Nyquist: Single Case Research and The History of American Legal Thought

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SingleCaseResearchandtheHistoryof
AmericanLegalThought
CURTISNYQUIST

ABSTRACT
The history of American legal thought provides a foundation for a

discussion of the value of singlecase scholarship. Many states have rich
archival material that can be an enormous resource for singlecase
scholarship, but the true value of this material to legal understanding has
long been overshadowed by the casebook method of instruction. Using the
court records of two early nineteenthcentury Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court contract opinions, Gray v. Gardner and Mills v. Wyman, this
Article provides a template for those interested in undertaking singlecase
research.Whilecontractlawhasledtheway,singlecaseresearchhasproven
equallyfruitfulinotherprivatelawareas.Thus,throughtheeyeofcontract
law,thisArticleprovidesalensonthetheoreticalsignificanceofsinglecase
scholarshipforallareasofresearch.

Professor of Law, New England School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., North
ParkCollege.TheauthorthanksElizabethBouvier,DavaleneCooper,RichardHuber,Duncan
Kennedy,GaryMonserud,andWilliamTwiningfortheirassistanceandNewEnglandSchool
ofLawfortheJamesR.LawtonSummerResearchStipendwhichprovidedfinancialsupport.
This Article is a revised and updated version of Contract Theory, SingleCase Research and the
Massachusetts Archives, originally appearing in Massachusetts Legal History (1997), permission
ofSupremeJudicialCourtHistoricalSociety,Boston,Massachusetts.
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590 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|589
INTRODUCTION
C
hristopher Columbus Langdell was appointed to the faculty of
HarvardLawSchoolonJanuary6,1870andlaterintheyearbecame
the first dean of the school.1 During the spring semester he taught
courses in partnership and negotiable paper in a style and with materials
commontolawschoolsofthetime.Hewouldhavelecturedaboutrules,cited
casesmerelytoillustratetherules,andsporadicallyquestionedhisstudents
abouttheassignedreadingfromatextbook.Butinthefallof1870,Langdells
first meeting with his class in contracts would become a landmark in legal
education:
Thedaycameforitsfirsttrial.Theclassgatheredintheold
amphitheatreofDaneHalltheonelectureroomoftheSchool
and opened their strange new pamphlets, reports bereft of their
onlyusefulpart,theheadnotes!Thelectureropenedhis.
Mr.Fox,willyoustatethefactsinthecaseofPaynev.Cave?
Mr.Foxdidhisbestwiththefactsofthecase.
Mr.Rawle,willyougivetheplaintiffsargument?
Mr.Rawlegavewhathecouldoftheplaintiffsargument.
Mr.Adams,doyouagreewiththat?2
Thus,thecasemethodwasborn,andtherestishistory.
The innovation of teaching by assigning cases exclusively and then
engagingstudentsinaSocraticdialoguewasthecenterpieceofaLangdellian
transformation of legal education.3 Furthermore, Langdells pedagogical
1See, e.g., 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 359, 37071 (photo.
reprint1999)(1908);ThomasC.Grey,LangdellsOrthodoxy,45U.PITT.L.REV.1,1(1983).
2SamuelF.Batchelder,ChristopherC.Langdell,18GREENBAG437,440(1906).Fordiscussionsof
law school pedagogy prior to the case method, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICANLAW23940(3ded.2005);MichaelL.Closen,TeachingwithRecentDecisions:ASurveyof
PastandPresentPractices,11FLA.ST.U.L.REV.289,29293(1983).
3Langdell attended Harvard Law School from 1851 to 1854 and practiced in New York City
priortohisappointmenttothefaculty.2WARREN,supranote1,at359.Heservedasdeanuntil
1895 and became professor emeritus in 1900. Id. at 452, 515. Langdell evokes a full spectrum of
responsesfromadulationtovilification.GrantGilmoreviewedhimasanessentiallystupidman
who,earlyinhislife,hitononegreatideatowhich,thereafter,heclungwithallthetenacityof
genius.GRANT GILMORE, THE AGESOF AMERICAN LAW42(1977).Formoremoderatecomments
onLangdell,seeFRIEDMAN,supranote2,at61217(discussingchangesatHarvardLawSchool);
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S,at
5356 (1983) (discussing the case method); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A
HISTORYOF IDEASAND MEN,18171967,at162205(1967)(discussingLangdellstenureasDean);
WARREN,supranote1,at35989(discussingLangdellsgeneralinfluenceonHarvardLawSchool);
2011 Single-Case Research 591
method and his guide to the casebook A Summary of the Law of Contracts4
became one of the foundations of a jurisprudential theory purporting to
reconstructthestudyandpracticeoflawasascientificenterprise.Thescience
he envisioned was a science of legal categories with nineteenthcentury
geometryperhapstheclosestanalogy.5Forbetterorworse,Langdellhasset
theagendaforthemoderndebateaboutlegalpedagogyandlegaltheory.The
focusofthisArticleiscontractlaw,butLangdellsinnovationspermeatedthe
curriculum,andananalysisofanyoftheotherprivatelawsubjectswouldin
large part parallel the discussion here. Indeed, his work was part of a
completereorderingofAmericanjurisprudencenowknownasClassicallegal
thought.
ThefirsteditionofLangdellsASelectionofCasesontheLawofContracts6
contained336cases.7Thecaseswerelargelyunedited,andtheonlyhintsof
Langdells presence were a brief preface, a table of cases, an index, and an
occasionalfootnote.OnlytwentytwoofthecaseswereAmerican.8Although
Langdellbelievedcaselawtobetheonlyproperobjectofstudyinlawschool,
hedemonstratednointerestinexaminingoriginalcourtfiles.Inhisview,the
CurtisNyquist,AContractTalefromtheCrypt,30HOUS. L. REV.1205,123036(1993)(discussinga
prefirsteditionofLandgellscasebookandhispedagogicalstyle).
4C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (photo. reprint 1980) (2d ed. 1880)
[hereinafterSUMMARY].TheSummaryfirstappearedasasupplementtothesecondeditionofhis
casebookpriortoitsseparatepublication.Id.atiii.
5See, e.g., Grey, supra note 1, at 1620. But see Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the
InventionofLegalDoctrine,58BUFF. L. REV. 551,585605(2010)(arguingthatLangdellstheory

shouldbeseenasanempiricalscience).
6C.C.LANGDELL,ASELECTIONOFCASESONTHELAWOFCONTRACTS(1871).
7E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406,
1439(1987).
8Id.Langdellscasebookhad310Englishcases.Id.TheAmericancasescamefromConnecticut
(one), Massachusetts (ten), New York (eight), Pennsylvania (one), and the U.S. Supreme Court
(two).Id.Farnsworthcommentedonhisselectionprocess:
WhydidLangdellsoskewhisselection?Anglophilia,coupledwith
Eastern snobbery, was surely a factor. Langdell recalled his contracts
professor, Parsons, exhorting new students to study English decisions
diligentlybecauseEnglandgovernsusstill;notbyreasonofforcebutby
force of reason. This view must have guided Langdell when he helped
Parsons with his treatise and again when he compiled an anthology of
cases under pressure of time. Since Langdell had forsaken a bookish
practice in New York for an ivory tower in Massachusetts, it was not
surprisingthathepreferredAmericancasesfromthosestates.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting WARREN, supra note 1, at 312). Another factor may have been
LangdellsvisionthatHarvardLawSchoolshouldpreparestudentsforapracticecomparableto
thatofanEnglishbarrister.SeeRobertW.Gordon,TheCasefor(andAgainst)Harvard,93MICH. L.
REV.1231,124245(1995).
law was contained in the published opinion of the court. Historical

background, social context, the identity of the parties, pretrial skirmishing,
and the vagaries of litigation would only distract students from the task of
extractinggeneralprinciplesfromcourtopinions.9Indeed,formorethanone
hundredyearsnolegalscholarbotheredtoinvestigatethecourtfilesbehind
the opinions used to teach contracts. During this period, singlecase
scholarship was limited to public law subjects and in particular the great
constitutionallawcases.10
In 1975, a seminal article by Richard Danzig investigating the English
case Hadley v. Baxendale11 provided a model for a new type of contract
scholarship.12 Danzigs article discussed Hadley in the context of mid
nineteenthcenturyEnglandandproducedfascinatinginsightsconcerningthe
facts,legalissues,parties,lawyers,andjudgesinvolvedinthecase.13In1978,
Danzig published a book14 that provided a contextualized treatment of six
othercontractcasesincludingcontemporarycases.15HisdiscussionofSullivan
9Langdell was so focused on case law that he regarded even legislation as something other
than law. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 124344. When A.V. Dicey, Vinerian Professor of English
LawatOxford,wasinvitedtoHarvardtolectureonnineteenthcenturyEnglishlawhediscussed
thehistoryoflegislationduringthatera.C.C.Langdell,DominantOpinionsinEnglandDuringthe
Nineteenth Century in Relation to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the Absence of It,
DuringthatPeriod,19HARV.L.REV.151,152(1906).Thelectureswerepublishedinbookformand
althoughLangdellwroteaglowingreview,hefeltcompelledtocomment,[i]ntruth,thebookis
innosensealawbook.Id.at153.
10See,e.g.,EdwardS.Corwin,TheSteelSeizureCase:AJudicialBrickWithoutStraw,53COLUM.L.
REV. 53 (1953). For an early article in labor law, see Walter Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32
COLUM. L. REV.1128(1932),discussedinEllenC.Kearns&N.JayShepherd,TheHuntforLemuel
Shaw: Commonwealth v. Hunt as a Defense of the Freedom of Contract, 1 SUPREME JUD. CT. HIST.
SOCYREV.62,77(1995).
11156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley v. Baxendale is the classic English case on the requirement
thatinordertorecoverdamagesforbreachofcontractthedamagesmustbeforeseeable.InHadley
a flour mill shipped a broken engine shaft to the manufacturer so that a duplicate could be
fabricated.Id.at145.Theshippingcompanydelayeddeliveryoftheshaftbutwasheldnotliable
for profitslostbythe mill during the delay. Id. Hadleywas notincludedin Langdellscasebook
,andalthoughitoftenappearedincasebooksondamages,itdidnotdebutincontractsuntil1931.
SeeFarnsworth,supranote7,at1443.
12Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD.249(1975).
13Danzigunearthedthereasonforthelatearrivalthebrokenshaftwassupposedtotravelby
rail, but midway in the voyage it was delayed for a few days in London and then by mistake
loadedontoaboatforthefinallegofthejourney.Id.at251n.5.
14RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON
WELLKNOWN CASES (1978). Danzigs book has been expanded and updated. See RICHARD
DANZIG & GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER
READINGSONWELLKNOWNCASES(FoundationPress2ded.2004)(1978).
15DANZIG&WATSON,supranote14,at1632.
v. OConnor,16 for example, is based on the trial court record and interviews
with the parties, lawyers, trial court judge, and four of the six jurors.17
Danzigsworkinspiredamovementtowardsinglecaseresearchincontract.18
Although this Article focuses on Massachusetts, many states have rich
archival material, and all of these archives are an enormous resource for
singlecase scholarship. This Article summarizes the court records of two
early nineteenthcentury Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)
contract opinions and provides a template for others interested in
undertakingsinglecaseresearch.Whilecontractlawhasledtheway,single
caseresearchhasprovenequallyfruitfulinotherprivatelawareas.19
Part I of this Article is a quick tour of the history of American legal
thought. This history provides a foundation for a discussion of singlecase
research, furnishes a backdrop for the analysis in Part II of two early
nineteenthcenturySJCcontractopinions,andoffersatleastapartialanswer
to the question of why contextualized singlecase research was so late in
developing. Part II discusses the original court records of Gray v. Gardner20
and Mills v. Wyman.21 Both opinions were included in Langdells casebook
and are still studied in contracts. Indeed, they are the only American cases
from Langdells casebook that survive in the modern curriculum.22 Part III
discussesthetheoreticalsignificanceofsinglecasescholarship.

