Beruflich Dokumente
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Center for Public Policy, Habitat & Human Development, School of Development Studies,
Tata Institute of Social Sciences (Mumbai)
Email: ashwanitiss@gmail.com/ashwani@tiss.edu
PS: Kindly do not quote from the draft presentation without the permission of the author.
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Abstract
1. Introduction
All states, barring predatory states, perform some welfare functions to retain not only their
legitimacy, but also to facilitate successful capital accumulation and maintain the necessary
social order. (Habermas, 1975; Esping- Andersen, 1990). India is no exception to this truism.
The country presents an enduring puzzle in the literature and practice of democracy and
development since independence (Chakravarty, 1987; Chatterjee, 1998; Chibber, 2003). The
fabled Nehruvian dirigisme was toppled in 1991 without any chaos or bloodbath. And the so-
called Divided Leviathan turned into a vibrant federal market economy (Sinha 2004;
Jenkins, 1999). Yet, for a majority of people, the tryst with La Dolche Vita (sweet life) is
still out of horizons as India continues to be home to the worlds largest concentration of poor
and has also gained notoriety for prevalence of clientelistic regimes and their highly
inefficient and corrupt public agencies, especially those involved with the delivery of pro-
poor services at the grassroots. (Besley, 2007; Echeverri-Gent, 1993; Krishna, 2008; Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2012)
No wonder, India presents a quintessential case of a flailing state --a nation-state in which
the head, that is, the elite institutions at the national (and in some states) level remain sound
and functional but that this head is no longer reliably connected via nerves and sinews to its
own limbs (Pritchett, 2012). However, it would be quite misleading to infer that all
development initiatives/schemes fail in India and it houses only clientelistic regimes.
(Mangla,2014). In fact, there are considerable variations in the performance of Indian states
when it comes to implementing social welfare programmes and policies. This attests to the
increasing legitimacy of politics of programmatic regimes in various states of India. In other
words, given the significant variations in the capacity of states to deliver welfare services to
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the poor, some Indian states have performed way better at implementing social welfare
policies than others. However, we are yet to figure out the causal mechanisms that crucially
affect state capacity and autonomy and eventually shape the resultant divergent welfare
outcomes at the local level.
2. Analytical Puzzle
What explains the prevalence of multiple welfare trajectories in Indias sub-national context?
Using insights from Esping-Andersens typology of the three worlds of capitalism, this
stylized presentation proposes to revise the dominant statist and societal perspectives on the
analytical salience of political regimes and structures of civil society in shaping welfare
outcomes in Indias states. It is true that the central government can decisively shape the
performance of centrally sponsored schemes given that it possesses superior resources
(constitutional, institutional, financial, political and symbolic) to set the agenda of national
development and influence development trajectories in states. But its also equally true that
politics in the states or so-called fragmented regional Leviathans have increasingly become
an independent domain and broken free of the logic of national politics. Given the
increased regulatory autonomy of the fragmented and asymmetrical Leviathans have become
more salient in structuring relations between the state and capital in the post-liberal India.
Bureaucratic capacity and leadership choices, electoral and mobilizational incentives
including strategic decisions about economic reforms and welfare are now routinely (both
politically and spatially) structured at the sub-national level. In other words, regional states
are laboratory for investigating the forms and effects of types of political regimes on welfare
and growth in India.(Kohli,1987; Harris 2004)
Using regime theory and extending Przeworski and Limongis classic formulation that
political institutions do matter, we argue that variations in welfare & growth trajectories at
the sub-national level depend crucially on the nature of political regimes and policy
institutions in providing programmatic support, ideological commitment and policy
coordination mechanisms (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Mahoney, 2000). Development
researchers and scholars have often linked development or welfare failure to politicians'
use of clientelism, vote buying and political favouritism more generally (Hicken, 2011
Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009; Callen et al. 2014). Further, research
also attributes poor implementation of government programs, especially pro-poor programs,
to a failure to incentivize and insulate state officials from locally dominant interests (Benabou
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and Tirole 2003; Perry and Wise, 1990). In other words, political origins of growth and
welfare are rarely taken into consideration to account for divergent trajectories of growth and
welfare in the states of India.
