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ARTICLE
INTERNATIONAL
journal of
CULTURAL studies
Plastic bags
Living with rubbish
Gay Hawkins
University of New South Wales, Australia
semiotics. The bag seemed to carry the whole enormous weight of ecologi-
cal crisis. The lightness of the bag, the emptiness of the bag, was in contrast
with its burden as the penultimate sign of environmental catastrophe: a
world drowning in plastic bags. A world in which we are constantly
instructed to say no to plastic bags!. The aesthetic resonances, the chore-
ography, the animation, could not completely override the moral under-
tones. The bag was rendered beautiful, but this didnt make it good.
I have no doubt that my response was partially an effect of being rendered
environmentally aware; all those years of public campaigns instructing me
to resist the easy convenience of plastic bags, to do my bit for nature. This
training does not mean that I have eliminated plastic bags from my life, far
from it, but it has meant that my relations with them have become more
complicated. Perhaps this is why the redemptive gesture that structures the
rubbish scene was so troubling. For redemption here meant the absolutely
worthless and trivial transformed into the absolutely beautiful; redemption
without any concern for moral or ecological consequences. I am simply too
ambivalent about plastic bags for this transformation to be completely suc-
cessful. For me, the bag signified much more than the beauty of ephemera;
it signified a major environmental problem rendered sensuous and en-
chanted. This scene invited me to change my affective relations with plastic
bags, to delight in something I have been trained to hate. I think this could
be why I found it so deeply unsettling. I think this could be why I felt sym-
pathy for the bag.
Consider another image of plastic bags, this time a television commercial
made by the New South Wales Environmental Protection Authority (EPA).
Here we see a man washing his car on the street without any concern for
the litres of soapy water draining into the stormwater system. The next scene
cuts to the interior of the drain where the soapy water gushes on its way,
accompanied by street detritus. The final scene returns to the car washer no
longer cleaning the car but at leisure, swimming in a pristine river sur-
rounded by bush, an image of Eden. He dives underwater and surfaces with
a plastic bag clinging to his shoulder. With a shudder of aversion he flicks
it off. Trust a plastic bag to spoil everything!
Unlike American Beauty, the EPA allows for no ambiguity about the
status of the bag. It is unequivocally bad. It is matter out of place, contami-
nating the purity of the natural with its sticky persistence. There is only one
response to this bag, disgust. The bag disrupts the binary between pure and
contaminated and in the same moment reminds us that binaries are more
often than not unequal relations. For, in this ad, contamination is not simply
puritys other, it is the lesser and devalued term in a moral framework.
Feeling sympathy for the plastic bag, feeling disgust for the plastic bag;
such different experiences of the bag, such different problematizations of
our relations with them. The wave of sadness inextricably draws me to the
bag what is this sense of connection, grief? The shudder of aversion is a
Figure 1
Mutawintji National
Park, outback
Australia.
Photo: Warwick
Pearse.
Problematizing disposal
it also identifies the practices and habits through which measures of good-
ness and order are established.
If styles of garbage elimination are also, implicitly, styles of self, how have
techniques of disposal been problematized? And how do these problemati-
zations shape our rubbish relations? To consider these questions we need to
examine the ethos of disposability; we need to think about those objects
marketed on the basis of their disposability. And were talking about more
than nappies, plastic bags or polystyrene cups here; were talking about the
fundamental logic of the commodity form, seriality. Mass production of
objects and their consumption depends on widespread acceptance of, even
pleasure in, exchangeability; replacing the old, the broken, the out of
fashion with the new. The capacity for serial replacement is also the capac-
ity to throw away without concern. Although ignorance of rubbish and dis-
tance from its management used to be a mark of distinction, the growth of
mass consumption and governmental systems of waste removal after the
Second World War allowed this level of disregard for where things ended
up to be extended across populations.2
In her history of rubbish, Waste and Want (1999), Susan Strasser chal-
lenges the assumption that the ethos of disposability is simply emblematic
of 1950s consumerism (1999: 266). For her, efficiency, cleanliness and
replaceability have been a significant part of modernist culture since the days
of paper collars in the 1860s. Post-Second World War expansions in manu-
facturing and consumerism merely enhanced already existing relations to
some objects in which the desire for possession or convenience subsumed
any concern for what became of things once they were used up or classified
as no longer of value. However, although disposal may be the ultimate
destiny of objects valued for their convenience or for their commodity
status, the logic of this disposability is a product of different processes of
value formation and decline. The object marketed for its convenience evokes
a modernist asceticism and temporality in which the technical is valorized
for not only saving time, but also for its instrumental rationality.3 Many
convenient objects have a presence as imminent rubbish that is difficult to
suppress. Plastic, paper and polystyrene discourage sensual attachments
their use in the making of transient objects signifies a finite value, a value
waiting to be used up.