16296N.E.2d183(Mass.1973).
17DANZIG&WATSON,supranote14,at544.
18See,e.g.,PETERLINZER,ACONTRACTSANTHOLOGY183270(PeterLinzered.,AndersonPubg
Co. 2d ed. 1995) (1989); Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the
AlleghenyCollegeCase,36BUFF. L. REV.645,645(1987);JudithL.Maute,Peevyhousev.Garland
Coal&MiningCo.Revisited:TheBalladofWillieandLucille,89NW. U. L. REV.1341,134142(1995);
Nyquist,supranote3;A.W.BrianSimpson,ContractsforCottontoArrive:TheCaseoftheTwoShips
Peerless,11CARDOZOL.REV.287,287(1989).
19See generally FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009)
(providingindepthanalysisofthestoriesbehindanumberofimportantfederalcasedecisions).
Inthepasttenyearsorso,theexpansionofinterestinsinglecaseresearchhasbeenstriking.The
Foundation Presss Federal Courts Stories series, for example, lists twentynine books in its 2009
catalogue. See Paul L. Caron, Foundation Press Publishes Federal Courts Stories, TAXPROF BLOG
(Nov.11,2009),http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/11/foundationpress.html.
2017 Mass. (16 Tyng) 188 (1821). The original court records for both cases are located in the
MassachusettsArchives,ColumbiaPoint,Boston.
2120Mass.(3Pick.)207(1825).
22Farnsworth,supranote7,at1443.ThereareonlysixEnglishcasesfromLangdellscasebook
stillincommonuse:Adamsv.Lindsell,Kingstonv.Preston,Pillansv.VanMierop,Thomasv.Thomas,
Dickinsonv.Dodds,andRafflesv.Wichelhaus.Id.
I. ContractLawandTheory
A complete account of contract from the Revolutionary War to the

presentrequiresthatcontractlawthe system ofrulesapplied bycourtsor
enacted by legislaturesbe separated from contract theorythe vast
outpouringofscholarlybooksandarticlesfocusedoncontract.Contractlaw
from the Revolutionary War until the present can be divided into three
overlapping periods. Contract theory is a more complicated story, and this
Articlefocusesonfoureras.Ofcourse,therealworldismoredisorderlythan
any attempt to provide categories: the assigned dates are only rough
approximations;therearetrendsandcountertrends;aparticularcasemaybe
aprecursorofafutureeraoraremnantfromthepast;andatanytimethereis
both a dominant theory and one or more opposed theories.23 Nevertheless,
these eras capture the essence of the transformation of contract law and
theory over the past two hundred plus years. In the first two eras, pre
Classical(fromtheRevolution1870)andClassical(1870mid1920s),lawand
theoryareparallel.Neoclassicalcontractlawbeginstocomeintofocusinthe
1920s and 1930s and still dominates the practice of law. In terms of post
Classicaltheory,thisArticlefocusesontwoeras:theProgressive/LegalRealist
Era from 19051941 and the era of pluralism (or chaos, depending on your
perspective)from1970tothepresent.
A. PreClassicalContractLawandTheory
At the time of the Revolutionary War, legal practice was dominated by

theformsofaction.Torecover,aplaintiffhadtopleadandprovethespecific
facts required under the form. For example, to recover in covenant the
plaintiffhadtoestablishawritingundersealdeliveredbythepromissorto
the promissee in accordance with the parties intent.24 The principal
theoreticalworkatamoregenerallevelthatattemptedtobringordertothe
entire system was Sir William Blackstones Commentaries on the Laws of
England,25whichhadenormousinfluencehere,butpresentsalegalstructure
23For a similar view, see P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 26263
(1979).InhisanalysisofhistoricaltrendsinnineteenthcenturyEngland,Atiyahcomments:
What we thus seem to find is a long drawn out and messy end to the
paternalism and traditional customary moralities of the eighteenth
century,prettywellstretchingouttowardsthebeginningsofthemodern
collectivist or quasisocialist period. The famous period of Victorian
individualismandlaissezfaireseemsvirtuallytodisappearatbothends.
Id.at263.
24WILLIAM
E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGEONMASSACHUSETTSSOCIETY17601830,at61(1975).
25Blackstonescommentarieswerepublishedinfourvolumesoverafouryearperiod.See
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIESONTHE LAWSOF ENGLAND(photo.reprint1966)(1765

thatisalmostunrecognizabletothemodernmind.26
DuringthefiftyyearperiodfollowingtheRevolution,theformsofaction
pleading system was gradually dismantled by courts and replaced with
noticepleading.27Withthedeclineoftheformsofaction,ageneraltheoryof
lawbecamepossible.OfthevariousattemptsinthepreClassicaleratocreate
ageneraltheory,themostnotablewasTheophilusParsonssLawofContracts
publishedin1853.28Parsonsstreatiseincludedvirtuallyalloftheprivatelaw
subjects we would identify as torts, quasicontract, contract, family law,
property, and agency, all gathered under one large tent labeled contract.
HisschemereflectedapreClassicaluniverse,withneitheracleardistinction
between obligations based on promise and obligations imposed by society,
nor between private law and public law.29 Parsonss organizing strategy
focused on relationships (e.g., marriage, parentchild, trustee, attorney,
bailment) and discussed the rights and duties arising out of those
relationships, which blurred the distinction between what people actually
intend and what they ought to intend30 and conflated the will of the state
withthewilloftheindividual.31ThispreClassicalsystemwouldberadically
reorderedintheClassicalera.
B. ClassicalContractLawandTheory
The principal architects of the Classical theory were Langdell, Oliver

Wendell Holmes in his lectures The Common Law,32 and Samuel Williston.33
1769).
26SeeDuncanKennedy,TheStructureofBlackstonesCommentaries,28BUFF. L. REV.205,211
(1979).
27NELSON, supra note 24, at 7288. Nelson commented that Massachusetts had traveled
most of the distance toward a system of notice pleading by 1830, and the legislature soon
intervenedandcompletedthetaskbystatutesenactedin1836and1851.Id.at8586.
28THEOPHILUSPARSONS,THELAWOFCONTRACTS(photo.reprint1980)(1853).
29DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 15764 (Beard
Books2006)(1975).
30Id.at158.
31Id.at172;seealsoMORTONJ.HORWITZ,THETRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICANLAW,17801860,
at11114(1977).
32OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW195264 (Mark DeWolfe Howeed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881). Holmes contributed both to the construction of classical theory and to its
demolition. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1894).There,Holmesstatedthattheissueofprivilegeintortnecessarilyraisespolicyquestions,
butsincejudgesareshyofreasoningfromsuchgrounds...decisionsfororagainsttheprivilege
...oftenarepresentedashollowdeductionsfromemptygeneralpropositions.Id.
33SeegenerallySAMUELWILLISTON,LIFEANDLAW:ANAUTOBIOGRAPHY(1941).Willistontaught
at Harvard Law School from 18901938, published a contract casebook in 1903, published a
contracttreatisein1909,andwasthereporterforthefirstRestatementofContracts.Id.at139,263,
Classicaltheoryheldthatitwaspossibletoconstructacomprehensiverules
system by inductively extracting general overarching principles from
individual cases and then deducing particular rules from those principles.34
For example, one of the contract principles plucked from the cases by the
Classicists was the axiom that only promises supported by a bargained
considerationwereenforceable.35Numerousparticularruleswerethoughtto
follow deductively from this principle: offers could be revoked, even if the
promisorhadpromisedtoholdtheofferopen;mererelianceonapromiseby
the promisee was insufficient to make the promise enforceable; if a benefit
was conferred by the promisee before the promise, the promise was
unenforceable; and in negotiating a contract, a person could do or say
anything without fear of contract liability, as long as she refrained from
issuinganofferoracceptinganofferbytheotherparty.36
The Classical approach to contract was based on rules rather than
standards.37Theideologyofrulesisthatlawshouldbeembodiedinbright
line statements that are clear in their application and that give the judge or
jurylittle,ifany,discretion.Thearchetypalexampleistherulethatapersonis
eligible to vote when they have reached their eighteenth birthday, but not
before.38 A standard is an openended statement of law that appeals to a
generalpolicy,requiresarelativelyextendedfactualinquirybythejudgeor
jury,andallowswidediscretionintheparticularcase.Examplesofstandards
are negligence or, in contract law, unconscionability.39 The ultimate goal of
310,33233;Farnsworth,supranote7,at1426.GrantGilmoreoffersapithyobservationaboutthe
contributionsofthethreefathersofclassicaltheory:Langdell,then,didlittlemorethanlaunch
theideathattherewasorshouldbesuchathingasageneraltheoryofcontract.Thetheory
itselfwaspiecedtogetherbyhissuccessorsnotablyHolmes,inbroadphilosophicaloutline,and
Williston, in meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail. GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATHOFCONTRACT15(RonaldK.L.Collinsed.,1995).
34SeeGrey,supranote1,at1112.
35SeeSUMMARY,supranote4,at58.Theoneexceptiontothisconsiderationrequirementwasa
contractunderseal.Id.
36SeeGILMORE,supranote33,at1937,foradiscussionoftheroleofconsiderationinclassical
theoryasthebalancewheelofthegreatmachine.
37See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV.1685(1976)(discussingthedistinctionbetweenrulesandstandards).
38Seeid.at1688.
39TheRestatement(Second)ofContractsprovides:
Ifacontractortermthereofisunconscionableatthetimethecontractis
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionableresult.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 208 (1981); see also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 2003
OFFICIAL TEXTWITH COMMENTS2302(addressingtheunconscionabilitystandardasappliedto
the Classical era was a comprehensive and formal rules system in which
everyissueineverycasewouldfitunderaparticularruleandtherulewould
dictatetheresult.
In the Classical era, questions of policy, fairness, and justice were
germane only at the level of general principles.40 There was to be no hand
wringing at the results in individual cases. A 1913 decision, Boone v. Coe,
epitomizes Classicalera jurisprudence.41 The plaintiffs, tenant farmers from
Kentucky,enteredintoanoralagreementwiththedefendant,whoowneda
farm in Texas. The agreement provided that the plaintiffs would move to
Texasandoperatethefarmforayearinexchangeforashareofthecrop.The
plaintiffs spent fiftyfive days moving to Texas, but when they arrived, the
defendant refused to perform, and the plaintiffs returned to Kentucky. The
plaintiffs sued for breach of contract seeking only their expenses in moving
andthevalueoftheirlosttime,nottheprofitstheywouldhavemadefrom
performance.Thecourtstressedtheimportanceofthepoliciessupportingthe
Statute of Frauds, held that because the agreement was a oneyear lease to
commence at a future date it was within the statute,42 and concluded the
plaintiffs were entitled to no relief since they could not produce a writing
signedbythedefendant.43Thecourtwascompletelyuntroubledbytheresult:
Torequire[thedefendant]topayplaintiffsforlossesandexpensesincurred
onthefaithofthecontract...would,ineffect,upholdacontractuponwhich
thestatuteexpresslydeclaresnoactionshallbebrought.44Theopinionreads
liketheworkofageometercalculatingtheradiusofasphere.
TheClassicaleracreatedthecategoriesthatstilldominatelegalthought.
Private law was separated from public; contract, tort, family law, property,
and damages were partitioned from each other; and the essence of contract
wasdelineatedasliabilityvoluntarilyassumedversusliabilityimposedby
society.45 Express promise was installed as the centerpiece of contract;
implied promise was separated out and moved to a different subject
entirelyrestitution.Inthelawschools,casesfloatedfreeoftheircontext,and
the study of law as the science of legal categories was divorced from fuzzy
and unscientific concepts like politics, morality, and policy. It is hardly
surprisingthattheClassicistsignoredarchivalmaterial.

