they both failed to appear
in several if not most of the hearings set by the Court since the
commencement of the trial of the instant case against them. Noteworthy
of such non-appearances in court despite due notices and subpoenas are
the scheduled hearings on November 23, 2005, February 8, 2006,
February 15 and 22, 2006, April 26, 2006, May 10, 2006, June 21, 2006,
September 20, 2006, October 11 and 25, 2006, November 29, 2006,
January 24, 2007, February 26, 2007, March 14 and 19, 2007, April 25,
2007 and the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007.
From all the foregoing actions during the trial of this instant criminal case,
and after their conviction by this Court, it is only accused PO3 Reynaldo
Macalinao who had shown sufficient interest in defending his case. The
records show no unusual and deliberate delay caused by him in the trial
of the criminal case.
As to the other two accused, it can[not] be gainsaid that they have not
proffered any cogent and excusable reason to justify their non-
appearance during the aforesaid dates and they only asked for judicial
leniency, which this Court cannot give. They have only themselves to be
blamed.12
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition13 for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA, in
its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2008, initially dismissed the petition for
not being accompanied with clearly legible duplicate originals or certified
true copies of the questioned Orders. Petitioners thus moved to
reconsider the April 30, 2008 Resolution.
In the August 1, 2008 Resolution,15 even as it took into account the
merits of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA nevertheless
resolved to deny the same for failure to show prima facie evidence of any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Hence, this petition
ascribing error to the CA in dismissing their petition and in not finding
grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for denying their notices of
appeal.
Petitioners now argue that the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial
of their respective notices of appeal since they already contained the
required manifestation and information as to the cause of their non-
appearance on the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e.,
lack of notice. According to them, their notices of appeal have
substantially complied with the requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, and have effectively placed them under the RTCs
jurisdiction. They allege further that their motion for reconsideration
should have been considered by the CA since they have offered the
explanations that their failure to appear during the promulgation of
judgment was due to the change of their respective addresses, and that
their former counsel of record did not inform them of the need to notify
the RTC thereof, much less properly advise them of the current status of
the proceedings. As regards their failure to move for the lifting of the
bench warrants issued for their arrest, petitioners asseverate that the
Rules of Court do not provide for such a requirement before they could
avail of the remedies they seek.
The petition is without merit.
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice
of appeal and that the trial court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the
case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal
could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in
court. In this case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their
unjustified failure to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during
the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners insist that their failure to attend the promulgation of judgment
was due to the lack of notice of the date thereof, allegedly because they
were transferred to another police station. Notably, however, petitioners
did not proffer any documentary and convincing proof of their supposed
transfer, not even to inform the court as to which police station they were
transferred. In contrast, their fellow accused PO3 Macalinao submitted to
the RTC a Certification issued by P/Insp. Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief of
the Philippine National Police Administrative Section, evidencing his
transfer from Police Station (PS-1), Raxa Bago, Tondo Manila to Police
Station 11, Meisic in Binondo, Manila. Petitioners were duty bound to
inform the RTC of their transfer, assuming its truth, so that notices may
be sent to their respective new mailing addresses. They were remiss in
the discharge of this responsibility.
Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court.
We differ. Said provision states
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
35
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention
upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have the authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to
him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation
of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.16
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available under the Rules
of Court against the judgment(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his
standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender,
and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies,
stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date
of promulgation of judgment. If the trial court finds that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail of the said
remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified
and allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of
conviction.17
Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their new
counsel, therein only explaining their absence during the promulgation of
judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact that
said notices were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the
purported date when their new counsel personally secured a copy of the
judgment of conviction from the RTC. The term "surrender" under Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a
convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against
him. The filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice as a physical and
voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only
upon petitioners valid surrender, and only after proper motion, that they
can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these
requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from
their conviction, were properly denied due course.
Even if petitioners notices of appeal were given due course, the CA
would only be constrained to dismiss their appeal. This is because
petitioners, who had standing warrants of arrest but did not move to have
them lifted, are considered fugitives from justice. Since it is safe to
assume that they were out on bail during trial, petitioners were deemed
to have jumped bail when they failed to appear at the promulgation of
their sentence. This is a ground for dismissal of an appeal under Section
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which provides
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.The
Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and
with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule,
except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal.18
Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in
the case of petitioners), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of
the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.19
What is more, the judgment of conviction against petitioners had already
acquired finality.1wphi1 Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
they had only 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment within
which to surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court to
avail of the remedies against the judgment. As the judgment was
promulgated on September 3, 2007, petitioners had only until September
18, 2007 to comply with the mandatory requirements of the said rule.
This Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as
such, may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
36
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 30, 2008
and August 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224 are Republic of the Philippines
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED. Manila
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA THIRD DIVISION
Associate Justice G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011
JUDITH YU, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to
enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Judith Yu, et al."1
The Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly
summarized below.
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an
information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto
mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the
payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount
as the fine.2
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion
for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material
evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted.3
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners
motion for new trial for lack of merit.4
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005,
the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November
18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. 6
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to
submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance. 7
37
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to
appeals in criminal cases.8
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the
decision.9
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for
resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the
prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.10
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the
prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-
day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the
"fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating
that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the
"fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the
Rules.11
In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to
comment on the petition.12
In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot
seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases
because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of
"standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the
interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42
and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in
Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned. 13
Issue
The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in
Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.
The Courts Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is
a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only
if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. 14 The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129),15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen
(15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from
the notice of the judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall
be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which
time the balance of the period begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of
the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set
a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for
reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time,
based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
38
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 16
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of
the issues involved in the case.
The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day
period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of
Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a
civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states
that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court)
also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results
are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration.
It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists
why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which
also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition
for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal
cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil
and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively
foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case
will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly
discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double
standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests
are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.
We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being
contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law
Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in
lege.18
Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions,
with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused
in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must
extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably
filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice
denying her motion for new trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad
is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction
over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the
decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to
the petitioners appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate
39
the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed
decision on the merits.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL
alias "TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
40
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and from seven to ten days.8 For the defense, petitioners denied the crime
Resolution2 dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR charged, declaring in unison that they were in their respective houses the
entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that the night
No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato. with other barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias area. At the time, they recovered a stolen carabao owned by a certain
"Tapol" were charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article
Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed to
128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4 The Information dated May 3, escape.
1990 reads: On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the
GENEROSO MARFIL Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
committed as follows: imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and
That at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed
Lantawan, Barangay Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element
of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:
being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the
inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, essential elements of the crime; on the issue of whether or not all the
armed with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were named
feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of ROBERTO CVOs and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same
MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an
occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for
consent of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than
LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter. that of the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers;
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 there exist a doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the accused; that
not guilty.6 Thereafter, trial ensued. on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged
10:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond
already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when reasonable doubt; x x x. 10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which,
petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial courts judgment. While it
the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor Less
striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation
firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag, of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay
Balerianos nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces
incident and corroborated his testimony. Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and portion of the assailed Decision states:
Warrant Officer of President Roxas Police Station who testified on the WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter
police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the and the evidence on hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE
prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he and a new one entered finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY beyond
issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128
left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate
region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six
abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum with the
axilliary region.7 Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted would heal accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to

41
follow a professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.
They argue that there is double jeopardy since the trial court already
acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being now
final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal
before the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for acquittal from
said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due
process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties. 12 When an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. 13 An appeal confers
upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law. 14 The appellate court may, and
generally does,look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of
weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court.15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction
for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned
their right to invoke the prohibition on doublejeopardy since it becomes
the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the
assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in
jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them
guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In
their testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they
filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a barangay captain nor Garde
and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such
positions, they are considered as public officers/employees. 16
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same.