Commodities, on the other hand, may well be convenient and efficient but
they are also much more. Their fetish qualities conceal the socially con-
structed nature of their value and animate them with autonomy and magic.
Because we have no idea how commodities come into being, their life after
weve finished with them is also of little or no interest. The magical quali-
ties of the commodity can obliterate their origins and their final destination.
Often this destination may not be the tip things can move out of com-
modity status without becoming rubbish. They might begin a life of lonely
isolation in the shed or be born again into the gift economy of the charity
shop. Chucking away is only one option but it is an option made easier by
the logic of seriality: just get another one.
Convenience and commodification reconstitute subject/object relations in
ways that make the capacity to dispose without concern possible. And
Strasser is right in arguing that this relation had to be acquired. But she is
somewhat glib in reading this acquisition as symptomatic of a way of life
remote from hand production (1999: 265). For the kind of self imagined
in this rubbish practice is not simply alienated from production, it is a self
who regards rubbish as ethically insignificant, a self for whom waste has
few moral connotations. A self who locates decisions about cleanliness and
purity in the intimate gesture of discarding rather than in the social life of
rubbish, the destination of the discarded.
This doesnt mean that disposability isnt problematized; rather, that the
terms of this problematization do not involve reflective modification of
the self. Disposability constitutes waste as a technical problem, something
to be administered by the most efficient and rational technologies of
removal. Generally this means dumping; the bin, the local tip and the
drain have become emblematic sites for the disposal of anything and
everything; these are the homes of waste. Yet, as anyone who has stood
at the edge of a tip or stared down a drain and felt the wave of horror and
fascination would know, this ethos of disposability is a technical and
spatial fantasy. Our relations with waste cannot be so easily severed; out
of sight does not necessarily mean out of mind. Disposability represents
our waste relations as necessary elimination, an inevitable part of progress
and consumption. This is a relation of mastery that constitutes the self
that discards as whole, separate, untouched, purified. And in this relation
the moral implications of our complex and shifting connections with
rubbish are denied.
Its harder to sell disposability now, perhaps because weve all seen too
much rubbish. Waste has become visible, a landscape in its own right. This
doesnt mean that disposing isnt flourishing; rather, that a different prob-
lematization of waste has emerged over the past 30 years that has made
trouble for the idea of careless separation the technical has become impli-
cated in the moral. This problematization has depended on different invo-
cations of contamination and their implications for the social body. Waste
was exceeding its limits, it was no longer contained in appropriate places
but was everywhere; classificatory boundaries were collapsing. The con-
dition of the environment was threatened by the presence of rubbish, so
too was urban order. The rise of anti-litter campaigns in the late 1960s rep-
resented rubbish as not merely matter out of place but as morally unset-
tling, evidence of the collapse of civic obligation.4 More crucial, however,
was the way these campaigns linked the individual body to the social body.