thesaleofgoods).
40SeeGrey,supranote1,at15.
41154S.W.900(Ky.1913).
42Id.at901.
43Id.at902.
44Id.at903.
45See,e.g.,P.S.Atiyah,Contracts,Promises,andtheLawofObligations,inESSAYSONCONTRACT10,
1016(1986).
C. NeoclassicalContractLawandtheProgressive/LegalRealistEraIn
ContractTheory
Asthenameimplies,Neoclassicalcontractlawisbothacontinuationof
and a critique of Classical law. In the first four decades of the twentieth
century,theprogressivesandlegalrealistsattackedeverypartoftheClassical
structure: formalism; the case method; the partition of subjects within the
curriculum; and the separation of public and private, law and politics, and
law and policy.46 The foremost realist Karl Llewellyn guided the Uniform
CommercialCode(U.C.C.)projectthroughoutthe1940sand1950sand,in
particular, drafted U.C.C. Article 2.47 The first Restatement of Contracts,48 a
fundamentally Classical document, became the Neoclassical Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. And for over sixty years Arthur Linton Corbin
painstakingly surveyed the contract landscape, recommending the careful
studyofcasesasanantidotetotheillusionofcertainty.49
TheessenceoftheattackontheClassicalsystemwasthataformalrules
systemdidnot,andcouldnot,work.50The Classicalsystemwasfilled with
contradictory rules, rules with exceptions that threatened the rules, and
exceptions to exceptions. Indeed, the entire Classical edifice was built on a
fundamentalcontradictionbetweenfreedomandsecurity:thecontradiction
is between the principle that individuals may legitimately act in their own
interesttoincreasetheirwealth,power,andprestigeattheexpenseofothers
andtheprinciplethattheyhaveadutytolookoutforothersandtorefrain
from acts that hurt them.51 Furthermore, the contradiction surfaced and
requiredresolutionineverycase.52Sometimesjudgeshandeddowndecisions
likeBoonev.Coe,53andsometimesjudgesprotectedthepromiseesreliance;it
46Forgeneraldiscussionsoflegalrealism,seeMORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIONOF
AMERICAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169246 (1992); WILLIAM TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYNANDTHE REALIST MOVEMENT passim (1973);CurtisNyquist,LlewellynsCodeasa
ReflectionofLegalConsciousness,40NEWENG.L.REV.419passim(2006).
47SeeT WINING ,supranote46,at270340(appraisingLlewellynsroleintheU.C.C.project).
48RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS(1932).GrantGilmorearguedthatthefirstRestatementof
Contracts was a fundamentally conflicted document, pointing toward Classical theory in the
definitionofconsiderationandtowardNeoclassicaltheoryinthesectiononpromissoryestoppel.
GILMORE,supranote33,at6768.
49SeeGILMORE,supranote33,at64.CorbintaughtatYaleLawSchoolfrom19031943whenhe
became Professor Emeritus, but he continued his contract scholarship into the 1960s. See also
ThomasW.Swan,ProfessorArthurL.Corbin:CreatorofthePresentDayYaleLawSchool,74YALEL.J.
207(1964)(providingabriefbiographyofCorbin).
50See,e.g.,Nyquist,supranote46,at43235.
51Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld,1982WIS.L.REV.975,980.
52Id.at105859.
53Seesupranotes4144andaccompanyingtext.
wasoftendifficulttotellwhichwayacourtwouldjump.Llewellynsreaction
inU.C.C.Article2wastogivecourtsflexibilitybysaturatingthestatutewith
standards (e.g., good faith,54 reasonableness,55 commercial reasonableness,56
and unconscionability57) and urging liberal construction in light of the
statutesunderlyingpurposesandpolicies.58
Under Classical contract law, only promises supported by a bargained
considerationwereenforceable.59Neoclassicallawretainsthebargaintheory
of consideration60 but provides two additional enforcement mechanisms:
promissoryestoppel61andpromiseforabenefitpreviouslyreceived.62These
mechanismsmovetheentireissueofpromiseenforcementtowardstandards,
and away from rules, since they make promises enforceable to the extent
necessarytoavoidinjustice.
The Neoclassical era challenged the Classical borders between subjects.
The issue of damages has now been reunited with contract,63 and in some
contract casebooks damages is the very first topic.64 Promissory estoppel,
although taught in contracts, is generally understood as tort based. Grant
Gilmore, who coined the term contorts,65 speculated that promissory
estoppel put contract itself at risk: if most contracts, historically analyzed
54SeeU.C.C.1304(2008).
55See,e.g.,id.2608.
56See,e.g.,id.2706(2).
57Id.2302.Llewellynfeltthatincertaincircumstancesstandardscouldleadtomorecertainty
thanrules.Forexample,hiscommentsto2302includethefollowing:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police
explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be
unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by
adverseconstructionoflanguage, bymanipulation oftherulesofofferand
acceptanceorbydeterminationthattheclauseiscontrarytopublicpolicy
or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to
allowthecourttopassdirectlyontheunconscionabilityofthecontractor
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its
unconscionability.
Id.2302cmt.1(emphasisadded).
58Id.1103.
60RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS71(1981).
61Id.90.
62Id.86.
63SeegenerallyL.L.Fuller&WilliamR.Perdue,Jr.,TheRelianceInterestinContractDamages,46
YALEL.J.373(1937)(discussingtheconnectionbetweencontractenforcementanddamages).
64See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed. 2003); JOHN P.
DAWSONETAL.,CONTRACTS:CASESANDCOMMENT24(9thed.2008).
65GILMORE,supranote33,at9899.
undertheconsiderationdoctrine,alsofitunderpromissoryestoppel,66whatis
to prevent a court from circumventing all of the principles of contract by
applying promissory estoppel?67 To a certain extent the Restatement (Second)
allows just such a maneuver. For example, under a Neoclassical approach
Boone v. Coe68 would likely come to a different result since the Restatement
(Second)protectsreasonablerelianceonanoralpromisenotwithstandingthe
StatuteofFrauds.69
Itisworthnoting,however,thatClassicalcontractlaw,thethesis,setthe
parametersforthedebatewithitsantithesis,Neoclassicallaw.Ina1978article
proposingarelationaltheoryofcontract,IanMacneilargued,Neoclassical
contract law partially, but only partially, frees itself of the foregoing
difficulties.Thefreeingcomesinthedetails,notintheoverallstructure.70It
is only after 1970 that the entire ClassicalNeoclassical edifice is put into
question,butonlyattheleveloftheory.Contractlawasreflectedincasesand
statuteshasnotmovedbeyondtheNeoclassicalsystem.
Theprogressive/realistcritique,asappliedtothelawschoolcurriculum,
argued studying law from appellate decisions was a wholly inadequate
preparation for practice. The first cases and materials casebook was
publishedin1935.71FormorethantwentyyearsJeromeFrankrailedagainst
the absurd notion that the heart of a law school is its library72 and
advocatedatypeoflegaleducationthatmergedpracticeandtheory.Frank,
66A promissory estoppel analysis is available because most contract promises lead to full or
partialperformancebythepromiseeor,ifnotperformance,atleastpreparationsforperformance.
67SeeGILMORE,supranote33,at96103.
68154S.W.900(Ky.1913).
69Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes3437.
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce

action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable
notwithstandingtheStatuteofFraudsifinjusticecanbeavoidedonlyby
enforcementofthepromise.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS139(1)(1981).
70Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 884 (1978). The difficulties to
whichMacneilrefersarecreated,inhisview,whencontractlawattemptstoresolveallissuesby
focusingonthemomentofcontractingratherthanadmittingthatmanyagreementsarelongterm
relationships.SeeLINZER,supranote18,at9093(discussingMacneilstheories).
71Farnsworth,supranote7,at1447.
72STEVENS, supra note 3, at 157 (quoting Jerome Frank, Address to the ABA Section of Legal
Education, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education? (1933)); Amy M. Colton, Eyes to the
Future,YetRememberingthePast:ReconcilingTraditionwiththeFutureofLegalEducation,27U.MICH.
J.L.REFORM963,974(1994).
consideredamajorprophetofclinicallegaleducation,73didnotmincewords
inattackingthecasemethod:Whowouldlearngolffromagolfinstructor,
contenting himself with sitting in the lockerroom analyzing newspaper
accounts of important golfmatches that had been played by someone else
severalyearsbefore?74
Althoughneithertheprogressivesnortherealistsengagedinsinglecase
research, Frank proposed a pedagogical innovation which, had it been
implemented,wouldhavecreatedaspeciesofsuchresearch.Inaspeechin
1947,Franksuggestedlawschoolsoffercoursesinwhichstudentsstudythe
completecourtrecordofafewcasesratherthanappellatecourtopinionsof
numerouscases:
A few months properly spent on one or two elaborate court
records, including the briefs (and supplemented by reading of
textbooksaswellasuppercourtopinions),willteachastudent
morethantwoyearsspentongoingthroughtwentyofthecase
booksnowinuse....Itisabsurdthatweshouldcontinuetocall
anuppercourtopinionacase.Itisatmostanadjuncttothefinal
step in a case (i.e., an essay published by an upper court in
explanationofitsdecision).75
Unfortunately,Franksproposal,likemanyofhisideas,wasignored.
D. PluralisminContractTheory
Since 1970 jurisprudence has become a great juristic bazaar of

competing,and,insomeinstances,complementary,legaltheories.76Contract
is particularly fertile ground for jurisprudential experiment, and although a
Neoclassical approach continues to be the core of the study and practice of
contractlaw,attheleveloftheorytherearenumerousopposedpositionsand
even one theory, law and economics, which has been characterized as a
revivalofClassicaljurisprudence.77Thetheoriesthathavebeencreatedby,or
drawn theattentionof,contractscholars arerelationaltheory,78criticallegal
studies,79 feminism,80 law and literature,81 deconstruction,82 law and
73See Stephen Wizner, What Is a Law School?, 38 EMORY L.J. 701, 70911 (1989) (discussing
JeromeFrankandclinicaleducation).
74JeromeFrank,APleaforLawyerSchools,56YALEL.J.1303,1311(1947).
75Id.at1315.
76Seegenerally WilliamTwining, The Great Juristic Bazaar,14 J.SOCY PUB. TCHRS. L. (n.s.)185
(1978).
77See,e.g,MarkV.Tushnet,PerspectivesonCriticalLegalStudies:Introduction,52GEO.WASH. L.
REV.239,241(1984).
78SeeMacneil,supranote70,at884.
79Peter Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical
LegalTheory,61MINN.L.REV.601,60304(1977).
80SeeMaryJoeFrug,ReReadingContracts:AFeministAnalysisofaContractsCasebook,34AM. U.
economics,83 critical race theory,84 story telling,85 and several trends in

historiography.86InPartIIIofthisArticlethreeofthesetheoriesarediscussed
astheyrelatetosinglecaseresearch.
In the law schools, the case method now competes with the problem
method,clinicalinstruction,coursesbasedonsimulation,coursesfocusedon
drafting, and an array of interdisciplinary subjects. The case method,
however, has proven to be highly adaptable to shifts in legal theory and at
leastinfirstyearcoursescontinuestoplayasignificantrole.
II. TwoEarlyNineteenthCenturyContractCasesandtheCourt
Archives
Both Gray v. Gardner and Mills v. Wyman are opinions by Chief Justice
IsaacParker.87ParkersatontheSJCfrom1806untilhisdeathin1830andwas
chiefjusticefrom1814to1830.In1816,hebecamethefirstprofessoroflawat
HarvardUniversity,andin1817,hesuccessfullyproposedtheestablishment
ofHarvardLawSchool.88Intheliteraturehehasareputationasakindand
amiablepersonbutasasomewhatlazy justice.Atleast part ofhis negative
standingmustcomefrombeingcomparedtohissuccessors.Onthecourthe
was succeeded by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, considered one of the great
Americanjudges,89andatHarvardhewasfollowedbythelegendaryJoseph
L.REV.1065,107778(1985).
81See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICEOFTHEORYINLITERARYANDLEGALSTUDIES3233(1989).
82SeeClareDalton,AnEssayintheDeconstructionofContractDoctrine,94YALEL.J.997,9991000
(1985);seealsoHORWITZ,supranote46,atviiix(commentingontheimpactofpostmodernismon
historiography).
83See,e.g.,ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICSOF CONTRACT LAW
(1979).
84See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV.C.R.C.L.L.REV.401,40608(1987).
85See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L.
REV.987,98991(1990).
86SeeinfraPartIII.BC.
87See Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 188, 189 (1821); Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (1
Pick.)207,208(1825).
88For biographical information about Isaac Parker, see Russell K. Osgood, Isaac Parker:
RepublicanJudge,FederalistValues,inTHE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT16921992,at153(RussellK.Osgooded.,1992);1CHARLES WARREN, HISTORYOF
THEHARVARDLAWSCHOOLANDOFEARLYLEGALCONDITIONSINAMERICA293315(photo.reprint
1999)(1908).
89See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 4 (photo. reprint 1960)
(1938);BernardSchwartz,TheJudicialTen:AmericasGreatestJudges,4S.ILL.U.L.J.405,407(1979).
Story.90Despitehisreputation,Parkerisanimportantfigureinthehistoryof
boththeSJCandHarvardLawSchool,andhisopinioninMillsv.Wymanis
one of the most significant private law opinions from the preClassical era,
capturingtheessenceofadirectionincasesinthefirsthalfofthenineteenth
century. For measuring the judicial atmosphere of the early nineteenth
century,thereisnobarometerbetterthanMillsv.Wyman.91
Gray and Mills are both important contract opinions but not because of
the frequency of their citations in cases; in fact, they are seldom cited. With
theLangdellianrevolutioninlegaleducationandlegaltheory,casestookon
importance because they were taught in the classroom, discussed in the
literature,andusedasfoundationsforsectionsintheRestatements.
A. Grayv.Gardner
1. TheOpinion
Gray v. Gardner92 was an action in assumpsit based on an agreement