Under Article 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccionalin
its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and
one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at
nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime
be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In
this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law17 requires courts to impose upon the
accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison
sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code.1wphi1 Yet
the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two,
not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision,
the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed
by Article 128 are:
Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20
days
Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10
days
Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the
medium period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9
months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this
case, the Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005
and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR
No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and
Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an
indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
42
 convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the defense
offered to present evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal opposed
the presentation of evidence by the defense, contending that the present
procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases
from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for
dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been
denied, and citing as authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz,
28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition of
the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present
evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein
petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P2,000.
From that sentence the herein petitioner together with his coaccused
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 7, 1948, the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion and without notice to the appellants as required in
section 8 of Rule 120 and in Baradi vs. People, G.R. No. L-2658, dismissed
the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their brief within the
extension of time granted them.
The present petition for habeas corpus was thereafter presented by Fidel
Abriol against the provincial warden of Leyte, contending that the
sentence entered against him in said criminal case No. 1472 was null and
avoid because it had been rendered without due process of law. Judge
Rodolfo Baltazar, who heard the petition for habeas corpus, denied it on
the ground that, the judgement of conviction against the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines having become final, "this court is entirely devoid of jurisdiction over and
SUPREME COURT power to modify or in any war alter said decision." From that decision of
Manila Judge Baltazar the petitioner has appealed to this Court.
EN BANC 1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present
G.R. No. L-2754 August 31, 1949 proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a
FIDEL ABRIOL, petitioner-appellant, palpable error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due
vs. process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the
VICENTE HOMERES, Provincial Warden of Leyte, respondent- Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of the
appellee. Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
Francisco Astilla for appellant. right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Isidro C. to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is on law nor
Borromeo for appellee. "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the
OZAETA, J.: right to be heard before being sentenced.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte Both the fiscal and Judge Moscoso have misunderstood the ruling of this
denying the appellant's petition for habeas corpus. Court in the case of the United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. In that
In criminal case No. 1472 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the herein case the accused-appellant assigned as error the denial by the trial court
petitioner Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of of the motion for dismissal presented by the defense after the evidence
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution had for the prosecution had been closed, although the court heard the
presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense evidence for the defense before rendering judgment. In refutation of said
moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence assignment of error the Attorney General cited in the case of United
to prove the guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and States vs. Abaroa, 3 Phil., 116, wherein the following principle was laid
against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs sufficient to down: "After the prosecution rests, the court should not dismiss the case
43
on motion for insufficiency of proof but should require defendant to
present evidence in his own behalf." In that connection the Court
observed that the ruling in the Abaroa case was handed down in
December, 1903, and before the decision in the Kepner case, when the
Government was permitted to appeal from dismissals and final judgments
in criminal cases. Said the Court:
. . . It was then held that the practice of dismissing the case
immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been
closed ought not to be followed, for when the order of dismissal
was appealed from and this higher court sustained the conviction
of the accused on that evidence of the prosecution he would have
been convicted without having been heard in his own defense
which would work an injustice; and when to avoid this difficulty
the order of dismissal was overruled and the case returned for
rehearing, another difficulty would be encountered, which is that
of subjecting the accused a second time to another trial without
action on his part and without need, since all the evidence could
and should have been taken at the trial already held, and with the
additional risk of all the inconveniences of delay. In this state of
affairs the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the
decision in the case of Kepner vs. U. S. (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil.,
669), and since then the situation assumed and disposed of in
United States vs. Abaroa cannot be considered, for the
Government cannot now appeal from an order sustaining the
motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the evidence for
the prosecution has been closed, on the ground of insufficiency
thereof.
Even now, after the Keeper case, it is no ground for error that the
Court of First Instance denied the motion for dismissal presented
immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been
closed because the defense believed it to be insufficient; for the
reason that, as in this case, the court did not hold it to be
insufficient it was under no obligation so to hold it and it
could continue the trial and take the evidence for the defense in
order to reach the conclusion induced in its opinion by the
allegations and the evidence, or as it did conclude in this case by
sentencing the defendant on the evidence for the prosecution,
which it held to be sufficient. (28 Phil., 282-283.)
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the
defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118),
the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the
prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the
motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether
or not the defense had reserved its right of present evidence in the event
its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before
sentence is pronounce on him. Of course if the accused as no evidence to
present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no
alternative but of decide the case upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution alone.
In the case of People vs. Moro Mamacol (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1],
3411) the accused, without reserving the right to present evidence,
moved for the dismissal of the case after the prosecution had rested. The
court denied the motion and, without allowing the accused to present his
evidence, sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment for the crime of
murder of which he was accused. On appeal this Court, although finding
that the evidence for the prosecution was sufficient for conviction, set
aside the judgment and ordered the case remanded to the lower court to
allow the accused to present his proofs.
In civil case cases, where either or both of the parties can appeal, the
ruling is different from that in criminal cases. If the defendant moves for
dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence after the plaintiff
had rested and the court grants the motion, and if n appeal by the
plaintiff the judgment is reversed, the case is terminated then and there;
that is to say, it is not remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of
allowing the defendant to produce evidence in his defense. "The
defendant in offering a motion to dismiss in effect elects to stand on the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's case." (Moody, Aronso and Co. vs. Hotel
Bilboa, 50 Phil., 198; Demetrio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil., 45; Arroyo vs. Andrea
Azur, 43 Off. Gaz., 54.) However, if the court denies the motion to
dismiss, it is not precluded from receiving evidence for the defendant,
and the plaintiff cannot by mandamus compel it to render judgment
without hearing the evidence for the defense. (Cataoco vs. Dinglasan, G.
R. No. L-2004, May 24, 1949.)
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies
in a case like the present. The general rule is that the function of a writ
of habeas corpus in permitting the petitioner to challenge by collateral
attack the jurisdiction under which the process or judgment by which he
is deprived of his liberty was issued or rendered cannot be distorted by
extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting within their
jurisdiction. (25 Am. Hur., Habeas corpus, sec. 13, p. 152.) This principle,
however, has been qualified in the sense that it "is not to be so applied as
to destroy constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty."
(Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461.)
Appellant relies upon the case of Schields vs. McMicking, 23 Phil., 526.
That case, however, was reversed in McMicking vs. Schields, 238 Y. S., 99;
59 Law, ed., 1220; 41 Phil., 971. The petitioner Schields was accused of
theft in the municipal court of Manila on December 1, 1910. There he was
duly arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced. He appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Manila on December 21, 1910. On December 23 he
received notice that the case would be heard at ten o'clock a.m. on the
44
24th. When he was arraigned on the last-mentioned date he asked for
time in which to answer the complaint, which request was denied by the
court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record that the petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's attorney
also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was also
denied by the same court. The petitioner's attorney excepted to this
ruling and asked that the exceptions, together with the request of the
petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record. After the
trial, during which the accused presented witnesses in his, defense, the
Court of First Instance found him guilty and sentenced him to four months
and one day of arresto mayor. In denying the petitioner's request for time
in which to prepare his defense, the trial court said:
At the beginning of the trial the defendant asked for further time
to prepare, and invoked certain sections of General Order No. 58,
which, in our judgment, were not applicable to this case. The
prosecution did not file a new complaint in this court. Defendant
was tried on the identical complaint which was presented in the
court below as long as December 1st. To that complaint, as the
record shows, he pleaded not guilty, and having further brought
this case here on appeal, the presumption is that such plea
continued, and to allow delays for the reiteration of such a plea
would be an empty formality. The law does not require a vain and
useless thing, and the provisions in question must be construed
as applying to cases where a new complaint is filed in this court.
