Human Moral Status and Animal Moral Status

Brooke Morin

Some people have no issue with consuming animals. Some people do. This

controversial decision is something that I would like to talk about. There has to be a

reason people are willing to fight so vehemently over animals. Many people hold the

belief that humans contain something animals do not, and therefore believe it is

justifiable to kill and use animals for experimental purposes. The purpose for this paper is

to examine this claim and to question the logic of people willing to eat animals.

A traditional belief that dates back to Aristotle is that humans have a superior

ethical status than animals. To make this claim, one has to distinguish the characteristic

that separates humans from animals. A common belief is that humans are rational beings

while animals are not. Based on this belief, it is morally just to give human interests a

greater weight than the interests of animals. Carl Cohen is a supporter of this belief.

The attributes of human beings from which this moral capability arises have
been described variously by philosophers, both ancient and modern: the inner
consciousness of a free will; the grasp, by human reason, of the binding character
of moral law; the self conscious participation of human beings in an objective
ethical order; human membership in an organic moral community; the
development of the human self through the consciousness of other moral selves;
and the underivative, intuitive cognition of the rightness of an action. Most
influential has been Emmanuel Kants emphasis on the universal human
possession of a uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. Humans
confront choices that are purely moral; humans- but certainly not dogs or mice-
lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. Human beings are self
legislative, morally autonomous. (Cohen)

Cohens reflection upon the origin of moral capability shows the various possibilities of

where humans and animals may differ. What these possibilities have in common is a form
of rationality. The claim remains as such: Human interests have a greater weight than that

of animals because humans posses a form of rationality that animals do not.

Let us now look at why this claim only works in some situations.

A baby is born. He cannot implement moral laws, does not have consciousness of

decisions or make moral claims. While the infant may be temporarily incapable of having

rationality, many argue that infants must be preserved because their incapacity is

temporary and rationality develops with age. However, some incapacity is permanent

such as irreversible comatose or the severely senile. Others have never had and will never

have rationality. This is the case with the severely mentally disabled. So if the claim that

rationality is what causes humans to have a superior morality to that of an animal, then

anything lacking that rationality (such as a severely mentally disabled child) is in turn

subjected to a lower moral status than that of a human with rationality. If the justification

for treating animals interests as less of a priority than that of a human, it must be true that

the interests of a disabled child is less of a priority than a rational human. If one is able to

rationalize killing a cow by these means, then the same rationalization can be applied to

killing a disabled child. Philosophers refer to this situation as a marginal case. A

marginal case can be described as Whatever kind and level of rationality is selected as

justifying the attribution of superior moral status to humans will either be lacking in some

humans or present in some animals. (Norcross)

So for anyone who is willing to say that it is ethical to kill a cow, must maintain the belief

that killing a disabled child is acceptable.

Some argue against this logic. David Schmidtz argues against marginal cases by such:
 Of course, some chimpanzees lack the characteristic features in virtue of which
chimpanzees command respect as a species, just as some humans lack the
characteristic features in virtue of which humans command respect as a species. It
is equally obvious that some chimpanzees have cognitive capacities (for example)
that are superior to the cognitive capacities of some humans. But whether every
human being is superior to every chimpanzee is beside the point. The point is that
we can, we do, and we should make decisions on the basis of our recognition that
mice, chimpanzees, and humans are relevantly different types. We can have it
both ways after all. Or so a speciesist could argue.(Norcross)

To which Norcross deems observed by using this example:

Suppose, for example, that ten famous people are on trial in the afterlife for
crimes against humanity. On the basis of conclusive evidence, five are found
guilty and five are found not guilty. Four of the guilty are sentenced to an eternity
of torment, and one is granted an eternity of bliss. Four of the innocent are
granted an eternity of bliss, and one is sentenced to an eternity of torment. The
one innocent who is sentenced to torment asks why he, and not the fifth guilty
person, must go to hell. Saint Peter replies, Isnt it obvious Mr. Ghandi? You are
male. The other four menAdolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, George W. Bush, and
Richard Nixonare all guilty. Therefore the normal condition for a male
defendant in this trial is guilt. The fact that you happen to be innocent is
irrelevant. Likewise, of the five female defendants in this trial, only one was
guilty. Therefore the normal condition for female defendants in this trial is
innocence. That is why Margaret Thatcher gets to go to heaven instead of you.
(Norcross)

Through this example, it becomes evident that Schmidtz claim is

unacceptable. We have a characteristic whose presence, or lack of

presence, is the determining point of a behavior being morally correct

or not. To claim that this characteristic doesnt matter on an individual

basis and instead only matters if such characteristic is normal is unfair

and unacceptable as a way of reasoning.

The belief that humans have superior morality than animals

based of the distinction between possessing rationality or not only

holds true if one is willing to subject severely mentally handicapped

children to the same things as animals. This has been shown through

the arguments in this paper.

Bibliography

Cohen, Carl. "The Case For The Use Of Animals In Biomedical

Research." New England Journal of Medicine (1986): n. pag. Print.

Norcross, Alastair. "Puppies, Pigs and People: Eating Meat and

Marginal Cases." Ethics. By John Hawthorne. Malden, MA:
Blackwell Pub., 2004. 229-45. Print.