entered into April 14, 1819 between the plaintiff William Gray and the
defendants,describedasOliverGardnerandOthers.93Graysoldwhaleoil
to the defendants, who paid sixty cents per gallon, and also signed a note
promisinganadditionalpaymentof$5,198.87.Thenote,however,contained
thefollowingterm:
[O]n the condition that if a greater quantity of sperm oil should
arrive in whaling vessels at Nantucket and New Bedford, on or
betweenthefirstdayofAprilandthefirstdayofOctoberofthe
present year, both inclusive, than arrived at said places, in
whalingvessels,onorwithinthesametermoftimethelastyear,
thenthisobligationtobevoid.DatedApril14,1819.94
Thefactualissuepresentedinthecasewaswhetheraparticularwhaling
ship, the Lady Adams, had arrived at Nantucket before or after midnight
October1,1819.IftheLadyAdamsarrivedbeforemidnight,thebuyerswould
notbeobligatedtopaythenote.
TheSJC,inaffirmingthetrialcourtsrulingfortheplaintiff,heldthatthe
90JosephStorywasappointedtotheU.S.SupremeCourtin1811attheageof32andserved
untilhisdeathin1845.Schwartz,supranote89,at405.InadditiontohisdutiesontheCourtandat
HarvardLawSchool,hepublishedcommentariesonninedifferentareasofthelaw.ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERYANDTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS238(1975).Hehasbeencalled
aonemanAmericanLawInstitute.Id.at239.
91SeegenerallyMills,20Mass.(1Pick.)at208.Fordiscussionofthetheoreticalimportance
ofMillsv.Wyman,seeinfranotes15878,21225andaccompanyingtext.
9217Mass.(16Tyng)188(1821).
93Id.at188.
94Id.(emphasisomitted).
burden of proof was on the defendants and that the evidence indicated the
Lady Adams had not arrived before midnight: A vessel with oil heaves in
sight,butshedoesnotcometoanchor,beforethehourisgone.Innosense,
can the oil be said to have arrived.95 The opinion covers barely more than
two pages in the reporter. The legal issues seem straightforward, one is
tempted to say simple, and Parker betrayed little distress at the result. His
onlyconcernwasthatheviewedtheagreementasakindofwagerastothe
quantity of oil,96 but he concluded, [t]hey must be held strictly to their
contract,therebeingnoequitytointerferewiththetermsofit.97
2. Grayv.GardnerintheLiterature
Gray v. Gardner is inherently appealing because of its facts. The opinion

evokes all of the romance of the great age of whaling in American history,
andthemidnightarrivaloftheLadyAdamsisoneoftheindelibleimagesin
contract law. Unfortunately, the case has also been a source of enormous
confusion.
In Langdells casebook Gray appears in a section entitled Conditions
Subsequent, which is part of a chapter on conditional contracts. There are
fourcasesinthesectionGrayfollowsthreeEnglishcasesdated1662,1700,
and1787.98InthatsectionLangdellfollowshisnormalmethodofpresenting
cases in chronological order by jurisdiction.99 It is impossible to be certain
how Langdell used Gray in the classroom, but he discusses the case in his
Summary, and it is unlikely his teaching of the case departed significantly
fromhispublishedcomments.
ThepromissorynoteinGrayissubjecttoacondition.Incontractlaw,as
distinct from property, a condition is defined as an event, not certain to
occur, which must occur . . . before performance under a contract becomes
due.100Acontractconditionisusedprimarilyasariskallocationdevice.In
Graythepartiesapparentlywereunabletoagreeonapriceforthewhaleoil,
so they created a condition that would adjust the price according to the
NantucketandNewBedfordwhaleoilyieldsoverasixmonthperiodin1819
ascomparedwiththesameperiodin1818.101Langdelldidnot,however,use
Graytoteachtheconceptofcontractconditionsthecaseappearedthirtyfive
95Id.at190.
96Id.
97Id.
98SeeSUMMARY,supranote4,at57.
99Seeid.Inchapterone,forexample,theorderofcasesistwelveEnglish(dated1789to1867),
tenAmerican(1819to1868),twoScottish(1830and1855),andoneFrench(1813).Seegenerallyid.
(outliningLangdellslayoutinthetableofcontents).
100RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS224(1981).
101Gardner,17Mass.(16Tyng)at18990.
pagesintothechapteronconditions.102Heusedthecaseforotherpurposes.
LangdellapparentlyusedGraytoteachtwoissues:burdenofproofwith
respect to conditions and the distinction between conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent. The court imposed the burden of proof on the
defendants, and Langdell viewed that as correct since the language in the
note is similar to language in a bond; in cases involving bonds, the
defendant has the burden of alleging and proving performance of the
condition,[whichis]establishedbyuniformandimmemorialpractice.103
With respect to the other issue, Langdell stated the differences between
conditions precedent and conditions subsequent are important and
radical.104Asrelatedtoburdenofproof,heassertsthatasageneralruleifthe
condition is precedent the burden is on the plaintiff, and if subsequent the
burden is on the defendant.105 But is the condition in Gray a condition
subsequent?(Onewouldthinkitwouldbesincethecourthadimposedthe
burden on the defendant.) No, says Langdell; although it is subsequent in
form,106 in fact it is a condition precedent since the not happening of the
eventinquestionwasclearlyaconditionprecedenttotheplaintiffsrightof
action.107 In other words, although the note was issued April 14, 1819, the
holdercouldnotpresentitforpaymentimmediately,buthadtowaituntilthe
1819whaleoilyieldthroughOctober1hadbeencalculated.
Langdells treatment of Gray is remarkably convoluted, transforming a
relatively straightforward opinion into an analytic maze. He deploys two
dichotomies (condition precedent versus condition subsequent and form
versussubstance),ananalogy(thenoteislikeabond),andageneralrulewith
anexception(theplaintiffhastheburdeniftheconditionisprecedentandthe
defendanthastheburdeniftheconditionissubsequent,butthepartiescan
agree otherwise).108 Under Langdells analysis, the case seems to convey the
messagethattheconditioninthenoteisaconditionsubsequent,although,as
Langdellwaswellaware,itactuallyisaconditionprecedent.
In The Common Law, Holmes takes up the precedent/subsequent
distinctionand,althoughhedoesnotexplicitlymentionGrayorLangdell,he
is clearly critiquing Langdells tangled scheme: The conditions which a
102SeeSUMMARY,supranote4,at57.
103Id.
104Id.at35.
105Id.
106Id.at57.
107Id.TheeventtowhichLangdellrefersisthe1819yieldbeingmorethanthe1818yield.
The phrase not happening of the event means, then, the 1819 yield being the same or less in
whichcasethebuyerswouldbeobligatedtopaythenote.SeeGrayv.Gardner,17Mass.(16Tyng)
188,188(1821).
contract may contain have been divided by theorists into conditions

precedent and conditions subsequent. The distinction has even been
pronounced of great importance.109 But Holmes points out how the
distinction is completely malleable: In one sense, all conditions are
subsequent;inanother,allareprecedent.110Theonlydistinctionthatmakes
sensetoHolmesistodistinguishaneventthatmustoccurbeforeapromise
can be broken111 and an event that would discharge a party for breach of
contract, but this distinction to Holmes is of the slightest possible
importance.112In otherwords,Holmesfelt theentire precedent/subsequent
enterprisewasmoretroublethanitwasworth.
One of the virtues of singlecase research is the opportunity to test
general theories by following the path of a particular case through the
literature. The divergence between Langdell and Holmes on the
precedent/subsequentissue,forexample,providesinsightintoaninteresting
controversy about Holmess motivation in The Common Law. It is generally
believedthathisgoalwastobuildadefenseofthecommonlawagainstthe
influence of German legal thought.113 Nineteenth century German
jurisprudencewasheavilyinfluencedbyRomanlaw,andtherearenumerous
admonitions in The Common Law against importing Roman/German
concepts.114 An opposed theory argues that Holmess main target was
Langdellianformalism,butthathedisguisedhiscriticismbecausehehoped
forafacultyappointmenttoHarvardLawSchool.115Singlecaseresearchinto
Gray v. Gardner supports the disguised criticism theory. If one puts the
precedent/subsequentpassagesfromLangdellandHolmessidebyside,itis
absolutelyclearthatHolmes,atleasthere,istargetingLangdell.
These passages also give a concrete example of Holmess most
fundamental criticism of Langdell, his penchant for overscrupulous
minuteness.116InananonymousreviewofthesecondeditionofLangdells
casebook,Holmescomments:

109SeeHOLMES,supranote32,at247.
110Seeid.
111Id.at248.
112Id.
113SeeMarkDeWolfeHowe,IntroductiontoHOLMES,supranote32,atxvxvii.
114See,e.g.,HOLMES,supranote32,at173(ThegroundsforrejectingthecriteriaoftheRoman
lawhavebeenshownabove.Letusbeginafresh.).
115SeeMathiasW.Reimann,HolmessCommonLawandGermanLegalScience,inTHE LEGACY
OFOLIVERWENDELLHOLMES,JR.7273,94(RobertW.Gordoned.,1992).
116Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 539, 540 (1871), quoted in William P.
LaPiana, Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell Holmess Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLUM. L.
REV.809,828(1990).
It is hard to know where to begin in dealing with this

extraordinary production,equally extraordinary in its merits
anditslimitations....Decisionsarereconciledwhichthosewho
gave them meant to be opposed, and drawn together by subtle
lineswhichneverweredreamedofbeforeMr.Langdellwrote.117
This general criticism could also operate as a specific criticism of