But aside from this, we think that the time of trial caused no
prejudice to the accused. As we have seen, the complaint was
filed on December 1st, and the accused had more than three
weeks to prepare before the trial in this court. During this period
there were evidently one or more continuances, and finally, it
seems, the defendant had to be called into the municipal court by
a bench warrant. Upon bringing the case here it was incumbent
upon him to follow it up and to be ready and waiting its
disposition by this court. Notice of the trial was sent both to him
and to his counsel the day before, and it was not claimed if the
case had been postponed. On the contrary it appears that he
called one witness who did not testify in the court below. After all,
the question in the case is mainly one of law. The principal
controversy as to the facts to the question of the alleged
permission to take articles, and this, as we have seen, would not
have excused the defendant, even had it been proved, though he
admits that himself and Frandom are the only witnesses on that
point.
This court granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the
discharge of the petitioner from confinement on the ground that under
section 30 of General Orders No. 58 the accused, on demand, had the
right to at least two days in which to prepare for trial and that the refusal
of the time in which to prepare for trial was equivalent to the refusal of a
legal hearing. On appeal by the respondent Director of Prisons to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the latter reversed the judgment.
Said that court:
We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court
that the judgment pronounced by three Court of First Instance
was void and without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed
denial of the request for the time to answer and to prepare
defense was at most matter of error which did not vitiate the
entire proceedings. The cause admitted to be within the
jurisdiction of the court stood for trial on appeal. The accused
had known for weeks the nature of the charge against him. He
had notice of the hearing, was present in person and represented
by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other evidence,
and seems to have received an impartial hearing. There is
nothing to show that he needed further time for any proper
purpose, and there is no allegation that he desired to offer
additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being forced
into trial. But for the sections in respect of procedure quoted from
General Order No. 58, it could not plausibly be contended that the
conviction was without due process of law. The Court of First
Instance placed no purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon
these sections and certainly they are not so peculiarly inviolable
that a mere misunderstanding of their meaning or harmless
departure from their exact terms would suffice to deprive the
proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused. . . .
It will be noted that in said case the fact that the cause stood for trial on
appeal from the municipal court; that the accused had known for weeks
the nature of the charge against him; that he had notice of the hearing,
was present in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own
behalf, introduced other evidence, and seems to have received an
impartial hearing; that there was nothing to show that he needed further
time for any proper purpose; and that there was no allegation that he
desired to offer additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being
forced into trial weighed heavily against the pretension of the
petitioner that the sentenced entered against him was void for lack of
due process of law.
There is no analogy between the facts of that case and those of the
present case.
A more pertinent and analogous case is that of Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.
S., 458 Law. ed., 1461. Johnson was indicated by the grand jury for
feloniously uttering, passing, and possessing counterfeit Federal Reserve
notes. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty, said that he had no
lawyer, and in response to an inquiry of the court stated that he was
ready for trial. He did not ask for and was not provided with the
assistance of counsel. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to four and
45
one-half years of imprisonment. Although the Federal District Court
believed that the petitioner was deprived, in the trial court, of his
constitutional rights to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, it
denied the petition for habeas corpus, holding that the proceedings "were
not sufficient to make the trial void and justify its annulment trial errors or
irregularities which could only be corrected on appeal." The Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed that judgment; but the Supreme Court
on certiorari reversed it. We quote the pertinent portion of its ratio
decidendi:
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to Counsel is
to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own
ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty
would be nullified by a determination than an accused's ignorant
failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the
Constitution. True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the
question of jurisdiction occurring during the course of trial; and
the "writ of habeas corpus can nor be used as a writ of error."
These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as
to preserve not destroy constitutional safeguards of human
life and liberty. . . . .
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
with crime to the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this
constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite
to a Federal Court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of
Counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's
jurisdiction to conviction and sentenced. If the accused, however,
is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his life or liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the
beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings"
due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment
requires--by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to
obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the
court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of
conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and
one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.
. . . (82 Law. ed., 1467-1468.)
We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be
invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to
present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly
guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court
of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him
of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on
the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough, and the court
denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no
power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and
the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in
a habeas corpus proceeding.
3. There is no doubt that if the petitioner had prosecuted his appeal to a
successful conclusion, the sentence against him would have been set
aside and the case would have been rendered to the trial court to allow
him to present his proofs, as was done in the case of People vs. Mamacol,
supra. We make this observation to show that the petitioner cannot by
this habeas corpus proceeding secure a greater relief that he could have
obtained by appeal, and that in any event he is only entitled to the
restoration of the right of which he has been unlawfully deprived, namely,
the right to present evidence in his defense. Under section 17 of Rule
102, a person who is not set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall
not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order
or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense. Although
the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove
stated, he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or
admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided.
The process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may sand should be
resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial
of his constitutional right to be heard. Up to the point when the
prosecution rested, the proceedings were valid and should be resumed
from there.
Under the title "Proceedings and Relief" and subtitle "Judgment and
Costs" on the subject of Habeas corpus, American Jurisprudence says:
"After the hearing, the court should dispose of the petitioner in such
manner as the justice of the case may require; he may be discharged,
remanded, or admitted to bail . . . Even though a petitioner is entitled to
be relieved of the particular restraint under which he is held, he may, if
there is sufficient cause for his detention, be restrained until valid
proceedings against him may be taken." (Section 152 and 154.)
Wherefore, in view of the nullity of the sentence under which the
petitioner has been committed to imprisonment by the respondent, the
judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ prayed for is granted.
The respondent shall discharge the petitioner unless within fifteen days
from the promulgation of this decision the provincial fiscal of Leyte should
move the lower court to reset for trial said criminal case No. 1472 to allow
the petitioner to present his evidence and the trial court to decide the
case anew. Pending such new trial, the petitioner may be admitted to bail.
It is so ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
46

Separate Opinions
REYES, J., dissenting:
This is a petition for habeas corpus.
The petitioner was sentenced to prison by the Court of First Instance of
Leyte for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. From this
sentence he appealed to the Court of Appeals; but the appeal was there
dismissed because of his failure to file a brief. And as no steps were taken
to have the appeal reinstated, the sentence was in due time declared
final. This was on June 22, 1948. Committed prison to serve his sentence,
petitioner, on December 3, 1948, filed the present petition for habeas
corpus in the Court of First Instance, and the petition having been denied
by that court, the case is now before us on appeal.
The petitioner challenges the validity of the sentence of conviction
imposed upon him on the ground that his constitutional right was violated
when the lower court, after denying his motion to dismiss for alleged
insufficiency of the prosecution's proof, refused to allow him to present
his own evidence, holding that his right to do so was waived by his
motion for dismissal. It was, of course, error for the trial court to deny him
that right, and the error would undoubtedly have been corrected had he
prosecuted his appeal to its conclusion. But this he did not do, and the
question now is whether notwithstanding what was happened, the
correction may still be made through habeas corpus proceedings, whose
only purpose in law is to determine whether or not a person alleged to be
illegally detained is entitled to release. Disregarding the legal purpose of
this remedy, the majority of the Court has granted the writ but has
denied liberty to the petitioner, remanding the case to the court below for
further proceedings. Actually, what the majority has done is to allow the
remedy of habeas corpus to perform the functions of an appeal that is
now dead and can no longer be revived. To this I cannot agree.
No rule is better settled than that habeas corpus is not a corrective
remedy. It cannot be used for correcting errors or irregularities of
procedure which are not jurisdictional. (25 Am. Jur., par. 28.) It dose not
take the place of an appeal. (Abanilla vs. Villas, 56 Phil., 481.) And even if
the error sought to be corrected may have the effect of voiding a
judgment, so long as the court that rendered that judgement had
jurisdiction, habeas corpus may not be invoked to correct the error. The
proper remedy is by appeal or certiorari.
