Rebellion -- Art.

134 of the Revised Penal Code

People vs. Lovedioro

FACTS:

1. Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was
walking.

2. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss.

3. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and
subsequently found guilty.

4. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of
rebellion.

5. It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of
the New Peoples Army.

ISSUE

Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of
rebellion?

RULING

Yes. Overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either
of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.

Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime,
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty, could benefit from the
laws relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is established
or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.

In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization
dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.

The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the
achievement of the NPAs subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victims
that can be considered as offending to the NPA.

Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently
infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by
appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified
by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law

People vs Hernandez L-6025-26 / July

18, 1956

Facts:

Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member of Congress of Labor Organizations, an affiliate of

Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (Hukbalahaps), a known group performing rebellious
activities.

Hukbalahaps have risen publicly and taken arms to remove the territory of the Philippines
from the allegiance of the government, making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks
against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians.

On about March 15, 1945, Hernandez and other appellants were accused of cooperates and
synchronizes its activities with the Huks by actively engaging in its armed rebellion against
the government of the Philippines.

They were charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons
and robbery and were sentenced with life imprisonment.

Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court where his case was
pending, but was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime was
complexed, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a
petition to the Supreme Court.

Prosecution argued that the gravity of the crime committed required the denial of the bail
and it maintained that capital punishment may be imposed for the crime Hernandez was
convicted of.

Defense contends that there is no complex crime in the crime of rebellion.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed by petitioner was rebellion complexed
with crime murders, arson & robbery, and should be punished with life
imprisonment, thus bail should not be granted

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes, such as
murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus granting
the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when
rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime
and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several
cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they killed several persons.
Thus, motion for bail was granted.

The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the
same and cannot be punished either separately there from. Indeed, if one act constitutes
two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the
graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had
no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is
readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is
deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave
than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.

CASE NO. 51

Ponce Enrile vs Amin G.R. No. 93335 / September

13, 1990

Facts:

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged of having committed rebellion complexed with
murder with RTC of Quezon City.

He was also charged with violation of Pres. Decree 1829 with RTC of Makati City because he
allegedly harbored and concealed in his house Ex. Lt. Gregorio Gringo Honasan, who was
suspected of having committed a crime.

Allegations: Rebellion Case:

In the evening of Dec.1, 1989, fugitive Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the
mass and birthday party held at the residence of Sen. Enrile.

Honasan conferred with Sen. Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers
wearing white armed patches.

These facts led the prosecution to conclude that Enrile and Honasan were co-conspirators in
the failed Dec. coup.

Violation of PD 1829 Case:

Sen. Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasanby giving him food and comfort on
Dec.1, 1989 in his house.

Omnibus Motion filed by Sen. Enrile:

To hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the
court of probable cause

To dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record
The court denied the omnibus motion. Sen. Enrile filed Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash/Dismiss but was also denied.

Enriles arguments on his appeal to the Supreme Court on certiorari:

The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting
on Dec.1, 1989 is ABSORBED in, or is a COMPONENT ELEMENT of, the complexed rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis
of the same meeting on Dec.1 1989.

The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion.

Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while
the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sen. Enrile could be separately charged of violation of PD 1829

nothwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him

RULING:

No. The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of
rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions. The Hernandez case remains a
binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

Sen. Enriles act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is a mere component of rebellion or
an act done in furtherance of the rebellion, it cannot therefore be made the basis of a
separate charge. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which
are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus: This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. Sen. Enrile cannot be tried separately under PD
1829 in addition to his being prosecute din the rebellion case.
CASE NO. 52

Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No. 92163 / June 5,

1990

Facts:

In February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103.

He was charged together with Mr. and Mrs. Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan for the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly committed during their
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. Then, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City on the
following day.

Later on the same day, Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights. The following are his arguments:

That the crime being charged against him is nonexistent.

That he was charged with a criminaloffense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
That he has been denied with his right to bail

That he was arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without thejudge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause

Solicitor Generals answer: the case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling sincethe in
Hernandez, the information charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion whereas in Enriles case, murder and
frustrated murder charged against Enrile were committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code

Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling

Ruling:

Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge
of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution
was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the
maximum. There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the
Penal Code cannot be applied in this case. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and
the two crimes were punished separately, then the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The Hernandez ruling is still valid. Hernandez doctrine remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are
deemed absorbed. The Court reiterates that based on the this doctrine, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, since there is no such crime as
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. These other crimes such as murder or
all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence petitioners
should be entitiled for bail, before final conviction.
People vs Pimentel

G.R. No. 100210 / April 1, 1998

Facts:

1. In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under Republic
Act 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC of Manila. A warrant of
arrest was issued but was not served due to his disappearance.