Langdells treatment of Gray. Langdell draws an extraordinary number of
subtlelines,whichneverweredreamedofbyJusticeParker.118
The rest of the precedent/subsequent story can be quickly told.119
Although Langdells position held the field throughout the Classical era,
ultimately Holmes has triumphed. In the first Restatement of Contracts,
Willistonwassoimpressedwiththeimportanceoftheprecedent/subsequent
distinctionthathebuiltitintotheverydefinitionofcondition.120Thefactsof
Gray were used to illustrate conditions precedent that were subsequent in
form:
A in a sealed writing promises to pay B $1000. The writing
continues this obligation shall be void if the ship Empress
arrivesbyJune1.ThefailureoftheshiptoarrivebyJune1,isa
condition precedent to As duty of immediate performance.
Therecanbenorightofactionbeforethatday.121
Inthecasebooksandliterature,Graybecamethefoundationforteaching
and scholarship about the distinction between precedent and subsequent
contractconditions,andtheconditioninthenotewasoftenmisinterpretedas
a condition subsequent.122 It is no exaggeration to say that the
precedent/subsequent distinction has baffled generations of students and
lawyersbecauseofGrayv.Gardner.
The Restatement (Second) completely abandons the terms condition
precedent and condition subsequent, in effect adopting Holmess position
almost a century after The Common Law.123 Gray does appearperhaps in
tribute to its importance in the history of American jurisprudenceas an
117Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 233 (1880) [hereinafter Book
Notice].For furtherdiscussionsof Holmessreviewsofvariouseditionsof Langdellscasebook,

see LaPiana, supra note 116, at 82630; Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common
LawandLegalTheory,10HOFSTRAL.REV.673,695702(1982).
118SeeBookNotice,supranote117.
119ForanextendeddiscussionofGrayintheliterature,seeNyquist,supranote3,at122847.
120SeeRESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS250(1932).
121Id.259cmt.b,illus.2.
122See,e.g.,GLEASON L. ARCHER, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS26162 (2ded.1920).In Willistons
casebook, which both updated Langdells casebook and added new sections, the English cases
wereomittedfromtheconditionsubsequentsectionandGraybecamethefirstcase.Id.at528.
123See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 224 cmt. e (1981); see generally Holmes, supra
note32.
illustrationtoSection227,whichaddressesanissueofinterpretation.124
3. TheCourtRecord
TheGrayv.Gardnercourtrecordcontainsthepleadings,juryverdict,an
attachment order, the note, affidavits concerning whale oil yields of ships
returning to Nantucket and New Bedford, and twentyeight depositions. A
procedural rule of the time allowed a witness living more than thirty miles
fromtheplaceoftrialtogivetestimonybywrittendeposition.125InGray,the
trialwasinBoston,andmostofthewitnesseslivedonNantucket,andsothe
court record is particularly rich. The record reveals that the plaintiff is the
sameWilliamGraywhohadmadeafortuneintheChinatradewhileliving
in Salem.126 Gray moved to Boston in 1809 when his support for the 1807
EmbargoAct,whichhurtNewEnglandshipping,puthimatoddswiththe
Salem community.127 The defendant buyers were a consortium of eight
Nantucketers,includingJaredCoffin,whosemagnificenthomeonNantucket
isnowoperatedasaninn.128Thesizeoftheconsortiumisanaptillustration
of the risksharing philosophy of American whaling. In whaling, even the
crew shared in the risk since each member was paid a percentage of the
incomeofthevoyage.129
The court record corrects two misreadings of the case that commonly
occur both in the classroom and the literature. One error is assuming the
whaleoilontheLadyAdamswastheoilsoldunderthecontract.130Theoilsold
underthecontracthadbeendeliveredinApril1819thearrivaloftheLady
AdamswasrelevantonlybecauseifitarrivedbeforemidnightonOctober1st,
the1819NantucketandNewBedfordyieldswouldbegreaterthantheprior
year, and the buyers would not be liable on the conditional note. The other
errorisassumingthepricedifferentialwaseightyfivecentspergallon.131In
fact,thebuyershadunconditionallyagreedtopaysixtycentspergallonand
theconditionalnoteprovidedforanadditionalpaymentoftwentyfivecents
pergallon.132
124Id.227cmt.e,illus.13.
125SeeMASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch.233,2425(2008)forthecurrentrule.
126SeegenerallyEDWARDGRAY,WILLIAMGRAYOFSALEM,MERCHANT:ABIOGRAPHICALSKETCH
(1914)(discussingWilliamGray).
127Id.at4648.
128The other defendants were Philip H. Folger, Oliver Gardner, Prince Gardner, Thomas M.
Macy,JohnB.Macy,FrancisG.Macy,andSamuelH.Macy.Id.
129A captains percentage could be as high as 1/7th while the lowliest member of the crew
mightmakeonly1/225th.SeeCLIFFORDW.ASHLEY,THEYANKEEWHALER5(2ded.1938).
130See,e.g.,ROBERTE.SCOTT&JODYS.KRAUS,CONTRACTLAWANDTHEORY642(4thed.2007).
131See,e.g.,FRIEDRICHKESSLERETAL.,CONTRACTS:CASESANDMATERIALS984(3ded.1986).
132The court record reveals that the seller delivered 20,635.5 gallons of whale oil under the
The Gray court record contains documents of interest not only to legal
historians but also to nautical historians.133 For example, the affidavits and
depositions give precise information, sometimes to the quart, of whale oil
returns for twentyeight voyages returning to Nantucket and New Bedford
during 1818 and 1819. This data provided a mechanism for checking the
accuracyofthebibleofwhalingresearch:TheHistoryoftheAmericanWhale
Fishery,FromitsInceptiontotheYear1876.134Indeed,acourtrecordinanycase
potentiallycontainsawealthofhistoricalinformation.
ForlegalhistoriansandfacultyteachingGray,thecourtrecordprovides
detaileddescriptionsfromthecrewandwitnessesonshoreofthearrivalof
theLadyAdams.TherecordindicatesthattheshipputintoportatMarthas
Vineyardabout9:00p.m.onOctober1andprobablyintendedtounloadher
cargothere,butthattheCaptainchangedhismind:
I Bartlet Pease of Tisbury in the County of Dukes County,
pilot,oflawfulagetogiveevidence,testifyandsay...[theship]
came to about nine oclock in the evening. About this time Mr.
Ebenezer Smith came on board the ship and mentioned to the
CaptainthatanumberofmerchantsofNantuckethadgivenhim
orders to notify the Captains of their ships as they arrived to
proceed immediately on to Nantucket... . The Captain then
orderedmetogettheshipunderwayandproceeddirectlyonto
Nantucket, which I did, it being then about ten oclock in the
evening.135
ThepromissorynoteatissueinGrayspecifiedarrivalsatNantucketand
New Bedford; an arrival at Marthas Vineyard would not have counted.136
The defendant buyers were apparently monitoring the 1819 returns and
realizingthereturnswereshort,hadpostedascoutatMarthasVineyard.137
Unfortunately,theLadyAdamswouldbeunabletosailfromtheVineyardto
contractandthebuyerssignedtwonotes.Theunconditionalnotewasintheamountof$12,381.30.
ThenotelitigatedinGraywasdueDecember1,1819andprovidedforapaymentof$5,158.87in
principal plustwomonths interestatanunspecifiedrate.SeeTranscriptofRecordat 1,Grayv.
Gardner,17Mass.(16Tyng)188(1821)(No.41).
133SeeCurtisW.Nyquist,ByMyWatchWhichWasaCorrectTimePiece:Grayv.Gardnerand
theArrivaloftheShipLadyAdams,44LOGMYSTICSEAPORT3,3(1992).
134See generally ALEXANDER STARBUCK, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WHALE FISHERY, FROM ITS
INCEPTIONTOTHEYEAR1876(ArgosyAntiquarianLtd.1964)(1878)(chroniclingthedevelopment
oftheAmericanwhalefisheryindustry).TheGrayrecordindicatesthatwhileStarbuckisoftenin
errorinreportingparticularvoyagesinthisera,itdoesnotconsistentlyoverorunderreportso
thatthetotalyieldforagroupofvoyagesisquiteaccurate.SeeNyquist,supranote133,at8.
135DepositionofBartlettPease,Grayv.Gardner,17Mass.(16Tyng)188(1821)(takingplacein
Edgartown on April 6, 1820). A pilot was knowledgeable about the local port and would be
broughtonboardtoassistwithnavigation.
136Nyquist,supranote3,at1207.
137Id.at1219.
Nantucketanddropanchorbeforemidnight.138
B. Millsv.Wyman
1. TheOpinion
In early February 1821, Levi Wyman, who was about twentyfive years
old,wasreturningtothefamilyhomeinShrewsbury,Massachusettswhenhe
fellillinHartford,Connecticut.139Fromthe5thtothe20thofFebruaryhewas
in the care of Daniel Mills: [T]he plaintiff acted the part of the good
Samaritan, giving him shelter and comfort until he died.140 When Seth
Wyman, Levis father, heard of Millss kindness he wrote on February 24th
promising to pay the expenses related to his sons illness.141 Wyman
subsequentlyrefusedtopay,andMillsbroughtanactionbasedonWymans
promise.
The trialcourt judge nonsuited the plaintiff because [t]here was no
consideration for this promise, except what grew out of the relation which
subsistedbetweenLeviWymanandthedefendant.142Theplaintiffappealed,
arguing a parents moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for an
express promise143or,alternatively,itis sufficient thathispromisewasin
writing, and was made deliberately, with a knowledge of all the
circumstances.144 The SJC affirmed, but Justice Parker apparently agonized
overtheresult.
Virtually every paragraph of Parkers opinion reverberates with one or
more of the great themes from the preClassical era in American law.
Although Wymans refusal to perform on his promise was disgraceful145
138Id.at1215.
139Millsv.Wyman,20Mass.(3Pick.)207,207(1825).
140Id.at209.
141Id. at 207. The Shrewsbury Wymans were descended from John Wyman, who emigrated
from England to Charlestown prior to 1640. 4 HISTORIC HOMES AND INSTITUTIONS AND
GENEALOGICAL AND PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF WORCESTER COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 135 (Ellery
BicknellCraneed.,1907).SethsfatherwasColonelRossWymanwhomademusketsforGeneral
Artemas Ward, who commanded the American army at Cambridge until the appointment of
George Washington. Wymanwas thecaptainof theShrewsbury Artillery Company of Minute
men.Id.at136.SethWymanwasbornMarch5,1758andwas,likehisfather,animportantfigure
inShrewsbury:[Seth]hadafarmandbuiltthegristmillandsawmill.Hewasacolonelofthe
militiaandselectmanofthetown.Hewasalargelumberdealer.Id.LeviwasbornNovember25,
1795,andwastheyoungestofsevenchildren.Id.
142Mills,20Mass.(3Pick.)at207.
143Id.at208.
144Id.
145Id.at209.
and a violation of moral duty,146 the issue for the court was not whether
Wyman is a bad person, but whether he has breached a legal duty. Parker
viewed legal issues as different from moral issues. In the early nineteenth
century,forthefirsttime,therewasagrowingsenseofasplitbetweenlaw
andmorality.147Parkerwasnotapositivist,eveninMillshereferstonatural
lawasasourceofobligation,148buttheseparationoflawandmoralityinMills
takesalargesteptowardthepositivismofOliverWendellHolmes.149
Whyshouldthelawrefusetoenforceapromisethatapersonisbound
inforoconscientiaetoperform?150Basically,lawisseparatedfrommoralityfor
reasons of policy or, to use a term of the time, convenience. The policy
consequencesofadjudicationisanotheroverridingthemeofthepreClassical
era.151 In Mills, Parker expresses it this way: Without doubt there are great
interestsofsocietywhichjustifywithholdingthecoercivearmofthelawfrom
these duties of imperfect obligation.152 The policy in Mills is shielding a
promisorfromliabilityforapromisemadeinconsiderately...withoutany
equivalent.153
Asageneral matter,inParkersview,lawiscreated for the protection
andsecurityofhonestandfairmindedmen,154butshouldthelawprotecta
scoundrel like Wyman? General rules cannot be departed from to suit
particularcases.155ParkersopinioninMillsisaveryearlystatementofboth
the importance of rules and their arbitrariness. Parkers defense of rules in
Millscouldbeusedasatemplateforanycontemporaryargumentinfavorof
rigidapplicationofarule.156
Throughout the opinion, Parker deploys the themes of law versus
morality, policy, and ruleness to support the outcome of the case. In one
passageheusesallthree:
146Id.at211.
147ForadiscussionofmoralityandpolicyduringthepreClassicalera,seeKennedy,supranote
37,at172528.
148Mills,20Mass.(3Pick.)at209.ParkergaveanannuallectureonnaturallawatHarvard.See
WARREN,supranote88,at303.
149AsHolmessaidfamouslyinhislectureatBostonUniversitySchoolofLaw:Theprophecies
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.
OliverWendellHolmes,ThePathoftheLaw,10HARV.L.REV.457,461(1897).
151FordiscussionsoftheroleofpolicyinpreClassicaladjudication,seeHORWITZ,supranote
31,at130,63108,160210;HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISEAND AMERICAN LAW18361937,at

113,27173(1991);Kennedy,supranote37,at172528.
153Id.at208.
154Id.
155Id.
156Forasummaryofrulesarguments,seeKennedy,supranote37,at168689,171316.
Thedefendant...onbeinginformedofthisevent,influencedby
a transient feeling of gratitude, promises in writing to pay the
plaintifffortheexpenseshehadincurred.Buthehasdetermined
to break this promise, and is willing to have his case appear on
record as a strong example of particular injustice sometimes
necessarilyresultingfromtheoperationofgeneralrules.157
The overall tone of the opinion is that Wymans conduct is outrageous,

butthattheresultiscorrectforreasonsofpolicyandbecauseoftheneedfor
rules.
2. Millsv.WymanintheLiterature
In Langdells casebook Mills appears in a section entitled Moral