Arguments
In light of the major findings in the literature on democracy, welfare state, federalism, civil
society, party politics and politics of redistribution in India, we make the following claims:
transfers provide an appearance of successful pro-poor targeting of public services. But they
usually come at the expense of long-term development, since they create biases towards
private transfer programs with short-term payoffs rather than public goods or private benefits
of a long-run nature (such as education or health). They are usually implemented to benefit
narrow subsets of intended beneficiary groups (class/ caste/ ethnic) (Bardhan 2012) . Thus, it
is no surprise that clientelism is often a much preferred strategy for politicians seeking to
consolidate their grip over power in a political climate characterized by a high degree of
electoral volatility and political competition. In programmatic regimes, the state adheres to
transparent, rational, legal procedures in economic decisions and implements welfare policies
on universal criteria whereas clientelistic regimes use patrimonial ties in allocation of public
goods and implement social policies in expectation of returns (economic and political) from
targeted/ favoured groups and individuals. Kitschelt (2012) asserts that programmatic
regimes are generally known to have a collective policy position that constitutes well-
structured, predictable and stable political programs. The governments in programmatic
regime have better internal coherence and agreement on a range of policy positions
commitment and the ability to deliver on at least some key programmatic promises when the
regime is in a position of power. Also, programmatic regimes dont often support using
patron client networks, nor make appeals and advocate policies that are critically designed to
achieve the interest of just one group, class or caste or ethnic group. This ensures broader
political appeal and increases electoral winnability and generally suits mutli-class rainbow
political parties. However, we propose that clientelistic and programmatic regimes are ideal
type constructs as democratic politicians everywhere manipulate public funds in order to
cultivate winning political constituency and the narratives about freebies are often far more
complex. In patronage form of competitive democracy where political support is based on
transactions between the client (the people) and the patron (the party in power) citizens are
not passive receiver of welfare freebies or services ; the groups/ communities possess top-
down political connections to the ruling party, as well as exercise high levels of grassroots
democratic mobilisation on local politicians to deliver welfare services. (Aditya 2016)
Scholars of patronage democracy fail to understand that in places like India where lower
class and caste groups and individuals who often swap votes for so-called welfare freebies
consider some forms of clientelism necessary for material and symbolic empowerment and
realizing suppressed social rights. (Chandra; 2004; Jaffrelot 2012) For instance, the
revisionist scholarship on welfare politics does not treat politics of Dravidian parties in
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2012). Following an agnostic perspective on the nature of regime, Dreze and Sen have
documented large differences in social development across states largely in terms of social
expenditure and redistributive pressures from civil society. And they detected a causal link
between redistributive outcomes feeding into capabilities that eventually lead to higher
economic growth (Sen & Dreze 2013).
There is another line of argument which asserts that the multiple trajectories of growth and
welfare and the varying patterns of authority in Indian states have more to do with the
mobilization of lower castes and classes into the political process than the ideology and
organizational bases of ruling parties. (Frankel & Rao 1990; Church 1984). Church in his
path-breaking analysis of state politics in India argues that patterns of politics in different
states need to be understood in terms of the extent and mode of mobilization of the lower
castes. States in which lower castes have come to occupy positions of power in the legislature
also tend to have governments that address the substantive concerns of the poor, at least to
some extent (Church 1984). Building on Churchs argument, Harriss (2003) goes on to make
the claim that states in which the dominance of the upper castes and the Congress party have
been challenged, have also been largely successful in addressing welfare concerns. Despite
the absence of well-organised, left-of-centre parties, states like Andhra Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu described as populist regimes have performed well in reducing levels of poverty
(ibid).
At a historical moment when the Indian state has decisively assumed a pro-business
character, high rates of economic growth have coincided with higher levels of welfare,
mainly driven by electoral pressures (Kohli 2012). In this context, Kohli modifies his original
thesis on regime, arguing that certain development tendencies have been noticed across
Indian states Developmental (Gujarat), Social- Democratic (Kerala) and Neo-patrimonial
(Uttar Pradesh), with their developmental outcomes being contingent on the underlying state
and caste/class relations. (Kohli 2012)
In their recent work Politics of Welfare, Tillin et al (2015) offer rich insights into the
variegated performance of social policies across a representative range of states in India. The
analysis factors in variables like nature of political leadership, capacity and autonomy of the
bureaucracy, strength of civil society organisations and organised interest groups and their
relationship with the state. Relying more on the significance of these variables in
guaranteeing social rights than the ideological commitment of political parties, the authors
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have come up with six broad clusters of sub-national regimes the first cluster consists of
states traditionally classified as social democratic states or are consistent welfare performers.
The second cluster is termed as Competitive Populist regimes, consisting of states such as
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in which there are underlying social support for
redistributive policies on universal lines. The third cluster is labelled as Incorporationist,
defined in terms of interest incorporation of dominant classes and castes and consisting of
states such as Orissa and Chhattisgarh which continue to be dominated by narrow socio-
economic elites and in which lower castes/classes are poorly organised, yet such regimes are
successful in implementing social welfare programmes. The fourth cluster consists of pro-
business regimes in which states prioritize economic growth over social welfare. The fifth
cluster of Competitive Clientelist regimes (as the typology suggests) comprises states such
as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh that follow a clientelistic mode of providing welfare services in
the backdrop of politicization of lower castes***. The last cluster, termed as Predatory
includes states such as Jharkhand in which state power is personalised for private gain and
the regime lacks a sense of public purpose. The latest contribution to this literature adds a
novel, psychological element to the enhancement of welfare. Singh (2015) in her latest work
How Solidarity works for Welfare puts forth a causal explanation of how the notion of sub-
nationalism is a strong factor which enhances social sector indices. In a comparative-
historical framework which includes five states of India, she traces the rise of sub-
nationalism and how it led to a corresponding improvement in welfare outcomes. This helps
us explain why welfare levels rose in Kerala, on the edifice of a strong pan-Malyalali
identity and not in Uttar Pradesh, where no such identity formation took place.