Thus, in the case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, 44 Off. Gaz., 22011,
where an attempt was made through habeas corpus proceedings to
invalidate a judgment of conviction rendered on a plea of guilty when, so
it was alleged, no such plea was properly entered by the accused, this
Court, through its Chief Justice, said:
. . . The trial court had jurisdiction over the offense and of the
person of the accused, and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to try the
case and render judgment therein. The allegation, if true, that the
judgment of conviction was rendered without a plea of guilty
properly entered by the accused to the lesser offense of
homicide, is merely a defect of procedure, not of jurisdiction,
though it may have the effect of voiding the judgment. And this
error of procedure cannot be reviewed in habeas
corpus proceedings wherein the only issue is whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to release. And the petitioner is not entitled
to release even if we have power to set aside the judgment upon
the ground aforementioned, for, in such event, the proper
procedure would be to reopen the criminal case and order the
trial court to proceed further as if no judgment has ever been
entered therein, that is, it must arraign the accused for the lesser
offense of homicide after the information is duly amended, then
try the case if the accused pleads not guilty, and the latter in the
meantime should remain in confinement if he is not on bail. But
this correction can be done only in an appeal or in an action
for certiorari wherein the trial court is made respondent and is
amenable to our orders.
In the present case, there is no question that the lower court had
jurisdiction to try the case against the petitioner for illegal possessions of
firearms and to convict him therefore. The court committed a legal error
when it convicted petitioner without allowing him to present his evidence.
But the error, though it made the judgment voidable, was only an error in
procedure, which could have been corrected by appeal. In fact, petitioner
took the steps to have the error so corrected, except that he later
abandoned the appeal by not presenting a brief. And though notified on
June 9, 1948, of the dismissal of his appeal, he did nothing to have the
dismissal reconsidered, and his petition for habeas corpus was not filed
until December 3, 1948, that is, about six months later, when he had
already been serving sentence for sometime. As said by this Court in the
case of Domingo vs. Director of Prisons, supra, "this passive attitude is an
indication of conformity with the proceedings and that the petition
(for habeas corpus) is but an afterthought."
The accused in a criminal case has the undoubted right to present
evidence on his behalf. But this right may be waived at any stage of the
case, and the waiver may be express or implied. Petitioner in the present
case could have insisted on the preservation of that right when he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. But since he gave up the appeal and
commenced to serve his sentence, the natural interpretation of his
attitude is that he no longer cared to have the error corrected and go
through further trial, thereby impliedly waiving his right to present
evidence if he had any.
The case of Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461, relied
on in the majority opinion is hardly applicable to the present case. There
the accused was denied his constitutional right to have the assistance of
counsel at the trial and the Supreme Court of the United States held that
47
the recognition of that right was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction,
so that when the right was denied the judgment of conviction was void as
having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is obvious that the denial of
the error which vitiated the entire proceedings of the trial court and made
a new trial inevitable. Annulment of the whole proceedings taken while
the accused had no legal counsel was, therefore, proper. In the case at
bar, as the majority opinion itself rules, the whole proceedings below did
not have to be annulled, so that the case had to be remanded to the trial
court for the reception of defendant's evidence. The question of
jurisdiction is not at all in issue and seems to have been invoked merely
as an excuse to justify recourse to habeas corpus as a merely for
correcting a procedural mistake.
I therefore vote for the dismissal of this petition and the confirmance of
the judgment below.
Bengzon and Tuazon, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6497 November 3, 1910
JUAN M. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondent.
48
Maximino Mina, for petitioner. The Director of Prisons, in his own behalf.
TRENT, J.:
On October 14, 1910, there was presented in this court a petition on
behalf of Juan M. Cruz, praying that a writ of habeas corpus issue directed
to the warden of Bilibid Prison, requiring him to bring the body of the
petitioner into court. The petition states that Juan M. Cruz is imprisoned
and restrained of his personal liberty in Bilibid Prison in the city of Manila
by the warden of said prison without authority of law. It is further alleged
in the petition that the petitioner was tried, convicted, and sentenced by
one of the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila in criminal cases
Nos. 1489 and 966, he being sentenced in the first case to imprisonment
for a term of three years, to pay a fine of P1,000, and to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the
payment of the fine, and in the second case to a term of two years'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,000 United States currency; that
this last case was appealed to the Supreme Court and affirmed, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case the fine was not paid; that the petitioner
having extinguished these sentences is now entitled to his liberty.
An order was issued requiring the warden of Bilibid Prison to show cause,
if any existed, why the writ should not issue. On the return day thereof
the said warden made return thereto in substance as follows:
That the petitioner is now undergoing in Bilibid Prison the sentences
imposed upon him by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, one
of three years' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the crime of conspiracy
against the Government, and the other of two year's imprisonment and a
fine of P4,000, for the crime of sedition; that the imprisonment imposed
in the two cases, without counting the subsidiary imprisonment, is five
years; that the petitioner having commenced to serve these sentences on
the 15th of November, 1905, the same will expire on the 15th of
November, 1910; that for good conduct, under the provisions of Act No.
1533 (the petitioner was not allowed the full time for good conduct under
this Act on account of certain violations of prison regulations), the five
years' imprisonment expired on the 4th of June, 1910; that the petitioner
is now serving the subsidiary imprisonment on account of his failure to
pay the P1,00 fine in case No. 1489, which subsidiary imprisonment will
expire about the 9th of July, 1911, at the rate of P2.50 a day.
The writ as prayed for having been issued on the 21st of October, 1910,
and the hearing having been set for the 22nd of the same month, the
case was submitted upon the answer of the respondent to show cause.
The respondent admits that the terms of imprisonment imposed upon the
petitioner, after giving him the time to which he is entitled for good
conduct, expired on the 4th of June, 1910. The only question to determine
is the legality of that part of the sentence of the Court of First Instance
condemning the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of the P1,000 fine. In this case the petitioner
was tried and convicted for having violated the provisions of Act No. 292
of the Philippine Commission, which went into effect on the 4th day of
November, 1901. Act No. 1732, which went into effect on November 1,
1907, provides that when a fine is imposed as a whole, or as any part of
the punishment for any criminal offense made punishable by any Act or
Acts of the Philippine Commission, the court shall also sentence the guilty
person to subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is satisfied; provided that
such subsidiary imprisonment shall not, in any case, exceed one year; but
in case the court imposes both a fine and imprisonment the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of imprisonment
imposed by such sentence. The penalty of three years' imprisonment and
a fine of P1,000 having been imposed upon the petitioner long before this
Act (No. 1732) went into effect, its provisions are not applicable to the
question under considerations, as such Act, being a penal statute, can not
have a retroactive effect for the reason that such effect would not be
beneficial to the petitioner. (Art. 22, Penal Code; U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11
Phil. Rep., 447.) Prior to the passage of Act No. 1732, Courts of First
Instance had no authority to impose subsidiary imprisonment for failure
to pay fines in cases of conviction for violations of the Acts of the
Philippine Commission, and such errors when committed have been
corrected by this court in those cases which were appealed. (U.S. vs.
Hutchinson, 5 Phil. Rep., 343; U.S. vs. Lineses, 5 Phil. Rep., 631; U. S. vs.
Macasaet, supra.)
In the case at bar the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction of the
offense described in the complaint for which the petitioner was tried. It
had jurisdiction of the prisoner who was properly brought before it. It had
jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defense offered by him, but it did
not have power to sentence the petitioner to subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency in the payment of the fine imposed. It is therefore
clear that that part of the judgment is void. This court at this time has no
power to correct this error committed by the court below, neither has it
power to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. The fact that
the petitioner did not appeal can not affect the question as the two
penalties imposed are separate and distinct. The courts uniformly hold
that where a sentence imposes a punishment in excess of the power of
the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of
the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of
authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to
the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that
the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid.