Considerationinthechapteronconsideration.ThemessageinhisSummary
is that a moral consideration is no consideration at all, and therefore the
resultinMillsiscorrect.158InLangdellsownteachingcopyofhiscasebook,
whichcontainshishandwrittennotes,nexttoMillshescribbledthequestion:
If the son had been a minor and a member of his fathers family, could
plaintiffhaverecovered,andifso,uponwhattheory;uponanexpressoran
impliedpromise?159InhisSummaryLangdellanswersthequestion:
Theserviceswereaconsiderationwhichinuredtothebenefitof
theson,andcreatedadebtagainsthimfromthetimewhenthey
wererendered;bynopossibility,therefore,couldtheyevercreate
a debt against the father. If the son had been a minor and a
member of his fathers family, and if the services had been
renderedonthecreditofthelatter,thedecisionwouldhavebeen
different.160
OntheissuepresentedinMills,unlikeGrayv.Gardner,therewouldbeno
disagreementbetweenLangdellandHolmes.InTheCommonLawHolmesis
adamant that the essence of consideration is reciprocal conventional
inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise.161
AlthoughMillsisnotcitedinTheCommonLaw,itisacaseHolmesmusthave
known well.162 Under Holmess bargain theory of consideration, Seth
158SUMMARY,supranote4,at8994.
159LANGDELL, supra note 6, at 367. Langdells own copy of this prefirst edition of his
casebookisheldintherarebookcollectionattheHarvardLawLibrary.Conservationworkonthe
volumeisdescribedinTREATMENTPROFILE:NEDCCSBINDERYCONSERVESANIMPORTANTLEGAL
DOCUMENT,NE.DOCUMENTCONSERVATIONCTR.(1989).Forfurtherdiscussion,seeNyquist,supra
note3,at123032.
160SUMMARY,supranote4,at94.
161HOLMES,supranote32,at230.
162See2JAMES KENT,COMMENTARIESON AMERICAN LAW258n.c,633n.f(O.W.Holmes,Jr.ed.,
12th ed. 1873). Prior to The Common Law Holmes had published three reviews of Langdells
Wymans promise is unenforceable since the act (Mills caring for Levi)
occurredbeforethepromise,anditisthereforenotpossiblethattheactcould
havebeensoughtbyWymanandgivenbyMillsinexchangeforthepromise.
The bargain theory of consideration, perhaps the single most important
ruleofClassicaltheory,operatedtonarrowcontractliability.163Millsassisted
inthiseffortbyestablishingalargeareaofnonliabilitybothincontractand
restitution, and the assumptions underlying the opinion were critical to the
Classicists. When Levi reached the age of emancipation, he was viewed as
disconnectedfromhisfatherabenefitbestowedonLeviwasnotabenefitto
Seth.164 Classical theory was grounded in nineteenth century individualism
thatadvocatedsocialatomismattheexpenseofcommunity.165SethandLevi
Wyman were separate entities for the purposes of bargaining and receiving
benefits.166TheClassicistsalsousedcaseslikeMillstoseparatecontractfrom
family law and private law from public. Under Classical theory Mills was
characterized as a contract/private law case, and the family/public law
implicationsoftheopinionwereignored.167
The first Restatement of Contracts adopted Holmess bargain theory of
consideration.168 The only past consideration cases that were enforceable
underthefirstRestatementwerepromisestopaydebtsbarredbyastatuteof
limitations169ordebtsdischargedinbankruptcy.170InMills,Parkerhaddeftly
distinguishedthosecases171fromthequestionbeforethecourtbyexplaining
that in those cases there was originally a quid pro quo172 but that the
legislatureforpolicyreasonshadoptedtoprotectthedebtor.Butifadebtor
subsequently promises to pay, the promise is enforceable because the
casebookandalsohadeditedKentsCommentariesonAmericanLaw,whichdiscussedMills.Seeid.
164SeeMillsv.Wyman,20Mass.(3Pick.)207,209,211(1825).
165Foradiscussionofnineteenthcenturyindividualism,seeATIYAH,supranote23,at25691,
31932,398408.
166SeeMills,20Mass.(3Pick.)at21011.
167Parkersopinion in Mills discusses the relationship between parent and child, a
Massachusettsstatuterequiringrelativestosupportapersonwhomightbecomeapubliccharge,
and the obligation of towns to provide for local indigents. One of the post1970 jurisprudential
developmentsisanattempttocollapsethedistinctionbetweencontract(private)andfamilylaw
(public).Foradeconstructionofthesedichotomiesasappliedtopalimonycases,seeDalton,supra
note82,at10951113.
168RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS75(1932).
169Id.86.
170Id.87.
171SeeMills,20Mass.(3Pick.)at209.Parkeralsodiscussesthecaseofaminorwhopromisesto
payavoidabledebtuponreachingtheageofmajority.Id.at211.
172Id.at209.
obligation is founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration.173

AlthoughthefirstRestatementdoesnotexplicitlyrefertoMills,thecaseisan
important foundation for both the consideration rule and the statuteof
limitationsandbankruptcyexceptions.
Although in general promissory liability has been expanded, under
Neoclassicaltheory,174theresultinMillsstillholds.TheRestatement(Second)of
Contracts in section 86 provides that [a] promise made in recognition of a
benefitpreviouslyreceivedbythepromisorfromthepromiseeisbindingto
theextentnecessarytopreventinjustice,buttheresultinMillsisunchanged
since the benefit is perceived as flowing to the son, not the father.175
Restatement(Second)usesMillstoillustratetherule:Agivesemergencycare
to Bs adult son while the son is sick and without funds far from home. B
subsequently promises to reimburse A for his expenses. The promise is not
bindingunderthisSection.176
Section86oftheRestatement(Second)contains,asGrantGilmorepointed
out,oneofthemostglaringanomaliesinAmericanlaw.177Inadditiontothe
illustration from Mills, Section 86 has an illustration based on Boothe v.
Fitzpatrick:178 A finds Bs escaped bull and feeds and cares for it. Bs
subsequent promise to pay reasonable compensation to A is binding.179 In
otherwords,ifyoucareformyadultchildIamnotliable,butifyoucarefor
mybullthatsadifferentmatter.
3. TheCourtRecord
The Mills record contains the pleadings, two depositions, copies of two
letters,ajudgmentcopy,thejuryverdict,awrit,andanaffidavitofcounsel.
Therecord,althoughnotasrichastherecordinGray,doesprovidedetailsof
LeviWymansillness,thetextsoflettersbetweenMillsandSethWyman,and
contradictsacentralfactintheopinion.
A deposition taken in Hartford on November 29, 1824 provides several
interesting details about the case. Daniel Mills was an innkeeper, and Levi
apparently was already in residence when he became ill. Furthermore, it
states:Mr.Wymanwasdestituteofpropertyhimselfandatthetimeofhis
recovery could pay neither his boarding nor physicians bill but was
confident his father Col. Seth Wyman would readily pay it.180 The
173Id.
174Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes5962.
175SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS86(1981).
176Id.86cmt.a,illus.1.
177SeeGILMORE,supranote33,at8283.
17836Vt.681,682(1864).
179RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS86cmt.d,illus.6.
180 See Transcript of Deposition of Nathan Wales, Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207
mythology surrounding the case, in large part stemming from Parkers

comparisonofMillstotheGoodSamaritan,181paintsaverydifferentpicture.
Forexample,arecentcontracttreatisegivesthefollowingsummary:InMills
v.Wyman,theplaintiff,asanactofkindness,gaveshelter,foodandsomesort
of medical attention to the defendants son, who, having returned from a
voyage at sea, was found by the plaintiff wandering the lonely streets of
Hartford ill and destitute.182 The Biblical Samaritan binds up the injured
mans wounds, brings him to an inn, pays the innkeepers expenses, and
promises to pay any additional expenses. Daniel Mills was an innkeeper
whoseguesthadfallenill.
ParkersopinioninMillsassertsseveraltimesthatLevidiedattheendof
his illness, but the deposition states he recovered. The letters in the court
recordonlycomplicatematters.Theinitialcorrespondence,fromMillstoSeth
Wyman, was not found. Wymans response on February 24, 1821, includes
thefollowingpromise:Iwishyoutotakeallpossiblecareofhimandifyou
cannot have him at your house I wish to remove him to some convenient
placeandifhecannotsatisfyyouforitIwill.183
MillsrepliedonMarch3,1821,indicatingLevihadrecoveredandhehas
leftthisplaceadayortwosince...tolerablesmartwhenhelefthere.184He
enclosed a physicians bill for $6.00 for treating Levi at Millss inn from the
13thtothe20thofFebruary.Thetotalexpenseoftheillnessreflectedinthe
letterwas$22.00.185
(1825).
181Jesus tells the story of the Good Samaritan in response to the question, [W]ho is my
neighbor?:
A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among
robbers,whostrippedhimandbeathim,anddeparted,leavinghimhalf
dead. . . . [A] Samaritan as he journeyed, came to where he was; and
whenhesawhim,hehadcompassion,andwenttohimandbounduphis
wounds,pouringonoilandwine;thenhesethimonhisownbeastand
broughthimtoaninn,andtookcareofhim.[T]henextdayhetookout
two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, Take care of him;
andwhatevermoreyouspend,IwillrepayyouwhenIcomeback.
Luke10:2935(NewOxford).
182MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2829
(5thed.2006).
183Letter from Seth Wyman to Daniel Mills (Feb. 24, 1821). For the full text, see Geoffrey R.
Watson,IntheTribunalofConscience:Millsv.WymanReconsidered,71TUL. L. REV. 1749,1760

61(1997).
184Watson,supranote183,at1756.
185Id. at 1758 n.59. The amount demanded in the writ (issued in May 1824) was $27.43
including$4.50interestthroughApril5,1824.Theexpenseslistedinthewrittotal$22.93andare
moredetailedthantheletter:Levisboardingandlodging(141/2days)$6.15;attendanceofWm.
Morton$4.00;boardingWm.Morton$3.00;Powersassistance(31/2days)$1.50;boardofPowers
TheConnecticutandMassachusettsdeathrecordsgivenoreportofwhen
orwhereLeviWymandied,butgenealogicalevidenceunearthedbyGeoffrey
R.WatsonseemstoestablishthatLevisurvivedhisillnessandlivedintothe
1830sifnotbeyond.186ForoveronehundredyearsSethWymanhasbeencast
as one of the villains of contract law, but if Levi survived, then Seth might
havefelt,understandably,thataninnkeeperwhoisputtoextraexpensedue
toaguestsillnessshouldlooktotheguestforpayment.
III. SingleCaseResearchandLegalTheory
Singlecaseresearchhasseveralobviousvirtues.Itcanleadtodiscovery
of a rich time capsule of documents such as the court record in Gray v.
Gardner. Singlecase research can test general theory by focusing on the
particularinstance.Acourtrecordcancorrectfactualmisreadingsofacase,
answerquestions,fillingaps,andgeneratenewquestionsaboutanopinion.
In the classroom, singlecase research provides context and serves as a
reminder that cases are not produced in a vacuum.187 The significance of
singlecaseresearchforcontemporarytrendsinlegaltheoryis,however,less
obvious, and any discussion must be tentative. Singlecase research is a
neutral tool that could be adapted to any theory and even fits comfortably
withapproachesthatarepostmodern.188Thediscussionherewillfocuson
its potential in three movements: law and literature; the study of legal
consciousness;andthetrendinhistoriographytowardthickdescription.