A favoured image in anti-litter campaigns was (and still is) the disembod-
ied hand in the act of dropping rubbish. This gesture of separation was no
Putting out the garbage has become complicated. No longer the lugging of
the bin to the kerb a couple of times a week, now its a complex assemblage
of actions: collecting all the papers and cardboard (clean only) and putting
them in their special container; rinsing the bottles and tins, removing labels
and lids and allocating them to their container; putting the food scraps in
the compost or worm farm (no meat); wheeling out the bin for everything
else. Dealing with our rubbish is an endless cycle of ritual and repetition,
now dominated by time-consuming acts of classification and sorting.
These new garbage practices have been overlaid on the old. Waste
involves ritual performance of an assemblage of actions and beliefs funda-
mental to the constitution of habitus. It has always been one of the ways we
keep chaos at bay, order the self, rehearse death. Now, in managing it, we
are also assuaging our guilt about the planet, being virtuous for the neigh-
bours and engaging in a form of disciplinary individualism that is both
voluntary and coercive at the same time (Cruikshank, 1999: 3). These newer
meanings and the practices theyve produced signal the impacts of domes-
tic waste education and the ways these are enfolded within a new conscience
about rubbish. And it is this conscience that is a significant element of our
moral attachment to recycling. Hundreds of surveys examining attitudes to
recycling reveal that peoples commitment to it is based on a strong sense of
doing something for the environment. This willingness to recycle, to vol-
untarily change rubbish practices and make the self environmentally
aware, reveals the play of power in subjectivity. There is no question that
the demand to recycle and minimize waste has come from state programmes
and structural transformations in domestic waste services that are coercive,
but the success of these changes, in terms of widespread participation across
populations, has depended on changes in micro-levels of everyday life, on
the ways weve willingly acted on ourselves. This alignment of subjectivity
with subjection is governance. But what is so significant about rubbish prac-
tices is that most of us are doing it for nature not for the NSW Waste Service
or the local council. We participate because we believe in some abstracted
sense of social and environmental good. We experience recycling and com-
posting as autonomous gestures, as expressions of our environmentally con-
cerned subjectivity.5
What, then, is the logic of waste education; how is it implicated in the
idea of conscience and new forms of subjectivity? Consider the recent leaflet
from the NSW Waste Service addressed to the householder: Are You a Good
Sort? (nd). The pun on good sort reveals how much our relations with
waste have become reordered around a variety of new classificatory pro-
cedures, the assemblage of actions these demand (bottles here, papers there),
and the virtue that is attached to these. We can see here how abstract notions
of care and management of the planet are linked to micro-practices in the
central concern was what happened when formerly esoteric ethical and
spiritual practices were taken up by large-scale institutions such as the
church and then bureaucratic states. This is the terrain of the govern-
mentsubjectivity relation where relations to oneself become implicated in
agencies of power-knowledge; when, according to Deleuze, the individual
is coded or recoded within a moral knowledge, and above all he becomes
the stake in a power struggle (Deleuze, 1995: 103). This is the point when
subjectivation becomes subjection, when power in the form of control and
dependence becomes implicated in daily life and interiority, when subjects
become tied to an identity by conscience and other techniques of moral self
knowledge (Deleuze, 1995).6
The Good Sort campaign shows how processes of self-regulation and con-
science shape our relations with waste, how circuits of guilt, self-reproach
and virtue have become enfolded within our intimate acts of disposing. The
problem is that this rubbish relation denies other ways of being with waste.
Waste habits are represented as flat, static, mechanical, easily altered with
appeals to reason and good sense. There is no room for disgust or horror
or pleasure or resentment, no room for movement between different regis-
ters of subjectivity, no room for any recognition of how changes in practices
of the self may affect ethical sensibilities. This type of moral instruction fore-
closes any possibility of understanding shifting forms of being in our
relations with waste. Relation means mastery and control we may be being
more careful and attentive with our waste but it is still absolutely and
unquestionably separate from the self, something to be got rid of. Recycling,
then, could be described as virtue added disposal. Although it infuses new
rubbish techniques with righteousness; although it qualifies the loss of
chucking away with a sense that this rubbish is entering a liminal zone
between waste and new commodity, its still disposal. Its disposal in which
the self is morally purified, disposal as an act of redemption.