(Ex parte Erdmann, 88 Cal., 579; Lowrey vs. Hogue, 85 Cal., 600;
Armstrong vs. People, 37 Ill., 459; State vs. Brannon, 34 La. Ann., 942;
People vs. Liscomb, 19 Amm. Rep., 211; In re Taylor, 7 S.D., 382, 45
L.R.A., 136; Ex parte Mooney, 26 W. Va., 36, 53 Am. Rep., 59;
U.S. vs. Pridgeon, 153 U.S., 48; In re Graham, 138 U.S., 461.)
49
The petitioner has served out, according to the return of the respondent
to the order to show cause, the entire part of the sentences which the
court below had power to impose, and adhering to the rule that that part
of the sentences imposed by the court below in excess of its jurisdiction is
void, the petitioner is entitled to his release.lawphil.net
It is, therefore, ordered that the petitioner be discharged from custody
and that the costs of these proceedings be adjudged de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan,
directed to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter
be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the body of the
petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief
prayed for on certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that
petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent
Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of
conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code, was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of
the offense with which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was
confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a
sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty
(20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was
transferred to the military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm.
McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade
Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while
still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his
confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted
for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article
157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged
and sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law,
on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition,
and on the basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the
case regarding the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the
petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or
constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the
sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas
corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of
First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to
impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he
was charged evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality of province where the offense was committed or
any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses
because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one
province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the
court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja
opines
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados
como hechos independientes en sentido natural, el principio del
resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de
aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares
donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof
for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason
of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is
deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation3 and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to
the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where
the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to
another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated
from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included
the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his
attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the
courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to
another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous
or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said
that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his
confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues
to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue
50
committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place
MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA,
where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be
SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO
invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one
A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO
he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
GOSUICO, *** , respondents.
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
evading the service of his sentence. Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs. Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur. 1wph1.t Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time
in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of
Republic of the Philippines foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr.
SUPREME COURT imprisoned for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in
Manila September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was
EN BANC sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986 offenses alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M. by judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain
BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but mere instruments
COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted
MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press
PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence
ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the
EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of
TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME, the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971 elections
**, petitioners, (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition
vs. candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The
Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has
FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. never been known. But the then President never filed the said charges
PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. against Ninoy in the civil courts.
ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave
VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile
2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to
MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by
51
soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to
2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of
accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on
August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment
of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed
it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then
President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a
nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of
August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the
military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate
Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and
outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the
ten-day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the
largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their
grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to
investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos
become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the
early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so
that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth
through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious
and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the
Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing
November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los
Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded
in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and
majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to
mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was
submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was
received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the
report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one
and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution
through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was
better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other
members was submitted on the following day to the then President who
coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of
their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your
conscience with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent
Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating
that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in
the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the
military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the
SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted
Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with
one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting
by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman
himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference between the two
reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and
therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the
chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as
plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator
Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his
intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that
"The epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with
the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be
taken. "The four-member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the
epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable
political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our
traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and
for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would
be capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This
task was not only to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of the late former
Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome
responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over
evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a
painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore our
country's honored place among the sovereign nations of
the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and
justice are a way of life.
52
 More than any other event in contemporary Philippine
history, the killing of the late former Senator Aquino has
brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine
society. It was the concretization of the horror that has
been haunting this country for decades, routinely
manifested by the breakdown of peace and order,
economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and
an increasing number of abusive elements in what are
otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military
and law enforcement agencies. We are, however,
convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the
officers and men of these institutions have remained
decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in
the service of our country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would
be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister
Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority
can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social
apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have
spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying
the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is
imperative that public officials should regard public
service as a reflection of human Ideals in which the
highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly
required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983,
and the crisis that followed, would have normally caused
the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a
country where public office is viewed with highest esteem
and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public
officials transcend all other considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded
public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his
own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of
Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no
involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told
David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on
September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my
government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a
fairly low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what
they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as
his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent
evidence that seems to contradict earlier
reports, namely, the recent evidence
seems to indicate that some of the guards
may have been responsible (for shooting
Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong.
What you have been reading are the
newspapers and the newspaper reports
have been biased. The evidence still
proves that Galman was the killer. The
evidence also shows that there were
intelligence reports connecting the
communist party to the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date
going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report
implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that
the circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in
its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and
testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board,"
and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy
resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return
the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo
Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as
saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the
accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of
the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners,
composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and
former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed
the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest
efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts
"clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out
the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the
pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985
53
and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an
impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court
resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-
day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of
which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-
two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift
the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of
respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very
material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which
to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate
comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the
dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such
action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits
because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and
suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are
entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an
unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed
by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as
scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment
on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus,
on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued
its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This
marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect
convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the
assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that
with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had
become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,
with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second
motion for reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the
March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham,"
that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by
Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents
accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second
motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment
thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation
filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as
of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M.
Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he
added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged
attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead
successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the
case after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and
prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against herein private
party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum:
"There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure.
That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been
denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies
insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any
alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should
this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and
retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that
any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very
least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be
reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that
he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his
comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of
the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be
reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their
collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal
cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of
evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is
true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
54
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which
would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would
not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to
allow justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice
Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he passed
no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his
handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any
note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the
prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the
note passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors
were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
He amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed
ominous signs that the fate of the criminal case on the
death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman
on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous end.
Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel
(composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe
and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was
resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all the
respondents as principals was forwarded to the
Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF
TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E.
Marcos (the former President) summoned to Malacaang
Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan),
Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding
Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro
(the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left
earlier, came back and left again. The former President
had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all
accused as principals), evidently furnished him in
advance, and with prepared notes on the contents
thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining
that Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the
undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent
was the more discreet posture when the former President
became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former
President talked about Aquino and the communists,
lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel.
Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as:
"It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is
getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to
do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his
stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the
boys were frantic when they heard that they will be
charged in court, and wig be detained at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a
more pragmatic approach. The former President more or
less conceded that for political and legal reasons all the
respondents should be charged in court, Politically, as it
will become evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and
thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand,
legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are
acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former
President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the
Coordinator was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso
Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin
to put on record that they had no place in their respective
institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody
to commanding officers of members of AFP charged in
court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division)
would personally handle the trial, and assurance was
made by him that it would be finished in four to six
months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of
the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be
expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the
script had been tacitly mapped out, the former President
uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank
you for your cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the
undersigned manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to
resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as
other moves to this effect, had always been refused.
Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and
efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the
trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility
55
 and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script,
the undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such
as the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of
the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985,
while there were no members of the media; the installation of TV
monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room"
occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the
prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S.
Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of
rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its
cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and
the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds
all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in
the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in
the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil
liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself
with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and
void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986
submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the
evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and
collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a
Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners
(as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if
petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder
case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of
acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and
prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step
for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of
acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and
pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of
the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all
respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for
respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of
proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and
convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per
its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission
composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman,
and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and
Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial
and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant
matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to
this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on
19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the
said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided
to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President
Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the
testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez.