2. Seven years later, Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the
subversion case, and was also found to possess an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver
and six rounds of live ammunition.

3. Due to this, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under PD 1866 before the RTC in Makati City.
4. Tujan filed a motion to quash the illegal possession case on the ground that he has been
previously in jeopardy of being convicted for subversion. He contended that common
crimes such as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed
absorbed in subversion. And since the present case is the twin prosecution of the earlier
subversion case, he is entitled to invoke constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

5. Opposing the Tujans motion to quash, the State contended that he does not stand in
jeopardy of being convicted a second time because:

6. he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case

7. the previous offense charged against him is for Subversion, punishable under RA 1700,
while the present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance
of Subversion, punishable under PD 1866, a different law

Issue:

Whether or not Tujan was placed in double jeopardy with the filing of the second
information for illegal possession of firearm & ammunition in furtherance of subversion

Ruling:

No. Sec. 21 of Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases
must have occurred. In the present case, Tujans motion to quash filed in the trial court did
not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. It is
noteworthy that the private respondent has not even been arraigned in the first criminal
action for subversion. Besides, the two criminal charges against private respondent are not
of the same offense as required by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.

While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700, as amended, and the one
for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD 1866,
as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992,
totally repealing RA 1700, as amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the
present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable to the accused-private
respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private
respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed. As regards the other charge of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this charge should be
amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since subversion is no
longer a crime. It would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-
private respondent for an offense that no longer exists. Subversion charge against Tujan was
dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion against
the same accused is deemed amended. Accused was ordered to be released immediately
from detention, since he was already detained for 7years, whereas the amended charge has
a penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.

Ocampo vs Abando G.R. No. 176830 / February 11,

2014

Facts:

1. A mass grave site was discovered at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte by the 43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be
victims of Operation Venereal Disease (VD). Said Operation VD was launched by the
 Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

8. PNP SOCO conducted a forensic crime analysis to identify the bodies by way of SNA
sample, however, the Initial Specialist Report remained inconclusive as to the identities of
the skeletal remains and the leght of time that they had been buried.

9. In a Special Report, 10 possible victims were named after comparison and examination
based on testimonies of relatives and witnesses.

10. Believing that their relatives remains were among those discovered at the mass
grave site,12 complaint-affidavits were filed by the relatives of the alleged victims of
Operation VD. They swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen wit
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.

11. Also, 4 former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP filed their affidavits alleging that
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad, being members of CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central Committee, ordered the Operation VD in 1985. On the basis of these affidavits,
petitioners were charged with murder.

12. In a resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of anInformation for 15

counts of multiple murders against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein. The said 4 former members of CPP/NPA/NDFP were dropped as
respondents and were considered state witnesses.

13. On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.

Petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition:

seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero.

praying for his unconditional release from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition

Ocampos arguments:

A rebellion case against him & 44 others was then pending before the RTC of Makati City.

Common crimes, such as murder, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrests

Whether or not the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under
the political offense doctrine

Ruling:
Yes, petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrant of arrests. A preliminary investigation is not a casual affair.It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public
trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration
of criminal justice.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was
only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that
they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

As to the issuance of warrant of arrest, Ocampos allegation that Judge Abando did not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners have no merit.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." In this case, the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is
addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.

The political offense doctrine is NOT a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior
to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of
rebellion. Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance
of a political offense, are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or
murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere
ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes
crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a
political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the
alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as coconspirators. The court ruled that the burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only
the accused knows. The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the
accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for
this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
Case No. 55

People vs. Umali

FACTS:

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to
have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00
and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid resulted in the
burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its
content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of
one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and
Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing
one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven
from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

After trial, the court found Umali et.al, found guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation
in Tiaong. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the
same political faction. However, these friendly relations between the two did not endure. In
the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the political
head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's)
fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for
political guidance, leadership, and favors. Then the elections of 1951 (November 13)
approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings
and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked
Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader. The result of the elections plainly showed that
Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an
overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly
disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate
Punzalan's victory.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the crime committed is rebellion.

Ruling:

Yes. The court is convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious,
crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid
and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
Government. Rather, the object swas to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one
object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this
was sufficient to constitute sedition.

Case No. 57

People vs Cabrera

FACTS:

The Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a rough relationship with each
other. The constabulary force had grudges against the Police force of Manila because of the
incident wherein a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a
constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman. More so, a day after
one Macasinag was shot by a Manila police, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that
the Police who shot himwas back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead.
There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered. As a result, some members of
the Constabulary,with rifles and ammunitions, escaped their barracks through a window and
went to attack the Police force, killing and wounding several policemen and civilians. After
trial, the court convicted Graciano Cabrera at. with the crime of sedition.