lower castes/classes (nature of civil society) and the capacity and autonomy of the
bureaucracy to design and implement policies of growth and welfare. Also, we have modified
the idea of a regime by incorporating the notion of HDI (Human Development Index) as it is
a variable used across similar constitutional and institutional systems of policy making and
implementation. Thus, we argue that growth and well-being of citizens have more to do with
-the nature of the ruling coalition, bureaucratic autonomy and diverse trajectories of
redistributive struggles than with any linear patterns of economic growth or social
development.
paradigm of growth with distribution or development with redistribution but also exposes
us to the limitations of democratic politics as India continues to grapple with incremental
gains rather than direct abolition of poverty. When political fragmentation along class, caste,
ethnic and regional lines becomes the only winnable strategy, it increases the appeal of
clientelistic regimes and makes collective action on long-term policy commitments more
difficult, thereby interrupting the progress of market reform and welfare performance. In this
context, the capacity of the state and bureaucratic autonomy both at the center and also the
lowest rungs and political commitment to welfare) matter the most in shaping the
trajectories of welfare regimes in India.
In short, we argue that the success or failure of redistributive policies/programs lies not in the
clichd organized left- of--centre regime or unitary/ordered national developmental state,
but in the mutually recursive relations between relatively autonomous political regimes and
sufficiently robust civil society at the grassroots. Results from recent parliamentary and state
elections point out those democratic politicians in the states routinely face the pressures of
accommodating aspirational classes and poor masses within the constraints of democratic
politics. (Varshney 1999). And this is further corroborated by the increasing trends of
politicians from the ruling and opposition parties trying various permutations and
combinations of clientelistic and programmatic regimes as the most preferred strategy of
winning elections and also mitigating the challenges of popular pressures of reconciling
growth and welfare.
Conciliating conflicting interests by democratic politicians from center-left right at the
sub-national level is perhaps one of the least noted achievements of democracy in India.
Credit must be given to the politics of regimes as an art of the possible that has led to
conjunction or divergence of welfare performance and pro-market reforms in Indias states.
The revolution of rising expectations in India is neither a threat to democracy nor a
hindrance to long term sustainability of social development and economic reforms. In other
words, the relationship between capital and democracy is not always inherently prejudicial to
reorganization of bases of social organization of society if one seriously takes the evidence of
the increasing salience of regional political regimes, forms of associational life and the
variegated trajectories of development in Indias states. Thus, its no surprise that though the
fate of redistributive policies or growth is decided at the lowest level of Indias federal
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structure, the ruling elite in Luytens Delhi fantasize about creating a dream world of
cashless society!
Kerala, West Characterised as These states have a Both Kerala (1st Rank)
Bengal/ Social democratic historical tradition and Tamil (8th Rank)
Tamil Nadu regimes (Kohli, of mobilisation of Nadu with their
1989) with a direct, lower castes/classes respective HDI scores
programmatic appeal (except West of 0.825 & 0.629 show
on universal criteria Bengal) and lower a relatively high degree
to lower castes/classes form of realisation of
castes/classes. In the core social base welfare. But West
such regimes, lower of the ruling Bengal (13th rank) with
castes/classes are party/alliance. a score of 0.560 is
well represented and below the national
the dominance of the average.
Congress party has
been strongly
challenged. Of late,
West Bengal has
come to be
represented by
center-left party with
less programmatic
appeal to lower
castes/classes
However, with
overwhelming
consensus on
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welfare in the
political sphere,
these states have a
relatively effective
bureaucracy
committed to
welfare
Gujarat, Characterised as Low degree of Maharashtra (7th Rank)
Maharashtra Developmental mobilization of with a HDI score of
states (Kohli, 2012) lower castes/classes, 0.631has attained a
with organic links mostly inter-mediate relatively high level of
between the political castes/classes, lower welfare but Gujarat (11th
elites and economic castes are usually Rank) lags behind the
elites. Pro-Business co-opted into the national average
Leadership in these ruling party/alliance. exhibiting a low level of
states hailing from But in Maharashtra welfare attainment.
intermediate castes has witnessed a
shows weak certain mobilisation
commitment to of lower castes and
welfare. Politics in Dalits.
these states is
usually bipolar and
the Congress Party/
along with its allies
is a viable political
alternative. The
relatively effective
bureaucracy is
committed towards
pro-growth policies.