On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of
its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice
Fernandez and the Special Investigating Panel composed
of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special Prosecutor
Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-
six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority
report should all be charged as principals of the crime of
double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino
and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of
the said charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special
Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft
Resolution recommending such course of action, President
Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members
of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran to
a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of
January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed
his disagreement with the recommendation of the Special
Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the
Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno
Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was
convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in
court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the
accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the
doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the
accused would be denied bail during the trial, considering
that they would be charged with capital offenses,
President Marcos directed that the several accused be
56
 "categorized" so that some of them would merely be
charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered
that the case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran
who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference
were followed to the letter; and compliance therewith
manifested itself in several specific instances in the
course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of
the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to
Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence,
harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who
gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board,
coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring
of proceedings, and even in the very decision rendered in
the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to
how he wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled
and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those
involved in said task to comply with the same in the
subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez
manifested no revulsion against complying with the
Malacaang directive, justice Herrera played his role with
manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a
scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-
managed from Malacaang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones
whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to
be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position
and to offer all the evidences which it could have
otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered
thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and
judgment of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in
the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process,
and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in
the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in
Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with
copies of the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto.
It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of
August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on
the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and
knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code
named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a
scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist', and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have
otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused of all
criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by
reference) and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the
evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members
of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in
the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services
(86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff
from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences
presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-
Galman case disposed of in a manner suitable to his
purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public
outcry and wide international attention. Not invariably,
the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling
motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the
assassination, President Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was
killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist
hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof
which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
57
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the
assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to
accomplish this purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose
for calling them. From the start, he expressed irritation
and displeasure at the recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents as principals of the crime of double murder.
He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino,
and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not
supported by evidence that could stand in court. He
discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point.
Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was
made that the filing of the charge in court would at least
mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street
demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the
accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted,
they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some
other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no
longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case,
instead of dismissing it, but with some of the accused to
be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the
question of preventive custody of the accused having
thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos
took up the matter of who would try the case and how
long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice
Pamaran 'point blank' to personally handle the case. This
was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was
voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his
two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such
order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not
yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the
case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to
a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit
having received such presidential directive. His denial,
however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that the
case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to
the division headed by him. A supposition of mere
coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that
he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the
Malacanang conference wherein the said directive was
given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also
be inferred from his admission that he gave President
Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to how
long it would take him to finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the
conference, and after an agreement was reached on filing
the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-
moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out of the
room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group
and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive
any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice
Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person present
in the conference was presented by the respondents.
Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of
their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor
Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason
having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the
evidence on record. In the mind of the Commission, the
only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that
pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear
on both the court and the prosecution in the handling and
disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of
this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of
the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy
over those to whom his instructions were directed, the
motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the
government prevailing at that time which enabled, the
then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That
the conference called to script or stage-manage the
prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept
away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure
its secrecy. None but those directly involved were caned
to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal
Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The
conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape
notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made
of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose
58
 some fifteen (15) months later when the former president
was no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of
the matter he wanted to take up with the officials he
asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and
not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice
Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their
realization of its unwholesome implications on their
handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily
inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No
effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most
valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they
went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the
Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming
to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of
mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential
pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very
acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos
may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not
having been given seats during the two-hour conference
(Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not
say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking
most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily,
it can be said that any avowal of independent action or
resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from
the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace
on January 10, 1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more
significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by
their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It
duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the
conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of
the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of
"Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all
the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and
charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as
accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for
the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely
justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no
sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of
conspiracy and recommended that all of the accused be charged
accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may hardly be
disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard
practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious
possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable
injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his
guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action
should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to
charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez
readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in
consonance with the Malacaang instruction." It is too much to attribute
to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty.
Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since
November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of
that time, [the Malacanang conference on January 10, 1985], his own
view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to
charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of
double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez
never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of
January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals]
was to have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of
said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go to
Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing,
no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present,
unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused
to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the
accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were
sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being
ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or
threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner
favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar
Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who
recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be
discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Raas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The
Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness
who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and
described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of
power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August
59
20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was
deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for
Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony
before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya
claimed before the Commission that the English transcription of his
testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo,
was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave
"although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original
transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on
August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing
trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media
men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him."
Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by
Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay
until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of
principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of
her proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the
cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the
same was as much as, if not more than those in the case
of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in constant
fear of her life, having been hunted by armed men; that
their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family
harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their
house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom
when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with
her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William
Farias offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that
Mayor Rudy Farias of Laoag City kept on calling her sister
in the United States to warn her not to testify; that, later,
Rudy and William Farias offered her two million pesos
supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and
lot in Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in
Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons responsible
for the death of her father, if she would refrain from
testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such
cajolery and harassments, or perhaps because of them,
Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice
Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at
justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano
to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to
attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1,
1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2,
1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her
testimony, however, did not end with her taking the
witness stand. In the course of her testimony several
notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense
counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested
that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa
who was suspected of having coached her as to what to
declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout
occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing
the courtroom into darkness, and making most of those
present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass
over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave
the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was
limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not
having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the
Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the main
switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was
located beside the room occupied by Malacaang people
who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August
26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality
girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a
hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them
away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of
the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was
kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have
been missing since then, despite his attempts to find any of them.
According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because
they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of
National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these
people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in
learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is
true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt
of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some
other place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of
the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the
Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out
that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider
range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans
designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino.
In any event, even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go
either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent or
wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of
evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its
60
introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not
so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice
Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been
totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse
developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice
Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military
respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter
almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion
for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile
to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His
posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the
instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of
something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice
Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-
blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of
such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having
been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by
President Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases
in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular
Justice, but to a division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on
how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a
strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue
of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice
Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be
presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid
Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice
Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the
officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice
Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to
corroborate the claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder
case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and
the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m.
or only 18 minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in
the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if
not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in
the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case
within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was
rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been
actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any
evidence on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran
who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other
members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after
the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order
directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This
order was not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden
of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said
jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to
be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National
Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with
Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of the
accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers.
Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known
even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then
Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and
was given such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang
and by Malacaang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that
the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the
developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take
remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of
the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that
purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned
'war room', wherein military and Malacaang personnel stayed to keep
track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacaang showed its
results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacaang was
immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence
injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of
his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave
the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacaang
intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of
Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought
there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain
custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted
"that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the
Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy
sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It
is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as
61
to how the case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his
instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President
Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not
be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of
the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal
objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to
then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the
public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in
court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be
prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall
no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally
ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit
all of the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that their guilt had
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and
appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a
total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the
accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the
crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur
neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person
accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two
justices who concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice
Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October,
1985, when the decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told
him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be
convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he
confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and
Justice Vera Cruz that Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the
twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told
Justice Herrera that he would confirm this statement (which was
mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This
testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then
President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources
of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the
happenings (res ipsa loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs,
for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 )
and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the
unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as
ordered at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the two
principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected
killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal
the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian
President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by
Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-
moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel
and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from
Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas
corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal
Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His
obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would
otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact
Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the "national
tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth through free,
independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day
ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred it to
respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were
the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four majority
members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for
the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas
(instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of
acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority
findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando
Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the
soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for
Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin
Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted
Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on
trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence
to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice
Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26
62
accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither
criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of
which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers'
version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at
which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the
imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused
(as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by
him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding
day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our
penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding
Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being
summoned to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized
and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent
action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the
very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10,
1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions"
from the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at
the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as
mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed
by military men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of
due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders
moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents
accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed
against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police
investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated
and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present
all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the
cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its
aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason
to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear
or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More
so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an
accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a
civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil
courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death,
Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and
the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once
more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot
be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment
of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court
stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case its right to due process is
thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420
[Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA
78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb.