What remains unacknowledged in the Good Sort campaign are the impli-
cations such practices may have for our ethical and affective sensibilities
around waste. Yet in the demand to handle and sort our waste responsibly
and to make aspects of it visible on the street, prior and entrenched senses
of order and self-cultivation may well be unsettled. A letter to the editor
protesting about recycling captures this tension beautifully:
There is no doubt that this writer hates recycling; stuff noble ideals, its
messy, offensive and primitive. Beyond irritation there is the sense in which
the disciplines of recycling contest the stability of the self. They make trouble
for existing forms of self-artistry and cultivation not simply through the
privileging of a third world aesthetic, but also through the affront to deeper
and more visceral registers of being. The letter goes on to describe the sense
of loathing and disgust experienced when rubbish sticks to the bottom of
the bin as a result of constant compaction by householders desperate to
make all their waste fit in the new half-size containers. Then there are the
effects of dogs and wind disturbing overfull bins. Being aware of the moral
pressure to recycle does nothing to lessen the horror of it all because, for
this writer, judgement is a product of much more than rational argument.
Unlike the Good Sort campaign, this letter gets to the heart of wastes rela-
tionality. Having to manage waste under this new regime disturbs identity.
If waste is our most immediate other and establishing our difference and
separation from it is the condition of possibility for a self, then its persis-
tence, its refusal to go, its visibility, is a primordial threat to the drive for
wholeness. The self exists only in relation but rubbish practices based on
expulsion, disposal and elimination maintain the fantasy of separation and
sovereignty. Recycling disrupts this. Not only do we have to handle our
waste much more but it sticks around longer and aspects of it become
public. The implications of this for this letter writer are more than guilt and
resentment about an imposed moral duty they are about the ethical effects
of recycling practices on sensibilities, they are about the unsettling impacts
of recycling on the micropolitics of the self, they are about encounters he
doesnt want to have.
The implied references to aesthetics, abjection and the visceral in this
response to recycling reveal the heterodox nature of ethics and their relative
autonomy. This letter describes an experience of ethical discontent that
emerges from a waste ethos constituted around aesthetic rather than
environmental values. For this author the disciplines that recycling demands
harbour no opportunities for artistic practice,7 in fact they disrupt the
relation between order and beauty, aesthetics and ethics that are funda-
mental to his arts of existence. He can feel the pull of moral reason, he has
a conscience about waste but he also has sensibilities, disciplined forms of
sensuousness, that are seriously offended by these practices. He isnt mourn-
ing the planet, hes mourning the pleasures of disposal free of governmental
and moral restraints.
involves work on the self in the interests of recognizing the plurivocity of being
and denaturalizing identity as stasis or essence:
The constitutive uncertainty at the center of becoming does not defeat the
central point. It, rather, reminds us how ethical uncertainty haunts the poli-
tics of becoming and how important it is to those who care for the plurivoc-
ity of being . . . to cultivate an ethos of critical responsiveness irreducible to
a fixed moral code or abstract conception of the person. (Connolly, 1999: 69)
What would an ethos of critical responsiveness look like in relation to
rubbish? Has it not already begun with the new waste regimes that we now
practise? Yes and no. The moral problematization of waste has established
new relations of obligation and duty with our rubbish, has initiated differ-
ent responses to it, but these still generally appeal to categorical moral
imperatives: global ecological survival, the care of the planet. The regulatory
disciplines involved often sit uneasily with other sensibilities and micro-
politics of the self, as the letter on hating recycling showed. In other words,
domestic waste education privileges a fairly restricted set of responses and
these are inextricably linked to the constraints of moral codes that too easily
slide into moralism. Guilt, resentment and anxiety are not politically pro-
ductive. Sure they may have mobilized most people to recycle, they may
underpin many peoples moral attachment to recycling, but they inhibit
other possibilities, other ways of being with waste, other responses. A poli-
tics of becoming does not proceed from guilt. It proceeds from a critical
responsiveness, critical in the sense that those intensities and affects in the
interstices of guilt and conscience awaken us to our own becoming.