Issue;

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Graciano Cabrera et.al with the crime of
sedition.

Ruling:

No.

Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of
vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal
Government.

Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of

Act No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the
offended party a public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a
fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without
foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions
of the accused.

Case No. 58

U.S. vs Lapus

FACTS:

A complaint for sedition was filed alleging that on the night of June 3, 1902, a band
composed of about four hundred men, among whom were the accused Mateo Lapus et.al.,
armed with guns, revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs, raided the town of Cabiao.

They went through the streets of the town firing shots, yelling, and frightening the
inhabitants thereof.

Some of said band went to the house of the municipal president, while others raided several
houses, taking captive sixty or seventy of the inhabitants.

They roamed about the streets of the town threatening and intimidating the people.

Some members of the band, among them the chief, Domingo Cunanan, told the prisoners
that the latter were often found in the justice court, and that they were loaning money at
usurious terms to their farm laborers, and when the latter were unable to pay the loan they
compelled their children to work for them as servants; that if the wealthy landowners
continued oppressing the poor they would not stop disturbing the towns, because the law
must be equally applied to rich and poor.

These acts were said to be in compliance with the orders of Felipe Salvador, chief of the
association called "Santa Iglesia", to which they belonged.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of sedition was committed.

Ruling:
Yes. The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4
of section 5 and punished by section 6 of Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission. The
appellants were members of an illegal association and had publicly and tumultuously
attacked the town of Cabiao and roamed over its streets, firing shots, yelling, and
threatening the residents with death, and thereby frightening them. They performed acts of
violence on the persons of the president and other residents of the town, against the law
and the supreme authority and with political-social purposes. For these reasons the acts
performed by the defendants constitute sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections of Act
No. 292. The crime of sedition was consummated, even though the object of the defendants
was not realized.

Case No. 59

US vs Apurado

Facts:

Filomeno Apurado et.al.were convicted of the crime of sedition as defined in section 5 of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission

Before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, entered upon its regular
morning sessions, some 500 residents assembled near the municipal building and
demanded the dismissal from office of the treasurer, secretary, and the chief of police, and
the substitution in their places of new officials whose names were suggested by the
spokesman of the party;

They wanted the council to accede to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting
out the reasons for its action.

The persons who took part in the movement were wholly unarmed except that a few carried
canes.

The crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the
council chamber during a session of that body can be called disorder and misbehavior; and
that the movement had its origin in religious differences between the residents of the
municipality.
The petitioners desired the dismissal of the officials because they believed that they should
not be permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance
to one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided.

Issue:

Whether or not Filomeno Apurado et.al were guilty of sedition.

Ruling:

No.The provisions of Section 5 of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the
freedom of speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress or grievances" guaranteed by the express provisions of section 5 of
"the Philippine bill. Not only were the individual members of the crowd wholly unarmed, but
they were manifestly desirous that fact should be known, for it appears that two American
officials having asked what the purpose of the gathering was, were assured that the
assembly merely desired to petition for the removal of several municipal officials; and in
proof of the fact that they had no intention of committing a breach of the peace, the
members of the crowd raised their jackets and camisas to prove that they were carrying no
concealed weapons.

The prosecution emphasizes unduly the fact that a few of those who took in the
demonstration carried canes, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that any usual
number of sticks were in the hands of the petitioners, or that they had been brought to the
meeting for the purpose of using them as weapons of assault.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992. Upon
meeting, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-
General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like
myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for
the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." With that act, he was charged in the Court
of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do
with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. Upon conviction of
such charge, Perez then appealed the case to this court.

Issue: whether or not Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime Sedition

Held:

Yes, Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime Sedition. In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses
which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the
State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created
and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is
the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate
authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least
such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open
violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution.

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands.
His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a
democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment,
seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-
General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his
office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in
the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the
representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and
on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903],
2 Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears
to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section
reads as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any
statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or
which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and
done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious
conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these
various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as
penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant

Facts:
On May 14, 1903, Aurelio Tolentino utter seditious words and speeches and did write,
publish, and circulate scurrilous libels in Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by
accused-appellant and which was presented by him and others on the May 14, 1903 at the
"Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila entitled 'Kahapon gayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-
day, and To-morrow) which is

against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful officers, instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and
riots, tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands

Issue: whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was in
fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission

Held:

Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are define in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.

In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the judgment
of conviction in this case must be sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record
that the accused was guilty as charged of any one of those offenses. We are all agreed that
the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and
to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government.

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and
manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the
American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are
satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the
Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the
opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and
setting up another in its stead.