27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
63
 Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967
being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted
of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the
remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or
trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial
where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and
total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him
near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief
that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could
not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the
authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to
suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of
the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their
natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent
Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and
announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months
time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile
attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the
defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing
witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain
period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a
reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending
cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer
time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by
the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were
denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan
under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A
dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case
at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all.
It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable
affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the
authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he
breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto
himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of
acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without
being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court
in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows:
"That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier
pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail
the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.
The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be
equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of
justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean
injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice
where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The
private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of
respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias
and partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now
Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been
passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the
motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the
prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not
decide the case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the
Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him and the
Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should
proceed with the trial and then deal later
64
 on with that. After all, the most important
thing here is, shall we say, the decision of
the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of
the case, Your Honor, is the capacity of
the justices to sit in judgment. That is
more important than anything else.(p. 13
TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by
Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly
blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition
for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related
exclusively for the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be
remembered that the prosecution neither joined that
petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a
similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for
decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is also
a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the
disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure
recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs.
Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in
a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding
and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial
of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the
Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is
substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt
dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order
was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs.
Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions,
ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from
deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence
gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by
deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the
acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his
part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of
respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's
declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the
judgment, instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to
declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And
after the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its
nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by the
Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were
from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by
the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for
the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six
respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in
the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect
the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the
sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and
contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the
pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents
and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be
untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained
wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein
held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may
not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of
his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand
that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for
reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending
so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked,
because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed
promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February
4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per
the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within
five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence
of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The
second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material
ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and
filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacaang
conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months
65
later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the
Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the
authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final
outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any
new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for
reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now
be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has
been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush
in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now
admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial
law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and
the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his
valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few
years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful
executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside
the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the
end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter
emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of
restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court
enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies
mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its
judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity
and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the
Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the
leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from
the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity
of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there
must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of
injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of
one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another.
This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for
the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had
denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now
be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The
people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed
as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public
office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are
accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must
be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate
of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts.
While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity
thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority
becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be
rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with
his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren
of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever
realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath
of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with
thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed
of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and
retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa
as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly
and without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in
discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating
the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the
scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted.
The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of
February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are
hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment
of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of
the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth
may be finally known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth
behind the vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as
expressed in my dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA
294, 379 [1985]), and so that justice may be done, I vote for the re-trial
prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed
by the prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant,
evidence which, if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it
is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out
before respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped
that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
66
 A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shag win
a case but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and every definite sense the servant of the law,
the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. [Emphasis supplied] (Suarez vs. Platon,
69 Phil. 556 [1940])
He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to
lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the
guilty may not escape unpunished (People vs. Esquivel,
82 PhiL 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to
end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and an liability, is
equally culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which
"requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and
the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to
the detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment
rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of
double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of
former jeopardy the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett,
164 N.W., 757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would make ineffective a
plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).
The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even
assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place,
they were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only
either as accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged
offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so that,
whatever pressure was exerted could only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in
jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction
secured fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state
(State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception
is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the
Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said
that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the
murder charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the
accused could no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double
jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices
and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail during the
trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of
protecting them from subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court,
192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in
jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same
offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA.
498).
The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and
collusion, with the legal consequence that there was no trial and
judgment to speak of, and under the circumstances peculiar only to these
cases, I vte for a re-trial in the interest of truth and the ends of public
justice. As in all criminal proceedings, however, the accused must be
guaranteed a fair, speedy, and impartial re-trial before an unbiased
Tribunal and prosecutor and, I might add, safeguarded against trial by
publicity.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not
previously disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission
constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity
of the same, to be duly established by sufficient evidence and are
indicative of "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case ...;" and that there exists
"adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it could have otherwise
presented, but also pre-determined the outcome of the case; ..." I join in
granting petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
In my considered view, the ends of Justice will be best served by allowing
the trial anew of the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain a
judgment that will be removed from any suspicion of attendant
irregularities. With the greatest significance being given by our people to
the said cases, which are evidently of historical importance, I am readily
persuaded that it is to our national interest that all relevant evidence that
may be now available be provided an opportunity to be received and
made known so that whatever is the actual truth can be rightfully
67
ascertained. I, therefore, vote for a declaration of mistrial and for
nullifying the proceedings of the referred Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the ordering of are trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring:
On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary
Restraining Order earlier granted. We are now acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately dismissing the petition, we were
denying the petitioners every reasonable opportunity to prove their
allegations of non-independent and biased conduct of both the
prosecution and the trial court. I stated that the issues of miscarriage of
justice and due process arising from that conduct should be allowed more
extended treatment. With then Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Vicente Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented from the Court's resolution
denying the petitioners' motions to continue presenting their case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the
petition on its merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were
still for the future, I concurred in the result of this Court's action on two
grounds-(1) the right of the accused to speedy trial and (2) the
presumption in law that judicial acts are regularly performed and that
public officers have discharged their duties in accordance with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial
misgivings and more than overcome the presumption of regular
performance of official duty upon which I based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the
investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the
accused nor the prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We
had the unusual phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent
lawyers and law professors, and retired Justices assuming the uncommon
role of alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan
holding back its own evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions
and emotions generated by the Aquino assassination to cool off or die
down, the accused insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with
the Supreme Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in
its Comment, the Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look
into the exercise of its jurisdiction. There was the further matter of
television cameras during trial, their effect on the witnesses and the
judges, and other mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Comission now shows that there was more to
these misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that
time. The Court's opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why
the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not
an unbiased prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated
litigations and continuous harassment of a person who has already
undergone the agony of prosecution and trial for one and the same
offense. It certainly was never intended to cover a situation where the
prosecution suppresses some of its own evidence, where the accused
correctly and eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and where the
court appears to have made up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a
failure of trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not
possibly result in a just or valid decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a
concern of this Court and of an Filipinos who want genuine justice to be
realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to
the judgment of acquittal we must insure that absolutely no indication of
bias, pre-judgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case.
The fairly strong language used by the Court in its main opinion
underscores the gravity with which it views the travesties of justice in this
"trial of the century." At the same time, nothing expressed in our opinion
should be interpreted as the Supreme Court's making a factual finding,
one way or another, about the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman
killing. Any statements about the circumstances of the assassination or
about the military version of the killings are intended solely for one issue
whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquittals should be set aside and a
retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons
involved, pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or
reappointment, or any other extraneous matters should color or influence
the future course of this case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally
expressed opinions about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be
neither a prosecutor or judge in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for
the future proceedings to be fair they should be above any suspicion of
partiality, bias, rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in the
conduct of further proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may
arise that a prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of
any accused. Having just declared a mistrial, we should not again declare
the retrial as another mistrial, ad infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant
the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
Feliciano, J., concurs in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior
to the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.
Separate Opinions
68
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth
behind the vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as
expressed in my dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA
294, 379 [1985]), and so that justice may be done, I vote for the re-trial
prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed
by the prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant,
evidence which, if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it
is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out
before respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped
that Court in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shag win
a case but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and every definite sense the servant of the law,
the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. [Emphasis supplied] (Suarez vs. Platon,
69 Phil. 556 [1940])
He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to
lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the
guilty may not escape unpunished (People vs. Esquivel,
82 PhiL 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to
end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and an liability, is
equally culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which
"requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and
the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to
the detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment
rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of
double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of
former jeopardy the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett,
164 N.W., 757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would make ineffective a
plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).