So much waste education denies the tension between being and becom-
ing. It secures an obligation to new techniques and habits by insisting that
the threat of waste be mastered: reduced, reused, recycled. This fantasy of
control establishes the responsible self as stable, separate, whole. It main-
tains an absolute alterity of waste and blinds us to an awareness of how our
relations with it are fundamental to the very possibility of life. Mastery
inhibits the possibility of seeing in waste our own unremitting unbecoming.
But it is never complete or successful, as those responses of unease or pleas-
ure or grief reveal. And surely it is here with these openings and intensities
that different ethical relations with waste could be established, that obli-
gation could become gratitude.
I can think of only a few waste education campaigns that presume a
pleasure and generosity in waste celebrations of composting and a
campaign run by Brisbane City Council called Enjoy Your Garbage. In
composting campaigns organic waste is often represented as beautiful, its
formless disorder reconstituted as an aesthetic of abundance; scraps, dis-
cards, leftovers becoming soil. Then there are slogans like: What you dont
eat your garden will. The play here is on sameness, on the similarities
between self and garden, on exchanges that connect. Composting is framed
Here I am, then, on my way downstairs already, holding the bucket by its
semicircular handle, taking care it doesnt swing too much and spill its con-
tents. The lid I usually leave behind in the kitchen: its an irksome accessory,
that lid, it never quite manages to combine its two tasks of concealing the
rubbish and getting out of the way when you have to chuck more in. The
compromise one settles for involves keeping it at an angle, a bit like a mouth
opening, trapping it between the bucket and the wall in precarious equilib-
rium. . . . That transfer from one container to another, which for most inhabi-
tants of the metropolis takes on the significance of a passage from public to
private, for me, in our house, in the garage where we keep the big poubelle
during the day, is only the last gesture of the ceremonial upon which the
private is founded. (Calvino, 1993: 96)
But unlike most waste education, Calvino thinks about these practices
in terms of their phenomenological and sacred resonances. The pleasure he
gets from putting out the garbage is not the pleasure of being virtuous, of
being a good sort, it is the pleasure of ritual and order that connect him
to the sacred. The gesture of throwing away is the first and indispensable
condition of being (1993: 104), for one is what one does not throw away.
In the purifying ritual of putting out the rubbish we not only confirm what
we are, the boundaries of the self, we also create the conditions for renewal.
For Calvino every act of rubbish disposal is a little funeral that postpones
our own inevitable demise, it is an offering made to the underworld, to the
gods of death and loss (1993: 104).
What is so startling about Calvinos essay is its absence of guilt and resent-
ment. He does not experience putting out the rubbish as coercion or moral
duty, although he is aware of the municipal rules that structure his practices.
For him, rubbish has other values and meanings; its disciplines, its rituals,
awaken him to the pleasures of self-cultivation. Waste here is not something
to be reduced, recycled, reused; he does not frame his relation to it through
the discourses of environmental awareness (not that I think Calvino is
opposed to these). Rather, it is a fundamental component of the arts of exist-
ence, of the sensibilities that give meaning and order to the self. It is an
activity through which we are able to query ways of being. Calvinos ethos
of waste blurs the distinctions between thinking and feeling; putting out the
garbage is both an intellectual and a spiritual experience. Its effects rever-
berate through several registers of being. Through waste practices we sense
the limits of the self and connect with wider forces. In enjoying waste, in
deriving pleasure from the careful management of loss and disposal, we
become aware of the presence of the sacred in the most mundane of actions.
In his reveries on rubbish, Calvino is open to the ways in which waste
management alludes to other ways of being: the inevitability of death, the
profound resonances of ritual, the sensuality and pleasure in ordering.