***post-clientelistic" policies are those policies where politicians or bureaucrats have little
scope and incentive for clientelistic capture and rent-seeking; Bihar, MP, Odisha, Rajasthan
have shown trends towards post-clientelistic" policies.
*The HDI is a composite index, consisting of three indicators- consumption expenditure (as a
proxy for income), education and health. India Human Development Report 2011: Towards
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Social Inclusion (HDR 2011) published by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research,
Planning Commission of India estimates the HDI for the beginning of the decade, and for the
latest year for which data permits. The top five ranks go to the states of Kerala, Delhi,
Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab in 2011-12. States that perform better on health and
education outcomes are also the states with higher HDI and thus higher per capita income. At
the other end of the spectrum are mostly the northern and eastern states Chhattisgarh,
Orissa, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan that have an HDI
below the national average. Poverty rates are highly contested so we use figures from the
Tendulkar panel. The Human Development approach has long argued that although income is
important, it needs to be complemented by more direct measures (Anand and Sen 1997). A
closer examination of these states past and current investments in social protection, health,
and nutrition programs can help inform the debate on policy instruments to protect
populations against hunger even in the face of poverty as economic growth is not necessarily
associated with poverty reduction. Additionally, even if equitable economic growth improves
food availability and access, it might not lead immediately to improvements in child nutrition
and mortality, for which more direct investments are required to enable rapid reduction. There
are other sources also for computing HDI and poverty reduction. For instance, Jean Dreze &
Ritika Khera, Regional Patterns of Human and Child Deprivation in India EPW, September
29, 2012 No 39. Sabina Alkire and her colleagues at Oxford University, Multidimensional
Poverty Index (MPI). Briefly, the idea is that poverty manifests itself in different kinds of
deprivation lack of food, shelter, sanitation, schooling, health care, and so on.[ There are
more MPI poor people in eight Indian states than in the 26 poorest African countries
combined. Some 421 million people in the Indian States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal live in multidimensional
poverty; the 26 poorest African countries are home to 410 million MPI poor people. India has
experienced strong economic growth in recent years, yet the MPI reveals that extensive acute
multidimensional poverty persists (Sabina; 2014)
@Disclaimer: The presentation is more of a research note rather than a paper and it is part of
an evolving manuscript on studying welfare regimes in India at the sub-national level.
Notes and References
1. Clientelism; According to Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012), "Clientelism refers to strategic
transfers made by political parties and governments to poor and disadvantaged groups as a means of
securing their votes, in an effort to consolidate political power. By their very nature such transfers
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provide an appearance of successful pro-poor targeting of public services. But they usually come at
the expense of long-term development, since they create biases towards private transfer programs
with short-term payoffs at the expense of public goods or private benefits of a long-run nature (such
as education or health)
https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/political-clientelism-and-capture
2. Types of populism and forms of clientelism;
Empowerment populism holds that the people have been robbed by an alien and privileged elite, and
the leading segments of .the people. will redress these grievances by attacking the sources of
disprivilege.
Protection populism holds that the people have been robbed by selfish special interests and it is the
role of the elite or of the government, to keep those interests in check and to protect and to provide for
the poor.
Assertive populism; under this excluded groups are urged to assert themselves against the
discrimination which they have faced (partly focussed in Tamilnadu by agitations over the
Language issue), and to secure entitlements (to education, jobs, loans, subsidized producer goods and
sometimes small pieces of property). Demands are presented as being made on behalf of the popular
community. Paternalist populism appeals more strongly to the lower strata. (including perhaps
mainly, the dalits) and women, who are often unable to assert their demands independently. For
instance, framing welfare as the distribution of public and club goods is it Amma canteens,
subsidized salt or goods such as grinders and mixers which have been distributed during the All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) regime as also similar initiatives during the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) regime in Tamilnadu helps it reach the people beyond sectional
interests. The efficiency of the delivery of goods and services in both the regimes has been very high.
(Subramanian, N (1999) Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: political parties, citizens and
democracy in South India. Delhi: Oxford University Press; Swamy, A (1996) The Nation, the People
and the Poor; sandwich tactics in party competition and policy formation, India 1931-1996.
Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley; Swamy, A, Parties, Political
Identities and the Absence of Mass Political Violence in South India., in a book edited by Atul Kohli
and Amrita Basu (OUP, Delhi 1998).Basu, A and Kohli, A (eds) (1998) Community Conflicts and the
State in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press
3. Patronage democracy is a democracy in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and services,
and in which elected officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and
service at the disposal of the state. (Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and
Ethnic Head Counts in India. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004)
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