The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even
assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place,
they were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only
either as accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged
offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so that,
whatever pressure was exerted could only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in
jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction
secured fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state
(State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception
is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the
Trial Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said
that the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the
murder charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the
accused could no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double
jeopardy; the "categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices
and accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail during the
trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of
protecting them from subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court,
192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in
jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same
offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA.
498).
The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and
collusion, with the legal consequence that there was no trial and
judgment to speak of, and under the circumstances peculiar only to these
cases, I vote for a re-trial in the interest of truth and the ends of public
justice. As in all criminal proceedings, however, the accused must be
guaranteed a fair, speedy, and impartial re-trial before an unbiased
Tribunal and prosecutor and, I might add, safeguarded against trial by
publicity.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not
previously disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission
constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity
of the same, to be duly established by sufficient evidence and are
indicative of "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case ...;" and that there exists
"adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
69
capacity to resist and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it could have otherwise
presented, but also pre-determined the outcome of the case; ..." I join in
granting petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
In my considered view, the ends of Justice will be best served by allowing
the trial anew of the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain a
judgment that will be removed from any suspicion of attendant
irregularities. With the greatest significance being given by our people to
the said cases, which are evidently of historical importance, I am readily
persuaded that it is to our national interest that all relevant evidence that
may be now available be provided an opportunity to be received and
made known so that whatever is the actual truth can be rightfully
ascertained. I, therefore, vote for a declaration of mistrial and for
nullifying the proceedings of the referred Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the ordering of are trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring::
On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary
Restraining Order earlier granted. We are now acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately dismissing the petition, we were
denying the petitioners every reasonable opportunity to prove their
allegations of non-independent and biased conduct of both the
prosecution and the trial court. I stated that the issues of miscarriage of
justice and due process arising from that conduct should be allowed more
extended treatment. With then Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Vicente Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented from the Court's resolution
denying the petitioners' motions to continue presenting their case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the
petition on its merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were
still for the future, I concurred in the result of this Court's action on two
grounds-(1) the right of the accused to speedy trial and (2) the
presumption in law that judicial acts are regularly performed and that
public officers have discharged their duties in accordance with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial
misgivings and more than overcome the presumption of regular
performance of official duty upon which I based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the
investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the
accused nor the prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We
had the unusual phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent
lawyers and law professors, and retired Justices assuming the uncommon
role of alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan
holding back its own evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions
and emotions generated by the Aquino assassination to cool off or die
down, the accused insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with
the Supreme Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in
its Comment, the Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look
into the exercise of its jurisdiction. There was the further matter of
television cameras during trial, their effect on the witnesses and the
judges, and other mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Comission now shows that there was more to
these misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that
time. The Court's opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why
the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not
an unbiased prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated
litigations and continuous harassment of a person who has already
undergone the agony of prosecution and trial for one and the same
offense. It certainly was never intended to cover a situation where the
prosecution suppresses some of its own evidence, where the accused
correctly and eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and where the
court appears to have made up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a
failure of trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not
possibly result in a just or valid decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a
concern of this Court and of an Filipinos who want genuine justice to be
realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to
the judgment of acquittal we must insure that absolutely no indication of
bias, pre-judgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case.
The fairly strong language used by the Court in its main opinion
underscores the gravity with which it views the travesties of justice in this
"trial of the century." At the same time, nothing expressed in our opinion
should be interpreted as the Supreme Court's making a factual finding,
one way or another, about the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman
killing. Any statements about the circumstances of the assassination or
about the military version of the killings are intended solely for one issue
whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquittals should be set aside and a
retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons
involved, pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or
reappointment, or any other extraneous matters should color or influence
the future course of this case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally
expressed opinions about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be
neither a prosecutor or judge in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for
70
the future proceedings to be fair they should be above any suspicion of
partiality, bias, rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in the
conduct of further proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may
arise that a prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of
any accused. Having just declared a mistrial, we should not again declare
the retrial as another mistrial, ad infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant
the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
Feliciano, J., concurs in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior
to the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 92418 November 20, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RITA LABRIAGA and JOEL LABRIAGA, accused-appellants.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Accused-appellant Rita Labriaga, through the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), filed this motion for reconsideration with modification of sentence.
Accused-appellant prays for the retroactive application to her case of R.A.
No. 7659 and for her eventual release from confinement at the
Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong as a consequence of
the application of the new law to her case.
Rita Labriaga was caught on January 28, 1988 selling two tea bags of
marijuana in Daraga, Albay in a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Narcotics Command. With her at the time was the other accused-
appellant Joel Labriaga, who was found in possession of 3 grams of
marijuana. Rita was found in possession of 115 grams of marijuana.
Corresponding charges for violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act, were filed against them. Rita Labriaga was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10, of drug
pushing and sentenced to life imprisonment and fined P20,000.00. On the
other hand, Joel Labriaga was convicted of illegal possession of marijuana
and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day to 8 years and fined P6,000.00.
In her Motion for Reconsideration with Modification of Sentence, Rita
Labriaga invokes the ruling in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) that
if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the penalty
imposable is prision correccional, that is, 6 months and 1 day to 6 years,
Rita Labriaga contends that as the quantity of marijuana involved in her
case is only 2 tea bags and in the case of People v. Simon the contents of
the 4 tea bags weighed 3.8 grams, the amount of the marijuana in her
case would approximately be 1.9 grams only and therefore the penalty of
life imprisonment originally meted out to her should be reduced to prision
correccional.
The attached prison records of the accused-appellant (Annexes C and D)
show that she has been confined in the Correctional Institution for Women
since March 20, 1990. She has been credited in the service of her
sentence with 1 year, 7 months and 2 days, the time she spent under
preventive imprisonment, and has actually served (as of August 17,
1995), inclusive of good conduct time allowances, 6 years, 5 months and
1 day.
Considering the quantity of marijuana involved and the period of her
incarceration, which is more than the maximum penalty of prision
correccional, the Court finds merit in the accused-appellant's motion. This
conclusion is not altered even if the 115 grams found in Ms. Labriaga's
possession, which was not considered in the disposition of her appeal,
were to be included in determining the amount of marijuana involved, as
the total amount would still be less than 250 grams.
The appropriate remedy of accused-appellant is to file a petition
for habeas corpus considering that the decision in this case is now final.
However, in accordance with our resolution in Angeles v. Bilibid Prison,
G.R. No. 117568, January 4, 1995 and People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 98362,
September 5, 1995, in which we held that the rules on habeas
corpus should be liberally applied in cases which are sufficient in
substance, we have decided to treat the motion in this case as a
substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus. The accused-
appellant Rita Labriaga, having served more than the maximum
imposable penalty of prision correccional, should be released.
Accordingly, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to
RELEASE Rita Labriaga y Millares from confinement at the Correctional
Institution for Women, unless there is other lawful cause for detaining her.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.
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 that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave
abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses." 1
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in
Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been
absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there
is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense
after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State
for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan: 2
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign
freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense
Republic of the Philippines would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The
SUPREME COURT provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
Manila make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
EN BANC thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011 compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner, well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
vs. found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
G.R. No. 176864 vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws. 3
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
vs. possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants. State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
RESOLUTION Rule 65.4
ABAD, J.: Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. For instance, he avers that the Court "must ensure that due process is
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them
treatment of witnesses and the evidence." 5But he has not specified the
on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate
that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly
relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming
72
questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious
doubts the validity of the decision" 6 is, without more, a mere conclusion
drawn from personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan 7 as
authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the
present case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution
was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case
was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however,
Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the
decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony
deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit
the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited
themselves did not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts
appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution
witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that
Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the
Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant
wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally
allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als
conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer
be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.
Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave
to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop
Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President
Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

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