Unlike the letter writer incensed about recycling, Calvino has no anxiety
about the boundaries between himself and his garbage. Instead of stinginess
and irritation he expresses openness and generosity. Instead of a binary, a
fixed opposition, he sees an active relation, a movement in which the iden-
tities of waste and the self are implicated in each other. This is an evocative
account of relationality, of the liminal space where separation meets
connection. Calvino does not deny the necessity of disposal putting out
the garbage is a gesture of separation that prevents merger and contami-
nation, but it is also, paradoxically, connection. For separation is a relation,
it is not the opposite of connection to experience ourselves as separate
from rubbish is to be in a relation with it, to be connected. This is the messi-
ness, the ambiguity that marks our relations with rubbish and exposes the
fantasy of a pure and stable morality. And this is the messiness and ambi-
guity that makes ethical work experimental, creative, relational.
These may seem weak, even pathetic, alternatives to the power and
urgency of campaigns based on guilt and mastery. But much like the plastic
bag scene in American Beauty they recognize a wider range of responses to
rubbish than moralism ever does. They implicitly speak to our plurivocity
of being, they acknowledge our dependence on waste, the ways in which we
need it to maintain a bounded self, but they dont convert this dependence
into resentment or fear. Connolly suggests that the most complex ethical
issues arise in contexts where intense suffering is implicated in securing the
self-confidence, wholeness, transcendence and cultural merit of others. That
is, the most intense, intractable cases of suffering are political in character.
They often revolve around . . . the politics of becoming (1999: 51). There
is no doubt that the environment, nature, is suffering because of the burden
of our excessive waste; that our sense of mastery over nature emerges, in
part, from our capacity to dump waste on it. As Serres (1995) says, one of
the ways in which we master and possess nature is by fouling it. But in
seeking to change this, politics driven by the logics of moral imperatives and
disciplinary individualism can go only so far. A politics of becoming pro-
ceeds from those responses to waste that unsettle mastery, those intensities
that signal not our difference from waste but our profound implications
with it. To be moved by waste, to be disturbed by it, is to be open to our
own becoming. It is to be able to cultivate a care and sensibility for it that
is also at the same time a cultivation of the arts of transience.
Notes
Many thanks to David Halperin for his tough and incisive reading of the first
draft of this paper, to Maureen Burns for introducing me to the Enjoy Your
Garbage campaign and for her generous feedback, and to Kathy Gibson and
John Frow for valuable comments.
1 The capacity to throw things out is often hard to acquire. Children can some-
times take a lot of convincing that something is ready for the bin in their
systems of value it may be part of a collection, part of a game that may be
played again in the future. Whatever the justification, the category of rubbish
has quite different meanings for them.
2 This is Strassers (1999: 271) point. Unfortunately she does not elaborate it,
nor does she really examine the significance of this blindness about waste for
the self.
3 See T. Tierney (1993). Tierney argues that techno-fetishism is ultimately predi-
cated on a fear and evasion of death and a desire to overcome the inconve-
nient body.
4 See D. Shuttlesworth (1973).
5 Of course, there are plenty of people who experience new rubbish regulations
as coercive and repressive, evidence of governmental desire to control aspects
of private life. I consider an example of this later in this section.
6 Making sense of conscience has been a significant focus of post-Foucauldian
accounts of the subject. Judith Butlers (1997) dialogue with Foucault in The
Psychic Life of Power is driven by the desire to think his theory of power
together with a theory of the psyche. If interpellation is the moment when the
subject is affected by subordination and normalization the moment when
we turn guiltily to the voice of the law Butler argues that what is needed is
an understanding of the psychic operations of regulatory norms, a theory of
conscience. Butlers account of interiority focuses on how norms and disci-
plines assume a psychic character, on the moments whereby a subject turns
on itself and works in tandem with processes of social regulation. This process
reveals the complex ways in which power is reiterated within the subject, the
ways in which we become guilty.
7 See Bennett (1996) for an excellent discussion of the relationship between
ethics and aesthetics in Foucault.
8 See, for example, Dean (1996).
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