(1/2week)$1.50;twoquartsspirits$.50;cashpaidforlaudanum$.13;cashpaidDoct.Linderfor
pills $.15; and paid Doct. Comstock bill $6.00. The jury assessed the damages, subsequently
nonsuited,at$26.95.Id.
186Watson,supranote183,at175658.
187For example, one contract casebook provides contextualized treatment of ten cases. See
DAWSONETAL.,supranote64,at6,16,48,27476,32324,35052,36465,55355,55860,76668.
188For a survey of postmodern trends in legal theory, see generally GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURYS END (1995). He

provides the following definition of postmodernism (andalsoadmits it meansmany things to
manypeople):
In law, postmodernism signals the movement away from
interpretationpremiseduponthebeliefinuniversaltruths,coreessences,
orfoundationaltheories....Postmodernismisanaestheticpracticeand
condition that is opposed to Grand Theory, structural patterns, or
foundational knowledges. Postmodern legal critics employ local, small
scaleproblemsolvingstrategiestoraisenewquestionsabouttherelation
oflaw,politicsandculture.
Id.at3.
A. LawandLiterature
Thelawandliteraturemovementhastwobrancheslawinliterature,
whichfocusesonworksofliteraturewithlegalissuessuchasMelvillesBilly
Budd and law as literature, which subjects legal texts to a literary
interpretation.189Singlecaseresearchcouldcontribute tolawasliterature,
whichoffersaprofusionofstyles,issues,andstrategies.Forexample,oneof
thedebates,whichhasprofoundimplicationsforthequestionofthekindof
constraints that act on judges, focuses on Mills v. Wyman. The debate,
however, lacks a contextualized treatment of the case, and singlecase
research seems to suggest a method of proceeding beyond the current
stalemate.
In 1985 Kenney Hegland published an article with the intriguing title
GoodbyetoDeconstruction.190HearguedthatMillsv.Wyman,andcaseslikeit,
refutethecentralthesisofdeconstruction,whichhesummarizedas:alllegal
rules and doctrines are indeterminatethey dont, and cant, decide legal
controversies, even the simple ones.191 Hegland cited Mills as his favorite
example of a case in which the judge reaches a result contrary to personal
preference because of the constraints of legal doctrine.192 He then issued a
challenge: Deconstructionists must explain away the Judge Parkers of the
casereports.193
Stanley Fish took up Heglands challenge.194 Fish contended that any
distinctionbetweenpersonalpredilectionandconstraintofdoctrineisafalse
dichotomy.JusticeParkerisamemberofvariousinterpretativecommunities,
each community having its own norms and practices, and the conflict is
betweentwonormativeobligations,oneofwhichcarriesthedaybecauseit
iscentraltotheroleheisnowplaying.195Inotherwords,Parkerisajudge,
professor of law, family member, attends church, has political preferences,
etc.,andanyconstraintshemayfeelindecidingMillsarenotduetoanylegal
doctrine out there. Instead, constraint results from participation in an
interpretativecommunity:
WhenJudgeParkersitsdowntoconsiderMillsv.Wyman,heisin
nosensefreetoseethefactsinanywayhepleases;ratherhis
veryfirstlookisinformed(constrained)bythewaysofthinking
thatnowfillhisconsciousnessasaresultofhisinitiationintothe
189Seeid.at14966.
190KenneyHegland,GoodbyetoDeconstruction,58S.CAL.L.REV.1203(1985).
191Id.at1203.
192Id.at1213.
193Id.
194SeeFISH,supranote81,at133.
195Id.at11.
professionalcommunityofjurists.196
TheHegland/FishdebateaboutMillsislimitedtothetextoftheopinion,
andthegenericcommentsaboutParkercouldbeappliedtoanyjudge.There
is no discussion of the court record or Isaac Parker as a person. Singlecase
researchcouldenrichthisparticulardebateandalsocontributetothelarger
discussionaboutthenatureofconstraintsfeltbyjudges.
IsaacParkerwasacommittedmemberoftwointerestingearlynineteenth
century interpretative communities. In religion he was a Unitarian. On the
Sunday following Parkers death, the minister of the Unitarian Church in
BrattleSquare,Boston,preachedasermonthatwasbothatributetoapublic
figureandafarewelltoanactivechurchmemberoflongstanding.197Parkers
tenureonthecourt(18061830)coincidedwithaperiodofturmoilandschism
within Massachusetts Congregational churches: Trinitarians and Unitarians
disputed the core issues of the faith (i.e., the nature of God, validity of
scripture, and the relationship of faith and reason),198 Andover Theological
SeminarywasformedasaTrinitarianreactiontotheUnitariandominationof
Harvard University,199 and individual congregations split and struggled for
controlofchurchproperty,occasionallyturningtolitigation.200
196Id.at12.
197JohnG.Palfrey,PastoroftheChurchinBrattleSquare,ASermonPreachedintheChurchin
BrattleSquare,Boston,TheLordsDay After theDeceaseoftheHonourableIsaacParker,Chief

JusticeofMassachusetts(August1,1830).Parkerjoinedthechurchin1814andwas[f]oralong
period an officer . . . and always cheerfully taking a leading part on occasions of particular
concern. Id. at 18. He also was an officer of the Evangelical Missionary Society and the
MassachusettsBibleSociety.Id.at19.
198A sermon delivered May 5, 1819 (a date known as the Pentecost of American
Unitarianism)byWilliamChanningsummarizedtheessenceofUnitarianismastheunityofGod,
the unity of Jesus, and the moral perfection of God. See Charles C. Forman, Elected Now by
Time: The Unitarian Controversy, 18051835, in A STREAM OF LIGHT: A SHORT HISTORY OF
AMERICAN UNITARIANISM3,2326(ConradWrighted.,1975)(discussingChanningssermonand
theTrinitarianreaction).
199Id.at1011.
200See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE UNITARIAN CONSCIENCE: HARVARD MORAL PHILOSOPHY,
18051861,at21621(1970).AlthoughTrinitarianswereinthemajority,Unitariansheldmostofthe
positionsofpowerwithintheCommonwealth.HarrietBeecherStowesfatherbecamepastorofa
TrinitarianchurchinBostoninthe1820s,andshewritesofthatera:
WhenDr.BeechercametoBoston,Calvinismororthodoxywasthe
despisedandpersecutedformoffaith.Itwasthedethronedroyalfamily
wanderinglikeapermittedmendicantinthecitywhereonceithadheld
court,andUnitarianismreignedinitsstead.
All the literary men of Massachusetts were Unitarian. All the

trusteesandprofessorsofHarvardCollegewereUnitarians.Allthelite
of wealth and fashion crowded Unitarian churches. The judges on the
benchwereUnitarian,givingdecisionsbywhichthepeculiarfeaturesof
More than eighty Massachusetts parishes experienced schism, perhaps

most notoriously at the First Church in Dedham. The Unitarian faction
elected a liberal minister whereupon the Trinitarians withdrew from the
congregation but refused to turn over the personal property of the church
including bonds, securities, and church records.201 The Unitarians brought
suitinreplevin,andinBakerv.FalestheSupremeJudicialCourt,inanopinion
by Justice Parker, ordered the Trinitarians to turn over the property.202 The
spectacle of a Unitarian judge handing disputed church property to a
Unitarian faction only added to the religious turmoil. The most virulent
reaction came from Reverend Parsons Cooke who preached a sermon
attacking all three branches of Massachusetts government. He accused the
judiciary of displaying a malignant spirit and of confiscating church
property:Forwhile,withoneexception,alltheseatsinbothourcourtshave
beenfilledbyUnitarians,decisionshavecomeout,clothedwiththeauthority
oflawsthatarenowinforce,exertingamostoppressiveinfluenceinfavorof
thatdenomination.203Thesermonwaspublishedandwidelycirculated,and
copiesweresenttopublicofficialstargetedintheattack.
Parker wrote a defense of the impartiality of Baker v. Fales that was
published, perhaps unwisely and in some confusion of his various
interpretative communities, in a Unitarian publication. Parkers stance was
notconciliatory:
Ihavedonewithyouandyoursermonforthepresent.Ifyou
think you are dealt harshly by, remember that, without any
provocation and without any decency, you have assailed the
actions and motives of your temporal superiorsthe whole
government of your countrynot the present only, but the
successive Governors and Legislatures for years; that you have
charged the Judges with corruption, partiality, sacrilege. There
wasatimewhenthewholecivilpowerwouldquailundersucha
denunciation.Thattimeisgoneby.Heoughttoquailwhoutters
church organization, so carefully ordained by the Pilgrim fathers, had

been nullified. The Church, as consisting, according to their belief, in
regenerate people, had been ignored, and all the power had passed into
thehandsofthecongregation.
Forman, supra note 198, at 29 (quoting 2 LYMAN BEECHER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN
BEECHER 81 (Barbara M. Cross ed., 1961)). For further discussion of the Trinitarian/Unitarian
conflict,seeNELSON,supranote24,at12729.
201Bakerv.Fales,16Mass.(15Tyng)487,487(1820).
202Id.at522.
203Parsons Cooke, Pastor of the East Church in Ware, Mass., Unitarianism an Exclusive
System,ortheBondageoftheChurchesThatWerePlantedbythePuritans:ASermon,Preached
on the Occasion of the Annual Fast (Apr. 3, 1828) at 7, in THE PASTORS MEMORIAL (Samuel N.
Dickinsoned.,1843).
it.204
ParkersletterledtoapublishedresponsefromCookeIamnottobe
browbeatenintosilencethat reaffirmedhis originalallegationsandcited
thevehemenceofParkersletterasproofofthoseallegations.205
In Mills v. Wyman, Parker explicitly separates law and morality,
emphasizingthatthequestionfacingthecourtisnotwhetherSethWymanis
aningrate,butwhetherhispromiseissupportedbyconsideration.206Perhaps
Parkers experience of church schism, and the general sense in the early
nineteenth century of a breakdown in the moral and religious consensus,
contributedtotheopinion.Inasocietywithamoralandreligiousconsensus,
itisprobablyjustassumedlawreflectsthatconsensus.Butwhenconsensus
disintegrates, judges will begin to explore and question the relationship
betweenlawandmorality.
In political persuasion, Parker was a lifelong Federalist. As a youth he
attendedtheMassachusettsconventiondebatingtheU.S.Constitution:This
wasthecrisisoflifeordeathtotheunionofthestates,andruinorprosperity
hunguponthedecision....I,thenayoungman,wasananxiousspectatorof
thesedoings.207HeheldelectedofficeasaFederalistandreceivedapolitical
appointmentduringtheadministrationofPresidentJohnAdams.208Although
atthenationalleveltheFederalistPartywentintoeclipsewiththedefeatof
Adamsin1800,inMassachusettsthepartycontinuedtobeinfluentialintothe
1820s. At the 18201821 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, John
Adams was elected chair, and when he declined, Parker was chosen.209
Although Parker outlived the Federalist Party, he was inflexible in
maintainingthroughouthiswholelife,thepoliticalopinions,which,inyouth,
afterdeepreflection,hehadadopted.210
TheelitismoftheFederalists(andtheirfearoftherabble)isreflectedin
Mills v. Wyman. Law must be established on ground firmer than public
morality, rules cannot be circumvented to avoid unpopular results, and
adjudication has an important role in setting public policy. The post
204LetterfromIsaacParkertoRev.ParsonsCooke,in5CHRISTIANEXAMINER277,283(1828).
205PARSONSCOOKE,AREPLYTOALETTERINTHECHRISTIANEXAMINER,ADDRESSEDTOTHEREV.
PARSONSCOOKE7(Boston,Peirce&Williams1829).
207IsaacParker,ASketchoftheCharacteroftheLateChiefJusticeParsons,anAddresstothe
GrandJury,DeliveredattheOpeningoftheSupremeJudicialCourtatBoston(Nov.23,1813),in
10Mass.(10Tyng)507,53132(1813).
208Osgood,supranote88,at15455.
209See HOWE, supra note 200, at 21621 (discussing the 18201821 convention and the
disestablishmentissue).
210Osgood,supranote88,at155(quotingBOST.DAILYADVERTISER,July31,1830,at2).
Revolutionary War period was notable for its antilawyer sentiment.211

Numerouscourtopinionsfromtheearlynineteenthcentury,includingMills,
canbeseenasnothingshortofeffortstocreateaprofession;andMillscould
be characterized as a Federalist essay on law (i.e., a temporal superior
explainingwhyaresultthatseemswrongis,infact,correct).Parkersopinion
in Mills does not reflect conflict between various interpretative
communities but instead seems to be just the sort of opinion a Unitarian
FederalistJusticewouldhavewritten.
B. LegalConsciousnessHistoriography
In 1975 Duncan Kennedy submitted a manuscriptThe Rise and Fall of

Classical Legal Thoughtas part of his Harvard Law School tenure
application.212Hecontinuedtoworkonthemanuscriptforseveralyears,and
in1980thefirstchapterwaspublishedinalawandsociologyjournal.213The
restofthemanuscriptremainedunpublisheduntilrecently,butitcirculated
amonglawfaculty,students,andlegalhistoriansandisnowconsideredone
oftwolegendaryunpublishedmanuscriptsofrecentAmericanjurisprudence,
theotherbeingHartandSackslegalprocessteachingmaterials.214InRiseand
211SeePERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICAFROMTHE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 99116 (1965) (discussing antilawyer sentiment during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenthcenturies).Millercommentsontheestablishmentoftheprofession:
A phenomenon of fundamental importance for both the social and
intellectual history of America is the amazing rise, within three or four
decades,ofthelegalprofessionfromitschaoticconditionofaround1790
toapositionofpoliticalandintellectualdomination....Theformationof
American law in this era embraces a mental adventure of heroic
proportions.
Itwasthemoreremarkableforbeingaccomplishedinthefaceofthe
widespread hostility of ordinary Americans to the very concept of law
andmorespecificallytheirbitterantagonismtotheCommonLaw.Asthe
lawyers looked back from their later eminence to the situation of 1790,
theycouldonlymarvelthattheprofessionhadsurvivedatall.
Id.at109.
212KENNEDY,supranote29,atvii.
213SeegenerallyDuncanKennedy,TowardanHistoricalUnderstandingofLegalConsciousness:
TheCaseofClassicalLegalThoughtinAmerica,18501940,3RES. L. & SOC.3(1980)(discussing

the development and disintegration of American legal thought that emerged between 1850
and 1885), available at http://duncankennedy.net/documents/Toward%20an%20Historical
%20Understanding%20of%20Legal%20Consciousness.pdf.
214See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMSINTHEMAKINGANDAPPLICATIONOFLAW(1994).Fortheeditorsdiscussionoftheir
decisiontopublishthemanuscript,seeWilliamN.Eskridge,Jr.&PhilipP.Frickey,Publication
EditorsPrefacetoHART&SACKS,supra,atxi.
Fall Kennedy defines legal consciousness as the particular form of

consciousness that characterizes the legal profession as a social group.215 It
includesavastnumberoflegalrules,arguments,andtheories,agreatdeal
ofinformationabouttheinstitutionalworkingsofthelegalprocess,andthe
constellation of ideals and goals current in the profession at a given
moment.216 Legal consciousness also includes the professions hidden
assumptionsthatrarelysurfacetothelevelofconsciousthought.
One of the central points of Rise and Fall is that legal consciousness
changes over time and, on occasion, changes dramatically. Classical legal
thoughtwasacompletereorderingofthejudicialuniverse,makingthestudy
of preClassical cases particularly challenging for contemporary readers. In
order to understand these cases, we need to read them with a preClassical
mindset.
To illustrate the point, consider one of the works of C.S. Lewis. Lewis
taught medieval English literature at Oxford,217 and to help his students
understand the world view of the medieval mind, he delivered a series of
lectureslaterpublishedasTheDiscardedImage.218Forexample,inresponseto
thequestionhow didthe medieval(preCopernican) mind thinkofthesky,
hewrites:
You must go out on a starry night and walk about for half an
hour trying to see the sky in terms of the old cosmology.
Remember that you now have an absolute Up and Down. The
Earthisreallythecentre,reallythelowestplace;movementtoit
fromwhateverdirectionisdownwardmovement.Asamodern,
you located the stars at a great distance. For distance you must
now substitute that very special, and far less abstract, sort of
distance which we call height.... The Medieval Model is
vertiginous....Tolookupatthetowering medievaluniverseis
muchmorelikelookingatagreatbuilding.219
Similarly, in reading Gray v. Gardner and Mills v. Wyman we must

rememberthat,althoughtheybecameimportantcasesintheconstructionof
Classicallegalthought,theyare,infact,preClassicalandreflectpreClassical
legal consciousness. For example, Parkers comment in Gray v. Gardner that
the agreement is a kind of wager as to the quantity of oil220 reflects his
failuretounderstandfluctuationsinearlynineteenthcenturymarketsandthe
transitionfromcontractenforcementbasedonanobjective,fixedstandardof
215KENNEDY,supranote29,at27.
216Id.
217A.N.WILSON,C.S.LEWIS:ABIOGRAPHY95(1990).
218C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE
LITERATURE(Canto1994)(1964).
219Id.at9899,quotedinWILSON,supranote217,at152.
22017Mass.(16Tyng)188,190(1821).
valuetovaluescreatedbytheagreementoftheparties.221ThecontractinGray
v.Gardnerisnotawager,butratheraproductofthepartiesinabilitytoagree
onapricebecauseofanuncertainmarket.Theirsolutiondraftingtwonotes,
oneunconditional,theotherconditionalonwhaleoilyieldsovertwoperiods
of timecreated an ingenious price fluctuation clause that pitched the
contractpricetothelocalsupplyofwhaleoil.222
Mills v. Wyman seems familiar to us as it deploys many of the concepts
that would become central to Classical legal thought,223 and as we read the
casewefocusonthefamiliar.Buttherearealsopassagesthatseemstrange,
untilwerememberthatitisapreClassicalcase.Forexample,Parkersaysin
support of his conclusion that the promise is not enforceable: If moral
obligation,initsfullestsense,isagoodsubstratumforanexpresspromise,it
is not easy to perceive why it is not equally good to support an implied
promise.224 To the modern mind, there is no slippery slope here since we
havecleardistinctionsbetweenexpressandimpliedpromises,andbetween
obligations based on promise and obligations imposed by society.225 Pre
Classicallegalconsciousnessdidnotmakethosedistinctionsandso,in1825,
Parkerscommentseemedapersuasivereasonnottoimposeliability.
What can singlecase research contribute to the study of legal
consciousness? Kennedy argues that focusing on legal consciousness levels
the playing field, demoting theory to a position no higher than legal
arguments,judicialopinions,andtreatises:Thejurisprudentialtheoryofthe
Langdellianswasaproductionwithinthelegalconsciousnessoftheperiod,
rather thanitsroadmap.226Ifthisistrue,thensinglecaseresearch, withits
focusonthecontextofthecase,includingthecourtfile,pretrialskirmishing,
andbackgroundofthepartiesaswellasthehistoricalmoment(e.g.,reading
Gray v. Gardner in the context of early nineteenth century Nantucket),
providesarichresourceforstudyinglegalconsciousness.
C. ThickDescriptionHistoriography
Another post1970 trend with implications for contract theory is the

movement in historiography toward thick description. The publication in
1992ofMortonJ.HorwitzsTheTransformationofAmericanLaw,18701960:The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy,227 a continuation of his first Transformation volume
221HORWITZ,supranote31,at20001.
222SeeNyquist,supranote3,at122324.
225Seesupranotes2431andaccompanyingtext(discussingfurtherthepreClassicallegal
thought).
226KENNEDY,supranote29,atxxxv.
227HORWITZ,supranote46.
published fifteen years earlier,228 produced a book that was, by his own
admission,averydifferentbook.229Theessenceofthedifferencereflectsa
lost confidence in singlefactor chains of causation230 and a movement
toward thick description.231 Transformation I reflected a single theory
explaining changes in American private law between 1780 and 1860.
Transformation II is a complex mix of highly particularized description and
generaltheory,allinanattempttodealwiththequestion:Buthowdoesone
explainanythingobjectivelyinaworldofcomplexmultiplecausation?232
Ahistoricaldescriptionthatisthickisfilledwithparticularityandrich
detail but short on general explanations. It is reluctant to prioritize and
interpret but offers an account more layered and nuanced. Singlecase
research is a type of thick description. Rather than analyzing a hundred
cases decided in twentyfive jurisdictions over a fiftyyear period and
constructingatheoryabouttrendsduringthatperiod,itfocusesononecase
decided in one location on a particular day. Rather than arguing that an
outcomeinacaseisdictatedbyhistorical,social,oreconomictrends,single
caseresearchisareminderthatacaseisadisputebetweenparticularparties,
arguedbyparticularlawyers,andthatanopinioniswrittenbyajudgefaced
with the pragmatic task of deciding and giving reasons for the decision.
Singlecase research is small in scale. Rather than attempting to construct a
grand theory of history, singlecase research admits it [is] better to speak
withinparticularcommunitiesaboutcontingentpractices.233
Ofcourseitisalsotruethatsinglecaseresearchcanbeusedtoattackor
defendageneraltheory.RichardDanzigsarticleonHadleyv.Baxendale,234for
example, is constructed around a modernization theory of nineteenth
centurylawthatargueschangesinlawandlegalinstitutionswereareflection
of and parallel to the Industrial Revolution. Perhaps the greatest appeal of
singlecase research is that it is available both to the historian who still
believesinsinglefactorchainsofcausationandtotheagnostic.
228HORWITZ,supranote31.
229HORWITZ, supra note 46, at vii; see generally G. Edward White, Transforming History in the
PostmodernEra,91MICH. L. REV.1315(1993)(reviewingHORWITZ,supranote46,andprovidinga
detaileddiscussionofthemethodologyofTransformationII).
230HORWITZ,supranote46,atviii.
231See
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 330 (1973)
(explainingtheoriginofthetermthickdescription).
232HORWITZ,supranote46,atviii.
233MINDA,supranote188,at163(quotingMarthaMinow&ElizabethV.Spelman,InContext,
63S.CAL.L.REV.1597,1611(1990)).

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NYQUISTFINAL589624.

The history of American legal thought provides a foundation for a

590 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|589

2011 Single-Case Research 591

InventionofLegalDoctrine,58BUFF. L. REV. 551,585605(2010)(arguingthatLangdellstheory

592 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|589

law was contained in the published opinion of the court. Historical

2011 Single-Case Research 593

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A complete account of contract from the Revolutionary War to the

At the time of the Revolutionary War, legal practice was dominated by

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIESONTHE LAWSOF ENGLAND(photo.reprint1966)(1765

2011 Single-Case Research 595

The principal architects of the Classical theory were Langdell, Oliver

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2011 Single-Case Research 597

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46Forgeneraldiscussionsoflegalrealism,seeMORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIONOF

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A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce

2011 Single-Case Research 601

Since 1970 jurisprudence has become a great juristic bazaar of

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economics,83 critical race theory,84 story telling,85 and several trends in

RepublicanJudge,FederalistValues,inTHE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME

2011 Single-Case Research 603

Gray v. Gardner92 was an action in assumpsit based on an agreement

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Gray v. Gardner is inherently appealing because of its facts. The opinion

2011 Single-Case Research 605

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contract may contain have been divided by theorists into conditions

2011 Single-Case Research 607

It is hard to know where to begin in dealing with this

This general criticism could also operate as a specific criticism of

Notice].For furtherdiscussionsof Holmessreviewsofvariouseditionsof Langdellscasebook,

122See,e.g.,GLEASON L. ARCHER, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS26162 (2ded.1920).In Willistons

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31,at130,63108,160210;HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISEAND AMERICAN LAW18361937,at

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The overall tone of the opinion is that Wymans conduct is outrageous,

In Langdells casebook Mills appears in a section entitled Moral

162See2JAMES KENT,COMMENTARIESON AMERICAN LAW258n.c,633n.f(O.W.Holmes,Jr.ed.,

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obligation is founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration.173

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mythology surrounding the case, in large part stemming from Parkers

Watson,IntheTribunalofConscience:Millsv.WymanReconsidered,71TUL. L. REV. 1749,1760

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POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURYS END (1995). He

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BrattleSquare,Boston,TheLordsDay After theDeceaseoftheHonourableIsaacParker,Chief

All the literary men of Massachusetts were Unitarian. All the

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More than eighty Massachusetts parishes experienced schism, perhaps

church organization, so carefully ordained by the Pilgrim fathers, had

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